TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILL

HL Deb 15 October 1968 vol 296 cc1275-338

6.55 p.m.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Town and Country Planning Bill, has consented to place Her interest, so far as it is concerned on behalf of the Crown, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD KENNET)

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. Before any Amendments are called, I will, with the leave of the House, make a short statement. First, I want to comment on the fact that there is a large number of Amendments—larger than usual on Third Readings in your Lordships' House. The House will see that by far the greater part of them are pure drafting, while most of the remainder are regroupings of material in the interests of clarity, and only a small number have any points of substance. I will indicate when we come to those. There are two points that I wish, as it were, to "pull out of the bag": first, a point about statutory undertakers and, second, a point about advertisement appeals.

Dealing first with statutory undertakers, the House will recall that the present Clause 70 in this Bill was moved in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, on Report and inserted in the Bill on a Division. The effect of the clause is to make compensation no longer payable to statutory undertakers for certain kinds of planning restrictions. The proposals of the Government which it replaced were rather less drastic, but we have considered the matter in the light of the action taken by your Lordships' House on Report. We have borne in mind the strong views expressed, in this House and elsewhere, about the cumbersomeness of the earlier proposals; about the continuing right of statutory undertakers to compensation in circumstances in which no one else would be entitled to it; and about the effect of having to deal with the kind of case which has focused attention on this issue, for instance, Abingdon. After this consideration the Government have, on balance, concluded that Clause 70 as amended by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, should stand. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, is not in his place to-night. He is to be congratulated that his clause will need only one small drafting Amendment simply to bring up to date the wording of paragraph (2)(b), because the definition to which it refers has already been altered during the passage of the Bill.

I turn now to the question of advertisement appeals, that is to say, appeals to my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government against refusal by a local planning authority of consent to display an advertisement. As I explained to the House on July 29 during the Report stage of the Bill, the Government had concluded that the control of advertisements was essentially a local matter which ought to be left to the locally elected council. The proposal of the Government made it desirable to ensure that these advertisement decisions, against which there would in future be no appeal to the Minister, should be taken by elected members and not by officers of the local authority.

Clause 63 of the Bill empowers local authorities to delegate certain planning decisions to officers, including advertisement applications. So at that time, when I was moving the Amendment to delete the relevant part of Clause 63 in order to prevent these decisions being delegated to officers, I announced the intention of the Government to lay regulations abolishing advertisement appeals. It was this Amendment which the House rejected at an earlier stage. My right honourable friend has naturally been considering the situation thus created, and I had hoped that it would be possible to make a statement.

In general, I am not sure whether the proposal has been fully understood. For example, do those who have misgivings in connection with amenity recognise that the power that the Minister contemplates relinquishing is one which only enables him to allow an advertisement against the wishes of the local authority and never vice versa? Do they appreciate that the abolition of appeals to the Minister would be accompanied by a strengthening of the provisions about appeals to the courts, making it easier for applicants to appeal against a local authority refusal to the court, and thus making local authorities more careful about issuing refusals?

Within the last few days my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing has received from the Outdoor Advertising Council proposals for alternative arrangements for appeals. These, briefly, envisage the appointment by the Minister of local panels of barristers and solicitors to whom advertisement appeals could be referred. The cost would be met by local authorities who would recoup it by charging a fee on each application.

The Outdoor Advertising Council also sent to my right honourable friend the results of a public opinion poll. This poll asked questions on public attitudes towards outdoor advertising, both in general and according to types of advertising and area; whether outdoor advertising should require permission from the local authority. It also included (and this is what concerns me to-night) the following question: If the local authority refuses to give permission. there is a right of appeal. It has been suggested that this right should be abolished. Do you think it should be abolished or not? According to the poll, 75 per cent. believed that the right of appeal should continue.

I should like to point out at this stage, for the sake of getting it on the Record (although this is not the time to discuss it), that this question did not inform those who were expected to answer it of two facts: first, that many people who want to display an advertisement do not have to apply for permission at all. A shopkeeper who wants to advertise what he does and what he sells does not even have to apply for permission, so the question of appeal or abolition of appeal does not touch him. The second fact of which this question left the answerers in ignorance was that at the same time as the Government proposed the abolition of appeal to the Minister they proposed a facilitation and broadening of the grounds of appeal to the courts.

The time to discuss this will be if and when the Government lay proposals before Parliament for abolition of appeals to Ministers. I do not wish to raise any false hopes that the Government will be able to accept proposals for an alternative method of appeal, but what has been done represents a constructive attempt to provide an alternative to the present arrangements and deserves consideration. The Government must consult with the various interested bodies, not least the representatives of local authorities who would, under the Outdoor Advertising Council's proposals, be largely responsible for operating the scheme. These consultations and the consideration which must follow them will be carried through as quickly as possible. I have myself already, yesterday, met the representatives of the Outdoor Advertising Council for a preliminary discussion. In the meantime my right honourable friend thinks it would not be right to lay regulations which would end advertisement appeals. As soon as the consultations and considerations are completed I will inform the House of the results, and of course any proposals for changing the arrangements now in force will come before your Lordships.

So much, my Lords, for a preliminary statement. We can discuss the matter further when we come to the Amendment down in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 3^a.—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD SILKIN

My Lords, may I clarify one point? The noble Lord says that those who voted in this public opinion poll were not aware that there were a number of advertisements that did not require planning consent. I am a little puzzled by that statement. We are talking of outdoor advertising. Is he referring to advertising by shopkeepers in their own windows or to any class of outdoor advertising for which planning consent is not necessary?

LORD KENNET

My Lords, generally speaking, if you are carrying on any trade or commerce in some premises and you want to advertise on the premises your name, and what is the nature of your trade and the sort of things you sell there, and even the brand names of the things you sell, you do not have to apply for planning consent to display that advertisement.

On Question, Bill read 3^a, with the Amendments.

Clause 17 [Certification of established use.]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 1: Page 18, line 16, leave out from ("of") to end of line 17 and insert ("procuring a particular decision on an application (whether by himself or another) for an established use certificate or on an appeal arising out of such an application")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is designed to ensure that the offences created by Clause 17(8) apply not only where the object of the fraudulent act is to obtain an established use certificate, but also where the object is to ensure that a certificate is refused. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I would support this Amendment. It seems to me a sensible extension of this particular provision and cannot be objectionable in any way.

Clause 18 [Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 2:

Page 19, line 10, at end insert— ("(4) Before determining an application or appeal under this section the Minister shall, if either the applicant or appellant (as the case may be) or the local planning authority so desire, afford to each of them an opportunity of appearing before, and being heard by, a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment rectifies an unintentional omission in Clause 18, which does not contain an express provision giving the parties to a called-in application for an established use certificate or an appeal against refusal of a certificate a right to have an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose. I beg to move.

Clause 19 [Power to stop further development pending proceedings on enforcement notice]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 3 is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 20, line 4, leave out ("is in force") and insert ("has effect").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 4:

Page 20, line 22, at end insert— ("() Where a person (in this subsection called 'the contractor') is under contract to another person (in this subsection called 'the developer') to carry out any operations on land and—

1. (a) a stop notice takes effect (whether in relation to the developer or the contractor, or both) prohibiting the carrying out or continuance of those operations; and
2. (b) the operations are countermanded or discontinued by the contractor accordingly,

then, unless and in so far as the contract makes provision explicitly to the contrary of this subsection, the developer shall be under the same liability in contract as if the operations had been countermanded or discontinued on instructions given by him in breach of the contract. This subsection applies only to contracts entered into on or before 1st November 1969, whether before or after the commencement of this section.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 hang together. They are designed to give protection to contractors who are obliged to discontinue operations on land as a consequence of a stop notice being served. These are essentially transitional provisions. I think they are quite clear. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, there is rather more to this than perhaps the noble Lord has indicated, since this matter was first raised in another place, I think at the Committee stage, and it was at that time that the Minister of State who was in charge of the Bill said that he would look at this point again. I know that negotiations have been going on as to the right way to deal with it, and very recently this Amendment has appeared. As I understand it, those who wish to have the matter dealt with are not wholly satisfied with this. However, one is in the position either that nothing is put in the Bill specifically about the matter and it has to remain to be dealt with simply under the compensation provisions as they now are with the word "directly", or that one accepts the Amendment because there will be no other opportunity.

Probably in the circumstance it would be better to accept the Amendment, but I would do so with reservations, for this reason. There are two ways in which this matter might be dealt with. One is the method the Amendment puts forward, which is that where a contractor has been employed he must seek his compensation first of all from the employer, the building owner, and then the building owner can go to the local planning authority in his turn, thereby involving two transactions; or it could be dealt with by the contractor going straight to the local planning authority. Of course, the situation is going to arise only where the stop notice has been, as it turns out, wrongly served; where it has been rightly served there will be no question of compensation anyway. The result of this method of doing it is to complicate the matter and it will put an extra burden on the building owner who, ex-hvpothesi, has been wrongly frustrated and thwarted by the local authority. Therefore, I do not think it is perhaps the best way of doing it; but of course we have no other chance.

I wonder whether the noble Lord could tell me why he says that it is only transitional? Then, why is the date November 1, 1969, chosen for this purpose? The noble Lord has not explained that, and I do not think he explained what is expected to happen thereafter. I may have seen certain information about this which is not available to the rest of the House, but I think that that matter needs explaining because I understand that it is not going to be simply a transitional problem; it will go on after November 1, 1969, as well, and I think the House ought to know the answer now.

7.10 p.m.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, the Government conceive it to be transitional because in the long run we hope that this new law on stop notices and compensation in the event of a wrongful stop notice will work through and be expressed in clauses in standard contracts. A lot of work is being done under contracts which are already in vigour, and many contracts are nearing signature in respect of which it is advantageous to legislate in order to ensure that a reasonably just situation exists between now and the time when contracts would nor- mally contain provisions to cover this point. The reason for November 1, 1969, is that which I have just given: that we want to give people warning that a new statutory provision is in effect, and give them time to adapt contracts and standard forms of contract; and that seems a reasonable period to give.

Clause 20 [Compensation for loss due to stop notice]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 5.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 15, at end insert ("o[...] of any liability arising by virtue of section 19(8) of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 21 [Determination of planning and similar appeals by persons appointed by the Minister]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 6. This is drafting.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 29, at end insert ("(default powers and appeals in connection with tree preservation orders)").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 7 which is also drafting.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 36, leave out ("publicity to be given to any directions made") and insert ("the giving of publicity to any directions given").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 8: Page 22, line 1, leave out ("section") and insert ("Part of this Act")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 and 15 are all drafting and hang together. I beg to move Amendment No. 8. I am conscious of the fact that the noble Lord who occupies the Woolsack has a lot of reading to do on this Bill, and probably during the course of our discussions this evening will actually talk more than I or any other noble Lord. It seems to me that the alternative procedure, which would be for me to move Amendments en bloc, would in the case of this particular Bill be most taxing on your Lordships' powers of computerisation, and that therefore it is far better not to risk it, because the Amendments do not come together in blocks. I should be jumping about and moving blocks with intermissions in them. So with the patience and consent of your Lordships, I will proceed as I have been doing, moving each Amendment separately. Amendments Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 and 15 hang together. I beg to move Amendment No. 8.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (LORD CHAMPION)

My Lords, I am grateful for the noble Lord's consideration.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, the only difficulty is that I think there is a point of substance under Amendment No. 11, and the noble Lord, while explaining the procedure, has not explained the substance. This is a paving Amendment to Amendment No. 11.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, if the noble Viscount would not mind, I would sooner discuss Amendment No. 11 under Amendment No. 9, to which we are coming next.

