HL Deb 23 October 1986 vol 481 cc441-51

3.39 p.m.

The Minister of State, Home Office, (The Earl of Caithness)

My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now further considered on Report.

Moved, That the Bill be further considered on Report.— (The Earl of Caithness.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 17: After Clause 15, insert the following new clause: ("Revocation or variation of orders under section 12, 13(1) and 14. .—(1) A person on whom any conditions have been imposed under section 12 or section 14 of this Act may apply to a magistrate's court or to a judge of the Crown Court and on the hearing of the application the court or judge may revoke or vary the conditions and may impose any conditions which the senior police officer might have imposed. (2) Any person included in the electoral roll of the district in respect of which an order under section 13(1) of this Act has been made may apply to a magistrate's court or to a judge of the Crown Court and on the hearing of the application the court or judge may revoke or vary the order and in particular may so vary the order as to include, conditionally or otherwise, any particular public procession from the operation of the order. (3) This section is without prejudice to any power of the High Court on an application for judicial review under section 3 of the Supreme Court Act 1981."). The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is an important amendment relating as it does to Clauses 12 and 14 of the Bill, which are provisions giving powers to senior police officers to impose conditions on the holding of public processions and public assemblies. They are significant intrusions on an important aspect of the democratic right of protest, however justified some of the provisions may be. The submission that I am making on behalf of my noble friends is that it is inappropriate that those derogations from civil liberty should be wholly and finally in the hands of police officers, however senior they may be, or, in the case of one of the provisions, however junior they may be.

The amendment proposes that those upon whom conditions have been imposed under Clauses 12 or 14 of the Bill should have the right to apply to a magistrates' court or to a judge at the Crown Court for an order to revoke or vary the police conditions. Subsection (2) deals with orders which may be made by a district council prohibiting processions in the circumstances set out in Clause 13(1) of the Bill and makes those orders also subject to the power of the magistrates' court or a judge to revoke or vary the order in question. The matter was debated but not resolved in Committee, and we venture to think that it is of sufficient importance to bring it back for the consideration of the House.

The remarkable thing is that the protesters in Scotland and the people of Scotland are given the right of appeal against such orders affecting public processions and assemblies. That is done in the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982—which date brings back to my mind the fact that a Conservative Government were then in power and must be deemed therefore to be responsible for the Civic Government (Scotland) Act. Section 64 of that Act provides for an appeal to the sheriff, (who is of course a judge in Scotland) against an order by a regional or islands council prohibiting the holding of a procession or imposing conditions on the holding of it. The sheriff in Scotland may uphold the appeal on the various grounds that are set out in Section 64(4) of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act.

Was that decision, were those proposals, for Scotland right or wrong? If they were right, should they not be equally applicable to England? If they were wrong, is this not a good occasion to set them right? If it was right to give a right of appeal to the courts in Scotland, why should that precedent not be followed in regard to England and Wales? Are the magistrates or Crown Court judges here less to be trusted than the Scottish sheriffs; or are the Scottish police, who have to be consulted by the relevant councils in Scotland, less to be trusted than senior English and Welsh police officers? In my submission, the co-existence of that Scottish Act with what is proposed makes a nonsense and creates an obviously undesirable conflict not only of procedure but of principle between Scotland and the rest of the country.

In the debate on this matter in Committee on 6th October, the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, called in aid the availability of judicial review to remedy the position. But, with respect, judicial review is not adequate to deal with the position. Indeed, so far as it goes, it is expressly provided for in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause. But it is nevertheless not adequate to deal with the position; and judicial review—I say this in the presence of the learned former Master of the Rolls—is directed to the question whether decisions have been properly and reasonably reached after proper consultations. It does not go to the merits of the decisions themselves.

In these circumstances, we feel that it is very important that in this considerable extension of executive power, justifiable in many of the instances where it is proposed to exercise it and less justifiable perhaps in others, there should be this right of review or variation of these orders in cases brought by those directly affected. It is for this reason that I move the amendment in view of the great potential constitutional importance of what is proposed. I beg to move.

3.45 p.m.

