THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES

HL Deb 09 March 1966 vol 273 cc1137-95

4.20 p.m.

Debate resumed.

VISOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN

My Lords, it is time that we got back to the Defence Review. I have spoken in many Defence debates in your Lordships' House, and I have always pleaded that the role of the Armed Forces is to support British foreign policy, the two being taken out of the realm of Party politics. This appears to be impossible, as we have seen in this debate. I have been a Member of your Lordships' House for twenty years, and I have never known a Defence White Paper which was not immediately criticised by the political Party in Opposition. This Review is no exception. It is not to be expected that everybody, wherever he or she may sit in the House, will agree with everything in the Review. I should now like to instil some common sense into this debate.

Let me say at once that in broad outline I consider the Review to be an eminently sensible Paper—in so far as it goes, that is the point. The real trouble is that we cannot solve British defence problems in isolation, and to put things right the Western Alliance needs, as I said in 1958, a complete overhaul. It is quite obvious once we face the following facts. First, there is no danger in Europe. Secondly, the areas of trouble are now outside Europe, and particularly in the Far East. Thirdly, the burden of handling troubles outside Europe is borne by two NATO members, the United States and the United Kingdom. Fourthly, we keep a large British Army in Continental Europe doing nothing, and it will continue to do nothing for years. Finally, NATO must cease to look inwards at itself and look outwards, reshaping itself on a global basis. The Defence Review points the finger at those facts, but we cannot act in isolation, and I hope that after the General Election Her Majesty's Government will urge a complete reorganisation of the Western Alliance.

My Lords, let me take the Review in itself. There appear to be three points which have come in for the greatest criticisms and I should like to give my personal view on those three points, because time will not allow of roaming over the whole Review. I understand the three points to be the following. First, deciding first on a financial ceiling and then working out the best defence we can get for that sum. The second point, sea power and the organisation of the Royal Navy to get the best results; together with the rôle of air power. Thirdly, British defence policy East of Suez. Those are the three points with which I should like to deal, and if there is time, and your Lordships by then are not completely bored, I should like to conclude with a few minutes on the Reserve Army.

Regarding the first point, the financial ceiling, most people would agree that in normal times we should first consider our commitments and then decide what Armed Forces are needed to meet them, matching military expenditure to the commitments. But, my Lords, the present times are very far from normal. The Western Alliance is in no defence danger, but as a nation we are faced with serious economic problems—balance of payments, gold and dollar reserves, safeguarding sterling, rising costs, and so on. Our military strength must be backed by economic strength, the two being properly balanced; and in the particular circumstances, I consider that it is prudent ("prudent" is not a word I often use, but I would use it at this time) to fix a ceiling for the Defence Budget, and I agree with the Government in the way in which they are tackling that problem.

Now, about sea power. During my long and very enjoyable military life I have always been a great advocate of sea power, and I have been a serious student of its influence on warfare. Indeed, when I was serving for ten years in the Western Defence Organisation several navies said that I was the best Admiral they had. In 1958 the United States Navy presented me with a silver boatswain's call, and the British Navy gave me an Admiral's cap. Whether they would do so again after this debate is concluded, is another matter.

My Lords, from the days of the Greek-Persian wars in the fifth century B.C., up to the mid-twentieth century the side which possessed superior sea power has, in the end, always prevailed. During Hitler's war, the Second World War, the progress of science and the mighty weapon of air power exercised a profound influence on the conduct of war and, as I know very well indeed, regarding land warfare. Your Lordships will recall that in the Coral Sea in May, 1942, the United States Fleet defeated the Japanese Fleet and removed the threat to Australia. That was the first naval battle in which the opposing warships never once sighted each other, and not one direct shot was exchanged. The battle of the Coral Sea proved that air power, when developed to its full potential, has an amazing effect on war at sea, and on war on land.

The greatest value of air power is its flexibility, which is a battle-winning factor of the first importance. It follows that control of all available air power, land-based and sea-based, must be centralised, and command must be exercised through one channel. This great principle will bring into discussion whether it is sound policy, as regards strategic flexibility and financial and economic saving, to have a separate Fleet Air Arm, rather than an undivided Air Force capable of operating on land, sea and in air defence.

The most important military development of Hitler's war, due to the onward march of science, was the upsurge of naval and air power as a major factor in warfare. It revolutionised strategic and tactical conceptions. But in my view sea power in future, because of the impact of science, will be operated in a different way. The Navy has got to go increasingly under the sea—a very good place for the Silent Service! There, under the sea, its armament will be the nuclear-powered submarine—the Polaris and the Hunter-Killer. I have always admired the submariner: he will now come into his own. That part of the Navy on the sea will increasingly become fast, small ships, capable of launching missiles. In fact, striking aircraft will in due course give way to missiles.

Now we come to air cover; and this is a very important point. Until such time as air cover of surface ships can be provided from land bases at considerable distances away, we shall have to continue to rely on carrier-borne aircraft; but looking to the mid-70s, and beyond, it is difficult to say what the scientists may produce for us by then. During the past fifteen years, the contribution of the scientists in the realm of research and development has been absolutely fantastic, and the answer is that as Defence Budgets are reduced, the money allotted to the scientists must be proportionately increased. If this is done, and if our scientists are given the money and the manpower they need, it is not impossible that in some ten years' time the large aircraft carrier will go out of business. The problem will arise over reconnaissance for ships at sea, on the surface and under the sea. V.T.O.L. aircraft capable of being operated from small surface vessels appear to be the answer, but at present their radius of action is too small for reconnaissance needs, and this is where I hope the scientists will lend a hand.

To sum up sea power, in any military organisation there is no surer way to disaster than to take what has been done for many years and go on doing it, the problem having changed. We British need a strong Navy. We have a vast merchant fleet, which brings us food and essential raw materials from all parts of the world. It must be protected. Therefore, we cannot weaken our historic sea power. But we must realise that the progress of science makes it necessary to exercise our sea power in the future in a different way. The Royal Navy is a magnificent Service. If I had not decided to be a soldier, I would have been a sailor—if the Royal Navy had accepted me. As it is, my grandson is going to join the Navy.

Take Britain's defence policy East of Suez. Your Lordships will know very well that during the past twenty-five years there has been a decline in the prestige of the white man in Oriental and Asiatic countries. This decline began in the winter of 1941–42, when Japan entered the Second World War and her armed forces overran South-East Asia. When Japanese overlordship ended in 1945, as suddenly as it had begun, the peoples in that part of the world did not want to take their old masters back, and movements in favour of independence began. And, as your Lordships are aware, the dark masses of Africa began to stir. It is very clear that to-day the white man, with his armed forces, is not too popular in countries East of Suez.

It is difficult to prophesy what the future may hold for the West in that area. One has only to compare the relations between Germany, the British Commonwealth, China, Russia and the United States in 1941, in 1945 and to-day to realise that the most unlikely and kaleidoscopic change is possible in the years that lie ahead. One point is vital: we cannot desert our friends in that part of the world. It may not be too easy to decide who are our friends To borrow a principle from strategy, the Western Alliance to which we belong must plan to be so well and flexibly deployed that it can deal quickly and effectively with all situations, including the unexpected and the unlikely—in fact, an elastic deployment based on a maritime strategy.

I am very doubtful whether the West is best served by a multitude of fixed bases, whether for sea, land or air forces. In a crisis such bases may suddenly be found to be facing in the wrong direction. They tend to cramp possible mobility. They are hostages to fortune, and often they are in territory where the local inhabitants are not too friendly, or may not be friendly for long. In that last connection, such bases make very good propaganda for enemies of the West.

The only safe place for a British base East of Suez is in a white Commonwealth country, and for many years in your Lordships' House I have advocated a base in Australia. Our future presence in bases East of Suez would seem to be uncertain. But in paragraph 24 of the Defence Review I note a reference to the possible base in Australia. There are some who say that we should begin at once a withdrawal from East of Suez. That would be highly dangerous. A quick withdrawal on our part would lead to a tremendous upheaval in social conditions in the area, with appalling consequences: for we have been there too long. Do not let us forget what happened in the Congo. It is essential that we have absolute naval superiority in the Afro-Indian Ocean. Let us get that right first and keep it, before we think of pulling out elsewhere in the East. In that respect, the Simonstown Agreement is vital and must never be abrogated.

What I have been saying is merely the outline of a really gigantic problem. The whole matter needs a much tighter control of the three Fighting Services by an all-powerful Minister of Defence than exists at the present time. I had hoped that we might get inter-Service unity when the centralised Minister of Defence came into being, but it is clear that there is still a good deal to be done in that respect.

If your Lordships will allow me a few more minutes, I should like to say something about the Reserve Forces. I hope that it will be possible to take the Territorial Army out of Party politics. The policy of the Government, as I understand it, is to reshape the Territorial Army to meet the needs of the mid-20th century; and it certainly needed doing. It should have been done fifteen years ago. The process of reshaping it has aroused terrific controversy. I gave my views about it in two speeches that I made in your Lordships' House, on June 30 and November 23 last year, and I do not want to go all over the matter again. I would say that the Government have shown courage in grasping this very prickly nettle, which previous Governments declined to do.

In tackling this particular problem, tradition and sentiment must not be allowed to be a bar to progress. I am all for tradition. But let us decide first what sort of Reserve Army is needed, and then decide how we can get it without extinguishing the tremendous voluntary national spirit of the British people. This is highly important, because the recruitment for the Reserve Army will depend on voluntary effort. I should like to suggest to your Lordships a few principles which must form the framework of future planning. First, it is most important that both the Army Volunteer Reserve and the Home Defence Force should succeed, and since they will be composed of volunteers, it will be essential to have the good will of their representatives. This means that the Ministry of Defence must listen to, and give proper consideration to, their views.

If the Home Defence Force is to succeed, it must be seen to make military sense; and since its cost is to be borne by the Home Office, the men must not be regarded as policemen in khaki. The order of battle must allow the Force to make military sense. Therefore it must be provided with the normal military elements needed to carry out its ôle, such as a simple command structure, communications, reconnaissance ability and means of self-maintenance in the field.

All these points need careful examination in order to find the cheapest answer—and when I say "the cheapest answer", I do not mean cheap and nasty. These points must not be ruled out of court. If they are, the Force will not make military sense.

If both Forces are to succeed, we must draw as much as we can on the traditions and the spirit of the old Territorial Army. The closest association possible between the two Forces must be the aim, based on the continuation of Territorial Army units and their links with county and city associations. It is most important that the Home Defence Force should be spread right across the country. The money available, £3 million a year, is not very much, and it will be difficult to do everything at once. But we have at least the structure, which, if necessary, can always be improved or expanded. If we can get the close tie-up between all the voluntary reserves, based on the old Territorial Army, all may yet be well. What we want is a military organisation, suitably composed and commanded, and one that makes military sense. And it looks as if that has now been agreed.

Now let me conclude. I am under the definite impression that my noble Leader proposes to divide the House on this defence issue. I hope that he will not do so—though I do not think my hope will make any difference. But we have had a good debate, and many interesting points have arisen. Why divide the House on the last day but one of a dying Parliament?

LORD CARRINGTON

Why not?

VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN

I hope that my noble Leader will withdraw his Amendment and not divide the House. But if he does decide to divide, then I shall find it impossible, for the reasons I have given, to follow him into the Division Lobby.

4.47 p.m.

LORD BOURNE

My Lords, it is somewhat difficult to follow the noble and gallant Viscount, except in one respect, and that is that he clears our minds on the subject under discussion, and therefore I am grateful and happy to follow him because I do not have to explain the fundamentals of the subject. Like the noble and gallant Viscount, I would prefer that this was just a discussion, not to be followed by a Division. We were waiting for this Defence Review. Now that it has come it is full of information, and it is, I believe, a brave attempt to match commitment to the money available. But I am sorry to say that I think it has failed. The only thing it has done is to save the money. It has not reduced the commitment; and it has certainly not reduced very much the over-stretch which is so well described in Part I. It has failed strategically, but not financially.

