HL Deb 19 March 1970 vol 308 cc1300-22

6.10 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will refer to the Geneva Disarmament Conference a definition of how far nerve gases and defoliants come within the provisions of the Protocol of 1925.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Unstarred Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. I do not imagine that the Minister who will be replying to the debate will object in any way to my raising this issue tonight. It was clear when we had exchanges and questions on this subject that there was great uneasiness on all sides of the House. This was indicated by the interventions of the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, and the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, from the other side of the House, and by a series of questions put from these Benches. I think this disquiet arises from two sources: first, concern about the development and the use of chemical weapons, particularly as evidenced in Vietnam; and secondly, the reversal of British policy in regard to the scope of the Geneva Protocol.

I think it desirable that the facts about British policy should be placed on record. The Protocol itself prohibited, the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices. There is no doubt at all that the British Government took the view that the Proto- col ruled out all gases, including the less lethal lachrymatory gases, the tear gases. This was the view of Labour Governments, Conservative Governments and National Governments over the period of the last 45 years. Mr. Hugh Dalton was questioned in 1930 on the extent of prohibitions under the Protocol. He replied (Hansard, February 18, 1930) that tear gases were included. Arthur Henderson gave a similar reply as recorded in Hansard of November 24, 1930. At the League of Nations Preparatory Disarmament Commission held in 1930, Lord Robert Cecil for the National Government then in office, went further. Arguing that lachrymatory gases were included in the terms of the Geneva Protocol, he said that the prohibition extended even to those gases which are not dangerous to health.

This rule of "no gas" was accepted because it was the only positive and simple standard for agreement about where to draw the line. It was recognised that when harassing gases were used in order to enhance the lethal effectiveness of conventional weapons, the distinction between the lethal and the incapacitating chemicals lost any essential meaning. This comprehensive definition was also urged because of the danger that a Government might justify their use of a particular gas on the ground that it was harmless when in fact there were doubts about it.

This is exactly the situation which has now arisen by the Government's decision to regard the CS gas as not prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. My noble friend Lord Chalfont said on February 26—I quote from column 161—that CS gas is not significantly harmful, except in exceptional circumstances. I think I can show that the evidence from Vietnam indicates that it is "significantly harmful".

In regard to his statement, that, If, for example, this substance were used in very high concentrations in enclosed spaces over long periods, this would be an exceptional circumstance, I think I can show that a prolonged period is not necessary for it to be lethal. In my experience, it is now fairly well known—

THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD CHALFONT)

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he can clarify a point for me which may be useful when I come to reply? I understood him to suggest that exposure to CS gas over a long period might be lethal. Was he really intending to suggest that?

LORD BROCKWAY

Well, my Lords, I thought I was reading the noble Lord's exact words. He said in this House on February 26 (column 165) when he was explaining the exceptional circumstances: If, for instance, this substance were used in very high concentrations in enclosed spaces over long periods, this would be an exceptional circumstance. I am trying to show that the experience in Vietnam indicates that it is not necessary to be concentrated over long periods.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, I am sorry, but I must get this clear because it is a most important point. In his original remarks my noble friend said—

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, may I ask the Minister to address the whole House?

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, I am sorry. The point I am trying to make is that in his original remarks my noble friend said that it is not necessary to have a long period for this gas to be lethal. As that suggestion will appear on the Record I am most anxious to know whether that is what my noble friend meant to say, because it is a most important point.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I want to say that it is not necessary for CS gas to be used for a long period in order to be lethal. I say that, and I will give the evidence for it. We have had more than one report from Vietnam that when containers of CS gas are thrown into dugouts in which villagers have taken refuge, women and children have been suffocated while the men, on emerging, have been shot down, which has been the object of the exercise. More than that, much more impressive than that, I want to quote the judgment of someone who is universally respected, an elder statesman in the best sense of that term, an authority who does not use words lightly and one unrivalled in his study of armaments, for which, indeed, he was presented with the Nobel Peace Prize; I refer to Philip Noel-Baker. In his letter to The Times on February 12 he used these words, and I hope the Minister will listen: In Vietnam CS gas is used by United States forces almost daily, and in enormous quantities. Delivered by six-inch shells on the trenches and bunkers of the N.L.F. soldiers, it makes a concentration that can be lethal, and which is wholly intolerable, if the soldiers stay in shelter; if they come out, they are killed by concentrated artillery or machinegun fire. Directly or indirectly, CS has been among the biggest killers in the Vietnam war. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said that so far as Britain is concerned, if it were ever necessary for British troops to use this substance, it would be used to save lives and to take prisoners."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26/2/70; col. 162.] I have no doubt at all that that would be his wish; but does he really believe that in circumstances of battle crisis, if the gas were available and could be used offensively, as it has been in Vietnam, its use would be limited to saving lives? That would be stretching our credibility too far. It is the nature of war conditions which makes comparison with the use of CS in riot control unreal. Its use in containing demonstrations is to limit violence; it may be to save lives. But war is violence; its means of victory are to kill.

