HL Deb 23 October 1986 vol 481 cc451-8

4.26 p.m.

The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Lord Trefgarne)

My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to repeat in the form of a Statement the reply being given in another place by my right honourable friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces to a Private Notice Question about the NATO Ministers' meeting held at Gleneagles. The Statement is as follows:

"At the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting at Gleneagles on 21st and 22nd October, NATO Defence Ministers had wide-ranging discussions on arms control and defence matters. The Ministers extended their warm appreciation to the President of the United States on his conduct of the talks at Reykjavik and fully endorsed his bold attempt to seek far-reaching arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. They expressed their continued support for the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to maintain the effectiveness and credibility of their nuclear deterrent capabilities.

"The Ministers remain deeply concerned about continuing Soviet efforts to upgrade and expand their military capabilities across the board. They noted with particular concern Soviet efforts involving the full range of strategic forces, shorter-and longer-range INF, and short-range nuclear forces, including artillery. They also noted with concern the major Soviet effort into continuing improvements in strategic and tactical anti-missile systems.

"The Ministers reviewed a number of issues and nuclear related programmes and reconfirmed our policy and planning related to NATO's nuclear forces. They agreed that both the force structure itself and the conceptual planning underpinning it are essential components for maintaining a credible deterrent posture.

"A copy of the official communiqué of the Gleneagles meeting has been placed in the Library".

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, I must begin by thanking the noble Lord for the Statement which he has made in response to a Private Notice Question in another place. I want to ask the noble Lord to elaborate on some aspects of the Statement and to take the opportunity, if he will be so good, to answer some questions of a related kind.

Will the noble Lord accept that both President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev came a long way at Reykjavik, especially in all but concluding an agreement on limiting all intermediate nuclear forces? Can the House be told what steps are now either being considered or proposed to negotiate this INF abolition in detail? When will discussions take place? In other words, what are the next steps not merely from Reykjavik but from Gleneagles? Is there not now a danger that the USSR's insistence on halting progress on the strategic defence initiative will interfere with this most desirable objective? Is there not now developing a never ending process of linkage whereby one set of proposals is conditional on another set of proposals, and that tactic could very well be counterproductive?

Has the noble Lord any comment to make on speculation that, as the possibility emerges of substantial agreement for the removal of the medium-range cruise, Pershing 2 and SS.20 missiles from Europe, the focus shifts to the consequence for the future of shorter range missiles and for conventional weapons, their control, and reduction? Does he thus recognise the express concern of Western Germany about its legitimate interests on that aspect? If we succeed in a breakthrough, can we be told what this means for an adequate NATO and British conventional force potential for defence?

The communiqué talks of the medium-range missile agreement being accompanied by: other appropriate provisions on missiles with a range of less than 600 miles". Can the noble Lord elaborate?

Finally, will he take note of the danger which exists for achieving reductions in both weapons and world tension from such acts as the expulsion of five United States diplomats from Russia followed by the expulsion of 55 Russian diplomats from America?

Lord Kennet

My Lords, in the context of what the noble Lord said about the Gleneagles meeting fully endorsing President Reagan's "bold attempt" at Reykjavik to obtain far-reaching agreements, did the Ministers discuss the fact that the Soviet Union had apparently invited the United States to agree to an extension and a strengthening of the ABM Treaty and the United States has not felt able to agree to that? Was this among the American positions that were specifically endorsed and, if so, why? What is the objection to an extension and strengthening of the existing ABM Treaty?

Did the Defence Ministers note that, in proposing a 50 per cent. reduction of strategic weapons and the European zero option on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union was only accepting longstanding Western proposals? Was that endorsed, discussed and approved? Was the idea that our proposals had at last been accepted welcomed at the meeting?

On a separate topic, in view of recent press stories about discussions among the NATO Defence Ministers and other NATO committees on a possible change in the rules of engagement, can the noble Lord confirm after this meeting the long-standing assurance of NATO that there will be no first use of any weapon by any military force belonging to any NATO country in the NATO area—no first use of any weapon in any circumstances?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, if I may be permitted to answer the last question put to me first, yes, I can readily endorse the position of the allies, which is that we shall never be the first to use any weapon save in response to an attack. That is an observation which I have made to your Lordships before today, and I am very happy to confirm it again.

The noble Lord, Lord Graham, asked me a number of questions, and I shall try to answer them as best I can. He was particularly concerned, I think, about the prospects now for an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. Talks on that matter will be continuing in Geneva, and I am certain that they will build on the undoubted progress that was made at Reykjavik.

