Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill [H.L.]

HL Deb 17 February 1987 vol 484 cc997-1028

3.11 p.m.

The Minister of State, Scottish Office (Lord Glenarthur)

My Lords, I beg to move that the Report be now received. In doing so, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I explain that although the amendments relating to serious fraud (that is to say, Amendments Nos 42 to 45 and 59 on the Marshalled List) were tabled last Thursday, at the request of the noble Lord, Lord Morton, those amendments will be taken formally today and considered more fully on re-commitment on Thursday 26th February before Third Reading.

Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Lord Glenarthur.)

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I rise only to thank the noble Lord the Minister for agreeing that these amendments should be re-committed.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Report received.

Clause 1 [Confiscation orders]:

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 1: Page 1, line 14, leave out ("person's drug trafficking") and insert ("offence of which he has been convicted").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment deals with an issue which I raised at Committee and it may be for the convenience of the House if I deal at the same time with Amendment No. 2. It remains my strong opinion that there is a serious risk that the provisions relating to drug trafficking offences will, if not amended, be found to be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore the Bill, if enacted in this form, will prove to be somewhat of a damp squib.

I wish to make clear that there is, from this side of the House, no dispute whatever that people who engage in drug trafficking should be severely punished. I would have no objection, and I am sure most of your Lordships would have none, to a Bill which had the effect of depriving drug traffickers of their assets. If the Bill becomes an Act and someone goes to the European Court of Human Rights which holds that the Act offends against the convention, what would be the position? The confiscation that the court might have ordered would be quashed, as I understand the situation.

In my view there is no need for the Bill to run any such risk with the Covention on Human Rights. But the Bill as it is drafted does. I shall therefore try to say why I consider that it would be held to be in breach of the convention and then go on to suggest how it might be adapted to prevent that.

The Bill provides that in the event of a conviction for a drug trafficking offence, it is to be assumed that any property which has been received over the past six years is the proceeds of drug trafficking—not the proceeds of the drug traffic offence for which the man has been convicted but of other drug trafficking offences for which he has not been charged, let alone convicted.

In the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, much the same provisions were made. In the Scottish Current Law statutes edition of the Act, one has the comments of a Doctor Thomas: It appears to be implicit in the section that the prosecution may allege … that the defendant has committed or been concerned in offences which are not included in the indictment or formally taken into consideration … In normal circumstances, a court would not be entitled to impose a sentence on the assumption that the defendant is guilty of offences which have not been charged or taken into consideration". That is precisely what this Bill and the Drug Trafficking Offences Act do. The court is to assume that the assets acquired over the last six years are the proceeds of drug trafficking for which the man, the accused, has not been charged. This offends against the Convention of Human Rights which preserves as an integral part of one's rights the presumption of innocence.

Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. This has been a matter of English law for many centuries and of Scottish law. If I could quote Viscount Sankey in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1935], he refers to the presumption of innocence as the "golden thread always to be seen" and says that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt. This runs throughout the whole legal system which we enjoy. I have quoted at some length on the subject and I would only quote a word or two from Chief Justice Dickson in the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Oakes in 1986 where he says that the presumption of innocence is a hallowed principle lying at the very heart of criminal law.

The noble Lord the Minister, if I may say so with respect, did not in fact reply to my argument in Committee. He merely said, if I may paraphrase, that this had been gone through in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. Of course, the accused has to be convicted of a drug trafficking offence. But, in a normal situation, that means he has been caught with drugs in his possession and therefore makes little profit out of the offence. The normal, or very frequent, situation is that a person is caught with a sufficient quantity of a hard drug for the court to infer that his possession of it is possession to supply; in other words, a drug trafficking offence. That, of course is taken away from him and he has no profit from it.

However, this Bill allows the court to say, "Well, everything you have got for the previous six years is assumed to come from drug trafficking." It is not at all clear what happens, because there is an onus of proof on the accused to prove otherwise. What happens if the man says, "The £50,000 in my bank account did not come from drug trafficking; it came from a bank robbery"? Is he then going to be charged with bank robbery? Or will it be a privileged statement for which he cannot be charged?

I would suggest it is better to avoid the risk of any challenge in the Court of Human Rights and better to avoid the risk of any alteration to the principle of the presumption of innocence, because it is quite unnecessary. All that is necessary, I would suggest, is for the Bill to provide for an unlimited fine for drug trafficking offences in addition to whatever prison sentence is appropriate, and for a scheme such as we have in the Bill to discover, restrain and on conviction take away all or any part of the assets of the person convicted of drug trafficking. One does not need the presumption that the assets are due to drug trafficking. It does not really matter. If somebody is engaged in drug trafficking, does it really matter whether his assets in their thousands come from previous drug trafficking or from anything else? He should be punished substantially. If one approached the Bill, if the Bill were altered in that way, there would be no reason to have difficulty about the presumption of innocence.

It seems to me that the Bill as drafted will be difficult to work. It seems almost to have been drafted as an attempt to please the press rather than to be effective in dealing with drug trafficking. Possibly the much more sensible way would be, as I suggest, to give unlimited power to the court to put on an unlimited fine with the power to recover. It is on that basis that I beg to move the amendment.

Lord Glenarthur

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Morton, for again explaining the concern that lies behind the amendments. The effect of Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 would be to enable the High Court, in deciding the amount of a confiscation order, to take account only of the proceeds of the offence of which the accused had just been convicted. It would not be able to take his wider activities into account. Any such offender sentenced to a period of imprisonment for the offence would therefore have the proceeds of his drug trafficking, other than the proceeds of the particular offence, to look forward to on his release from prison.

At Committee stage I had assumed that this was an unintended effect of the noble Lord's amendment, to have the confiscation provisions widened to include profitable crime generally. But I think I now understand that this weakening of the Bill in a way was part of the noble Lord's aim, but rather differently from the way he addressed it when we last discussed this matter.

The noble Lord is concerned both at the provision to allow all assets acquired in the previous six years to be taken into account in deciding the amount of the confiscation order and at the provision which places the burden on the accused to prove that such assets were not the proceeds of drug trafficking. As I said in Committee, such a provision really is essential if the courts are to have the chance of depriving a convicted offender of the full proceeds of his crimes. In many cases it will simply not be possible for the prosecution to prove exactly how much of a wealthy trafficker's lifestyle was financed by his criminal activity. To insist on proof of what specific assets were acquired with the proceeds of drug trafficking would inevitably allow a good many traffickers to retain a large part of their illegal gains and that would frustrate the entire objective of the Bill.

On the other hand, the offender knows what his legitimate income has been and is therefore in the best position to show which of his assets were legitimately acquired. Therefore in my view it is quite proper that the onus should be placed on him to establish these facts to the satisfaction of the court.

The noble Lord, in seeking to justify his attempt to depart from the approach in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986—which as the noble Lord himself is aware was welcomed on all sides of your Lordships' House—referred to the procedure in England and Wales of having offences taken into consideration. That is a bit of a red herring. In deciding the amount of a confiscation order the Crown Court in England and Wales will be able to take into account activity much wider than that involved in any offences which might be taken into consideration, including drug trafficking abroad, which could not possibly be taken into consideration.

I note the point that the noble Lord makes about the European Court of Human Rights. The question of a possible contravention of the European Court of Human Rights was fully considered (as I imagine the noble Lord would have expected it to be) at the time of the passage of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act. The view was then taken that while this risk could not be ruled out, it was not substantial. It was agreed on all sides, as I have said, that the peculiar aspects of this horrible trade were such as to justify our proceeding on this basis.

I really cannot agree with the noble Lord that it will be difficult to work with the Bill framed as it is; nor, I assure the noble Lord, is this Bill one which is written, as he suggested, to please the press. That, as I think the noble Lord accepts, is very far from the truth. We are dealing, as I have said on more than one occasion from this Dispatch Box, with one of the most horrible crimes with which we have had to deal in recent times. That is why the Bill, and the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, were produced in the way they have been to deal with what is a thoroughly reprehensible activity.

I come back to an argument that I used at Committee and will attempt again to press upon the noble Lord. If these two amendments were accepted the Bill would be very much weaker than the 1986 Act. There is no way we can get away from that. We do not wish to encourage drug traffickers to move north of the Border because they think they will avoid confiscation of all their proceeds of drug trafficking. Even the noble Lord himself would not want that to happen. I hope that with that further explanation I have persuaded the noble Lord that what we propose is correct and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

The Earl of Selkirk

My Lords, I am a little worried about the reply that my noble friend has given. We are dealing with a matter on which we want to take extreme measures. No one here doubts that for one moment, but are we to do it in a manner which violates a principle that goes back a very long way—in fact to the origins of our law?

