Defence

HL Deb 09 December 1981 vol 425 cc1344-54

3.4 p.m.

Earl Cathcart rose to call attention to the problems involved in making provision for defence, including the important part to be played in this by nuclear weapons; and to move for Papers.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. On the second day's debate in your Lordships' Chamber in reply to the gracious Speech, the topic for the day's debate was shared between foreign affairs and defence, and many noble Lords pointed out that it was not possible to do justice to both subjects in one debate. Since it is now seven months since Mr. Knott, the Minister of Defence, presented his revised defence programme entitled The Way Forward, we have all had more time to consider that and to review the major revisions he then proposed. It was good to learn from the Chancellor of the Exchequer's recently announced financial arrangements that sufficient additional funds will be made available to enable us to guarantee the 3 per cent. increase in defence spending which we have undertaken to NATO to maintain.

The Motion we are debating today specifically refers to the problems involved in making provision for defence. The problems are, of course, of providing sufficient money in the present financial climate set against the obvious need to achieve what the defence Statement of last June described in its opening sentence: The first duty of any British Government is to safeguard our people in peace and freedom".

The fundamental proposals announced last June came as a shock to most of us when we first read them. But now that we have had more time to consider them I feel that they are economically realistic and that they have not disrupted the satisfactory state of our defence posture as much as we first thought they would. However, there are still areas which cause some anxiety, the most obvious of which is our ability to protect our vital sea routes, weakened by the contraction of our surface fleet and our air defences. Whatever the outcome of the Geneva negotiations, the duty to defend the security of this country will remain and the purpose of this debate is to ensure that we are getting the best value for money to achieve that aim.

The cornerstone of our defence is NATO, which is a defensive alliance of collective security for the free Western nations. There is nothing wrong in like-minded nations grouping together in a pact of mutual protection. For that reason, there is nothing wrong when the Eastern nations of the Warsaw Pact do the same thing. With widely different codes of conduct and political theory, this division of the two sides does not surprise us. Provided the two adjacent alliances remain purely defensive, peace will not be in jeopardy. Therefore, the aim of the Geneva negotiations, and, in due course, the START discussions, must be to eliminate excessive weaponry which is clearly of an aggressive nature while tolerating defensive arrangements made by each side to safeguard its national or allied integrity.

The Motion that we are debating today emphasises the important part played by nuclear weapons in our defensive arrangements. With the existence of nuclear weapons, a policy of deterrence is inevitable. Deterrence is not a policy of aggression, and nuclear weapons forming part of the strategic deterrents is weaponry of defence. A potential aggressor has nothing to fear from them until he commits aggression.

In the Warsaw Pact alliance the Russians hold the monopoly of nuclear weapons. But that is not so in NATO, although the Americans have very much the largest share. While I agree that our strategic nuclear forces are fully committed to NATO and would never be used without the authority of NATO and the approval of the United States, nevertheless they play a most important part by deterrence in securing the integrity of NATO and therefore of the United Kingdom. I would not wish to delegate this vital part of our deterrence solely to the Americans. Although France is part in and part out of NATO, she also possesses a nuclear capability which would probably be available to the West in time of war. We would not wish France to be the only nation besides the United States to have this strategic capability. Indeed, besides adding a further dimension for the Soviets to have to consider before committing aggression—and for us to continue with our nuclear capability is highly desirable—I think it highly desirable that this awe-some weapon should not be held in the sole monopoly of one nation within the alliance. It is right that, within NATO, the responsibility of even threatening to use the weapon should be shared with more than one single nation and, since the United Kingdom has played such an important part in developing NATO's strategy of deterrence and has committed a nuclear capability to NATO, we must continue to do so and play our full part in this responsibility.

Doubt is often expressed on the wisdom of the Trident programme. Trident is certainly a most effective and modernised replacement for Polaris: perhaps I should say that Trident will be certainly a most effective and modernised replacement for Polaris. With its pinpoint accuracy and ranges of up to 6,000 miles, combined with invulnerability to any pre-emptive strike, it is a second strike weapon and will provide a most powerful strategic nuclear deterrent. The main criticism it faces is its cost, and cost-effectiveness of our defence expenditure is one of the main topics that we are debating today.

