§ 7.0 p.m.
§ BARONESS SUMMERSKILLMy Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
§ Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Baroness Summerskill.)
§ On Question, Motion agreed to.
§ House in Committee accordingly.
§ [The LORD ALPORT in the Chair.]
§ Clause 1 agreed to.
1187§ Clause 2 [Matrimonial relief and declarations as to validity in respect of polygamous marriages: Scotland]:
§ On Question, Whether Clause 2 shall stand part of the Bill?
§ LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALEI must apologise to the noble Baroness and to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that I have given them no notice of the question that I am going to raise, which is a question of Scottish law on which I am quite ignorant myself. I notice that in Clause 1(2)(f) the Bill extends relief in courts of summary jurisdiction, in my view quite rightly, and the noble Baroness's new clause dealing with Northern Ireland has a similar provision. But there is no such provision in the Scottish clause. It may be that there is no court in Scotland of summary jurisdiction which can award maintenance, but I should like to draw attention to that point in case, in spite of the close timetable, it needs consideration and can be considered.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORAs the noble and learned Lord has said, I have had no notice of this, and as I am as innocent of Scottish law and legal procedure as he is, I think it is rather hard that I should be asked the question. But the noble and learned Lord will see that the court in Scotland is not precluded from entertaining proceedings for or granting any such decree as is mentioned in subsection (2) of that clause by reason only that the marriage to which the proceedings relate was entered into under a law which permits polygamy.
I am not sure that I can give without notice a compendium of the law of Scotland about summary jurisdiction, but I think that the following considerations should be borne in mind. The law of Scotland is the same as the law of England in two respects. A polygamous marriage cannot be validly contracted in Scotland, and a person of Scottish domicile cannot contract a valid polygamous marriage overseas. Such a marriage would undoubtedly be void, and as a result of this Bill, a Scottish court would be able to grant a decree of nullity in respect of it. There is no need to make provision for this in the Bill, because the. Scottish law of nullity has not been codified into a Statute. Clause 3 applies only to England and Wales, 1188 because the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971 extends only to England and Wales, and for the same reason in that clause there is no particular reason to include Northern Ireland.
The list of the decrees mentioned in subsection (2) of Clause 2 which relates to Scotland is limited, according to my information, to those decrees which the law of Scotland requires for the purposes of this Act. I am myself quite confident that it has been both exhaustive and exclusive. But what the particular answer is about summary jurisdiction courts in Scotland, I am not sure that I can say without notice.
§ LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALEThe noble and learned Lord—and I cannot blame him for this—in the first part of his answer did not deal with the point on which I was proceeding. It seems odd that subsection (2) of Clause 2 should be different from the English and Northern Irish sections. Certainly, so far as I know
a decree of separation and aliment, adherence and aliment, or interim alimentcan only be given in the Scottish High Court. It seems therefore, at first sight, that there is a lacuna here, and I hope that the matter can be considered.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORI will look into the matter, so far as I can. But I do not believe there is a lacuna here, because, although I do not know the detail of it, I do know that the law of Scotland differs on this point. If the noble Lord had given me notice, I would have found out the answer and given it to him. As he did not, the best I can do is to find out from a Scottish lawyer and tell him what the answer is. That I will do.
§ Clause 2 agreed to.
§ 7.10 p.m.
§
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL moved Amendment No. 1:
After Clause 2, insert the following new clause:
§
Matrimonial relief and declarations of validity in respect of polygamous marriages: Northern Ireland.
.—(1) A court in Northern Ireland shall not be precluded from granting matrimonial relief or making a declaration concerning the validity of a marriage by reason only that the marriage in question was entered into under a law which permits polygamy.
1189
(2) In this section "matrimonial relief" means—
(3) In this section "a declaration concerning the validity of a marriage" means—
being a declaration in a decree granted under the Legitimacy Declaration Act (Ireland) 1868 or a declaration made in proceedings brought by virtue of rules of court relating to declaratory judgments.(4) This section has effect whether or not either party to the marriage in question has for the time being any spouse additional to the other party; and provision may be made by rules of court—
in such cases as may be specified in the rules.