I personally do not care all that much about the European Court, to be perfectly frank, but we are now introducing the thin edge of a wedge which Parliament has a great way of quoting in the future: "We have done it once, we can do it again". I wonder whether it is worthwhile to do so.

There are two other points that I should like to make. If this were used in a certain way it might bring the Bill into disrespect, in spite of the subject with which it deals. My third point is that the noble Lord, Lord Morton, has suggested a way out with an unlimited fine. That means that if someone is fined the court is fully entitled to look at the whole of his resources, whether in material, moveables or money, and say that in view of the fact he has committed this offence the fine is £2 million. That does not violate any principle whatever. It would hit this trade, if anything, harder. It is not true to say that this would make it more lenient. It is right in line with the principles of law that we have in this country.

I wonder whether the noble Lord will consider this. I am not talking particularly about these amendments, which are verbal, but if anything is done which might bring the Bill into disrepute that would be wholly counter-productive. I ask my noble friend to look very hard at these points once again.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, for, as usual, being extremely clear and to the point. I am using the amendment as a vehicle for suggesting that the Bill has been cast in a wrong frame altogether. What I am suggesting is not that the drug trafficker should be treated any more leniently but that the court should have more power. I am suggesting that there should be a power to take away all his assets. It does not matter a hoot whether he proves that they came from drug trafficking or from anywhere else. If he is convicted of a drug trafficking offence the court should have the power to take all his assets, if it considered that suitable.

It is in that frame that I am attempting with this amendment to try to persuade the Government, as I hope they will be persuaded, that perhaps the Bill could be redrafted, not to offend against the presumption of innocence or to run that risk but to enable this horrible crime to be even more severely punished. I beg to move.

Lord Glenarthur

My Lords, with the leave of the House, perhaps I may respond briefly to the noble Lord and to my noble friend Lord Selkirk. I am sorry if my noble friend believes that this is the thin edge of the wedge. We dealt with the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 last year in your Lordships' House. Indeed, I am somewhat surprised that there is a lack of consistency from the Front Bench opposite in the light of the progress of that Bill. It was widely recognised that we were dealing with a matter which required an unusual and unorthodox approach and which hitherto had not been written into an English statute, as far as I am aware.

Nevertheless, it was generally agreed that this was the way it ought to proceed. I should particularly like to try to keep both aspects, the Scottish and the English, in line. I do not believe that that would bring the Bill into disrespect. I think it would bring both Bills into disrespect if we were to weaken this Bill in the way that the amendment inevitably would by allowing those who are in the South to proceed to the North and carry out their trade in that way.

So far as fines are concerned, as I understand it a fine can be imposed only to the extent of the assets that are owned by the person who might be fined at that moment. It could not go back the six years which this Bill proposes. But by far the most important aspect is that this is a unique situation so far as a horrifying crime is concerned—trafficking in drugs. That is a uniquely objectionable crime and it requires draconian measures.

I do not think I can add any more to what I have already said. I have repeated it from this Dispatch Box on many occasions, and I hope that the noble Lord will not press his amendment.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I regret that the hope of the noble Lord is not to be fulfilled. I must press this amendment.

Lord Sanderson of Bowden

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he thinks that the law on each side of the Border between England and Scotland should be similar or different? It seems to me that this is a crucial aspect of the amendment.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I should not like to answer that question in general. If I were to say that it should always be the same, no doubt that would be quoted against me in some other argument. In respect to drugs, I suggest that there is no reason why the Scottish provision should not be slightly more severe than the English one, which is the basic principle for which I am trying to argue.

3.34 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 65; Not-Contents, 122.

DIVISION NO. 1
CONTENTS
Birk, B.	Kings Norton, L.
Blease, L.	Kinloss, Ly.
Blyton, L.	Leatherland, L.
Boston of Faversham, L.	Listowel, E.
Brockway, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.
Brooks of Tremorfa, L.	Lloyd of Hampstead, L.
Bruce of Donington, L.	Lockwood, B.
Burton of Coventry, B.	Manchester, D.
Campbell of Eskan, L.	Morton of Shuna, L.
Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.	Mulley, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.	Munster, E.
David, B. [Teller.]	Nicol, B.
Davies of Penrhys, L.	Northfield, L.
Dean of Beswick, L.	Parry, L.
Denington, B.	Phillips, B.
Ennals, L.	Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]
Fisher of Rednal, B.
Fitt, L.	Porritt, L.
Fletcher, L.	Prys-Davies, L.
Gallacher, L.	Sefton of Garston, L.
Galpern, L.	Serota, B.
Glenamara, L.	Shepherd, L.
Graham of Edmonton, L.	Silkin of Dulwich, L.
Gregson, L.	Somers, L.
Hatch of Lusby, L.	Stewart of Fulham, L.
Hayter, L.	Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Heycock, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Hunter of Newington, L.	Underhill, L.
Hylton-Foster, B.	Wallace of Coslany, L.
Jacques, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Jeger, B.	Williams of Elvel, L.
John-Mackie, L.	Willis, L.
Kearton, L.	Winterbottom, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aldington, L.	Beloff, L.
Allenby of Megiddo, V.	Belstead, L.
Allerton, L.	Bessborough, E.
Ampthill, L.	Blake, L.
Annandale and Hartfell, E.	Blyth, L.
Astor, V.	Boyd-Carpenter, L.
Auckland, L.	Brabazon of Tara, L.
Bathurst, E.	Brougham and Vaux, L.
Bauer, L.	Broxbourne, L.
Beaverbrook, L.	Buccleuch and Queensberry, D.
Bellwin, L.

Byron, L.	Lauderdale, E.
Cameron of Lochbroom, L.	Layton, L.
Campbell of Alloway, L.	Long, V.
Carnegy of Lour, B.	Lonsdale, E.
Constantine of Stanmore, L.	McFadzean, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Macleod of Borve, B.
Cottesloe, L.	Margadale, L.
Cowley, E.	Marley, L.
Craigton, L.	Maude of Stratford-upon-Avon, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.
Davidson, V. [Teller.]	Merrivale, L.
De Freyne, L.	Mersey, V.
De La Warr, E.	Middleton, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Milverton, L.
Denning, L.	Molson, L.
Donegall, M.	Monk Bretton, L.
Dormer, L.	Montagu of Beaulieu, L.
Dundee, E.	Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Effingham, E.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Ellenborough, L.	O'Brien of Lothbury, L.
Elliot of Harwood, B.	Orkney, E.
Elliott of Morpeth, L.	Orr-Ewing, L.
Elton, L.	Penrhyn, L.
Enniskillen, E.	Peyton of Yeovil, L.
Faithfull, B.	Portland, D.
Fanshawe of Richmond, L.	Reay, L.
Ferrier, L.	Rugby, L.
Fortescue, E.	Russell of Liverpool, L.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Gainford, L.	St. Davids, V.
Gisborough, L.	Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.
Glenarthur, L.	Sanderson of Bowden, L.
Gormanston, V.	Sandford, L.
Gray of Contin, L.	Sandys, L.
Gridley, L.	Sempill, Ly.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.	Shannon, E.
	Skelmersdale, L.
Harmar-Nicholls, L.	Somerset, D.
Harvington, L.	Stockton, E.
Hesketh, L.	Strange, B.
Hives, L.	Sudeley, L.
Home of the Hirsel, L.	Swansea, L.
Hood, V.	Swinton, E.
Hooper, B.	Teviot, L.
Inglewood, L.	Tranmire, L.
Kaberry of Adel, L.	Vivian, L.
Keith of Castleacre, L.	Ward of Witley, V.
Kimball, L.	Whitelaw, V.
Kimberley, E.	Wise, L.
Kinnaird, L.	Wyatt, L.
Knollys, V.	Young, B.
Lane-Fox, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

[Amendment No. 2 not moved.]

3.41 p.m.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 3: Page 2, line 14, at end insert— ("(e) any offence involving dishonesty where the proceeds are at least £10,000.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is another amendment which was discussed but not voted upon at the Committee stage. I remain puzzled as to why for England a Bill should be going through another place to do what this amendment seeks to do but the Government have decided that they need to have the views of the Law Commission in Scotland before they make the decision on whether this is a good thing for Scotland.

