HL Deb 03 December 1964 vol 261 cc1238-72

5.18 p.m.

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]

Clauses 1 to 7 agreed to.

Clause 8 [Provision of money for making good default of Accountant General with respect to funds in Supreme Court]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and to insert instead: has been guilty of any default with respect to any money, securities or effects in the Supreme Court". The noble and learned Lord said: This is a drafting Amendment. The object of the clause was and is to protect a suitor's funds against any loss arising from an act of default of the Accountant-General, but as worded in the clause it applies only if the failure relates to money, securities or effects required by an order of the court or of the Mental Health Authority to be paid, transferred or delivered by the Accountant-General. This provision would not cover every failure on the part of the Accountant-General: for example, money paid into court in satisfaction of a claim may be taken out without a court order, and there are other such cases. The Amendment, by referring simply to "any default with respect to" any funds in the Supreme Court covers these possibilities.

Amendment moved— Page 8, leave out lines 24 to 30 and insert the said new words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is consequential on the previous Amendment. The words left out refer back to the words left out by that Amendment and are therefore no longer appropriate. I beg to move accordingly.

Amendment moved— Page 8, line 32, leave out from ("for") to ("making") in line 34.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 9 agreed to.

Clause 10 [Amendment of section 171(1) of County Courts Act 1959]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to leave out Clause 10 and insert the following new clause:

Provision of money for making good default of Accountant General with respect to funds in county courts.

10. If the Lord Chancellor, whether on a representation made to him by any person interested or not, certifies that the Accountant General has been guilty of any default with respect to any money or securities in a county court in England or Wales, such sum as the Lord Chancellor certifies to be necessary for making good the default shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament or, if and so far as it is not so paid, shall be charged on and issued out of the Consolidated Fund.

The noble and learned Lord said: This Amendment, in a sense, is consequential. It is giving the same sort of guarantee to the suitor in relation to funds in the county court as the Committee have just been considering in the case of the Supreme Court. The Amendment brings the guarantee given to suitors' funds in the county courts into line. As drafted, Clause 10 amends Section 171(1) of the County Courts Act so as to bring it into line with the unamended version of Clause 8. The Amendment substitutes a new Clause 10. This does not operate on Section 171 of the County Courts Act, but it provides for county court funds a guarantee corresponding to that given in Clause 8, as now amended. In consequence, there is no reason for retaining Section 171, which will be wholly repealed by Schedule 3, as is done by a later Amendment, at page 38, line 46. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Leave out Clause 10 and insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clauses 11 to 17 agreed to.

Clause 18 [Interpretation of Part I and Schedule 1]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The object of this Amendment is to correct a printing error. In a definition clause, it is usual to put the words or phrases to be defined in alphabetical order, disregarding the word "the". Owing to a printer's error, "Su"—for Supreme Court—is put in front of "St"—for statutory. If the Committee approve this Amendment, everything will be in beautiful alphabetical order, and then everybody will be happy. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 16, leave out lines 1 and 2.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential. It is in substance the same point. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 16, line 10, at end insert "the Supreme Court means the Supreme Court of Judicature in England".—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 18, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 19:

Control in certain cases, of money recovered under Fatal Accidents Acts

19.—(1) Where, in any proceedings instituted in Her Majesty's High Court of Justice in England. a county court in England or Wales or the Mayor's and City of London Court,

  1. (a) money is or has been recovered by or on behalf of, or adjudged or ordered or agreed to be paid to, or for the benefit of, a widow in satisfaction of a claim made by her or on her behalf under the Fatal Accidents Acts 1846 to 1959 or
  2. (b) money paid into court is or has been accepted by or on behalf of a widow in satisfaction of such a claim as is mentioned in paragraph (a) above:
then, if the proceedings were for the benefit also of a person who, when the money is or was recovered, or adjudged or ordered or agreed to be paid, or accepted, is or was an infant, the money shall, so long as he remains an infant, be subject to be dealt with in like manner as money recovered in proceedings brought by an infant is subject to he dealt with.

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD MERTHYR)

It has been suggested that the four Amendments which are set down to Clause 19 may conveniently be debated together. It is not for me to say, but I apprehend that it may be convenient to the Committee to do this, but I must, of course, call the Amendments separately and individually.

LORD SILKIN

Before the noble Lord proceeds, perhaps I ought to make clear that we must reserve the right to ask the Committee to come to a decision on any particular Amendment, though I think that it would be convenient to discuss them altogether.

LORD DILHORNE

May I say a word before the noble Lord moves his Amendment? I was going to suggest taking this course, because the issue is plain, though the views on it may be very different. I think that it will be convenient to discuss the whole subject at one go.

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES

As I said, it is a matter entirely for the Committee. But I must call the Amendments separately, if the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, wishes to speak on any particular one, he can do so, as many times as he likes.

5.23 p.m.