§ The noble Baroness said: I think this Amendment is self-explanatory. The purpose of this clause is to make for Northern Ireland provision corresponding to that contained in Clauses 1 and 2 for England and Wales and Scotland respectively. I beg to move.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORI would advise the Committee to accept this Amendment. We have gone through all the processes of consultation which are necessary, and this is desired as much in Northern Ireland as it is here.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
1190§ Clause 3 [Amendment of section 1 of Nullity of Marriage Act 1971]:
§ LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALEAre we not speaking to the Motion, Whether Clause 3 shall stand part of the Bill?
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORNo, I think not. With respect, I am now not on the Woolsack and can possibly rise to a point of Order. No, we are not dealing with Clause 3 stand part. We are amending Clause 3 before we discuss Clause 3 stand part; and that is the ordinary procedure.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEESI am directed on this. The Question is, Whether Clause 3 shall stand part of the Bill?
§ On Question, Whether Clause 3 shall stand part of the Bill?
§ 7.12 p.m.
§ LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALEAs I may now speak to what I thought I was about to speak to, on this matter I venture to raise two queries, of which I have given both the noble Baroness and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor notice. The purpose of Clause 3 is to enable the court to annul a marriage which is polygamous, if either party was domiciled in England at the time of the marriage. It is dealt with in the Law Commission Paper, paragraphs 18 and 19, and they suggest in effect that the provision of the Bill does no more than give statutory form to the existing rule. That was repeated by the noble and learned Lord on the last clause, to which it was not in fact relevant. I myself have great doubt whether they are right on that. I do not think it matters. I am sure the noble Baroness is right to include the provision.
But I have myself very serious doubts on two matters. The first is the last sentence of Clause 3:
For the purposes of paragraph (d) of this section a marriage may be polygamous although at its inception neither party has any spouse additional to the other.The intention of that, as I think, is to include within the relief of the Bill not only polygamous marriages but also 1191 potentially polygamous marriages, with which I venture respectfully to agree. But I do not believe that it does that. The words "at its inception" are liable to be construed in this way: that what you must show is that neither party had another spouse at any time during the marriage. I am sure that that is not the intention; the intention, as I think, is that it is sufficient for relief if either spouse could at any time during the marriage have another spouse. But the wordsmay be polygamous although at its inception neither party has any spouse additional to the otherseem to me to exclude the case where the marriage is potentially polygamous at its inception and there has been no after-taken spouse at all. I hope that that matter can be considered. As I say, I gave notice of it. The words to which I venture to take exception are "may be polygamous" and "although at its inception" et cetera. It suggests that only polygamous marriages are within the Bill if at some time during the currency of the marriage one party has a spouse additional to the one who is seeking relief. I repeat, I do not believe that that is the intention—that it must be actually polygamous at some time—and I hope there may be an opportunity to consider the wording of that particular sentence.The second question I wanted to ask is this. What is the legal situation if someone domiciled in Scotland enters into a potentially polygamous marriage? This is the point that the noble and learned Lord spoke to on my previous Amendment, and obviously the Law Commission considered that such a marriage would be invalid. I myself think that that is extremely doubtful. It depends on two cases at first instance which have been found very puzzling; one called re Bethell and the other Ali. It also seems to be difficult to reconcile with the generally held view that whether a marriage is monogamous or polygamous or potentially polygamous is referred to the law of the place of celebration and not to the law of the domicile, whereas this seems to proceed on the basis that it is the law of the domicile which prevents a Scotsman from entering into a potentially polygamous marriage. Unless that is right, unless no domiciled Scotsman can enter into a potentially polygamous 1192 marriage, whatever his religion and whatever the place of celebration which may permit polygamy, it seems to me again there is a lacuna in the Bill which ought to be filled.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORPerhaps I ought to speak next; I do not really know. It is quite true that the noble and learned Lord gave notice of this point. I am advised, and so far as the law of England is concerned I am convinced, that there is no need to alter the words of the Bill in either respect. If I may deal with the points in the order in which the noble and learned Lord raised them, the first question related to the last sentence in Clause 3 of the Bill, the sentence reading:
For the purposes of paragraph (d)"—which is an amendment to the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971—… a marriage may be polygamous although at its inception neither party has any spouse additional to the other.The point I think is this. We are dealing with nullity of marriage and the question whether a marriage is to be treated as a polygamous or a monogamous marriage can only be decided at the time of its inception. That is the time when the marriage is celebrated. What the last sentence says is, if at that point of time it is polygamous then it is void under the section. At any other point in time, if somebody enters into relations of some matrimonial kind with some second person it is not the first marriage which becomes polygamous ex post facto; the polygamousness, or monogamousness, of the first marriage, or of any marriage, must be decided at the moment at which the marriage is celebrated.What the last sentence of Clause 3 says—and it says no more—is that if at that moment the marriage is polygamous, the mere fact that actual polygamy is not being committed at that moment because the man has no other wife does not prevent the polygamous character of the marriage from operating. I am advised that the last sentence of Clause 3 is simply to make it clear that the phrase "polygamous marriage" is not confined to cases of actual polygamy but includes a marriage which, from the outset, is potentially polygamous in character, although there are at that time only one husband and one wife. My view, taken after having had notice from the noble and 1193 learned Lord and having taken counsel with those who drafted the Bill, is that Clause 3 as drafted achieves that purpose and achieves it perfectly satisfactorily.
