RHODESIA: MONITORING OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION (Hansard, 18 November 1965)

§ LORD COLERAINE
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
No, my Lords. It was self-evident that an exceptional telephone call of the kind which took place in the very special circumstances of the morning of November 11 would be listened to in order that an accurate record should be available.

§ LORD COLERAINE
My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl whether it is not self-evident from the transcript, whatever reservations the Prime Minister may have had, and not self-evident from the candour, some might think the damaging candour, of Mr. Smith's reply, that he had no idea that whatever he was saying was going to be taken down and used against him? May I ask the noble Earl this further question? Does he know of any other Government, except, of course, the Russian, which would publish something that is clearly a confidential exchange, without the permission of the other party to the exchange?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, of course I cannot say for certain whether the telephone call was listened to at Mr. Smith's end. We assumed that it was being listened to, and there is evidence to bear out that it was in subsequent statements by Mr. Smith. That answers the first part. About the second question the noble Lord put, I am sorry to say that I find it remarkably insulting to the present Government to imply that we should stoop to conduct which no other country in the world but Russia would stoop to. The answer is that it is to be regarded as a natural thing to do in the circumstances.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My My Lords, are we to understand that, not only before, but after this conversation, 692 Mr. Smith was not told of the monitoring, and that he was not asked to check any conversation which was afterwards to be published? That would seem to be a very unusual procedure for any Government.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, as the noble Marquess has intervened, perhaps I might call attention to something that he said in the debate on Monday. He said: We have had two accounts of those discussions, one from Mr. Wilson and one from Mr. Smith; and, as so often on occasions like this, they differ widely."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 270 (No. 4), col. 269; 15/11/65.] He later said: I therefore cannot personally accept sans phrase, the Prime Minister's account of what emerged from the discussions."—[Col. 269.] if anybody was going to raise that kind of point, that he could not accept the Prime Minister's account, it seems to me particularly fortunate that a check was taken.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, I was referring to a statement made by Mr. Smith in his broadcast. I do not know what the House thinks, but to me this is a very unusual procedure. I have never heard of it happening before in our history on an important matter.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, of course the situation here was very unusual. No doubt there would not have been publication of this kind in the ordinary way, if U.D.I. had not followed. But here we were dealing with a rebellion, which happens very seldom, and this exceptional step was necessary. Since Mr. Smith has come into it—and I have no desire to make further criticism of him at the moment—I would say that he did not hesitate to give an account of his discussions with the Governor shortly after they had taken place.

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE
My Lords, while recognising the desirability of a record being kept of conversations between Prime Ministers—and this is always done in one form or another—is not the real question here whether the account was published with Mr. Smith's consent or without his consent? Could the noble Earl say whether in the course of the conversation, or afterwards, Mr. Smith was asked to agree to the record being published, or whether any approach was made to him?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the answer is that, to the best of my belief, he was not asked for his agreement. By that time he had become a rebel, and a new situation had been created.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
No.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
That is the position: a new situation had been created, and therefore the ordinary procedure was not followed. I do not suppose for one moment that if the noble Viscount's Government had been in power they would have followed it.

§ LORD GLENDEVON
My Lords, would it not be better to accept the position that, even regarding somebody who had put himself out of court (if you like to say it like that) as Mr. Smith had, at a crisis or at any other time, for those in the sort of position he was in, talking to the Prime Minister of this country, it must be possible to have confidential telephone conversations without their being published unless they agree to it?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I must return to the point I made to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. On Monday the noble Marquess said that we could not be sure if Mr. Wilson's account was correct or incorrect. If that point was to be made, then it was invaluable to have this record. I assure the noble Lord that it was entirely normal that this conversation should be listened to. The only question—and the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, raised this—was whether publication would be normal; and the answer is that it would not be normal without the permission of the other party, and it would not have occurred on this occasion unless there had been a U.D.I. This kind of thing has frequently occurred in the past.

§ BARONESS SUMMERSKILL
My Lords, are we, as Parliamentarians and sophisticated people, really being asked to believe that a Prime Minister in these circumstances is so naive that he does not anticipate in the first case that the conversation is being recorded, and also—again, in these circumstances—that the conversation, if necessary, will be given publicity? I really feel that this is under- 694 estimating our intelligence as Parliamentarians.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
I agree entirely with the noble Baroness. No one, surely, would object to the Prime Minister giving his own account of this conversation, and if this account is to be given, is it not much better to have a record in addition?