LORD CHORLEY

moved, in subsection (1), to leave out the words immediately following paragraph (b), down to and including "was an infant,". The noble Lord said: This is the first of three Amendments which go together and stand in my name. This matter is a good deal more controversial, though not in any Party sense, than anything that has happened so far this afternoon. The object is to give effect to a recommendation of the Pearson Committee that courts should still exercise control, within their discretion, of awards made under the Fatal Accidents Acts, to widows without children.

This matter was fairly and clearly put before the House or the Second Reading by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who gave both sides, and we heard a speech from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Dilhorne, putting a case against the Pearson proposal. As the Bill stands, it is the Bill produced from the famous "cupboard", to which we have had so much reference. The noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack said that we ought to go into this matter carefully at this stage of the Bill. I entirely agree and I expressed my agreement with him in my own Second Reading speech.

I find it difficult to make up my mind on this point, but I feel that we have a duty to the community to come to a decision on it. It is one to which the Pearson Committee gave a great deal of thought and it is a matter of considerable social importance. A few days ago, when I found that no Amendments had been put down, I felt that I was under a duty to move some sort of Amendment, and thinking that the easiest way of giving rise to a discussion about it was to move to leave out the clause altogether, this was what I did. Some of your Lordships will have seen the Amendment which I first put down. Afterwards, however, the Lord Chancellor's Department kindly provided me with a much better Amendment, or series of Amendments, which it was suggested I should put down, instead of the rather brutal course of just moving to leave out the clause; and I found myself happy to do so.

The Amendments are admirably drafted and have the effect of carrying out much more carefully the recommendation of the Pearson Committee, who advised that the position should be dealt with by Statute and not left as it stood. I hope to explain the reasons in a moment or two, but I think that it would be to the advantage of the Committee if, before doing so, I were to go over quickly the reasons of substance why I have come to the conclusion that the recommendation of the Pearson Committee is best both in the public interest and in the interest of the widows in question.

The Fatal Accidents Acts provide for compensation to widows whose husbands have been killed in certain circumstances. There are obviously two kinds of cases—widows with children and those without. In both cases, in the past, the courts have had discretion to keep their hand upon the money which is paid into court and not just to hand it over to the widow to deal with as she liked. I think that everybody agrees with the Pearson Committee that when there are children there should be some safeguard and some control over the money. My noble friend Lord Silkin is anxious to remove some of the control as well, but I am concerned with the position of the widow who has no children.

The question of substance is whether there should still be a discretion to the court, in proper cases, to keep control over this money, or whether in all cases it should be paid straight out to the widow, so that she is entirely free to deal with it in any way she likes. For instance, somebody might meet her outside court with an attractive proposition for the investment of the money in a fish-and-chip shop, and before she knows where she is, she may be landed with a shop which is valueless and the money will have gone down the drain.

Obviously there are arguments why women should be treated like everybody else, and if a woman in this position wishes to spend her money in that way, she should be free to do so. Naturally, the women's organisations have strongly pressed on the Pearson Committee that she should be free in that way. It is a matter of fairness between the sexes. It is also argued very much that so long as we subject women to controls of this kind they will not be free agents properly working in the community, but will continue to labour under the sort of disadvantages which have been only too evident in the past.

It has been pointed out that in Scotland, and I think in Northern Ireland, too, there is no such control—although it is significant that Lord MacDermott, Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, and a member of the Judicial Committee of your Lordships' House, having seen the Pearson Report, expressed the view, from his long experience of judicial administration, that it would be much better for Northern Ireland that there should be there the same sort of control that the Pearson Committee would like to retain in this country.

I do not think I can do better than read to your Lordships the argument as it is put in the Pearson Report, at the bottom of page 22, where they say: … we are of opinion that the Court's power to control the investment and application of widows' damages even in the case of widows without dependent children should be continued. The point which seems to us to be ultimately decisive is a very simple one. Take the case of a widow who has never before controlled any larger sum than £10 or £20 or £50 at most, and has no special education or training or experience of financial or business affairs, and suppose that she is awarded a sum which (as appears from the illustrations given in paragraph 15 of this Report) may be as large as £5,000 or £6,618. Is it sensible that a sum of that magnitude should be placed forthwith at her unfettered and unaided disposal, and is it fair to expect her to devise a sound scheme of investment and a proper regime of utilisation? In our view, plainly not. The majority of widows, used to receiving their housekeeping money weekly, have no training or experience in the handling of sums running into four figures. There is a minority of widows who are perfectly capable of handling large sums of money and of distinguishing clearly between capital and income. The Court should have a discretionary power and should exercise it in such a way that the majority will have their money controlled for them and the minority will have their money released to them immediately or at an early stage. The Committee go on to underline the fact that this power is discretionary, and should remain discretionary. They say: We suggest that the money should be directed to be paid to the widow whenever the Court is satisfied that control of the money is not necessary for the purpose of securing the sufficient preservation and prudent application of the money: otherwise the money should be directed to be paid into or retained in Court. It should be incumbent on the widow, personally or by her solicitor or counsel, to satisfy the Court on this point, because the Court will often need information as to the widow's situation and resources and expectations as a guide to the decision … I think that that statement puts the case very well. It is not surprising, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out, that, on the whole, the weight of the evidence given to the Pearson Committee was favourable to that point of view. The Law Society were in favour of it. The Bar Council were divided, although it is true that a majority were in favour of the proposal in the Bill. The General Council of the Trades Union Congress has a large experience of this, because most of these cases arise from fatal accidents which occur in industry, and clearly most of them are cases in which those who are killed are trade unionists, whose widows are the claimants for compensation.

