Mobile Homes Bill [H.L.]

HL Deb 24 January 1983 vol 438 cc25-59

4.11 p.m.

Report stage resumed.

Lord Bishopston moved Amendment No. 3:

Page 2, line 30, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert— ("(3) Where the owner has offered the occupier an agreement under this Act within the required period—

1. (a) if the terms of the agreement so offered are unacceptable to the occupier, the occupier may, within six months of the offer, apply to the court for an order requiring the making of such an agreement;
2. (b) if the occupier already occupies the mobile home as his only or main residence, he may accept the offer at any time;
3. (c) where paragraphs (a) or (b) above do not apply, the offer shall he treated as withdrawn six months after the date on which it was made.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 3. This amendment is similar to one which was discussed at Committee stage without Division a week or two ago. It seeks to replace subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 2 with a new subsection (3). The new subsection deals with the situation where an owner has made an offer under the Act. If it is unacceptable, the occupier may apply to the court. The period during which that may be done is extended from three months to six months. We believe that the period of six months is a reasonable one, three months being really quite inadequate and not enough time for the occupier to recognise the inadequacies or shortcomings of the offer made by the site operator and, indeed, to seek advice from Citizens Advice Bureaux or from legal sources, or to see a solicitor, possibly seeking legal aid, and to make an application to the court. There are problems where agreement is not being made or where the terms are not clear.

The amendment seeks to deal with the position where the owner has offered an agreement but where it has not been accepted or challenged. As the House will know, at present, according to the Bill, the mobile home occupier who, through ignorance or inertia, does nothing about it is in a vulnerable position. It is all very well for some to say that people should know and should exercise their rights; but a good percentage—25 per cent.—of mobile home occupiers are elderly. Half of them are over 40 years of age—which, of course, is not too old—and about 28 per cent. are young people with families. There are some categories here in which those involved may not be able to enforce their rights, or know what they are.

We also think the time of three months is too short if the occupier has had to act in that relatively short space of time to get to know his rights, to seek legal aid and so forth. It is really not long enough. The noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, claimed in Committee that she thought that three months was too short, and that a period of six months was more acceptable. I am sorry she is not here to give her support today to what I am saying. We believe that on the period aspect the noble Lord the Minister has some sympathy. He said, in fairness, that it is an arguable point, and he stressed this twice. If he thinks that six months is too long and the rest of us think that three months is too short, I really think there is a chance of some compromise between those periods. Perhaps he can have a look at this.

The third part of the amendment safeguards the position of the site owner who has made an offer to a prospective occupier, and in that event the offer would be treated as withdrawn after six months. This amendment has already had some indication of support from the other side of the House, and certainly from noble Lords who are supporting it, and I believe that the merits of the case are worth considering. I hope that the Minister will be able to come to some agreement within the period I have suggested.

Lord Evans of Claughton

My Lords, may I say briefly but, I think, with considerable strength that I believe that three months is far too short a time and that six months is more appropriate. It is the period set up for similar kinds of action under the Landlord and Tenant Acts. I do not want to suggest in any way that the legal profession goes in for delays. I can assure you it does not; it does what its clients ask it to do. Very often, clients ask solicitors to delay things. For all the things that may be needed to be done before the occupier takes the matter to the courts, I can say with complete certainty that three months is not a long enough period. As the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, has said, it may be shorter than six months. From my experience of similar kinds of problems, I believe that s six months' period would be appropriate in this case. I think that this should be given serious consideration by the Government.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, I am not without sympathy for what is being said here, but it is not quite that straightforward. There is one respect in which I am quite sure that the approach which the amendment takes is balanced too far against the site owners, and that concerns the position of occupiers who are on a site at commencement. The amendment would place no time limit on their ability to accept, refuse or challenge any agreement. This would place the site owners in an uncertain position in respect of everyone who was on site at the commencement. Apart from anything else, site owners would never know when they were likely to be taken to court. That does not seem to be fair. I am not even sure that it would be entirely in the interests of occupiers to have forever in which to decide. I do not think that there is any possibiliy that the Government would be prepared to accept that aspect of the amendment.

For the rest, we are talking about numbers. Given that the offer of an agreement will be accompanied by the notice that we will prescribe, advising the occupier to read the Government's booklet and stressing the importance of the time limit, I am still inclined to believe that three months is adequate. Having said that, I accept that this is an absolute judgment. Certainly, the noble Lord, Lord Evans, when he talks about the legal requirement, and so on, makes a fair point. I cannot today accept this amendment as it is. We are coming now to the later stages as far as your Lordships' House is concerned. May I say—and I am choosing my words carefully—that we will consider this point again, assuming that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment. I cannot undertake what we will decide, nor even, if we did decide, that we would have the opportunity to do anything in your Lordships' House; but I know from discussions with colleagues following the debates during Committee stage that no one is saying that this is a closed issue. If your Lordships will bear with me and perhaps withdraw the amendment with that in mind, without an undertaking other than that we are not unsympathetic to the point that is being made, perhaps we can move on.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, I am sure that the House are pleased at the tone of the Minister's reply to this amendment. The amendment is an important one and I suspect that he is not fully happy with the six months' period. Nevertheless, his reply justifies my seeking the consent of the House to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.20 p.m.

Lord Bishopston

moved Amendment No. 4: Page 3, line 5, at end insert— ("(7) The Rent Officer shall, on the application of the owner or the occupier, specify the extent to which he considers to be reasonable sums payable by the occupier in pursuance of an agreement under this Act and the occupier shall not be liable to pay more than the sums so specified. (8) In determining for the purposes of subsection (7) above what sum is or would be reasonable—

1. (a) regard shall be had to all the circumstances (other than personal circumstances) and in particular to—
1. (i) the character and locality of the protected site;
28
2. (ii) the place within the protected site where the mobile home is, or is to be, stationed;
3. (iii) the services available to the occupier on the protected site; and
4. (iv) rates payable by the owner in respect of the protected site; and
2. (b) there shall be disregarded—
1. (i) the condition of the mobile home;
2. (ii) the fact that the agreement was offered or made under this Act.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is one of real importance. We were very concerned in the earlier stages with the problem with which this amendment seeks to deal. This amendment would give power to the rent officer to deal with an assessment which he might consider fair to both the site owner and the occupier, thereby keeping the balance and setting out criteria for that purpose. That is very important. Rent officers, as we all know, have the experience required and would be competent, and—most important—they are respected by all concerned. The Minister has paid tribute to them in the past.

The amendment seeks an independent check on the reasonableness of the charges made. The Bill gives power to the court to deal with charge fixing situations in an agreement, but the criterion which we recommend to the House is taken from the Rent Act 1977. At the same time it does not take into account scarcity value, which I think is an important point. Occupiers, as we know, have the right not only to expect security of tenure, but also to be protected from excessive charges. Clause 2(5) refers to the power of the court to make an agreement under the Bill on such terms as is considered just and equitable in the circumstances. The interpretation of the term "court" in Clause 5—to which I have made reference on previous occasions—is not such as to give us confidence, for it covers a county court or an arbitrator. There is an amendment later from the Minister about the county court.

The arbitrator can be anyone whom the parties agree to as someone to arbitrate in their dispute. It could of course be a friend or relative of the site owner if the mobile home occupier agrees to it. Some of the people who live in mobile homes to which I have made reference may well not be aware of their full rights, and the site owner can say, "I am sure you will agree to Mr. A or Mrs. B arbitrating in this situation". Indeed, it could be a site owner; it could be a friend; it may be a greengrocer or somebody known to both parties as a fair person. It may not be the county court which comes near to people's expectations as a place where they can get justice and advice on what is a reasonable rent.

A rent officer may not make decisions acceptable to both sides, but the reputation of rent officers being experienced in the matters referred to them is such that I feel sure their decision would be accepted as being from someone who acts fairly. The rent officer would accept that the site owner must be allowed a fair rent, a fair return on his capital, and the occupier. with less bargaining power, should at the same time be protected from exploitation. There is this balance of fairness between the two parties—the balance that the Minister on numerous occasions said was so desirable—and rightly so. There is harassment by bad site owners. We all know this. It has been accepted by the DoE. Some occupiers may not like to seek a fair rent arbitration for fear of the consequences. When they do, we should ensure that at least they get a fair hearing based on uniformity—and this is important—of criteria by those experienced in the work of rent assessment.

We debated this question in Committee on a slightly different amendment. The Minister will be aware of the amendment in which we said that the arbitrator should be someone appointed by the president of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors as somebody who would be experienced in this matter. That was not acceptable to the Government. I am sure we are anxious that where the county court does not become involved, the definition of the court as an arbitrator—the arbitrator can be anyone—is something which should be looked at.

The Minister, as I have said before, sees the Acts of 1977 and 1980 as not being relevant to mobile homes legislation. We accept that the two Acts cannot apply to mobile homes, but there is no reason why the rent officer, with his vast experience and in view of the way in which he is accepted by all concerned, should not use the provisions of this measure in the circumstances to which it applies. That surely is a very reasonable proposition to make.

Referring to rent officers on 2nd December, at column 1340 of Hansard, the Minister said: I think there is general acceptance that they have skills and knowledge which enable them to hold a reasonable balance, at least one which makes a very hard situation tolerable. I gladly pay tribute to them—and I know quite a lot about the way in which they work". That is a great tribute indeed coming from the Minister, who with his experience in local government has been in touch with rent officers over a long period of time. The Minister has said that he is not happy about rent officers being brought in and that the courts are able to deal with the rents. They do not always know the criteria because they deal with so many other matters. They are not sure to what extent they get brought in on rent matters. In the case of the two Acts to which I have referred, the rent officer does that work. We see no reason why he should not be brought in again. This amendment tries to bring in somebody who is experienced and is accepted by all concerned, and who has the ability to bring in a degree of uniformity as between one side and the other. That is the ideal person to do the job.