If peace is to be based on deterrence—I believe that in a nuclear age that must be a prime consideration—the high deterrent value provided by Trident is still worth going for at, as we are told, 3 per cent. of our defence budget spread over 15 years. A sound defence posture, whether nuclear or conventional, must be based on a balance of power. Indeed in 1979, Lord Mountbatten of Burma said: We are most likely to preserve the peace if there is a military balance of strength between East and West". It is to restore the balance of long-range theatre nuclear weapons in Europe that the Americans wish to deploy cruise missiles in NATO territory. This is in order to restore the balance against the new Soviet SS20s, which the Russians have been deploying in the Warsaw Pact zone at the rate of one new one every three weeks. These nuclear weapons—SS20s—with a range of up to 3,000 miles, each with three nuclear warheads, can bombard anywhere in Europe.

It is essential that the cruise missiles are deployed in this country and in other countries of NATO in order to restore this military balance in Europe. To refuse deployment of these missiles on our soil would not only denigrate the West's negotiating position at Geneva and greatly reduce the Soviets' incentive to negotiate, but it would also have a serious destabilising effect on the NATO defence posture due to the imbalance of military power.

Those who propose a defence policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament are proposing disarmament by example. But who can think that the Soviets will in any way be impressed by such example? Could such a policy, in an age when nuclear weaspons exist, satisfy the first duty of any British Government, which I quoted at the beginning of this speech?—that is, to safeguard our people in peace and freedom.

It is morally wrong to propose a defence policy for this country by unilaterally opting out of all nuclear weapons and United States missiles based here, but at the same time to announce that we wish to remain part of NATO. As NATO is a defensive alliance and, therefore, in a nuclear area it needs a strategic nuclear deterrent in its armoury, this policy is simply passing the buck to the United States. To regard NATO as a group of free and like-minded nations sheltering solely under the American nuclear umbrella is morally indefensible. If we want the protection that America can provide, we must also fully involve ourselves in the awful responsibility that goes with it.

The proposal for a nuclear-free Europe is also an attractive idea, but as a practical proposition it does not stand up to consideration. If it means that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact alliance can, by agreement, deploy any missile, ship or aircraft carrying a nuclear warhead from a base in Europe, then it places a massive advantage in the hands of the Soviets who, by re-deploying their SS20s east of the Urals—that is, in the Soviet Union and outside Europe—could bombard the whole of Europe, whereas NATO's weapons in that case could only be based across the Atlantic in America.

However, if, on the other hand, a nuclear-free Europe means not only that no nuclear launcher can be located in Europe, but also that no nuclear strike can be detonated in Europe, that of course is a very attractive proposition. But it is also a very different matter and would call for massive disarmament negotiation, far beyond anything that has yet been proposed and with far more elaborate and detailed systems of inspection and verification than has yet been devised.

Finally, there is the suggestion that if we opted out of our Trident programme and simply relied on the United States nuclear system, we could spend the money thus saved on increasing our conventional forces. Although I agree that in defence you do not need parity with your potential aggressor, nevertheless very large conventional forces indeed would be needed to deter the Soviets. Of course, it would require a very large increase in NATO forces on land, sea and air. Even assuming we only provided our share of this NATO increase and, of course, assuming that all the NATO nations agreed to do the same, our share of that increase would need to be very considerable. My noble friend the Minister gave a figure of a 60 per cent. increase in expenditure in our debate on 10th November. That figure rather depends on how you calculate it, but even if it is half that amount, it would be unacceptable. There is another aspect. We could not increase our conventional forces in manpower without resorting to a degree of conscription, and in modern warfare conscription is neither cost effective nor an efficient solution.