What was new and disappointing in this area was the Soviet link of this matter to SDI. That was going back on previous Soviet statements and we very much regret it. The agreed outcome was zero in Europe, as the noble Lord knows, and 100 warheads in Asia and the United States, which meets the Western concerns for global equality and must, of course, be verifiable. The United States has made important proposals in that regard. It has also made important proposals with regard to parallel short-range INF constraints, and the noble Lord will be pleased to hear about that.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked me about the ABM Treaty. As he knows, the United Kingdom is not a party to the ABM Treaty, and it is not for us to take part in discussions about it. Nonetheless, we believe the treaty to be important and attach significance to its maintenance. To be frank, I am not exactly certain whether there was specific discussion along those lines at Reykjavik, but perhaps I can make some inquiries and let the noble Lord know.

I think that those were the main points put to me but, if there are others I shall be happy to deal with them.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that his reply to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, might be misunderstood? Would it not be a more accurate formulation to say that NATO will not be the first to use military force but that that does not preclude the first use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack? Secondly, does he agree in the light of other questions put to him that it is indeed desirable that there should be a great deal of linkage in these negotiations? In other words, would he not agree that it would be dangerous to agree on radical measures of nuclear disarmament without dealing with the conventional balance? Does he not also agree that any arms control agreements of radical kind, should not be concluded without some linkage with the Soviet attitude on human rights?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I certainly agree that the elimination of whole categories of weapon is a desirable long-term objective, but the Government have made it clear that nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand with a reduction of conventional weapons and, indeed, an improvement of East-West relations generally, which includes dialogue on human rights and such other matters.

As for the first use point which the noble Lord put to me at the beginning of his remarks, I was not suggesting any change in the NATO Alliance position in what I said just now in response to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. Those are words that I have used on many occasions before and endorse again today.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that if nuclear disarmament is to be linked with the abandonment of SDI, with reductions in convential troops, with human rights in the Soviet Union, there will be no nuclear disarmament? Is that not perfectly plain to anyone with common sense?

Perhaps I may ask him also whether his Statement and the communiqué do not lay the whole blame for the breakdown of these talks on the Soviet Union and none at all on the United States? Is that the serious position of the Government because it is at variance with the great majority of well-informed and commonsense opinion? Finally, do the Government support the zero-zero option?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, as for the zero-zero option, I can only repeat the answer that I gave just now to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. Elimination of whole categories of weapons is certainly a desirable long-term objective.

As for laying the whole blame for the breakdown, as she called it, of the Reykjavik conference on the Soviet Union, I do not think that the Reykjavik conference was by any means a failure, as the noble Lord seems to imagine. A great deal of progress was made in a number of areas. What was perhaps regrettable was the Soviet reversal of the position they had adopted previously on the question of linkage of SDI with the rest of the proposals that were under discussion. That was, as I say, a change in the position they had adopted previously, and certainly presented the American President—understandably—with great difficulty.

Viscount Trenchard

My Lords, would my noble friend agree that, while it is true to say that the near agreement at Reykjavik got close to endorsing a longstanding proposal back in 1979 that we should adopt the zero option on medium-range missles, since 1979 there have been major changes in other weapons which have to be taken into account? The balance of tactical nuclear weapons, due mainly to the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, has changed drastically and is today heavily in favour of the Warsaw Pact.

The conventional balance has continued to tilt against us, year by year since 1979—particularly in tanks and tactical aircraft—so that the fire-power advantage on land and in the air is well over two-to-one. Will my noble friend please confirm that it would be folly in that situation not to link—as the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, suggested—the position in these other areas with a movement towards a zero option on medium range nuclear weapons and the halving of strategic weapons?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I certainly think that the position is not as simple as some people imagine. My noble friend, speaking from his particular position of experience in these matters, will I am sure confirm that. I also confirm the point made by my noble friend that in recent years one of the most remarkable things we have had to observe is the increase in Soviet conventional forces. That is why the reduction in whole categories of weapons, as I said just now, while certainly a desirable objective is nonetheless a long term one and will certainly have to be considered in the context of reductions in conventional forces as well.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, are we to assume that the European Defence Ministers assembled at Gleneagles were unanimous in approving President Reagan's totally uncompromising stand on SDI? Is that or is it not a fact?

As regards linkage, of course there must be some linkage but is it not a fact that those most opposed to arms limitation are mostly in favour of linkage of every kind? Is it not indeed a fact that, while linkage with conventional weapons is of course an important matter, provided we have enough capacity on second strike to knock out the Soviet Union does it matter very much whether they have rather more conventional weapons than we do?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I certainly think that it matters if they have more conventional weapons than we do; but if the noble Lord is concerned about the unanimity of NATO Defence Ministers at Gleneagles, I can assure him that the communiqué—and I invite the noble Lord to study it, particularly paragraph 2 —was issued unanimously, and all the Ministers at Gleneagles subscribed to it.