7.15 p.m.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 9: Page 22, leave out lines 17 to 21.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendment No. 9 is, I believe, a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 11, which is substantial, so let us discuss them now. Amendment No. 11 replaces subsection (7) of Clause 21 with two new subsections. The new subsection (7) is partly concerned to achieve an effect similar to that achieved by the present one, but the provision contained in paragraph (b) is new. This paragraph is aimed at preventing an inspector's jurisdiction to determine an appeal being challenged for the first time after he has given his decision. It will not prevent an inspector's jurisdiction being challenged for genuine reasons while the appeal is in progress. What it will do is to prevent a party to an appeal having the best of both worlds—that is, keeping his doubts about an inspector's jurisdiction to himself during the appeal, in case the decision should turn out in his favour, and then seeking afterwards to upset it and get a second hearing from the Minister if the decision has gone against him.

That is the Amendment of substance in the group of Amendments Nos. 9, 11, 48, 49, 84 and 85. I beg now to move the paving Amendment, Amendment No. 9. I shall move the others formally when we reach them.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 10.

Amendment moved— Page 22, line 27, leave out ("section") and insert ("Part of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 11.

Amendment moved—

Page 22, line 38, leave out subsection (7) and insert— ("(7) Where an appeal to which this section applies has been determined by a person appointed under this Part of this Act, his decision shall be treated as that of the Minister and—

1. (a) except as provided by Part XI of the principal Act, the validity of his decision shall not be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever;
2. (b) it shall not be a ground of application to the High Court under section 179 of that Act or of appeal to the High Court under section 180 or 181 thereof, that the appeal ought to have been determined by the Minister and not by that person, unless the challenge to the person's power to determine the appeal was made (either by the appellant or the local planning authority) before his decision on the appeal was given.

(8) Where in any enactment (including this Act) there is a reference to the Minister in a context relating or capable of relating to an appeal to which this section applies, or to any thing done or authorised or required to be done by, to or before the Minister on or in connection with any such appeal, then so far as the context permits it shall be construed, in relation to an appeal determined or falling to be determined by a person appointed under this Part of this Act, as a reference to that person.").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 22 [Determination of appeals by the Minister]>:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 12:

Page 23, leave out line 14 and insert— ("section 16 of this Act; section 18(2) of this Act; Part I of Schedule 5 to this Act; and")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is the first Amendment that falls into the class which I shall call "machinery". It is not drafting—it is a little more than drafting; but it affects nobody's rights, and it affects nobody's duties. It affects merely the route by which rights and duties are laid down, and if your Lordships agree I will move this Amendment and other subsequent ones by simply saying "machinery". Accordingly, I beg to move Amendment No. 12, with the assertion that it is an Amendment of machinery.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

Nevertheless, my Lords, I have one question on it. There is a reference to Section 18(2) to (4). We have just added a new subsection in the middle of Clause 18, and I wonder whether, when this is reprinted, it will read "Section 18(2) to (5)" or whether it will still read "Section 18(2) to (4)". I do not know whether the noble Lord can tell us about that. It is, in any event, a matter that should be looked at when the Bill is printed because the right decision has got to be made.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I will ensure that all the numberings in the Bill when we have finished with it here take account of anything that may have been added.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 13.

Amendment moved— Page 24, line 5, leave out subsection (2).—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 24 [Local inquiries and hearings]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 14.

Amendment moved— Page 24, line 24, leave out ("section 21 or 23 above") and insert ("this Part of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 26 [Supplementary]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 15.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 20, leave out ("section 19 or 21 above") and insert ("this Part of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

7.20 p.m.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 16: After Clause 26 insert the following new clause:

Regulations to provide for appeal against refusal of consent to display of advertisement

".Notwithstanding anything in section 34 of the principal Act any regulations made thereunder whereby the consent of a local planning authority is required for the display of any advertisement shall include provisions granting a right of appeal against the refusal of such consent by the authority."

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this is the Amendment about advertising appeals which the noble Lord foreshadowed, and I was glad to hear what he had to say, because I am sure it is correct that he should now look at the matter afresh. I hope that what seemed to me to be a touch of reluctance to have his ideas changed on this matter is not really true, and that he will find there is a possibility of applying a genuine new look to this matter. So far, then, I very much agree with what he has to say but I think it is worth while moving this Amendment this evening because there may be other noble Lords, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who may have something to say about it and we can have an enclosed debate.

I also have seen the Outdoor Advertising Council's proposals, and they certainly look to me as though they are a basis for discussion. Whether in fact they will come out in the end exactly as they are now, I would not know. It also seems to me that they would save public money (which, I believe, is one of the objects) and also the time of public officials, which at one time was put forward as an argument by the noble Lord and his right honourable friend in another place for this proposed change. Although it would require a little ingenuity among the provisions of Sections 34 and 44 of the 1962 Act, I think it would be within the powers that already exist under the Statute. The provisions of Section 44, of course, relate to an independent tribunal, which was an idea of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. I do not believe that has ever been implemented, but this may be the opportunity. Equally, if the matter was dealt with by regulation under Section 34, it looks to me as though it would be possible, if the tribunal were called an advisory committee, to deal with the payment of that body under Regulation 34(2)(d), because there is a specific power to make provision by regulation for payment of advisory committees. I do not know whether that is too ingenious, but at any rate it may be possible that something could be done.

I must confess that, although I have not studied this as fully as the noble Lord and perhaps others in this House, I suspect that some appeal system is needed in this matter. The local planning authorities do not all stick to the rules, and they do not all stick to the same rules. At least, if they do it is a strange thing, because it was only in 1960 that the Ministry themselves issued Circular No. 3 of that year which has this passage in paragraph 11(b): The Minister has noticed that in some cases which have come to him on appeal the reasons given by the local planning authority for refusing consent appear to be outside the powers which are conferred by the regulations. The regulations provide that these powers are exercisable only in the interests of amenity and public safety and do not provide for consent to be refused because, for example, (i) there is no need for an advertisement, or (ii) the advertisement advertises a particular kind or brand of commodity, or (iii) it is not the Council's policy to permit advertising in a particular way or in a particular area. Perhaps all those sinners have repented in the last eight and a half years, but I wonder whether there does not lurk in the bosom of some councils a desire to go back to some of those reasons which they have been told by the Minister are wrong reasons for refusing advertisement consents. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said on the Report stage that the Ministry does not necessarily accept that the local authorities might act like that, but I would require a certain amount of convincing that there would always be a very strict sticking to the rules if that has been the experience in the past.

I do not see how, even if the full reason for the decision is to be given—and that is one of the things that is being suggested—there is going to be very much source of rejoicing in an appeal to the High Court. I have not seen particular arrangements for strengthening this right of appeal and I do not know of what they consist, but I think one thing is quite clear, that is, that it is notoriously difficult to go behind what is called a "speaking order". If the council gives a reason for refusal and says in its reason that the refusal was based on amenity—and amenity is one of the grounds in the regulations for refusing consent—it is singularly difficult to impugn the good faith of the authority in the High Court. Of course, I can very well envisage that it would not necessarily be a matter of bad faith. A local authority might very well say that in a certain area there is a proper amenity consideration that there should be no advertisements at all perhaps in the whole of their area. That may be a perfectly sincerely held view based on pure amenity grounds, and I do not see what one could do about that in the High Court.

Then again it is an historic accident that the right of appeal in this matter is not in the 1962 Act as it now is. It was left to regulation when Lord Silkin's Act was passed. I think it was because the actual method of arranging the appeals had not been finally decided, and it was thought better to leave this to be dealt with subsequently by regulation. But, as I understand it, the Government have suggested that the abolition of rights of appeal here is in line with their general policy of allowing devolution of local matters to be dealt with locally and locally alone, and if this is so then we are dealing with a matter which is rather broader than the pure advertisement appeals alone. It so happens that this is the only matter that the Government can tackle without specific legislation in this particular realm of local government, because it is the only one that can be done by regulation. But the question of policy goes much wider, and I do not think it should be tested in this way by regulation, for this reason. It is all very well the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, saying that the matter will be brought to this House and, indeed, to another place, but every noble Lord knows perfectly well that once the regulations have been laid no power on earth can get them amended. There is no method of getting them amended in this House, and unless the Government withdraw them and relay them nothing can be done. I do not think this is a matter, involving as I believe it does a wider question than just advertisement appeals, which ought to be dealt with without a Parliamentary debate and the possibility of amendment.

There is another difficulty, if I am correctly informed, which is that there are still in force in various parts of the country local Acts or by-laws, or something of that sort, which used to govern the display of advertisements before Lord Silkin's Act came into force in 1948. I do not know whether any of these contain rights of appeal, but a fascinating situation would arise if they did. Suppose the advertiser applies for and is refused consent under the advertisement regulations, and suppose there is another power, another right to apply a still existing local Act which provides for a right of appeal. I dare say the advertiser could get his appeal heard under the old legislation despite the fact that it would not necessarily get his advertisement up, and we would have an extraordinary and chaotic situation whereby these two separate powers were still running side by side and could be played off, as I think, against each other.

To be perfectly honest, I believe the Government's approach on this, in dealing with it in isolation, is wrong. I do not say this in any way in order to protect the advertisers; I am not saying it from that point of view at all. I am treating this as a matter of principle, and I believe it goes rather further perhaps than this very issue, because in the complicated society in which we live there is an ever growing number of things that you cannot do without getting consent. If the public interest demands that you have to get permission for that and consent for the other thing from one source or another, so be it, but I believe there is a concomitant duty on Parliament and on the Government to see that at least people are allowed to have an appeal when their consents and their permissions are refused.

The growth of control by quasi-administrative rather than by purely legalistic decisions may be useful and effective, but it is still part of a system of control by law. From the early days of our legal system in this country our law has developed systems of appeal whereby unmeritorious decisions in the first instance can be overturned by appeal tribunals and appeal courts. I strongly suspect that, in their desire to get things which are local dealt with locally, the Government with utilitarian motives, may be making a move directly contrary to the whole direction in which our thinking about quasi-administrative tribunals ought to go. I cannot believe that the reason given, that this is a purely local matter, to be dealt with locally, holds any water at all. Precisely the same thing can be said about an enormous number of the planning appeals which are dealt with under the 1962 legislation; but the Government cannot do anything about rights of appeal there because they would have to alter the law by Statute to do so. Those matters are just as local as advertisements. I do not believe that there is any difference between the two which warrants a different approach. The only difference is that it can be done by regulation, which Parliament cannot amend.

I hope that it will not be necessary to press this Amendment. If it is pressed, it would still allow, by the breadth of its wording, for the sort of appeal tribunal which the Outdoor Advertising Council have suggested, because I have not said what sort of appeal there should be. Nevertheless, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, will be able to go further than he has already and maybe persuade your Lordships that there is not quite so much need to fear on this matter as was perhaps at one time the case. My Lords, I beg to move.

7.33 p.m.

LORD SILKIN

My Lords, I should like strongly to support the Amendment. Unless my noble friend the Minister is prepared to go very much further than he has gone, I would strongly urge the noble Lord to press his Amendment to a Division, in which case I will support him in the Lobby. When this matter came up on Report—and I was unaware that it was coming up—my first reaction was that this was a gross breach of faith, but I gave no reasons for it. I should like to elaborate on this matter and tell the House why I feel that the withdrawal of the right of appeal constitutes a grave breach of faith.

Prior to the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, outdoor advertising was controlled by the Town and Country Planning Act 1932. Under that Act outdoor advertisers did not need to get planning permission at all. They could put up their advertising as they thought right, but if the local authority disapproved of the advertisement it had the right to call upon them to remove it. The advertisers could then go to the court of summary jurisdiction and get the matter dealt with. The advertisers were under a great advantage because the initiative for the withdrawal of the advertisement had to come from the local authority. They were also at a great advantage in being able to go to the court of summary jurisdiction, because the matter was quite open at that stage and the court was not limited or restricted by any rules: it could decide just as it thought fit.