Lord Denning

My Lords, as my noble and learned friend has referred to me, may I say that I would not support the amendment. The law of Scotland may be different from the law of England. In some ways it is superior; in other ways it is not. Let us consider the position in England to which this will apply. This applies when a senior police officer has to inquire into a proposed procession, whether it is going to create disorder or whether conditions should be imposed as to the time at which it is to take place, or the day, and so forth. Those are matters which he has to decide on the material before him, probably just two or three weeks before the procession is to be held. His decision on that matter is for his individual judgment, on which we should trust that senior police officer.

Now the question is this. Should there be an appeal from that decision of the senior police officer to a circuit judge, perhaps, or to a magistrate, whichever it is? If it is an appeal proper it means going into all the circumstances and the facts again, hearing all the material which the police officer had before him and deciding afresh what the position ought to be. That is very different from a judicial review. That is available in any case. On a judicial review, the applicant can go to a judge of the High Court and can say, "This senior police officer has been totally unreasonable". He can impugn that or that he may have misdirected himself in law, or whatever it may be. That is not an appeal proper. It is a case in which any applicant has got to show that the senior police officer in some way acted improperly or totally unreasonably.

Surely that is sufficient for any protection in this case. It can be dealt with almost at once on an application by an aggrieved person for leave for a judicial review. Let him go at once to a judge of the High Court and ask for leave for a judicial review. I suggest that that is quite sufficient protection in the law against any untoward or totally mistaken decision by a senior police officer. Otherwise, in matters of this kind leave it to the good judgment of the senior police officer who has got to judge the circumstances in his area at the time, knowing all about it. I hope your Lordships will not accept the amendment.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

My Lords, I should like to support this amendment and to take up, perhaps with a degree of modesty, some of the points that the noble and learned Lord has just made. When this matter came up in Committee, the noble Earl put two points against this suggestion. The first was that the Crown Court or the magistrates were not an appropriate tribunal to deal with any limitation or condition which had been put on by a police officer. It would arise by way of a second guess, to use his expression, and the courts should be limited simply to matters of law. The other point he made was that the time factor, where a condition may be imposed very shortly before a procession or assembly, made an appeal of this kind impracticable.

Taking the last of those points first, if it is possible to appeal to the divisional court for judicial review, if there is a procedural impropriety, and, as the noble and learned Lord just said, if the police officer is so irrational that a judicial review arises, the time factor is exactly the same as, and indeed is somewhat longer than, appealing to the magistrates; and so that does not arise at all, I would suggest.

The second is as to whether a Crown Court judge or the magistrates are the appropriate body to deal with a condition which is plainly unfair—not irrational but unfair. A condition that would set at nought the whole purpose of the procession could be, "You cannot proceed down that road. You must go to the football ground", or something like that. I suggest that the magistrates or the Crown Court are both absolutely appropriate to make that decision in their own district. It is an administrative decision. Sitting as licensing justices, that is precisely the sort of decision which they continually make, almost exactly parallel with a condition imposed by the police.

What they decide in licensing matters is whether there should be a licence given on this condition and, if so, whether attention should be paid to a condition which the police wish to have imposed on that licence. They will then decide, knowing their own district and with their own knowledge, whether the condition is sensible or fair. That will mean looking into the whole situation. They will then decide whether to grant the licence—that is exactly equivalent to the banning of a procession—or whether to look at the condition and say whether it should be imposed. On appeal to the Crown Court, that court has to make precisely the same decision.

I therefore suggest that the two objections put forward by the noble Earl simply do not apply. For instance, conditions as to the place of assembly (which would be the site in the licensing situation), as to maximum duration (which would be the equivalent of the hours that a licence should cover), or as to the maximum number of persons who may constitute the procession are questions which constantly arise in licensing matters as well.

With the greatest of respect to the noble and learned Lord, when he says that we should trust the police, surely that is going much too far. The police cannot always be expected to be right about conditions, and the citizen is entitled to question a decision of the police.

Lord Renton

My Lords, on the last remarks of the noble Lord, there are occasions when we have to trust the police.

Noble Lords

Hear, hear!

Lord Renton

We must envisage the practical circumstances, my Lords, with which the police may be confronted. They may have very little notice of an intended public procession and they may have to take an immediate decision. The organisers of that procession, perhaps annoyed by that decision and knowing that they would be guilty of a relatively minor offence if they are in breach of the conditions, may very well say, "Let us go ahead just the same and put in an appeal to the court." That would be in strong mitigation, they would hope, in the event later of proceedings being taken against them.