The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, has tabled a Motion for a short debate to discuss the problem of limiting or controlling nuclear war. That is a most important subject. Indeed, for nuclear nations it is of absolutely paramount importance. I can only wish that the noble Lord will be successful in the ballot, as it is a subject which needs to be debated. Nobody can possibly say with confidence that if one or other side ever launched a limited nuclear strike, escalation of that strike could be contained or limited. However, I noticed with interest that when the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, first tabled his Motion on 5th November he phrased it as: To call attention to the impossibility of limiting or controlling nuclear war". Since then he has amended the word "impossibility" to read "problem". This indicates to me that he has had second thoughts and now feels that perhaps full-scale escalation or Armageddon might be avoided. I believe that he is right. There must be a chance that commonsense and survival would prevail under those awful conditions.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Earl for giving way. On a point of clarification, may I point out that the alteration of that word was made at the suggestion of what is called, in the other place, The Table Office—I do not know what it is called in this House—because they felt that the word "impossibility" was too contentious for the particular form of debate which was desired on that occasion.

Earl Cathcart

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. I am sure that, in either case, it will make for an extremely good debate if the noble Lord becomes successful in the ballot, which I hope he will. In this matter of controlling escalation we must try to ensure that the mechanism of communication exists at this awful moment—as indeed it would be—when a nuclear strike occurred in order to prevent the full-scale and unimaginable frightfulness that will then take place.

We all know that a hot-line procedure exists between the President of the United States and the Russian Leader; indeed, this hot-line has been used in peace-time, at the time of Cuba, and with success. It is absolutely paramount if both sides have this frightful weapon of destruction that we are satisfied that the procedures for attempting to control it are really satisfactory. I find that I have to place some doubt on that.

I ask whether the hot-line telephone—presumably a coloured telephone on the desks of each leader—would really work in war. To what extent does the successful outcome of a hot-line conversation depend on the personality and ability of the two individual leaders? Without casting aspersions on either side, or perhaps casting aspersions on both—I must say that I am certainly not referring to the present incumbents—it is easy to imagine a situation when this awful moment comes when one or other of the leaders in office at that time possessed flaws in his personality, and in his ability perhaps, which would make a satisfactory outcome of these vital battle conversations less likely.

Is it right that this vital and perhaps final hot-line conversation should be confined to those two super powers who are capable of firing a nuclear strike? Should not, as things stand at the moment, France and the United Kingdom be included? Perhaps here there is a further argument for the USA not to be the only nuclear power in NATO to possess nuclear weapons. Should not those European countries on whom the nuclear strikes may have fallen be represented in these hot-line discussions designed to prevent the final Armageddon from occurring?

I am not sure that I can solve these questions in this debate. Perhaps they should wait until Lord Jenkins' debate comes up, when those more experienced in what I choose to call the mechanism of diplomacy can discuss how best that procedure can be improved. My feeling at the moment is that the arrangements are not as adequate as one really would want. It is worth noticing that in President Reagan's great peace offer one of the proposals was to formulate arrangements to reduce the risk of surprise attack and therefore the chances of war arising out of uncertainty and miscalculation. I believe that these arrangements might well be extended to include a system to control a limited nuclear exchange once hostilities have begun. What a valuable by-product of the current disarmament negotiations it would be if enhanced and improved hot-line procedures can be developed for maintaining communications after hostilities have begun to limit, or control, nuclear strikes if ever such were used.

Finally, I want to mention civil defence. There are people, I am sorry to say—and that includes some noble Lords in your Lordships' House—who disparage the need for any form of civil defence because, so their argument goes, in the event of a nuclear attack against this country the whole country will be destroyed and all the population killed or severely maimed. Therefore, what is the point, they say, in wasting money in peacetime on what would be a futile effort.

But, of course, those who think this assume that there will be only one scenario in the event of a nuclear attack against this country, and that is an all-out bombardment of annihilation. But there are many other situations which might occur. If ever this awful situation arose the initial strikes would almost certainly be targeted against specific targets of a strategic nature, such as airfields and ports. Destruction in a wide radius around those targets would o course be total and complete, but the effects would be less in areas further out from the point of impact, finally diminishing to lethal fall-out over an even wider area.

Many lives could be saved by a proper civil defence plan, and I believe that money is well spent on doing this. Of course, if the first nuclear strike developed into total annihilation no civil defence plan would help much, but as we have already discussed previously it may be possible to limit and control nuclear warfare. Therefore, I believe that civil defence planning must be an integral part of our total defence posture, and I know that there are a number of my noble friends who will be expanding on this subject today. The theme of my speech has been that we must remain with a strong defence, and only disarm multilaterally through careful negotiation supported by safeguards and protected by sound means of verification. There can be no place in our defence policy to disarm unilaterally. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

3.26 p.m.

