HL Deb 09 March 1987 vol 485 cc824-34

3.4 p.m.

Report received.

Clause 1 [Purpose and construction of Part I]:

The Lord Advocate (Lord Cameron of Lochbroom) moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 1, line 12, at end insert— (" "dependant" and "relative" have the same meaning as they have in, respectively, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976;").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I should like to take this amendment together with Amendments Nos. 19 and 23. Perhaps I should first explain the mechanics of these amendments before dealing with their purpose.

At present the terms of Clause 7(2) of the Bill define the meaning of the words "dependant" and "relative" for the benefit of that clause only. We now, for reasons which I shall shortly explain, wish to apply those definitions to the whole of Part I. Accordingly, Amendment No. 23 deletes that subsection while this amendment inserts a similar subsection in Clause 1 of the Bill where we have defined some of the more important terms relevant to Part I.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Morton, moved an amendment to insert the words "or his representative" after the word "damage" in subsection (3)(a) of Clause 2. At that time I explained that the meaning of the words "the person" at the beginning of that subsection would in effect encompass that person's representative—for example, his solicitor. However, we conceded that in a case where a defective product causes death or where a person subsequently dies there might be a difficulty in Clause 2(3). It could be argued, for instance, that no cause of action will arise until there has been a failure by the supplier to comply with the request from: the person who suffered the damage".

In other words, it might be construed that the victim's rights die with him.

Unfortunately, as the noble Lord opposite perhaps presaged in his response to my agreement to consider his amendment, we have required rather more than his three words to achieve the desired objective. As noble Lords will see, we have taken rather more than the six lines that he suggested we might need. The difficulty is that the rights accorded to personal representatives and dependants under the existing law are in a sense derivative. The action of personal representatives depends on the deceased, had he been alive, being entitled to bring an action. Accordingly, it would not be sufficient simply to enable a personal representative or a dependant to make a request after the death because, apart from the making of the request, the conditions in Clause 2(3)(b) and (c) have to be fulfilled to trigger a cause of action.

We have achieved the purpose which we seek by inserting a new subsection in Clause 6 to follow subsection (1). Paragraph (a) describes the situation we are dealing with; namely, where the death of a person is caused by a defect in a product or if a person dies after suffering damage caused by a defect in a product. Paragraph (b) enables a request to be made to the supplier of that defective product under Clause 2(3) by that person's personal representatives or, in the case of a person whose death is caused by the defect, by any dependant or relative of that person.

The remainder of the subsection provides that so long as the conditions specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (3) of Clause 2 are also satisfied—that is to say, that the request is made within a reasonable time and the supplier fails to comply with the request—it will be as if the liability of the supplier to that injured person did not depend on the deceased person having made the request himself. In other words, he will be deemed to that extent to have had a cause of action on which his representatives or dependants can found a claim. Of course, the general conditions for liability under Part I would still apply.

This small group of three amendments, though somewhat longer than it was perhaps expected, clarify an important point and I am very grateful to the noble Lord for bringing the matter to the attention of the House. I beg to move.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government and the noble and learned Lord for having considered the amendment and made the necessary alterations. It meets the position of the person who dies either as a result of a defective product or after he has been injured by a defective product. However, I am afraid that it does not in any way meet—I am still not sure that this point is covered—the situation of a person who is so severely injured by the defective product that he is not capable of giving instructions to anybody to deal with it. I am thinking of someone who suffers brain damage or something of that nature. How will such people be covered? They have a duty under Clause 2(3) to ask the supplier who the producer was.

I fail to see how the person's curator in Scotland, or his English equivalent, has a right to do those things that the person has the right to do, as the Bill is drafted. The same position would arise with a child who had not the capacity to act or with a person who, prior to the defective product causing the injury, was mentally incapable of dealing with matters. It still appears to me that the defect exists in this part of the Bill.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

My Lords, I should like to respond to that point. I take note of what the noble Lord has said and I think that it is a point which I answered on the last occasion. We still remain of the view that the use of the words "the person" is quite apt to cover the persons who would act for or with him in putting forward a request. For example, in the case of a disabled person unable to deal with the matter by himself, his curator—as the noble Lord is well aware—would, we consider, be entitled to put forward the request as being equivalent to the person.