I should like to give my reasons for supporting the Amendment if there is a Division at the end of the debate. I want to say, also, that my confidence in the Government's defence decisions has been very much shaken in recent months by the fact that they can make a very serious mistake—I refer to the one on Home Defence. Admittedly, it was rather gracious to withdraw that error at the end of July. Nevertheless, it was a terrible thing to say that there was no Home Defence problem, not even a Civil Defence problem, which the Army should help in; and I think the Army Board, or whoever was advising the Secretary of State for Defence in that decision, are very much to blame. The Government have now had the courage and good sense to reverse that decision, and I will not trouble your Lordships by saying any more about the Territorial Army or the Home Defence problem.

There are two or three mechanical points in the White Paper that I should like to mention, and then I want to get on with what I think are the fundamentals of our defence problem, which were dealt with, in my opinion, rather piece-meal in the Defence Review. The first organisational question is the changeover in the use of our nuclear strike deterrent force from Bomber Command to the naval Polaris submarines. Not so long ago people got very excited and hot under the collar at any such suggestion, but here it is. It has gone through extraordinarily quietly, and it is a fundamental change.

Another point which you can dig out of the White Paper, which is not dealt with in a few words but which I am glad to report, is that the Army is now properly equipped, or very shortly to be. By the end of this year it will be a modernly equipped Army, with the best weapons. We have the best tank in the world, the best field gun in the world, and now the infantry, I am thankful to say, have the best infantry weapons. Incidentally, only one weapon out of about five or six was invented in this country, and those I have mentioned were ordered by the previous Government.

The last mechanical point is about the aircraft carriers. I will not go through the arguments again, of course, but there is one point which has not been mentioned. That is, that the Army, if it goes ashore, whether it has sophisticated opposition or a doubtful opposition (as is so much more often the case), wants an intimate air support, hour to hour, minute to minute, and the nearness of a carrier is something which the Royal Air Force really cannot supplant, especially if they are operating from an island base 1,000 or 2,000 miles away. They simply cannot do it. Whether we can afford the aircraft carrier is another subject entirely. It may be that the Government are right in saying that they can replace the necessary air support by other means. We have not yet, by the way, learned to use our helicopters offensively, which the Americans are doing every day. I heard recently from a parachute battalion which I was visiting that they wanted to use a helicopter or two offensively in the mountains of Aden. They were not allowed to do so, because they would risk losing an aircraft, which would mean that the logistic purpose for which it was built would be lost. So we have to examine, as my noble and gallant friend said, ways and means of replacing the modern strike fleet carrier, if we can afford it. One suggestion which has been made is that perhaps we could build or buy very much smaller carriers—25,000 tonners, instead of the 75,000 tonners, which I believe are contemplated. I am not sure about that; I am not an expert on the subject.

Now I should like to turn to the fundamentals of the subject, and to do so I will deal with the three co-ordinates mentioned, I think, by the Foreign Secretary in another place yesterday: first of all, our place in the world, secondly, our commitments, and, thirdly, what we can afford. First, our place in the world. No one in this House has argued, I believe, that we can match for power the two super Powers. We are no longer a world Power so far as defence is concerned. We may have a wide-world rôle, but we are not a world Power. I have much sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said yesterday, that we could not contemplate being a world Power any longer on borrowed money. So we are a medium Power. On the word "power", I should like to remind your Lordships that this business of pacifism does not enter my horizon. Somebody who would shake hands with the Russians if they walked up Kingsway is, in my opinion, wasting the time of the House in this debate. On the other hand, the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord King-Hall, for United Nations aid service brigades—doctors, engineers and so on—may be a fine suggestion, again if you can project it ten, twenty or thirty years ahead. If you could come back and make the same speech in thirty years' time I think it might be more to the point. Lastly, we simply cannot carry on in all the rôles which I will describe in a moment. We simply cannot afford it any longer.

Now our commitments. I will not bore your Lordships by going through a list of the commitments—you know them well by now. But I will say that this argument about reaching a balance of Asiatic forces, or the countervailing forces, which have been mentioned and discussed so frequently in recent months, is probably a valid argument, but again it is not valid to-day. It may be valid in ten years' time, although so far as the Far East is concerned we must remember that we have to wait for Japan and India to have any countervailing forces available; and the countervailing forces in the Middle East are by no means clear to me at the present time. So I would argue that we should not leave the stability of these countries in Asia to their own independent forces yet awhile.

I entirely agree with the noble and gallant Viscount that we must stick to our friends, and, incidentally, we must defend our interests. We have friends and interests, and usually they coincide in that part of the world. For example, your Lordships have heard me talk many times in your Lordships' House about the situation in Asia; the position is similar in the Middle East. I was in the Arabian Gulf in December. If you talk about creating power vacuums there, and the possible British withdrawal one day from Aden—I did not know it was to be planned quite so soon—the Sheikh or Sultan to whom you are talking is not interested in the military vacuum or who is going to fill it. All he would say straight away was, "I shall have Nasser on my frontier, or so-and-so on my frontier". To him it is a much more intimate problem. We talk about it in a much more ethereal. theoretical, way, but to them it is a very real problem.

I have not been to Libya lately, but if you go and talk to the King he will tell you that the Treaty of Defence with this country is very important indeed, and he inquires how far away are the British tanks and whether we are going to defend him if an aggressor comes over his frontier? At a time when we are withdrawing forces from Libya, it is a difficult thing to tell him that we are going to fulfil our Treaty. So I am not with the argument which we heard from the Liberals yesterday for abrogating Treaties or weakening our links with our friends in any way at all. I think we should stay with our friends. and I entirely agree with the Secretary of State for Defence when he said yesterday that we will stay East of Suez for many years.

This very brief survey brings me to a choice. Our forces in this country are divided roughly into three First of all. there is the nuclear strike force, which I am glad to see is getting cheaper. It used to be 10 per cent., it is 5 per cent. in this Defence Review, and it is going to be 2 per cent. when the Polaris submarines get hold of it. Secondly, there are very large forces in Europe and, thirdly, there are large forces overseas, chiefly East of Suez. To talk about the nuclear force first, a Member of this House yesterday suggested that we could get rid of our nuclear forces now. The last chance for doing that, and for having any influence on the non-proliferation system, was about 1957, before the French started making their bomb. Now we have not only the French to consider but the Chinese, and a good many people waiting on the threshold to make bombs, and who may do so. The days of nonproliferation seem to me rather far off. Proliferation is the order of the day at the moment, and we are quite right to give it top priority in our White Paper and in our policy, but we have not reached it yet. So we cannot throw away our nuclear force.

Next, we have the large forces in Europe. I would remind your Lordships that the defence of Europe rests chiefly on two things: first of all, the strength of the U.S. strategic air command, which is still the big threat which keeps the peace, and, secondly, the West German army of twelve divisions. If that were taken away, there would be no conventional defence of Europe worth the name. Lastly, we have the East, where we are very stretched indeed. If we are faced with this choice and we have to economise, which we must do, it seems to me we can choose to save only on the middle one: that is, the large Army and Air Force in Germany. I will come to that in a moment.

So my plan for saving money would be rather different from the one in the Defence Review. First of all, instead of having large bases overseas which, by their very presence, are apt to aggravate the local situation which we have heard so much about, I would reduce the size of the bases and go for small garrisons overseas and not for large ones. Incidentally, the three conditions for operating in war which are so clearly stated in the Defence Review are not new: they have been operating now for about fifteen years, to the best of my knowledge. We certainly do not go to help anyone unless we are asked, and we certainly do not stay if we have lost the sympathy of the local population. Therefore, as I say, I would reduce the size of the bases, and I would go for small garrisons overseas. A small garrison creates much less friction with the local inhabitants; it is also much easier to discuss if there is a sudden debate in the United Nations, and your actions are criticised the moment you want to take them. For instance, in Aden we used to want to bomb this or that target; we had only to drop about two bombs for the matter to be raised in the United Nations, whereas if you have small forces—a company of infantry and a few scout cars and helicopters—very often they can prevent trouble from starting. So I am in favour of small garrisons dotted about, without big bases behind them. I think that if we adopted that policy we could also save a good deal on the size of the headquarters.

In recent years we have not been content with Navy, Army and Air Force headquarters, we have put a Supreme Headquarters over them in Singapore and Aden, and it is extremely expensive; and although it might be necessary from the world wide point of view, it would not be nearly so necessary if we had the small garrisons that I am recommending. Such a change would save thousands of men. I remember writing in from Cyprus, where there was a big Army headquarters, and suggesting that we should reduce the size of my headquarters by 1,200 men. That was ten years ago, and I am fairly sure we would save not hundreds but thousands of men on the headquarters staff.

Returning to the subject of Germany, I agree that it is a very difficult matter to argue. Germany costs us £199 million a year, of which £89 million, according to Part II of the Defence White Paper, is foreign exchange. One can save a little by getting out of Aden, although we must not forget that, if we are not careful, we start talking about defending the base in Aden, which is fundamentally wrong. After all, what we are really defending is the frontier, and if we withdrew from Aden it would not be just a question of losing the base: it would result in an invasion over the frontier by hostile troops, Yemeni troops backed by Egyptians. So I reckon that if we want to save foreign exchange, which is the chief object on the financial side, it would be better to do it in Germany rather than East of Suez.

The arguments for keeping three weak divisions in Germany no longer apply. The noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, says that they are doing nothing; I say that they have not fired a shot for twenty years, except in training. The Army have been shooting, supported by the other two Services, but do not forget that for the past twenty years, in nearly every situation, there has not been an idle day for the Army. So, from the point of view of shooting, we have the Army in the wrong place. I say that it is high time we reduced the numbers in Germany. The Defence Review says that we can withdraw troops temporarily from the B.A.O.R. I would say that we should alert our NATO allies and tell them that we are moving our troops away, and for longer than just temporarily, leaving their stocks behind—their ammunition, and their weapons perhaps and getting over the quartering difficulty. If we were to withdraw nearly half of the B.A.O.R. it would not endanger the security of Europe, but would save £50 million of foreign exchange. So my plan would be rather different from that in the Defence Review. I think we should get the Navy, Army and Air Force in the right places for dealing with the emergencies which we actually face. Then we should finish up with a plan which would actually work. We should encourage stability by small forces which we could afford.

5.7 p.m.

LORD WINTERBOTTOM

My Lords, it is something of an ordeal to follow in a defence debate two such eminent soldiers. For this reason I hope that I shall not be accused of evasion if I talk in rather simpler terms about the ways in which we can finance the Armed Forces and defence policies that we all want to see. I am certain that my noble friend Lord Shepherd, who opened this debate for the Government this afternoon, will not be displeased with me if I underline a number of points that he made in his speech.

One important element in the clash of ideas that this defence reappraisal has provoked—and I think it is one of its virtues that it has forced all of us to reassess our attitudes towards the defence policy—is the assertion that vital responsibilities which we now have will not be able to be discharged because an arbitrary ceiling of £2,000 million at 1964 prices has been imposed on our expenditure on the Armed Forces. This argument is also expressed in terms of percentage of the gross national product applied to defence, but I would maintain that to argue the case in straight monetary terms is to conceal the real nature of the problem.

What we are trying to do is to look five or ten years ahead and to measure the cost of the various alternatives open to us. During the first five years of that period our gross national product will rise, according to the National Plan, which I suppose is as good a guess as we can get, from £32,000 million to £40,000 million. In the same Plan, in which the Defence Review was integrated, we are shown that defence costs will rise during this five-year period by an estimated sum of £115 million at 1964 prices. But at the same time the estimate shows that the expenditure on personal spending will rise by £4,400 million —approximately twice the whole of our expenditure on our defence programme.

So I think it is true to say that, if we argue in monetary terms alone, we should be able to find the money for a carrier force if we really needed it. And, indeed, we should find the money if some great national crisis had to be faced. But as the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, has said, we are not at the moment facing such a crisis. We are living through a period of uneasy stalemate, while the young emerging nations bicker among themselves. What we must do is to tailor our defence expenditure to that situation, and—what is equally important—we must survive economically in a competitive world.