I agree with what was put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Sanderson. It would be advisable for England and Scotland to march in step. I cannot see why one cannot have confiscation proceedings where the offence involves dishonesty and the proceeds are over 10,000. I beg to move.

Lord Glenarthur

My Lords, I do not have much to add to what I said at Committee, which was supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State intends to refer the whole question of forfeiture to the Scottish Law Commission to enable the fullest consideration to be given to the complex issues involved.

I am conscious that this means we shall not be marching in step with England and Wales in this respect, which is contrary to what I have been arguing in relation to the two previous amendments. But we take the view that the fight against the evil drugs trade justifies our acting with speed, and that is why my right honourable friend suspended the reference to the Scottish Law Commission. But with crime generally, however serious, the same considerations do not apply. That is why we believe that the correct course is to allow the Scottish Law Commission to look at the complex issues involved. I hope that I have managed to resolve the noble Lord's puzzlement and that he will understand the proper reasons for our referring the matter in this way. I also hope that he will see fit to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I see no purpose in asking the opinion of the House again so shortly after the last Division. On that ground, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I remain baffled by the Government's reasoning.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 8 [Cases in which restraint orders may be made]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 4: Page 9, line 44, at end insert ("a").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 12 [Interdict of person not subject to restraint order]:

Lord Glenarthur move Amendment No. 5: Page 12, line 43, leave out second ("the").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment simply corrects a printing error. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 14 [Functions of administrators]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 6: Page 14, line 16, after ("of") insert (", and if appointed (or empowered) under paragraph (b) of section 13(1) of this Act shall as soon as practicable take possession of,").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a simple amendment designed to ensure that, where an administrator is appointed or empowered to realise property—that is, once a confiscation order has been made—he is required to take possession of the property, since we are informed by the Accountant of Court that failure to do so could give rise to difficulties. For example, property could be disposed of in the interval before the administrator took possession of the property. The amendment does not affect administrators appointed to manage property affected by a restraint order. They are entitled, but not required, to take possession of the property. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 15 [Money received by administrator]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 7: Page 16, line 2, after ("prescribed") insert ("by the Secretary of State").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 7 and, with the leave of the House, I should like also to speak to Amendment No. 8. These two amendments are to provide that regulations made by the Secretary of State under Clause 15(2) are to be made by statutory instrument. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 8: Page 16, line 3, leave out ("the Secretary of State") and insert ("statutory instrument").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have already spoken to this amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 9: After Clause 21, insert the following new clause:

("Rules of court as regards accountant of court's supervision etc. of administrators

. Without prejudice to section 16(i) of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 (power, in relation to certain statutory powers and duties, to regulate procedure etc. by Act of Sederunt), provision may be made by rules of court as regards (or as regards any matter incidental to) the accountant of court's powers and duties under this Act in relation to the functions of administrators.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this new clause is designed simply to enable the Court of Session to make procedural rules with regard to the powers and duties of the Accountant of Court in supervising administrators appointed under Clause 13 of the Bill. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 22 [Exercise of powers by Court of Session or administrator]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 10: Page 18, line 12, leave out ("power") and insert ("powers").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment, and indeed Amendment No. 11, are simply to correct printing errors. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 11: Page 18, line 21, leave out ("power") and insert ("powers").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have already spoken to this amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 25 [Compensation]:

[Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 not moved.]

Clause 26 [Recognition and enforcement of orders under Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 14: Page 20, line 44, leave out ("function") and insert ("functions").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting amendment, and I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Chairman of Committees (Lord Aberdare)

My Lords, the next item on the Marshalled List is wrongly numbered Amendment No. 12. It should be Amendment No. 15.

Clause 28 [Enforcement of Northern Ireland orders]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment,No. 15: Page 22, line 19, leave out ("include") and insert ("included").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is also a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 29 [Enforcement of other external orders]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 16: Page 23, line 35, after ("country,") insert ("either—(a)").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, with the leave of your Lordships, in moving this amendment I should like also to speak to Amendments Nos. 17, 24 and 40.

Clause 29 of the Bill provides for Orders in Council to be made for the enforcement in Scotland of orders made by designated countries. Subsection (8) of Clause 29 enables the Court of Session to make restraint orders if it is satisfied that proceedings have been instituted in the designated country and those proceedings might result in the equivalent of a confiscation order.

Clause 8(1)(b) of the Bill enables restraint orders to be made where the Court of Session is satisfied that a procurator fiscal proposes to initiate proceedings within 28 days. But there is, however, no equivalent provision in Clause 29(8) enabling the Court of Session to restrain property before proceedings have been initiated in the designated country. Clause 29(8) is largely based on Section 26(8) of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. That Act has been on the statute book since last summer, and the Home Office has already had discussions with some countries which it would hope to designate. Those discussions have led it, and us in Scotland, to the view that the absence of a provision for restraining property before proceedings are formally instituted in the designated country is likely to prove a severe impediment to the effectiveness of reciprocal confiscation procedures. It would not only prevent the Court of Session from acting on an external request for restraint until it was satisfied that proceedings had been instituted in the country concerned, but also in practice would be likely to prevent our requests for restraint from being recognised abroad until proceedings had been instituted here, since our partners in agreements are likely to seek reciprocity on this point.

The only people to gain from such an arrangement would be the drug traffickers themselves, who would be able to dispose of their assets in the interval between proceedings being instituted and restraint taking effect in the other country, and we believe it would therefore be wrong to leave the Bill as it is. This group of amendments will therefore allow the Court of Session to restrain property where it is satisfied either that proceedings have been instituted or that the institution of proceedings is imminent.

Amendment No. 40 to Clause 43 is to ensure that where designated countries are concerned, the list of circumstances in Clause 43(5) in which proceedings are deemed to be concluded is subject to the provisions of subsections (8) and (9) of Clause 29. This is because an Order in Council under Clause 29(9) may include provision as to the circumstances in which proceedings in the designated country are to be treated as concluded. I commend these amendments to your Lordships, and I beg to move.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I have no objection to the amendment but, as I said in Committee in relation to the Government's amendments to Clause 6, it would be much easier surely, instead of having something like nine amendments to subsections (8) and (9) of Clause 29, to have one amendment rewriting the whole thing, so that we could look at it on the Marshalled List and see what the rewritten subsections were intended to say. I am very grateful to the Minister for having sent me the rewritten subsections (8) and (9). That makes matters very much clearer. But surely other Members of the House are also entitled to this and I suggest that it might be easier if these amendments came in that form in future.

Lord Glenarthur

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I entirely take the noble Lord's point. I believe that it would be improper for me to go much further than to say that this is more a matter for the Procedure Committee than for me, but I certainly note his point.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendments Nos. 17 to 24: Page 23, line 38, after ("concluded") insert ("; or (b) that such institution is imminent,"). Page 23, line 40, leave out ("(a)") and insert ("(i) where paragraph (a) above applies,"). Page 23, line 43, after ("concluded") insert ("and, where paragraph (b) above applies, as if the imminence of institution satisfied the Court of Session of the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1)(b) of the said section 8"). Page 23, line 44, leave out ("(b)") and insert ("(ii)"). Page 23, line 48, leave out ("(c)") and insert ("(iii)"). Page 23, line 51, at end insert ("as Her Majesty considers expedient"). Page 24, line 3, after ("which") insert ("for those purposes—(i)"). Page 24, line 4, leave out from ("concluded") to end of line 6 and insert ("; or (ii) the institution of proceedings is to be treated as imminent or such circumstances as are mentioned in paragraph (a) of section 8(5) of this Act are to be treated as having occurred.").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 30 [Sequestration of person holding realisable property]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 25: Page 24, line 24, leave out ("and 23") and insert (", 23, 26 and 27").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I mention also Amendments Nos. 26, 27, 38, 39, 67 and 68. They arc all related and are minor drafting amendments. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 31 [Bankruptcy in England and Wales of person holding realisable property]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 26: Page 25, line 51, leave out ("and 23") and insert (", 23, 26 and 27").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 32 [Winding up company holding realisable property]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 27: Page 27, line 21, leave out ("and 23") and insert (", 23, 26 and 27").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Lord Advocate (Lord Cameron of Lochbroom) moved Amendment No. 28: Page 27, line 34, at end insert— ("( ) For the purposes of the application of Parts IV and V of the Insolvency Act 1986 (winding up of registered companies and winding up of unregistered companies) to a company which the Court or Session has jurisdiction to wind up, a person is not a creditor in so far as any sum due to him by the company is due in respect of a confiscation order (whether under this Act or under and within the meaning of section 1 of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 or any corresponding provision in Northern Ireland).").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment simply provides that a confiscation order cannot found a claim in liquidation. It applies equally to confiscation orders made under the Bill or under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, or under equivalent Northern Irish legislation. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 37 [Disclosure of information held by government departments):