My question also deals with defoliants. I do not propose to go into detail, partly because it is the CS gas which the Government have legalised and also because there will be some controversy whether the Geneva Protocol covers defoliants, though it does prohibit not only gases but all analogous liquids, materials, or devices. I was able to indicate in the exchange of questions regarding herbicide 245T on March 11 that researches in the United States had been so frightening in what they revealed of deformities caused in births from infected pregnant animals, that President Nixon had prohibited the use of 245T in America and limited its use in Vietnam to unpopulated areas. I regard this latter decision as very significant indeed.

It has been suggested that our Government's decision to exclude CS from the provisions of the Geneva Protocol was made to encourage the United States to sign the Protocol, with the reservations involved in the use of gases in Vietnam. My Lords, I hope that that is not true. There is deep concern and debate in America on these issues, with influential figures pressing for further decisive action on chemical and biological weapons. Our influence should be used to encourage those tendencies, not to compromise with them. We have reason for some optimism. President Nixon has banned the production in America of biological weapons, and their use; he has banned the production of toxins for germ warfare; he has banned the distribution of the herbicide 245T in America; he has supported the British proposal for an ininternational Convention outlawing biological weapons. We should be encouraging this tendency in America instead of retreating from it. So far from taking a step which limits the international prohibition of chemical agents, we should be seeking to extend it.

I turn to the proposal in my Question that we should refer this issue to the Geneva Disarmament Conference for decision, rather than insist on our unilateral interpretation. If I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, misunderstood my references on February 26, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Convention on Biological Warfare. I did not suggest that they had anything to do with CS in their contents; I did suggest that if we unilaterally decided that a particular gas was not within the terms of the Geneva Protocol, a precedent would be set for other Governments to decide exceptions when they signed international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Warfare Convention.

When it was proposed that the Geneva Disarmament Conference should define the scope of the Geneva Protocol the noble Lord said: … in any international instrument of this kind it is up to the individual signatories to interpret the Treaty they have signed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26/2/70; col. 163.] Does the noble Lord realise that even in this disinclination to accept an international interpretation of the Treaty he is going back on British precedent? When there were previous doubts about the scope of the Protocol, the British representative, Lord Robert Cecil, sought the opinion of other Governments in the League of Nations Preparatory Disarmament Commission in 1931.

On this matter—again, I am sure, unintentionally—the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, slightly misrepresented me. I did not say that opinion was unanimous on the Commission. I said that it was the general view that lachrymatory gases came within the terms of the Protocol. In fact, all the 12 delegates who spoke on that occasion, with the exception of the United States delegate, endorsed the view that these gases do come within the terms of the Geneva Protocol. The U.S., which had not signed the Convention, was the only dissenting Government on that occasion. The question which I wish to ask is this. Why, if we could consult the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in 1931, cannot we consult the Disarmament Conference today?

I sincerely regret becoming engaged in controversy with the noble Lord. I believe we agree fundamentally. If I may say so, his speech yesterday was magnificent. I was thrilled to the depths by what he said, and I am going to quote it now. He said that we spend, … nearly one-tenth of the world's resources on the means of destroying each other when two-thirds of the world's population do rot get enough to eat. Young people simply do not understand this … and they believe, as I do, that we shall be looked upon in the future as some kind of barbaric society. They will want us to move away from that … we can move from it".—[OFFFICIAL REPORT, 18/3/70, col. 1214.] Old as I am, I believe that in making this appeal I am expressing the mind of the youth to whom the noble Lord referred.