This position was changed by the 1947 Act, under which outdoor advertisers, as in every other case of development, were required to apply for planning permission. An outdoor advertisement was regarded as development, and the intending advertisers had to apply for permission. In that way they were restricted. They were restricted in another way in that they virtually were not allowed to advertise in rural areas or in other areas which the Ministry decided were areas which ought to be restricted in respect of advertising. These were two valuable concessions which the outdoor advertisers made as a result of lengthy negotiations. I remember those negotiations very well, although they took place some twenty years ago. Fortunately, the Secretary of the Association of that time is still the Secretary to-day, and I have been able to refresh my memory.

The fact is that we had lengthy and strenuous negotiations, and the advertisers gave way on these points—or, rather, they accepted them—in exchange for a definite assurance that in the same way as any other developer, they were to have the right of appeal. To take that away unilaterally to-day seems to me to be a grave breach of faith, and I am very sorry indeed that my Government, the Government which I support, should be guilty of even contemplating such a thing, let alone actually doing it.

The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, discussed the reasons as to why this was being done. If one is to take facts at their face value, this whole question arises out of a casual suggestion by a member of the Committee in another place when the Bill was being discussed there. He thought that it would be a good idea if this right were taken away from advertisers, as advertising was merely a matter of local concern and was not important enough to bother about. As I mentioned the last time we discussed this matter, the particular person who raised it happens to be a partner of mine, and I feel pretty sure that had he first talked to me about it he would not have raised the matter. But he did raise it, apparently the Government were most attracted by the suggestion, and all this has followed from it.

But are these matters purely local matters? Are they only of local concern; and what is the significance of saying so? If to affix an outdoor advertisement is a piece of development, it is as much a piece of development as any other kind of development which may be of very minor interest. Whether one has a door leading on to the street, or whether one puts an extra window into a house, these are all matters of local concern; and if one is refused permission one can appeal. Nobody so far has suggested—and I hope that it is never going to be suggested—that in these other matters of local concern the right of appeal should be withdrawn.

The right of appeal is surely inherent to-day in any kind of public decision. We accept that local authorities may go wrong—they may be prejudiced or even ignorant. After all, one knows that a large number of local authorities are involved in this matter. As the noble Viscount said, even the Ministry know that some of them in the past have been rather prejudiced in dealing with outdoor advertising. We know that officers who make recommendations may be prejudiced, and we also know that they may be wrong. We know that generally some 25 per cent. of appeals are successful, which means that local authorities are wrong in 25 per cent. of cases—and they may be wrong it 25 per cent. of appeals on advertising. In fact, on the figures that have been given there are something like 1,400 advertisers who have been successful on appeal and who, but for the right of appeal, would not have been allowed to carry out their undertaking. Surely this is something more than a local matter. It would be a grave injustice if these people, who have actually been successful on appeal, were not to be allowed in future to appeal at all.

I have frequently contended that the citizen has a right to do what he likes with his own property so long as he does not act contrary to the interests of the community. In my view, this is a most important right, and interference by the local authority can be justified only if it is a matter of the interests of the community as a whole. We have instituted an admirable system for enabling administrative mistakes of local authorities to be put right, and, generally, we are extending this right. We do everything we can to give people a right of appeal against possible errors by the local authority. Why, then, are we withdrawing it in this particular case? I must say that I find it extremely puzzling. If it is a matter of expense, then I think the expense is trifling. In any case, are we justified on the ground of expense in taking away people's rights and acting contrary to what I regard as natural justice?

It seems to me unthinkable that the Government can seriously proceed with this matter, and I hope the Minister will be able to give us some more satisfactory assurance than he has done so far about these matters. The assurance we want is that there will definitely be a right of appeal. On the question whether it should be in one form or another, as the matter has gone as far as it has I should be willing to have a discussion about it; but to satisfy me, at any rate, the Minister must stand up and say that there will be an unconditional right of appeal. We can discuss the method of appeal, but there should be one. Only that will satisfy me and prevent me from voting against the Government if there is a Division.

LORD AIREDALE

My Lords, very briefly, I should like to support this Amendment on the ground that the right of appeal is what secures uniformity of practice throughout the country, which I regard as desirable. If you are a large company selling petrol, tea or ice cream all over the country and you are making your advertising decisions, you surely ought to feel entitled to say to yourself that an advertisement which is satisfactory in Sussex will be satisfactory in a similar situation in Yorkshire. It would be intolerable if you had to say to yourself, when considering your advertising programme, "This will do for Lancashire and Northumberland, but it will not do for Cardigan and it will not do for Dorset. We must have some thing quite different for those counties."

I should have thought that a Government, which allowed obstacles of that sort to stand in the way of large companies in regard to their advertising could not afterwards go to them and say, "You must keep your costs down. You must not raise your prices for the goods that you sell. "It seems to me that this right of appeal is what secures the uniformity of practice throughout the country which commercial people are entitled to feel they can have. For that reason I warmly support this Amendment.

VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD

My Lords, may I, in twenty words, warmly support this Amendment? As I see it, if this right of appeal is taken away from advertisers it wil1 be a dangerous precedent. Where is it going to stop? It may well be that other categories of people will have their right of appeal taken away from them. If the reply of the Minister is not satisfactory I sincerely hope that my noble friend will press the Amendment to a Division. This his is a very serious matter and I sincerely hope he will do that.

LORD FERRIER

My Lords, if the noble Viscount presses this Amendment to a Division, I will support him on the principle of the matter, which was so clearly set out by the noble Lord, Lard Airedale. The principle is what seems to me to matter. I hesitate to criticise the advocacy of the noble Viscount, and even of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who seemed to assume that all the appeals meant the upsetting of decisions of local authorities, but I imagine that that is not the case at all. Appeals cut both ways. It is a matter of the right of the individual to feel that he is entitled to appeal, and for that reason I support the Amendment.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, in answering this interesting discussion, I want to speak with some caution because, as I have already informed the House, we are going into a period of consultations about this matter and I do not want to say anything which is going to prejudice the chances of success coming out of those consultations. So I am sure your Lordships will understand if I leave unanswered a good many of the points which I should have liked to answer, because I feel that I could not answer them without running the risk of jeopardising the consultations and negotiations which I must now have. Some points, however, I shall take up.

The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, welcomed the proposals of the Outdoor Advertising Council as a basis for discussion. I share his welcome. I, too, welcome them as a basis for discussion. Discussion has already begun—I met them yesterday—and this will continue. The noble Viscount also mentioned the three things in the 1960 circular which the then Minister found that councils had been doing and which they should not have been doing. These were, in essence, all grounds for refusal which were incompatible with the only two permissible grounds of refusal; namely, amenity and public safety.

I beg the House to remember that this is not a proposal to abolish appeals against refusals of permission to exhibit advertisements. This proposal, which I am not pressing on the House, is a proposal to abolish the appeal to the Minister, while at the same time strengthening the grounds of appeal to the courts. It would not be right to take away the appeal to the Minister without at the same time facilitating access to the courts. The decisions affected by the three things which the noble Viscount Lord Colville of Culross, rightly reminded the House the Minister had warned local authorities against in 1960 were decisions taken because those local authorities did not like something about an advertisement, and had nothing to do with amenity or public safety. If a local authority takes a decision on those other grounds, then the applicant has a right to appeal in the court against the decision.

He has that right now, but the Government freely admit that it has been a bit difficult to exercise it, because if all a local authority has to say is, "It is against amenity", or, "It is against public safety", and, in point of fact, it has taken the decision for quite a different reason, you cannot win against the authority. If, on the other hand, you insist, as the Government propose you should insist, that the local authority should say, "The advertisement is against amenity in that blank-blank-blank", or, "It is against public safety in that blank-blank-blank", and should go on and say why it is against amenity—such as that something was in the wrong place and spoiled the view, or ruined the look of the High street, or was against public safety because it stuck out into the street or took the eyes of the driver off the road—you would ensure that some detail, some reason for a decision, was given. This will then give the applicant a chance to go along to the courts and say, "This is perfectly ridiculous. This is not a reason for holding that the advertisement is against public safety or against amenity".

LORD SILKIN

But we are in some difficulty about this. Of course, if it is the intention that the courts should have exactly the same jurisdiction as the Minister has, and should be able to decide, on the basis of evidence presented to them, that the reasons given by the local authority are not satisfactory, then we are merely changing the tribunal, and I do not suppose anybody would seriously object to that. But is my noble friend in a position to go as far as that?

LORD KENNET

The courts would have power to quash the decision; to say that the local authority decision—in this case the refusal—was wrongly taken; and that would be that.

LORD SILKIN

But that means only that they have gone beyond their jurisdiction, and that, of course, the courts already have the right to say. One can always go to the court and say that the local authority has gone outside its jurisdiction. But the real point is would an appeal be available if a local authority decides within its jurisdiction but where the applicant feels that the decision is a wrong decision?

LORD KENNET

I do not think I can improve on what I have just said. The Government's proposal was to provide that local authorities should justify their decision; that they should not simply say, "Against amenity; full stop; turned down," but, "Against amenity in that blank-blank-blank", and put some reasons on it. The point of this, of course, is that it opens a flank by way of appeal to the courts, and the knowledge in a local authority's mind that it has got to do this will perhaps make it think a bit more before refusing permission than it already has to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question on this, becaus I should be glad to have his views on it? It is all very well to say that you will ask the local authority to say, "It is against amenity because …" The authority may say, "It is against amenity because, for amenity reasons, we do not wish to have an advertisement at this place in the High Street"; and that may on the face of it be a perfectly reasonable thing to do. But the difficulty is that they may have already done it 15 times on every other advertisement application up and down the High Street; and they have every intention of doing it again with every other advertisement application that comes in for that same street, simply because they have taken a policy decision that they will have no advertisements there. You cannot take any of those to the court. You cannot compare one with the other. You cannot say, "The local authority has been doing this systematically". You take each one on its own merits, as I understand it. In each case the decision is made on amenity grounds, and there is no possible method that I can see for getting that quashed.

LORD AIREDALE

Whereas, if you went to the Minister the Minister would say, "Ah, I remember this. This has been coming before me a number of times recently".

LORD KENNET

My Lords, there are great difficulties in the way of the House considering how the courts are likely to interpret provisions which have been drafted, but there are almost insuperable difficulties in the way of the House seeking to guess how the courts would interpret provisions which have not even been drafted yet. If at the end of the consultations the Government propose to go forward with these proposals, then they will be brought before your Lordships, and that will be the time to discuss them. I shall be coming to that point in a moment. I think that perhaps we are getting a little far ahead of ourselves in the present discussion.

Another point I want to take up is that very one. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, said, "Ah, but of course the House cannot amend regulations"—and this of course is true. It can throw them out, however, and I would say that any Government which drafted regulations without bearing in mind that Parliament was not able to amend them and had a simple "Yes" or "No" choice would not be proceeding very sensibly. The regulations, if they offend your Lordships, and if they are laid, will no doubt be thrown out by your Lordships. They are not at present before your Lordships. Let us wait until the time when they may or may not arise. I cannot say at the moment whether they will or not.

My noble friend Lord Silkin made many interesting points in his speech, most of which I will not take for the reason I gave: for fear of fouling up the discussion. I am sure he will understand my reason for saying that. He said that there is a right of appeal inherent in any kind of public decision. My Lords, I wish there were. I think your Lordships should bear in mind the fact that a person who lives opposite a site on which an advertiser wants to display a poster, and gets permission from the local authority to do so, has no right of appeal. There is nothing he can do. He cannot go to the Minister and appeal against a poster which may be ruining his view and, if he is a sensitive person, ruining his life. He cannot go to the court about it. There is nothing he can do. This is not the time to pursue that line of thought, but it is not true in all circumstances that there is a right of appeal inherent in any public decision.