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 29: Page 32, line 47, leave out first ("the").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a simple printing amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 38 [Offence of prejudicing investigation]:

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 30: Page 33, line 14, after ("place,") insert ("deliberately").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is to add the word "deliberately" in Clause 38 so that it would read: suspecting that the investigation is taking place, deliberately does anything which is likely to prejudice". This is a subsection where the Scottish law will be different, and in the Government's view should be different, from the English law, because the English provision is not "does anything" but "makes any disclosure". The suggested addition of the word "deliberately" is to make it quite clear—which is perhaps implicit from subsection (2)(a)—that there has to be the deliberate intention to interfere with the investigation before the offence is committed. I beg to move.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining the reason for this amendment. As I said at Committee, we share his concern that this provision should not strike at a person who does something unintentionally that prejudices an investigation. But I have to say to the noble Lord that I think his amendment is unnecessary, first, because, as he well knows, the prosecution would have to prove mens rea (guilty mind), and, secondly, because Clause 38(2)(a) gives the accused a defence that he did not know or have reasonable grounds to suspect that by acting as he did he was likely to prejudice the investigation. There is the further factor which is of importance, that if the word "deliberately" were to be inserted it could cast doubt on the effect of other statutory offences where there is no such qualification. I hope that with those comments the noble Lord will agree that this amendment is unnecessary and will not press it.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I shall take advantage of the second offer and I shall not press the amendment. With that comment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 31: Page 33, line 21, leave out ("has") and insert ("had").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think that this is a mere drafting amendment, though no doubt I shall be told I am wrong. But as the Bill reads, it means that at the time of the trial the person has lawful authority or reasonable excuse. It surely must be intended to mean that at the time of the offence he had lawful authority, and that is why I have suggested that there should be the word "had" rather than "has". I beg to move.

Lord Glenarthur

My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right. If he had not tabled the amendment, I would have done so.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 41 [Minor amendments in relation to drug trafficking]:

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 32: Page 36, line 7, after ("confiscation") insert (", or charging,").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, for the convenience of the House, I shall also speak, if I may, to Amendments Nos. 33 to 36. Clause 41(5)(b) provides inter alia that a claim in respect of a confiscation order or a restraint order, whether made under this Bill or under the 1986 Act, should not be taken into account when calculating the constitution of apparent insolvency. We now take the view that the same considerations should also apply to charging orders made under Section 9 of the 1986 Act, and this group of amendments simply inserts references to and a definition of charging orders into the relevant section of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendments Nos. 33 to 36: Page 36, line 10, at end insert (", or charging,") Page 36, line 15, at end insert— (" "charging order" has the meaning assigned by section 9(2) of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986;") Page 36, line 18, leave out ("Drug Trafficking Offences") and insert (said") Page 36, line 18, after ("Act") insert ("of")

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 37: Page 36, line 43, after ("inserted") insert ("the words")

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is drafting. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendments Nos. 38 and 39. Page 37, line 26, after ("words" ") insert ("11 (as applied by subsection (6) of that section),") Page 37, line 27, after ("1987 (") insert ("inhibitions and arrestment of property affected by restraint order and")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I spoke to these amendments with Amendment No. 25. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 43 [Interpretation of Part I]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendments No. 40: Page 38, line 34, after ("Act") insert ("(and subject to subsections (8) and (9) of section 29 of this Act)")

The noble Lord said: My Lords I spoke to this with Amendment No. 16. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

4 p.m.

Clause 46 [Detention in connection with certain drug smuggling offences]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 41: Page 41, line 44, leave out ("that subsection") and insert ("the said subsection (2)").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 42: After Clause 46, insert the following new clause:

("Lord Advocate's direction.

Investigation of serious or complex fraud

.—(1) Where it appears to the Lord Advocate—

1. (a) that a suspected offence may involve serious or complex fraud; and
2. (b) that, for the purpose of investigating the affairs or any aspect of the affairs of any person, there is good reason to do so,

he may give a direction under this section.

(2) Where a direction is given under this section, sections (Power of investigation), (Offences in relation to investigations under section (Power of investigation)) and (Disclosure of information) of this Act shall apply as regards the investigation of the offence; and any person nominated by the Lord Advocate either generally or in respect of a particular case (in those sections referred to as "a nominated officer") shall be entitled to exercise the powers and functions conferred by those sections.

(3) A direction under this section shall be signed by the Lord Advocate or one of his deputes.").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, at the commencement of Report my noble friend indicated that certain new clauses would be the subject of recommitment before Third Reading, These are the clauses contained in Amendments Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45 and 59. Since they will be the subject of recommitment, at this stage, with the leave of the House, I formally beg to move Amendment No. 42.

The Deputy Speaker (Lord Nugent of Guildford)

Does the noble and learned Lord wish to move the amendment now or is he going to withdraw it?

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

My Lords, I move it now formally.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I am not quite clear what is happening. Is it only Amendment No. 42 that is being moved or will Amendments Nos. 43, 44 and 45, as I hope, also be moved formally?

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

My Lords, I think I made it quite clear that I would be moving the remaining amendments formally. Since it was only this amendment that was called, it was only in relation to that that I made the Motion.

The Deputy Speaker

Will the noble and learned Lord kindly make clear whether these amendments are now before the House or whether he is withdrawing them?

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

My Lords, they are before the House.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendments Nos. 43 to 45: After Clause 46, insert the following new clause:

("Powers of investigation.

—(1) A nominated officer may by notice in writing require the person whose affairs are to be investigated ("the person under investigation") or any other person who he has reason to believe has relevant information to attend before a nominated officer at a specified time and place to answer questions or otherwise furnish information with respect to any matter relevant to the investigation.

(2) A nominated officer may by notice in writing require the person under investigation or any other person to produce at a specified time and place any specified documents which appear to a nominated officer to relate to any matter relevant to the investigation or any documents of a specified class which appear to him so to relate; and—

1. (a) if any such documents are produced, a nominated officer may—
1. (i) take copies or extracts from them;
2. (ii) require the person producing them to provide an explanation of any of them;
2. (b) if any such documents are not produced, a nominated officer may require the person who was required to produce them to state, to the best of his knowledge and belief, where they are.

(3) Where, on a petition presented by the procurator fiscal, the sheriff is satisfied, in relation to any documents, that there are reasonable grounds for believing—

1. (a) that—
1. (i) a person has failed to comply with an obligation under this section to produce them;
2. (ii) it is not practicable to serve a notice under subsection (2) above in relation to them; or
3. (iii) the service of such a notice in relation to them might seriously prejudice the investigation; and
2. (b) that they are on premises specified in the petition, he may issue such a warrant as is mentioned in subsection (4) below.

(4) The warrant referred to in subsection (3) above is a warrant authorising any constable—

1. (a) to enter (using such force as is reasonably necessary for the purpose) and search the premises; and
2. (b) to take possession of any documents appearing to be documents of the description specified in the petition or to take in relation to any documents so appearing any other steps which may appear to be necessary for preserving them and preventing interference with them.

(5) A statement by a person in compliance with a requirement imposed by virtue of this section may not be used in evidence against him.

(6) A person shall not under this section be required to disclose any information or produce any document which is an item subject to legal privilege within the meaning of section 36 of this Act; except that a lawyer may be required to furnish the name and address of his client.

(7) No person shall be bound to comply with any requirement imposed by a person exercising power by virtue of a nomination under section (Lord Advocate's direction) (2) of this Act unless he has, if required to do so, produced evidence of his authority.

(8) In this section—

"documents" includes information recorded in any form and, in relation to information recorded otherwise than in legible form, references to its production include references to producing a copy of the information in legible form; and "premises" has the same meaning as in section 36 of this Act.