I want to be helpful. The Government have taken the decision to legalise CS gas in war, and I recognise that it is difficult to go back on a decision of that kind. But surely it would not be inconsistent for the Government, in view of the disquiet which has now been expressed, to say that they will stats their view to the Disarmament Conference but seek the reactions of the Disarmament Conference. The noble Lord suggested that the Conference had more important matters to deal with, and I recognise the part that he has played in the discussions. But the Conference is now discussing the most relevant issues—the Biological Warfare Convention, its extension to chemical agents and its relationship to the Geneva Protocol. Surely nothing would be more logical in this context than to consider the scope of the Protocol as I have suggested.

I do not ask the Minister for a decision today. I ask him only not to turn down this proposal. I ask him to take it to his colleagues and to say to them how wide is the support and how deep is the concern.

6.35 p.m.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, in rising to support the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and to speak particularly to that part of his Question connected with CS gas, I would say that I hope your Lordships will not judge it as a sign that I do not regard this matter as of the deepest importance if I do not detain you long. There are two basic reasons for this. The first is that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in his very thorough and wholly admirable speech has covered so much of the ground. The second reason is that, while it is easy to get involved in the juridical and scientific arguments about this matter, it seems to me that the fundamental point is a simple one and not very involved in queries about who did what, when or why.

The basic assumption, ever since 1930 when we signed the Protocol, has been that gas has been included in the Convention. It has been the assumption of the British Government; it has been the assumption of other countries involved. International opinion has always viewed it so, and continues to do so, finally reaching a peak in the United Nations debate at the end of last year. In my view, international opinion is right to have taken that line. The broader such a Convention is, or the larger ground it can cover, the better and happier we must all feel; and, indeed, there is a very strong case for saying that this is the only line which can be drawn, the line which bans all gases.

I cannot accept for a moment the idea that in war, even with the best will in the world by the best Government in the world, this gas could or would be used only to save life. As the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has said, war is a much more savage matter than that, and the experience that we have already had of CS gas in the hands of one of the civilised countries of the West shows us that the danger is quite enormous.

It seems to me that there would have to be a very good reason for us to disagree with world opinion on interpretation in this matter; and no good reason, except the one which I think has been shown to be fallacious—the one that it might save lives in war time—has been given for taking it on ourselves to interpret the Convention in this way. If anything, this is a case for rethinking. I know that everyone in this House joins in the most tremendous admiration for the work that Britain has been doing in Disarmament Conferences. It is one of the things we can be very proud of over the last few years, and to no one does more credit go than to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. I think it would be very sad indeed if we were now to spoil this record.

I join with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in asking not for any kind of hasty answer to the Question, but that in a matter as important as this the Government should go back and think again, and take into account and consult, if necessary unofficially rather than officially, with other countries so that we may not act unilaterally in such a dangerous and difficult matter.

6.40 p.m.

BARONESS BIRK

My Lords, I usually try to take the view in any debate that if the ground has been covered before I speak (and, if so, it has usually been covered very well) I should try not to repeat the same arguments. On this occasion, however, I fear that I shall have to go over some of the same ground in speaking to the Unstarred Question raised by my noble friend Lord Brockway, because it seems to me a matter of such importance and such concern to the people of this country; and I do not think that what the Government have decided to do has received as much publicity or has been as clearly understood as it should be.

On February 3, in another place, the Prime Minister referred to CS gas as "smoke". I would only say that a gas by any other name smells just as bad. However, on looking up the word "smoke" in the Oxford Dictionary one finds the following interpretations: The visible volatile produce given off by burning or smouldering substances". I do not think that is what we are discussing. Then: A mist, fog or miasma. Fume or vapour caused by the action of heat on moisture"— and may I say that I understand from experts who know much more about the technical side than I do that in any case the substance we are discussing, CS, is too thin ever to be called a smokescreen.

My noble friend on the Front Bench was very anxious to get quite specifically what it was that my noble friend Lord Brockway was saying when he referred to the effect of CS gas in concentrated doses in enclosed spaces, and whether or not this was lethal. I do not think we are discussing whether it is lethal: we are discussing whether this obnoxious substance should be made legal and whether, in doing so, we should break the legality of a Convention which we entered into and in fact promoted for very many years. But on the point of whether it is lethal or incapacitating, it does not seem to me, with great respect to my noble friend on the Front Bench, that this is very relevant—although I appreciate the difficulty facing anybody speaking for the Government on this matter, since it must be extremely hard to find any arguments at all for the decision. A group of consultants working on behalf of the World Health Organisation recently reported that: No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between lethal and incapacitating agents used in chemical and biological warfare, because incapacitating agents can be lethal or permanently disabling in certain circumstances (e.g. in the presence of malnutrition or preexisting disease; in infants or the aged …). For similar reasons, no sharp demarcation line can be drawn between harassing agents and other antipersonnel chemical agents ". That quotation comes from Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, W.H.O., page 12.