With regard to the second of the two points made by the noble and learned Lord—the law of Scotland—I fear that to some extent the point is one in which the noble and learned Lord has not the same expertise as he undoubtedly has in the law of England. Nor have I, so to some extent the Committee is in the position of the blind leading the blind. But I have this advantage, that I again have had notice of this point. I have taken counsel, and the counsel that I have had is that the law of Scotland is the same as the law of England: a polygamous marriage cannot be validly contracted in Scotland and a person of Scottish domicile cannot contract a valid polygamous marriage overseas. Such a marriage would undoubtedly be void under Scottish law and as a result of this Bill the Scottish court would be able to grant a decree of nullity in respect of it. I am advised that there is no need to make special provision for this in the Bill because the Scottish law of nullity has not been codified in Statute. But as the noble and learned Lord and the Committee will remember, we did codify the English law of nullity in 1971, and it is for that reason that the law needs to be changed in Clause 3, because the law of England being codified in that way requires this additional Amendment. That is the advice which I received. So far as the English law is concerned, I am satisfied about it, and I have no reason to doubt the validity of the advice I have received about Scottish law.
§ Clause 3 agreed to.
§ 7.22 p.m.
§
LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE moved Amendment No. 2:
After Clause 3, insert the following new clause.
§
Amendment of section 2 of Divorce Reform Act 1969 c. 55
. In subsection (1) of section 2 of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 (which states what facts a petitioner may satisfy as proof of breakdown of marriage leading to divorce) after paragraph (e) there shall be added—
(f) that the respondent being the husband has married again after his marriage to the petitioner and that the other wife so married is still married to the respondent
1194
at the commencement of the proceedings, or that any other wife of such respondent husband was alive at the time of the solemnisation of such marriage and is still married to the respondent at the commencement of the proceedings."".
§ The noble and learned Lord said: The main purpose of the Bill is to enable the court to grant matrimonial relief to a spouse who was married according to a law which permits of polygamy. For the reasons that I ventured to give when this matter was debated last summer, I entirely agree with that proposal. Mr. Justice Lawson, however, as he now is would have restricted the relief to financial relief. He would not have extended it to direct relief from the bonds of matrimony so contracted; in other words, contracted polygamously. He felt that it would be a direct recognition of the validity of an institution; namely, polygamous marriage, which was fundamentally repugnant to the people of this country (as I believe it to be) because it is degrading of the status of women.
§ The majority of the Law Commission, although not agreeing with that argument, saw the force of it, as did indeed the noble and learned Lord when he spoke on the matter last summer. I myself ventured to take the same view, though I felt that the arguments in favour of the measure as proposed by the majority and by the noble Baroness carried the day. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that polygamy is an institution which is really repugnant to the social life of this country.