We shall look at the matter again. It has not gone in the by-game; but, if necessary, we can look at it in another place to make it clear beyond peradventure.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 2:

Page 2, line I, leave out from ("or') to ("the") in line 5 and insert ("game and agricultural produce which has undergone any process").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an attempt not to exclude agricultural produce from the Bill but to put into the Bill what is in the directive and to make it accord with the directive. It has been said on numerous occasions that the purpose of Part I of the Bill is to give effect to the directive. The preamble to the directive, which in my view is not part of the directive, refers to agricultural products and game undergoing a processing of an industrial nature.

Article 2 says: For the purposes of this Directive 'product' means all movables, with the exception of primary agricultural products and game, even though incorporated into another movable or into an immovable. 'Primary agricultural products' means the product of soil, of stock farming and of fisheries, excluding products which have undergone initial processing".

If we look at the Bill we have something which is completely different. Subsection (2)(c) reads: in the case of a product which has not been manufactured, won or abstracted but essential characteristics of which are attributable to an industrial or other process having been carried out (for example, in relation to agricultural produce), the person who carried out that process".

First, there is nothing in the directive which allows for the exclusion of anything other than agricultural produce or game. Therefore, why we have "for example" in relation to agricultural produce, which implies that there is something else that would be covered, is completely obscure to me. I suggest that it is completely contrary to the directive.

Secondly, there is the phrase: essential characteristics of which are attributable to an industrial or other process".

"Essential characteristics" are words which do not appear anywhere in the directive or the preamble, and there is no suggestion that that is an essential matter.

The noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate referred at the Committee stage to the memorandum and to the draft directive. The memorandum to which he referred is no help on this point because it suggests that all agricultural produce should be included. Reading from the memorandum: Whereas liability should extend only to movables, in the interests of the consumer it nevertheless should include all types of movables, including therefore agricultural produce and craft products".

Therefore we gain no help from the memorandum as to what may be meant by that exclusion.

What is intended to be meant by the phrase "essential characteristics"? For example, if one takes a frozen pea, what are we talking about? Is it the frozen nature of the pea that is the essential characteristic or is it the pea itself, whether thawed out or not? If one has potatoes which have been peeled by being washed in a chemical so that peeled potatoes are delivered to restaurants and chip shops, is there a change? Is it still a potato or is the peeling an essential characteristic?

What does "essential" mean? Is it essential to the existence of the defect or essential to the change in the nature of the product, because there is obviously a difference in how it will be applied? If I buy potatoes in a supermarket which have been weighed and put into a plastic bag, are they a product which has: essential characteristics of which are attributable to an industrial or other process"?

They have certainly been through a process: they have been weighed and packed.

Surely it would be better—and the purpose of the amendment is to achieve this—to return to the words of the directive which are clear, which are in simple English, which can be easily understood and which fit in with all the legislation which has been introduced in the other countries of the Community, each of which has used the word "first" process.

I also speak to Amendment No. 5, which is the bottom line of page 2, leaving out "an industrial" and inserting "a". I beg to move.

3.15 p.m.

Lord Allen of Abbeydale

My Lords, I should like to say a few words in support of this amendment, to which I have put my name, and I should also like to speak to Amendment No. 5. It will be recalled that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate told us at an earlier stage that the Government had decided to proceed by way of synthesising the force of what is in the directive rather than putting the directive itself in the Bill. It seems to me that here the synthesis has strayed a little too far from what is actually in the directive. It is rather as though the film of the book has moved too far from the original plot.

When I first saw the Bill I could not understand what Clause 1(2)(c) was about. I listened with interest to the Minister's explanation at the Committee stage that it was aimed at processes which fell short of the manufacturing in the normal sense of the word, like the refining of petroleum and the processing of food. That appears in the Official Report at col. 742 on 19th January 1987.

I also listened with interest to the explanation of the Minister of what was meant by the industrial processing of agricultural products, which arises on Amendment No. 5. The Minister said that there were two tests. The first was that the essential characteristics of the products must have been changed—the thought expressed in Clause 1(2)(c) on which the noble Lord has just made some comments. The other test was that the process must have been carried on a large and continuing scale and with the intervention of machinery. That appears in the Official Report at col. 737 on 19th January 1987.