Now I take the view that for us to make a decision of this sort is a completely retrogressive and retrograde step, so far as disarmament is concerned; and it has a rather unfortunate irony in that my noble friend on the Front Bench who is to answer this Question did have (I do not know if he still has) the title of Minister for Disarmament. To argue also that CS gas is O.K. if taken in small doses is really like saying that a girl is just a little bit pregnant. What we are all concerned with, of course, is not to argue whether it is a little bit worse here or a little worse there.

My noble friend Lord Brockway dealt with the question of its use in warfare to flush people out in order that other weapons could be used to make quite sure that they are killed. This must mean an escalation in the whole field of weapons, whether they are chemical, biological or nuclear. Once we do a thing like this, we cannot be surprised if the floodgates of armaments are opened, because we ourselves are driving a coach and horses right through a Protocol which we were very instrumental in bringing about and which we have been promoting for many years. What we are doing—and this is really, I think, the core of it—is abandoning the standard of "No gas". This, I think, is the most important point, and this is something that people—the general public—can understand quite clearly and quite simply.

It also seems to me to create a moral problem over and above the one which faces all of us as individuals. Take the case of the scientist who feels that he has a responsibility to society and is concerned not just with the scientific results of his work but also with the social results. If he is working on a gas like this, having taken the trouble to read up the Protocol of Geneva and to read the different comments of support that we have made over the years, he can be put in the position of actually helping to produce something which, in his opinion up to that point, was not going to be used in warfare and was simply outside the bounds of involvement in warfare, but which he suddently finds has now been included as a weapon of war by his own Government. These, I think, are some of the problems that face the individual.

Here, I really must take up some of the points made by my noble friend Lord Chalfont when answering my noble friend's Question in the House on February 26. He said that it was up to the individual signatories to interpret the Treaty. My Lords, this seems to me an extraordinary way to go on. We do not allow somebody who is up before a court for breaking some law to say: "I find it very difficult and I do not accept the legal argument. I did not interpret that as stealing; I was borrowing it according to my lights". This, evidently, is in fact what we are going to do. I think it is quite clear that that part of the Protocol dealing with the use of chemical weapons in war is a declaration of customary international law. It is not contractual; and even if it were, we could withdraw only if a fundamental change of circumstances had occurred. This has not happened; and in my view—and, I think, in the view of most Members of this House—it was a declaration to which we were a party and which we should still be keeping.

My noble friend on the Front Bench also said that developments since 1925 and 1930 have led us to the view that a different interpretation can now be made. To save time I am paraphrasing my noble friend's words, but I think he will see that this is what he said. I should have thought that what had happened in the last 40 years would surely lead us not to loosen the bonds of the Protocol but in fact to tighten them. In any case, CS gas, as I understand it, was synthesised in 1928, which was two years before Hugh Dalton, in another place, promoted the Protocol.

My noble friend Lord Chalfont also suggested—in fact, he did not suggest: he said—that when it was proposed that tear gas should be excluded the reaction was not unanimous, and it was not true that only the United States was not prepared to go along with us. Of the 13 countries taking part in that particular debate, all except the United States agreed that to use tear gas in war was forbidden. In my view, there is no evidence to show that the other half-dozen silent countries were opposed to this. Indeed, if one is opposed to something one is much more likely to get up and speak about it than if one is in sympathy with it. What I think is very significant is that so far not one Member of your Lordships' House, whose name was on the list of speakers has spoken in favour of the Government's decision.

The noble Lord made a further point: that he did not see why our interpretation of the Geneva Protocol should have any effect on our draft Convention on biological weapons. If I may say so, with respect, this seems a curiously naïve attitude. Moreover (we do not know but it may have been true when he was last in Geneva because they had not then realised the implication of what we were doing), I doubt whether this will hold water for very long. Even if it could be argued on that basis, what price is our credibility worth when, on July 2 last year, U Thant appealed to the members of the United Nations to affirm once again that gas and chemicals and biological weapons should not be included in any form of warfare? Then in December of last year there was a vote in the United Nations Assembly, and by 80 votes to 3, with 36 abstentions, it was again affirmed that international law forbade the use in war of any chemical agent which had direct toxic effects on man. This must include tear gases.