(9) This section and sections (Lord Advocate's direction) and (Offences in relation to investigations under section (powers of investigation) of this Act shall apply to England and Wales and Northern Ireland; and for the purposes of such application any reference—

1. (a) to the sheriff shall be construed as a reference to a justice of the peace; and
2. (b) to a petition presented by the procurator fiscal shall be construed—
1. (i) in England and Wales as a reference to an information laid by a nominated officer;
2. (ii) in Northern Ireland as a reference to a complaint laid by a nominated officer.").

After Clause 46, insert the following new clause:

("Offences in relation to investigations under section (Powers of investigation).

—(1) Where any person

1. (a) knows or suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that an investigation under section (Powers of investigation) of this Act is being carried out or is likely to be carried out; and
2. (b) falsifies, conceals, destroys or otherwise disposes of, or causes or permits the falsification, concealment, destruction or disposal of documents which he knows or suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect are or would be relevant to such an investigation,

he shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) above, it shall be a defence to prove—

1. (a) that he did not know or suspect that by acting as he did he was likely to prejudice the investigation; or
2. (b) that he had lawful authority or reasonable excuse for acting as he did.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) above shall be liable—

1. (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or to a fine or to both; and
2. (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both.

(4) Any person who fails to comply with a requirement imposed on him under the said section (Powers of investigation) shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or to both.

(5) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for acting as he did.").

After Clause 46, insert the following new clause:

("Disclosure of information.

—(1) Where any information subject to an obligation of secrecy under the Taxes Management Act 1970 has been disclosed by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or an officer of those Commissioners for the purposes of any prosecution of an offence relating to inland revenue, that information may be disclosed by the Lord Advocate for the purposes of any prosecution of which he has the conduct but not otherwise.

(2) Where an information is subject to an obligation of secrecy imposed by or under any enactment other than an enactment contained in the Taxes Management Act 1970, the obligation shall not have effect to prohibit the disclosure of that information to a nominated officer but any information disclosed by virtue of this subsection may only be disclosed by the Lord Advocate for the purpose of a prosecution in Scotland or elsewhere.

(3) Without prejudice to his power to enter into an agreement apart from this subsection, the Lord Advocate may enter into an agreement for the supply of information to or by him subject, in either case, to an obligation not to disclose the information concerned otherwise than for a specified purpose.

(4) Subject to subsections (1) and (2) above and to any provision of an agreement for the supply of information which restricts the disclosure of the information supplied, information obtained by a nominated officer may be disclosed—

1. (a) to any government department or other authority or body discharging its functions on behalf of the Crown;
2. (b) to any competent authority; and
3. (c) for the purposes of any investigation of an offence or prosecution in Scotland or elsewhere.

(5) The following are competent authorities for the purposes of subsection (4) above—

1. (a) an inspector appointed under Part XIV of the Companies Act 1985;
2. (b) the Official Receiver;
3. (c) any body having supervisory, regulatory or disciplinary functions in relation to any profession or any area of commercial activity; and
4. (d) any person or body having, under the law of any country or territory outside Great Britain, functions corresponding to any of the functions of any person or body mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) above.").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 46: After Clause 48, insert the following new clause:

("Detention of children in summary proceedings. Detention of children

48A.—(1) For section 413 of the 1975 Act (committal for residential training) there shall be substituted the following new section—

413.—(1) Where a child appears before the sheriff in summary proceedings and pleads guilty to, or is found guilty of, an offence to which this section applies, the sheriff may order that he be detained in residential care by the appropriate local authority for such period, not exceeding one year, as the sheriff may determine in such place (in any part of the United Kingdom) as the local authority may, from time to time, consider appropriate.

(2) This section applies to any offence in respect of which it is competent to impose imprisonment on a person of the age of 21 years or more.

(3) in this section—

"the appropriate local authority" means—

1. (a) where the child usually resides in Scotland, the regional or islands council for the area in which he usually resides:
2. (b) in any other case, the regional or islands council for the area in which the offence was committed;

"care" shall be construed in accordance with section 32(3) of the 1968 Act, and the provisions of that Act specified in section 44(5) of that Act shall apply in respect of a child who is detained in residential care in pursuance of this section as they apply in respect of a child who is subject to a supervision requirement;

"the 1968 Act" means the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.

(4) Where a child in respect of whom an order is made under this section is also subject to a supervision requirement within the meaning of the 1968 Act, the supervision requirement shall be of no effect during any period for which he is required to be detained under the order.

(5) The Secretary of State may, by regulations made by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament, make such provision as he considers necessary as regards the detention in secure accommodation (within the meaning of the 1968 Act) of children in respect of whom orders have been made under this section.

(6) Section 20A of the 1968 Act (review of children in care) shall apply to a child detained in residential care in pursuance of an order under this section as if the references to care in that section were references to care within the meaning of this section; and, without prejudice to their duty to do so by virtue of the said section 20A, the local authority may, at any time, review the case of such a child and may, in consequence of such a review and after having regard to the best interests of the child and the need to protect members of the public, release the child—

1. (a) for such period and on such conditions as they consider appropriate; or
2. (b) unconditionally.

(7) Where a local authority considers it appropriate that a child in respect of whom an order has been made under subsection (1) above should be detained in a place in any part of the United Kingdom outside Scotland, the order shall be a like authority as in Scotland to the person in charge of the place to restrict the child's liberty to such an extent as that person may consider appropriate having regard to the terms of the order.".

(2) In section 463 of the 1975 Act—

1. (a) in subsection (1)(b) for the words "and 390" there shall be substituted the words ", 390 and 413"; and
2. (b) in subsection (1A) for the words "and 374" there shall be substituted the words ", 374 and 413";

(3) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of section 58A of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, any child who, before the commencement of this section, has been ordered to be detained pursuant to the directions of the Secretary of State under section 413 of the 1975 Act—

1. (a) shall, while so detained after such commencement, continue to be deemed to be in legal custody; and
2. (b) may at any time be released conditionally or unconditionally by the Secretary of State, and any such child conditionally released shall be liable to recall on the directions of the Secretary of State and if he fails to comply with any condition of his release he may be apprehended without warrant and taken to the place from which he was released.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendment No. 46 is one of a totally different group of amendments. With this amendment, with the leave of your Lordships' House, I should like to speak to Amendment No. 64.

New Clause 48A revises Section 413 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, which gives the sheriff court powers to impose residential training orders on children found guilty under summary proceedings of offences that would attract imprisonment for over 21 year-olds. In essence the new clause provides that such children should be committed to detention and residential care by local authorities rather than by the Secretary of State, as at present. It sets out a maximum period for such detention at one year, and spells out the duties and responsibilities of the local authorities in caring for the children involved.

The amendment is above all a recognition of profound changes that have occurred since Section 413 in its original form came into operation in 1971. At that time there was understandable concern that the new children's hearings and the local authorities might not be able to cope with all the youngsters referred to them. Provision was made therefore for the sheriff to impose a residential order for up to two years in the case of any children who required to be prosecuted for offences, and for the Secretary of State to place them in suitable establishments.

The past five years have thankfully seen a clear downward trend in the number of cases so dealt with: there were only 63 in 1985. We can see two main factors at work; first, the success of children's hearings in coping with the vast majority of youngsters referred as being in need of compulsory measures of care. Secondly, at the same time the local authority social work departments have shown themselves increasingly professional and capable in dealing with young people in trouble.

At the same time we have taken the opportunity in the amendment to exclude the possibility of children being under Section 413 orders even in exceptional circumstances in penal establishments. There is I think, widespread agreement that they are not the sort of places for children. All the evidence points to local authorities' success in making use of suitable secure provision for such children. I believe this to be a modest but significant step forward.

So much for the background to the amendment. It may be helpful if I summarise the key features of the new clause. Subsection (1) sets a maximum period of one year for a residential training order. The reduction from the existing two-year maximum is a recognition of the circumstances of the majority of children who are subject to Section 413 orders. They are normally over 15 years old at the time of sentence and are approaching the school-leaving age. It seems right that if local authorities are to prepare a programme of residential care and treatment for such young people, they should do so within the terms applicable to the great majority of young people with whom they deal.

