HL Deb 02 August 1972 vol 334 cc382-98


Peers and peeresses entitled to receive writs of summons to attend the House of Lords.

Members of the House of Commons.

Officers of the House of Lords.

Officers of the House of Commons.

The Forces

Full-time serving members of—

(A person excusable under this head shall be under no obligation to attend in pursuance of a summons for jury service if his commanding officer certifies to the officer issuing the summons that it would be prejudicial to the efficiency of the service if the person were required to be absent from duty.)

Medical and other similar professions

The following, if actually practising their profession and registered (including provisionally or temporarily registered), enrolled or certified under the enactments relating to that profession—

The noble Viscount said: The other day my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor introduced new clauses dealing with juries. In this clause we have a part of the rewritten law which deals with the categories of people who are ineligible, disqualified and excusable as of right from jury service. In practically every respect, and certainly whenever there was any difficulty, we have followed the Report of the Committee headed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest. I could, if noble Lords desire me to do so, go through all of these categories and explain why we have done it in this way, but it might be more convenient if I were to resume my seat and wait for noble Lords to question me on any points that are outstanding. I will willingly explain to the best of my ability anything that is in the least obscure. I beg to move.


Am I right in believing that this new provision includes the words, "Peers" and "Peeresses?"


Yes, that is so.


In that case, while I do not oppose the Amendment I feel that some protest should be made at this stage. Women Peers have virtually established in this House their right to be known as such, as distinct from those who are in the building because they are wives of Peers. That is the way in which they wish to be known. I understand that there may be technical difficulties about it, but I thought that we should not part with the Amendment without drawing attention to this point.


I, too, must comment on this subject because this concerns something for which we have been struggling ever since we came into your Lordships' House. We are women Peers and we have exactly the same privileges as Life Peers. A Peeress is something quite different. She is the wife of a Peer whereas we are Peers in our own right.


I have been shown a substantial file containing the history of this controversy going back, as my noble friend Lady Elliot of Harwood said, a very long way indeed. It contains some arguments and details of great fascination. I appreciate that this matter is dear to her heart in the same way as it is of considerable interest to other Members of your Lordships' House, and very understandably so. I assure the Committee that I tried valiantly to see whether the popular terminology "Women Peers" could be used in this context. I gather that because in the drafting of the Peerage Act 1963 the term "Peeresses" was used, if we did not follow that terminology there could be difficulty.

It is all very well to use in this House terminology which everyone here understands, but outside we are dealing with those who have to administer the jury law and decide who is and who is not eligible or can be excusable as of right. It would be confusing outside this House if we did not use the same expression as appears in the 1963 Act. Thus, after a good deal of consultation—I promise the Committee that this is not something we have done lightly; we have done our best to consult everybody, both inside and outside this building—I am afraid that we have had to come to the conclusion that this is the only way in which it can be satisfactorily expressed in Statute. That is no indication of how it should be dealt with in any other place. I am simply saying that I am afraid that in this Bill it must be expressed in this way to avoid difficulties of interpretation.


The noble Viscount said that he had consulted everybody. So far as I am aware, I was not consulted. Nor do I think the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, was consulted.


She was.


I apologise to my noble friend. She may have been consulted, but I was not. The fact remains that we do not wish to be called Peeresses. We are not Peeresses. We do not want to be known by that name in this Statute or elsewhere. We are Peers and whether we are ladies or gentlemen we should all be known by that term. There should be only one category in this House and this fact should be established immediately.

Had I known that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, intended to raise this matter—indeed, had I known about the matter at all—I would have tabled an Amendment to alter the term. Whether it is used in a Statute or elsewhere, it is not true, because we are not Peeresses and nobody in this House is a Peeress. As I say, we are all Peers, whether we are hereditary or Life Peers. It is high time that the Government realised this, and I am sure that if she were in her place I would have the backing of the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, for she and I are the sole remaining two of the original four who originated this question. It was quite obvious from the beginning that this was something that had to be described accurately. When on a platform I may be described as a Lady as distinct from a Lord, but here I am a Peer like the rest of your Lordships.