It seems to me that, in a sense, this is not the widow's accident. I appreciate that, on the technical legal side, it is a quite separate claim from anything the husband would have had if he had not died as a result of the accident. Nevertheless, taking it in a broad way, it is the husband's accident that has led to the claim. It is not like a case where a woman who has been injured in a motor car accident is awarded damages and should be allowed to spend them. This is a case where the compensation arises out of an accident to the husband; and if we ask ourselves what the husband would have wished. the answer obviously would be that his widow, in a proper case, should receive some protection.

It may well be that the husband would be satisfied that his wife was a woman who wore the breeches in the household and was competent to control any money awarded. But in a large number of these cases the women are middle-aged or elderly and, as the Pearson Report pointed out, have had little experience of handling large sums of money. That being so, it seems to me that in the national interest, in their own interest, and following out what one feels the husbands would have wished, on the whole, the arguments in favour of accepting the proposal of the Pearson Report are made out. Thy, main reason why it should be done in this way is that the courts have been exercising this jurisdiction for a long time without any clear authority to do so. I spent some time puzzling over this in the Library. There is nothing in the Fatal Accidents Acts which establishes the right. It is in the Rules of Court, but it is doubtful whether the rule-makers have the power to establish a rule of this kind. The Pearson Committee thought that, if this policy was to continue, it was only right that it should have statutory sanction.

There is another reason, perhaps not of quite such moment. The new clause, if it is put into effect, will result in putting the county court, in those rare cases where the county court might have jurisdiction over a case of this kind—and in the rather less rare case (because its jurisdiction is much wider) of the City of London Court—on the same footing as the High Court. It is obviously in the interests of everybody that there should be uniformity in regard to this matter. That is the reason why it is suggested that, instead of just excluding Clause 19 altogether, and leaving the matter as it stands at Common Law, it is desirable that this discretion in the court should be established by Statute, and that it should be established in such a way that county courts, the City of London Court and other courts which have jurisdiction over this type of case should be in the same position as the High Court, and there should be uniformity in regard to these matters. I hope that I have been able to explain this Amendment sufficiently clearly to your Lordships. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 16, line 25, leave out lines 25 to 27.—(Lord Chorley.)

5.38 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I think it may be of assistance to the Committee if I say a word at this stage, because this is a question which affects quite a large number of people. So far as I can see, it has nothing to do with Party politics, and therefore is eminently a matter to be decided by the Committee itself. For a very long time the court has always exercised control over sums of money awarded to infants and to those of unsound mind. I am sure there is no member of the Committee who would not think that that was proper.

However, more than fifty years ago, in the Workmen's Compensation Act, it was provided that if a workman died as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment compensation was payable for the benefit of his dependants, including his widow; and that the payment in the case of death, unless otherwise provided, should be paid into court and any sums so paid into the court should be subject to the Rules of Court and so on. It further provided that it should be applied or otherwise dealt with by the court in such manner as the court in its discretion thinks fit for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto under the Act.

For the last forty years the High Court has done the same in the case of damages awarded to a widow in a fatal accidents case. The nature of those damages is this. These are not damages awarded for the pain and suffering caused to a widow by the death of her husband. It is an action which lies, not merely for widows, but for dependants of the deceased man, against the man by whose fault the death was caused; and it is monetary compensation to the extent of the degree to which the widow or children or other dependants were depending on the deceased. So normally the way of assessing the damages is to see what the deceased man earned, what he would have been likely to earn in the future, and for how long he would have been likely to remain in work. One then looks to see whether he gave the whole earnings to his wife, keeping only £2 or £3 for drinks and cigarettes, or whether he gave her £5 for the housekeeping money, and kept the rest for himself. Another question is who paid for the holidays. It is a cold assessment of the value of the deceased to dependants, both widows and children.

As between widows and children, while the court has to specify how much is awarded to the widow and how much to the children, in principle the greater part is awarded to the widow. For example, mention is made of specimen cases in the Pearson Report: £1,500 to the widow, £200 to the younger child, and £150 to the older child; £2,375 to the widow, £75 to one child, and £100 to each of the three other children; £5,000 to the widow, £150 to the elder son, £200 to the elder daughter; £6,618 to the widow, and £175 to each of the two children. The reason for the marked disparity, considering that the whole family was financially dependent on the deceased, is that the sums awarded to widows are awarded with the knowledge that she will spend most of her money, not only on herself, but also in bringing up the children.