Lord Brooks of Tremorfa

My Lords, I must apologise in advance to the House for not being able to remain for the debate. I have a long-standing local authority engagement in Cardiff this evening. I wish in particular to apologise to the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, to whom we are all grateful for introducing this debate. In the debate initiated by the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, on 25th November last a great many comments were made which, in my view, did not assist in the aims which are shared by every Member of your Lordships' House. We are all agreed that the arms race is becoming more and more dangerous. We all believe that nuclear stockpiles are capable of destroying the world many times over, and although there are differences over methods, there is a general wish that the present disarmament talks will result in reversing the arms race.

In that debate of 25th November the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley—and I am sorry he is not present today, for I have a great regard for the noble Earl—in opening that debate went on to devote almost the whole of his speech to attacking the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. I am not a supporter of CND, and I am fully aware of the cynical interest of the Soviet Union in such campaigns. But I do not believe that the prospects for peace are enhanced by a wholesale condemnation of the many thousands of serious minded people who genuinely dread the future prospects for mankind.

A more balanced and objective view was recently taken by Mr. Eugene Rostow, the director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, when he said that the anxiety about the possibility of war is "natural and reasonable". He went on to say that the protest movement did not mean that our, moral fibre has been ruined by the welfare state or that leaders of our churches and peace movements are all Communists or their dupes". Rather, he said, public opinion has reluctantly begun to acknowledge the true condition of world politics.

In the Defence Estimates of 1980 we were told that the increase in defence expenditure would entail a switch of resources from civil programmes to defence. The then Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Francis Pym, said in another place on 28th April 1980: Military force will not provide us with any short cuts or any easy way to a more stable world order. It should not be—and it certainly is not—our first recourse. Indeed, it is the very ast recourse—to be avoided at almost any cost".—[Col. 998.] He went on to say: The effectiveness of military force depends profoundly on our appreciation of political and social forces, both in those countries whose security we are seeking to maintain and in the West as a whole, for it is those political and social forces that determine decisively the outcome of the use of military force or its threatened use". I quoted that passage in our May 1980 debate on the Estimates, and I then went on to refer to Mr. Edward Du Cann's attack on the then Treasury forecasts for the economy, where it was said that the estimate for unemployment over the next four years was 1.8 million maximum. We all know what has happened to the economy since that forecast was made. We know that there has been a serious deterioration in public morale and that areas of our society are far from stable. The recent savage Treasury impositions on those least able to bear the burdens is not calculated to inspire public confidence in Government policies, and will certainly raise a great many questions regarding defence expenditure.

We do not know, for example, where the Government will decide to go for the new D5 version of the Trident system. If they should so decide, the 1980 estimate of £5,000 million will almost certainly be doubled. If the Government insist on the deterrent, there is sufficient support to show that Polaris provides a realistic deterrent into the next century. The current total defence budget following the recent Treasury announcement is £12,655 million and the projected budget for 1982–83 is £14,103 million. A recent Sunday Times report said that over £1,000 million extra may be needed simply to meet existing commit- ments. That report also said that Mr. Nott's long-term Defence Review in June does not appear to have gone far enough to create an equipment, personnel and deployment programme that can be sustained into the late 1980s. Indeed, Mr. Nott has recently said that the present one-to-two ratio of British military spending on research and development to production costs, if sustained, may drive us into bankruptcy". A United States Senate committee has found that on average, major weapons in the end cost twice as much as the estimate submitted when the order is first approved. A Financial Times report said it would be foolish to criticise industry alone for this situation, and that understandably the military want the best possible equipment. But even marginal improvements to weapons systems often cause more than marginally increased costs. If the cost overruns were to be only marginal, then given annual expenditure on arms of £210,000 million around the world, the sums involved would be in danger of ballooning until the balloon burst. I am grateful to the same report in the Financial Times for reminding us that in the late Middle Ages, the cavalry turned up for battle in armour so heavy that the knight, if he came off his horse, was unable to remount and fight on. Unless military spending is brought under control, Western economies could find themselves in the same unhappy position.