Perhaps I may come to the defence of the Minister. I was one of the people who pointed this matter out to him originally, and after having discussed it with the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, he was good enough to tell us both that he had looked through everything and that what we wanted was impossible. Perhaps he won us over, as he put up such a good case on this particular occasion in the Prince's Chamber. We both had an undertaking, however, that this was once and for all and never again would this matter arise. So far as this particular matter was concerned, as he explained he could not do very much about it because of translating the Act. Rather than hold up the business of the House further, I think I can speak on behalf of Lady Wootton of Abinger and myself and say that we are prepared to let it go, but for this once only. I am very grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner for raising it in the first place. I think it is better for a man to raise the question of "Women's lib." anyway.


May I address a question to the noble and learned Viscount? When we are asking to be excused as a right should we claim to be "Peers" or "Peeresses"?


Fortunately, in the drafting of this Bill the choice is one which the noble Baroness can make herself. She can come under either category. I do most earnestly hope that I never have to legislate for noble Baronesses again or pilot a Bill through the House. However, if I do, then upon my own head be it. The trouble about what my noble friend Lady Elliot of Harwood says is that whatever she may say is in the Statutes, unfortunately in the 1963 Act the word "Peeress appears and there is nothing that I can do about it. I have to be consistent, and the drafting in this Amendment has to be consistent with that particular Act because it was that Act, if my noble friend will recall, which introduced into this House those—dear me! what shall I call them?—women who have Peerages of their own through heredity and who were described as "Peeresses". Therefore, I am very sorry but to be consistent in statutory terms this is the only way to do it.


Has the noble Viscount considered inserting a simple provision at the Report stage of the Bill to remove the word " Peeresses " from the 1963 Act and substitute "Women Peers"?


My contention is that you do not need the word "Women". We are "Peers". I am just as much a Peer as Lord Gardiner is a Peer and just as much a Peer as Lord Denham is a Peer, and the word "Peeress" has nothing to do with it. We are "Peers".


That is not right. There is the gravest possible dispute among those who hold hereditary Scottish Peerages as to what they are, and there are other people who hold English, British or United Kingdom Peerages who happen to be women. What they all are technically is a matter of the most incredible obscurity, and I do not think I can accept what my noble friend says.

7.35 p.m.


This third new Schedule, Amendment No. 56, is the Northern Irish Clause 30. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— After Schedule 1 insert the following new Schedule—


Reference to Court of Criminal Appeal of point of law following acquitted on indictment

48A.—(1) Where a person tried on indictment has been acquitted (whether in respect of the whole or part of the indictment) the Attorney General may, if he desires the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal on a point of law which has arisen in the case, refer that point to the Court, and the Court shall, in accordance with this section, consider the point and give their opinion on it.

(2) For the purpose of their consideration of a point referred to them under this section, the Court of Criminal Appeal shall hear argument—

  1. (a) by, or by counsel on behalf of, the Attorney General; and
  2. (b) if the acquitted person desires to present any argument to the Court, by counsel on his behalf or, with the leave of the Court, by the acquitted person himself.

(3) Where the Court have given their opinion on a point referred to them under this section. the Court may, of their own motion or in pursuance of an application in that behalf, refer the point to the House of Lords if it appears to the Court that the point ought to be considered by that House.

(4) If a point is referred to the House of Lords under subsection (3) of this section, the House shall consider the point and give their opinion on it accordingly; and section 38(1) of this Act shall apply also in relation to any proceedings of the House under this section.

(5) Where on a point being referred to the Court under this section or further referred to the House of Lords the acquitted person appears by counsel for the purpose of presenting any argument to the Court or the House, he shall be entitled to his costs, that is to say to the payment out of moneys appropriated from the Exchequer of Northern Ireland of such sums as are reasonably sufficient to compensate him for his expenses properly incurred for the purpose of being represented on the reference or further reference; and any amount recoverable under this subsection shall be ascertained as soon as practicable by the Registrar or, as the case may be, such officer as may be prescribed by order of the House of Lords.

(6) A reference under this section shall not affect the trial in relation to which the reference is made or any acquittal in that trial.