I think that in practice and as a matter of the operations of the police and the necessity for immediate action on their part—partly in order, let it be said, to help the organisers of these processions so that they do not get into any kind of public disorder—what is proposed in this amendment with the best of intentions on the part of the noble and learned Lord and those who support him would merely cause confusion and would not help to achieve public order.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, with his usual force and charm, exhorts the House to disregard the fact that the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 happens to create appellate systems north of the Tweed. He suggests—and of course he is totally correct in this—that there are quirks of Scottish law which lend charm and enchantment to that system but which need not necessarily be followed in the law of England and Wales. But, with the greatest respect—and I have the profoundest respect for the noble and learned Lord, as have all Members of this House—this is not the sort of situation which has developed from the mists of Scottish antiquity, going back to the Middle Ages; something evolving out of Scottish land tenure or such like. It is an issue of human rights. The right to involve oneself in a procession under Section 12, and the right to assemble publicly under Clause 14 are important fundamental human rights. They are no more and no less important whether one is north or south of the Tweed.

I understand from my Scottish colleagues that that Act has operated well in Scotland for four years and there has been no complaint whatsoever as to its operation. Again, with very great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Renton, it is not a question of trusting the police. Fortunately we have in Britain a police system which can be trusted. The police are fallible human beings but they represent splendid and noble standards. However, I know that the noble Lord will agree with me that a community which trusts the police completely and trusts it above the will of the people, above the will of Parliament and above the courts is a police state. There must be a limit to the trust that can be invested even, in the most worthy police force. I feel we are dealing here with matters of such profound importance to human liberty that the luxury of an appeal, if I may put it in such a way (because it would add to the burden of the magistrates' courts and of the Crown Courts) is one which is thoroughly justified in this situation.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, says, in relation to a judicial review there would have to be a detailed examination as to the evidence which confronted the police officer in coming to that reasonable decision. That involves a substantial examination. In my submission, the ground that would be covered in an appeal would not be infinitely wider than that. It would be examined by magistrates who have a close and detailed knowledge of the local situation or by a circuit judge who is there on the spot, as it were.

In the circumstances, I invite the House to consider that this is a most worthy and necessary amendment and that the arguments tendered by my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones are unanswerable.

4 p.m.

Lord Boyd-Carpenter

My Lords, it seems to me that the introduction of the Scottish comparison is largely a red herring. We are not concerned in this House at this moment with whether or not Scottish law is sound. Indeed, we are all very conscious of the fact that the law of Scotland differs very distinctly in many respects from the law of England. If I may call to mind a recent example, in another place it was decided that the law of England should remain different from the law of Scotland with respect to the opening of shops on Sunday.

It seems to me that the question is a fairly straightforward one. It is the question of responsibility for the handling of disorders which can arise either in processions or demonstrations. All of us know only too well how often this can occur. We have all heard accounts of injuries—particularly of injuries to police officers—which resulted when demonstrations or processions got out of hand. We are dealing with very serious physical facts. As regards the question of responsibility, in the Bill as it now stands it is up to the police officers concerned (in most cases, as the noble and learned Lord agrees, senior police officers) to decide whether undue risk of injury to police officers or others, or damage to property, will be involved if certain demonstrations or processions take place in certain ways and in certain places. That is a difficult enough judgment to make, though it can be made by police officers who know their districts. I am sure it will be made in the best of good faith.

However, let us assume that in respect of one of these demonstrations the police officer concerned has formed the view that unless certain conditions are imposed, particularly as to location, there is a serious risk of disorder, of injury to persons and of damage to property. Suppose that the people concerned in organising the demonstration appeal and that their appeal is in some measure allowed. Suppose that at the end of the day there is a riot and innocent people are hurt, police officers are injured or knocked about and property is damaged. In those circumstances, who is responsible?