Another curious point, it seems to me, is that, again in answering my noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, pointed out that the Himsworth Committee were studying in greater depth the problem of the use of CS gas in Ulster and that there would be a long-term report. If the Government are going to take notice of this report, why not wait until the report is produced before going ahead? The experience, as I understood it as a nonscientist, from reading the short report on Ulster, makes quite clear that unless people can emerge very quickly from the enclosed surroundings, and come out into the open air, they are bound to be affected.

It was also stated in the report that people who are bronchial or asthmatic, or who have other complaints which are responsive to this gas, can suffer effects as bad as if they had naturally had a bad attack of the ailment from which they suffer. It seems a rather curious thing if it is to be said, as an argument to support the use of CS gas, that if it makes people as ill as they might naturally be, it is not too bad. Does it mean that even when we use this gas in riots at home, or in any civil war, in order to be absolutely fair there would be some people who would be licensed to be gassed and others who would not? We should get ourselves into a most tremendous tangle. Whether we use it or whether we do not, in Ulster or in any other place, when we are not involved in international warfare, is, to me, quite irrelevant in this debate. We come back to the principal point: that we entered into an agreement under international law, and we have broken that agreement.

So far as the war in Vietnam is concerned, I support entirely what has been said by my noble friend Lord Brockway, and by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. I would only add that in 1965, when it was decided to use CS gas in Vietnam, it was stated that it would be used in order to save lives. That, in fact, is on the same basis as it has been put to us in this House and in another place. Yet at the hearing before the Committee of the United States House of Representatives from November 18 to December 19, 1969, Han Swyter, who was on the staff of the Assistant Secretary for Defence, said that about three-quarters of the 6 million pounds of CS gas used in 1968 was used essentially to kill people. So, my Lords, let us get rid of that "fairy tale" right away. I do not know whether it will make any difference now—possibly not—but there are some occasions when, even though one may be repeating what others have said, even though one may be doubtful about the outcome of one's words and the words of one's colleagues, one has to stand up and be counted. I feel deeply upset and ashamed that the Government which I normally support should have made such a decision.

6.55 p.m.

LORD RITCHIECALDER

My Lords, I apologise for intervening without notice. I did not expect to be able to be present, but if I had known that I should be present I certainly would have put my name down in support of the Question put by my noble friend, Lord Brockway. I agree with everything that has been said. As one who has been involved in international work for many years and has defended and justified British decisions, I have a sense that it is almost impossible to defend this situation; not just on the question of expediency but because we have set a deplorable example of what we are capable of doing unilaterally in a situation which, to the best of my knowledge, has not been challenged, except perhaps on some basis affecting not what we were going to do but what other people were doing.

I wish to point out that this gas is not smoke, despite what was said by my right honourable friend, the Prime Minister. It can be a heat vapourising principle. By any definition, or however you like to qualify what you say, or defend or excuse its use in riot situations, and so on, I can assure your Lordships that under war conditions, for example in Vietnam, its use is biological and not chemical warfare. The very nature of tear gas is progressively to exhaust the tear ducts of the eye. As your Lordships will realise, the eye is probably the most vulnerable portal of the body, yet we never get heavy infection through it because we are defended by the tear ducts. If in such a situation as that in Vietnam, in a jungle situation of that kind, you exhaust the tear ducts, you are exposed to the invasion of biological infection.

My Lords, a great deal of nonsense has been talked about the fact that we can qualify the meaning or uses of gases. I would go even further and oppose its use even in civil disturbances, and the ultimate abuse of it in civil disturbances. We could be very bighearted and say that it is used to avert more serious circumstances. But let us choose the situation that we are trying to avert and see what would be involved. I say with some hesitation, because I do often accept objective evidence, that I have not seen objective evidence to satisfy me about what happened in Ulster. Incidentally, the report of the World Health Organisation referred to by my noble friend, Lady Birk—I am subject to correction because I have not had a chance to check the reference—was endorsed by Sir Solly Zuckerman or by Britain's representative on that Group.