Lord Evans of Claughton

My Lords, I suspect that one of the great success stories of the post-war world is the creation of the rent officer. Rent officers seem to be fairly well accepted by their creators, by the tenants and by the landlords. The atmosphere in which they conduct their proceedings is informal. They act fairly rapidly, and there is very little criticism of their decisions. I wish that could be said of a lot of other organisations that have been created since the war. They are the ideal people for the purpose.

The problems about going to the courts under the charging clause are apparent. To the uninitiated, the atmosphere in a rent officer's office is very different from the rather daunting atmosphere of a court. The necessity of initiating proceedings of various kinds is rather frightening official procedure to the average layman. As the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, said, in any event the question whether the charges are fair or unfair is difficult for a county court judge or registrar to answer. With the excellent opinion in which the rent officers are held on such a broad front, I would have thought that the Minister might have welcomed this amendment as an improvement to the Bill.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, we are actually going over an amendment identical to one we went over in Committee, and it will probably be no surprise if I make the same arguments now as I did then. The first of them is that the rent officer service is not equipped to deal with pitch fees on mobile home sites. I am second to none in my admiration for rent officers. I said it on the last occasion, and I happily say it again. I know precisely how they operate. The fact is that the rent officer's job is to fix rents for houses and flats within the Rent Acts; but registering fair rents for tenants of houses and flats is not the same thing as fixing a pitch fee which an owner-occupier of a mobile home should pay. Not only are mobile homes in themselves quite different, but surely the critical point is that we are not here concerned with the rent for accommodation. Mobile home owners are paying for a licence to occupy land and to receive certain services.

The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, says that rent officers could acquire the expertise to deal with mobile home sites. I am sure that he is right about that: I expect they could. What he does not explain is why rent officers should have to do so. If he believes that rent officers are the only people who can arbitrate fairly between a site owner and an occupier, then I have to say that I do not share that belief. I believe that people other than rent officers can also act as arbitrators. Surely, it is not impossible that a person may be known to both site owner and home occupier whom both would find acceptable to resolve the dispute between them.

I hope we are not again going to spend a lot of time discussing the appointment of an arbitrator. I made many points in Committee. The choice of an arbitrator is a free one to be made between the site owner and the occupier. It might be helpful if I add that the general law relating to arbitration will itself protect occupiers from the worst abuses that noble Lords are trying to guard against. If an arbitrator is not impartial and disinterested, his decision can be set aside by the court. In appropriate circumstances it is also possible to apply to the court before going to the arbitrator for his appointment to be set aside under Section 24 of the Arbitration Act 1950. The chances that the site owner would get away with appointing, for example, his agent or his brother-in-law as an arbitrator are therefore severely limited.

I should like to make a further point about the rent officer service. In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, argued that to bring them into this Bill would have a great psychological value for occupiers. It would also have a psychological impact on the site owners. They know as well as anyone else the effect that the Rent Acts have had on private landlords. They do not want their mobile home sites to be affected in the same way, and I do not believe that your Lordships' House would want them to apply to these sites for fear that they would have this effect. We are back once again to this whole matter of a balance. I strongly contend that the owner-occupied mobile homes do not need the rent officer service; nor can we be sure that bringing rent officers in would have the desired result. We clearly have a difference here, but the Government are adamant about it and the noble Lords may feel able not to press their amendment.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, the noble Lord the Minister quoted my noble friend Lord Jacques, but I should like to quote from what he himself said at col. 1342 on 2nd December, during the Committee stage. I quote: The point that the noble Lord makes about going to court is the most important part of what he was saying, if I may say so. People do not want to go to court. People dislike this; they fear the costs; they fear it might involve them in all kinds of traumas. So they do not want this, and I understand it. This, I think, is the point, apart from the costs concerned. The Minister keeps saying they can go to court. but that is really not a satisfactory way of doing it. Although one accepts the county court as being part of our judicial system—and very commendable it is—I suggest that on the matter of rents they are not as au fait with the criteria as the rent officer is; and the matter of going to an arbitrator is really more worrying still because arbitrators can be anyone on whom the two parties agree. It may, for example, be some relative of the site owner who is known to both as a fair person; but what on earth does he know about rents? What does he know about the uniformity of values throughout an area? I would suggest this would not be a fair way of getting arbitration.

We tried, with one amendment, to get the Chartered Institute of Surveyors to recommend arbitration people who would be not only acceptable but fair to both sides. Now we are suggesting rent officers. I believe this is an area which the Government must look at again. Although I feel inclined to press this, I believe that the Government should be given another opportunity to look at this matter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 [Successors in title]:

4.35 p.m.

Lord Bellwin

moved Amendment No. 5: Page 3, line 6, at beginning insert ("(1)") My noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendment No. 5 is a paving amendment to amendments Nos. 6,7 and 8 and, with your Lordships' agreement. I will speak to this group of amendments together. They apply to the inheritance provisions of the Bill. An amendment to these provisions was tabled at the Committee stage by the noble Lords, Lord Avebury and Lord Bishopston, and proposed most eloquently, if I may so, by the noble Baroness, Lady Fisher. In my response to the noble Baroness, I accepted that the provisions as they stood in the Bill, which followed those of the Mobile Homes Act 1975, had given rise to some concern. I promised to consider the possibility of a change. I am pleased that we have been able to make that change. These amendments will extend the Bill's provisions in a way that meets the case argued by the noble Baroness, but avoids the less desirable results that we feel her amendment, as it then was, would have had.

The Bill, as presently drafted, enables a member of an occupier's family who was living with him at the time of his death to inherit the full benefit of the statutory agreement which the deceased occupier held. These amendments will not change that provision, though they will clarify it a little. The amendments will come into play if the occupier does not have a member of his family living with him at the time of his death. In that case, the person to whom the deceased occupier leaves his home will inherit the right to sell the mobile home on site and assign the agreement relating to it. He should, as a result, be able to recoup the value of the investment which the deceased occupier made in buying the home. The amendments will not, however, enable this heir to come and live in the mobile home—unless, of course, he makes a new agreement with the site owner to do so. It is primarily in this last respect that these Government amendments differ from the amendment proposed in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Fisher. Her amendment would have allowed the person who inherited the mobile home to come and live in it, without any say in the matter for the site owner, possibly at the cost of disturbing the other occupants of the site. The Government amendments will avoid that possibility. At the same time, they will achieve the essential aim of enabling someone who buys a mobile home to leave the value of his investment to his heirs.

I hope it will be helpful to your Lordships if I explain the effects of this amendment a little more fully. Its drafting is, I must confess, a little complicated. If no member of an occupier's family is living with him at the time of his death, the person to whom he leaves his mobile home will be entitled to sell the home on site and assign the agreement. The heir in these circumstances will not be entitled to come and live in the mobile home; nor will he be entitled to make a gift of the home under paragraph 9 of Schedule 1, Part I. During the period between his inheriting the home and selling it—the "pre-sale period"—he will be liable for the occupier's obligations under the agreement. He will, for example, be responsible for paying the pitch fee and for keeping the mobile home in good repair as the agreement requires. The site owner will also continue to be liable for his responsibilities during this period. He will be able to exercise his right to terminate the statutory agreement during this pre-sale period, on the grounds of breach of agreement or on the grounds that the mobile home will not last another five years, if a five-year point falls within the period. He will not, of course, be able to terminate the agreement on the grounds that it is not being occupied as an only or main residence.

The way in which these amendments are drafted will, therefore, give some protection to a site owner. If the person who inherits a mobile home does not pay the pitch fee or allows the home to fall into disrepair, the site owner will be able to protect himself. But, more importantly perhaps, these amendments will give a new kind of protection to mobile home occupiers. Many occupiers are retired people and I know that there has been anxiety about the existing inheritance provisions of the Bill. These amendments should remove that anxiety. They will enable people to buy their mobile homes in the confidence that they can pass on the value of their investment to their heirs. They represent an important and valuable change to the Bill's provisions. The change is one which I felt your Lordships were looking for in Committee and I hope that it will be welcomed now. I beg to move.

Baroness Fisher of Rednal

My Lords, before I speak to the amendment, may I ask the Minister to accept my best wishes on his appointment. We are all pleased that his abilities have been recognised by the Government.

I welcome the amendment provisions and thank the Minister for honouring the undertaking which he gave on the second day of the Committee stage. I welcome also the Minister's elucidation of the clause. I found the greatest difficulty with Clause 3. I read and reread it, and the more I read it the more confused I became. The Minister's knowledge has resulted in an interpretation which I believe executors of wills and solicitors will very much welcome. Clause 3 was drafted in a very confused way. May I ask the Minister whether there is any possibility of the clause being reworded a little more simply so that there is no dubiety about it? There is dubiety about the clause.

I have in my hand one of many letters which were sent to me after a broadcast of "Today in Parliament". One of the letters says: It would be nice if the owner of a caravan was able to pass on this to his next of kin, but can I tell you what happened to my husband and I when left a nice little mobile home, only to be told by the site owner that it was not worth anything and that it had got to be removed". In those circumstances, people who inherit will undoubtedly find themselves in difficulties if the site owner says that there is no value attached to the mobile home and that it has got to be removed. No doubt solicitors will have to make a decision about this. They will have to decide whether or not the property is of any value.

I hope I understood the Minister correctly when he said that the intention is that the person who is left a mobile home will be able to sell it and assign the agreement but will not be entitled to live in it. It may be, however, that the site owner could give an entitlement if the person who is left the mobile home is considered to be satisfactory. That seems to cover all that we expected, or 99 per cent. of what we expected. Therefore, all I have to do is to thank the Minister for looking at our amendment and for going so far towards meeting our point.