The problem is not a monetary one so much as a problem of the use of scarce, skilled human beings. My noble friend I think was quite right in drawing your Lordships' attention to a statement in the National Plan: As a nation we spend as much on defence as we do on investment in industrial plant and machinery … the defence programme now uses some 35 to 40 per cent. of total national research and development expenditure and about one-fifth of the qualified scientists and technologists engaged on it. The diversion of one-fifth of our scientists and two-fifths of our research expenditure is the true burden on the economy. It is not a monetary one; it is these scarce human beings that the defence programme sucks in. It is for this reason that I believe that in many sections of our bread and butter industry we are less competitive than other nations who are devoting a lower proportion of their high-grade people to military research. I am thinking in particular of Japan and Germany, both of whom have based their defence systems on American aid, American equipment and so on, and have used their technologists to develop the various engineering projects that they are so successfully selling in world markets. We talk about the brain drain abroad. We must not forget that we have suffered a very severe internal brain drain, into a whole series of ill-conceived design and research projects which we have had to cancel in the course of the last few years.

As my noble friend has pointed out, and as did the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, our capacity to compete in world markets is absolutely basic to the success of our defence policy. If we are to give the White Paper any reality we must become competitive once again. The Prime Minister was quite right when at the head of the Labour Party's Election Manifesto he stated that his first responsibility was the stability of the pound. We cannot have a presence abroad if we cannot afford the foreign exchange costs involved. I am in full agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who yesterday pointed out that it was the foreign banking community that was financing our overseas commitments at present. This, of course, cannot continue but must soon be replaced by finance from our own resources.

I believe that the husbanding of our foreign exchange is an essential part of our defence policy, and for this reason I think we should all congratulate the Minister of Defence on the whole series of parallel measures he has been taking either to reduce our commitments abroad or to increase our earnings abroad. The agreement we have reached with the Americans on the ending of the 50 per cent. rule is, I think, of prime importance. Of course nothing falls into our lap; we must go and take the opportunities that have been offered to us. But these negotiations, brought to a successful conclusion, I think, are of the first importance. I also think that the impetus the present Government have given to the competitive selling of arms abroad is of importance and the Minister is to be congratulated upon it. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, has said, the main drain on our foreign exchange resources has been our commitment on the Continent of Europe. I agree with him fully when I say that unless the European Powers, in particular Germany, are willing to make a greater contribution to our support costs in that country, then we must be prepared to withdraw some, at least, of our forces from that theatre of operations.

We as a nation have, I believe, played our full part in bringing stability to Western Europe. Stability now reigns because of the things that our allies the Americans and ourselves have done in meeting the Russian pressure on Germany. But now I think it is right that our German partners should pay their fair share of the cost of a policy we are continuing to support at their request. I think the debate to-day has shown quite clearly that we are not afraid of the situation in Western Europe. The Germans still are, and it is for this reason, in order to support them as allies, that we are staying in Western Germany. But since this policy is for their benefit they must be prepared to pay. I have not done any research on this matter, but I am reasonably certain that in the 18th century when we employed Hanoverian mercenaries we paid for their skills in gold, and in advance. I suggest that the Germans should pay for our mercenaries on the same terms to-day.

The Defence Review has faced up to the various problems that we have to analyse rationally. This is the important word, I think: they have been faced rationally. The Minister has not let himself be influenced by national sentiment which is no longer relevant to our position to-day. He has accepted the reality of our economic situation and for this reason has accepted the fact that if our defence forces are to continue to function at all we must buy certain advanced weapon systems from the United States of America. The former Government and the present Government have committed us to Polaris missiles, the Phantom, the F 111 and the Lockheed Hercules aircraft. These weapons will be the key weapons during the next decade, and they are all American. We shall therefore to a great extent be dependent on the United States of America. Our foreign policies will have to be in harmony with theirs in the future, as at present, but we shall not, as Mr. Enoch Powell stated in another place, with what I suggest is a note of hysteria, be their prisoners.

It is not the Americans' fault that we have had to buy substantial quantities of American equipment. It is not really our fault either. Social evolution throughout the world has changed our power position in the world. Within the framework of that changed power position we have done our duty, and must continue to do our duty. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, said, we are no longer a world Power but a Power of second magnitude, and for this reason we have to adapt our policies so that the policies of a Power of second magnitude are effective and consistent. At the moment we are dependent on the United States of America, but the hard fact is that we shall always be dependent on someone.

If we are peering into the future for our defence requirements, it seems that Anglo-French co-operation will play a large part in this shift of the balance of dependence, but a successful air policy for this nation seems to depend on interdependence between ourselves and France. We should all of us, I know, like to control every aspect of weapons-supply to our armed forces and to control it from the centre of political power. This is not possible with America. But if we were in Europe, and if the political community were created in Europe, then we might be able to have influence at the centre of political power over the whole field of procurement of weapons. And I would suggest that one of the important political factors we should bear in mind as we consider defence is the need for entering Europe as a necessary part of increasing our economic strength and increasing our ability to influence the centre of political power in strategy. That is all I have to say. I do not believe we have shirked our responsibilities. I believe we must take and accept those responsibilities we bear at the moment. But this is no reason for not considering rationally the way of best disposing our resources so that our policies, such as they are, can be effective.

5.20 p.m.

LORD BOOTHBY

My Lords, I shall be brief. I propose to support the Government in the Division Lobby to-night, simply because I think that, broadly, the conclusions of their Defence Review are right, and those of the two Amendments which have been moved are wrong. Undoubtedly we are overstretched, and this overstretch can only be met, as both Lord Carrington and Lord Gladwyn said yesterday, by some reduction of our commitments. I think the Government are particularly right when they point out that once nuclear weapons were employed in Europe, on however limited a scale, it is almost certain that the conflict would escalate rapidly to a general nuclear exchange, in which case organised land warfare would become impossible; and that what we need there is more air support for conventional operations. I think that that should be accompanied by some withdrawal of our troops from Germany. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and the noble and gallant Field Marshal said on that subject—they are wasting their time, and they should be brought back to form part of the strategic reserve in this country, where they would be well trained and could be sent anywhere. I think the Government are right to reduce our forces in Cyprus and Malta.

I should have thought it would be all right to withdraw from Aden when South Arabia becomes independent; but the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, knows much more about this question than I do, and I would hesitate to contradict his view on this point. I am sure the Government are right to contemplate some increase of our forces in the Persian Gulf, where the oil interests are vital to this country. Why Lord Gladwyn imagines that the security of Kuwait has been greatly increased because she has become a member of the United Nations, is beyond my comprehension.

I think the Government are right not to build, at colossal expense, and at this time, a single carrier, which could not come into service for seven years, and then in circumstances which cannot possibly be foreseen, but which will certainly be quite different from those prevailing to-day. That is all I feel about this question. I feel that the expense would not be justified, and that if it did happen we might find ourselves with a tremendous "white elephant" on our hands. I think they are also right to buy the F 11lAs from the United States, although I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, that their number may have to be increased at a later stage.

I certainly do not share the view that the Royal Navy is being run down. Apart from the conversion of the Tiger-class cruisers, and the building of the Type 82 destroyers, they will remain in charge of by far the most formidable and deadly weapon in our possession.

Finally, I am not much worried about the financial ceiling, which has clearly been imposed by the Treasury, and has been referred to quite frequently in the debate. I have been in public life for forty years, and I cannot count the number of financial ceilings I have seen. They proliferate, and they can go up and down; and I must tell your Lordships that usually they go up. The only thing that puzzles me a little about the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, was how he expects that the wireless sets with which the Home Defence Force is to be provided are going to protect us from nuclear attack. He said that they would be a great safeguard against nuclear attack. That is most hopeful, if he takes that view.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I do not think I am quite as crazy as that. What I was saying is that these forces are going to be equipped with rifles, vehicles and radio sets to supplement the police and Civil Defence in the event of a nuclear attack. I do not think we can use radio sets against a nuclear attack.

LORD BOOTHBY

My Lords, I am delighted to hear that, because I was getting a little worried. The Defence White Paper says It is in the Far East and Southern Asia that the greatest danger to peace may lie in the next decade". The danger already exists. I am in a rather difficult situation, because I know that this topic is a delicate one, but I do not see how you can have a two-day debate on defence without any reference at all to the only war that is going on in the world. We cannot ignore Vietnam altogether, and at least somebody ought to say something about it. This is the place where a horrible war is flaring, and children are being burned to death, day and night, in their village homes. After the Second World War—I saw quite a bit of this—great pressure was put on by the Americans to get us out of India, the Dutch out of Indonesia and the French out of Indo-China. In every case they succeeded. I thought at the time—this was in 1946–47—that they were wrong. Now I am not so sure. The cost has been great—not to us, or to the Dutch, or to the French, but to the inhabitants of those areas. But the tide of history was already flowing quite strongly against colonial empires, and continues to do so.

In these circumstances, it seems to me to be almost incredible that they should have embarked alone on what might well be described as a colonial war in Vietnam. a war which is not only cruel but, to my mind, senseless. Ten years ago Walter Lippmann remarked to me If we ever make the fatal mistake of landing ground troops on the Continent of Asia we shall find it almost impossible to extricate them. I put down that remark in my diary. He has now written the best series of articles of his long journalistic career—which is saying a lot. To the great credit of the American people, these articles have been published and syndicated throughout the United States, which indicates that they are a real democracy. There is, of course —and we know it—a great controversy going on in the United States about the Vietnam business.

I can understand the desire of Her Majesty's Government not to get involved in it. But I should like, just for the record, to give a brief quotation—it is only a few sentences—from one of Walter's articles. It is very good. He says: I regard both the bombing pause and the resumption of the bombing as irrelevant to the real problem, which is how to make a truce which is consistent with the military realities. Some will say that by more and bigger bombing and by a big build-up of troops we shall be able to change the military realities in our favour. Experience and the history of this wretched war are against that hope. For the forces against us can be increased indefinitely, and the notion of a decisive military superiority over the land powers of Asia is a dangerous fantasy. Well, the French discovered it at Dien Bien Phu, and my fear is that the Americans may discover that, too, and when it is too late.

I thought a week or two ago that President Johnson intended to make an end of it. Now it appears that he does not. This means that there is no discernible end, except the increasing possibility of war between the United States and China, which would be the ultimate catastrophe. I realise, as I have said, the difficult position of Her Majesty's Government; but I regret that they should appear to give some tacit approval to what is happening in Vietnam, and that they do not appear to have made more strenuous efforts to get a truce and to keep peace in that area. I see no reason why we should quarrel with the United States over this. We know quite well that they are rent among themselves, torn with dissension, and in great disagreement. Senator Fulbright, for example, takes a strong view; but I should like to see the Government make it perfectly plain that they are really flat out for a truce in Vietnam, and certainly do not approve of any continuation of this ghastly war if it can possibly be avoided.

In this matter I consider that President de Gaulle has taken the wiser course and played a better hand—an example which Her Majesty's Government would do well to follow. There is no need to quarrel at all with the United States; but we should make our attitude on this question much clearer than we have done.

5.30 p.m.

LORD MORRIS OF KENWOOD

My Lords, as the last, but I hope not by implication the least, of a long list of Back Benchers who have put down their names to speak in this debate, I feel a little like Salome. As speaker has succeeded speaker, my veils have been stripped from me and I now find myself with little to say.

We have ranged during the debate over the whole field of defence from the Charge of the Light Brigade, through the two world wars to the terrible prospect of world annihilation by atom bombs? However, it is not my intention to discourse upon such momentous happenings. Instead, as one who has served comparatively recently as a pilot in the R.A.F., I will confine my remarks in the main to the part of the Review dealing with that service. Indeed, it would be unnecessarily repetitious of me if I were to attempt a lengthy discourse on the decision not to go ahead with the new carrier. Given the hard fact that this country cannot afford to jeopardise its economic life by apportioning too great a part of its gross national product to defence, the decision had to be made as to how the money was to be allocated. Those who had to make this choice were, I believe, influenced not only by the cost-effectiveness of this form of insurance, but also by the whole concept of defensive thinking. Apart from the enormous cost of the new carrier and the time taken to bring it into service, is it right that we should, as it were, put too many of our eggs in one basket, particularly when that form of basket becomes increasingly vulnerable to attack by nuclear submarine?