The trouble is that, although those explanations are very interesting, there is nothing in the directive to support any of them. As has been pointed out, there is nothing about changing the essential characteristics of the product and nothing to define industrial processing. I, for one, find it rather hard to accept that, if I were poisoned by some processed food, it would be possible for the producer to get away with it on the argument that he was only a small producer, and that he had carried through that particular process only a couple of times, and that, therefore, on the Minister's criteria, what he had done did not amount to an industrial process.

I go along with the argument that we are getting too far from the directive. I do not believe that Clause 1(2)(c) in its present form reflects anything at all in the directive. The reference to "industrial process" in Clause 2(4), to my mind, cannot be reconciled with Article 2 of the directive. There is indeed no need to have a qualifying adjective at all, whether "initial" or "industrial", since what we are concerned with is simply whether the agricultural product has undergone a process however the courts, in the end, define that word. And, evidently, it is something that we shall have to leave to the courts.

The amendments we are discussing seem to represent a better method than the Bill as at present drafted in giving effect to what the Committee, in its wisdom, decided; namely, that there should be retained the exemption for primary agricultural products.

Lord Denning

My Lords, I am afraid that while I sympathise with the amendment I would be against it. This and many other points of amendment, bring into question the relationship between the directive which has been issued by the European Communities and the Bill itself. Perhaps I may remind your Lordships that the directive is addressed to each of the member states and tells them to implement its provisions where necessary. Indeed the European Court has said that when applying national legislation, courts must interpret the legislation in the light of the text and objectives of the directive.

Therefore, when interpreting the Bill before us, we have to interpret it in the light of what the directive says and achieve harmony so far as possible. The directive is itself ambiguous. The recitals exempt "agricultural products and game" except where they have undergone processing of an "industrial nature". But the article itself simply excludes them when they have undergone "initial processing".

Those phrases are ambiguous in themselves. What is "initial processing"? What is a process of an "industrial nature"? I would ask your Lordships to consider the packaging and grading of apples, the getting up of potatoes with machines, and the like. When electrical machines are used for milking, is that an industrial process? It is difficult to say. It is really a question for the courts to decide hereafter. In the clause as it stands, the Government, it seems to me, have done the best they can to explain the position in fulfilment of the objective. Subsection (2)(c) states: essential characteristics of which are attributable to an industrial or other process having been carried out". Then there is the wording of Clause 2(4): when it had not undergone an industrial process". That is going to be difficult to construe. The courts would have to do it. Nevertheless, the wording seems simpler than what is proposed in the amendment, which simply refers to a "process". A "process" is a much wider exclusion. The grading of apples, the getting up of potatoes by machine, or whatever you like to call it, all may be a process. I doubt whether it would be called an "industrial process". The milking of cows by electrical means, or whatever it may be, is a process. I doubt whether it would be called an industrial or other process.

The difficulty is that the words are obscure. They will have to be interpreted by the courts. So far as I can see, the Government have done their best in the clause as it stands to implement the directive. I am afraid that the amendment goes too wide. I would therefore support the Government and not the amendment.

Lord Mottistone

My Lords, may I be allowed to comment from this side on what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, has just said? It seemed to me that all he was doing was making more the point that we sought to make in Committee and on which we were defeated—that trying to draw a distinction between primary agricultural products and processed products is too difficult.

I should have thought that notwithstanding what the noble and learned Lord said—and he is learned, as we all know—when one is in this sort of doubt, it is surely much better to go back to the principles on which the particular clause is based, to wit the directive, and to follow it as closely as may be. That surely is what the amendment seeks to do.

I gave my reasons for saying this at col. 728 on 19th January and I do not want to waste your Lordships' time by repeating all that I said at that time. I should have thought that if there is a doubt—and the noble and learned Lord made it clear that there will be doubts in the courts, whatever conclusion we come to now—surely it is better to follow as closely as possible the directive rather than seek to make one's own interpretation which may in the long run cause even more trouble. Therefore, I strongly support the amendment.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment. What we are being invited to do by the Minister and by the noble and learned Lord is to say that if there is going to be trouble, let us leave it to the courts; they will be able to interpret and decide. Without any disrespect to the courts, I should imagine that we have an obligation to be as precise as we possibly can.