§ As the noble and learned Lord pointed out, this Bill does not allow—nor does the present law allow—a polygamous marriage to be contracted in this country. He has been advised that no-one domiciled in this country can contract a polygamous marriage, as to which I confess myself far from convinced, in spite of the advice that he has received. In any case, the fact remains that someone may have validly contracted a polygamous marriage in a place which permits of polygamous marriages and which is valid by his own personal law, and if he comes to this country he is married polygamously. He may, of course, bring more than one wife to this country, although I understand from the Law Commission Report that that is a very unusual circumstance. But certainly what he may do is to bring one polygamously married wife 1195 to this country, leaving another one, say, in his domicile of origin. If he becomes domiciled in this country it will not affect the marriage. It would if he only had one spouse, because according to one decision at first instance that would convert a potentially polygamous marriage into an irredeemably monogamous marriage. But if he is already married polygamously, so far as I know he would continue to be married polygamously. Certainly that would be so if he did not acquire a domicile in this country. That would mean that he could live with a wife in this country and, say, visit another wife in another country and the wife in this country would have no relief at all. She could not obtain a divorce under the existing law because sexual intercourse with a polygamous wife is not adultery. She could not prove desertion if the husband intended to return to her after visiting the other wife. The only possible relief open to her would be to wait five years in separation and then go ahead for divorce.
§ The new clause that I venture to lay before your Lordships allows a wife an immediate divorce on the very ground of polygamy. That is not an original proposal. It follows the Indian Hindu Marriage Act, although much more restrictively. That Act of 1955 abolished polygamy so far as Hindu Indians were concerned, and various other similar sects. Therefore no future marriage could take place polygamously, and any actually monogamous union was converted into an irredeemably monogamous union. But the Act—as my new clause does—went on to provide that anyone married polygamously or potentially polygamously could on that very ground obtain a divorce. Where the new clause that I have ventured to propose is more restrictive is that I have limited it to cases where not only was the original marriage polygamous but it is still polygamous at the time of the proceedings. It seems to me that what was permissible for India would hardly be proper in this country in deference to the different customs of different people, but it also seems to me that we should entitle a wife who is polygamously married and who remains polygamously married to terminate the union.
§
I know it will be said—because I had a courteous answer from the noble and
1196
learned Lord's Department—that that might be difficult to reconcile with the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which lays down in Section 1 that breakdown of marriage is to be the sole ground for divorce. I do not agree with that objection because Section 2 of that Act goes on to say:
The court hearing a petition for divorce shall not hold the marriage to have broken down irretrievably unless …
one of five conditions is satisfied, and my proposal would merely add a sixth. It goes on to say in subsection (3) of that section:
If the court is satisfied on the evidence of any such fact as is mentioned in subsection (1) of this section …
any of the facts of those five matters to which I would add a sixth—
… then, unless it is satisfied on all the evidence that the marriage has not broken down irretrievably, it shall … grant a decree..
that is, a decree of divorce. The new clause I propose fits perfectly well into that. I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, and the Lord Chancellor have always seen the point that one spouse need only say, "I will not in any circumstances live with the other," and the marriage has broken down irretrievably. No court can gainsay that. One cannot say, "We have seen your husband in the witness box and he is a most charming man. We have seen your wife in the witness box and she is a most charming woman. We find it difficult to believe that the marriage has really broken down irretrievably." The spouse has only to say, "I am sorry, it is not your opinion but mine that matters. You may like him or her very much, but I do not and, what is more, I will not live with him or her any longer."
§ If a polygamously married wife were to say that to the court, then the court would, in my view, hold that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. It seems to me that if we really mean what we say—that polygamy is repugnant to the social life of this country as degrading to women—then some such provision as I have ventured to propose to your Lordships should be inserted in the Bill. I hope that it can be accepted as it stands because I do not want to do anything that might prejudice the passing of the Bill, which I regard as a valuable measure of social reform. I beg to move.
1197§ 7.35 p.m.
§ BARONESS SUMMERSKILLI was particularly glad to hear the last sentence of the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, in which he said he did not wish to prejudice the Bill. I confess that when I first saw his Amendment—he will agree that we have had very little time to consider it—I was somewhat apprehensive lest tomorrow, when the Bill goes to another place, it might provoke discussion and consequently jeopardise the Bill. I am therefore pleased to know that the noble and learned Lord feels as strongly as I do on this score.
I listened with interest to the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, when he said that he had had to take counsel. I always think that his wisdom is so profound that he never needs to take counsel in any legal matter. I, too, have had to take counsel, and no doubt my information, because it comes from the Lord Chancellor's Department, is already known to the noble and learned Lord. However, I think that in the circumstances there should be a record of it in Hansard.
It would appear that the proposed clause has two limbs. The first would enable a wife to obtain a divorce if her husband took another wife after marrying her. The second would enable a second or subsequent wife to obtain a divorce on the sole ground that her husband had a previous marriage subsisting when she married him.
§ LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALEAnd is still subsisting.
§ BARONESS SUMMERSKILLIn either case, the other marriage must be still subsisting at the commencement of the proceedings. It seems to me that neither of these limbs can realistically be regarded as evidence of breakdown, which is now the sole ground for divorce under the 1969 Act, into which the new provision would be inserted.
Under the first limb, the husband has done what his wife well knew he might do when she married him—namely, take another wife. Under the second limb it is the mere fact that she has herself married him when he had another wife which enables her to seek a divorce. These are novel principles which do not fit easily into the concept of breakdown.
1198 Furthermore, the proposal seems to conflict with the basis of the Law Commission's Report, which is that family relationships validly created abroad should be recognised here unless there are compelling reasons of public policy to the contrary. Their recommendations were that such relationships should be subjected to the normal English matrimonial law and not that they should be treated differently.
Whether public opinion would endorse this proposal is by no means certain. The leaders of the non-Christian communities living here might find it objectionable that a marriage valid under their law could be dissolved on grounds relating not so much to the conduct of the parties as to the essential characteristics of the marriage. Moreover, a divorce on those grounds might not be recognised in the parties' country of origin, and more "limping" marriages might be created.
English public opinion might also be divided. The wife of a polygamous marriage could obtain a divorce under this proposal on no other ground than she wished to be free from the marriage. An English woman cannot do that and I am sure, knowing and admiring the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, so much, that he would not like to establish this discrimination. She, the English woman, has to establish one of the grounds of breakdown and may have to wait five years.
It seems that the Indian Hindu Marriage Act is not a good precedent. It was passed to stamp out polygamy among Hindus but it had no effect on persons living in India of other religions. A Muslim woman cannot get a divorce in India on these grounds, nor, so far as is known, in any other country in the world. There is certainly no need for legislation to discourage polygamy in the United Kingdom because it is not permissible here. I therefore feel that the noble and learned Lord's proposal must be justified on some other ground than a mere comparison with the Indian Hindu Marriage Act. The noble and learned Lord will agree that a substantial new principle is therefore at issue and cannot properly be decided without most careful research and consultation.
It was clear to me from what he said and from what the noble and learned Lord Chancellor said that even with the 1199 profound wisdom of such eminent members of the legal profession, questions of this kind did pose other questions of such importance that it will take some time to examine it very carefully. Therefore I do ask the noble and learned Lord to leave this matter for this consideration because the reaction of the other place is unpredictable. We who have been Members of that other place know what can happen on Fridays and I am quite sure that my noble and learned friend does not wish to imperil this Measure and I do ask him therefore at this stage to withdraw his Amendment.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLORI can never listen to the noble Baroness on a legal subject without thanking my stars that she never went to the Bar and adopted instead the humane profession of medicine because all of us would have been out of a living if she had really been given a chance. I doubt whether she is ambitious that way—
§ BARONESS SUMMERSKILLIt is too late.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR—but if she did I feel sure she would sweep to the top in a very short time.
I should like to join with her in a plea to my noble and learned friend not to pursue this Amendment at this stage and I do so broadly on similar grounds. I do not want to be pedantic but I must point out, in support of what the noble Baroness has stated, what the long Title of this Bill is about. It is not a Bill to alter the substantive law on divorce in this country. It does in one respect amend the Nullity of Marriage Act which is not the same as divorce. It gives matrimonial relief which includes divorce. It does not alter the grounds of divorce and what the noble Lord is seeking to do—and it is not a matter of pedantry; it is a matter of reality—is to go outside the ambit of the Bill altogether. It would be out of order in the other place and will only become in order in this place if we alter the title of the Bill.
This is rather a serious matter. We passed a special suspension of Standing Orders in order to allow the Bill to get to the other place for ratification tomorrow if need be as it has got to be amended in one respect, as the noble Lady has already done, and now we are being asked by my noble and learned 1200 friend to add a provision to the Bill which is actually outside its ambit and to send it back to the other place to-morrow. I must beg him not to try that. It is a very piratical thing to do, if he will forgive me for saying so. I will come to the merits of this in a moment.