The police officer has done his intelligent, professional best to provide restrictions to prevent such a happening and he has been overruled by a local bench of magistrates or a local judge who carry no direct administrative responsibility for what has happened. Your Lordships can imagine the state of mind of a police officer put in such a position as a result of his decisions being overruled by people who do not have to carry the can when things go wrong. I therefore think it would be the greatest possible mistake to accept this amendment.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, referred, in those tones of rolling Welsh eloquence which this House loves hearing from him, to the impact on civil liberties. I think he was indulging in a little hyperbole. The description, the exact location and the exact conditions under which demonstrations take place theoretically impinge on civil liberties, no doubt, but they are surely not matters which weigh heavily in that context.

Your Lordships may contrast our freedom in this country in allowing demonstrations and processions of this kind with the absolute prohibition on them which exists in the greater part of the world, including the greater part of the communist world, large parts of Africa and elsewhere. To take the view that to leave to our responsible policemen (who are responsible in a very direct sense) the question of whether these demonstrations or processions should take place exactly in one place or in another is an infraction of civil liberties seems to me, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, to be the grossest exaggeration.

Baroness Turner of Camden

My Lords, perhaps I may address the House not as a lawyer but as one who has from time to time participated (and who probably will again participate) in demonstrations—orderly demonstrations, I should assure your Lordships. It seems to me that this Bill gives the police additional powers. I should have thought that the police already had substantial powers to deal with disorder. Nevertheless, the Bill proposes additional powers for the police. It seems to me that giving them these additional powers places a very heavy onus on the police to make judgments in political and industrial matters.

In these circumstances, it seems to me that it is appropriate to include a right of appeal. I understand that this is what this amendment is about. If permission for a demonstration is refused, the organisers will have somewhere to go to appeal against that decision. This is a very sensitive area; it is an area of civil liberties and it concerns a very highly-prized right which we have in this country to demonstrate peacefully. I am sure that all your Lordships will be against the violence we have seen from time to time in demonstrations in the recent past, but it is a question of striking a balance.

I therefore commend the amendment moved by my noble and learned friend. I think it will enable us to preserve that individual right, the right of appeal, and that it will assist to some degree in the very heavy burden of responsibility which the police will have under the Bill to make political and industrial judgments concerning demonstrations. I therefore support the amendment.

Lord Inglewood

My Lords, may I ask a question in a grey area? Every police officer, no matter how junior, has the same oath and powers as a senior police officer. He must act accordingly. At the same time, a young man may, at a given moment, not realise that instructions are coming from above and that a senior officer has in fact given instructions as to what he should do. The junior officer, having seen the situation with his own eyes and acted within his powers, may then find that there is a clash. This may often happen. Is it accepted generally that one decision overrules the other, or not?

The Earl of Caithness

My Lords, this amendment, which we have seen before at an earlier stage, would provide a right of appeal to either a magistrates' court or a Crown Court against conditions imposed by the police under Clause 12 or Clause 14, and it confers a similar right of appeal against a banning order imposed under Clause 13(1), but the right is here conferred on to local electors in the district concerned. Banning orders in London would not be subject to appeal. On appeal, the courts would be able to revoke or vary conditions imposed by the police, or the terms of a banning order; and in the case of a ban the court could spell out that it applied to a particular procession if so desired.

I do not wish to re-rehearse all my previous arguments, but I think I need to point out that the essential question posed in this amendment is whether there should be a right of appeal against police operational decisions. As I explained to your Lordships in our earlier debate, police decisions in imposing conditions or seeking a banning order will be subject to challenge in the courts under the judicial review procedure. This is a sensible and necessary safeguard. It will enable the courts to ensure that the police took account of all relevant conditions and did not exceed their powers.

Scottish law has been mentioned, and it would be remiss of me not to comment on it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, has referred to the appeals procedure under Section 64(4) of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982. It is my understanding of the position that argument merely strengthens our case. Up until April 1985, in Scotland the procedure for petition to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session was at that time somewhat cumbersome and lengthy. There was a need for a streamlined appeal procedure.

There were a number of other reasons why this procedure was introduced into the Act, but I do not think we ought to get too heavily sidetracked into discussing the whys and wherefores of Scottish legislation. The important point is that speedy judicial review of decisions taken by local authorities was not then available in Scotland and so this procedure was introduced. Since April 1985 a judicial review procedure has existed in Scotland, where there is no existing statutory right of appeal or review. This means that judicial review is not available in Scotland in relation to matters falling within Section 64. I am afraid that all this is rather aside from the main point of our debate. There is a judicial review procedure in England and Wales, and it can be operated quickly. Noble Lords will remember that I gave an example of this during our last debate.