Of course, the more words, the more room there is for interpretation and misinterpretation. That is why this amendment is a step in the right direction. But even if we go back to the directive for our fount of wisdom and seek to understand what the directive means by "process", there is no definition of "process" or "processing" in the directive. In other words, the EC directive is deficient so far as guidance is concerned.

It may well be the view of the House that where one comes up against a difficulty of impreciseness one leaves it to the courts. We have had reference to the difficulties of interpretation or application in respect of frozen peas, apples, and potatoes. I have been given an illustration by the Retail Consortium. The Retail Consortium obviously is a major element representing the ultimate in the selling process; the shops and the large stores, that will be involved. They do not give me apples, pears, or potatoes. They give me carrots.

What they ask is: will washing and packing—of carrots, for example—be regarded in the courts as an industrial process? We have illustration after illustration. If that is left out of the term an "industrial process", then, in their view, you leave out a great deal of vegetables and fruit. What the Minister has to tell the House, if he decides not to accept the amendment, is that he is satisfied, as few people outside this Chamber, I venture to suggest, are satisfied—the Retail Consortium is not—that the words that will ultimately appear in the Bill are so well understood and so well applied that there will be acceptance by all sorts of individuals and organisations outside the House.

I believe that the Minister has a good deal of explaining to do if I am not to support my noble friend in his amendment.

3.30 p.m.

Lord Stanley of Alderley

My Lords, I think that I shall be in the position at some stage of trying to interpret whether I have carried out a process or not. I have to say to the noble Lord that I do not like this amendment, mainly for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, gave. If the words in the amendment "undergone any process" are included, they could well cause doubt in my mind when I am lifting sugar beet or sorting potatoes. At the moment, for better or worse, I consider that the directive allows me to be exempt for what I do inside the farm gate. Once outside, then I believe it becomes a farm process.

The noble Lord falls, I believe, into the trap that I tried to fall into last week when I got involved with hydroponics. I commend a letter that I received from my noble friend on the Front Bench explaining why it was impossible to bring hydroponics into this area as I tried to do on behalf of my noble friend Lord Radnor, who unfortunately cannot be here. We are going against the directive. I take exactly the opposite view to the noble Lord because I think that his amendment makes the directive more difficult than it is as it stands. I accept that the matter is complicated, but I should have preferred not to have the legislation at all.

Lord Mottistone

My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, does he not agree that the old-fashioned idea of the farm gate and things happening one side or the other is a bit out of date these days; and it is not like that? There are not farm gates which separate one sort of factory from another—

Noble Lords


Lord Stanley of Alderley

I think I had sat down.

Lord Beaverbrook

Your Lordships might like me to remind Members that we are at Report stage.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Trade and Industry (Lord Lucas of Chilworth)

My Lords, I do not think it will be any surprise to your Lordships' House if I say that I intend to advise the House to reject Amendments Nos. 2 and 5. The House will recall that we had a very long and full debate during the Committee stage on the principle of whether we should implement the directive as we found it and exclude agricultural products which had not been subjected to industrial processing. Following that very long and informed debate, your Lordships' Committee decided that we would not derogate from the directive. Once that decision was made, we had taken the one serious decision upon that matter that we were entitled to take within the confines of the directive.

A second question which then arose was how properly to implement the exemption as it stands in the directive. Noble Lords opposite argued that an exemption that related to goods that had not undergone initial processing was closer to the intention of the directive than the words we have used; that is, goods that have not undergone industrial processing. We then had another long and interesting debate on that subject in Committee, and the Committee decided that the proper interpretation of the directive in the Bill was that the exemption should be available for goods that had not undergone industrial processing.

The two essential decisions that we had to take—whether or not we should make use of the derogation and how we should implement the directive—have already been discussed and debated in your Lordships' House in Committee and the decisions taken. We are now faced (are we not?) with a further discussion on how to implement the directive. It is suggested again that what the directive really means is that agricultural produce that has been subjected to processing, again without any kind of explanation at all, should fall within the Bill.