The supervision requirement imposed by a children's hearing until a child is 16 years old or more may extend to a year unless it is reviewed or specifically extended. The reduced maximum is also justified by current trends of sentences under Section 413. In the past two years the average length of sentence was one year and the average length of order served by children, following the exercise of the Secretary of State's powers to order release, is now between eight and nine months.

Subsection (5) provides for the Secretary of State to make regulations for the detention of young people by the local authority under residential training orders in future. I think that the provision for regulations represents a reasonable safeguard and is consistent with the provision in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 for secure placements made on the decision of children's hearings. The regulations outlined in this subsection would ensure that the young person is clearly established as a persistent absconder and, without the use of secure accommodation, is liable to endanger himself or others; that the decison to place young people in secure accommodation lies clearly with the person in charge of the establishment with the agreement of the appropriate director of social work; that such a decision can be revoked at any time; and that in any event the decision to use secure accommodation should be reviewed by the director of social work and the person in charge of the establishment at least every three months. I feel that they are important safeguards.

Over the years Section 413 has attracted a good deal of public comment. The consultation that we have carried out shows a very strong body of opinion for its amendment to transfer the Secretary of State's powers to local authorities. Some interests, I know, would have wished that Section 413 be repealed altogether, but I think that that would have removed a really important safeguard. The new clause represents a balanced approach—continuing provision for children to be sentenced directly by the courts for more serious offences under summary procedure but at the same time allowing them to be cared for by local authorities along with other children who are committed to compulsory measures of care by children's hearings.

I commend the new clause to your Lordships, and I beg to move.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord the Minister for providing me with the background information and prior intimation of the amendment, something that unfortunately for some reason did not happen in regard to the previous amendments. Perhaps that was not entirely the Minister's fault.

Under the amendment a matter is raised that I wish to protest. The Government have already brought in an extension of the power of sheriffs by means of an amendment in Committee. Now we are asked to consider a fairly radical change in the law on Report.

It seems to me that there is no reason why this amendment should not have been part of the Bill from the start. I understand that the consultation document issued by the Social Work Services Group was issued in August of last year. The document asked for responses by the end of September, and no doubt they were received. That having been done and a view taken in October as to what the position should be, I fail to understand why this provision could not have been put forward in the Bill when it was originally presented.

In any event, as the noble Lord the Minister hinted, the local authorities, the reporters to children's hearings and social workers are generally of the view that this amendment to Section 413 of the 1975 Act does not go far enough. They would have preferred that Section 413 was repealed.

No doubt there was some reason for the section, perhaps because social work was a fairly new concept in 1975. But it is not my understanding that it deals with the more serious offences. The serious offences committed by children are those covered by Section 206 of the 1975 Act under the powers of the Lord Advocate to direct that such offences should be dealt with under that section. The Section 413 type of case tends to deal with the situation where there must be a summary trial, which is often of a person who is 16 or 17 years old or a child of 15 or 15½. It is because of this juncture of two persons, one over the age of 16 and one just under that age, that they are sent to the sheriff rather than to a children's hearing.

I do not understand, when we are dealing with a small number of children—I think that in 1985 63 children were dealt with under this section—why we really need the section at all. If the sheriff has the trial and refers disposal to the children's hearing, that would seem to be adequate, especially as the children's hearings now command greater confidence, having been in existence for 15 or 18 years.

In my view, there is little logic in taking the maximum sentence down to one year when the maximum sentence for a summary offence committed by a 16 or 17-year-old is six months. Why should the child who is a year younger have a period of detention of up to a year when that period cannot be put upon the older person (to whom I may not refer as a child although he is only six months older) who can only be sentenced to six months? There is considerable doubt, which I do not wish to press to a Division, as to whether this is the best way or whether the better way would not have been to abolish Section 413.

Another matter on which I wish clarification from the Government is costs. I gather that the transferred costs from central government to local authorities in general will be something of the order of £750,000 to £1 million pounds a year. Where will that come from? Will the Government increase the grants which local authorities get to meet that expense, or will they have to meet it out of their rate-capped provisions? I do not really welcome the amendment; it goes some way, although not far enough.

4.15 p.m.

Lord Glenarthur

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. Perhaps I can go into further detail about the matters of outright appeal cost and the logic of a one year sentence as opposed to six months.

As I indicated, our consultations showed a division of opinion. Substantial support was expressed for repeal, and, at the same time, strong arguments were advanced for retention, albeit in an altered form. Repeal would have meant that if a child was prosecuted before the court for an offence under summary procedure, the court would have no means of dealing with him directly and would have to remit the case to a children's hearing and rely on it to impose a supervision requirement. We concluded in favour of an amendment to Section 413 which balances both the interests of the child and the interests of the public. Inevitably, both those interests must be considered.

We see three main reasons for preferring amendment. First, a residential training order under Section 413 as at present or under the new residential care order we propose, is the gravest disposal available to the courts under summary procedure for children. Where offences are sufficiently serious to warrant the prosecution of children who are guilty of offences which would attract imprisonment for the over 21-year-old in the courts, I think it is illogical to remove from the courts the most serious measure available for dealing with them.

Next, the public interest requires that justice be seen to be done where serious offences are committed. That would be frustrated if sheriffs were deprived of Section 413 disposals. After the procurator fiscal had brought a case to the court, it would be anomalous to oblige the court to refer the child to a children's hearing if the sheriff thought that a residential training disposal was appropriate. That would be particularly the case where the reporter suggested that the procurator fiscal take the case before the court because the children's hearings had dealt with the child on a number of previous occasions, apparently without success.

All the experience I have come across in my dealings with this matter, and the much more extensive experience of those dealing with it more regularly, shows that individual reporters, children's hearings and social workers recognise the merits and indeed the necessity of having the courts deal with the small number of children who commit particularly serious offences. I think that our amendment brings together proper roles for the courts in dealing with children who have committed serious offences and for the social work departments in arranging appropriate residential detention and care of those children.

The noble Lord suggested that there was some lack of logic in having a one year sentence for this particular aspect of the matter when perhaps six months, as is found in other cases, would be more appropriate or the norm, if I have understood the noble Lord.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, if the noble Lord will give way, what I thought I said clearly was that the maximum sentence possible at summary trial for a 16 or 17-year-old person is six months. There is an illogicality in saying that if he is 15½ years old he can go away for a year for the same offence.

Lord Glenarthur

My Lords, as I understand it, the existing two-year maximum sentence for a residential training order is anachronistic. Following extensive consultations, we concluded that one year was the most appropriate maximum sentence to use in the future and that it was certainly preferable to six months. The reason we have so decided is that first, it is important to relate children who receive Section 413 orders to their peers who are dealt with by the children's hearing system. The supervision requirements decided by hearings are subject to review at stated frequencies and lapse after one year unless specifically renewed. It seems consistent to allow a maximum of one year for Section 413 orders and so provide a reasonable period of time for a child's progress and rehabilitation in care, whenever that is possible.

For children receiving Section 413 orders, programmes of treatment will often have to be for a period of over six months to be effective. The average length of Section 413 orders in 1986 was just over a year, as I indicated earlier; that compares with 14 months in 1985. Powers for early release have been used extensively so that, on average, children now spend eight to nine months in residential training. Though the maximum period of detention applicable to young offenders with whom Section 413 children are often co-accused—which brings us to the nub of the noble Lord's point—is six months, the courts have regard to the need for equity and the differences between young offenders' institutions and the regimes available to local authorities (for example, in List D schools) in arranging residential training. All the evidence suggests that a one-year maximum sentence is about right both on grounds of equity and the need for scope to secure planned programmes of care and rehabilitation for the young people concerned.

The noble Lord raised the matter of cost for local authorities. Our proposals involve some added responsibilities for local authorities in looking after children in care. We intend to adjust the rate support grant appropriately to take account of the extra costs which will be met by authorities. Though it is not possible to say how much will be involved in such transfers, it will be comparatively modest. In 1985 only 63 children received Section 413 orders, and the trend is clearly downwards. Currently the administration of these arrangements costs the department less than £1 million per annum, as the noble Lord indicated. I hope that with those assurances he will feel better informed about what is proposed. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 47: After Clause 48, insert the following new clause:

("Probation

. In the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, in section 58(1) (Compensation order against convicted person), in the proviso, in paragraph (a) insert "or" after the word "absolutely" and omit paragraph (b).").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, perhaps I may speak also to Amendment No. 48. The purpose of this amendment is one which I brought forward at the Committee stage; and clearly from the letter for which I have to thank the Minister who wrote to me after it, I did not make myself clear. What I am trying to do is to make it possible for a person to be subject to a probation order and a compensation order. At present one can have a probation order and a community service order. There seems to be no reason in logic why there should be a prohibition, as exists in the legislation, to say that if a judge, a sheriff or a district court judge decides that probation is appropriate for somebody who has broken a window he should be prohibited from making an order that the person should pay for the broken window.