Lord Bellwin moved Amendments Nos. 6, 7 and 8: Page 3, line 6, leave out second ("shall"). Page 3,line 8, leave out ("(a)"). Page 3,line 9, leave out from ("such") to end of line 17 and insert ("successor. (2) Where an agreement under this Act is lawfully assigned to any person, the agreement shall enure for the benefit of and be binding on that person. (3) Where a person entitled to the benefit of and bound by an agreement under this Act dies at a time when he is occupying the mobile home as his only or main residence, the agreement shall enure for the benefit of and be binding on—

1. (a) any person residing with that person ("the deceased") at that time being—
1. (i) the widow or widower of the deceased; or
2. (ii) in default of a widow or widower so residing, any member of the deceased's family; or
2. (b) in default of any such person so residing, the person entitled to the mobile home by virtue of the deceased's will or under the law relating to intestacy but subject to subsection (4) below.

(4) An agreement under this Act shall not enure for the benefit of or be binding on a person by virtue of subsection (3)(b) above in so far as—

1. (a) it would, but for this subsection, enable or require that person to occupy the mobile home; or
2. (b) it complies with the requirements of paragraph 6(1) or 9 of Part I of Schedule 1 to this Act.").

Clause 5 [Interpretation]:

4.44 p.m.

Lord Bellwin

moved Amendment No. 9: Page 3, line 22, at beginning insert (" (1) ") The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a paving amendment for Amendment No. 14. With your Lordships' agreement, I shall speak to the two amendments together. Two amendments were put down when the Bill was in Committee to provide a definition of the word "family". One was put down by my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy, the other by the noble Lords, Lord Avebury and Lord Bishopston. I did not feel able to accept either of those amendments as drafted, but I offered to consider the possibility of introducing an alternative definition at a later stage, I am glad to have been able to follow up that offer with the Government amendments which are now before your Lordships.

The word "family" appears at two points in the Bill—in Clause 3, which deals with the inheritance provisions of the Bill, and in Schedule 1, Part I, paragraph 9, which enables an occupier to give his mobile home and assign his agreement to a member of his family. It is the second of these references which has given rise to a request for the word to be defined. Site owners are concerned that occupiers may pretend to give their mobile homes and assign their agreements to people whom they claim to be second cousins twice removed in order to avoid paying commission on a sale when they are in fact receiving payment from their imaginary relation. I said in Committee that I considered this anxiety on the part of site owners perhaps to be exaggerated. None the less, I recognise their concern.

I am also aware that there was a general feeling in Committee that it might be helpful to give the courts some indication of Parliament's intentions in using the word "family". The definition provided by the Government's amendment is taken from section 50(3) of the Housing Act 1980, where it us used in relation to succession rights for secure tenancies. I believe that it combines the advantage of clarity with that of bringing in those members of a family whom it is desirable to include. The amendment will apply the definition to the references to "family" in both Clause 3 and Schedule 1.

Before I sit down, may I deal with the questions that were raised on the definition proposed by my noble friend in Committee, in case anybody wants to raise the same points about this definition. I understand—what I say now must of course be subject to the interpretation of the courts—that the definition provided by our amendment would include a mother-in-law because of the reference to "any relationship by marriage as a relationship by blood". It would also include adopted children by virtue of the provisions of the Children Act 1975, but it would not include second cousins twice removed.

I hope that this amendment will meet the need for a definition which the Committee perceived and I invite your Lordships to accept it. I beg to move.

Lord Campbell of Croy

My Lords, my noble friend has very kindly put down this amendment in order to meet, as he generously stated, an amendment which I moved at the Committee stage. I should like to thank him and to congratulate him for introducing these two amendments.

The purpose behind the moving of my amendment at the Committee stage was that I thought that a degree of closeness was necessary: that to leave it wide open would encourage claims based on very tenuous relationships. As my noble friend has said, the Government have adopted a formula which is to be found in the 1980 Act. I am sure that with the assistance of expert draftsmen this amendment carries out broadly the purpose which I had intended at the Committee stage.

Another degree of relationship was raised at the Committee stage: whether there would be difficulty about the common law wife. I see, however, from the last line of the amendment that that situation is covered. At the Committee stage I said that I thought there would not be great difficulties in Scotland with regard to Scots law but that I was not sure about England and Wales. I assume that the last line of Amendment No. 14 covers the position for England and Wales also. Where there are any arguments about this it is for the courts to decide, but I believe that putting a definition like this into the Bill will avoid a great deal of disappointment and misunderstanding.

It will also save a great deal of time because, with this in the Bill, cases about distant relationships will not be brought up. Again, I would like to thank my noble friend for having, in the space of time before Report stage, met the point I raised at Committee stage.

Baroness Fisher of Rednal

My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord the Minister from this side of the House for this amendment. The noble Lords, Lord Campbell of Croy and Lord Avebury, put arguments at Committee stage on the subject of definition, and it so happened that we on this side of the House had exactly the same sort of amendment to put down but the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, became the "second cousin removed" and got there before we did. It is for that reason that we welcome this amendment. We welcome it because we believe it is important in Government legislation that definitions of this type should follow legislation. I believe the noble Lord would agree that when we have a debate on the legal interpretations of Acts of Parliament, it is a good thing that the same definitions in respect of family membership are applied to all sorts of legal interpretations. It is for this reason that we welcome the amendment and are pleased that it is following the Housing Act 1980.

Lord Evans of Claughton

My Lords, this is a very generous amendment which the Government have put down, although I do not feel that it is quite as generous as the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, was suggesting. For example, second cousins twice removed are excluded, quite rightly, but I understand that even first cousins once removed are excluded—which is also quite right. I see also that the child of a mother and reputed father is included, but not the child of a father living with a woman who is not the child's mother; they are excluded and the male sex suffers relative to the female sex. Again, that is probably an accepted principle although it is one that I believe should be noted; that there is in fact a slight lacuna there. People who live together as husband and wife are included. It strikes me that this is a situation which is going to cause a great deal of excitement and interest. Without being unduly delicate in your Lordships' House, one is aware that on the northern coasts of Wales and elsewhere, some of these mobile homes are love nests in the old-fashioned sense of the word.

I wonder about the extent to which living as husband and wife will be freely defined. We have in the North of England an expression with which I am sure the noble Lord the Minister is familiar, which is "living tally". Perhaps the noble Lord the Minister can confirm whether this will extend to those rather uncertain relationships which exist on a fairly short-term basis. I do not know. As the noble Lord the Minister has said, that is a matter for the courts to decide. I must say that this is very much to be welcomed on the grounds already mentioned, because it should eliminate a great deal of uncertainty and possible litigation.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

4.54 p.m.

Lord Bishopston

moved Amendment No. 10: Page 3, line 23, at end insert (", except in relation to paragraphs 5 and 6 of Part I of Schedule 1,—"). The noble Lord said: My Lords, having got rid of the last amendment, which was one of "relative" importance, we now go on to Amendment No. 10, and I should like to speak to Amendment No. 13 also. Amendment No. 10 is also an important amendment. I am not sure what will be the response of the noble Lord the Minister. He will, perhaps, not be quite so forthcoming as he was on the previous amendment, but we are always hopeful. These are new amendments, and they seek to modify the definition of the word "court". I will read what Clause 5 says because it is very important that the House should know what is meant by "the court", which has to assess rents and to decide on termination of agreements and a number of other matters of importance to the two parties concerned. As a magistrate myself—as other noble Lords are—and knowing what courts are like, we all have the greatest confidence in them, whether they be magistrates' courts or county courts. But in Clause 5, which is the interpretation clause, "the court" means:

1. "(a) in relation to England and Wales, the county court or, where the parties have agreed in writing to submit any question arising under this Act or, as the case may be, any agreement made under it to arbitration, the arbitrator;
2. (b) in relation to Scotland, the sheriff or, where the parties have so agreed, the arbiter;".

So "the court" is not just a dignified forum of justice, accepted as the protector of all our rights, but can be an arbitrator.

As I have already mentioned, the arbitrator can be someone who is related to the site occupier. These are important aspects when one realises the powers which are being given to the arbitrator, not to the established court, which is a well-known part of our judicial system. "The court" could be an arbitator who could be a friend or relative of the site owner, as long as he is accepted by the occupier. But the occupier may be under pressure or may accept through fear or ignorance; then "the court" is not the impartial and understanding institution which is so much a part of British justice.

I have mentioned the powers of the arbitrator in relation to the interpretation contained in Clause 5. If we now look at paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1, we see a reference to the power of the court to terminate the agreement. So this arbitrator, who could be biased towards the party seeking arbitration, can also have the power to terminate the agreement. This far from impartial situation could in some cases mean that the future security of the mobile home occupier will be at stake. I consider that it is intolerable that a person chosen by the site owner should have the absolute power to terminate any agreement; it makes a mockery of the Bill. We have debated this point at length earlier, when we recommended that arbitrators be appointed or recommended by the county surveyors' institution. This amendment seeks to promote more justice by modifying the definition of the word "court". I beg to move.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, the Bill provides that agreements under the Bill may be terminated on a number of grounds by the court, and "the court" is defined in the following way. In England and Wales it is the county court or if the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration any questions or disputes about agreements under the Bill, an arbitrator. In Scotland it is the sheriff, or again, if the parties have agreed to arbitration, an arbitrator. These amendments are in part consequential on a later amendment, Amendment No. 17, but their effect, when taken with this later amendment, would be to enable only the county court in England and Wales, and the sheriff in Scotland, to terminate agreement. The arbitrator would be cut out altogether. For the moment, I shall concentrate my remarks on the value of arbitration in these circumstances, rather than on the grounds for termination.

We have spent a good deal of time during the passage of this Bill in discussing its arbitration provisions. One might almost think that what we were proposing in the Bill was something new and dangerous, and that it was designed to harm the interests of mobile home occupiers. But the occupiers who responded to the consultation paper we issued in February last year wanted arbitration just as much as the site owners did; they wanted an alternative to court action to be available. This amendment would remove that alternative for an important area of disputes under the Bill—disputes over the termination of an agreement.