(7) In this section " the Attorney-General" means the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland.")—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

Schedule 2 [Minor and Consequential Amendments]:


This is the Royal Ulster Constabulary consequential. I beg to move Amendment No. 58.

Amendment moved— Page 40, line 25, at end insert—

("The Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 In the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851

  1. (a) in sections 27 and 29 for the words "county inspector" (wherever occurring) there shall be substituted the words "chief superintendent of police"; and
  2. (b) in section 44, for the words from "county inspector shall " to rank of county inspector" there shall be substituted the words "'chief superintendent of police' means an officer of the Royal Ulster Constabulary having the rank of chief superintendent".")—(Viscount Colville of Cuirass.)


Amendment No. 59 is consequential on the probation sub-areas. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 41, leave out lines 14 to 19.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)


With the agreement of the Committee I will move Amendments Nos. 60 and 61 together. They are concerned with costs in the higher appeal courts. I beg to move.

Amendments moved— Page 41, line 34, leave out ("after subsection (4) there shall be inserted") and insert ("for subsection (4) there shall be substituted") Page 41, line 40, at end insert— ("In section 17 of the said Act (interpretation), the definition of "prosecutor" in subsection (1), and subsection (4), shall be omitted.")—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)


Page 42, line 35 at end insert— ("(cc) in section 67(1), after the words `probation order' there shall be inserted the words a community service order' ").

The noble Viscount said: This Amendment needs a word of explanation; it is about the community service orders. A little earlier the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, was speaking about Section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act and the effect on remission. He said there were certain exceptions about previous periods in custody before sentence. And it is indeed so. If somebody is made the subject of a probation order and also a conditional discharge and a suspended sentence, time spent in prison before the sentence does not count towards remission if he does something he should not do, goes back to the court and is put in prison for it. It seems to us that community service orders fall into exactly the same sort of category as those three existing provisions of the law, and we therefore want to accommodate the community service in the same way and make time spent in custody before a community service order is passed not count towards remission, in the same way as in the other three cases I have mentioned. I beg to move.


I am not absolutely happy about this, but I do not want to delay the Committee to-night. May I look at it with my noble and learned friend and perhaps raise it again on Report?


Indeed it is absolutely parallel to the three other cases which I mentioned, which in some instances have been of very long standing. I do not think there has been any complaint about this point in the prison community, because they realise that although they were in custody on remand before sentence, they were given a chance to be free and it is their own fault that they breached the probation order, or whatever it was, and got back into prison. Therefore, to count the previous period is going too far even for this particular provision. I do not think it has caused any difficulty in the other cases where it already applies.

7.39 p.m.

LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 62A: Page 43, line 7, at end insert—

"The Criminal Appeal Act 1968

After section 17, insert the following new section: (17A) Appeal against interlocutory decision of trial judge. The Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction to entertain and determine an appeal against the refusal of the trial judge to order further particulars of the charge or charges and against such other interlocutory decisions of the trial judge as may be specified in Rules of Court which may also make provision as to the circumstances in which and the limitations subject to which any appeal against an interlocutory decision of the trial judge may be made.'").

The noble and learned Lord said: As this is the last Amendment on which I shall say anything, may I begin by saying that on the first day of the Committee stage I said that I thought a number of the difficulties the courts had run into on the Theft Act were due to Amendments proposed by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. I had not observed when I started to say that that he had left the Chamber; otherwise, I should never have said it. He has since told me that the only difficulties have been due to the wrong decisions of inferior courts which, happily, he and his fellow noble and learned Lords have since put right. If he tells me that, then I of course accept it and I am sorry to have given him any offence.

This Amendment is a mere proposal—I referred to it on the Second Reading—and it arises simply in this way, as my noble friend Lady Birk would be the first to agree, that one of the things some of us least like in our law is that part of the procedure which started with the Star Chamber and which consists of our law of conspiracy. As we know, there has recently been rather an increase in the prosecuting authorities' liking to charge conspiracy, because it gives evidentiary benefits and what A says to B may be evidence, whereas otherwise it would not. We have run into an era in which, for instance, if two men have done a burglary then instead of charging them with what they have done, which is burgling the house, they are charged with conspiracy to burgle. When they know what they have done it may cause no difficulty but, as I understand it, your Lordships' House have said judicially more than once that sufficient particulars must be given before charging conspiracy to enable them to know what it is, and when and where they are supposed to have done it.