The last time I addressed your Lordships' House on the subject of the Air Force, I made a plea for urgent action to be taken on the replacement of the obsolescent aircraft with which a large proportion of the R.A.F. was equipped. To a great extent I believe that the Government's proposals will satisfy this need. During the last year I had the opportunity to visit several of our bases at home and overseas. One such visit to Cyprus produced the ironic comment from a Canberra pilot that they were able to achieve success in their low-level operations by flying through the sound barrier backwards. While this was intended to be a somewhat frivolous remark, it is indicative of the disturbing position which relates at this time to the discrepancy in performance between the Canberra and its possible adversaries.

The future acquisition of the F 111A has been greeted by the R.A.F. with great enthusiasm. This excellent aircraft will fill the much-needed role as a Canberra replacement and will put the R.A.F. on an equal or superior footing "equipment-wise" with other air forces. The choice of this aeroplane in preference to the Spey-Mirage or Buccaneer 2 double star has been fully covered by my noble friend Lord Shackleton in his opening speech and does not need repeating. Suffice it to say that its main attractions lie in its versatility, its short take-off ability and, most important of all, its availability.

Another of the visits I made was to the Kestrel Evaluation Squadron at West Rainham just before it was dispersed. In spite of almost freezing to death, I was greatly impressed with this aircraft—a sentiment which apparently was shared by the pilots of the three countries involved in the evaluation. Apart from its striking vertical take-off ability, and even more useful and practical short take-off and landing capability, its greatest asset, from the pilots' viewpoint, is its extreme simplicity of operation. Other than the normal controls found in all single-seater attack aircraft, there is only one other control, that which operates the gas flow deflectors. As an ex-Hunter pilot I can assure your Lordships that this simplicity is of the greatest importance to the pilot. Together with its ability to operate from forward dirt strips, it has a good load capacity and, with the Phantom, should provide a first-class replacement for the Hunter.

One possible application of the P 1127 which has been mentioned by the noble and gallant Viscount is its potential as a ship-borne aircraft. Whilst I appreciate the operating difficulties which such a concept may engender, I should have thought that this idea, supplementing the helicopters to be carried, would considerably enhance the defensive capacity of the naval escort vessels. Perhaps the noble Earl the Leader of the House, in his winding-up speech, would let us know if such a suggestion has received serious consideration.

The basis on which the future Air Force has been planned and the reason for the small number of F 111s ordered is the intention to go ahead with the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft. Far from being just a gleam in somebody's eye, as was suggested in another place on Monday, design work is going on, and if the aeroplane comes up to expectations it will enormously enhance the strike and reconnaissance capability of the R.A.F. From an economic standpoint also, together with the proposed light strike and trainer aircraft, the Jaguar, this decision will demonstrate the oft-commended need for joint action with the French in the production of military aircraft. It will also provide much-needed work for the design and production teams of our aircraft industry.

Finally, my Lords, these decisions, together with the acquisition of the other aircraft referred to in the Statement, should give a great boost to the morale of the R.A.F. and will increase the attraction to young men to join; and I hope that the very expensive advertising campaign which started in last Sunday's newspapers will have the desired effect on recruiting.

5.38 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate, for I realised that there were many others who wished to do so, and I felt that I had no special contribution to make which would have justified my taking up your Lordships' time. Even now I shall intervene for only a few moments. But there was one aspect of the Government's Defence White Paper which emerged more clearly, I thought, than before from yesterday's debate, and which, in the light of such experience I have had while in office, seemed to me especially disturbing. I refer to the Government's decision to give up the British base at Aden.

I am worried about this, first because I believe that it will be regarded as definitely a breach of faith by all our friends in South Arabia. In that connection the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, recalled yesterday how the Prime Minister had emphasised as recently as 1964, less than two years ago, how vital Aden was to our peace-keeping operations and our communications. No doubt that statement was regarded by all our friends—and we have good friends in that part of the world—as a solemn assurance on the part of Great Britain that we intended, whatever might be the evolution in the hinterland in that area, to keep our base at Aden, a base which was their chief protection against the machinations of President Nasser and others in the Arabian Peninsula. Now, less than two years later, we are told in this White Paper that we intend to clear out and leave them, our friends, to their fate. In such circumstances, can they regard us as anything but a broken reed for the future?

Nor is it only in Southern Arabia that the bad effects are likely to be felt. In foreign affairs—and this is really more a decision of foreign policy than of defence policy—one cannot divide the world into separate compartments and assume that what you do in one area will have no effect in other areas as well. Anything one does, for good or ill, has an effect everywhere. This is no new idea of mine trotted out for use in this particular debate. I believe it to be fundamental to our whole approach to foreign and Imperial policy.

It was, indeed, the reason why I myself resigned from the Leadership of this House and the membership of the Government almost ten years ago. I took that action, which virtually ended my active political life, because I was convinced that to let Archbishop Makarios return to Cyprus, in spite of his repudiation of our demand that he should call off his terrorist campaign as a condition of his release from detention in the Seychelles, would give the impression that we were on the run and could always be bullied into acquiescence by a campaign of violence and terrorism, if it was pursued with enough resolution; and that it would have repercussions far beyond Cyprus itself. Nor, I believe, did subsequent events prove this view to be wrong; for the campaign of violence in Kenya, which is a long way off, began to be intensified very soon after, and that succeeded, too. And we have been on the run ever since, and we are on the run still, as the Government's announcement of the abandonment of the Aden base clearly shows. Nothing, I believe, that Government speakers said yesterday will convince our remaining friends there—and they are getting, I am sorry to say, very few—that that is not the case. And what is more, the evil consequences of our abandonment of the base will not be merely economic, as I thought was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, last night. They are likely to be even more political—an aspect of which he, in his speech, said nothing.

It is quite true that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, spoke some very brave words yesterday afternoon about the Persian Gulf. He said: … we shall fulfil our obligations in the Persian Gulf area by increasing our forces there."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 273 (No. 48), col. 954, March 8, 1966.] That sounds very good. But what are the friendly rulers, our friends in the Persian Gulf, going to think as they ponder over that statement? They are going to think "That is just what the Prime Minister of Britain said about Aden only two years ago." In any case, the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was careful to follow his bold pronouncement with a carefully worded proviso. He said: Some time in the future. no doubt"— and "some time" is rather an elastic phrase— our forces may cease to be required in the Persian Gulf but until that time comes we must honour our existing obligations." [col. 954.] After that, apparently, when those obligations cease to be useful to us, we shall regard ourselves as quite free to rat on them, and leave our friends there, in that equally important area, to their fate.

Nor was that all. There was the same note, I thought, if I may say so—and I regretted to hear it—in the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, on Malaysia and Singapore. He said: We plan to retain forces in Malaysia and Singapore, but we recognise that this may not be acceptable for all time. This will be a matter of hard fact, rather than of choice." [col. 953.] Can anyone consider that this kind of early warning system, telling the people, first in one area and then in another, that we may be obliged to walk out at a not too distant date, is a sensible way to run our foreign policy or consolidate our friends? Can we really hope to maintain our position as a great Power on that kind of basis?

The noble Lord, Lord Bourne, in the admirable speech to which we have just listened, said that we are no longer a world Power in the military sense; and this may well be so, though it is sad to many of us to think it. But, as he equally said, we still have both interests and friends and we have an obligation to defend both; and I entirely agree that we must do that, to the best of our ability. But such things as the decision to abandon Aden and to abandon the aircraft carrier make it almost impossible to do it.

And if I am told that it is all very well for me to talk like this, but where would I look for the money to enable us to pursue a less discreditable policy, my answer would be, quite frankly, something of this kind. I should say this to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, who spoke on these particular lines this afternoon: first, I should look at our policy of overseas aid to emergent countries. I believe that hundreds of millions are at present being handed out in this way, and it is extremely doubtful how much of it is being well spent. Surely it would be worth while at any rate to go into this and limit what we lend to what we believe to be entirely justifiable. And secondly, we ought to look, I think—though perhaps we should not save quite so much that way—at the kind of economies of which the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, spoke in the speech to which I have just referred. And thirdly and lastly —and most important, I think—we should look again at our home expenditure; look at our spending here in this country. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, obviously thought that there was no real possibility of any further economy in that quarter. He reminded us of what we were spending on roads, of what we were spending on this, of what we were spending on that, and indicated that we could not cut any of it down. That, perhaps, is a natural attitude, if I may say so—and I do not say it in any spirit of offence—in any Party spokesman who has to make an oration on the very eve of a General Election.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I hope that the noble Marquess will forgive me for interrupting. I suggest that he looks at the Manifesto of the Conservative Party, the Party to which he belongs. He will see the very large claims that they make with regard to public expenditure.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I would apply the same remarks equally to my own Party. But, as noble Lords on the opposite side of the House constantly remind us, they are the Party in power at this moment and they intend to stay there.

Yet if we go on piling on expenditure in the home sector, while leaving our defences inadequate and our foreign policy without the military support that it needs to make it effective, we shall be like the house in the Bible which was built on the sands. If we do not mind our ways while there is still time, we shall, just like that house, if and when a storm comes, as it well may, find ourselves without defences and without friends, and crumble away in ruin and disaster. Your Lordships may think that those are too strong words: but I have been through the approaches to two world wars. I know how inadequately prepared we were for both. I do not want to see it happen again. Let us therefore, in this House, at any rate, which is a wise House, consider these things frankly and courageously before it is too late.

5.50 p.m.

LORD REA

My Lords, at this stage of the debate I have a very shrewd suspicion of what your Lordships would like, and I am going to comply. I think we all want to see what it is all about. I am rising to refer to the Liberal Amendment, which comes last on the Paper and which I ask your Lordships not to regard as a verbal quibble. We believe very much in the Amendment put forward by the Conservative Party to-day, except that they have put the cart before the horse—and that is the whole point of our Amendment. We maintain that commitments can be so large that military support of them cannot be afforded, and that that is the position which this country has got into, not necessarily owing to one Government or another Government, but because of the progress and the development of Defence in the last twenty years.

We do not claim that this is a poor country, an unimportant country, one that is despised; because I am convinced that it is a country full of potential. But I would say that there are means of arranging commitments and promises by mutual consent whereby you can get out of things when you are over-promised. We consider that this country is over-promised in its commitments and must get out of them, not by dishonouring them, not by walking out of them, but by the historical, Parliamentary tradition of negotiation and diplomacy. If I may paraphrase a remark of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, I would say that we must cut our cloth according to our cloth. The emperor who had no clothes was very chilly; and there is not much satisfaction in going on cutting a coat when there is no cloth to cut, or when you can only cut off one arm to put it on the other side.

We have very simple criticisms—and I am not going to repeat anything, because everything has been repeated a great deal. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who asked me to express his regret for not being here, made a very good case from our point of view of why we should try to be an important European Power and not a third or fourth rate world Power, which we shall be if we go on as we are. That, really, is the criticism we have of the Labour Party's point of view.

With the Conservative Party, we have great sympathy, because they have with them the element —that small element that there always will be in this country —of the "gunboat mind". It is a little element, but I can assure your Lordships that, on March 31, they will to a man vote for the Conservative Party and not for any other Party. My Lords, this is not 1866; it is 1966, and things have changed a great deal. We should all like to be in 1866 for some reasons. We have heard that the Americans have fifteen carriers. Now the thing for us to have, of course, would be 21 carriers, and another 50 divisions in every country in Europe and the Far East. That is the idea of the "gunboat mind", and we in Parliament must remember that we have got to deprecate that quite a lot, and not act upon it.