Just as a gloss on the figures given by my noble friend Lord Silkin, may I point out that he said that local authorities were wrong in 25 per cent. of the cases, when the appeal was allowed by the Minister. No, my Lords, it is in rather less than 1 per cent. of the cases. More than 99 per cent. of the applications are either allowed by the local authority, and that is that; or they are refused by the local authority, the applicant accepts the decision and that is that; or—

LORD SILKIN: But, my Lords—

LORD KENNET

May I just finish running through my statistics, if my noble friend would allow me? Or they are appealed against to the Minister and again refused by the Minister. That accounts for 99-plus per cent. of the cases. The less than 1 per cent. in the last year were those cases which were refused by the local authority, appealed against and allowed on appeal by the Minister. It is this less than 1 per cent. of which the Government proposal would deprive the advertising industry.

LORD SILK1N

My Lords, the noble Lord is really confusing the issue. The real point is: of those cases that go to appeal, how many are allowed? And the fact is that about 25 per cent. of the cases that go to appeal, amounting roughly to about 1,500 cases a year, are successful. That means that the local authority has been wrong in 1,500 cases a year. Now is that not a justification for the right of appeal?

LORD KENNET

I would have to check the figures, but I just took the noble Lord up on his words. He said that the local authorities were wrong in 25 per cent. of cases. He could have said that they were wrong in 25 per cent. of those cases against which there had been an appeal.

LORD SILKIN: Yes.

LORD KENNET

Not in 25 per cent. of all the applications during the course of the year.

To my mind the most important thing about the present situation and where we stand on this subject in this House tonight is this matter about which I have already told the House. The Government proposed to abolish the right to appeal to the Minister while yet strengthening the right to appeal to the court. That was the proposal which told your Lordships the Government would be laying before Parliament. Since then, the Outdoor Advertising Council has made a counter-proposal which, in the Government's opinion, is constructively intended. It clearly is constructively intended. It is well thought out. It is a compromise. Whether it will be acceptable in the long run I cannot say. We must examine it. It does not rest solely on the willingness of the advertising industry to operate it, or on the willingness of the Government to operate it; it rests also on the willingness of the local authorities to operate it. We have not yet talked to the local authorities about it. We must do so. I submit to the House that it would be wrong to tie the hands of the Government in this matter during the negotiations we are about to enter into with the local authority associations and other interests—and there are other interests concerned—by passing this Amendment.

I turn back for one moment to an earlier stage of the argument about the figures of my noble friend Lord Silkin. I think he has confused the appeals allowed with the appeals received in the Ministry. The 1,500 is the number of appeals that come to the Minister in the year.

LORD SILKIN: No.

LORD KENNET

And about a quarter of those—in fact, rather less; 23 per cent. of them—are allowed. That is about 400 a year. So, although the number of appeals allowed is nearly 25 per cent. of appeals received, yet it is not 1,500 cases a year in which the local authorities, in the opinion of the Minister, were wrong. It is about 400.

To conclude, I hope that the noble Viscount will agree, in view of the fact that no amending regulations are going to be laid before your Lordships in the immediate future, until after a period of consultation and discussion, and in view of the obvious undesirability of tying the Government's hands about what they are to do at the outcome of this period, that he will not find it necessary to press his Amendment to a Division.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have taken part in this debate. I think the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, will now realise that in fact he is perfectly correct in supposing that the appeals are not all successful. The only one I ever did, I lost, I well remember. At any rate, I think the situation is clarified. The decision your Lordships have to take—I cannot withdraw this Amendment without your Lordships' leave—is this. To what extent, if at all, do we wish to tie the hands of the Government?

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, very rightly said that in these negotiations with the Outdoor Advertising Council he does not want to be tied. The Amendment would not tie him in any way, because as long as the Government are prepared to accept that there shall be a right of appeal by Statute, as applies in all other town planning matters of this sort, he can negotiate to his heart's content with the Q.A.C. to decide what sort of appeal is best. We must decide, therefore, whether this House ought to make a decision of principle this evening or not. If the noble Lord does not wish to have his hands tied so that he can revert to regulations abolishing the right of appeal, this Amendment will not do. If the House wishes to leave that matter open, then I must withdraw this Amendment. But, without in any way suggesting what might occur if regulations having this effect were to be introduced at some subsequent date, I hope that the noble Lord will realise from the speeches made this evening that he is likely to have a fairly rough ride if he does not take substantial account of what has been said.

I think my inclination is to ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw this Amendment, because I believe that the noble Lord, when he reads what has been said, will find that perhaps there is a certain amount of force in what we have been talking about and that this is an anomaly of which the Government ought not to take advantage. But, of course, if other noble Lords do not wish to have this Amendment withdrawn by leave then I will have no objection to having it tested by the House as a matter of principle. I would ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 33 [New descriptions of land qualifying for protection]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 17 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 29, line 19, leave out third ("the")—(Lord Kennet.)

8.4 p.m.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 18: Page 29, line 33, leave out paragraghs (a) to (c).

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is the first of a series. The first of the series is Amendment No. 18, the present one, followed by Amendments 21, 30, 87, 88 and 91. The purpose of the series is to clarify the presentation of the blight provisions in the Bill. The object is to state more directly the changes made in the Bill, and to gather into an expanded Schedule 4 the verbal amendments of provisions of the Act of 1962 which flow from the changes already made by this Bill. The Amendments to be moved make no change in the substance of the blight provisions as the House left them at the previous stage: they are concerned solely to rearrange, redraft or make consequential references. I shall move the subsequent five Amendments formally when I come to them. I now beg to move Amendment No. 18.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords., the blight provisions, either as originally enacted or as amended by this Bill, must be a draftsman's nightmare. Although I appreciate that a great deal of hard work has been put in to clarify this matter, it is not going to be easy to see what the law is when this part of the Bill is brought into effect; and I shall be asking about this in general. I hope it will not be too long before a great deal more clarification takes place and before we have some consolidating legislation to do it properly.

Clause 34 [Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 19 is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 15, after ("Act") insert ("or, as the case may be, section 33(3) of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 20 is consequential upon a change made in the Bill at an earlier stage. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 39, after ("section") insert ("and in a case to which section 35(1) below applies, the ground specified in that subsection").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 21 formally.

Amendment moved—

Page 32, line 11, leave out subsection (9).—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 35 [Extension of grounds of objection to blight notice]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, this is an Amendment of substance. I regret that it is one of infinite complexity. I am sure that the noble Viscount understands it. In the hope of saving the time of the House I should like to ask him straight across the Table whether he wishes to have it explained to the House or not.

Amendment moved—

Page 32, line 18, leave out from ("within") to end of line 21 and insert— ("section 138(1)(c) of the principal Act or section 33(1)(a) of this Act; and (b)not falling within section 138(1)(e) or (f) of that Act or section 33(1)(d) of this Act ").—(Lord Kennet.)

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I thought the noble Lord was going to ask me to explain it. No, I think this is a technical matter which will work out all right.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 23 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 4, leave out ("and") and insert ("or").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 24 is also a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 33, line 22, leave out from ("area") to end of line 28 and insert— ("references in those provisions to the affected area being construed as references to the hereditament").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 25 is a drafting Amendment in the interests of style. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 43, leave out ("the Tribunal is") and insert ("they are").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 37 [Miscellaneous amendments of Part VIII of principal Act]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment; but it is the first of a series which hang together. The series starts with Amendment No. 26, is followed by Nos. 27, 28 and 29 and then jumps to Amendment No. 92. With your Lordships' leave I propose now to abandon my previous procedure and, for the sake of the Chairman's voice, to move Amendments Nos. 26, 27, 28 and 29, all of which are to Clause 37, together.

Amendments moved—

Page 34, line 33, at end insert— ("(3) For a person to be treated under section 149(1) or (3) of the principal Act (definitions for purposes of blight notice provisions) as owner-occupier or resident owner-occupier of a hereditament, his occupation thereof at a relevant time or during a relevant period, if not occupation of the whole of the hereditament, must be or, as the case may be, have been occupation of a substantial part of it. (4) In subsections (1)(b), (2)(b) and (3)(b) of the said section 149, the period of six months ending not more than six months before the date of service shall in each case be replaced by a period of six months ending not more than twelve months before that date.")

Page 34, line 36, after second ("Act") insert— ("(a)")

Page 34, line 40, at end insert— ("and (b) subsections (1)(b), (2)(b) and (3)(b) of section 149 of that Act shall apply with the substitution for the reference to twelve months before the date of service of a reference to that period extended by so long as it takes to obtain a determination of the question.")

Page 34, line 41, leave out subsection (4).—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 30 formally.

Amendment moved— After Clause 37, insert the following new clause:

Consequential amendment and modification of sections 138 to 149 of principal Act

(". The provisions of the principal Act specified in Part I of Schedule 4 to this Act (being provisions about blight notices and proceedings in connection therewith) shall be amended as shown in that Schedule.—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 44 [Penalties for non-compliance with notice under section 43]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 31 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 18, leave out from second ("notice") to end of line 20 and insert ("as that within which the steps specified in the notice are required thereby to be taken, or such extended period as the local planning authority may allow for taking them").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 46 [Enforcement by, or by direction of the Minister]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 32, 33 and 34 are all drafting Amendments. With the leave of the House I beg to move them en bloc.

Amendments moved— Page 43, line 2, after ("authority") insert ("(and, in Greater London, also with the Greater London Council.") Page 43, line 9, leave out ("41") and insert ("44(5)") Page 43, line 26, after ("of") insert ("subsections (3) and (4) of").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 61 [References to a Planning Inquiry Commission]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 35 has the effect that development to be carried out on behalf of a Government Department may be referred to a planning inquiry commission as well as development to be carried out directly by the Government Department itself. The obvious example, of course, is a regional hospital board. There are two consequential Amendments, Nos. 40 and 103. I beg to move Amendment No. 35.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 29, after ("by") insert ("or on behalf of").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 36, 37 and 38 are drafting. I beg to move them en bloc.

Amendments moved— Page 52, line 38, leave out ("evaluating") and insert ("evaluation") Page 53, line 15, after ("him") insert ("or them") Page 53, line 23, leave out ("shall").—Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, this is a little more than a drafting Amendment. It is a matter of machinery, but it is extremely complex and changes no important matter of substance. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 54, line 6, after ("appeals)") insert ("and sections 21(6) and 22(4) of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 62 [Procedure on a reference to a Planning Inquiry Commission]:

LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 40:

Amendment moved— Page 54, line 13, after ("by") insert ("or on behalf of").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 63 [Delegation of planting functions to officers of local authorities]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 41 to 47 inclusive are drafting Amendments. I beg to move them en bloc.

Amendments moved—

Clause 63, page 56, line 31, leave out ("in respect of it, as the case may be").

Clause 63, page 57, line 3, leave out ("had been") and insert ("was").

Clause 64, page 58, line 8, leave out ("or").

Clause 64, page 58, line 11, at end insert ("or").

Clause 65, page 59, line 24, leave out ("any conditions under subsection 3") and insert ("the conditions required by subsection (41").

Clause 66, page 60, line 6, leave out ("the proviso to section 65(3)") and insert ("section 65(6)").