This means, my Lords, that we are spelling out the things which in fact we are allowing; we are spelling out what is wrong with it and in the next breath we are justifying its use. There is one ultimate in this matter which has nothing whatever to do with the scientific or any other justification. By destroying—and I mean destroying—the credibility of the British Government on the Protocol, we have done immense damage to the power of initiative and our sense of direction in our disarmament negotiations.

6.59 p.m.

LORD ARCHIBALD

My Lords, may I also apologise for intervening without giving notice? I want only to express the deep sympathy which I think all on these Benches have for my noble friend, Lord Chalfont, on the Front Bench who has to reply on this matter. I think he is in the unfortunate position that he has no support from his own Back Benches.

7.0 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, like the noble Lord who has just sat down, I do not envy the role of the Minister on the Government Front Bench. All the more so when I think of the work he has done to scale down these horrible engines of war. If my intervention is brief, it is not because I or any of my noble friends on these Benches do rot attach great importance to the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. If I may say so, I thought that his speech was very moderate in tone, and I support him. He said that we should be encouraging this tendency. Surely there will be no doubt about that. He also said that we should be seeking the reaction of the Disarmament Conference.

I am not going into, nor am I qualified to do so, the technical details of whether CS gas is smoke or whether it is a vapour. This is something quite beyond me. But it is not beyond the comprehension of the Geneva Conference, and it is for this reason that I hope that Her Majesty's Government will think again. I know perfectly well that the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister, in replying to the question which was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, was replying perfectly sincerely when he said that perhaps CS gas was less horrible than bullets. That may be so but, as has been pointed out, CS gas, of course, can be used as a means of smoking people out like fillets (if I may use the expression), bolting them out, and then killing them by some other means. There is, I think, no comparison between the use of CS gas for riot control and the use of CS gas in war.

I join with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I can well see that if this gas is allowed for civil uses, it will also be allowed in war. I beg Her Majesty's Government to take the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and refer this matter back. It would not be an undignified thing to do. I think that it would be something of which we could all be proud, and certainly we on these Benches would not crow or in any way be jubilant if Her Majesty's Government had to submit to a little humiliation.

7.3 p.m.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, this has been a very interesting discussion and I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Brockway for raising it, though I must confess that a good deal of what has been said has nothing much to do with my noble friend's Question. If your Lordships look at the Order Paper, you will see that the Question refers to nerve gases and defoliants, and we have spent a good deal of this evening talking about other things. However, the Rules of your Lordships' House are elastic. In the course of the few remarks I have to make I shall try to answer some of the extremely powerful and, to my mind, valid, points that have been made, valid in the sense that I think it is right that they should have been raised. Before I do so, I should like to express my gratitude to noble Lords for some of the remarks they have made about the role that Her Majesty's Government have played in disarmament negotiations. I am particularly touched by some of the remarks that have been made about my own modest contribution.

I should like first to answer my noble friend's Question, because even though it is an Unstarred Question, I think it deserves an answer. The short answer, I am afraid, is, No. This may seem unequivocal and unaccommodating, but what my noble friend asked was whether we will refer the question of nerve gases and defoliants to the Geneva Conference. So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, nerve gases fall clearly into the category of chemical methods of warfare covered by the Geneva Protocol, of which we are a party. I know of no controversy about this and I see no reason to refer it to the Geneva Conference. On the subject of defoliants, we have never regarded defoliants and herbicides as being covered by the terms of the Geneva Protocol nor do I know of any Power which does. I think again that there is no point in referring this to the Geneva Conference. So the answer to the Question on the Order Paper is, No.

However, I think that it would be right to take up the point that has been made by most noble Lords who have spoken this evening, referring to the Government's recent decision on CS gas and the Geneva Protocol, but which was not mentioned (I hope I am not labouring the point) in my noble friend's Question. This subject has already been exhaustively discussed in both Houses and I do not propose, obviously, to go into the matter in any great detail here. The Government's view on this and the reason for taking this decision were made plain both by me in this House on February 26 and by my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in another place on February 2.

However, I think there are a number of points that have been made that are so important in their implications that I should try to reply to them. The first point I would make is that references to the way in which the substance CS has been used, or is alleged to have been used, by United States Forces in Vietnam are not entirely relevant to the decision which Her Majesty's Government have taken. I am not going to be drawn into a debate here on what American troops are doing in Vietnam. However, I would say that to match the document which has been adduced to show one way in which the Americans can use this gas in Vietnam, there is adequate documentation to show that it has also been used very considerably to facilitate the taking of prisoners and the saving of lives in Vietnam, both of noncombatants and of American forces. I beg my noble friend Baroness Birk not to dismiss this entirely as fairy tales. This substance has been used by the Americans in many different situations. As I said, this is not entirely relevant to our own decision but I think it right to point out that there is more than one side to this particular question.