We must phase ourselves out of over-commitments by proper negotiation. We must not inflate defence, but must deflate commitment properly and by diplomacy. The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, told us about and explained the position in Aden, and that seems to be a pattern on which we can act in other parts of the world. But we cannot approve of this Statement on Defence, which seems to us an unsatisfactory Statement, an unworkable compromise, really, between outdated military glory and economic irresponsibility. if I may use a classical analogy, I would say that this Government are going right ahead piling Pelion slap into Charybdis, and the result is not very satisfactory.

My Lords, this, I hope, is not a Party matter. It is very difficult at this stage, the very last day of Parliament, to take it out of Party affairs; but nobody wants to deal a body blow to-night—at least, I hope they do not, and it would be very unsatisfactory if anyone did. I ask your Lordships to look objectively at our little Amendment, which says merely that political commitments must be reduced, that military resources will therefore go down and that, on those lines, we shall be a prosperous country. I have had tremendous support from the noble and gallant Field Marshal, who took up our point and, I take it, will come into the Lobby with us to-night. I hope that others of your Lordships will please look on this objectively, and not as a political matter, and will consider whether our little Amendment is not, in the end, really making sense and putting the horse before the cart.

5.55 p.m.

LORD HARLECH

My Lords, I shall have a few words to say about the Liberal Amendment in the course of my speech, but first, as this is the first debate on Defence that I have attended in your Lordships' House, I should like to say that I have found it an extremely valuable one; and, though very strong feelings are held in many parts of the House on these matters, it has been an extremely good-tempered debate. It is, I think, my first pleasant duty to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Barnard, on an admirable maiden speech. He spoke with authority on the Territorial Army, and made some very pertinent points. We are most grateful to him for the part he played in the debate.

Our fundamental criticism from these Benches is that the Government's policy, of first setting an arbitrary ceiling to defence spending and then trying to make the resources cover our world-wide commitments, is the negation of sensible defence planning, and nothing we have heard in the two days of debate has shaken us in the slightest degree from that conclusion. The approach to the defence policy adopted by the Labour Government seems to me rather reminiscent of Alice through the Looking Glass. I was going to say Alice in Wonderland, but it is obviously more like Alice through the Looking Glass—it is done in the reverse way. Indeed, when the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, kept on jumping up to explain to us how admirable their Defence Statement was—they were saying about their own Defence Statement that is was long and full of merit—I was reminded of the White Knight who, before starting on his poem, said that it was long but very, very beautiful.

We have had, I think, an excellent debate on the merits and demerits of aircraft carriers. We have had speeches from these Benches from the noble Lords, Lord Teynham and Lord Ashbourne, and the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk; and, from the Government Benches, from the noble Lords, Lord Shackleton and Lord Blyton. At one stage I thought their arguments were so similar that they seemed to have been hewing their material from somewhat the same quarry. We have had a good discussion, also, on the Reserve Forces and the future of the Territorial Army. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, asked me one particular question on this matter. He asked: what does the Conservative Party Manifesto mean by our retaining the Territorial Army? What we mean is that, whatever is agreed between the Government of the day and the Council of the Territorial Army Association regarding the remaining volunteer forces which we are to have in this country, it will be known as the Territorial Army.

LORD SHEPHERD

Oh!

LORD HARLECH

I thought that Lord Shepherd's other remarks about noble Lords on these Benches sneering at the Americans were uncalled for and totally unjustified. I have listened to most of the speeches in this debate, and I have read all those to which I have not listened, and I heard no sneering at the Americans from these Benches. I did, however, read a speech made from the opposite Benches by the noble Lord, Lord Soper, in which he suggested that, in the Cuban crisis, President Kennedy was within half an hour of starting a nuclear war. "It so happened that Mr. Khrushchev was not". I thought that that was an unworthy remark, and I think Lord Shepherd might have addressed his comments to his own side of the House.

My noble friend Lord Carrington yesterday indicated the astonishing way in which the Labour Party's policy while it has been in office had been almost the exact reverse of what it said it would be when it was in Opposition. I want to take up some of these points again later on in my speech. but first I wish to deal with this question of the correct approach to defence policy.

The alternatives seem to be these. Either you can review your commitments, reduce them to the minimum consonant with the country's security and then set aside the resources needed to meet them—that is our approach—or you can do as the Liberal Party suggests. and decide that it is absolutely necessary to reduce the resources expended on defence; and set about reducing your commitments substantially in order to bring your commitments into balance with your ability to meet them. I think that is a fair statement of the Liberal Party position. This is a perfectly rational approach; although I and my noble friends on these Benches think it an unwise and somewhat irresponsible one. Or you can do what the Government have done: place an arbitrary, rigid; and lower limit on the proportion of the national wealth to be expended on defence and then maintain virtually all your commitments. For it is clear that in abandoning the Aden base the Government are not giving up any commitments, but are simply giving up part of our ability to meet them. The third alternative is, self-evidently, the worst possible solution and is likely to lead us into severe trouble.

The only argument that Government spokesmen have advanced in support of this topsy-turvy method of dealing with defence is that this country cannot afford to spend more than 6 per cent. of the gross national product for this purpose in 1969 –70. It is all a question of priorities; but this assertion by Government spokesmen is supported by no convincing evidence. There is a whole series of figures, dating back to the previous Labour Government, to show that it is possible to spend over 7 per cent. of the gross national product on defence and still have a surplus on our balance of payments. Indeed, in the last thirteen years, with defence spending never falling below the figure of 6.6 per cent.—and sometimes going higher —we had a surplus on current account in eight out of those thirteen years, a virtual balance in one, and we were in deficit in four years.

I do not think that comparisons with the level of expenditure in other European countries is valid for us. It might be valid if the Government said that they no longer wished to carry out a world rôle. But if they insist on carrying out a world rôle—and, indeed, we have commitments around the world which force them to do so—then a comparison with these figures from Europe is not valid. And if they took the view that the best scheme would be to get down to somewhere near the same figure as was quoted for Germany and France, I think they would soon find them- selves in the same Lobby as the Liberal Party.

The country as a whole is substantially better off than it was in the early 1950s, and it should be better off still by 1970. But Government spokesmen insist that the British people are not prepared to spend a penny over 6 per cent. of the gross national product for their defence in that year. The country will be richer, but the proportion that we shall be spending on our security will be the lowest for twenty years. The Government rejoinder to all this is that we, the Conservatives, are committing ourselves to spending more on defence. We do not seek to deny it because we are convinced that it is a burden that we can bear, provided that we find a buoyant and expanding economy.

Here we come to one of the troubles: there seems to be little prospect, in our view, of the Socialist economic policy producing this kind of expansion. Productivity in 1965 was stagnant and the gross national product increased by nearer 2 per cent. than the 4 per cent. which was planned. This has meant that the resources available to us as a country will be about £600 million short of what they should have been; and it looks as though the same story will be repeating itself this year. If the Labour Party is convinced that it cannot do better than this, then the Government's determination to make unjustified defence cuts becomes more understandable. But the National Plan promises a very substantial increase in both production and living standards by 1970, and it is in the light of these that we believe it to be quite wrong to insist upon a lower and rigid ceiling for defence expenditure.

It is also a matter of grave concern that the Labour Party show no enthusiasms or determination to take Britain into the Common Market—and I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Winter-bottom, is an exception to this—for as the years go by we are bound to find it increasingly tough going economically if we are left out in the cold. Indeed, I believe that I have under-stated the case, in that the Prime Minister and a number of senior Cabinet Ministers are known to be strongly opposed to Britain's entering into Europe. Personally, I do not believe that it will be possible for Britain, in the long run, to sustain the world rôle envisaged in this year's White Paper unless our economy is joined to that of Europe.

THE EARL OF LONGFORD

My Lords, may I interrupt? The noble Lord has made an important statement derived, I have no doubt, from what he imagines to be the facts about the Prime Minister's attitude to Europe. I can assure him that to the best of my belief his statement is quite false.

LORD HARLECH

My Lords, we listened to the Prime Minister speaking at a Press conference the other day at which he was laying down conditions for getting into Europe—conditions which everybody in this House knows perfectly well will make it impossible for us to do so.

I turn now to one aspect of the Statement on the Defence Estimates with which I found myself in broad agreement: the necessity to reinvigorate the United Nations so that it can discharge the burden laid upon it more than twenty years ago of being the main instrument for keeping the peace. In the aftermath of the most destructive war in human history, those who survived set out to create an organisation which, through collective machinery, could deter aggression and settle disputes between nations peacefully. We and the U.S.A. played the leading rôle in establishing the United Nations and in drawing up its Charter. Some who played prominent parts are, happily, still with us. I have in mind the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who is with us here to-day, and also the noble Earl, Lord Avon. They, and men like them, who shared in the task, were not visionaries with no conception of the realities of international political life. No! They were those who had had the fullest experience of it and they were convinced that in the nuclear age we had to find a way of maintaining peace or the whole of human life was in jeopardy.

That is why I am not one of those who decry the United Nations. Rather I grieve at its recent weakness and I am angered by those who scoff at it and seek to diminish its rôle. Of course, it may need some improvement. All human institutions do. It may need reform. But the major improvement needed is in the performance of the individual Governments that make up its membership. So long as they show scant regard for the purposes and provisions of the Charter, so long will the Organisation fail to command the confidence and respect of the people it was designed to serve.

Similarly, I find myself in agreement with the words of the Statement on disarmament—apart from some mumbo-jumbo about the aim to "internationalise" our nuclear strategic forces, which I will come to later. It is a thousand pities that the momentum towards arms control and disarmament generated by the partial nuclear test ban has so far led to nothing. But we all know that the political climate has been unfavourable, and it is difficult to see how any important progress can be made while the Vietnam war continues at its present intensity.

Nor shall we reach any finality with regard to a non-proliferation agreement, until we in the Western Alliance decide on what arrangements we intend to put into practice over nuclear sharing. Frankly, from the point of view of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, I do not think it makes much difference which of the alternative solutions we go for. Whichever one we adopt they will inevitably threaten dire consequences, since it is clearly in their interests to try to stop any move designed to strengthen the Western Alliance and to tie the United States more closely to the defence of Europe. But when the deed is done, they will live with the facts of the situation as they did over German rearmament in 1954.

My Lords, there is one other comment I would make while on the subject of disarmament. I was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea that the United States had of setting up a separate Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. A strong disarmament section in our own Foreign Office is also important, but I am sure that we must guard against the danger of allowing disarmament to become a special subject somewhat remote from the main thrust of our foreign and defence policy. This would be quite wrong. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of Defence should all feel a personal responsibility in the disarmament field, because it is only by a combination of both political and specific disarmament initiatives that any progress is likely to be made.

Reference is also made to the need to check the conventional arms race among the smaller Powers, and I found some difficulty in squaring this statement with the appointment of a super-salesman for armaments and with the deal under which a Labour Government is selling £100 million worth of arms to Saudi Arabia. I imagine that this sale will result in the renewal of understandable demands from Israel to us to make purchases of further arms here; and no doubt also from Egypt to the Russians to supply them with arms. It looks as though for the time being the arms salesmen are winning over the disarmers in the Government. However, I am sure that this is no more than a temporary aberration and that Her Majesty's Government, together with representatives of all Parties in this House sincerely desire to strengthen the role of the United Nations and to make progress in the disarmament field.

But, my Lords, we have to face the fact that for the time being no progress is discernible and that, in the words of the Defence Statement: the United Nations has not yet assumed effective responsibility for keeping the peace. We are therefore obliged to discharge the responsibility of defending ourselves and our own interests, and of helping to defend our friends, and this requires us to provide forces under three broad headings: first, the nuclear strategic forces; secondly, forces contributing to the defence of Europe, and thirdly, forces to meet our commitments in the rest of the world, particularly East of Suez. I propose to discuss them shortly in the reverse order.