On the other hand, I am told, though I cannot vouch for it myself, that the judges at the Central Criminal Court at least, have decided never to order any further particulars to be given. If this were so, I should have thought there ought to be some way to correct it, but I see no way in the absence of a right of appeal from such a refusal. In fact, in a case to which I have referred the noble Viscount, that was tried, but the Court of Appeal said: "We are a statutory court and the only things we can do are those which appear in the Act. We have never had any power to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order in a criminal case". This Amendment has been put down with a view to rectifying that. I expect that it is in the wrong place in the Bill and is wrongly worded, but it is simply a new section to provide a jurisdiction in the Court of Appeal to hear an appeal against an interlocutory decision of a trial judge. I have made it very much subject to rules, because it would obviously have to be guarded and limited, and I thought that the judges themselves would know much better than I do to what rules they should be subject.

I know already that the Amendment is wrongly worded, because the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice, has been kind enough to point out to me that it appears to cover matters arising after a jury has been empanelled. I never intended that at all. When I said "interlocutory order", I meant something that had arisen before the trial. I naturally accept that from the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice. I never intended that; otherwise you would get great delays taking place and people wanting to appeal from some order made while the trial was on, simply for the purpose of delay. On the other hand, as I understand it, and I hope the noble and learned Lord will not mind my saying so, he does not seem on the whole to be opposed to the Court of Appeal having such a power, provided that it does not apply once the jury have been empanelled. With that I entirely agree. I beg to move.

7.43 p.m.


I have, of course, followed up what the noble and learned Lord said on Second Reading. Certainly the Central Criminal Court pleads not guilty to what he says. I think I am justified in accepting that plea, seeing who they are, so that perhaps that is one thing that is not so much a worry. One of the difficulties about this, apart from the scope—about which I should like to say a word in a minute —is the policy matter of whether one should give to the Court of Appeal criminal division a fairly large volume of extremely urgent work. It is no use their sitting on these things and setting them aside for hearing after some time; this sort of interlocutory appeal would have to be given priority over everything else they were doing. Even if the jury were not empanelled, an appeal on an interlocutory point means that the case in the lower court cannot even start. So one has to look at the burden on the Court of Appeal criminal division to see whether they could do this. I suppose that to some extent the answer is that one wants to see how much you are giving them to do.

I know the noble and learned Lord started this matter off when he was on the subject of conspiracy, but I do not think he really confines it just to that. Certainly as the Amendment is drafted at the moment, it goes miles beyond the sort of Collins situation to which he referred. For instance, among the more important of the decisions that would be covered by the Amendment are these: a motion to quash an indictment; an application to amend an indictment; an application for severance of the indictment so that the accused, if there were several, could be tried separately: a request for an adjournment; an application for transfer of the place of trial; proceedings to forfeit the accused's own recognisances; a request to the judge to sentence a co-accused who pleads guilty so that he can be called as a witness; an application to withdraw a plea of guilty. Certainly some of these could take place after the trial had started.

I think the difficulty about trying to say anything about this at the beginning of August is that one has got to go pretty fully and carefully into it, not only with the Court of Appeal judges themselves but with the officers and others who are extremely experienced in its technicalities and practicalities. The noble and learned Lord said, rightly, that this would be novel, because it is not a power that this statutory court has got at the moment, and even if one had rules I think the Government would like rather more time than we have had to consider this. I am sorry if that sounds rather a feeble excuse.

There have been a number of pretty important Amendments down on this Bill. I do not underestimate the importance of this Amendment for one moment, although I do recall what Lord Justice Salmon said in the Collins case about the merits of the particular matter. Certainly the implication was that if a judge did not do what the applicant suggested there were plenty of opportunities on merit for Collins to get the matter put right, either there or on appeal if convicted. There have been some very important Amendments on this Bill, and we have been consulting with the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice, for instance on Clause 30. The noble and learned Lord has got one or two other things to do, and I am afraid this is not a matter to which I have got round. I cannot make any promises as to whether anything can be achieved on this by Report stage. We have probably got to the Vatican—I do not know where we are in law terms—and therefore a lot of the important people are not there.