This Bill was after all fully ventilated in this House last year. It was drafted on the basis of a Law Commission Report which has been very well known for much longer than that—I forget the exact date of it. It has gone all the way up the other place. Its terms were perfectly well known to my noble and learned friend and at any time from the first delivery of this Report from the Law Commission my noble and learned friend had only to communicate with me, or with my predecessor, to say that he wanted to achieve this particular result, and we could have taken the necessary counsel to do it. We would have at any rate given it a very fair consideration coming from so eminent a source as my noble and learned friend. But to do it now at the notice of something like 48 hours is to put us in an impossible position. I should never like to alter the substantive law on divorce even at the suggestion of my noble and learned friend without consulting the judges of the Divorce Division through the President and I could not possibly have time to do that. The Law Commission cannot be consulted in the time.
As the noble Baroness has pointed out and as my noble and learned friend will remember from his less respectable days as a member of a political Party in another place, the Commons could quite easily resent the sudden intrusion of this Amendment into the Bill asking them to pass it at the last moment. The noble Baroness is right; it departs from the basic approach of the Law Commission Report, which was that the status of a marriage validly acquired overseas by persons of foreign domicile should be respected. That was their design. The Bill is designed to extend matrimonial relief to them but the Bill is not designed to cast any doubt on the validity or propriety of their marriage previously entered into.
I would have thought myself that at any rate in some of the circumstances postulated by my noble and learned friend divorce would have been available to the 1201 wife treated in that particular way. It is true that sexual intercourse between polygamous partners cannot be adultery to one other partner of the triangle—if one can put it like that—but if he keeps a wife in two countries one of which is England, I would have thought that the English wife, with a certain amount of sympathy from the Divorce Court, could have said that the marriage was irretrievably broken down on the basis—and here I quote:
… that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent".I would have thought that if he did visit India from time to time to visit his polygamous wife, came back to England and expected his wife to live with him indefinitely without getting a divorce, that there was anyway a reasonable prospect of her going to the Divorce Court and saying that he behaved in a way up with which his English wife cannot be expected to put. Of course, that would be a question to be thrashed out in the courts. But in the meantime we have to deal with the Amendment. I agree with the noble Baroness that the provision may very well be regarded as objectionable by leaders of non-Christian communities here. They are entitled to expect their personal law to be respected unless there is good reason to the contrary.It could well be objectionable to English opinion here because it would put Muslim women in a privileged position. It would be open to them to bring divorce proceedings as soon as their jurisdictional qualifications were satisfied without bringing in the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Others of the population have to satisfy the breakdown requirements. It discriminates between the sexes. And, as the noble Baroness has also pointed out, there is the fact that the Hindu Marriage Act in India is not open to non-Hindus and it represents not a real contribution to the law on Christian marriage but a social policy of the Indian Government with which all of us must sympathise, to discourage Hindus from having more than one wife, which they do for various reasons, some of which are good and some of which may be more questionable.
All this, I would have said, leads me to reinforce the noble Baroness's plea. 1202 This proposal forms no part of the particular law reform which the Bill is about. It is no part of any necessary consequence of the law reform which this Bill is about; it relates to the law of divorce and would need the closest consideration before it could be accepted in principle. The Law Commission have not considered it, the Divorce Judges have not considered it, the various interested bodies have not considered it, and I would suggest that the best thing to do if one wants to pursue a separate proposal of this kind, is to put it forward in the ordinary way as a potential law reform and not to seek to tag it on as part of this Bill.
§ LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALEI am accustomed to eat out of the hands of the noble Baroness and my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. I confess that this evening I have been far less than convinced by the arguments of either of them, which were indeed to some extent mutually inconsistent and contradictory. However, I see no purpose in arguing the matter in detail. As I assured the noble Baroness—and I adhere to this—I shall take no step that might endanger the future of this Bill in another place. Therefore I do not propose to pursue the Amendment, and I beg leave to withdraw it.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Clause 4 [Short title, interpretation and extent]:
§
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 3, line 26, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
("(3) In subsection (2) of this section "enactment" includes an enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland; and for the purposes of section 6 of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 this Act shall, so far as it relates to matters within the powers of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, be deemed to be an Act passed before the appointed day within the meaning of that section.")—(Baroness Summerskill.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments; Report received.
§ Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution) Bill read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
§ [The Sitting was suspended at eight minutes before eight o'clock and resumed at eight o'clock.]