Lord Boyd-Carpenter

My Lords, can my noble friend confirm that among the so-called conventional weapons of the Soviet Union which have to be linked for purposes of a nuclear agreement there was included their massive development in respect of chemical warfare?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, my noble friend is quite right, if I may say so, to draw your Lordships' attention to that point. It is indeed the case that in recent years, along with an increase in the more conventional conventional weapons—if I may call them that—there has likewise been an increase in Russia's chemical weapons capability. We seek a worldwide ban on those too.

4.45 p.m.

Lord Hankey

My Lords, this interesting discussion has surely shown that there is a great deal more thought and negotiation needed on this important question. Is the noble Lord aware that many of us who have spent our lives at conferences—including, in my case, the disarmament conference in the 1930s—have often felt that a conference never really succeeds in dealing with these difficult questions until it has broken down? It is only then that the participants face up to the really difficult, insoluble issues and find a solution in spite of all the difficulties.

In view of that, would my noble friend agree that it is terribly important that profound consideration should continue to be given to all these questions? In the light of that, is it not very sad that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have now descended into mutual mud-slinging and extremely insulting behaviour to each other on issues which may be important in themselves but which are trivial compared to the enormous importance of world peace and a settlement on disarmament and the control of armaments?

Do the Government intend to use their influence to reach a better balance on both sides in this matter, as I hope they will? Is it not important that these discussions should be continued in whatever forum—notably Geneva—in the calmest and most friendly atmosphere possible?

Lord Trefgarne

Yes, my Lords, I certainly hope that the Geneva discussions will continue. I believe they will and there is every evidence to support that proposition. I agree that we need to get the other matters that we agreed about into perspective and into proportion. The rejection of diplomats, and so on, which goes on from time to time is a trivial matter compared with the main issues that have been discussed between the two leaders. It would greatly assist the process of the main negotiations if the Soviet Union would ensure that their diplomats stick to diplomacy.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, the Minister has now stated three times that in linking the possibility of nuclear weapons reductions with the necessity for an agreement on SDI the Soviet Union has gone back on its earlier position. It would greatly assist the Chamber if the noble Lord could refer the House to a public statement, made by a responsible Soviet leader, which admitted the possibility of progress on nuclear disarmament without an agreement on SDI.

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, it was said originally by Soviet officials, I believe in more than one forum; and perhaps I can let the noble Lord have a note about that.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, may I remind the House that the Minister has referred more than once to the substantial progress made at Reykjavik; but no progress would have been possible without both sides agreeing and working to that end, and are therefore entitled to take the credit for any such progress. The Minister is uncharacteristically churlish in not being prepared to acknowledge—to the extent that progress was made and it is common knowledge that it was—an equal proportion of credit for that progress is due to the attitude of the Russians.

The Minister decries the way in which the Soviet Union has sought to link acceptance of the intermediate agreement with SDI. He should take careful note when the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, points out that there is every entitlement, in this extremely important matter, to seek linkage between one aspect and the other and the Russians are entitled to choose their own particular stance. Linkage of itself—sadly in my view—is a reality of life.

The noble Lord should check the official record in regard to his answers on the first use of nuclear weapons because he made it absolutely clear today that NATO would not be the first to use them—

A noble Lord

Any weapons, my Lords.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

Yes, my Lords, any weapons. I remind the noble Lord that in an exchange earlier this week, in which his noble friend Baroness Young spoke for the Government in response to a series of questions initiated by my noble friend Lord Molloy, she refused to give such a categorical statement. She said that in the event of a war which began by using conventional weapons, NATO would reserve the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord that there is no difference at all in the position between myself and my noble friend Lady Young. The position is that NATO will never be the first to use any weapons save in response to an attack. That is the position we have consistently adopted and the position I have repeated again today.

Referring back to he Reykjavik talks, the noble Lord asked about the position of the Soviet Union. Yes, it is the case that the Soviets moved their position during the Reykjavik talks towards that of the United States, which I recognise and acknowledge. It is a pity therefore that in the light of the fact that they were prepared to make those changes they then put a road block in the way of agreement by insisting upon a linkage with SDI. Of course they are entitled to do that but they must have done so in the clear knowledge that it would make agreement impossible.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, I apologise for prolonging this exchange, which I think your Lordships will admit is an important one, but may I ask the Minister whether he agrees that, when the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, says that, if intermediate range nuclear missiles are removed from the equation but one has the capacity to retaliate with strategic missiles, the balance of conventional forces does not therefore matter, that is the classic enunciation of the doctrine of massive retaliation?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I fear that the noble Lord has pointed to another anomaly in the defence policies of the noble Lords on those Benches which yesterday's alleged agreement did nothing to resolve.