I am well aware that noble Lords are worried that the arbitration provisions may be abused. They are apparently unwilling to accept that the freedom to choose an arbitrator that the Bill provides is adequate protection against abuse. I hope that what I have said about the arbitration system itself when we were discussing the rent officer will reassure them. As I understand it, the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, is particularly concerned that an occupier will commit himself to a choice of arbitrator who turns out not to be impartial, perhaps by accepting a named individual in the agreement or in some other way. If that should happen, the occupier can apply to the court to have the appointment changed or cancelled. Even if he was aware that the site owner and the arbitrator were connected and he accepted the appointment in spite of that knowledge, the Arbitration Act of 1950 allows him subsequently to apply to the court for the existing appointment to be revoked on the grounds that he may not be impartial. So it is simply not the case that an occupier is not protected from a site owner who tries to use his agent or his brother-in-law as an arbitrator.

I hope I have said enough to show that the danger that an occupier will find himself stuck with a biased arbitrator is by no means as great as has been suggested. This amendment has also been justified on the grounds that the termination of an agreement is a special sort of issue which only a court should be allowed to resolve. I certainly do not deny that the question of whether or not an agreement should be terminated is important, but I do not see that its importance prevents an arbitrator from dealing with it. Is an arbitrator not capable of deciding whether someone is still living in his moblile home or not—the first ground for termination in paragraph 6—and is it not likely that an arbitrator could actually do a good job in deciding how long a mobile home will last—the second ground for termination in paragraph 6?

I made the point earlier on that many occupiers have asked us to ensure that arbitration is available. It can offer a quicker and cheaper means of resolving disputes than the court. It seems to me that the arbitration provisions in the Bill are fair and valuable to both occupiers and owners, whatever the dispute. I think that if the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston will carefully consider what I have said, as he so often asks me to do, he will recognise that this is the case. After all, there is nothing political in this in any way: we are simply trying to find a fair and sensible way of going about it. I do believe that the amendment is not needed.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, I feel that this is a very important matter. It is so easy for people who do not know too much about the law to sign on entry into a site an agreement which has a clause which says that the site owner shall decide on his own arbitration. If you sign that agreement you have very little say at all; you have signed away your rights under the measure which talks about agreement between the two parties. It is all very well for the Minister to say that if you do not like what the arbitrator decides you can go to the court. Surely arbitration means that you accept the decision of the aribtrator. Would not the court say, "You put this to arbitration and now you do not like what the arbitrator has decided you come to a second forum"? In that case why not go to the court straight away? That is what the amendment is about—going to an acceptable forum where the ruling will be such that both sides will see that justice has been done, even if they do not agree. I have never known of a situation where you can have arbitration and then if you do not like the result you can go to someone else to have it reconsidered, if that is what the Minister was saying.

I still think the principle at stake is one which should receive further consideration by the Government, and certainly by my noble friends and myself. I should like the Minister to comment on the points I have made about people having the right to go to another forum if they do not like what the arbitrator says. This must surely be unique.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, I have some difficulty in following the noble Lord. Only a few moments ago he was saying that he was concerned about the courts being clogged up by applications; now he is saying, do not have an arbitrator but go to the court. He really will have to make up his mind which he wants. As far as I am concerned, the prime matter here is whether or not both sides can receive equity without the necessity of having to resort to the courts. Yet there can be no harm, at the same time, in retaining an opportunity—should all else fail and everyone be unhappy—for either side to fall back on it. There can be no harm in having the first as a desirable option, which occupiers themselves have said they want, and at the same time, if all else fails, having the right of recourse to the court. I see nothing wrong in that. I just could not say that we would deny the opportunity for arbitration as an option should the parties decide to have it.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, I can accept what the Minister says, that we do not want to clutter up the courts. But I should like the Minister to reconsider the matter from the point of view of the status of the arbitrator, who should be someone not only impartial but also experienced in the matters which would be referred to him. It is not only about rent levels but is also about reasons why someone should terminate an agreement and get off the site. We suggested last time the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors. If the noble Lord could have another look at that, we should be grateful. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.15 p.m.

Lord Bellwin

moved Amendment No. 11: Page 3, line 25, after ("court") insert ("for the district in which the protected site is situated") The noble Lord said: My Lords, with your Lordships' agreement, I will speak to Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 together. These are purely technical amendments and need not detain us long. Their effect would be to provide that the appropriate court to deal with a dispute arising under the Bill would be the court which has jurisdiction for the area in which the mobile home is situated. Without these amendments, I understand, there might be some doubt in Scotland as to which sheriff is the right one. The second of these two amendments, No. 12, will remove that doubt. No. 11 makes parallel provision for England and Wales. I beg to move.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, this seems to be a matter of drafting and clarifying the powers of the court for the area concerned.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bellwin

moved Amendment No. 12: Page 3, line 29, after ("sheriff") insert ("having jurisdiction where the protected site is situated") On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bishopston

moved Amendment No. 13: Page 3, line 30, at end insert— ("In relation to paragraphs 5 and 6 of Part I of Schedule 1, "the court" means, in relation to England and Wales, the county court and, in relation to Scotland, the sheriff.") The noble Lord said: My Lords, I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 10. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bellwin

moved Amendment No. 14: Page 4, line 11 at end insert— ("(2) A person is a member of another's family within the meaning of this Act if he is his spouse, parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece; treating—

1. (a) any relationship by marriage as a relationship by blood, any relationship of the half blood as a relationship of the whole blood and the stepchild of any person as his child; and
2. (b) an illegitimate person as the legitimate child of his mother and reputed father;

or if they live together as husband and wife.") The noble Lord said: My Lords, I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 9. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 1 [Agreements under Act]:

Lord Bishopston

moved Amendment No. 15: Page 5, line 14, leave out ("and") The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 15, and would also, with your Lordships' leave, speak to Amendment No. 16. The amendment is aimed to ensure that the terms of the agreement under the Act shall be in such form as may be provided by the Secretary of State; in other words, it permits the Minister to lay down model terms which we believe should be included in the statutory agreements. The DoE Report of 1977 came to the conclusion that the statute itself should impose implied terms into all residential agreements. The present Bill has not accepted that, and this amendment seeks to combine the advantages, but not necessarily the mechanics, of the implied terms with the approach adopted by the Bill.

In Clause I the Bill provides that the agreement must comply with the requirements of Part I of the schedule and must include terms concerning the matters mentioned in Part II. Beyond that the Bill does not give guidance to anyone as to what agreements should look like and what they should contain, and it will be an expensive waste of resources for all concerned, including the site owners, if lawyers all over the country have to sit down to devise agreements which comply with the Bill. We do not believe that that is in the interests of either the owner or the occupier.

Moreover, we also say that, even while complying with the schedule, there will be considerable room for unfairness and injustice in the preparation of agreements. As an example, a site owner may in the agreement reserve the right to make site regulations and provide that the resident must comply with those regulations. It would be very difficult for even the well-informed and determined resident to challenge such a term if the site owner, or indeed his successor later, makes unreasonable regulations. The owner would be able, under paragraph 5 of the schedule, to terminate the agreement and deprive the resident of any protection under the Bill. We believe that the Government must have in mind what a new statutory agreement should be. Why not prescribe the basic terms? There would be no need to cover every detail and individual terms could still be added to cover arrangements on a particular site.

I do not know why, but the Government appear to think that the Bill contains provisions on the lines proposed by the amendment, and we may be told that. On the second day of the Committee stage, the 6th December, the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, said: The Bill says that it will be obligatory to offer an agreement. The terms of that agreement will be those which we will prescribe". He went on to say that, the Secretary of State prescribes what the notice should say and what has to be involved in an agreement".—[Official Report. 6/12/82: col. 21.] Surely that is wrong, but it is precisely what the amendment seeks to authorise. Even if the Government remain unconvinced of the need to prescribe the form and terms of the agreement it would be a very useful reserve power. It does no more than give the necessary powers and if the need arises once the Bill is in operation the power could then be used to deal with the problems. This would be much more satisfactory than coming back for yet another look at the Bill after it has been enacted. I believe it would help everyone concerned if such model terms were available. I therefore beg to move.

Lord Evans of Claughton

My Lords, we congratulate the Minister for agreeing to define "families" to simplify matters for everyone. I beg him to accept the amendment, or something similar, for the same reason. I put to the Minister the kind of thing that I expect to happen from experience of other kinds of agreement in landlord and tenant relationships or quasi relationships. The landlord, or the owner in this case, has a printed form which he has had prepared by his solicitor, his association, or whatever. One of these forms he hands to the prospective occupier and says. "Do you mind signing that? I shall sign this copy and we shall swap them". The chap agrees because he is anxious to get the site and he signs the form. As the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, says, he then finds afterwards, because he has not bothered to consult the Citizens' Advice Bureau or a solicitor, that he has committed himself to something which goes beyond what he had thought on looking through the agreement. In other words, there is some small print that he has not looked at in the sense that the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, mentioned in referring to regulations to be made by the owner at some future time. That is already not uncommon between landlord and tenant.

I should have thought that the Government would have been well advised to follow the precedent set in earlier landlord-tenant legislation where the form of notices, and so on, is set out in statutory form. For example, in the Landlord and Tenant Act the notice to terminate a business tenancy is set out in statutory form. I should have thought that from everyone's point of view, for the sake of simplicity, first, for the sake of accuracy, secondly, and for the sake of protection, thirdly, it would be very useful and advantageous if a model agreement could be used in such circumstances set out in the Bill and required to be used in that form in any relationship or agreement drawn up between the owner and occupier.