Clause 66, page 60, line 9, at end insert— ("(a) in the case of planning permission granted by an order under section 28 of the principal Act (requirement of discontinuance of use of land or alteration or removal of buildings or works) is the local planning authority making the order or, where the Minister in confirming the order exercises his powers under section 28(5) of that Act, the Minister;").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 48 and 49, to Clause 66, hang together with Amendment No. 9 to which the House has already agreed. I beg to move Amendment 48.

Amendment moved—

Clause 66, page 60, line 13, leave out from ("granted") to end of line 17.—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET: My Lords I beg to move Amendment No. 49:

Amendment moved— Clause 66, page 60, line 23, leave out from ("Minister") to end of line 26 and insert ("grants the approval, on the date of the determination of the appeal").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 67 [Termination of planning permission by reference to time limit]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I am taking a hint from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, about his willingness for me to put my foot on the accelerator. I beg to move Amendment No. 50.

Amendment moved— Page 62, line 10, leave out ("for the purposes of") and insert ("whether the original period specified under subsection (2) above or a longer period substituted by the Minister under").—(Lord Kennel.)

Clause 68 [New provisions as to what is "operational land" of statutory undertakers]:

LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 51:

Amendment moved— Page 63, line 11, after ("a") insert ("special").—(Lord Kennet.)

Clause 70 [Restriction on entitlement of statutory undertakers to compensation for adverse planning decisions]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 52:

Page 65, leave out line 1 and insert— ("(b) it is not development which has received specific parliamentary approval").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment although it is one of some note since it is the only minor change which the Government consider it necessary to make to the new clause about statutory undertakers introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, at an earlier stage. I said a few words about this important matter of substance at the beginning of the debate. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I simply want to slow down the machine for one moment in order to say, "Thank you" to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and to the Government for, in effect, accepting my noble friend's new clause. I think it extraordinarily clever of him to have drafted it with only this minor change required. Much more important, of course, is the fact that the substance of the matter has now been changed and that the provisions in the Bill are agreed between both sides of the House. This, I think, is a most satisfactory situation to have achieved. On behalf of my noble friend Lord Ilford and, I think, all on the Opposition Benches, I should like to thank the Government.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I should like to take advantage of the momentary pause imposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, upon our headlong rush to thank him on behalf of the Government for his kind words. I agree with what he says about the drafting feat performed by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford. This whole matter of compensation to statutory undertakers has, in my view, been a remarkable example of the dialogue between Government and Parliament in the many stages in the passage of a complicated Bill of this nature.

Clause 71 [Modifications of s. 164 of principal Act]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 53 to 57 en bloc.

Amendments moved— Page 65, line 11, leave out ("under the section") Clause 74, page 67, line 27, leave out ("to") and insert ("of") Clause 80, page 71, line 34, leave out from ("order") to ("be") in line 36 and insert ("instead of requiring the confirmation of the Minister in accordance with section 29(4) of the principal Act, may") Clause 82, page 72, line 30, after ("development") insert ("or precluding it from containing any office floor space") Clause 88, page 78, line 10, after ("section") insert ("153").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 58: Page 78, line 16, leave out ("path or way") and insert ("highway")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Kennet I beg to move Amendment No. 58 to Clause 88 and speak to Amendments Nos. 74 and 75 to Clause 93. This Amendment is little more than drafting. Clause 88(3) already recognises that it will sometimes be necessary or expedient to create an alternative highway over which there are rights of way with vehicles as replacement to a footpath or bridleway which is being stopped or diverted. As it stands, the clause would not permit the alternative highway to be provided by the improvement of an existing vehicular highway, although it does permit the improvement of a path or way. The Amendment will remedy this. Regarding Amendments Nos. 74 and 75, Clause 93 provides powers for local authorities similar to those in Section 153 of the principal Act which are transferred to the Minister, that is to say, powers to stop up or divert footpaths or bridleways. Clause 93(3)(a) enables an order to provide for the creation of an alternative footpath or bridleway as a replacement for one stopped up or diverted.

The purpose of these Amendments is to enable the order to provide for replacement, either by the creation of a new highway or the improvement of an existing highway, a term which goes wider than merely footpaths or bridleways. This brings the provision into line with that in Clause 88(3) as proposed by a previous Amendment. I beg to move.

LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 59:

Page 78, line 24, at end insert— ("() In section 32 of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (power of Minister of Transport to make temporary stopping-up or diversion order in connection with surface working of minerals),—

1. (a) in subsection (1), after the words 'Minister of Transport' there shall be inserted the words 'or the Minister of Housing and Local Government'; and
2. (b) in subsection (2), after the words 'Minister of Transport' there shall to inserted the words 'or the Minister of Housing and Local Government, as the case may be'")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Bill has already extended powers to make orders for stopping up or diverting footpaths or bridleways to the Minister of Housing and Local Government. This Amendment similarly extends the powers to the Minister of Housing and Local Government in relation to orders for temporary closure or diversion to permit mineral workings. I beg to move.

Clause 89 [Procedure for making orders for stopping-up and diverting highways]:

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 61, 62, 63 and Amendment No. 64 to Clause 90 are drafting. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 78, line 35, leave out ("had")

Page 80, line 4, after ("bridleway") insert ("only")

Page 80, line 6, leave out from beginning to ("the") in line 7 and insert— ("(b) otherwise")

Clause 90, page 80, line 10, leave out ("given") and insert ("granted").—(Lord Shepherd.)

LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 65: Page 80, line 26, leave out ("(4)") and insert ("(5)").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment to Clause 90 makes the necessary additional application of Section 153(5) which specifies that the powers conferred are to have effect without prejudice to any power conferred by any enactment on the Minister of Transport to authorise the stopping up or diversion of a road; the provision of Section 3 of the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act 1946, "Power to extinguish certain public rights of way over land acquired" and the provisions of Section 155 of the principal Act, "Extinguishment of the public rights of way over land held for planning purposes." I beg to move.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 66, 67 and 68 are drafting, basically for clarification. I beg to move.

Amendments moved— Page 80, line 31, after ("order") insert ("made by the Minister of Transport"). Page 80, line 32, leave out ("the Minister of Transport") and insert ("that Minister"). Page 80, line 34, after ("Minister") insert ("(as defined by subsection (2) above)").—(Lord Shepherd.)

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, the purpose of this Amendment is to secure consistency of provisions relating to the extinguishment of rights of statutory undertakers in respect of their pipes and cables and other apparatus when roads are closed and diverted. I beg to move

Amendment moved—

Page 80, line 34, at end insert— ("(4) In section 32(3) of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (rights of statutory undertakers in respect of their apparatus where order made under section 153 of principal Act), after the reference to the said section 153 there shall be inserted an alternative reference to this section.").—(Lord Shepherd.)

Clause 91 [Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway]:

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, this Amendment is drafting. I beg to move Amendment No. 70.

Amendment moved— Page 81, line 7, after ("the") insert ("responsible").—(Lord Shepherd.)

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, this Amendment is drafting. I beg to move Amendment No. 71.

Amendment moved— Page 81, line 24. leave out ("being made") and insert ("coming into force").—(Lord Shepherd.)

Clause 92 [Provision of amenity for highway reserved to pedestrians]:

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, this Amendment is drafting. I beg to move Amendment No. 72.

Amendment moved— Page 82, line 43, leave out ("in, under or over") and insert ("under, in, on, over, along or across").—(Lord Shepherd.)

Clause 93 [Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act]:

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, this Amendment is drafting. I beg to move Amendment No. 73.

Amendment moved— Page 83, line 16, leave out ("for the purposes of this section").—(Lord Shepherd.)

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I spoke previously to Amendments Nos. 74 and 75 when I spoke to Amendment No. 58. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 74 and 75.

Amendments moved— Page 83, line 33, leave out ("footpath or bridleway") and insert ("highway"). Page 83, line 36, leave out ("path or way") and insert ("highway").—(Lord Shepherd.)

LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 76:

Page 83, line 40, at end insert— ("() for the preservation of any rights of statutory undertakers in respect of apparatus of theirs which immediately before the date of the order is under, in, on, over, along or across any such footpath or bridleway.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment adds a further matter for which an order made by a competent authority—in this case an authority granting planning permission for development occasioning the footpath or bridlepath order—may provide. It is made to secure consistency and adequacy in the machinery dealing with the rights of undertakers. I beg to move.

LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 77:

Page 84, line 4, at end insert— ("(5) Section 32(1) and (2) of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (power of Ministers to make temporary order for stopping-up or diversion of highway in connection with working of surface minerals) shall apply to an order made by a competent authority under this section as it applies to an order made by a Minister under section 153 of the principal Act, with the substitution—

1. (a) for references to Ministers of references to a competent authority for the purposes of this section; and
2. (b) for the reference in subsection (2) to section 153(3) of the principal Act, of a reference to subsection (3) of this section.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment applies to the case of a footpath or bridleway order made by a competent authority—the local planning authority or a delegate planning authority—the extended powers already conferred by the Mineral Workings Act 1951 in relation to similar orders when made by a Minister. These powers under the Mineral Workings Act enable a highway to be stopped up or diverted temporarily in connection with the surface working of minerals. They permit the imposition of requirements as to maintenance of alternative highways for the period of closure or diversion and also as to the reinstatement of the original highway at the end of that period. It is only right and consistent that these powers relating to temporary diversion and stopping up should be available in the new circumstance created by the Bill—where the footpath closure or diversion order is originated by a competent authority under the section, and not the Minister. I beg to move.

Clause 96 [Miscellaneous amendments of Part IX of principal Act]:

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I am advised that this Amendment is drafting—a matter of style. I beg to move Amendment No. 78.

Amendment moved— Page 84, line 42, leave out ("which statutory undertakers have") and insert ("of statutory undertakers").—(Lord Shepherd.)

Clause 99 [Miscellaneous amendments of principal Act]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 79: Page 85, line 26, leave out subsection (1).

The noble Lord said: My Lords this Amendment removes an otiose subsection, and Amendment No. 141 is consequential to it. I beg to move Amendment No. 79.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I have not understood this and I wonder whether the noble Lord could explain it a little more. What is being done in the Bill as it stands is that Clause 99(1) repeals Section 187 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962, and that is what happens in Schedule 11 as well, but now apparently they are both to stay in force. I am afraid that I have missed the point and I should be grateful if the noble Lord would tell me exactly what is going on.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I missed the point, too, but in fact this section has already been repealed earlier this year by the National Loans Act.

Schedule 1 [Special provisions as to development plans in Greater London]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 80: Page 90, line 21, after ("5") insert (",6")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the general principle in the Bill is that proposals for the alteration of a structure plan or a local plan shall go through the same procedure as the original plan. This Amendment ensures that proposals for alteration of the structure plan for a London Borough shall follow the same procedure as the original plan, coming to the Minister through the G.L.C. I beg to move.

Schedule 2 [Provisions as to established use certificates]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 81, 82 and 83 and later Nos. 93, 94 and 95 are addressed to machinery and change the substance of nothing. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 81, 82 and 83.

Amendments moved—

Page 91, line 41, after ("certificate") insert ("in such form as may be prescribed by the order and")

Page 91, line 46, leave out paragraph (a) and insert— ("(a) include requirements corresponding to section 16(2) and (3) (contents of certificate), section 16(4) (planning authority not to determine application for a certain period) and section 17(3) (duty of planning authority and Minister on appeal to take into account representations by owners, tenants, etc.) of the principal Act;")

Page 92, line 12, leave out sub-paragraph (3).—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 84 and 85 are consequential on Amendment No. 9. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved— Page 92, line 29, leave out from ("Minister") to ("shall") in line 31 and insert ("grants an established use certificate, he") Page 92, line 39, leave out from ("Minister") to end of line 40.—(Lord Kennet.)

Schedule 3 [General vesting declarations for land compulsorily acquired]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 86, which is drafting.