So far as our rôle East of Suez is concerned, the Statement says that it is in the Far East and South-East Asia that the greatest danger to peace may lie in the next decade (the passage from the Statement has already been quoted to us by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby), and it adds that some of our partners in the Commonwealth may be directly threatened. It is in this context, and with the present evidence of continued Indonesian hostility to Malaysia, that the Government have decided to phase out carriers from the Royal Navy. We know that the Navy Board, with the full support of Mr. Mayhew, gave it as their firm opinion that this commitment could not be carried out effectively without aircraft carriers; and it is really straining our credulity beyond breaking point to expect us to believe that their task can be performed by surface-to-surface missiles which we do not at present possess, and by a small element from the force of 50 F 111s which we are to buy from America.

I have no doubt that the F 111 will prove to be a very remarkable plane, certainly the best of its type in the world. But it will have to be a great deal more than this if 50 of them are going to replace and do the job of the Canberras and other aircraft in Europe and the Middle East, while at the same time providing around the world the long-distance strike capacity now provided by five aircraft carriers. The truth of the matter is that the phasing out of the carrier force is a pure gamble, with the odds, on the Government's own assessment, stacked heavily against its being a successful gamble.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord, purely on a point of fact? The F 11ls are not intended primarily to re-provide the carrier capacity. I do not want to go into too much technical detail on this, but the re-provision, of course, is coming mainly with Phantoms in the fighter protection rôle—the Maritime Comet. I ought to say that it is certainly true that the Admiralty Board took that view, but, as the Secretary of State made clear, in fairness, other Staffs in the Ministry of Defence did not.

LORD HARLECH

My Lords, I quite accept that. As regards the F 111, I thought I had understood correctly that it was to provide the long-range cover; indeed, it will be the only plane which has the same radius of action. The Phantom will not have the same radius of action as the F 111, and therefore in very distant places, a long way away from a land base, it will be the F 111 on which the Government will have to rely. To this extent I was correct in saying that a small contingent out of this 50 will be doing, perhaps not all the work of five aircraft carriers, but at least some of it.

We have, rightly in my view, encouraged the Malaysians to offer a vigorous resistance to Indonesian confrontation; and, as Mr. Healey explained last year, we persuaded Australia and New Zealand to support our policy and to help in the defence of Malaysia by convincing them of our long-term intention to play a rôle in that area. This is a vitally important point because there was, on the face of it, much to be said from the Australian point of view for not adopting an openly hostile attitude towards Indonesia. Indonesia is Australia's closest neighbour and has a population ten times that of Australia. I know it was of real concern to the Australian Government that Britain, having entangled her in this imbroglio, perhaps rightly, might grow weary of the burden, and either pull out of our commitments or seriously reduce our military capability in the area. There seems to me to be a real danger that Australia's and New Zealand's suspicions will be heightened, and Indonesia's hopes of wearing us down will be encouraged, now it is known that we wish to abolish that element of our naval forces in the Far East which Mr. Mayhew described last year as the vital element, and which we know the British Government's naval advisers still regard as vital.

We find much the same sorry tale in the Middle East. We are to retain all our commitments in the area, together, apparently, with one to intervene in a peace-keeping rôle in Africa; but we are to diminish substantially our ability to meet them by winding up the Aden base in 1968. In spite of the very full statement made yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, I do not quite know where our commitments to the defence of an independent Southern Arabia now stand. I gather that the existence of some commitment is no longer denied, but we now intend to discharge it by building up the Federation's own forces and by helping the authorities there to cushion the economic effects of our withdrawal. What the financial saving to this country will be after these new burdens have been taken on, and after our forces from Aden have had new accommodation provided in Bahrein and elsewhere, is debatable, but it is unlikely to be very large. I quote a statement made by Mr. Healey on March 3: Incidentally, it is no good simply closing foreign bases unless the men who serve in them are demobilised, because otherwise the overall defence expenditure will have to be increased in order to provide new accommodation and facilities for them somewhere else.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I think we want to get this clear, since the noble Lord is talking about new heavy economic burdens. We are already spending a considerable sum in Aden every year, and my understanding is that the financial commitment will be continued for some time after independence.

LORD HARLECH

My Lords, I accept that, but the noble Lord also told us yesterday that the economic effects upon Aden of our withdrawal will be quite substantial, and I understand that his Department is entering into discussions now as to how they could be cushioned. My general experience has been that, when we come to cushion these effects, it usually entails the spending of a good deal of money, but I may be wrong; I hope I am.

One thing which has not been denied is that, by closing the base, we are certain to be reducing our capability to discharge the commitments which the Government are retaining in the area. I cannot feel that a small transfer of forces to Bahrein is a satisfactory substitute. The total forces remaining available will be minimal. They will have been removed from a territory now wholly under our jurisdiction, and a territory which was later on to be a co-partner with us in a new defence agreement, into a territory which is entirely independent and where nationalist elements are strongly resentful of our presence. I should have thought it inevitable that an increase in our local presence, together with a weakening in our military capability in the area as a whole, could only lead to a rise in Arab nationalist hostility to us.

We have all read and listened to cogent arguments in favour of eliminating bases and reducing our commitments in the Middle East. There was a particularly thoughtful and intelligent article on the subject by Miss Elizabeth Monroe in the January number of International Affairs. If, gradually, it were possible for Britain to disengage from the area, without endangering our interests or the interests of our friends, there would be much to be said for such a course. But surely the whole essence of such a policy is good timing, and whatever else may be said about the Government's decision to abandon the Aden base, its timing has been disastrous.

It had seemed that Egypt was at last weary of her intervention in the Yemen, and an Egyptian withdrawal from the Yemen was bound to be followed by a decrease in Egyptian subversion in South Arabia and in Aden. One would have thought that a principal objective of British policy in the area was to ensure that such an Egyptian withdrawal took place. But, of course, the Government's announcement about giving up the base in Aden has practically guaranteed that Egypt will stay in the area and that subversion will increase and continue. Indeed, as my noble friend Lord Carrington said yesterday, President Nasser has already intimated as much. There has been a great deal of lip-service paid during the course of this debate to the idea that defence policy should be the handmaiden of foreign policy. Here the rôles have been exactly reversed.

What seems to me so profoundly worrying about all this is that, whether we look at the Middle East or at the Far East, we seem to be encouraging our friends to adopt policies which depend upon an assurance from us that, if they get into difficulties, we shall he standing by with sufficient force to guarantee their security. This places upon us a tremendous responsibility, for if the situation in one of these areas should deteriorate and it then becomes apparent that we could not match our word with deeds, then we should have committed perhaps the worst crime in the sphere of foreign policy.

I shall never forget how greatly I was struck by reading Lord Salisbury's violent condemnation of Palmerston's conduct of the Schleswig-Holstein crisis. I need hardly say that I am not referring to the noble Marquess who has just addressed the House, but to his illustrious grandfather. Your Lordships will recall that Palmerston was continually urging the Danes to stand up to Germany and gave them every encouragement to believe that, if this led them into conflict, we should stand by them. The Germans called the bluff, seized territories in Schleswig-Holstein, and we did nothing. The episode brought shame upon this country and ruin on Denmark. It was a lesson which was never to be forgotten by Lord Salisbury in the conduct of his foreign policy, and I trust that it will never be forgotten by this Government. [Interruption.] It has happened to different Governments at different times but, as I say, I hope that this is a lesson the Government will learn, because some of the policies they are attempting to pursue in this White Paper run this particular danger.

I turn now to our rôle in the defence of Europe and I am glad to see that Her Majesty's Government have no intention of reducing our conventional forces in that theatre. I am sure that it would be unsound to do so, both on political and on military grounds. On the other hand, they no longer demand that these forces should be increased at the expense of our nuclear forces, which was the theme of so many of their speeches while in Opposition.

However, there is just one point I should like to make. To some extent this is in answer to the objections expressed by the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, and also by the noble Lords, Lord Bourne and Lord Boothby. I think there is at the moment an exaggerated confidence in a prolonged state of calm along the Iron Curtain. The Berlin situation remains full of inflammable material, while the balance of forces on both sides has hardly changed since those days in 1961 when we had a very serious crisis on our hands. With the United States Government ever more heavily committed in South Vietnam and with NATO in some disarray, the Soviet Union might well decide once more to test our will and our determination over West Berlin. If they do so, we should find ourselves in a dangerously inflexible position if we had meanwhile run down our conventional forces, so bringing appreciably nearer the threshold at which we should need to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. We must not allow ourselves to be lulled into complacency and so drift into such a position. I quite accept that some of these forces may have to come out on a temporary basis, but I think that the Government are quite right in attempting to maintain 55,000 men on the mainland of Europe.

The third aspect of our defence forces I want to deal with is the nuclear one, and here I find the Government's policy almost totally incomprehensible. They do not accept the Conservative view that, in present circumstances, a nuclear capability is a sensible and not unduly costly insurance for this country. Indeed, when in Opposition, the Labour Party used the strongest language to condemn the continuation of nuclear forces and, in particular, they inveighed against the Nassau Agreement, which enabled us to buy Polaris missiles for fitting in British submarines.

I have two typical quotations from the Prime Minister. On January 16, 1964, he said: Then, of course, on Polaris we have made it clear a hundred times that we intend if returned to power to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement on the basis of our declared policy that our proper contribution to our Alliance and that our most effective military strength in this country is secured without the illusion which is created by nuclear, missile-carrying submarines. Later, in March, 1964, he said: We have made absolutely clear that the idea of Britain trying to add anything to the Western striking force by buying or hiring Polaris submarines from the Americans is absolute nonsense. In terms of strength it is like a dry pea on top of a mountain. I think that everyone must have assumed from this and similar statements that a Labour Government would be determined to rid themselves of these unwanted weapons. But nothing of the sort has happened, and the Polaris fleet has been described by the Government since they took Office as a massive British contribution to the Alliance and a force of tremendous power and significance. I have seen it suggested in the Press that the Government were urged by the United States not to abandon the Polaris programme. This is, of course, totally untrue. The United States very properly took up a completely neutral attitude and would have been as ready to arrange for the cancellation of the programme as for its retention; and I know that the noble Earl who is to reply would wish to confirm this.

The Government now say that the Polaris forces are being built for the purpose of internationalising them, since they deny that they could ever be of value in a national rôle. But is there any evidence that there are other nations clamouring for us to take on this work of supererogation? Not the Americans; not our European partners, so far as I know. Her Majesty's Government profess that they do not want British Polaris submarines either. In the Government's view, who on earth are they being built for? Perhaps we can also be told of the progress that is being made towards the setting up of an Atlantic Nuclear Force, because it would appear that the Government's whole nuclear policy hinges upon this initiative. That being the case, there seems to have been a curious lack of information about how it is faring in recent months.

To sum up, we find much of the Government's defence policy muddleheaded and inconsistent. Shortly after taking office, Mr. Healey said, on November 23, 1964: We are still trying to sustain three major military rôles—to maintain an independent strategic nuclear striking power, to make a major contribution towards the Allied defence of Western Europe and to deploy a significant military capacity overseas. He then added that Britain must decide which of these three rôles should have priority. After sixteen months of careful deliberation, the Government have decided that they should all have priority. Having carefully set out and arranged three stools around the room, they have sat with the greatest precision between them.

Last autumn, while in New York, I was saddened to read in Mr. Walter Lippmann's column his judgment that: Britain is unable for the time being to play a leading rôle in the world. And Mr. Robert McKenzie had much the same thing to say in last Sunday's Observer, when he commented, having travelled recently in most parts of the world: There is no more laughable claim than the Prime Minister's assertion that under Labour Britain speaks with a new voice in the world. These statements make depressing reading, and I fear that if the present misguided policies of the Government are allowed to continue, Britain will become increasingly a light-weight in international affairs. I believe that the people of Britain, and indeed the world, expect us to play a nobler and more important rôle. I therefore urge your Lordships to support the Amendment which was moved so ably yesterday by my noble friend Lord Carrington.

6.34 p.m.