I hope that the Government will either say that they will think again about this and produce something or, if I may say with the greatest possible respect—which, as your Lordships know, means something quite different—that the Minister will reconsider what he has been saying in previous discussions, because I believe he has misled himself in the belief that there is something in the Bill which in fact is not there at all. I ask him to reconsider the matter very carefully.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Claughton, was doing very well until he came to his last sentence and spoilt it all. I wonder whether the noble Lord will feel the same after he has listened, as he always does, to what I have to say on the subject. I shall be interested to know that. We are now in a field where he has practical experience of having to make it happen, if I may put it that way and of having to deal with such matters.

We discussed this amendment in Committee and I said at the end of our debate that we could not accept the amendment but that I would read what the noble Lord said. I have read the Official Report, and very interesting it was. However, I am afraid that I still cannot accept the amendment. What was particularly interesting about the speeches made in Committee was the extent to which noble Lords are trying to give the Secretary of State powers that he does not want. That is quite a reversal. Not only is it now being proposed to give the Secretary of State the power to prescribe the form of an agreement, but the amendment will enable him to be able to add, by regulation, to the matters listed in the Bill that the agreement must cover. This is an odd argument to have on a Bill. Normally it is the Government who seek order-making powers and Oppositions who resist them. In this case it is the reverse. The amendment would enable the Secretary of State to prescribe the form of an agreement. I do not believe that this would take us significantly further than the Bill already does. Part I of Schedule 1 lists a number of requirements with which agreements must comply. Part II lists matters which agreements must cover. It does not say how they are to be covered. It does not say what services a site owner is to provide, nor what the basis for the yearly rent reviews is to be. Unless we are prepared to change that and control the contents of agreements in detail—and we are not prepared to take that control—surely it will not help anyone for us to prescribe the form in which the contents of the agreement are to be expressed. In any case, as I have said many times, an occupier who does not like the agreement offered to him can ask the court to order the making of a new one. The notice that we will be prescribing will emphasise to occupiers their ability to challenge agreements and will tell them to read the Government booklet on the legislation.

The second aspect of the amendment is that it would enable the Secretary of State to add to the list of matters which an agreement must cover by regulation. I have said that the Secretary of State does not want this power, but if he had it I am not at all sure that he could use it effectively. Unless he used it very soon after the Bill achieves Royal Assent it would be too late to affect the contents of agreements that are to be offered at commencement. There is no realistic way in which regulations can affect agreements retrospectively.

Even if we wanted to take a power to make regulations retrospective, it would be well nigh impossible to ensure that all those who held agreements were aware of the new terms added by them. Its is at commencement that agreements are to be offered to all occupiers then on site. It is with the contents of those agreements that we must be immediately concerned. It seems to me that if we feel there are matters which should be covered in agreements under the Bill we should ensure that the Bill deals with them, rather than create a power to add new subjects which will by very difficult for us to use effectively. I want to be as helpful as I can. After all, your Lordships are trying to give the Secretary of State more powers and I should not like to be thought ungrateful.

There are two issues which were mentioned in Committee and again today which are not covered by Schedule 1 to the Bill. The two issues which are not covered are arbitration and the site rules. Surely we have already spent enough time on the subject of arbitration, and therefore I would only add now that the Bill itself allows site owners and occupiers to use arbitration if they wish. The agreement between them does not have to provide for it, but if they do not want to use an arbitrator I do not think that we should force them to do so. In view of our earlier discussions, I should not have thought that your Lordships would wish to require the use of an arbitrator either. I am dealing with this matter at length because I take entirely the point that both noble Lords who have spoken made, that this is an important matter and I hope that your Lordships will agree that I treat it as such.

The site rules are a different matter. The first point that must be made about them is that if the site owner wishes to enforce them, he must provide for them in the agreement which he offers the occupier. He does not have to spell them out in the agreement but he will have to allow for their existence, as does the standard agreement for the 1975 Act provided by the National Federation of Site Operators. In that case the occupier should be able to challenge the relevant term in the agreement to make sure that the rules will not be unacceptable to him. There is perhaps a slight danger that an occupier will not know the site rules. It will be possible for the Bill to contain a requirement that a copy of the site rules should be made available to occupiers, perhaps at the time when they are offered an agreement, if noble Lords thought that that was desirable. The amendment before us at present would not have that effect.

I have gone into the matter in detail and I think that that shows the respect—and I use the word advisedly in view of the fact that it was used to me—I have for the matter, and it is proper that I should do so. However, I hope, in view of my explanation, that noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Claughton, will say, "Well, there may be a point here". I live in hopes, my Lords.

Baroness Ewart-Biggs

My Lords, in spite of what the noble Lord the Minister has said, I should still like to support the amendment because as I understand it this model agreement is merely a skeleton which can be tilled by both occupier and owner as it applies. I cannot see any reason why the occupier should go to the expense of challenging the agreement if he does not agree with it. I should have thought that that was one of the things that the Bill was trying to avoid. Can one not see the amendment as something that is providing a simplification and a safeguard in some cases? To my mind it is something that would really stand the Bill in very good stead and stand the test of time. Moreover, it will try and keep a good relationship between the occupier and the owner. From the many letters I have read that have been published in the press, it seems to be a tragedy that on these sites which do, after all, constitute small villages, the relationship can sometimes be very much aggravated through misunderstandings that could possibly be avoided by this particular amendment.

Lord Tordoff

My Lords, I should like briefly to intervene and pick up one point which the Minister made. I can well understand that he can take some amusement from the fact that noble Lords are trying to give the Secretary of State increased powers, when on many occasions we are trying to decrease those powers. Indeed, on such occasions it is either that Secretaries of State are trying to take powers from other areas, such as local authorities—and we have seen quite a bit of that in recent times—or that they are asking for open-ended powers. In a case like this where the Secretary of State is being asked to take powers to defend the weak and to assist those people who do not read Government publications as much as we do, there is a much more valid reason for making the type of insertion in a Bill which this amendment seeks to do.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, of course the noble Lord would not expect me to agree with his side observations about the purpose for which the Secretary of State should have powers; nor do I. But let me remind him, if he will allow me, that again it is the Government who are bringing forward this Bill. We are doing so precisely because we are concerned about the 1975 Act which was originally introduced as a Private Member's Bill by he who is now my right honourable friend the Secretary of State—and want to try to improve the balance between the two sides here so as to make it all work better. We are concerned that the occupiers should in no way be disadvantaged; indeed, quite the contrary. If we did not feel like that we would not have introduced the Bill in the first place. We are saying that we want to get the best Bill and to get it as right as we can.

At the end of the day there will be those who will say, "Yes, it is an advance"— everyone has said that—"but we would have liked it a little more our way". Others will say, "It goes too far that way". I have listened with respect—and I mean respect —to what has been said because again it is not a question of an exact, precise judgment here. One has to take a view on balance and that is why we take the view that we do. We do not say that you are wrong. I do not say that at all. All I am saying is that we feel that, in the totality of what we are trying to do here, the way in which we have it now seems to hold the balance. Only time will tell.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, the Minister is right to claim credit and we would give credit to the Government for bringing forward the Bill, but it does not follow that because the Government have brought forward the Bill it is automatically all right. Even the Government themselves would not accept that. Of course, the House is very anxious, in the light of the enormous press publicity and the concern which has been made clear to many organisations and through various bodies, about the loopholes in the 1975 Act.

Having said that, of course, we are all constructively trying to help the Government. We say that they have provided a skeleton. At the same time we say, "Make no bones about it, there is still a lot of flesh to go on" and the House is anxious to deal with that. I know that the Minister, now being a Minister of State, would not be any more impressed if we had inserted, instead of "Secretary of State", the "Minister of State", because the principle is the same, However, we believe that this amendment, or something like it, would help those involved on both sides of the mobile homes business to have the type of model terms which are essential to a good agreement. Living in hope, as we all do, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, in the hope that we might come back to it again at a later stage.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 16 not moved.]

5.28 p.m.

Lord Bishopston

moved Amendment No. 17: Page 5, line 38, leave out ("owner") and insert ("court"). The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 17. This is another important amendment. I would not like to talk about the relative importance of the amendments because they are all intended to try to help those concerned and also to stop any loopholes. This amendment was not moved in Committee. Paragraph 5 of the Schedule allows the owner—and I stress "the owner"—to terminate a statutory agreement and in effect to evict the occupier. It is, of course, true that he would have to go to the county court, and the Minister will doubtless tell me that. But the court has only limited powers under the Caravan Sites Act to delay the actual eviction. This power could be used for a minor breach; for instance, there could be a dispute about what is grown in the garden or a breach of some unreasonable term like preventing visits from relatives or friends which was not challenged by the occupier at the outset.

It is surely wrong and at variance with all similar legislation that the owner should be the draftsman, the judge, the jury and the effective executioner. We believe that it should be the court that decides whether a breach is sufficiently serious to merit termination of the agreement, because it is on the continuity of the agreement that the security of tenure depends.

This amendment ties in with an amendment that we tabled to Clause 5 on "Interpretation", to which I have made numerous references already and which seeks to ensure that for the purposes of this paragraph only a court, and not an arbitrator, can act. I believe that this is a very important amendment and, in view of the situation which faces the occupier, whose bargaining power is much less than that of the site owner, I hope that the Government will be able to say that they can go some way towards accepting the spirit of the amendment that I now propose. I beg to move.