It is usual for the money to be transferred to the county court, and thereafter the dependants can always apply to the county court to take money out for any purpose which the court may feel a perfectly reasonable purpose. The sort of purposes for which the money is in fact paid out on the application of the widow are for monthly payments—there may be a monthly payment over a long period—or for clothing for the widow or the children; the cost of a holiday; school fees; equipment and other educational expenses; tools of trade, books and special clothing (for example, for a boy being apprenticed, or a girl entering the nursing or other profession); the purchase of a house; repairs and decorations of a house or flat: purchase of furniture; paying off a mortgage; purchase of a business; purchase of a motor cycle or car, and expenses of the widow's re-marriage. The average period for which the money in fact remains in court is five and a half years.

It is in those circumstances that your Lordships have to choose between three alternatives—some purists say that you cannot have more than two alternatives, but on the assumption that you can, there are here three. One is to leave the law as it is giving the court a discretion, where the court thinks it right, to order damages awarded to a widow to be paid into court. I think it is true to say that normally it does so. But the judge sees the particular widow, and if she is a woman who has had her own business, and he thinks that she is obviously capable of looking after money, he does not make such an order. That is one alternative, and that is the alternative for which my noble friend Lord Chorley has contended—to leave the law as it is.

The second alternative, which I think my noble friends Lord Silkin and Lady Summerskill support, is to remove the control. The arguments for that have not yet been heard. They are fairly obvious. One is that there should be no difference between the sexes that a woman is as well able to look after herself as a man is. If a woman is injured and awarded £500, the court does not try to control that. Why, it is said, should they do so in a fatal accidents case? That is the second alternative.

The third alternative is that provided for in the Bill, which is to retain a power of control where there are dependent children, but not otherwise. I might remind the Committee that the Pearson Committee were not really appointed to look into this question at all. There had been no serious complaints against the law as it is. What there had been complaints about was the way in which the court had invested the money, notably in gilt-edged securities, so that many such people lost a good deal, instead of their money appreciating by the court's looking after it.

The object of this Bill as a whole is to make other arrangements, the nature of which were discussed on Second Reading. Some of those who gave evidence before the Committee referred to these points and, so far as the dependent children are concerned, the view expressed by many is that if a widow was persuaded by some plausible man to invest all the money in some bankrupt business and she lost it, then, of course, all that would he left for the family would be what had been awarded to the children and, obviously, must be had by them.

The National Joint Committee of Working Women's Organisations said: … there are important practical reasons for continuing the present practice in the case of widows with dependent children … But in many cases the widow concerned is in the same position as her deceased husband, in having had no experience of the control or investment of funds. If the money recovered in damages were placed at her own disposal, she might not know where to turn for good financial advice, and might take the advice of her friends, quite honestly given, to the financial disadvantage of herself and her family. The power of the Court to control her money is a protection to her and her children, and it is a relief to a widow. worried by her changed circumstances and anxious about her children's future, to have the matter taken care of by the court … The National Joint Committee believes that widows with no dependent children should be in the same position as other adult persons recovering damages. So this was a middle view, and it is a middle view which the Bill—which, I make plain, had been prepared when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Dilhorne, was Lord Chancellor—propounds as a solution: the intermediate course of retaining control where there are children, but abolishing it where are none. At the moment, I do not propose to trouble your Lordships with my own view, but I thought it desirable at this stage to explain the way in which the matter comes before the Committee.

LORD DILHORNE

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, for his exposition. I should have been more grateful if he had explained his own view at this moment. I can say that when this Bill was being worked upon, I think the most difficult and controversial question was the question now before us. The views of members of all Parties differ on this matter, and there was a wide difference of view, both in the legal profession and in bodies outside the legal profession. I myself gave much thought to this problem, and I support, for the reasons I am going to indicate, the clause now nut forward by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack.

As the Report of the Pearson Committee shows, and as we have been reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, the Trades Union Congress and the Law Society are of the opinion that the court should retain control over the sums awarded under the Fatal Accidents Acts to all widows, whether or not there are dependants. Their views are supported by Masters and others who have had experience in dealing with such widows, and the Pearson Committee recommended that this should continue. Of course, the recommendations of a Committee of that authority, backed as they are by those bodies, deserve the most serious consideration. Having reflected upon this, and having had discussions upon it with a number of people who have been interested, I must say that I do not myself share the view expressed by the Pearson Committee and expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, to-day. Of course, the power to exercise control is discretionary, but I do not think—and I shall be corrected if I am wrong—that there are many cases in which the courts have failed to exercise their discretion and retain control, and I doubt whether there will be very many cases in the future where they would not do so.