Defence costs must be contained to the point that our strained economy can afford, there must be more effective cost control and the burdens of defence costs must not fall disproportionately on those sections of the community least able to afford them. There must be much closer scrutiny of defence expenditure to avoid duplication and in research, development and production costs. Above all, the nation must be assured that disarmament talks are genuine in attempting to reduce the hugely wasteful and dangerous arms race which is at least partly responsible for social instability in Eastern as well as Western Europe. The Labour Party document contains this passage: The threat of war and annihilation for the people of Europe and the world is greater than ever before. Fighting continues between countries outside NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Arms spending by Governments in the third world has increased substantially, and there is reason to believe that some are developing their own nuclear weapons. This danger can ultimately only be ended by multilateral international disarmament with agreements between different countries involving both nuclear and conventional weapons". The whole Labour Movement can unite around those sentiments. Indeed, all political parties in this House can surely recognise that only by such an approach can peace be secured.

3.35 p.m.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, in his extremely persuasive and informed speech dealt faithfully with the demand for unilateral disarmament, and of course it is true that the initiative of President Reagan, his offer of the zero option, has caused a good deal of division and confusion in the ranks of the peace movements in Europe. We have only to read the explanations of Mr. E. P. Thompson and Mgr. Bruce Kent to see the extraordinary contradictions into which their position has now developed. The Reagan initiative has compelled them at last to face up to the simple fact about disarmament that you cannot bargain about nuclear weapons and at the same time throw them away. I was glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Brooks, say that he was going to bargain with nuclear weapons; of course, there can be no compromise between multilateralism and unilateralism, and we all understand that.

However, even when that happens—even when the unilateralist case is discredited—questions remain which we who are not unilateralists have to take seriously and try to answer. Could anything justify an all-out nuclear war? Could a nuclear exchange be limited? Could it ever be right to use nuclear weapons first? And if one decided never to use nuclear weapons first, it is sensible to say so in advance? Or, coming closer home—and here I would quarrel with the noble Lord—is it right to defer delivery of vital conventional weapons, such as the Tornado, in order to spend £9 billion on Trident? In the last debate I used the figure of £9 billion, having read the Financial Times on the subject, and I am hoping very much to have an estimate from the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, not of just 3 per cent. over 15 years—we are a little tired of that figure—because we want the figure; by now the Government should be able to give us, perhaps on one or two different assumptions, the cost of Trident.

I thought there was a weakness in the noble Earl's speech in that he began by saying that the economics set out in the White Paper were realistic, but he went on to say that the air defence effort needed more money, that the naval effort needed more money and that civil defence needed more money. We all waited to hear on what he was going to reduce expenditure. I have an answer, because I do not believe Trident is cost-effective. I believe the Government will come round to that view and that the reason we are not told the cost is because the Government have worked it out and have found it so appalling that they are not at all sure whether to go on with the project. We shall soon hear, no doubt, from the noble Viscount about that.

It would of course help immensely in all these problems if we could get some progress in the Geneva talks. My feeling is that they started in highly unpromising circumstances. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States could hardly be worse. There could hardly be less trust and respect between them, and both have quite plausible reasons for spinning the talks out. The Russians can reasonably hope that if they drag on, unilateralism will flourish in the West and the West will disarm itself without the need for concessions from the Soviet Union. On the American side—we must be realistic—voices will be heard arguing that the new missiles are essential to the security of the West and there would be no great loss for Western security if the talks broke down.

We must not be naive about the United States' position. The fact is, after all, that the Americans had to be pushed into these talks, partly by Chancellor Schmidt, partly by the other West European leaders and partly by the European peace movements. If President Reagan and his advisers had had a proper understanding of the issues, that pressure would not have been necessary at all. It will be remembered that very soon after he took office President Reagan spoke about getting a nuclear lead over the Soviet Union. Only last September he was saying: The argument, if there is any, will be over what weapons to build, not whether we should forsake weaponry for treaties and agreements". Well, we must hope that that was in order to establish a good negotiating position with the Soviet Union—we hope so—or we must hope that President Reagan has now firmly changed his mind and really is going to make a big effort in the talks.