Lord Evans of Claughton

My Lords, this is an important amendment. I do not know whether I am unfairly inviting the Minister to speculate on what the courts would do but, as the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, said, perhaps the Minister can assure us that the courts would say that the owner would not be entitled to terminate the agreement, et cetera, if the breaches were of a minor nature or if the owner's actions were unreasonable; because there have been cases under the analogous position of leases where the courts have refused to order eviction of a tenant when the breaches are fairly minor. It is extremely serious because, as the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, said, these could be for quite trivial matters. Some of us, of course, might welcome a rule which prohibited visits from relatives at our mobile home, but I was thinking of something really serious like being prohibited from wearing a daffodil on St. David's Day or not being allowed to have a Liverpool FC pennant in your window. If the courts do not feel that they have the jurisdiction to say that that is such a trivial breach of covenant that they will not enforce it, then it is very important that the decision should not be made by the landlord on quite capricious grounds such as that, but that the court should decide it. As I say, if paragraph 5 is exercised purely at the discretion of a landlord, it must be amended for natural justice.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, I have listened carefully to what the noble Lord has said and obviously I sympathise with the thrust of that. But, again, I wonder whether he will still feel the same anxiety about it after I make my points. The Bill provides for agreements to be terminated in a number of ways. An occupier can terminate his agreement at 28 days' notice. A court can terminate an agreement either on the grounds that the occupier is no longer living in his mobile home or on the grounds that the mobile home is, having regard to its age and condition, having a detrimental effect on the amenities of the site, or is likely to have such an effect within five years. Finally, a site owner can terminate the agreement on the grounds that the occupier has breached its terms, provided that he has first served notice on the occupier that he is in breach and that the occupier has failed to remedy the breach within a reasonable time. It is, of course, to this last ground that the amendment applies. Its effect would be to require a site owner to go to court to terminate on the grounds of breach of agreement.

The provision enabling a site owner to terminate for breach of agreement without court action is taken from the 1975 Act. Agreements under the 1975 Act have, where they have been made, on the whole worked very well and it has not been our intention to disturb the system used by that Act unless there was good reason for doing so. I am not aware that this particular provision has caused problems. It was not mentioned in any of the responses to our consultation paper earlier this year. Given the large number of occupiers and pro-occupier organisations who responded, I think it is fair to say that, if there had been problems on this point, they would have been raised. I wonder whether, therefore, the case for this amendment is a very strong one, although the noble Lord, Lord Evans, certainly made me think about it. I wonder what he would say about the point that I have just made, that we really did get the most comprehensive and extensive responses to consultations, yet no one made this particular point as a matter for concern.

Another point that I should make about this amendment is that the Bill will allow a site owner to terminate an agreement on the grounds that it has been breached without going to court, but it will not allow him to evict an occupier without court action. The Caravan Sites Act 1968 provides that a residential occupier cannot be evicted without court action. That surely is a very important provision, and therefore is it right to say that the Bill would leave occupiers unprotected by the courts? I do not think it is. However, I look forward with interest to hearing what the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Claughton, has to say on this because he is very involved in this matter.

Lord Evans of Claughton

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I would point out that that is precisely the point about which I was speculating. If, before eviction, the owner goes to the court and says, "I want to evict this occupier" for some totally trivial reason, I was speculating whether the courts would not say: "This is totally trivial. Go away." If that is the case, we do not need this amendment.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, I think that this is a very important amendment because, although the Minister seems to suggest that there has been no pressure for this kind of thing, in fact the DoE review says at paragraph 333: Residents normally have to comply with certain site rules. On some sites these cover no more than the essential requirements for people living close to each other—restrictions on noise at night, keeping certain pets, parking, and so on, On other sites the rules have been used to intrude unnecessarily into the lives of residents by, for example, prohibiting visitors from entering the site and specifying what can and cannot be grown in gardens". These are some of the points to which the noble Lord, Lord Evans, referred. Therefore, these are some of the rules which can be broken on the allegations of the site owner and the termination of the agreement may follow. Perhaps I may read again the paragraph which we want to amend. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 says: The owner shall be entitled to terminate the agreement for any breach of a term of the agreement if, after service of notice to remedy the breach, the occupier does not remedy the breach within a reasonable time". I have just mentioned some of the possibly unfair ways referred to in the DoE report in which the site owner can press for the occupier to comply with the terms of an agreement as he sees it. We believe that where the security of tenure is concerned, it should be the court, and not the site owner, who shall be entitled to terminate the agreement. This is a very important matter and I wonder whether even at this stage, the Minister is prepared to say that he will have another look at it because it is a matter of fundamental importance to those concerned.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, with leave of the House—and I suppose that I should have been saying that all along because we are on Report—of course, we read everything that is said and we think about it. If I had really thought that the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Evans, in particular, had put the matter would have led to that kind of situation, I would certainly have said, "Yes, we will". I can only say to the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, that we will read what has been said very carefully and think about it. I can say no more. That is as far as I can go.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, I am far from happy with that reply, but at this stage I still live in hope and I think that we might live to look at the matter again. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.40 p.m.

Lord Bishopston

moved Amendment No. 18: Page 6, line 7, after ("a") insert ("substantially"). The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 18 in the names of myself and other noble Lords. Sub-paragraph (2) says: The court shall be entitled to terminate the agreement at the end of a relevant period if, on the application of the owner, the court is satisfied that, having regard to its age and condition, the mobile home—(a) is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site". We want the provion to say "substantially detrimental effect" because "detrimental effect" could in the opinion of anyone be something of a fairly minor nature. The amendment narrows the criteria for allowing the termination of an agreement due to the condition of a mobile home. An existing problem is that owners compel residents to buy new caravans from them at regular intervals, even though the condition of the first van is perfectly habitable. The formulation in paragraph 6(2) is much too loose and will allow this sort of practice to continue. It has always been argued that any mobile home has a detrimental effect on a site's amenity. It will be very easy indeed for the owner to put pressure on the occupier and threaten eviction on the grounds that a van is having, or will have, a detrimental effect, whatever that may mean. We ask what kind of security is that because the occupier will, in practice, have to buy a new van or leave. That could be very costly. The noble Lord the Minister knows of the periodic turnround of vans where an owner expects a new van to be brought from him, and as something like £2,000 or £3,000 can be involved, with new agreements and so on, it may be a costly matter indeed.

The amendment narrows the scope for eviction and the pressure to buy new vans and it will mean that the court could only terminate an agreement if satisfied that the condition and age of the mobile home meant that it was having, or would have, a "substantially" detrimental effect on a site's amenities. I think this amendment should go into the Bill. I beg to move.

5.42 p.m.

Lord Evans of Claugton

My Lords, we are still in the area of nuances of meaning of words. This is a considerable softening of the previous suggestion put forward in the Committee stage—"fit for human habitation", I think, being the criterion. I should have thought that it would be farly important that this word "substantially" should be inserted here. The owner already has, as the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, has said, considerable powers and means of requiring new caravans and so on to be bought from him. One ought, in all conscience, to have the word that is suggested, "substantially", inserted because again, subject to interpretation by the courts, it would appear that as it stands now a site owner has complete carte blanche to tell an occupier that he must have a new caravan at very frequent intervals indeed, at substantial cost to the occupier and probably considerable profit to the site owner. I should have thought that this was a reasonable amendment that the Government might consider accepting.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, I suppose the test is how substantial is "substantial". Where does one begin? The fact is that I believe that the Bill's existing provisions and the test which they impose are not light. The court or the arbitrator is required to consider the age and condition of the mobile home. He must be satisfied that, having regard to those factors, the mobile home is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site; that is, causing the site as a whole to suffer. It would not be enough for the site owner to argue that a mobile home was ugly or was of a different make from the others on the site. He must show that the age and condition are such as are harming the site. It is unlikely to be an easy matter for a site owner to persuade a court that an agreement should be terminated on those grounds when the mobile home has, in reality, a good many years' life left in it. I doubt it.

It is not only the site owner who suffers if a mobile home is in poor condition remaining on the site; it is the other occupiers as well. Their enjoyment of the site is affected if the amenity is damaged. More important, the price they can charge when they come to sell their homes will be affected by the state of their neighbours' homes. Do we really want to provide that an agreement can be terminated only when the effect of the age and condition of a mobile home has become substantially damaging to the amenity of the site and its value? I do not think so.

I think that everyone accepts that the life of a mobile home is finite. There comes a point when it has to be removed. We are talking about where the line should be drawn. I think that the Bill draws it in the right place. It provides strong protection for the occupier concerned and at the same time safeguards the site owner and the other occupiers on the site. The amendment would shift the balance in a way which I think is not desirable. I am far from convinced. I say again, when one starts talking about words such as "substantial", how substantial is "substantial"?

Baroness Ewart-Biggs

My Lords, if I might add one short word to the argument, it is that the amendment surely is not a very strong one. Adding just one word, surely, is only trying to protect occupiers on those very few sites where the site owner does not behave in a completely equitable way. There can be no doubt that some occupiers do suffer. Again there are the letters, that I do not think one can totally disregard, which have been published. I shall read one short extract where an occupier describes the situation on his site. He says: If your caravan is more than two years old on some sites, five years on others, your caravan is too old and must £… be taken off site"— or you must sell it to the site owner for a pittance. This seems such a very moderate alteration to the meaning, but it could actually protect that tiny minority of people whom the Minister has so often said he is wishing to protect by the Bill.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, there are two points here. One is the point about the occupier having difficulty in selling a mobile home to anyone else because, as we have said before, the number of sites with planning permission are so few. Where it is a condition that the van is therefore sold to the site owner the amount offered by him for it, even a £15,000 van, could be £2,000 or £3,000. After all, he can decide because if the occupier cannot sell it to anyone else then the site owner will buy it at his price. The second point is that he will decide on a new van being sold to the occupier at his price, on which he gets a profit. A third point is the one where we return to the disagreement on the meaning of the word "arbitrator". If it is to be Joe Bloggs who will decide on the condition of a mobile home—as I said, I do not want to weary the House on this; it could be a friend or relative of the site owner—then the interpretation would not necessarily be the one which would come from the courts. We have already debated the determination of agreement by the courts rather than the arbitrator. On the ground that the Minister might look again at the status of the arbitrator, which would give us more assurance, I am prepared to seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bishopston

moved Amendment No. 19: Page 6, leave out lines 24 to 32. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I seek to delete paragraph 8(2) and (3) which do away with the owner's rights to purchase a departing occupier's home in preference to anyone else. This is a point on which I touched very briefly a moment ago. In other words it abolishes the right of first refusal conferred by the Bill on the owner. We all know that considerable abuses have taken place where site owners have insisted on purchasing a van from a departing occupier. We ask the question, why should a site owner be entitled to first refusal? He makes a profit where he sells the first caravan; his continuing expenditure will be met by pitch charges and he can make a further profit, as I said a moment ago, when a van requires renewal because of its condition. The statutory rights of the owner seem to be in conflict with at least two principles of Government policy. The first is the restriction of free competition, and the second is the restriction of mobility of residents—two important points, as I am sure the House would agree. The site owner should be able to purchase a van from a departing occupier in fair competition with other potential purchasers. This is relevant to the last amendment.