Returning to Scotland, which the noble and learned Lord opposite, and the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, sought to deploy as an example, I am afraid I must disagree with their remarks. In referring to the right of appeal under Scottish law, the noble and learned Lord suggested that those appeals examine the merits of the decisions taken, not the method of reaching the decision. Indeed, I have looked into this, as the noble and learned Lord suggested earlier, and I am satisfied that this is not so. The words in Section 64(4) are consistent with any appeal relating to the manner of exercise of a statutory discretion, rather than one involving the consideration of the merits of the decision. The items listed in the subsection mirror the consideration set out in the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, of the circumstances in which judicial review is available; that is, "illegality", "irrationality" and "procedural impropriety". I do not accept, therefore, that the noble and learned Lord opposite is correct in saying that these rights of review are essentially very different.

The noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, repeated two agruments that I had put forward at an earlier stage. One was the time factor, by which I stand, because this is a material consideration. Then he took up my other argument that the magistrates' court was the wrong place to deal with this. He asked: What about the unfair decision? That is the flaw in the noble Lord's argument, because if I may draw his attention to the clauses in question he will see that the policeman has reasonably to believe. If it is an unfair decision he will have exceeded his duty and be open to judicial review on that precise point.

Another comment that I would make to the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, and to the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, who waxed eloquent and most interesting about this matter, is that nobody is trying to stop a peaceful or legal procession or assembly. That has never been the intention. What we are talking about today is public order. That is the important point, which I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Turner of Camden, will bear in mind.

Yes, my Lords, within the full scope of the Bill there are some additional police powers, but when dealing with this matter the situation is not very different from what the police have had to implement over many years and have done very successfully. When we are dealing with public order, it is essential that the police should be able to act and not have the reasons for their action subject to any review, other than judicial review, which takes account of the patently unfair decision. I am grateful for the support that I have received from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, and from my noble friends Lord Renton and Lord Boyd-Carpenter.

In summing up, I can only return again to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, and his report on Red Lion Square. He said: It is best that a decision to ban a march should require the consent of a politically responsible Minister such as the Home Secretary which under the existing law it does. We do not believe that it is a proper function for the courts to second-guess operational decisions; nor is it one which they are well equipped to discharge. Nothing that has been said in our earlier debate, or indeed today, has persuaded us that this view is wrong.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, I venture to submit that judicial review does not cover the question whether, in a matter affecting civil rights, the decision of a police officer was a wise decision. Judicial review does not go to the merits, and time and again noble and learned Lords have asserted that. Otherwise, almost every executive decision in the land would be the subject of judicial review proceedings. It is limited to the three factors in the Wednesbury propositions and no more. It is interesting and significant that the amendment which I moved expressly provides for judicial review to deal with those aspects of the matter. But as my noble friend Lady Turner so clearly expressed it, we are touching here upon a matter of great importance to our democratic institutions; namely, the right publicly to protest and to demonstrate—to protest by demonstration, by marching and by assembly—

Lord Renton

My Lords, will the noble and learned Lord allow me to intervene? I am very reluctant to interrupt him, but is it not important that we should remember that there is an even greater right which every citizen of this country should be able to enjoy; that is the right to be protected against any kind of mob violence?

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, this matter does not go to mob violence. Mob violence can be dealt with in many other aspects of the criminal law; in regard to breach of peace, in regard to violence itself. People can go to gaol for years and years on proof of violence. If I may say so, that is not up to the usual standard of the interventions of my old friend Lord Renton.

No, my Lords, what we are concerned with here is whether in all cases the final and last word in a sphere of great importance to the liberty of the subject should lie with the police. We are not suggesting anything terribly revolutionary. We are saying that the courts could perhaps be of assistance and ought to be called in. Access to the courts is, again, a very important right of the citizen of this country and in this field I submit that that right should be available to him. I put the matter to the view of the House.

4.18 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 17) shall be agreed to.

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 76; Not-Contents, 125.