Amendment moved—

Page 95, line 1, leave out paragraph 9 and insert: ("9.—(1) Subject to the following sub-paragraph, the supplementary provisions contained in Schedule 3 to the Land Commission Act 1967 (being provisions as to exclusion of power of entry, objections to severance, compensation and other miscellaneous matters arising on the making of a general vesting declaration under Part II of that Act) shall have effect for the purposes of paragraphs 6 to 8 above as they have effect for the purposes of section 10 of that Act. (2) For the purpose of applying the said Schedule 3 to paragraphs 6 and 8 above, the following substitution of references shall be made therein—

Original reference in Land Commission Act 1967, Schedule 3	Substituted references for purposes of this Schedule
The Land Commission	An acquiring authority
The Land Commission Act 1967	This Act
The Land Commission Act 1967
Section 9(3)	Paragraph 4 of this Schedule
Section 10	Paragraphs 6 to 8 of this Schedule
Section 10(2)	Paragraph 7 of this Schedule

(3) In the said Schedule 3 as so applied, 'land' shall have the same meaning as in this Schedule.")

Schedule 4 [Consequential amendments of planning blight provisions of 1962 Act]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 87 and 88 are consequential on a series of Amendments which I explained on Amendment No. 18. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 87 and 88.

Amendments moved

Page 96, leave out lines 37 to 42 and insert— ("In subsection (1)—

1. (a) after the word 'Act', where occurring for the first time, there shall be inserted the words 'and of sections 33 to 37 of the Act of 1968';
2. (b) paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be omitted; and
3. (c) in paragraph (c), for the words in parenthesis there shall be substituted the words '(otherwise than by being dealt with in a manner mentioned in section 33(1)(a) or (b) of the Act of 1968)';

For subsection (5) there shall be substituted the following subsections:— (5) In this section and in the said sections 139 to 151 'these provisions' means the provisions of this section, those sections and sections 33 to 37 of the Act of 1968; and 'the specified descriptions' means the descriptions contained in paragraphs (c) to (f) of subsection (1) of this section and paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 33(1) of that Act.")

Page 96, line 46, at end insert— ("In subsection (3)—

1. (a) in paragraph (a) the word 'designated' shall be omitted, in both places; and for the words any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of the last preceding section' there shall be substituted the words paragraph (c) of section 138(1) above or paragraph (a) or (b) of section 33(1) of the Act of 1968'; and
1317
2. (b) in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) for the words 'that subsection' there shall be substituted, in each place, the words 'section 138(1) above'.")—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 89 and 90 are drafting. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved—

Page 97, line 2, leave out from ("(1)") to end of line 10 and insert— ("for the words 'Where a notice has been served under the last preceding section' there shall be substituted the words 'Where a blight notice has been served'. For subsection (3) there shall be substituted the following subsection— '(3) Any counter-notice served under this section in respect of a blight notice shall specify the grounds (being one or more of the grounds specified in subsection (2) above or, as relevant, sections 34(8) or 35(1) of the Act of 1968) on which the appropriate authority object to the notice'.")

Page 97, line 22, at end insert— ("In subsection (3), for the words from the beginning to 'that notice' there shall be substituted the words 'Where the appropriate authority have served a counter-notice objecting to a blight notice'.").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 91 and 92 to Schedule 4, and 93 to 95 to Schedule 5, are all consequential. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved—

Page 97, line 26, at end insert— ("Section 145 Subsections (3) and (6) shall be omitted.")

Page 97, line 30, at end insert— ("Section 149 In subsections (1)(a), (1)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b), for the words 'the whole or part' (wherever occurring) there shall be substituted the words 'the whole or a substantial part'. In subsections (1)(b), (2)(b) and (3)(b) for the words 'six months before the date of service' there shall be substituted the words 'twelve months before the date of service'. Section 150 Subsection (5) shall be omitted.")

Schedule 5, page 98, line 4, after ("certificate") insert ("in the prescribed form and")

Schedule 5, page 98, line 10, leave out paragraph (a) and insert— ("(a) include requirements corresponding to section 16(2) (contents of certificate), section 16(4) (planning authority not to determine application for a certain period) and section 17(3) (duty of planning authority and Minister on appeal to take into account representations by owners, tenants, etc.) of the principal Act;")

Schedule 5, page 98, line 26, leave out subparagraph (3).—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 96:

Page 100, line 21, at end insert— ("or—

1. (a) in the case of a building to which section 39(10) of this Act applies, that the Minister should give a direction under that section with respect to the building; or
2. (b) in the case of a building subject to a building preservation notice under section 47 of this Act, that the building should not be included in a list compiled or approved under the said section 32").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment, No. 96, to Schedule 5, is a matter of machinery. It provides that a ground of appeal which is already applicable in the most likely case should be also applicable in the least likely. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I think that in paragraph (a) "section" should be "subsection" but this may be beyond power of recovery at this stage.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 98 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 105, line 38, leave out ("of the owner").—(Load Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 99 is a matter of machinery. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 109, line 3, leave out ("of this Act committed by him") and insert ("or 44 of this Act committed by him with respect to the said building").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 100 is a matter of clarification. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 109, line 12, after ("thereon") insert ("under Part IV of this Schedule").—(Lord Kennet.)

Schedule 6 [Construction of references in sections 61 and 62 to "the responsible Minister or Ministers"]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 101 and 102 are both drafting Amendments. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved— Page 109, line 36, leave out paragraph 3. Page 110, column 1, line 13, at end insert ("or to land in the case of which the circumstances mentioned in section 69(2) of this Act are present,").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 103 is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 110, column 1, line 29, after ("by") insert ("or on behalf of").—(Lord Kennet.)

Schedule 7 [Procedure in connection with orders relating to footpaths and bridleways]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 104 and 105 hang together. They are addressed to machinery. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 111, line 9, at end insert— ("(iii) any statutory undertakers to whom there belongs, or by whom there is used, for the purposes of their undertaking, any apparatus under, in, on, over, along or across that land; and")

Page 112, line 24, at end insert— ("4.—(1) The Minister shall not confirm an order under section 93 of this Act which extinguishes a right of way over land under, in, on, over, along or across which there is any apparatus belonging to or used by statutory undertakers for the purpose of their undertaking, unless the undertakers have consented to the confirmation of the order; and any such consent may be given subject to the condition that there are included in the order such provisions for the protection of the undertakers as they may reasonably require. (2) The consent of statutory undertakers to any such order shall not be unreasonably withheld; and any question arising under this paragraph whether the withholding of consent is unreasonable or whether any requirement is reasonable, shall be determined by whichever Minister is the appropriate Minister in relation to the statutory undertakers concerned.")—(Lord Kennet.)

Schedule 9 [Adaptation and interpretation of enactments, etc.]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendments Nos. 106, 107 and 108:

Page 115, line 45, leave out from beginning to ("references") in line 47 and insert ("References in any Act to the acquisition of land under Part V of the principal Act or to land acquired thereunder (including references which, by Schedule 14 to that Act, are to be construed as such) shall be respectively construed as, or as including (according as the context requires)")

Page 115, line 49, after first ("and") insert— ("(a)")

Page 116, line 5, at end insert— ("and (b) in section 130(2) (effect of purchase notice accepted by local planning authority or statutory undertakers) and section 133(1) (confirmation of purchase notice by Minister) of that Act, references to compulsory acquisition shall, in the case of statutory undertakers, be construed as references to any statutory provision (however expressed) under which the undertakers have power, or may be authorised, to purchase land compulsorily for the purposes of their undertaking.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I propose to move Amendments Nos. 106, 107 and 108 together

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I should like the noble Lord to explain Amendment No. 108, at any rate.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, perhaps I should explain the three together, since they are closely bound up. So far as No. 106 is concerned, it is necessary for the Bill to provide for the bringing forward of references to powers of acquisition under earlier enactments so that other provisions expressed in terms of those powers may be enabled to continue working as was intended. The provision in paragraph 6 of Schedule 9—the general adaptation schedule—is not wide enough.

First, it has not dealt with references which there may be in enactments other than the 1962 Act to acquisition (or to land acquired) under Part V of that Act. It is necessary that it should do so, otherwise the effect of those provisions could become entirely uncertain on the repeal of the powers of acquisition in Part V of the 1962 Act (effected by Clause 27 of the Bill). Second, paragraph 2 of Schedule 14 to the Act of 1962 provided that a reference to an enactment repealed by the 1962 Act should be construed as, or as including, a reference to the corresponding provisions of the 1962 Act. By this means references to the powers of acquisition contained in the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 fell to be construed as references to those in the Act of 1962. But they will not be carried forward under the Bill unless now referred to in the manner of the Amendment.

Amendment No. 107 paves for Amendment No. 108, which arises out of the repeal by this Bill of Section 67 of the 1962 Act, which is the provision conferring powers of compulsory acquisition on statutory undertakers.

My Lords, if that is sufficient explanation of the way in which the three Amendments relate to each other, I beg to move them together.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 109 is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 116, line 19, after ("by") insert ("the Minister of Transport or").—(Lord Kennet.)

8.35 p.m.

LORD AIREDALE moved Amendment No. 110:

Page 116, line 30, at end insert— (". In section 14(8)(b) after "1959" there shall be inserted the words "except sections 72, 73 and 74 thereof")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move, not for the first time, this Amendment, whose purpose I am afraid is not too self-evident upon the face of it. It refers to Sections 72, 73 and 74 of the Highways Act 1959. Those sections deal with road widening schemes and the like. What they provide is that such schemes are to be achieved by prescribing improvement or building lines in consequence of which any landowner whose land is injuriously affected by the road widening scheme is entitled to immediate compensation.

No doubt, my Lords, Parliament's reason for so enacting in the 1959 Act was Parliament's experience of the time that it takes for road widening schemes and such schemes to be effected. It may take 25 years or more for this to happen. So unless the person whose land is injuriously affected, and who is no longer allowed to develop this land, is to receive immediate compensation, it is tantamount to saying that he will not get compensation at all, because in 25 years' time, when the scheme is put into force, he may no longer be with us.

The Ministry of Transport apparently discovered what they thought was a way round this intention of Parliament, and they published a circular which they addressed to local authorities in which they said that they need not proceed under the Highways Act in the manner that Parliament said they were to proceed, but could proceed under the planning legislation instead. The consequence of acting under the planning legislation was that the landowner whose lard was injuriously affected, and who Parliament had specifically indicated was to receive immediate compensation, would not receive immediate compensation. Indeed, I think it is right to say that in some cases he might receive no compensation at all.

This circular earned for the Ministry of Transport the following rebuke in the Court of Appeal from Lord Justice Salmon, who said of the circular, in a case which was reported in The Times on May 31 last: Ever since the circular was published it appeared that improvement lines were not prescribed under the Act, but planning powers were used to sterilise land without property owners having the right to compensation. That practice was to be deplored. It was a practice to defeat the express intention of Parliament in the Highways Act.

LORD KENNET

Before the noble Lord goes on, would he tell us from what case he is quoting the judgment?

LORD AIREDALE

As a matter of fact, I have only one more sentence to quote. The case is the Westminster Bank Limited v. Beverley Borough Council.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, the House will be aware that this matter is sub judice in that an appeal lies to your Lordships' House in its judicial capacity.