In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, thought that Amendment No. 22, which also sought to abolish arrangements for commission or discount, was too sweeping, but he conceded, in columns 42 and 43, that there was "some merit" in the arguments supporting that amendment at that time. I suggest that the present amendment is more modest. It seeks only to delete the first right of refusal, and I believe that the Bill would be strengthened by its incorporation. I beg to move.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, may I just say, as I said on an earlier amendment, that I think there is some merit in this point. I certainly cannot undertake that we shall bring this matter in here at this stage, or whatever, but I feel, as I felt before, that there is some merit in this argument. I would not want just to turn it down. If the noble Lord withdraws his amendment I promise him that we will consider this. I will undertake that the matter will be considered.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reaction, and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.51 p.m.

Lord Bishopston

moved Amendment No. 20: Page 6, line 45, at end insert— (" .—(1) If any question arises whether the withholding of an approval required by paragraph 8 or 9 above was unreasonable it is for the owner to show that it was not. (2) Such an approval—

1. (a) may be validly given notwithstanding that it follows, instead of preceding, the sale or gift in question;
2. (b) cannot be given subject to a condition, and if purporting to be given subject to a condition shall be treated as given unconditionally; and
3. (c) shall be treated as given if unreasonably withheld.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, still continuing our campaign to close some of the loopholes in the measure, I shall make my comments as brief as possible. The purpose of this amendment is to bring the arrangements for the giving of approval, that is to the assignment or gift, closer to those adopted by the Housing Act 1980. In other words, the burden of proof should be on the owner to show that lack of approval was not unreasonable. The approval may follow the sale, assignment or gift. The approval cannot be made conditionally. Finally, the approval should be treated as given if unreasonably withheld.

The drafting is in keeping with the Housing Act 1980, but of course it is capable, like many amendments, of some improvement. In Committee the Minister said that this amendment tipped the balance too far in favour of the occupier. The balance is, as we have said on many occasions, too heavily weighted against the occupier, and this amendment is needed. The Minister said on 6th December (at col. 48) that the corresponding provision was needed in the Housing Act 1980 because: It is clearly important that a renting tenant should be able to get on with improving his home if the landlord is being difficult about the improvements". We feel that this amendment is needed here for precisely the same reason, because the site owner might be "difficult" about approval for the more important and pressing need to sell the mobile home to a new occupier. The owner can only veto a sale by reasonable approval if he has been unreasonable, and neither the seller nor buyer is likely to take the risk. The amendment shifts the burden of proof to the stronger party and improves the procedural arrangements. The amendment is tied in some ways to the last amendment, and I think it would help the Bill. I beg to move.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, this amendment deals with another aspect of the sale of a mobile home, and the basis on which a site owner may withhold his consent to a sale. The amendment will also apply to the provisions for the gift of a mobile home. It is another amendment that we had at Committee stage, and substantially there is not much I can add to the points I made then. The Bill uses the same approach as the 1975 Act to the site owner's consent to the assignment of an agreement; that is, it stipulates that consent must not be unreasonably withheld.

The amendment would bring in the wording of Section 82 of the Housing Act 1980. But, as I said in Committee, Section 82 is concerned with a tenant's right to improve the accommodation he has rented from the landlord. If he makes these improvements the people affected are him and his landlord and no one else. But the transfer of the ownership of a mobile home affects other people as well. It affects the other occupiers on the site. I could develop this argument at quite some length, which I suspect is not the thing to do just now. Therefore, I have to say to the noble Lord that I cannot accept this amendment. I hope I have indicated a willingness, wherever I feel there is need to do so, to look at or to make adjustments, but I do not feel that I could accept this amendment.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, living in hope, we feel that this is a matter which can be looked at again, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bishopston

had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 21: Page 6, line 45, at end insert— (", . The occupier shall be entitled to give the mobile home and to assign the agreement to any person by virtue of a testamentary disposition."). The noble Lord said: My Lords, I do not intend to move this amendment because I believe that this has been dealt with amicably with amendments of the Minister earlier on.

[Amendment No. 21 not moved.]

5.55 p.m.

Lord Campbell of Croy

moved Amendment No. 22: Page 7, line 7, after ("home") insert ("except where the re-siting is for the purpose of carrying out essential work to the site or for re-development"). The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to move Amendment No. 22. I wonder whether the provisions in this part of the Bill have fully taken into account situations where improvements of site are to be carried out. I move this amendment to indicate that there could be some doubt and misunderstanding about this. I think that everyone concerned is in favour of improvement of sites where this is necessary, or can be done, and where the owner is proposing to carry out such improvement. But during the process of redevelopment of a mobile home site it is not always possible to accommodate occupiers on broadly comparable land when they have to be moved. If there were strict enforcement of the proposed terms of this part of the Bill, the desirable or necessary development of a site might be held up, or made difficult, to the detriment of both the owners and the occupiers.

It could also be possible that sites would not be approved even though local authorities were requiring such improvement. If my noble friend is satisfied that the wording here covers those situations, of course I shall be content. I believe that these improvements would very often be carried out with the occupier's agreement. I hope that the Government will consider whether there should be something in the Bill on the lines of my amendment to cover the situation. I beg to move.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, I think that the Bill covers this, but it would help my noble friend if I were to say why I think so. The Bill at present provides that if an agreement allows a site owner to resite a mobile home elsewhere on the site the new location must be "broadly comparable". This sub-paragraph re-enacts an important provision in the 1975 Act with two minor changes. First, the Bill does not use the earlier provision which enables an owner to move a home to another part of the site temporarily while essential works, say, are carried out, subject to reinstatement either in the same position or a reasonably equivalent one. And secondly, the Bill replaces the phrase "reasonably equivalent" with "broadly comparable". This sub-paragraph is designed to ensure that if a site owner has the right to re-station a mobile home, the occupier does not suffer as a result.

It is surely right that occupiers should be able to live on a site that they have chosen, secure in the knowledge that if the owner does move them they will not be worse off. This amendment would remove the obligation to resite upon broadly comparable land, if the resiting were for the purpose of carrying out essential work or development. It would substantially weaken the protection offered to occupiers by this paragraph. It would enable site owners to move homes on site almost at will, perhaps to worse or smaller locations, if they claimed they were carrying out essential work or redeveloping the site. It is not hard to imagine a situation in which an unscrupulous site owner could move homes around without good reason on one or other of these pretexts. It seems to me right that if a mobile home has to be moved—and it will usually be in the interests of the site owner that the move is made—the move should be to a "broadly comparable position".

There may be occasions when a site owner is forced to resite a mobile home in order to comply with regulations imposed by the local authority. But if he thinks the requirement is unreasonable, he should contest it with the local authority, not penalise the occupier. As I said, I am not aware that this paragraph, which re-enacts a provision of the 1975 Act, has caused problems. I wonder, therefore, whether my noble friend will feel able to withdraw this amendment.

Lord Campbell of Croy

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for what he has said. I think everyone in all parts of your Lordships' House agrees with the principle of this part of the Bill to which he drew attention just now. The only question that arises is as to whether an improvement would actually be held up or prevented. I certainly would not wish to give to any unscrupulous owner any kind of provision to enable him to do what my noble friend suggests. and therefore I realise that the wording of my amendment could be defective in that respect. Having made the point, and hoping that the Government will bear it in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

6 p.m.

Lord Campbell of Croy

moved Amendment No. 23: Page 7, line 8, leave out ("incurred in consequence of the requirement") and insert ("of the removal of the mobile home to other land"). The noble Lord said: My Lords, a simple point is raised here. The amendment seeks to ensure that there would be excluded from the costs and expenses to be borne by the owner any charges which should properly be paid by the occupier. As the passage is worded in the Bill at present, it is not clear that that distinction would be made. I beg to move.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, the Bill provides that, if an agreement enables a site owner to resite a mobile home elsewhere on the site, the costs of that move must be paid by the owner. The costs of moving involve not only the physical moving of the mobile home from one pitch to another, but also the costs of reconnecting essential services such as water, sewerage and so on. The 1975 Act required a site owner to reconnect services. It did not specifically provide for him to meet the costs of doing so, though I think it reasonable to say that a court might well have held that such a provision was implied into the wording of the 1975 Act.

The amendment would, however, ensure that a site owner was liable only for the cost of the removal of the mobile home to another pitch. The cost of reconnection of services would fall upon the occupier. I do not believe that that is acceptable or is what my noble friend has in mind. It would be inequitable for an occupier to be worse off as a result of a move which had been initiated by the owner and which he had not asked for. If the site owner requires the move, he should pay for it.

In practice, of course, what is likely to happen is that a site owner will seek to offset the costs of restationing mobile homes by increasing pitch fees for all occupiers on the site. That effect is not, I think, unacceptable. If a mobile home is moved in the interests of the site as a whole—perhaps to carry out essential works as part of a redevelopment scheme—then the site as a whole should benefit and it is reasonable to expect the occupiers, as a whole, to pay for it. What is not reasonable is that a significant part of the cost should fall on an individual occupier, especially when he may not particularly want his mobile home moved. I am confident that my noble friend will read my remarks carefully and take the equity of the point. Accordingly, I hope he will withdraw the amendment.