THE EARL OF LONGFORD

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, comes to this House with high credentials, some of them relative to his family and some to himself. When I first came into this House the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, used to take a certain pleasure in congratulating his noble uncle, the late Lord Cecil of Chelwood. I am sure that he will find it equally satisfactory to be able afterwards to congratulate his noble nephew. The noble Lord, Lord Harlech, has rendered a splendid service to this country in more fields than one: in disarmament, and also as our highly regarded Ambassador in the United States. Therefore, the country has reason to be grateful to him. I realise that he won golden opinions in the United States. I came across a passage in Mr. Schlesinger's book about the late President Kennedy in which this passage occurred: Bundy possessed dazzling clarity and speed of mind—Kennedy told friends that next to David Ormsby Gore Bundy was the brightest man he had ever known—as well as great distinction of manner and unlimited self-confidence. I read that also in that way. There is something to live up to certainly, and I am sure the noble Lord will wish to be judged against this background to-day.

As regard the noble Lord's speech, I would only say at times that he was the lofty and elavated statesman, and at other times the equally lofty partisan, although not always quite so elevated. I could not speak more politely than that. I will come back later to some of his main contentions, but before doing so, perhaps I can deal with one or two of the issues that have arisen.

There have been so many speeches, all of them expert, quite a few moving, that I am aware that I shall fail to answer most of them in any adequate sense. Before attempting to do so, I should perhaps say this—and I hope the House will not think it impertinent. It has been a great privilege to me to lead the House during the whole of this Parliament, and although we know, as the noble and gal-land Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein—who was in magnificent form to-day—was yesterday reported to have said, that "war is a very uncertain business", the same is true of politics, and this may be the last time that I occupy this position. But as the late Julian Grenfell said: If this is to be the last song you shall sing, Sing well, for you may not sing another. Brother, sing!". I do not intend to sing for ever.

Among the most attractive speeches we have had was the one from the noble Marquess, Lord Aberdeen and Temair, who referred to the Battle of Waterloo and the part played by his heroic ancestor. He finished on this note: "It must be borne in mind that, whatever defence arrangements are made, the end must be victory as usual." On the face of it, that might conflict somewhat with the voice of the noble Lord, Lord Soper, who argued strongly yesterday that those who take the sword will perish by the sword. I can only remind the noble Marquess of what the Duke of Wellington said on the morning after the Battle of Waterloo, when he was told by the doctor that the noble Lord's distinguished ancestor had died. The Duke of Wellington, with tears coursing down his cheeks, said: Well, thank God I do not know what it is to lose a battle, but certainly nothing could be more painful than to gain one with the loss of so many of one's friends. So that, like many other great soldiers —and some of them have taken part in this debate: the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, and the noble Lord, Lord Bourne—the Duke of Wellington certainly detested war. Maybe in the conclusion the future will lie rather with the noble Lord, Lord King-Hall, who held out a prospect which, if we could realise it, would appeal to everyone in different ways—that is, the prospect of World Government.

Many other speeches have been made to which I cannot refer. There was that of the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, yesterday and those of my noble friends Lord Haire of Whiteabbey and Lord Blyton; and to-day of my noble friends Lord Winterbottom and Lord Morris of Ken-wood. I am afraid that I cannot cover all the speeches that I should wish to. The maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Barnard, was one which attracted the whole House and made us all want to hear him often again in the future.

But if one asks what are the issues that have emerged, there have been some concrete issues which I do not intend to pursue very far. My noble colleagues are much better equipped to deal with these matters, which require not only physical courage but technical knowledge, and they have already spoken very convincingly. I am referring now to the questions of the carrier, the aircraft programme, and the Territorial Army, among others. On all those matters, the noble Lords, Lord Shackleton and Lord Shepherd, have set out our position much better than I could. As the House knows, I certainly would never dream of coming down to speak with any personal authority on the matter of defence, but since carriers have been mentioned I will indicate my only claim to fame. I am told that I am the first First Lord ever to have landed on a carrier, so I do not suffer from any prejudice against carriers. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, landed on them very often afterwards, but that gives me some slight bias in favour of that weapon, or instrument of war.

I am not going to deal with those matters. However, if the House is not convinced already, I do not think there is much more which can be added on those topics. I would rather come to some of the wider issues that have been raised during the debate concerning commitments. I should have liked, if I had time, to deal with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Bourne (though I am afraid that I was compelled to miss some of it), and the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby. I will say only one word about Germany, and I will simply refer the House, if I may, to a rather carefully drafted passage in the Defence Review. The passage runs as follows: As things now stand, we think it right to maintain our ground forces in Germany at about their existing level until satisfactory arms control arrangements have been agreed in Europe provided, however, that some means is found for meeting the foreign exchange cost of these forces. I hope the noble Lords in question, and other noble Lords, will realise that those words have not just crept in, inadvertently, but that great importance is attached to them.

LORD BOOTHBY

My Lords, could the noble Earl say one or two words about what Her Majesty's Government are doing, and propose to do, about the war in Vietnam, because I did put that question?

THE EARL OF LONGFORD

I do not feel that I am called upon to-day to deal with that topic—

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Hear, hear!

THE EARL OF LONGFORD

—except to repudiate any idea that we have been dragging our feet in pursuit of a truce. I do not think noble Lords opposite accuse us of that. I do not think anybody accuses us of that. I hope that they would know, and that Lord Boothby would know, the efforts which have been made by the Prime Minister and by Mr. Stewart, and I do not seriously suppose there is any difference between the main Parties in this House with regard to peace in Vietnam.

I would now come on to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech. The same point (I am referring to the question of nuclear policy) was raised by several noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, at the beginning of the debate. When we came into power, we inherited a nuclear programme for the Forces that included the V-Bombers with their various weapons, the Polaris firing submarines which were planned to succeed them, and a range of aircraft and missiles for the tactical delivery of nuclear weapons. I cannot believe that noble Lords opposite are criticising us for this. They may or may not argue that we have learnt from them, which I would not accept; but they may claim we have learnt from them—they had nine Ministers of Defence in their period and I should be surprised if we learned nothing from them, although I am afraid that it does not amount to an awful lot. Wherever we acquired this wisdom, we decided that the maximum use should be made of these elements of the Forces to forward our long-term objectives for the international control of nuclear weapons, and, indeed, of all armaments.

Proposals were made for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, a subject which has frequently been discussed in this House—and if I may say so, with the greatest respect, to the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, his absence from previous debates has been a slight handicap, because in his excellent speech he covered much ground which had been traversed before, and a number of points that have been dealt with before now by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. So I will not reply to points which he could, so to speak, look up in earlier Hansards.

Proposals were made for an Atlantic Nuclear Force to which we would assign our V-bombers, and subsequently Polaris submarines, organised in such a way as to further the aims of non-proliferation and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. There is no one in this House who is more entitled to talk about disarmament than the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, but if he had been present in previous debates, or would do us the courtesy of reading them, he would see that in all these debates since we came into office we have stressed non-proliferation or non-dissemination more than any other aspects of our policy. So I hope he will take it from me that there has been no departure from our principles, or objectives, which are just those—non-proliferation and non-dissemination. The sooner, therefore, we can internationalise these nuclear forces, the more satisfied we shall be that we are coming at any rate somewhere near to the objectives we set ourselves.

LORD HARLECH

My Lords, I quite appreciate what the noble Earl is saying, but could he indicate what progress has been made recently towards an Atlantic Nuclear Force? I do not think we have yet heard what progress has been made by the Government.

THE EARL OF LONGFORD

I have not a progress report to make to-day, and with a good many points to answer I am not quite sure that I am called upon to deal with that matter in any detail. But as soon as we have another debate, I am sure the noble Lord will receive full information. I was only trying to stress the point that, in our view, the only object of possessing these weapons is that they assist us in the search for control of armaments and the policy of non-dissemination.

I would also stress the point—and I think I may accuse the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, perhaps unfairly, of being a little out of date. I am not sure that he realises that times have changed since his very distinguished grandfather, who was referred to with so well-justified eulogy by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech. In 1901, the noble Marquess's grandfather, of course, espoused a policy of isolation for Britain. That was his policy. He rejected the idea (I will not go into the passage in detail) that we need become entangled in alliances. Times have changed, and now the essence of our policy—which I think was shared by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, and the noble Lord, Lord Carrington; or, at least, I should hope so—is that we must achieve our purposes through interdependence, and not in isolation. That is fundamental for our policy. This interdependence, acting with others, is something which is not to be regarded with contumely. It is not a rôle of which we must be ashamed: it is a forward move to internationalisation, which is the only foreign policy that will save the world.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, the change has been that we are moving out, and people who stand for the things we stand for are moving in. The situation is steadily deteriorating, and has done so during the whole period of this Government.

THE EARL OF LONGFORD

At the risk of being impertinent to a Member of the House I respect dearly, I think the noble Marquess feels that it has been deteriorating ever since the time of his grandfather.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I should be delighted to accept that from the noble Earl.

THE EARL OF LONGFORD

I am delighted to have it accepted. But I can only say, to wind up that little passage, that it was not from a Labour Government that the noble Marquess resigned twice. All honour to him—at any rate to his high principles, if not, on the latter occasion, possibly to his prudence.

Leaving out these personal factors, let us come back to what is undoubtedly a much more important question, this idea of interdependence. This brings me to the whole topic of commitments. I should think there is no word which is now causing more confusion than this word "commitment". We really need the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, first to redefine it, and then to abolish it, because it is undoubtedly full of the gravest ambiguity. I would say, myself, that it is simpler to think in terms, in the first place, of our vital interests as a country, and then of our duty which may carry us, and in my opinion does carry us, a long way beyond our vital interests in any narrow sense.

The matter is put quite simply, but perhaps a little less grandiloquently, in a passage in The Defence Review, at paragraph 16, on page 6 of Part I: At first sight, a direct threat to our survival seems less likely outside Europe. Although we have important economic interests in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere, military force is not the most suitable means of protecting them, and they would not alone justify heavy British defence expenditure. We have, however, a number of obligations, which we cannot relinquish unilaterally or at short notice; some of these obligations will still exist in the 1970s. It then refers to particular obligations where we have undertaken some kind of formal pledge, and no doubt they would also refer to dependent territories for which we would recognise a responsibility—for one of our remaining Colonies. But in addition it says: It is this interest above all which justifies our military presence outside Europe. So may I briefly submit to the House that, in addition to what is necessary for our survival, we have these pledges which we made to other countries, and beyond that we have this responsibility for playing our part in maintaining the peace of the world and in establishing the United Nations on a much firmer basis. That is surely the soundest approach, and if one adopts that approach one has to look at one's responsibilities.

I will not weary the House with an account of my own responsibilities as Secretary of State for the Colonies, but we do recognise responsibilities for Colonies. The point was raised by the noble Lord, Lord King-Hall, yesterday of our colonies which have gained independence—and I am now referring to the policy of recent Governments of various Parties. Our policy is that we should not retain any continuing responsibility for their defence unless we have specifically entered into a defence agreement, as for example in Malta. That is, if you like, the bipartisan policy of accepting responsibility for our colonies but not for a country which becomes independent, unless we enter upon a defence agreement which is recognised to be of mutual advantage. I do not think there is any controversy between the Parties over that, but it is as well to set out the position.

However, the more idealistic noble Lords may say that our responsibilities do not stop there. When anyone approaches these things from a Christian or other high ethical point of view we put the question, "Who is my neighbour?" and answer that the whole world is our neighbour. In that sense, of course, I would say that the only limit to our moral responsibility is set by our economic capacity. I do not think anybody would deny that at the present time America is, rightly, in view of her wonderful economic resources and achievements, assuming larger responsibilities than we can ever afford to do, once we pass beyond the survival of this island and the promise we have given of what we can in fact afford to contribute to peace-making and establishing the United Nations. I am bound to say I am surprised there is so much argument about what in the end is surely a fairly simple matter.