My noble friend Lord Brockway has rightly said that we should be encouraging any tendency in the United States towards arms control, particularly in the field of biological warfare. I think that at the time he was referring to President Nixon's historic denudation of the use of biological weapons on behalf of the United States. I know that my noble friend, who is an expert in these affairs, must have noted the exact United States position. I will not labour this point, but I think that he will have read President Nixon's statement and he will know the American position not only on biological warfare but also on the Geneva Protocol.

The only point I want to make in your Lordships' House is that there is no sign whatsoever that anything we have done in our interpretation of the Geneva Protocol has had any kind of discouraging effect upon the United States in their search for a multilateral agreement on biological warfare. Although the United States have made this unilateral renunciation, they have over and over again, in various places, given the fullest support to the British attempt to reach a multilateral agreement on this issue.

Can I assure my noble friend Lord Brockway that there was no misunderstanding in my answers to him in your Lordships' House on another occasion. I did not misunderstand his reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I merely said that in my view our action was not relevant to any interpretation that we or anyone else may make of any other treaty. I think this is a valid point to take, although I understand fully what his argument is about.

I think there is some misunderstanding in our minds about the whole question of interpretations of international instruments—and both my noble friends Lord Brockway and Lady Birk referred to this. It is indeed the case that signatories to international instruments are entitled to make their own interpretations and reservations about an internationally agreed instrument. That has been done on many occasions: indeed, noble Lords will recall that in the case of the very Protocol about which we are speaking the United Kingdom Government made two clear reservations in the period between 1925 and 1930 when the Protocol was signed and ratified. These reservations were to do with the use of weapons in retaliation and the use of weapons against non-signatories of the Protocol. Those were unilateral reservations entered about the Protocol, and it is quite normal and customary for Powers signing international agreements to do this.

If I may diverge for a moment to the analogy of my noble friend Lady Birk, I do not think her legal analogy is a particularly good one. Like most analogies, it falls down if you attempt to follow it to its logical conclusion. She said that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was a declaration of customary international law. That may be her opinion, but it is not universally agreed. So far as I am aware, the Geneva Protocol is an international agreement arrived at by agreement among the signatory Powers. Whether it is a declaration of customary international law is another matter, and that is something about which lawyers have different views.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? The British Government did have reservations; but is it not the case that those reservations were made during the discussions of the Protocol, rather than after it had been ratified? And were they not part of the negotiation for its ultimate ratification?

LORD CHALFONT

That is indeed the case. This is another example of where comparisons and analogies fall down if they are ruthlessly followed to their logical ends, as my noble friend has done. It is true that these reservations were made in the course of negotiations; but they were unilateral negotiations. It is true, also, that it is possible to make unilateral interpretations. After all, although the Protocol is dated 1925, we made an interpretation of the meaning of that Protocol in 1930. We have now reaffirmed that interpretation with the change that is now the subject of this debate. However, I do not want to labour the point, because I do not think it is the substance of our argument.

Nor do I think we need to make too much of another point that has been raised and which I should like to dispose of at this stage; namely, the question of whether CS is a smoke or a gas. That, frankly, is a matter of no importance. As a matter of scientific fact, my best advice is that it is more accurately described as a smoke, because it is delivered by aerosol in solid particles. But there may be different views about that. I do not think it worth while in your Lordships' House or anywhere else to argue whether the substance is a gas or a smoke, because its effect is very much the same, whichever it is.

LORD RITCHIECALDER

My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether he will now define it as a gas?

LORD CHALFONT

I do not think it would be for me to define this substance; it is a matter for scientists. The definition that I have been given is that it is an aerosol of solid particles and therefore might be described accurately as a smoke. If people want to describe it as a tear gas, I should not argue with them. It has always been called a tear gas, and I am happy that it should go on being called a tear gas.