Lord Campbell of Croy

My Lords, again, I am grateful to my noble friend for those comments and, again, I am the first to agree that the drafting of my amendment probably fails to meet the situation I described. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bishopston moved Amendment No. 24: Page 7, line 9, at end insert£—

("Service charges

11.—(1) If the occupier requests the owner in writing to supply him with a written summary of the costs incurred by the owner in respect of services available on the protected site in the relevant period defined in sub-paragraph (4) below, the owner shall do so within six months of the end of the period or within one month of the request, whichever is the later. (2) The summary shall set out these costs in a way showing how they are or will be reflected in the sums payable by the occupier and must be certified by a qualified accountant as in his opinion a fair summary complying with this requirement and as being sufficiently supported by accounts, receipts, and other documents which have been produced to him. (3) The occupier may require the owner in writing to afford him facilities for inspecting the accounts, receipts, and other documents supporting the summary and for taking copies or extracts from them and the owner should then make reasonable facilities available to the occupier. (4) The relevant period mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) above is—

1. (a) if the relevant accounts are made up for periods of 12 months, the last such period ending not later than the date of the request: and
2. (b) if none are made up for such a period, the period of 12 months ending with the request.

(5) In this paragraph "qualified accountant" has the same meaning as in Schedule 19 to the Housing Act 1980.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is the final amendment of the day. We have gone through the amendments rather quickly, but I hope we may return to some of them later. They are all of great importance to the occupiers of mobile homes, who, as I said earlier, represent a not insignificant percentage of the population. We are speaking in the main of permanent homes, not holiday caravans where one can endure a situation for a week or so before deciding not to go again. These are homes in which people live and many expect them to be their final homes.

We believe that the amendment, which concerns charges and the right to information, is very important indeed. It is in relation to the part of the schedule concerning the re-siting of mobile homes, and I quote the first part of it to stress its importance: If the occupier requests the owner in writing to supply him with a written summary of the costs incurred by the owner in respect of services available on the protected site in the relevant period defined in sub-paragraph (4) below, the owner shall do so within six months of the end of the period or within one month of the request, whichever is the later. We are saying that the occupier has a right to know about the charges being imposed by the site owner, including electricity, gas and amenity charges, charges for looking after the site and other charges. If the site operator is asking the mobile home owner to pay certain charges, surely the occupier has a right to have certified accounts. The amendment gives the occupier rights to information about service charges. That information may also be needed by the court or arbitrator; if they do not have that information, how can they do justice to those who appear before them? There is a growing awareness of the need of residents for this sort of information. The amendment draws on Schedule 19—perhaps I should not say that too loudly—to the Housing Act 1980, which gives leaseholders this kind of information. Further, paragraph 8.1.7 of the relevant DoE report concluded: In addition, residents should have a right to certain information about the costs of service analagous to those already enjoyed by private tenants and leaseholders". Surely the Minister will not say that other people, living in different forms of housing, should not have a right to this information—how much they pay for electricity, gas and other charges—so they can see whether the charges are fair. After all, some site owners can get an enormous profit in various ways, as I said earlier, apart from saying that the van is old and needs replacement. The site owner can in those circumstances buy the home at his price and make a jolly good profit on the sale of a new one. In all those ways the occupier is subject to the site owner's pressures. The amendment provides merely for a written summary of costs, certified by an accountant and supported by receipts, and the occupier would also be entitled to inspection facilities. If one is being asked to pay a bill, one should have a right to ask how that bill is made up. I should have thought that that was the minimum we could expect.

The Bill would be strengthened by the inclusion of the amendment. If, as the Government indicated in Committee, an amendment similar to this would go too far, they should introduce their own amendment to give these rights to information about service charges. Justice must support the amendment and I hope the Minister will either say he accepts it or will undertake to give the matter further thought between now and the next stage of the Bill.

Lord Evans of Claughton

My Lords, the amendment would and should fill a gap which now exists in the Bill. Perhaps the words may not completely satisfy the Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, said, but I should have thought that they would accept the principle of the words and introduce an amendment of their own at a later stage to give this kind of right to information to occupiers.

I recall, as I am sure the Minister does, spending hours discussing the trying problem of service charges and how to give people the information they need. One thinks of the number of Bills that have been before this House and another place trying to deal with the problem of service charges, particularly in London flats. Perhaps the problem is not of the same depth in the case of mobile homes, but in many cases the vans are the main homes of the people concerned, not just temporary holiday homes, and I should have thought that anyone who, either perforce or because he chooses, lives in a mobile home as his principal residence or as his main place of abode would be entitled to very full information about any charges the site owner is imposing, both so that the information is available so that he or someone on his behalf can check it, and, frankly, so as to keep fairly close control on site owners, who may in certain cases be tempted (who knows?) to exaggerate a little the charges they are making.

I feel strongly that the Government should either accept the amendment or undertake to introduce one which would give these people the kind of rights the Government have rightly given tenants—council tenants and lessees—in other legislation. I hope they will give a favourable reply on the amendment.

Baroness Ewart-Biggs

My Lords, I wish to support what the noble Lord has just said. To me the major aim of the amendment is to bring the rights of mobile home dwellers closer into line with the rights already enjoyed by private tenants and leaseholders, and that seems entirely appropriate. The reasons why people, especially young couples and elderly couples, choose to live in mobile homes are not going to change. They cannot afford a mortgage; they do not want to become yet another name on an endless council housing list. Surely anything to balance the rights of mobile home dwellers with those of people who live in ordinary houses should be supported.

On this point I wish to remind the Minister of something that he said during the Committee stage, when he referred to the 1975 Act. He said that he only wished that someone at that time had tried to anticipate the things to which our attention was being drawn. I think that the Minister was quite right. But I only hope that in 10 years' time the Minister's successors will not be using the very same words when referring to the imperfections that we have, sometimes vainly, been trying to draw to his attention today.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, the question really turns on the extent to which it is fair to compare. The fact is that the amendment would go much wider than Schedule 19 to the Housing Act 1980. It would require site owners to provide summaries of costs, irrespective of whether pitch fees are related to the cost of the services. When this matter was raised at Committee stage, I drew attention to the dangers of comparing the position of mobile home occupiers and tenants of flats. I do not believe that there is a valid comparison between the two. My understanding is that pitch fees are normally inclusive of services. They are normally all paid in one sum, and there is normally no provision in the agreement for the inclusive fee to be related to service costs. The amendment would, therefore, place an obligation on the site owner which could significantly affect the way that he keeps his accounts, but which would not be material to the agreement that he has with the occupier. Unless the agreement itself restricted increases in the pitch fee to increases in costs borne by the owner—and it is most unlikely that that would be the case—it would not be of any use to an occupier to have access to greater information about the costs.

As I have previously mentioned, an occupier is quite entitled to challenge the agreement that he is offered if he considers that it does not provide enough information about the yearly review of the sums payable by him, or the provision of services available on the site. Those are matters which agreements must cover. I recall that at Committee stage the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, was particularly concerned that occupiers did not have enough information about their electricity charges, for example. Where electricity is one of the services provided on site, there is nothing to prevent an occupier from asking that his agreement should include satisfactory terms about the charges to be made for it, including, for example, a reference to the maximum rates which the area electricity boards set for the resale of electricity. I do not think that the amendment is any more relevant or necessary now than it was when we discussed it in Committee.

When the noble Baroness, Lady Ewart-Biggs, reminds me of the importance of having a balance in regard to what is right on both sides, I should like to remind her that in regard to a previous amendment I told my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy why I felt that it would be wrong to accept his amendment. That was because it would swing the balance in favour of the site owner, whereas we were trying as hard as we could to maintain the fairest possible balance all round. I think that that is what we are doing throughout the whole of the Bill, and that applies to the present amendment.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, the amendment deserves much more time than it is to be given today, and I hope that we can come back to it again, or that at least it will be considered later. Surely the Minister is treating mobile home occupiers as second-rate people, because he is not giving to them the kind of rights that are afforded under the Housing Acts to other tenants, and that is really quite unjustified. Surely in matters of the resale of electricity the prices charged should be what one might call the current prices. It is possible for the site owner to buy electricity at one price and to sell it at a much greater price, and at an unjustified profit, to the occupiers of mobile homes, who as we have said are mainly elderly people. In fact the elderly, and young people with families, represent the majority of the type of people living in mobile homes.

If the Minister is saying that the legislation is fair in so far as the rents can be demanded on the basis of being fair, I would ask: how does one know that they are fair when it is not known how the charges are made up? How do the court and the arbitrator, who have to assess whether the rent demanded is fair, know what is justified if they do not know how the bills are made up? Surely the occupiers have a right to this kind of information. As I said, the Minister's own DoE report concluded that residents should have a right to certain information about costs of services and so forth. I do not intend to press the amendment now, but I hope that the Minister will look at it in the wider context of the powers of the owner and the court generally.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, and with the leave of the House, I should like to make perhaps a last comment at this stage. It is most unreasonable for the noble Lord to say that the Bill attempts to treat mobile home occupiers as second-class citizens. If that were the case, the Bill would not have been produced. I should like to remind the noble Lord that in 1975 it was not his Government who produced a Bill to deal with mobile home occupiers. Everything that I have said throughout all the stages of the Bill, and on all the amendments, has been in an attempt to show how we are trying to hold a fair and reasonable balance, not least on behalf of the occupiers. That is what we have done, that is what we shall go on doing, and I do not accept what the noble Lord says as to that.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, I should like to clarify the position. I am not saying that the Government are treating these people in a second-class way. I said just now that I supported the Government, and I praised them for bringing forward the legislation, but bearing that in mind, as well as the fact that we are trying to improve the legislation, I should not like that kind of accusation to go out. It is important that we close as many loopholes as possible. I believe that the Bill has had the support of noble Lords in all parts of the House, and we have been constructive, as well as brief, in our attempts to help the Government to produce a Bill that will be worthy of the job that they are seeking to do. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.