It must also be borne in mind that it is only the damages awarded to a widow under the Fatal Accidents Acts that are subject to control. If she suffers personal injuries so extensive as to deprive her of her earning capacity and she gets a substantial sum of damages, the courts exercise no control over how she spends those damages, part of which—and it may be the most substantial part—are assessed to compensate for her loss of income.

The Pearson Committee based their conclusion on the passage of their Report to which the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, referred. They stressed that the point which seemed to them to be ultimately decisive was a very simple one, drew attention to the fact that damages awarded might be £5,000 or £6,618, and posed the question: Is it sensible that a sum of that magnitude should be placed forthwith at her unfettered and unaided disposal, and is it fair to expect her to devise a sound scheme of investment and a proper regime of utilisation? In our view, plainly not. That reasoning surely applies with equal force to a widow who receives, as it may be, an even larger sum for personal injuries.

Although, as the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has said, a claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts differs in essence from a claim for damages for personal injuries, the basis of the Pearson Committee's Report for their view that the control should remain was the largeness of the sum which might be awarded and the unfitness of the widow to look after it herself. Whatever force there is in that, the same must surely apply in relation to a large sum awarded for personal injuries to a widow who may be, as I have said, entirely deprived of her earning capacity. Yet it is not suggested—and so far as I am aware, never has been—that sums of that magnitude awarded for damages for personal injuries should be subject to control of the courts. Nor has one heard of such widows being assailed by vendors of bankrupt businesses and by people seeking to deprive them of their money; but that is the argument that is regularly advanced when this subject comes under discussion in relation to the damages obtained by a widow under the Fatal Accidents Acts.

I do not understand why it should be assumed that in these days a widow would be wholly unable to make proper disposition of a large sum awarded to her. After all, in these days a widow is likely to be advised by solicitors and counsel, and there may be a trade union behind her. What is there to stop the court saying to the widow at the time of the award something on these lines: "This is a very large sum. Our advice to you is to go straight away to a bank manager at your nearby bank and take his advice and lodge the money with him"? Why should we continue to have—I am leaving on one side for the moment widows with dependants—this rather paternal attitude on the part of the courts only where damages are awarded to a widow under the Fatal Accidents Acts?

I myself prefer the view of the National Joint Council of Working Women's Associations that widows with no dependent children should be in the same position as other adult persons recovering damages. This is the same position as the Bar Council accepted by a majority, and the Solicitors' Managing Clerks' Association, whose evidence was published in paragraph 29 of the Pearson Committee's Report, said that it was the opinion of the Association that widowhood does not of necessity entail diminished reasoning powers. They went on to say: In our opinion, when damages awarded under the Fatal Accidents Acts are being considered, it is not equitable that women should be placed in the same category as infants and persons of unsound mind because they have the misfortune to be widows. I think the clause is right in removing the control where the widow has no infant dependant, but the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, takes the view that that control should remain. All I can say is that I know there is a wide difference of opinion about this, but I do not myself think the case for retaining that control is made out. I think, therefore, the clause is right in removing it where there are no infant dependants.

What I think is a more difficult question is whether there should continue to be control where there are infant dependants. The present practice, as the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has said, where there are dependants is to award the major part of the damages to the widow in the belief, which is usually well-founded, that she will use them for the benefit of her children as well as of herself. I think it is right that control over sums awarded to infants themselves should continue to be, and also that it is right that sums awarded to the widow in the belief that they will be used to some extent for the support of the children should also be, controlled.

When I was responsible for dealing with this matter, I considered the possibility of altering the practice by securing that larger sums were awarded to the infants and less to the widow, leaving the widow free from control. But I think the Pearson Committee are right in their conclusion that there is no advantage in such a change of practice. They deal with this in paragraph 27 of their Report: that there would have to be provided periodical contributions from the infants' funds for upkeep of the household, and cases might well occur where the widow, having spent her own funds, had to be supported and the family home kept going from drawings from the children's funds.

The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, said that we have three alternatives; I would say, without any wish to be pedantic, that we have three choices. They are: leaving the law as it is, as the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, proposes; the choice of removing the control entirely even where there are dependants; and the course proposed by the Bill. Some may think that it is a compromise—it may be put forward as such—between completely opposed views; but whether that be the right view or not, I think it is right and justified for keeping control in that category of cases, but in that category of cases alone. I see no reason at all why a widow who has no infant dependants, because she has had a claim which has succeeded under the Fatal Accidents Acts, should be treated differently from any other adult male or female or spinster in relation to an award of damages under this heading, particularly when, no matter how large may be tie award, she is free to dispose of it as she wishes, should her action he for personal injuries, for negligence or nuisance or something of that kind.