On the question of commitments, I think I should answer one question which was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow. I am glad that the noble Lord, with his happy memories of the gallant island of Malta, has raised the question of the deployment of British forces there. We fully abide by our obligations to consult with the Government of Malta when major changes on the island are contemplated. Until these have taken place it is not possible for me to add to the information given in the Defence White Paper. We shall of course continue to discharge our responsibilities under the defence agreement. I realise that our friends in Malta are keenly interested in what is said to-day, and I am sorry that I cannot go further, but I hope the noble Lord will agree that, so far as it goes, it is satisfactory.

My Lords, I must not keep the House very much longer, but before I close I would try to explain quite clearly how I see these Amendments. I am glad the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, has called on the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to withdraw his Amendment. if I thought that the noble Lord was a free agent, and if I did not feel that he had a great commitment here (to use a phrase of the moment), I would add my appeal to that of the noble and gallant Viscount, but I realise that the noble Lord's followers have come for one purpose. Admittedly the noble Lord is as brave as a lion, but he would hardly dare, even so, to send them away hungry, so I am afraid my appeal would be wasted. If there were any way in which I could add to the force of the appeal made by the noble and gallant Viscount, I would certainly do it, but I am afraid it would be useless.

The noble Lord, Lord Rea, to-day, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, yesterday, were very interesting in their remarks, though I am afraid they are not sufficiently aware (which is a little strange, as they come from the Party of such idealistic traditions) of our duty to sustain a number of countries owing to promises given. I followed the noble Lords' arguments, but I think they are not quite sufficiently aware of our duties in this respect and I do not think they realise how important it is, if we are to build up the United Nations, that Britain, in the words of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, should be one of the two Powers which really count in the world East of Suez. Therefore, I think that they would in fact keep our rôle—I will avoid the word "commitment" again if I can—below that which our duty imposes on us; and I would say to the Conservatives that they would in fact impose a rôle—I am not going to accuse the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, of pursuing the ghost of empire —which it is beyond our power to sustain. I am sure the noble Lord would agree that there must be a limit to what we can accomplish. He said 7 per cent. We say it is more than we can afford, but it is a very narrow distinction.

I can only say that this is the most thorough review of the defences of this country which has ever been conducted at any time in our history. I do not think anybody will challenge that. I will repeat that statement because I am not sure that noble Lords took it in: this is the most thorough review of the defences of this country which has ever been conducted. I am sure each of those nine Conservative Ministers would in turn have conducted an equally thorough review if he had been spared, but there was not time. No one can claim that this review has been conducted in an atmosphere of Party politics. The best official advice in the world has been mobilised and this tremendous review has taken place.

I have sat through it; I have had a front seat in the stalls—I would not claim a higher position than that—and I would make one point of a personal character in concluding. I will not go into the question of Aden because in my opinion the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, dealt with that so thoroughly and clearly that it is beyond controversy. I will only say this. I became Colonial Secretary before the decision was finally taken, but when it seemed likely to be taken, that we would act in the way we have done. I was perfectly clear that it was quite monstrous to remain in Aden if all the best defence advice was opposed to the idea that there was any value in staying there.

But I would add the further point and say, particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said it and the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, raised the issue and I must answer them—that I think it would have been wicked to conceal from the Ministers in Arabia the fact that we intended to leave the base. That was an issue which came very close to me. I saw these Ministers in London when I knew we were likely to leave the base, and it would have been a betrayal almost without parallel in British history, a real act of the greatest deceit and hypocrisy, if we had gone on talking to them about the future of their Constitution and keeping this a secret in the cupboard. So I am afraid I entirely refute the suggestion that if we were going we could have chosen a later date to inform them and inform the world. If I misjudged the noble Lord I withdraw my remark, but I must make the point very clearly.

I would, in conclusion, say this. I suppose that when I first sat in on these discussions a year ago I was very doubtful whether the world-wide rôle, with all this expenditure, was compatible with the kind of international aspirations which I had shared so long with so many in my own Party and outside my own Party. But I have come to the conclusion personally (and I speak for myself, but noble Lords will see that I have some right to offer my opinion here) that if in this phase we are going to make our maximum contribution towards the establishment of a permanent peace-making machinery—in other words, towards the World Government which alone offers any prospect of peace for long—then it was necessary to embark on the worldwide rôle. So I cannot accept, I am afraid, the view of the noble Lord, Lord Rea. But, having accepted that proposition, I am perfectly happy to believe, according to all the expert opinion I have listened to, that we shall be able to honour the obligations we are assuming.

Finally, I would say that this House, which is going into the Division Lobby now, will be going through ritual motions, but I cannot myself believe that after hearing the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, any dispassionate person will come here and say that noble Lords opposite have any justification. We have not been told their policy. Would they really keep the carriers going? Would they really build one at an extra cost of £500 million to

1975, and at a cost of very much larger sums from 1975 to 1985. Would they really keep the Territorial Army at its former size, and would they really incur all these foreign exchange costs in Aden to the tune of £150 million from 1968 to 1975? We have listened to them and have enjoyed their speeches, but we are still completely in the dark.

They have been told they must vote against the Government, and so they will do that. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, has not told us how he would de-negotiate these agreements and escape from these commitments without dishonour. As we move to the Division and bring this memorable Parliament to an end in the House of Lords, I can only say we are satisfied that in years to come this will be seen as a turning point, not simply because for the first time it is a defence policy which makes military sense but because it is a defence policy which clearly leads on to the better world which all of us, in all Parties, equally desire in our hearts.

7.8 p.m.

On Question, Whether the Amendment to the Amendment shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 15; Not-Contents, 109.

CONTENTS
Airedale, L.	Carnock, L.	Ogmore, L.
Amherst, E.	Henley, L.	Rea, L.
Amulree, L.[Teller.]	Iddesleigh, E.	Stamp, L.
Barrington, V.	Mottistone, L.	Terrington, L.
Byers, L.	Moynihan, L.	Wade, L.[Teller.]
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdeen and Temair, M.	Colville of Culross, V.	Ferrier, L.
Ailsa, M.	Conesford, L.	Foley, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Courtown, E.	Forster of Harraby, L.
Albemarle, E.	Coutanche, L.	Fortescue, E.
Aldington, L.	Crathorne, L.	Furness, V.
Allerton, L.	Cromartie, E.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]
Ampthill, L.	Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	Greenway, L.
Atholl, D.	Daventry, V.	Grenfell, L.
Auckland, L.	Denham, L.	Hailes, L.
Audley, Bs.	Derwent, L.	Harlech, L.
Balerno, L.	Dilhorne, V.	Hawke, L.
Barnard, L.	Drumalbyn, L.	Howe, E.
Bessborough, E.	Dudley, L.	Hylton, L.
Birdwood, L.	Eccles, V.	Ilford, L.
Blackford, L.	Effingham, E.	Inglewood, L.
Boothby, L.	Egremont, L.	King-Hall, L.
Boston, L.	Elliot of Harwood, Bs.	Kinnoull, E.
Bourne, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Limerick, E.
Boyd of Merton, V.	Erroll of Hale, L.	Lindsey and Abingdon, E.
Brecon, L.	Exeter, M.	Long, V.
Carrington, L.	Falkland, V.	Lothian, M.
Cholmondeley, M.	Ferrers, E.	MacAndrew, L.
McCorquodale of Newton, L.	Polwarth, L.	Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Malmesbury, E.	Rathcavan, L.	Somers, L.
Mancroft, L.	Remnant, L.	Strange, L.
Margadale, L.	Rockley, L.	Strange of Knokin, Bs.
Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Rothes, E.	Strathcarron, L.
Merrivale, L.	Russell of Liverpool, L.	Strathclyde, L.
Mersey, V.	Sackville, L.	Swansea, L.
Milverton, L.	St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]	Teynham, L.
Monk Bretton, L.	St. Helens, L.	Thurlow, L.
Monsell, V.	St. Just, L.	Wakefield of Kendal, L.
Montgomery of Alamein, V.	Salisbury, M.	Windlesham, L.
Mowbray and Stourton, L.	Savile, L.	Wolverton, L.
Newall, L.	Selkirk, E.	Woolton, E.
Newton, L.	Sherfield, L.	Ypres, E.
Oakshott, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment to the Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

7.18 p.m.

On Question, Whether the Amendment shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents 107; Not-Contents 55.

CONTENTS
Aberdeen and Temair, M.	Effingham, E.	Mersey, V.
Ailsa, M.	Egremont, L	Milverton, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Elliot of Harwood, Bs.	Monk Bretton, L.
Albemarle, E.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Monsell, V.
Aldington, L.	Erroll of Hale, L.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Allerton, L.	Exeter, M.	Newall, L.
Ampthill, L.	Falkland, V.	Newton, L.
Atholl, D.	Ferrers, E.	Oakshott, L.
Auckland, L.	Ferrier, L.	Polwarth, L.
Audley, Bs.	Foley, L.	Rathcavan, L.
Balerno, L.	Forster of Harraby, L.	Remnant, L.
Barnard, L.	Fortescue. E.	Rockley, L.
Bessborough, E.	Furness, V.	Rothes, E.
Birdwood, L.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Russell of Liverpool, L.
Blackford, L.	Greenway, L.	Sackville, L.
Boston, L.	Grenfell, L.	St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]
Bourne, L.	Hailes, L.	St. Helens, L.
Boyd of Merton, V.	Harlech, L.	St. Just, L.
Brecon, L.	Hawke, L.	Salisbury, M.
Carrington, L.	Howe, E.	Savile, L.
Clwyd, L.	Hylton, L.	Selkirk, E.
Colville of Culross, V.	Ilford, L.	Sherfield, L.
Conesford, L.	Inglewood, L.	Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Cottesloe, L.	Kinnoull, E.	Somers, L.
Courtown, E.	Limerick, E.	Strange, L.
Coutanche, L.	Lindsey and Abingdon, E.	Strange of Knokin, Bs.
Crathorne, L.	Long, V.	Strathcarron, L.
Cromartie, E.	Lothian, M.	Strathclyde, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	MacAndrew, L.	Swansea, L.
Daventry, V.	McCorquodale of Newton, L.	Teynham, L.
Denham, L.	Malmesbury, E.	Thurlow, L.
Derwent, L.	Mancroft, L.	Wakefield of Kendal, L.
Dilhorne, V.	Margadale, L.	Windlesham, L.
Drurnalbyn, L.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Wolverton, L.
Dudley, L.	Melchett, L.	Woolton, E.
Eccles, V.	Merrivale, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Citrine, L.	Iddesleigh, E.
Arwyn, L.	Cohen of Brighton, L.	Kilbracken, L.
Attlee, E.	Collison, L	King-Hall, L.
Beswick, L.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Latham, L.
Blyton, L.	Gifford, L.	Leatherland, L.
Boothby, L.	Granville-West, L.	Lindgren, L.
Bowles, L. [Teller.]	Haire of Whiteabbey, L.	Listowel, E.
Burden, L.	Hall, V.	Lloyd of Hampstead, L.
Burton of Coventry, Bs.	Henderson, L.	Longford, E.
Champion, L.	Hilton of Upton, L.	Mitchison, L.
Chorley, L.	Hughes, L.	Morris of Kenwood, L.
Morrison, L.	Shackleton, L.	Strabolgi, L.
Peddie, L.	Shepherd, L.	Taylor, L.
Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Silkin, L.	Walston, L.
Piercy, L.	Snow, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Plummer, Bs.	Sorensen, L.	Williamson, L.
Royle, L.	Southwark, L.Bp.	Winterbottom, L.
Sainsbury, L.	Stonham, L.	Ypres, E.
St. Davids, V.

On Question, Motion, as amended, agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.

On Question, Whether the Motion, as amended, shall be agreed to?

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, in exercising my right of reply, I shall not detain the House beyond thanking noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and expressing my regret that noble Lords on that side of the House did not take the advice of the noble and gallant Viscount. It is not to the credit of the House of Lords that, on the eve of an Election, a matter of such seriousness should be treated in this way.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Order, Order!

LORD SHACKLETON

If noble Lords think that this will do them any good on March 31, they are much mistaken.