I should like to raise another point with the noble Viscount. It seems to be taken for granted that the talks have to be bilateral; but it is not self-evident that an eyeball to eyeball confrontation between an American and a Russian is necessarily the best way of making progress in the talks. It is hard to see what would be lost by participation, perhaps simply as observers, by representatives of European countries. I already know the answer that the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, will give. He will say that it is the Russians and the Americans who produce the nuclear weapons. He has made that statement before in the House, in the last defence debate. But this is not strictly true. We make nuclear warheads. The French have a major nuclear deterrent, which owes nothing at all to the United States. But even if it were true that the Russians and the Americans produced all the weapons, it is in Europe that the weapons are sited, or will be sited, and if the weapons are fired, it will be in Europe that they will land. I feel that the Europeans are entitled to raise the cry, "No annihilation without representation". I ask the Minister to take the matter seriously, because I believe that the Europeans have a serious contribution that they can make, and we want to try everything possible.

It would not be so disturbing had the American Administration shown a little wiser judgment in some other aspects of foreign and defence policy since they took over. Look, my Lords, at central America, or at the military manoeuvres in the Sudan, or at Turkey—the American relations with the new régime in Turkey—or at the provision of arms for fighting the Polisario. One might not object to the fact that these actions by the United States Administration anger and alarm the communists if they did not also upset the West Europeans, the Latin-Americans, the Greeks and Cypriots, the Arabs, the Africans and the rest. I am saying that the Geneva talks would be improved if some feed-in could come from the West Europeans, and indeed President Ceausescu is taking an extremely constructive view on these matters. I do not think that these voices should go unheard.

The talks were bound to be difficult, whatever happened. I hope that the Government will now start to give clear indicatio s to the country as to how they feel the talks should proceed. How can we distinguish between theatre nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons, or between a conventional and a nuclear launcher? How can one categorise an aircraft which can use either conventional or nuclear bombs, whose range depends on its payload, and which in a few hours can be switched from one theatre to another? Under what category in the disarmament field can one classify that?

Will the Minister also say something about where battlefield nuclears come into the equation? It is a strange thing that for years there has been so little interest in the proliferation of battlefield nuclear weapons. I remember being shown a Lance missile in Germany 20 years ago, and it is interesting that at that time those weapons aroused no political interest whatsoever. So far as the unilateralists were concerned they might never have existed. I think it noteworthy that short-range nuclear weapons, or nuclear missiles, such as the SS20s which threatened London, aroused no interest among the members of CND, but the prospect of a missile that threatened Moscow was a different matter. Yes, then those tender consciences were aroused, then the sense of moral revulsion grew. I do not believe that it is a coincidence—not at all.

What I am saying is that it is time we paid attention to battlefield nuclears. There are too many of them. As the noble Earl said, the question of the use of them needs a very careful examination, and I should like the Minister to comment on that aspect as well.

Lord Kaldor

My Lords, will the noble Lord give way for a moment? I am sure that among nuclear disarmers there are many who are more alarmed about the prospects of a bomb reaching London than Moscow.

Lord Mayhew

Well, my Lords, I am not sure; I think that we are all very worried about the prospect of having to use these bombs in any circumstances, against any target of any kind.

I should like to draw my speech to an end by asking the Minister to try to answer some of these questions. I feel that the Government should take some responsibility in these talks, not just leave it to the Americans. I have seen it suggested tht there might be a single ceiling for all warheads, strategic, theatre and tactical. Have the Government considered that suggestion, and is it a possible way ahead?

Perhaps Ministers would agree that the one possible justification for possessing nuclear weapons is if they provide a credible deterrent against aggression. That does not mean matching the other side weapon for weapon, or going for some statistical parity. It does not mean that at all. It might be much easier to get a credible nuclear deterrent than to get these other things with which we seem to be so obsessed at present. It is obviously going to be immensely difficult, but if the talks fail, it would be very hard to see what other talks in the future would succeed. This might be the last hope that the world has of disarming by agreement, and that is why I urge all Governments, including Her Majesty's Government, to do their utmost to ensure that the talks succeed.