While saying this. I hope, if the Bill stays as it now is—and I certainly strongly support the view that it should—that steps will be taken by the courts, when large awards are made to widows without dependants under the Fatal Accidents Acts, to draw to the attention of the widows the advisability of obtaining advice with regard to the investment of the money. If this is done, and done when the award is given, before any of these vendors of bankrupt businesses, et cetera, can approach the widow, I believe that in the vest majority of cases that advice will be taken and it will remedy the evil to which the Pearson Committee drew attention when they referred to the inability of such widows to look after their own affairs.

LORD SILKIN

Bath the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and the noble and learned Lord. Lord Dilhorne, referred to three courses which it is possible to take on this clause under this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Chorley, advocated complete control. He wishes to go further than the Bill itself. I have an Amendment on the Marshalled List which seeks to give to the widow complete control over any money that is awarded to her. That is to say, I neither agree with the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, nor agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Dilhorne.

I was very sorry indeed that Lord Dilhorne did not go a little further along his line of argument, because I agreed with almost everything he said, until he came to his conclusion that we ought still to retain control in respect of a widow with children. Once he has accepted the position that a widow with- out children should be allowed to deal with her damages as she likes, I cannot see that the fact that there are infant children, who are awarded monies for themselves which remain under control, should make any difference. She is no less able to look after her money because she has children than she would be if she had no children. I thought therefore that his argument was a non sequitur.

I want to look at this question from the human point of view. I regard all this control over widows' damages as being a piece of out-of-date sex discrimination. It appertains to the 19th century, and I thought that we had done everything we could and had gone a very long way to removing all sex discrimination. If you argue this on the basis that a widow is not fit to control a large sum of money and therefore you ought to control it, then you ought to take the same line with all other people who are not fit to control a large sum of money. Why do you restrict it to a widow? Why not a man? Would you suggest that every man who comes into a large sum of money and who has not had experience of dealing with big sums is fit to control a large amount? Why not retain damages that are awarded to a man in court, and ask him to go to the registrar every time he wants to buy a piece of furniture or go for a holiday or buy clothes, as at present widows have to do in this humiliating way?

After all, we have removed a great many sex discriminations since the time when the Fatal Accidents Acts were passed. Women now have the vote; they now sit in Parliament; they even sit in this House. I do not know what my noble friend Lady Summer-skill is going to say. But I think there is very little sex discrimination left. This is just one piece of it, one tiny piece. Even the widow who recovers damages in respect of her husband's death, if she is fortunate enough to come to an agreement without having to go to court, can retain all her damages and spend it just as she likes. It is only when the case comes into court that the court has control over her money. In my own experience, when I was in active practice dealing with this kind of case. I have settled scores of these cases before they actually went to court, before issuing a writ, and one was then able to hand over the whole of the money to the widow. I should like to say this—again I do not want to draw on my own experience, because it is limited. In fact, I have never come across a widow who has misused her money or got rid of it in an improper way. I found widows as careful as anyone else.

This restriction does not apply, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Dilhorne, said, to a woman who meets with an accident and recovers a large sum of money. If one wanted to protect her one ought to have the same principle of keeping the money in court. She may even have children, but we do not say, "Because you have children you are less able to look after your money and therefore you must keep it in court, and go to the registrar of the county court every time you want to spend a little money, and leave it to him to say whether the fur coat you may want to buy it too expensive or you ought not to have a grand piano or television set because you cannot afford it." We do not do that in the case of a person who has met with an accident, even if she is a widow with children. My own experience is that women are actually much more careful with money than are men.

It is true that the present practice has existed for a great many years. What an opportunity this Bill gives for reviewing the whole practice and removing the last piece of sex discrimination in this sphere! I hope that the Committee will be prepared to go one step further than the Bill itself. The Bill removes some of the discrimination; it goes a little of the way and deals with a widow without children. But I want to emphasise that the widow with children is just as capable of looking after money as is the widow without children. I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Dilhorne, will be prepared, even after his speech, to travel this little bit of the way with me and support the further step I am asking the Committee to take.

It is, as I said, a human question. It is a question of how we regard one half of the human race. Are we men to say that women are not capable of looking after their affairs and therefore we must go on looking after them in this limited field? I think it is humiliating that a woman should be subjected to this kind of discrimination. I very much hope the Committee will be prepared to go all the way and remove this discrimination from the Bill.

6.9 p.m.

BARONESS SUMMERSKILL

About 1880 (I think it was 1879; I am not quite sure of the date of the Married Women's Property Act) a Bill was introduced in this House, and it was framed in order that the husband's control of his wife's money should be removed. I would invite my noble friend Lord Chorley to read the reports of the debates on that occasion. I felt as I listened to him to-day that many of the men who spoke then, the ghosts of this House, would have applauded him. They said, "My Lords, how can we for one moment let a woman control her own money?"—not any of her husband's money, but money she had when she got married—"she is less intelligent than a man. She has little common sense. She is emotional. She will be so easily moved to do something wrong and wicked with any money she might control". When it was suggested that her husband could be a drunkard, a gambler, the worst type of tyrant or irresponsible individual, it was nevertheless said in that debate that he was male and, therefore, superior.