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, I am sure that the noble Earl does not wish to misrepresent me, but I did not say that I doubted the truth of what the Prime Minister said. I said he did not tell the whole truth. My point was that there was another element in this situation, and that was the great mistrust which the Rhodesians had of British Governments in general. I never suggested that the Prime Minister had himself—the noble Earl may not agree—said what was incorrect.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
I think the noble Marquess has distorted my words. As he will find in Hansard, I did not accuse him of any such thing. I did say that there was this great difficulty. Here one had two men giving their own accounts, and one could not be sure which was right. As so often happens on occasions like this, he said that the accounts differed widely.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD
My Lords, without in any way approving the action of Mr. Smith and his Government, which I regret, are we to understand that in future, when Her Majesty's present Government hold a confidential conversation with members of another Government, they will have to bear in mind that the line may be tapped and the conversation recorded?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, all Governments use their discretion in this matter.

§ LORD COLERAINE
My Lords, arising out of the question put by the noble Baroness, and the reply of the noble Earl, may I ask him how he sees the possibility of diplomatic negotiations when confidential exchanges are published by one side within a very few hours of their taking place? Does he not also realise that one day Her Majesty's Government will have to treat with Rhodesia? How can he expect those on the other side of 695 the table to have any confidence in Her Majesty's Government?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I am rather shocked at the way the noble Lord talked about the suspicions held in Rhodesia about this Government and, for that matter, the Governments of their own colleagues recently. Personally, I would rather trust the word of any British Government of the last ten years than the words of some gentleman we have been criticising in recent days.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER)
My Lords, as I was there, perhaps it might assist the House if I said that, during the discussions with the representatives of the Rhodesian Cabinet (and I think your Lordships will find this in the record), when we were trying to agree with them on the publication of the record of the discussions, it was made plain to them that of course if there was a U.D.I. we should regard ourselves free to publish anything we liked.

§ LORD COLERAINE
My Lords, arising out of what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, is it not the case that those documents certainly contain, in various places, a declaration that such-and-such a discussion would have to be published in the event of a U.D.I.? I would ask the noble Earl, or the noble and learned Lord, whether, in their judgment, reading those documents, any reference to publication could conceivably cover this telephone conversation?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I should say that it was entirely in keeping with the general approach that this telephone conversation should be published. I am sorry to repeat myself, because the noble Lord and I do not seem to understand one another as well as usual this afternoon. I cannot believe that the noble Lord would seriously suggest that the Prime Minister should not give an account of that telephone conversation. May I rub that in? When the negotiations hung in the balance, most people agreed that he was right to conduct the telephone conversation. It was surely right, beyond all question, to give his account of it, and surely right also, if the argument carries me as far as that, to confirm that by means of a document of this sort.

§ LORD COLERAINE
Would it not have been perfectly possible for the Prime Minister, at the beginning of that telephone conversation, to adopt the same line that he adopted in Rhodesia, as the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, pointed out, to say to Mr. Smith: "Look here, I want to talk to you, but I had better let you know that if we break down I am going to publish this conversation, as I am going to publish the other documents"? Would the noble Earl not agree with me, reading the transcript, that it was quite evident that Mr. Smith could have had no idea that what he was saying was going to be published?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I do not agree with that. I am bound to say frankly to the noble Lord that a good many of us—I do not know how many in this House, but I am certainly one of them—resent the tone of his remarks about the Prime Minister.

§ LORD GLENDEVON
My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl a question about the future, because it is important? I know as well as the noble Earl the difficulties in which the Government have been over this crisis—of course I do. There may be a time, sooner or later, when somebody important in Rhodesia is going to want to talk to the Prime Minister by telephone. Are we to understand that he is not going to be certain whether the Prime Minister of the day, whoever he may be, is not going to publish that conversation?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I am afraid that I regard that as a somewhat slighting comment. All Ministers who have to take part in these long-distance calls know what is likely to happen.

§ LORD COLYTON
My Lords, as these questions have gone rather wide of the original Question, may I ask this supplementary? Why was it that Mr. Johnston, the British High Commissioner, was given strict instructions, when he conveyed the last oral message from Mr. Wilson to the Rhodesian Government at 7.30 p.m. on November 10, to leave nothing in writing at all, in spite of the fact that he was repeatedly pressed to do so?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the noble Lord said that the questions had gone very wide and, therefore, he was entitled to go wider. I am afraid that I do not agree with him.