LORD AIREDALE

My Lords, that was a matter which I explained when I moved this Amendment on Report; I explained that this case was sub judice. I am not proposing to quote any part of the judgment which affects the facts of the case. I am citing a general observation of Lord Justice Salmon. The conclusion of the quotation is: It was an unjust practice designed to save money. My Lords, I suggest that it is not a feather in the cap of a Government Department when it incurs for itself that kind of rebuke from the judiciary. There is one, and only one, proper constitutional way for a Minister to have the intention of Parliament as expressed in the Statutes changed, and that is to go to his colleagues and explain that a particular provision in a Statute is inconvenient, and for Parliamentary time to be found to bring the matter before Parliament for repealing the Statute and putting something else in its place. I suggest that that is the only proper way in which this matter could have been dealt with. What we have to decide, my Lords, is whether we are to have Government by Act of Parliament or Government by Ministry circular, not published for the benefit of the public at large but addressed and forwarded by the particular Ministry to whom they choose.

I am sorry to say that in the replies I have so far received from Government spokesmen to this Amendment, I have not detected much in the way of what I would call humanity. I have not detected that the Government appreciate that what we are here dealing with is a specific intention of Parliament, expressed in an Act of Parliament, saying that if land is taken away for the public use in certain circumstances the person from whom the land is taken shall have immediate compensation. Is it the Government's intention that the immediate compensation which Parliament has said the landowner is to have shall change? Is this compensation no longer to be given? Are we to have government by Ministry circular or are we to have government by Act of Parliament? That is what this Amendment is about. I very much hope that it will be accepted, and that if the Government wish to change the law in this matter they will do so in the constitutional manner. I beg to move.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, the House considers this Amendment for the third time on this Bill. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, rested his case mainly on some remarks by a judge in a certain case, which he alleged were a rebuke. But this case has not finished: it is sub-judice; an appeal is now pending to the House of Lords. I do not wish to go much further into it, but I do not think it was wise of him to rest so much of his case on this amendment to the law on the remarks of a judge in a case where an appeal is allowed and a further appeal is pending. As to relating that with the highly emotive question of whether we are to have government by circular or by Act of Parliament, I think that really is pushing it a bit.

I do not know how much more the House would wish me to say on this third occasion, in addition to what has already been said at earlier stages, but I would assure Lord Airedale (I think he was assured before; I am speaking generally now and forgetting the Case) that the effect of his Amendment would be against developers, in that it would prevent the Government from coming to their rescue in certain awkward cases by dictating that one Act should be used rather than another. I think it would probably come out the other way from what he intended. We could go into an enormous explanation of it, but that is the essence of the matter: that if it is the intention of his Amendment to help developers, as I think it is, then it would not have that effect.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I should like to say just this. With great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, I do not think that this is a matter that can be put right by an Amendment in a Schedule to this Bill. What is really at issue here—in fact in this case it may not turn out to be an issue under this particular set of legislative provisions, but it is nevertheless a general issue—is the relationship between conditions that can be attached to planning provisions, which have some sort of restrictive effect, and similar powers which are granted to local authorities by other Statutes but which carry rights of compensation. Whether or not it is right that the power that does not carry the right of compensation should be used in lieu of the one that does is a much broader matter than something that just arises under the Highways Acts. It applies over a broader field, and I think it ought not to be isolated in this particular case.

I hope that the Government are not simply waiting for the decision in the House in its Judicial capacity in the particular case that has been mentioned. I hope that the Government have some thoughts about the generality and are not simply going to drop this matter altogether, depending upon what happens in the Westminster Bank v. Beverley case. I believe that this matter would repay a little thought on the part of the authorities, and I hope that that is something which will be given.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, if I can add anything to that it is to say that the noble Viscount should be assured that the Government are giving it a lot of thought, but it seems that the next thing to do is to wait for the final determination of the Beverley case.

LORD AIREDALE

My Lords, I am willing to wait for the final determination of the Beverley case. Before I withdraw this Amendment I will simply say this. When you are looking to see what the intention of Parliament is with regard to highways you look at the Highways Act, and if you find that what is in the Highways Act may be in some way in conflict with something which is contained in planning legislation, you still adhere to what is contained in the Highways Act, because you say to yourself, "When Parliament was considering the Highways Act it had its mind riveted upon this kind of problem, whereas when Parliament was considering planning legislation Parliament was considering planning generally and was not riveting its mind upon highways in particular".

I can only bitterly regret that any Government Department should have thought it fit to issue a Ministry circular in those terms which earned that rebuke from the Judiciary, because I want to see the Executive held in high repute in the country, and it does not do the Executive one little bit of good when it gets its actions criticised in terms of that sort from the Judiciary. Having said that, I will await the result of the Beverley case, and I hope that I shall then be encouraged to return to the attack. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 111 and 112 are both drafting. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 118, line 15, after first ("of") insert ("the provisions of").

Page 118, line 17, leave out ("in both subsections") and insert— ("(a) in subsection (1), after the words 'this Part of this Act' there shall be inserted the words 'and Part II of the Act of 1968'; and (b) in subsection (2)").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 113, 114 and 115 are addressed to machinery. They have that in common. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved—

Page 119, line 44, leave out ("91") and insert ("90, 91, 93, or 94")

Page 120, line 9, at end insert— ("(h) any decision of the Minister on an application for an established use certificate referred to him under section 18(1) of the Act of 1968; (i) any decision of the Minister on an appeal under section 18(2) of the Act of 1968").

Page 121, line 33, at end insert ("o[...] 91").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET,

My Lords, Amendment No. 116 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 122, line 16, at end insert— ("(b) subsection (2) shall be omitted; and").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 117 tidies up the machinery and improves and clarifies the right of appeal to the courts in certain cases. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 122, leave out lines 20 to 29 and insert— (". In section 183 (orders subject to special parliamentary procedure), after the word Act', where first occurring, there shall be inserted the words 'or section 90 or 9l of the Act of 1968'").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 118 and 119 are both drafting. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved— Page 123, line 38, leave out ("section 28, 48 or 90") and insert ("section 20, 48 or 91") Page 124, line 8, after ("a") insert ("completion").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 120 is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 124, line 8, at end insert ("and for the words (in the proviso) from 'an enforcement notice' to 'this Act' there shall be substituted the words an enforcement notice under section 15 or 43 of the Act of 1968 which is served by the Minister, the provisions of sections 47 to 51 of this Act or, as the case may be, sections 44 and 45 of that Act'; and").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 121, 122 and 123 are all drafting. I beg to move them all together.

Amendments moved— Page 125, line 11, leave out ("this Act") and insert ("the Act of 1968") Page 126, line 14, leave out from ("the") to second ("Act") in line 15 and insert ("Town and Country Planning Act 1968 (hereafter in this Act referred to as 'the 1968 Planning Act'), for all purposes of the Planning Act and the said") Page 126, line 24, leave out ("said Act of 1968") and insert ("1968 Planning Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendment No. 124 is machinery. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 126, line 36, after ("24(4)") insert— ("(a) After the words 'Planning Act' where first occurring, there shall be inserted the words 'and of the 1968 Planning Act (except sections 17 and 18 of that Act)'; (b)").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 125, 126 and 127 are all drafting. I beg to move.

Amendments moved— Page 126, line 45, leave out ("Act of 1968") and insert ("1968 Planning Act") Page 126, line 47, leave out ("subject to the next following paragraph") Page 127, leave out lines 1 to 7.—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 128 and 129 go to machinery. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved—

Page 127, line 47, at end insert— ("(d) in subsection (5), for the words 'section 46(1) of the Act of 1962' there shall be substituted the words 'section 16(1) of the said Act of 1968'")

Page 127, line 50, leave out from ("the") to end of line and insert ("said Act of 1968; for the words 'paragraph (a) to (c)' there shall be substituted the words 'paragraphs (a) and (b)'; and for the words 'section 177(1)' there shall be substituted the words 'section 177(1)(a)'").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 130 and 131 are both drafting. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved— Page 129, line 7, at end insert ("and for the words 'that Act' there shall be substituted the words the 'Planning Act'") Page 129, line 29, leave out from ("16(2)") to end of line 32 and insert ("(3) and (4)(a) of the Planning Act of 1968 and so much of section 16(5) of that Act as enables the Minister to give directions").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 132 and 136 hang together. They are both addressed to machinery and achieve the same effect as the Bill as drafted, but by another route. I beg to move Amendment No. 132.

Amendment moved— Page 129, leave out lines 33 to 35.—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 133:

Page 130, line 25, at end insert— ("The Leasehold Reform Act 1967 (c. 88) In section 28(6) (description of development which, if proposed to be undertaken by a local authority, public or other body, may restrict the rights under the Act of tenants of the land affected) for the words from 'in order to secure' to comprehensive development' there shall be substituted the following:— 'in order to secure—

1. (a) the development or re-development of an area defined by a development plan under the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 as an area of comprehensive development; or
2. (b) the treatment as a whole, by development, re-development, or improvement, or partly by one and partly by another method, of any area in which the property is situated'").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendment No. 133 is a little more than machinery. It ensures that certain provisions of the Leasehold Reform Act shall carry forward in terms of the new language used in this Bill about the development and improvement of an area, as well as in the old language used in the 1962 Act. I beg to move.

On Ouestion, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 10 [Transitional Provisions and Savings]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 134.

Amendment moved— Page 130, line 43, at end insert ("this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, this is a matter of the machinery of transition. I beg to move Amendment No. 135.

Amendment moved— Page 131, line 3, leave out from ("shall") to end of line 4 and insert ("be taken to prevail for the purposes of Parts III, IV, V, VI and VIII of the principal Act, Parts II and VI of this Act and Schedule 5 to this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, this Amendment, No. 136, is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 132, line 25, at end insert— ("11. Section 9 of the Control of Offices and Industrial Development Act 1965 shall, in relation to an enforcement notice served before the commencement of Part II of this Act, have effect as originally enacted and not as amended by paragraph 64 of Schedule 9 to this Act. 12. The amendment of section 14 of the Civic Amenities Act 1967 which is made by paragraph 73 of this Act shall not have effect in relation to a notice served under that section before the commencement of Part II of this Act.").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET

My Lords, once again this Amendment No. 137, is a matter of the machinery of transition. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 132, line 45, leave out paragraph 14 and insert— ("14.—(1) Notwithstanding any amendment by this Act of sections 138 to 151 of the principal Act, the description of land contained in section 138(1)(b) of that Act (land allocated by a development plan for the purposes of a government department, etc.) shall continue as one of the specified descriptions for the purposes of those sections in their application to any district to which this paragraph applies. (2) This paragraph applies to any district for which no local plan is in force under Part I of this Act—

1. (a) allocating any land in the district for the purposes of such functions as are mentioned in section 33(1)(a) this Act; or
2. (b) defining any land in the district as the site of proposed development for the purposes of any such functions.

(3) To the extent that section 138(1)(b) of the principal Act survives by virtue of this paragraph and for so long as it does so, the amendment by this Act of section 139(3)(a) of that Act (definition of 'relevant date' by reference to section 138(1)(b)) shall be treated as not displacing the reference in that paragraph to section 138(1)(b).")—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 138.

Amendment moved— Page 133, line 21, after ("of") insert ("Part V of").—(Lord Kennet.)

Schedule 11 [Enactments repealed]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 139, 140, 141 and 142—that is, all the remaining Amendments—are consequential on various earlier provisions already taken into the Bill. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved—

Page 135, column 3, leave out lines 14 to 16.

Page 135, column 3, leave out line 18 and insert— ("In section 145, subsection (3), in subsection (4) the words 'and (6)' and subsection (6)")

Page 135, column 3, leave out lines 50 and 51.

Page 136, column 3, line 17, at end insert ("and (3)").—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.

Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Kennet.)

8.57 p.m.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I do not think I should be in favour if I made a long speech at this stage of the Bill and at this time of the evening, but there are two points I want to ask the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. The first thing that catches my eye is Clause 104, dealing with the commencement of the Bill. Can the noble Lord give any indication of the stages at which this Bill will be brought into effect, and when they are likely to be? This information will be of great interest to almost everybody in this country, as in one way or another a large number of people are affected by its provisions.