I tried to make clear during the Committee stage that in my view there is no doubt at all that the processing referred to in the directive is processing of an industrial nature. So much I believe is clear from the preamble. Of course, I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Morton, had to say; that the preamble is not part of the directive. I suggest however that the preamble helps us in our interpretation of the directive.

The noble Lord, Lord Morton, suggested that Amendment No. 2 was intended to remove the element of uncertainty which would otherwise appear on the face of the Bill. I am suggesting that this is unhelpful. I object to the amendment on that ground. But equally—whether or not the noble Lord, Lord Morton, intended this I do not know, although I think perhaps he might have done—the effect would be to restrict the scope of the exemption for primary agricultural products. I should then object to that because, as noble Lords will note, the word "process" would be given such a wide interpretation as to cover vitually any kind of operation carried out either on the farm or elsewhere.

The noble Lord, Lord Graham, asked us to be precise. I believe we are being more precise than the amendments. He asked us again about the carrots, the washing, the packing and so on. With respect to the noble Lord, we went through all that during Committee stage. Again, I say with respect to my noble friend Lord Stanley of Alderley, we also went through all of what happens within the farm gate at Committee stage.

That which I have described as the outcome of these two amendments is not the proper interpretation to be placed on the words of the directive. I tried to explain—certainly, I took long enough during the Committee stage—that it would further narrow the exemption to the point where it was virtually worthless. One thing that is clear is that derogation in the directive is meant to offer some real choice about a reasonably sized category of agricultural produce.

Finally, while the main burden of these amendments is directed towards Clause 2, I should point out to the House the consequences of the amendment that has been suggested to Clause 1. Clause 1 contains the definition of "a producer". This is a very important definition since it is only producers, importers or, in certain circumstances, suppliers who are to be liable. Producers are defined in Clause 1 in terms of what they have done to the product concerned. The most important case is when they have manufactured it. That is contained in Clause 1(2)(a). Some products are mined or abstracted rather than manufactured. That is covered in paragraph (b). Finally, there are some products where the natural English expression is neither "manufactured" nor "abstracted" but "processed".

Here, I come to the contribution made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, who reminded us that it is for national governments to interpret the directive so that it conforms to or runs alongside—I prefer to put it that way—our own understanding of law in this direction. That is exactly what the Bill does. As paragraph (c), which covers this subject, indicates, one of the major categories of such products is agricultural produce. But it is not the only one. For example, the activities of those who refine petroleum are more naturally regarded as processing than manufacturing. As a consequence the amendment proposed to Clause 1 will throw the position of such processors in doubt.

It is for those reasons that I cannot advise the House to accept the amendments. The main question of principle on agricultural products has already been decided by your Lordships' Committee. We have also decided how to implement it, and the main amendment here that is proposed undermines those decisions. The more minor amendment also has an unfortunate effect on the definition of "producer". I suggest that noble Lords who are proposing these two amendments be invited to withdraw them.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I regret that I cannot accept that. I am grateful to the noble Lord for agreeing with me that the directive is in the words that follow "has adopted this directive" and do not include the preamble. The definition in Article 2 says quite firmly: 'Primary agricultural products' mean the products of the soil, of stock farming and of fisheries, excluding products which have undergone initial processing". That is quite clear. There is nothing whatever to justify the phrase "essential characteristics" in Clause 1(2)(c). There seems to be very little justification for that except perhaps petroleum, but I would have thought that petroleum is manufactured just as flour is manufactured in the grinding of wheat.

It is always with great diffidence that one disagrees with so noble and learned a Lord as Lord Denning, but I should have thought that milk, which has to be sold pasteurised if my information is correct, has certainly undergone a process. If one looks at the third line on page 2 one sees there the words, an industrial or other process", and "other" presumably means other than industrial. One could just as well have "a process" and the sense would be exactly the same. It seems to me that the amendment in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Abbeydale, meets the directive, whereas Clause 1(2)(c) does not. Therefore I must seek the opinion of the House.

Lord Campbell of Alloway

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him whether he accepts that in Community law the preamble is used as an aid to construction, unlike our system?