What I think the noble and learned Lord has done is to draw attention to an important matter which certainly ought to be considered. I rather doubt whether we can deal with it in this Bill, but I do promise the noble and learned Lord that it is something we shall look at, even if we cannot take advantage of this vehicle to do something about it. He knows from his professional experience and as Lord Chancellor that this is a fairly large embarkation to make, and I think he would probably understand if I said that I would want to take a departure of this sort quietly and calmly and with due consideration. In those circumstances I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord would be prepared to leave it with us, even on my rather unhelpful suggestion about Report stage, because we want to do it justice and avoid getting it wrong.


I am very happy with that. I thought I had pretty well confined it to particulars because I said … to order further particulars of the charge or charges and against such other interlocutory decisions of the trial judge as may be specified in Rules of Court which may also make provision as to the circumstances in which and the limitations subject to which any appeal against an interlocutory decision of the trial judge may be made. I really only wanted to enable both the Government and the judges, if they thought it right, to do this. It is the sort of point on which the judges know far better than I do what they want to do or do not want to do. I should have thought it was doubtful whether there would be many such appeals, but I am very happy to leave it with the noble and learned Viscount, and if he does have a chance to talk to the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice, before we come back perhaps he would do so. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.


With the leave of the Committee, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 63 and 64. These are consequential on earlier Amendments.

Amendments moved— Page 44, line 23, at end insert—

("The Courts Act 1971

In the Courts Act 1971, the following amendments shall be made—

  1. (a) in section 31(4), for the words " recorded in the juror's book " there shall be substituted the words " shown in the electoral register"
  2. (b) in section 33(1), for the words from "and who" to the end of the subsection there shall be substituted the words" to be summoned (without any written notice) for jury service up to the number needed (after allowing for any who may not be qualified under section (Qualification for jury service) (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972, and for refusals and challenges) to make up a full jury";
  3. (c) in section 34(2), for the words from " notwithstanding" onwards there shall be 395 substituted the words " excuse him from so attending (whether or not he is a person entitled to be excused under section (Qualification for jury service) (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972)";
  4. (d) in section 40(2)(b), for the words" included in the relevant juror's book or jury list" there shall be substituted the words qualified in accordance with section (Qualification for jury service) (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972";
  5. (e in Schedule 4—

in paragraph 3, for sub-paragraph (2) there shall be substituted the following sub-paragraph— (2) In section 29 of the Juries Act 1825 for the words" any of the courts herein-before mentioned "substitute " the Crown Court"; at the end of paragraph 6, there shall be inserted the words " or in consequence of section (Qualification for jury service) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972".")

line 27, at end insert—>

("The Road Traffic Act 1972

In section 105(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 after the words for the purpose of endorsement" there shall be inserted the words " (or its production to comply with section 23(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 in the case of disqualification under that section)".").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 3 [Repeals]:


I beg to move Amendment No. 65. These are the comprehensive jury repeals which follow on the Morris Committee Amendments.