In my view it has been clear over the past few years, and perhaps for much longer than that, that there is a need for the courts to have as much flexibility as possible in disposing of convicted people in non-custodial ways and in as many different ways as may be made available. The whole approach—rightly in my view—on this type of offence for which probation is talked of is that the person should be kept out of prison. I can see no logical reason why, if a community service order is thought to be appropriate to run along with a probation order, it is inappropriate in a proper case to have a compensation order. That is the purpose of the amendment.

There is some suggestion apparently that I was arguing that there should be a grouping of all three; in other words, that there should be a community service order, a compensation order and a probation order. I make no such suggestion. If that were to be proposed, I should be surprised if any sheriff made use of it. What I am suggesting is that if there is to be a probation order the judge should not be prevented from making a compensation order; and that is all. I beg to move.

Lord Wilson of Langside

My Lords, I hope that the Government will accept this amendment. It is surely entirely consistent with common sense. So far as I recall, this was frequently done by judges in the lower courts until there was a decision by the higher court—and I speak from recollection—that this was incompetent. There are many cases, especially in dealing with young people but also in dealing with adults, too, where a sensible course, depending on the circumstances of the case, is to impose both a probation order, which will keep the accused person under supervision over the years, and at the same time make a compensation order which will perhaps bring home to him a sense of responsibility and be a condition of his probation order.

Lord Glenarthur

My Lords, I am grateful both to the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, for their remarks. When the noble Lord, Lord Morton, raised his similar amendment in Committee I advised him that, while I was in sympathy with his intentions, for a number of reasons which I need not repeat again, I did not consider that the amendment as tabled was the best way to approach the issue. I also indicated at that time that we were engaged in examining the whole question of probation. I hope that both noble Lords will be pleased to learn that I have given further consideration to the arguments that were advanced in Committee.

Subject to favourable responses to consultations with the local authorities, which of course have the responsibility for probation supervision in Scotland, and other interested parties, it is the Government's intention to bring forward an amendment in another place which, unlike the tabled amendment, will enable both solemn and summary courts in Scotland to include within a probation order a condition in respect of compensation to the victim. This approach will ensure that failure, for whatever reason, to satisfy the compensation requirement will be treated as a breach of probation and not, as in the noble Lord's amendment, be dealt with in like manner to nonpayment of a fine, with the resultant custodial implications.

Perhaps I should emphasise to your Lordships that we shall continue to examine the possibilities which may enable us at a later date to consider other means whereby we may broaden and develop probation.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I am delighted at the Government's response. I have never made any claim to be a draftsman. I am sure that the government draftsman will draft this much better than I should have drafted it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 48 not moved.]

Lord Morton of Shuna moved Amendment No. 49: After Clause 48, insert the following new clause:

("Accused and spouse.

—(1) Section 141 of the 1975 Act shall be amended as follows.

(2) In the proviso, in sub-paragraph (f)(ii) there shall be added the word "general" before the word "character" where it appears for the third time.

(3) In the proviso, after sub-paragraph (f)(iii) there shall be added the words— (iv) for the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared that it is not an attack on the general character of any witness for the prosecution to invite the court to disbelieve that witness's evidence in so far as he testifies in support of the indictment, even if to do so involved an inference that the witness is lying or has fabricated that evidence either by himself or with others."").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I tabled this amendment because at the Committee stage the Lord Advocate indicated that he might at the Report stage be in a position to say what his attitude was. Rather than repeat what I said at the Committee stage, I merely move the amendment.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom

My Lords, I undertook to reflect on the amendments which the noble Lord tabled in Committee. Having done so, I have to advise him that I cannot suggest to the House that these amendments should be accepted. I do so on grounds of principle.

In Committee the noble Lord indicated that it was his intention to restate the law as he understood it to have been before the decison in Templeton—to put it in colloquial terms, to get back to O'Hara, which was an earlier Appeal Court decision. I have come to the view that there is no need for legislation to achieve that. The bench in the Templeton case did not quarrel with the law as expressed previously in the O'Hara judgment.

If there was any room for doubt this must have been removed by a decison just at the end of last year in Conner v. Lockhart. In that case the court emphasised the importance of the distinctions drawn in the O'Hara case. I take one citation from the judgments, from Lord Dunpark, who said: The issue in every one of these cases has to be decided by the court upon the distinction drawn by Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson in O'Hara". He went on to quote the late Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson where he said: But it is one thing to attack the character of a witness generally and another to do so inferentially by asking questions which are relevant to the defence, and, indeed, without which the true facts cannot be ascertained". I come to the view that it is thus clear that the courts will not regard it as an attack on the character of a prosecution witness for the defence to ask questions which are necessary for the proper establishment of the defence, even though such questions involve imputations as to the witness's character.

I do not think that a legislative change of the kind the noble Lord proposes—I accept that the amendment was tabled because of what I said in Committee—would be of any assistance to the courts in making the necessary distinctions in individual cases. In my view, any problems which may arise are best dealt with by the court in particular cases exercising discretion against the background of the facts in the case and of course guided by the body of case law in Scotland on this complex issue which has now been built up.

I therefore concluded that legislative intervention of the nature suggested in the amendment would not be helpful. Indeed, I have to say that my advice is that it may lead to further difficulties of a kind which I do not believe the noble Lord, or indeed myself, wish to see in this realm. For those reasons I reached the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to amend the section of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act as suggested.

4.30 p.m.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord. He mentioned the case of Conner v. Lockhart, and he will recollect that I also referred to it in Committee. There is of course a difficulty in the Templeton case and that difficulty will remain, because it was a full bench decision. However, subject to the suggestion that what the noble and learned Lord said might be circulated in proper form to the sheriffs in Scotland, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Morton of Shuna had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 50: After Clause 48, insert the following new clause:

("Act and part guilt

. Section 216 of the 1975 Act shall be amended as follows—

"(1)" shall be inserted before ("A") at the beginning of the section and after the word ("only") shall be inserted the words—

"(2) Any person who, after this section is brought into force, aids, abets, counsels, procures or incites any other person to commit an offence against the provisions of any enactment shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction, unless the enactment requires, to the same punishment as might be imposed on conviction of the first mentioned offence.".")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in the confident hope that either the noble and learned Lord or the noble Lord the Minister will move Amendment No. 53, I shall not move this amendment.

[Amendment No. 50 not moved.]

[Amendments Nos. 51 and 52 not moved.]

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 53: After Clause 50, insert the following new clause:

("Aiding and abetting

50A.—(1) In each of sections 216 and 428 of the 1975 Act for the words "statute or order" there shall be substituted the word "enactment"; and each of those sections as so amended shall be subsection (1) of that section and in each of those sections there shall be inserted the following subsection— (2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) above or to any express provision in any enactment having the like effect to this subsection, any person who aids, abets, counsels, procures or incites any other person to commit an offence against the provisions of any enactment shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction, unless the enactment otherwise requires, to the same punishment as might be imposed on conviction of the first-mentioned offence.".

(2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply to an offence committed before the commencement of this section.".)

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the noble Lord has anticipated me. I gave an undertaking in Committee to consider further the drafting of an amendment which would give effect to the Scottish Law Commission's proposals to introduce a general provision in Scotland with regard to aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting a person to commit a statutory offence. As I made clear during that debate, my principal anxiety was to ensure that the existing law on art and part guilt of statutory offences should remain unaffected; otherwise the Government saw no real disadvantage in the introduction of such a general aiding and abetting provision.

I hope that in bringing forward this amendment it will satisfy the intentions of the noble Lord in tabling his earlier amendment. In view of what he said, I imagine that it does so. However, I should like to express the Government's gratitude to the continuing contribution made by the Scottish Law Commission to the overhaul of the law of Scotland. It was one of its reports which gave rise to this amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I am happy about this amendment. I tried to bring in the Law Commission's report during the Committee stage. As I said earlier this afternoon, I am not a draftsman but I am happy with the Government's drafting of their amendment and that this should be accepted.