My noble friend Lord Chorley has pursued that argument to-day, and we come here and ask you, just as many progressive people in the 1880s came to this House and asked, that a woman should be allowed to control her own money. I do not think that now I have to argue with your Lordships—it has already been proved—that the convolutions of a woman's brain are exactly the same in number as those in a man. There is only one individual here (he is sitting on the end of the other Bench) whom I think I should have to convince that perhaps women might even serve his profession as well as a man. What we have to do to-day, if there is to be a Division, is to convince just a few here that the time has come when the law must be changed.

I was most moved when I heard my noble friend Lord Silkin speak. I had never heard him emotional before on behalf of women, and having sat behind him, listening, my respect for him soars. In fact, I thought that after his speech there was no need for me to speak. I came completely to support him. But I must tell him that if we support the attitude of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Dilhorne—and, in fact, the attitude of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor—I feel that we shall have won 99 per cent. of the case.

Nevertheless, may I just remind your Lordships of the life of the individual whom we are discussing? I may tell your Lordships that I practised in medicine in a not-to-well-off part of London, and I have in mind a family that I know so well. The man might get killed and leave a widow. I must just say here, in parenthesis, that I have never known any of these women deceived by somebody with a bogus business. I want to remind your Lordships that in this particular family life the man, a trade unionist, uses an expression which always warms my heart. He says "I have earned so much to take home." He says "to take home": that is the accepted expression. And he takes it home and, in most cases, gives the majority of his earnings to his wife. She is the "Chancellor of the Exchequer." This is the woman who pays the rent, the coal, the heating, everything, and she makes the savings. We heard last year that savings in the country had increased. It all depends upon this efficient little woman, of high integrity, prepared to sacrifice things for herself if there is not enough to go round for her husband and children.

But suppose, one day, terrible accident comes, and the husband is killed. When that happens, this woman's basic character does not change overnight. She does not become a flibbertigibbet. She does not become irresponsible. She does not lose her common sense, her integrity, her shrewdness—the shrewdness which has helped her to maintain her family all these years. She is equally shrewd when somebody has a bogus business. This shrewd woman, who has conducted the home so well for years, does not become a changed individual.

Now and then, when I read the papers, I read the investment page, as I read fiction, because I know little about these things; but I am always struck by the fact that often the people who write about investments in the newspapers say that to-day the most successful investors are women, that they hold a vast number of shares in this country. I always read this comment with interest. The writers always say the same thing: that the women are so successful because they are shrewd; they always weigh up the position carefully, and they are not precipitate. I think that those words might well be borne in mind by many men.

And, by the way, women are not, by nature, gamblers. So many people say, when they look in betting shops, that women use them. I invite your Lordships to peep in sometimes, as I often do. You may see one woman there; but the place is packed with men. It is the men who gamble; it is the men who can be taken in by bogus vendors of some shop. It is not these shrewd women. Therefore, it seems to me quite absurd that, suddenly, when they have this appalling blow of losing the man they love—which is the worst blow to a woman—the law says, "Now we must see to it that this woman is controlled; that she must come to us if she wants some more clothes. She must come to us if she wants a little holiday." I feel that in this House, where I have recognised already that your Lordships are always responsive to an argument based on equity, your Lordships realise that the time has come when this state of affairs must be changed.

The other argument, of course, is: "Well, all this is very well. We will accept the fact that she is a good manager. But when her man goes, another man will come along, and then she will be a changed personality." We have heard already that most of these women are middle-aged and elderly; so do not let us be too worried about that possibility. I agree that a spinster with money who wants a husband, a home and children may be tempted to part with her money, because she knows that a prerequisite to a family is a man. Yet, curiously enough, apparently the law it prepared to allow a spinster to retain a large amount of money which she gets through damages. So it is the spinster who might need protection. We allow her to be vulnerable to any adventurer who might come along. We let her get married. So I am afraid that the law is not logical in these matters. The law does not understand the mind of women, because the law is always expounded by men; and, for the most part, the law is written by men. But on this occasion I am pleased to find that our lawyers here to-day, with the exception of my noble friend Lord Chorley, who I believe has a law qualification, realise that the widow should be given her freedom.

Finally, I should like to say that a widow with experience knows that her best friend is her bank balance. I think your Lordships realise that. If we were talking about protecting the widower, I would not be so dogmatic, because it is a commonplace for us to read of the children of a first marriage contesting a will because they allege that their father has been subjected to undue influence by a young woman who subsequently became his wife. We see this time after time in our newspapers. Do we often see that a widow has been exploited and deceived? Of course not. I ask your Lordships to realise that the provision which we are seeking to remove is an anachronism which stems from the 19th century.

6.20 p.m.