My noble friend Lord Ritchie-Calder has intervened on this subject, and I think he may have created some confusion in people's minds by suggesting that it might be called a biological weapon. As I understand it, a biological weapon depends on the definition contained at any rate in the Secretary-General's Report on this matter; that is to say, it depends on its ability to reproduce in the living organs: and whatever effects CS gas has on the human body, I do not think that it has such an ability. I think we should be doing clarity and lucidity a disservice if we suggested that this was a biological and not a chemical weapon. Again, I think this is no more than a debating point.

To come back to the substance of what my noble friend Lord Brockway has said, of course we shall, as he has asked, look constantly at the implications of this problem. I cannot promise him or noble Lords that there is likely to be any change in the policy of Her Majesty's Government about this subject. The matter was given long thought; it was the subject of a great debate and a decision was made. It is right that criticisms on it should be put forward and views should be expressed in your Lordships' House and elsewhere; and I certainly promise— this is all I can promise—to bring to the notice of my colleagues the views that have been expressed in your Lordships' House.

In order to set this question into some kind of perspective, may I say a few words about what exactly our policy is in the field of chemical and biological weapons? As the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, said, I think Britain has every reason to be proud of the role that she is playing in this particular field. It was the British Government who in 1968 took the lead in advocating new arms control measures specifically to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. That was a fairly controversial measure at the time. As noble Lords may recall, it was a measure to deal with biological weapons. But although controversial at the time, I think it is fair to say that it was largely responsible for arousing the present worldwide interest, which is now very intensive, in the field of arms control and disarmament in relation to chemical and biological weapons.

I think we might recall, too, that the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on this matter, which was published in July, 1969—it has been widely acclaimed throughout the world, and quoted often in this debate in your Lordships' House—had its origins in the suggestion by the British Government. It was we who put the idea forward, and the report sprang from that idea. But I think we have done more than simply arouse interest. We have put forward some real proposals for negotiation. We have put forward as the best way of strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol the proposal to ban all use, production and possession of biological agents for hostile purposes. I and others have explained on many occasions the reasons why we thought it right to tackle biological weapons first and separately from chemical weapons, and I do not want to go over that again. It is sufficient to say that we tabled in July, 1969, at the Conference in Geneva, our Convention for the prohibition of biological weapons of warfare. That document is now one of the basic documents in the discussions in Geneva on chemical and biological weapons, and it has, since we tabled it, aroused a great deal of support, which is increasing all the time, for its practical and workmanlike approach to the problem.

This gives the lie to suggestions that any interpretation we might have made of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in terms of CS gas has undermined our disarmament position in Geneva. On the contrary, our biological warfare Convention is gaining increasing support. I do not disguise the fact that there are a number of countries who want to deal with chemical and biological weapons together, rather than seeking progress first in the biological field. We took the step for sound, practical reasons. It does not mean that we regard the question of chemical weapons as being of any less importance. As I made clear recently in Geneva, if the other countries there want to discuss the prospects for progress on chemical weapons and biological weapons together, we are ready to do so. I am bound to add—and this is going to become an important point in the negotiations—that there are compelling practical reasons why we should deal with biological weapons first and not try to combine our attack upon the two together.

I have taken a little of your time, my Lords, briefly to set this question in what I believe is its right context. The question of the use of CS (and perhaps if we call it that we shall avoid the sterile debate about whether it is a smoke or a gas) is a problem to which the Government gave very deep thought for a very long period. I assure my noble friends, and noble Lords in all parts of the House, that this was not a decision lightly taken. We took it after deep thought, after seeking advice in all quarters, and the Government believe that the decision taken was the right one. Whatever my noble friends may think about that, I ask them to believe that in our view the main consideration is that there should continue to be progress in the main field of chemical and biological weapons. There should continue to be effective attempts to reach international multilateral agreement on the whole field of chemical and biological warfare. Nothing that has been said tonight, nothing that the Government have done, can alter the fact that we have played, and shall continue to play, a leading part in seeking this progress.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I put a question? He referred to consultations in all quarters. Does that include international quarters, our allies in NATO and other countries at the Disarmament Conference? Also, does it include sounding opinions at United Nations, or does it mean just in this country?

A NOBLE LORD: NO.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, although my noble friend behind me has just said "No", the answer is, "Yes". In the course of the debate on this matter, I personally was at both the Disarmament Conference in Geneva and at the General Assembly of the United Nations. I can assure the noble Lord that while I was there I consulted many representatives of many countries and organisations about this problem—not only Governmental representatives, but nonofficial organisations as well. There are very few countries and organisations in the world that I have not talked to about this.