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, with the leave of the House, no doubt that is so. An aid to construction is necessary when there is dubiety as to what is meant. The phrase, excluding products which have undergone initial processing", means that all one is left with is the question: what is a process?

3.43 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 2) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 90; Not-Contents, 94.

Airedale, L. Kilmarnock, L.
Allen of Abbeydale, L. Kinloss, Ly.
Amherst, E. Kirkhill, L.
Annan, L. Leatherland, L.
Ardwick, L. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe,
Banks, L. Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.
Barnett, L. McNair, L.
Blyton, L. Mishcon, L.
Bonham-Carter, L. Molloy, L.
Boston of Faversham, L. Moran, L.
Broadbridge, L. Morton of Shuna, L.
Brockway, L. Mottistone, L.
Bruce of Donington, L. Mulley, L.
Burton of Coventry, B. Nicol, B.
Campbell of Eskan, L. Northfield, L.
Caradon, L. Ogmore, L.
Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L. Oram, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Darcy (de Knayth), B. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
David, B. [Teller.] [Teller.]
Davies of Penrhys, L. Prys-Davies, L.
Dean of Beswick, L. Rea, L.
Diamond, L. Reilly, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Ritchie of Dundee, L.
Elwyn-Jones, L. Robson of Kiddington, B.
Ezra. L. Rochester, L.
Falkland, V. Ross of Marnock, L.
Fisher of Rednal, B. Sainsbury, L.
Fitt, L. Serota, B.
Flowers, L. Silkin of Dulwich, L.
Foot, L. Simon, V.
Gallacher, L. Somers, L.
Gladwyn, L. Stallard, L.
Graham of Edmonton, L. Stedman, B.
Grey, E. Stewart of Fulham, L.
Hanworth, V. Strabolgi, L.
Heycock, L. Strauss, L.
Hill-Norton, L. Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Hooson, L. Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Hunt, L. Tordoff, L.
Hutchinson of Lullington, L. Underhill, L.
Hylton-Foster, B. Wedderburn of Charlton, L.
Jenkins of Putney, L. White, B.
John-Mackie, L. Williams of Elvel, L.
Rennet, L. Winchilsea and Nottingham,
Kilbracken, L. E.
Alexander of Tunis, E. Bellwin, L.
Auckland, L. Beloff, L.
Bauer, L. Belstead, L.
Beaverbrook, L. Bessborough, E.
Belhaven and Stenton, L. Biddulph, L.
Blake, L. Kinnaird, L.
Blyth, L. Lane-Fox, B.
Borthwick, L. Lauderdale, E.
Boyd-Carpenter, L. Layton, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L. Lovat, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L. Lucas of Chilworth, L.
Caithness, E. Malmesbury, E.
Cameron of Lochbroom, L. Manton, L.
Campbell of Alloway, L. Marley, L.
Campbell of Croy, L. Merrivale, L.
Carnock, L. Mersey, V.
Cottesloe, L. Molson, L.
Cross, V. Montagu of Beaulieu, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L. Morris, L.
Davidson, V. [Teller.] Mowbray and Stourton, L.
De Freyne, L. Munster, E.
De La Warr, E. Newcastle, Bp.
Deedes, L. Nugent of Guildford, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.] Penrhyn, L.
Denning, L. Plummer of St Marylebone,
Dormer, L. L.
Drumalbyn, L. Porritt, L.
Dudley, B. Portland, D.
Dundee, E. Roskill, L.
Effingham, E. St. Aldwyn, E.
Ellenborough, L. Saint Oswald, L.
Elliot of Harwood, B. Sandford, L.
Faithfull, B. Shannon, E.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L. Sharpies, B.
Gainford, L. Shaughnessy, L.
Gibson-Watt, L. Skelmersdale, L.
Gormanston, V. Slim, V.
Greenway, L. Stanley of Alderley, L.
Gridley, L. Strange, B.
Grimthorpe, L. Strathcarron, L.
Hailsham of Saint Strathspey, L.
Marylebone, L. Sudeley, L.
Hesketh, L. Swansea, L.
Hives, L. Terrington, L.
Home of the Hirsel, L. Teviot, L.
Hood, V. Torrington, V.
Kaberry of Adel, L. Trumpington, B.
Kimball, L. Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.