Secondly, not only have we "blight" provisions but we have yet another instalment of chaotic amendment of the provisions relating to industrial development certificates and office development permits. We had Section 38 of the 1962 Act, which was the original I.D.C. provision; then it was changed by the Control of Offices and Industrial Developments Act, which added the O.D.P.s and changed the I.D.C.s in 1965; the Industrial Development Act, 1966, changed the I.D.C.s again, and here we have a Bill in 1968 which changes both of them again. It is already virtually impossible to understand what any of this means. It is far more difficult than "blight" provisions, and I hope something will be done fairly soon about consolidation and that any loopholes which have been discovered have now been satisfactorily stopped up by this Bill.

I am also interested in the matter of commencement because the moment this Bill comes into force all the way through, I have no doubt the whole thing can be consolidated. Can the noble Lord help on either of those points? They are really of some importance.

LORD SILKIN

My Lords, we are speaking on the Motion, That the Bill do now pass, and I want first of all to pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Kennet for the way in which he has handled this Bill. I know that I have been in conflict with him, but I hope he will not feel that there has been anything personal about it: I really do strongly disagree with the decision on advertisement appeals. But generally I have nothing but praise for the way in which my noble friend has handled this Bill. He has been calm, serene, helpful and conciliatory, so far as his instructions permitted. I would say the same thing about the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor. He has been ideal as an Opposition spokesman. He has never taken a political or Party view about this Bill; he has treated it as a measure which is for the common good, and I think I can say quite truthfully that every single speech of his has been of a non-Party character, and made with the sole desire to improve the Bill. I wish I could say the same about all Bills which go through this House.

It is now twenty years since the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 was passed, and as one who was very largely responsible for that Act I must agree that the time has come to look at the planning proposals once more, and I am very glad to find—it is a personal gratification to me, at any rate—that the structure of the 1947 Act, by and large, has not been greatly changed. This Bill introduces a considerable number of improvements and modifications which experience has shown are necessary, and I do not complain about them in the very least. I think they are all for the better.

What I wonder is whether there was any urgency about this Bill. I can see no great dramatic changes in the law, and I cannot see why there was this great urgency to get this Bill through at this time. I recognise that there was a problem in connection with planning appeals. They were getting hopelessly congested, and I agree that something had to be done about it. But as regards the rest of the Bill I wonder whether it could not have waited. I should have thought it might have waited until we had had the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government. Undoubtedly that Report, when it is produced, is going to recommend very great changes in the structure of local government and in the powers of local authorities.

I myself feel that we have too many planning authorities in the country with jurisdictions which, by and large, are too small, and we have got ourselves in the further difficulty of having a very large number of local authorities who have delegated powers but who in fact are carrying out very important functions without very much interference from the bodies that have delegated those powers to them. If we take the total number, there must be over 1,000 local authorities that are exercising town planning functions to-day. They cannot do this efficiently, and it would have been far wiser, in my view, if we could have held over the major changes that we are making in this Bill until we had had the Report from the Royal Commission on Local Government and had decided what to do and altered the structure of local government. Only at that time, I feel, would it have been appropriate to introduce a measure of this kind in town planning; and had that course been taken it would have been a much more drastic measure.

I think the general trend to-day is towards more and more regional government, and undoubtedly in this small island of ours a reasonable unit for planning development is the region, and not the generally artificial local authority of to-day. You cannot have a development plan for the country which is based on the separate development plans of 124 local authorities. Yet that is the position to-day, and that is the position which has largely been maintained in this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, shakes his head: but he does not know what is going to be the structure of local government; he does not know what is going to be the future, and undoubtedly there will have to be great changes in the future.

There is one final matter that I want to touch on, and I do so with great diffidence. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, some years ago, in the early days, held out high hopes of the simplification of our legislation. We were going to have legislation which would be understood, if not by the man in the street, at any rate by even the least experienced practitioner in the law. We were going to bring an end to the complicated highly technical legislation which we are getting to-day and which we have had for so many years. Certainly this Bill is not an example of such a change—though I quite realise (I want to be quite fair) that it cannot be done in the present outlook of legislation. If we are to have legislation intended to provide for every possible contingency in planning, for the exceptional cases and for the normal cases, then of course we must have a highly technical Bill.

I understand that some thought is being given by the Law Commissions to some method of simplifying Bills, possibly by laying down principles and having more regulations, more statutory orders, or some other way by which a Bill will be readily understood by most of its readers. I am sorry to say that that is not the case with this present Bill: even I find it very difficult to follow in a number of places. I remember that when the 1947 Act was before the House it used to be said by friends that there was only one person who understood it, but by those who were not friends that nobody understood it; but it was not quite as bad as that.

However, I will say this as regards recent legislation: that already there are several matters coming up before the courts for decision. May I quote one, the Leasehold Reform Act? The Lands Tribunal are inundated with cases in which a decision is sought on what is the proper amount of payment to be made for the redemption of leaseholds. We all know what was meant in the Bill. What I understood the Bill to intend way that it was to be a payment representing something excluding the value of the house, only the land. Certainly there is a strong feeling throughout the country that that is not what the Act says, and it is being argued that all the great labyrinth of words means simply that a person wanting to redeem the lease has to pay the full market value of the lease. That is one example. Another example, which no doubt your Lordships have had drawn to your attention, concerns the Landlord and Tenant Act, where there is some doubt as to a large class of cases which have been left out of the Act although it was intended that they should be included. Again there is a great pressure on the Government to amend almost immediately after the Act has been passed.

I feel that some kind of simplification of legislation is called for, and I am only sorry that the ambitions of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor have not yet been realised. I hope that before the end of this Government we shall have this simpler legislation. Having said that, I once more congratulate my noble friend Lord Kennet on having got through this monumental Bill, with no friction in this House, with great pleasantness, and, I think, with the general good will of the whole House.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I be allowed to associate myself and those on these Benches with the tribute that he has paid to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet? I have not been intimately involved in this Bill, but I have read the proceedings and I appreciate that the tribute is well deserved. May I also, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor, thank the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, for the kind words he said about my noble friend.

9.10 p.m.

LORD HOLFORD

My Lords, to add any words at all to what has been said by what I may call the three statesmen of planning, Lord Silkin, Lord Brooke, and finally Lord Kennet, needs a certain audacity at this hour of night; but Lord Silkin did encourage me to say a few brief words on the passing of this Bill as one who has been teaching and practising town and country planning for thirty-five years.

What I want to say is that the Bill seems to me to try to resolve a great number of conflicts, the biggest of which, as I have listened in the course of the passage of the Bill through this House, has been the wish to get greater public participation in planning and at the same time to increase the speed of the machinery, to have fewer appeals and delays. These are obviously complex matters. I should like to associate myself with what the noble Lord and also the noble Viscount have said: that here, in a situation where you have a fast driver on a rather skiddy road, the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has shown himself to be a wonderful steersman.

The only other thing I want to say is that I believe that although there is no great urgency for this Bill it is timely. I happen to be one of the guinea pigs in regard to this Act, in that I have just put up an application for planning permission in full display in the Royal Exchange, in the middle of the City of London, for a building which has not yet received planning permission. In the course of the eight days for which this exhibition, with its models and photographs has been exposed, we have had, to my surprise, 20,000 people visiting it, and comments which run into several thousands. Whether those comments are for or against I am not prepared to say; I do not think any of us know. But it is at any rate a measure of the interest which people are taking in this subject, and therefore, although the Bill may not be urgent, it is certainly timely.

LORD AIREDALE

My Lords, The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, was most lavish in his praise for the efforts of others upon this Bill; but it all rests upon the foundation of the 1947 Act, the indefatigable pilot of which was the noble Lord. Lord Silkin, himself.

9.14 p.m.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, let me thank for their kind words all those who have uttered them, and if I may, I should like to pass on a due share of them to my noble friends Lady Serota and Lord Shepherd, who have borne the brunt of some of the most incomprehensible parts of this Bill, and also tell my noble friend Lord Silkin of my impression that he got it right first time in 1947. I think it is remarkable that the principles laid down in that first Planning Act ever really to bite on the British situation should have stood the test of time so well and needed so little revision twenty years later. I am only sorry that he did not agree with me on all the details of this Bill. I have great sympathy for what my noble friend Lord Silkin said about too many planning authorities, and I would point out that if the Royal Commission recommend fewer, and the recommendation is adopted by the Government, that will fit very well with this Bill. In the meantime, there is a de facto reduction going on among the authorities whom we have invited to operate the new provisions as soon as they can—indeed, they are already beginning to work on it.

A couple of statistics may be of interest. The House has considered about 400 Amendments to the Bill. We have carried in 21 new clauses, and three new Schedules. This is quite a lot. It is an unusual score, and I would not draw it to your Lordships' attention if I were not perfectly confident that we have very much improved the Bill by doing this. It is one of those occasions when my noble friend Lord Silk in was able to speak about the lack of Party animosity in this Bill. There has been virtually none. And how pleasant it is to find something on which the Parties really do agree; and how pleasant it is to legislate in such an atmosphere!

On the question of compensation and consolidation, I have told the House at earlier stages that an overall review of compensation is going on inside the Government machine. It is still going on. It is going on well but, as all Members of the House will know, there is probably nothing in the country, or hardly anything in the country, so complicated as land compensation; and tempting as it sometimes is to say, "To hell with the details: let us decide the principle", that is not possible, because the details "come back at you" the next day and you find that you have decided the principle the wrong way and got it upside down. But I assure the House that this review is active; it is going forward. There is progress. We are further forward than we were last time I mentioned it. I cannot yet give a date when anything will come before Parliament from it. As the House knows, the programme is pretty congested these years, and in any case it is an open question yet how many of all the matters which are now under review should he put in one Bill, whether we can wrap it all up or whether it may be necessary to go ahead with some parts of it before others.

The noble Lord, Viscount Colville of Culross, also asked when the Bill would be coming into effect, and I am glad he did so, because I think it may be useful to get certain intentions of my right honourable friend known among those who will have to operate it. Because of the varied nature of the alterations and additions to planning law which are made by the Bill, the various parts of it will have to come into effect on different dates. There are some provisions which must be brought into force as soon as possible, and the Order for this purpose will be made as shortly as possible after Royal Assent is given to the Bill. These provisions include Clause 38 and Clauses 68 to 72, "Statutory undertakers".

A number of other varied improvements in the detail of planning lays contained in Part VI which do not require the making of regulations or administrative preparation will also be brought: into effect as soon as possible after Royal Assent. The Planning Inquiry Commissions provisions need a small set of regulations. My right honourable friend intends to bring them into force at the end of November, so that all that should be ready if ever a case arises in which it would be appropriate to refer to a Planning Inquiry Commission.

Nearly all the rest of the Bill, including the provisions for transfer of appeals to inspectors, the strengthening of protection for listed buildings, and the improved enforcement code, but with the exception of Part I, my right honourable friend plans at the moment to bring into force on January 1 of next year. Time is required between now and then to get the regulations and circulars drafted, and some of these will have to be the subject of consultation with interested organisations. A very few provisions, such as Clause 87, dealing with ministerial responsibility for the Location of Offices Bureau, will fit more conveniently with the term of the financial year, and accordingly will be brought into force later next year.

My Lords, we take leave of a long Bill. I regret that it is in places an obscure Bill, but if it were any clearer than the surrounding landscape it would give rise to greater obscurity. It is a Bill which has to its credit two records: probably a record number of Amendments on Third Reading in your Lordships' House, in recent years at any rate, and a record degree of concordance and agreement among all Parties.

On Question, Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

House adjourned at twenty-one minutes past nine o'clock.