DIVISION NO. 1
CONTENTS
Ardwick, L. Brockway, L.
Aylestone, L. Bruce of Donington, L.
Banks, L. Burton of Coventry, B.
Beswick, L. Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.
Birk, B. Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.
Bonham-Carter, L. Collison, L.
Bottomley, L. David, B.
Dean of Beswick, L. Nicol, B. [Teller.]
Diamond, L. Oram, L.
Elwyn-Jones, L. Phillips, B.
Elystan-Morgan, L. Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Ezra, L. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Falkender, B. [Teller.]
Fitt, L. Prys-Davies, L.
Foot, L. Rea, L.
Galpern, L. Ritchie of Dundee, L.
Gladwyn, L. Sainsbury, L.
Graham of Edmonton, L. Scanlon, L.
Grimond, L. Seear, B.
Hampton, L. Serota, B.
Hunt, L. Shackleton, L.
Hutchinson of Lullington, L. Silkin of Dulwich, L.
Jeger, B. Stallard, L.
Jenkins of Putney, L. Stedman, B.
Kennet, L. Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Kilbracken, L. Strabolgi, L.
Kilmarnock, L. Strauss, L.
Leatherland, L. Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Listowel, E. Tordoff, L.
Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. Turner of Camden, B.
Lovell-Davis, L. Wallace of Coslany, L.
McIntosh of Haringey, L. Wells-Pestell, L.
Mackie of Benshire, L. Whaddon, L.
McNair, L. White, B.
Mais, L. Wigoder, L.
Mayhew, L. Williams of Elvel, L.
Mishcon, L. Willis, L.
Molloy, L. Winterbottom, L.
Mulley, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Alexander of Tunis, E. Hailsham of Saint
Alport, L. Marylebone, L.
Ampthill, L. Halsbury, E.
Beaverbrook, L. Hankey, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L. Harvington, L.
Beloff, L. Hayter, L.
Belstead, L. Hesketh, L.
Bessborough, E. Hives, L.
Blyth, L. Home of the Hirsel, L.
Boyd-Carpenter, L. Hooper, B.
Brabazon of Tara, L. Hunter of Newington, L.
Brookeborough, V. Hylton-Foster, B.
Broxbourne, L. Ilchester, E.
Butterworth, L. Inglewood, L.
Byron, L. Ironside, L.
Caithness, E. Kimball, L.
Cameron of Lochbroom, L. Knollys, V.
Campbell of Alloway, L. Lane-Fox, B.
Campbell of Croy, L. Layton, L.
Carnegy of Lour, B. Long, V.
Carnock, L. Lucas of Chilworth, L.
Clinton, L. Lyell, L.
Coleraine, L. McFadzean, L.
Colville of Culross, V. Malmesbury, E.
Cornwallis, L. Mancroft, L.
Cottesloe, L. Maude of Stratford-upon-
Cox, B. Avon, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L. Merrivale, L.
Davidson, V. [Teller.] Mersey, V.
De Freyne, L. Milverton, L.
De La Warr, E. Monk Bretton, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.] Montagu of Beaulieu, L.
Denning, L. Montgomery of Alamein, V.
Dundee, E. Morris, L.
Elliott of Morpeth, L. Mottistone, L.
Elton, L. Moyne, L.
Faithfull, B. Newall, L.
Falmouth, V. Nugent of Guildford, L.
Forester, L. O'Brien of Lothbury, L.
Fortescue, E. Onslow, E.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L. Orr-Ewing, L.
Gainford, L. Pender, L.
Gardner of Parkes, B. Plummer of St Marylebone,
Gibson, L. L.
Glenarthur, L. Polwarth, L.
Gray of Contin, L. Porritt, L.
Gridley, L. Portland, D.
Radnor, E. Strathcarron, L.
Reay, L. Suffield, L.
Renton, L. Swansea, L.
Rodney, L. Taylor of Hadfield, L.
Romney, E. Terrington, L.
Rugby, L. Teviot, L.
Russell, E. Trefgarne, L.
Saint Brides, L. Trenchard, V.
St. Davids, V. Trumpington, B.
Sandford, L. Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Savile, L. Vivian, L.
Seebohm, L. Ward of Witley, V.
Shannon, E. Westbury, L.
Skelmersdale, L. Whitelaw, V.
Slim, V. Wise, L.
Somers, L. Wolfson, L.
Stanley of Alderley, L. Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.