Amendment moved— Page 44, line 29, at end insert—



Chapter Short Title Extent of Repeal
31 Geo. 3. c. 32. The Roman Catholic Relief Act 1791. Section 8 the words "from serving upon any jury or".
6 Geo. 4. c. 50. The Juries Act 1835. Sections 1, 27 and 50.
33 &34 Vict. c. 77. The Juries Act 1870. Sections 4, 5, 7 to 10, 25 and the Schedule.
53 &54 Vict, c. 21. The Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890. In section 8, the words "or on any jury or inquest whatsoever".
53&54 Vict, c. ccxliii. The London Council (General Powers) Act 1890. Section 26.
Chapter Short Title Extent of Repeal
7 Edw. 7. c. cxl. The City of London (Union of Parishes) Act 1907. Section 26.
9 & 10 Geo. 5. c. 71. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919. In section 1 the words "and a person shall not be exempted by sex or marriage from the liability to serve as a juror".
In section 4(2) the words from" and any enactment relating to juries" onwards.
9&10 Geo. 5. c. 92. The Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919. Section 8.
12 & 13 Geo. 5. c. 11. The Juries Act 1922. the whole Act.
19&20 Geo. 5. c. 17. The Local Government Act 1929. Section 79(1).
11 &12 Geo. 6. c. 65. The Representation of the People Act 1948. Schedule 10, Part II, paragraph 7 (2).
12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6. c. 86. The Electoral Registers Act 1949. Section 3(1). Schedule 2.
14 & 15 Geo. 6. c. 53. The Midwives Act 1951. Section 22.
15 & 16 Geo. 6. &1 Eliz. 2. c. 44. The Customs and Excise Act 1952. In section 2(1) the words "or on any jury whatsoever ".
1 &2 Eliz. 2. c. 50. The Auxiliary Forces Act 1953. In section 39(3) the words " and shall be exempt from serving on any jury ", and the proviso.
2 & 3 Eliz. 2. c. 70. The Mines and Quarries Act 1954. Section 144(5).
3 &4 Eliz. 2. c. 18. The Army Act 1955. Section 183.
3 &4 Eliz. 2. c. 19. The Air Force Act 1955. Section 183.
5 &6 Eliz. 2. c. 28. The Dentists Act 1957. In section 32, in subsection (1), the words "serving on all juries and inquests whatsoever and from"; subsection (2).
9 & 10 Eliz. 2. c. 34. The Factories Act 1961. Section 145(5).
10 & 11 Eliz. 2. c. xlii. The British Transport Commission Act 1962. Section 43(2).
1964 c. 42. The Administration of Justice Act 1964. Section 21. Schedule 3, paragraph 13.
Chapter Short Title Extent of Repeal
1964 c. 48. The Police Act 1964. In Schedule 9, the entry relating to the Juries Act 1870.
1965 c. 16. The Airports Authority Act 1965. Section 10(5).
1966 c. 36. The Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966. Section 24(1).
1967 c. 80. The Criminal Justice Act 1967. Sections 14 to 16.
1968 c. xxxii. The Port of London Act 1968. Section 154(4). In Schedule 2, Part I, paragraph 14.
1970 c.9. The Taxes Management Act 1970. Section 5(2).
1971 c. 23. The Courts Act 1971. In section 31, in subsection (3), the words from "and in section 1" onwards; and subsection (7).
Section 33(3).
In Schedule 4, paragraphs 1 and 2.
In Schedule 8, paragraph 11.
—((Viscount Colville of Culross.)

With the leave of the Committee may I deal with Amendments Nos. 66, 67 and 68 together? They are all consequential Amendments. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 44, line 49, column 3, after ("onwards") insert ("paragraph 3(4)").

Page 45, line 8, at end insert—

("15 & 16 Geo. 6 and 1 Eliz. 2. c. The Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1952. In Section 17, in subsection (1), the definition of "prosecutor" and subsection (4).")

persons (if any) as may be co-opted to be members of the sub-committee; but so that the number of co-opted members of the sub-committee shall not exceed the numbers of its members who are members of the principal committee.")

Page 45, leave out lines 16 to 18.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No.69: Page 45, leave out lines 25 and 26.

The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos 69 amd 71 go together. The Road Traffic Act 1972 consolidation measure repealed the Road Transport Licensing Act 1957, and we are therefore swapping references and repealing both of them. I beg to move Amendment No.69.


Amendment No.70 is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 45, line 46, column 3, after ("3") insert ("paragraph 19(4) and").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)


I beg to move Amendment No. 71.

Amendment moved— Page 46, line 35, at end insert—

("1972 c.20. The Road Traffic Act 1972. Section 185(1).")
—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.


Amendment No. 72 brings into the Title reference to juries. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— In the Title, line 5, after ("methods)") insert ("to amend the law about qualification for jury service, the summoning of jurors and the payment of allowances in respect of jury service").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

Title, as amended, agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments.

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