The only area about which I am not terribly happy is the wording of subsection (2) of the new clause, which read quickly seems to be that it is the existing subsection (1) of Section 216 that is not to come into force; but clearly that is not what is meant. It is a slightly difficulty clause to take in, but I welcome this amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 51 [Penalties in respect of summary conviction for certain offences]:

The Deputy Speaker

My Lords, I should point out that the line numbering in the Bill is incorrect. The line numbering in the amendments is correct.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 54: Page 45, line 33, leave out from ("worded") to ("a") in line 35 and insert (", contained in an Act passed before the commencement of section 51 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987,").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment and Amendment No. 56 resolve the discrepancy between the new subsections being put into Section 289G of the 1975 Act and new Section 289GA in their treatment of the use of the inflation-proofing terminology in subordinate legislation made under future Acts. It is not necessary specifically to allow the use of references to the standard scale in instruments made under future Acts, because the standard scale will apply to all offences and not just to those in primary legislation. The amendments therefore remove an unnecessary reference to future Acts in new subsection 289G(13) and bring it into line with new Section 289GA(1), which deals similarly with the statutory maximum, and make a related amendment to new Section 289GA(2). I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 55: Page 45, line 44, leave out ("in") and insert ("under").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendment No. 56: Page 46, line 4, after ("worded)") insert ("contained in an Act passed before the commencement of section 51 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendments Nos. 57 and 58: Page 47, line 25, leave out ("section 51 of). Page 47, line 28, leave out ("section") and insert ("Act").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, these two amendments are simply drafting amendments. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 57 [Short title, commencement and extent]:

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 59: Page 49, line 26, after ("Scotland;") insert ("sections (Lord Advocate's direction), (Powers of investigation), (Offences in relation to investigations under section (powers of investigation)) and (Detention of children in summary proceedings) extend to England and Wales and to Northern Ireland as well as to Scotland;").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, again this is one of the clauses which will be covered by recommittal. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 1 [Minor and Consequential Amendments]:

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 60: Page 50, line 10, at end insert—

("The road Traffic Act 1972 (c. 20)

In section 101 (endorsement of licences) for subsection (8) there shall be substituted the following subsections—

"(8) Notwithstanding sections 311(5) and 357(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (requirements as to notices of penalty and previous convictions), where a person is convicted in Scotland of an offence involving obligatory endorsement—

1. (a) where his licence is produced to the court, subsection (4A) above shall apply;
2. (b) where no such licence is produced, subject to subsection (8B) below, subsection (8A) below shall apply.

(8A) Where this subsection applies, it shall be competent for the court in determining what order to make in pursuance of such conviction as is mentioned in subsection (8) above to take into consideration particulars of

1. (a) any previous conviction or disqualification pertaining to the person; and
2. (b) any penalty points ordered to be endorsed on any licence held by the person which have to be taken into account under section 19(3) of the Transport Act 1981,

specified in a document purporting to be a note of information contained in the driver licensing records maintained by the Secretary of State in connection with his functions under this Part of this Act.

(8B) Where the prosecutor decides to put before the court a document such as is mentioned in subsection (8A) above—

1. (a) if a plea of guilty is tendered, or if, after a plea of not guilty, the accused is convicted the prosecutor shall lay the document before the court and the court or the clerk of court shall ask the accused if he admits the accuracy of the particulars relating to him contained in the document and if such admission is made it shall be entered in the record of the proceedings;
2. (b) it shall not be necessary for the prosecutor to produce evidence of the particulars so admitted; and
3. (c) where the accused does not admit the accuracy of any such particular, the prosecutor unless he withdraws the particular shall adduce evidence in proof thereof either then or at any other diet.").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, for the convenience of the House I speak to Amendment No. 65 at the same time. Despite the length of this amendment it is relatively minor and straightforward but it secures a useful change. Its purpose is to allow a court when considering sentence for a person convicted of a driving offence to take into account any driving convictions, disqualifications and penalty points which courts may have previously imposed.

Doubts have arisen as to the circumstances in which the courts may take account of these particulars of a convicted person's driving history when they are recorded in a print-out from the driver licensing record; that is, the record which is held on computer by the DVLC in Swansea. The present provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1972 allow the court to take account of these particulars when they are recorded in a driving licence produced to the court. Situations arise, however, where no licence can be produced or indeed where the convicted person is not a licence holder. In these cases courts have not always felt able to use the DVLC print-out to provide the particulars in question. In such circumstances we wish the courts to be able to have placed before them an extract from the DVLC records containing the information that the courts have ordered should be endorsed on any licence which the motorist may hold. This is achieved by the present amendment. The amendment goes further, however, by allowing the convicted person the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of any of the particulars. In that case the prosecutor must either prove them in the usual way or else withdraw them.

The amendment would apply only to Scotland, since I am advised that the courts in England and Wales have not encountered similar difficulty in using the DVLC print-outs in the manner that we propose. I am confident that the courts will welcome the clarification of the status of these print-outs. I beg to move.

Lord Morton of Shuna

My Lords, I have no wish to stop this procedure from happening. I merely comment that a lot of the difficulty that has occurred in proving and establishing whether or not people have previous convictions that are relevant to road traffic offences arises from the chief constables in Scotland having ceased to keep a record of convictions under the Road Traffic Act. This is a matter of practice and habit rather than legislation. It would be much better if they returned to the system under which all road traffic offences went on to the ordinary record of convictions. The difficulties that may arise when a person who is already disqualified is convicted but only after conviction is the disqualification brought to light would not then occur. Otherwise, I support the amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 61: Page 50, line 42, leave out ("inserted") and insert ("substituted").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 62: Page 51, line 27, at end insert— (" . In section 289B—

1. (a) in subsection (7) for the words "Subsection (4) above" there shall be substituted the words "Section 289GA(1) of this Act"; and
2. (b) in subsection (8) for the words "subsection (4) above" there shall be substituted the words "section 289GA(1) of this Act".").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, in moving this amendment, it may be for the convenience of the House if I speak also to Amendment No. 66. These are both minor amendments, the effect of which is that Section 289B(4) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 is subsumed within the proposed new Section 289GA(1) and is therefore being repealed. However, subsection 289B(4) was subject to two qualifications in subsections (7) and (8) of Section 289B. The amendment to Schedule 1 merely ensures that those qualifications will continue to have effect on the new Section 289GA(1). With that simple explanation, I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom moved Amendment No. 63: Page 52, line 21, at end insert— (" (2) In that Schedule, in the entry relating to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, in column 3 (matters which may be certified) the word "and" shall be omitted and after the word "classification" there shall be inserted the words "purity, weight and description".").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment relates to the provisions of routine evidence made in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. That Act implemented a recommendation of the Thomson Committee to extend the use of the procedure which allows routine or technical evidence about which there was no dispute to be put before the court in a certificate. The measure was intended both to speed up court procedure and to save the time of police and other officials in their attendance in court. In regard to various drugs offences, Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act allows evidence as to the type and classification of a substance to be given in a certificate by two analysts who have analysed the substance. This provision has in practice been found to be too restrictive and the need to provide further information of a routine and technical nature has led to an increase in court attendances by forensic scientists.

The amendment is intended to relieve some of this additional pressure on forensic science laboratories by expanding the matters to which the certificate may relate so as to include information as to a substance's purity, weight and description. These are matters of scientific fact which are not likely to be contested in most cases. There is of course provision in the 1980 Act to allow this and therefore they are perfectly appropriate for inclusion under this procedure. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 2 [Repeals]:

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendments Nos. 64 to 66:

Page 53, line 14, at end insert—

("1 Edw 8 and 1 Geo 6. c. 37.	The Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937.	Section 58A.
1968 c. 49.	The Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.	Schedule 2, paragraph 16.").

Page 53, line 14, at end insert—

("1974 c. 50.

The Road Traffic Act 1974.

In Schedule 3, paragraph 10(4).")

Page 53, line 28, at end insert ("and (4)").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Glenarthur moved Amendments Nos. 67 and 68: Page 53, line 37, column 3, leave out ("section") and insert ("each of sections") Page 53, line 37, column 3, after ("13(1),") insert ("15(2), 16(2) and 17(2)").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 67 and 68 have already been spoken to with Amendment No. 25. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.