The Royal Navy and Naval Dockyards (Hansard, 4 May 1982)

§ Lord Boothby
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, the strength of the Royal Navy is currently evident. Its power has grown since this Government came to office. Under the Government's current defence policy further new ships will come into service and our Navy will remain very strong.

§ Lord Boothby
My Lords, arising out of that Answer may I ask one or two very brief supplementary questions of the Minister? First of all, is he aware that a nuclear deterrent is necessary in order to prevent the wholesale use of nuclear missiles which could destroy the world, but for no other purpose? The security of this country has always depended on sea power, and always will. Is he aware that it was the loss of sea power that brought us nearest to defeat in two world wars?
1048 I should like further to ask him whether he realises that the closure of the Chatham and Gibraltar dockyards will involve massive unemployment and a great weakening of the Fleet at home and total loss of sea power by this country in the Mediterranean, with the consequent dangers to our obligations to NATO? Finally, would the Minister agree that the present rundown of the Royal Navy, and the fact that the spearhead of the Falklands task force, the"Invincible", has already been sold, constitute a mortal threat to the security, indeed the survival, of Britain?

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, the noble Lord has asked four supplementaries, although perhaps the first was a comment. Of course, we share his view that there is a need for a nuclear deterrent, and the House is well aware of the very limited proportion of our defence budget which is spent on nuclear weapons. Certainly the Government agree on the importance of sea power, but I do not think I could sensibly add to the many commentaries and histories as to the parts played by all three Services in the last two wars. In relation to the dockyards, there is no question but that the existence of all the dockyards which we had provided an administrative cost and tail which was limiting our ability to buy modern ships with extremely expensive modern weapons. There will always be a change of emphasis and modernisation. At present, we have started on a dockyard reorganisation. When that is complete, both the dockyards and the Royal Navy will be, as I said the other day, in a very strong position, should a call be made on them, to rise to any emergency, such as the emergency facing us today.

§ Lord Peart
My Lords, the Minister will be aware that we supported the view of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, when we had our previous defence debate, and I congratulate him on raising the matter now. We should like to know when it will be possible to have what will be an important defence debate—I do not mean now; perhaps within the next two or three days—in view of other events. May I have an assurance that there will be one?

§ Viscount Trenchard
I understand that that will be dealt with through the usual channels, my Lords. I would just comment to the noble Lord, Lord Peart, as I have commented before, that in reviewing comparative strengths at one time and then at a later time, one must take account of all classes of ships, including submarines, and all weapons, including things like modern torpedoes, and we shall be spending £2 billion on modernising our torpedoes.

§ Lord Hankey
My Lords, in supporting the remarks of my noble friend Lord Boothby, may I ask if the Government will keep a somewhat open mind on the question of dockyards until this important affair in the Falklands has been settled and until we can see what the future shape of naval requirements is likely to be? Is it not a fact, following the thought of my noble friend, that if we had only one or two dockyards, one atom bomb on one of them might gravely maim the Navy, which would create a disastrous situation? Is it not also true that in this affair, the incredible efficiency and speed with which the Navy got into 1049 motion depended on the use of Chatham, which is due to be suppressed; Portsmouth, which is due to be reduced; and Gibraltar, which is due to be phased out? Would the noble Viscount agree therefore that it would be desirable to keep an open mind in relation to dockyards, at least until the end of this affair?

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I suggest that the first part of that supplementary would best be raised in a future debate. Concerning the noble Lord's question about Chatham and Portsmouth in relation to the current emergency, I have said before that in such an emergency we clearly need to use everything we have—both those weapons and support facilities which are being phased out and those, if we can bring them in more quickly, which are coming in. But that does not really have any bearing on the question whether the plan to base ourselves on two dockyards—not one—for the kind of force we shall have in future is or is not the best use of resources. Certainly at the time we did the review we felt it was, and we must remember that we face a number of potential threats, which have very different challenges, and not just one at the extreme south of the South Atlantic.