§ 2.50 p.m.
§ LORD ROWLEYMy Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
§ [The Question was as follows:
§ To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is their policy to welcome the consideration of the Vietnam situation by the Security Council of the United Nations with a view to the convening of a Peace Conference.]
§ LORD CHALFONTMy Lords, we should naturally welcome any consideration of the Vietnam problem, in the Security Council or elsewhere, that seemed to offer a chance of progress towards peace.
§ LORD ROWLEYMy Lords, in view of the failure, through no fault of Her Majesty's Government, to reconvene the 1954 Geneva Conference, is it not time that the Security Council should at least discuss the Vietnam situation with a view to ending the present deadlock and bringing about peace negotiations? Is my noble friend aware of the resolution passed unanimously last Thursday by the United States Senate asking the Security Council to take this course; and should not their proposal be strongly supported by Her Majesty's Government?
§ LORD CHALFONTMy Lords, I am aware of a report that the American Senate has asked for action in the Security Council; but, of course, the American Senate is not the American Administration. I 365 think it would be wrong of me, as a Minister of Government, to comment on this matter until we know what, if anything, the American Government propose to do. When we know that, then, as I said in my earlier reply, we should be delighted to discuss, and support, anything that offers the slightest chance of bringing about peace in Vietnam.
§ LORD ROWLEYI thank the noble Lord for that reply; but may I, with respect, request an answer to the first part of my supplementary question? Do the Government not agree that because of the failure to reconvene the 1954 Geneva Conference we have had five years of bloody warfare? Is it not possible for the Security Council to discuss—if only discuss—the problem?
§ LORD CHALFONTMy Lords, while I respect the passion and sincerity of my noble friend in this matter—and no one agrees with him more than I—I can only say again that we should all like to see an end to the war in Vietnam. But what happens in the Security Council is a matter for the Security Council. I can only repeat that Her Majesty's Government would welcome any consideration of that problem in this Council or elsewhere that would offer a chance of progress towards peace.
§ LORD CHAMPIONMy Lords, is not our position, as a member of a Security Council, such that we could ourselves initiate this discussion?
§ LORD CHALFONTMy Lords, this is a matter for decision by Her Majesty's Government in the light of all the considerations that apply in New York. I will bear in mind the questions that have been asked. I can only say again—and I ask my noble friend to believe me when I say so—that we shall welcome any consideration of this problem in the Security Council. I ask my noble friend to note that word "welcome"; for it has, as he will know, a certain United Nations connotation.
§ LORD SILKINMy Lords, cannot we take the initiative in this matter? Why are we not in a position, like anyone else, to take the initiative?
§ LORD CHALFONTMy Lords, I think my noble friend will know that for a Government to take an initiative it is usually better for them to know that that 366 initiative will have some profitable end. An initiative that is unlikely to arrive at a profitable end has only a sort of moral impact and moral content. We should like to take the initiative when we know that it will be successful.
§ LORD BROCKWAYMy Lords, while welcoming the spirit of the reply of the Minister, may I ask this? Is not the difficulty that the Government of neither North Vietnam nor China is represented in the Security Council? And is not the road towards peace the suggestion that U Thant, who has wide acceptance in this matter, should take the initiative in bringing about a peace conference in which both China and North Vietnam would be represented?
§ LORD CHALFONTMy Lords, perhaps I had better answer my noble friend by saying that in so far as the North Vietnamese are concerned—for we all realise that the People's Republic of China is not represented in the United Nations—their co-operation is essential to the eventual success of any move designed to end the war. But I would make the point that the North Vietnamese have consistently rejected any consideration that the United Nations should concern itself with the affairs of Vietnam.
§ LORD BROCKWAYIs my noble friend aware that that is why I have made the alternative suggestion that U Thant, who himself is so widely accepted, should be given the responsibility of seeking a peace conference which would include both the Government of North Vietnam and that of China?
§ LORD CHALFONTMy Lords, that is a constructive suggestion from my noble friend; but I think we must realise that U Thant, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, is a man closely identified with the United Nations and its organisation; and I repeat that the North Vietnamese have rejected any suggestion that the United Nations should be involved in their affairs.
§ LORD ROWLEYMy Lords, may I put a last supplementary question? Would my noble friend reply to Lord Brockway by reminding him that in the 1954 Geneva Conference both the Viet Cong (now North Vietnam) and the People's Republic of North China were 367 represented although neither was a member of the United Nations? And will he not be aware that, although it is true that the Conference was not actually under the ægis of the United Nations, it was organised by members of the United Nations?
§ LORD CHALFONTMy Lords, I think my noble friend has performed that task more effectively than I could have done myself.