LORD COLERAINE

I am not a lawyer; nor am I one of those progressive persons to whom the noble Lady referred who existed, she told us, in this House even as long ago, as 1879. Perhaps it is inappropriate for me even to attempt to say a word on this subject, but I am emboldened to do so if only because this is the first occasion, either in this House or in another place when I have listened to a speech from the noble Lady and have entirely agreed with her.

BARONESS SUMMERSKILL

Thank you.

LORD COLERAINE

I feel that that fact of itself is worth registering. As I understand this issue, it is the case that under the law as it stands a widow is treated as an infant. That may be the law to-day, but it seems to me quite inconceivable that we should allow it to continue to be the law in 1964, as I understand the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, would have us do. It seems to me to be a ludicrous conception that we should regard a widow, merely because she is a widow, as an infant.

The noble Lady produced some powerful arguments in support of her view. I myself, as a layman, think I would go a little further than she and agree with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. It is surely reasonable, if the widow is not to be regarded as an infant, that if she is conjoined with an infant (if that is the correct term) in damages she should not be regarded as an infant so far as her own affairs are concerned merely because the infant is an infant. I gather that Lord Silkin proposes that the two should be separated, and that the widow should be regarded as an adult human being, while the infant's rights would be safeguarded by the court.

BARONESS SUMMERSKILL

That is my proposition.

LORD DILHORNE

Does the noble Lord realise that that involves difficulty in the reassessment of damages? Now the major part goes to the widow on the basis that she will look after the infant.

LORD COLERAINE

I did not realise that. I can see that that would make some difference; but, as a layman, I would go as far as was practicable in recognising that a widow is, in fact, an adult human being.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

I should like to intervene, very briefly, in support of my noble friends Lord Silkin and Lady Summerskill. I do not always agree with Lady Summerskill on nonpolitical matters, but this is an instance in which I am wholly with her. But I am particularly with my noble friend Lord Silkin. I want to go all the way on this.

I am most touched by the gallant and old-fashioned legal argument which runs something like this. If a widow is only hurt and is compensated, she gets the money; if a widower is hurt and compensated, he gets the money; only if a woman's husband is killed does the law become solicitous and suddenly ask the question, "What would her husband have preferred? What would he have liked?" This seems to me to be utterly illogical, especially as we have heard this afternoon that, in some cases, the courts themselves which have held money in trust for widows have not on some occasions invested such money profitably, so they have been as feckless as the widows themselves might have been. The argument does not stand up at all.

In fact, I go much further. A widow should be given the compensation she is entitled to. Of course, as to the money held in trust for the children, that is all right. But if she is a gambler, I do not think that matters. We do not have laws prohibiting men or widowers from gambling. Therefore, why should we have laws to prevent women from gambling? I absolutely support my noble friends Lord Silkin and Lady Summerskill on this issue.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Dilhorne, asked me to express my opinion. It is very painful to me to find myself differing from so many of my noble friends, particularly as I have always regarded myself as a feminist. But when there are dependent children it does not seem to me that one can really separate the sums in this way. As the Pearson Committee pointed out, if there are dependent children and the wife loses the £5,000 which she has been awarded, there is nothing left, except the children's fund, for the family to look to. In the first place, I entirely agree with Lord Dilhorne that the widows would get very much less than they get at the moment, because the whole footing on which a widow is given £5,000 and each of the children about £150 is that the widow is going to spend her money in maintaining herself and the children. And, to be fair, this is what is usually done, and a widow usually leaves the money which is awarded to the children to the last.

But, of course, if that money, instead of being under the control of the court, was unfortunately to be invested in a hopeless business, then the people who were going to he affected would be the children. So long as one says, "Yes, of course, the children must be protected and the court must have this right in regard to the children", it is difficult where there are dependent children not to apply the provision also to the damages awarded to a widow. Therefore, I should personally feel compelled to vote against the Amendment of my noble friend Lord Silkin. There are, I am told, some technical reasons about it, but those no doubt could be resolved.

On the question whether the law should be left as it is, or whether widows should be free unless there are dependent children, I have no strong views. I think that if I had to vote I should be inclined to support the Amendment of my noble friend Lord Chorley, largely because everybody who knows the women who get the damages supports the Pearson Committee's conclusion that the law should be left as it is. It is quite right to say that the Bar Council took the view that control should be removed, but the solicitors (who know the women clients very much better than the barrister does), the Law Society, the Trades Union Congress, the Registrars of County Courts, who know the sort of purposes for which the widows want the money taken out of court, and the Masters of the Supreme Court, who have the same experience—all those who have experience of the actual women in question—feel that, for their protection, it is better that the money should be in court, provided, of course, as happens now, that for any sensible purpose for which they want it out they can have it out.

It is difficult for these widows to protect themselves against relatives who want loans. But if they can say, "I am afraid the money is in court, and I do not know whether the court would agree to my taking it out to lend it to you", it is in that sense a protection. All those of experience in these matters say that there are in fact men with businesses to sell, and so forth, who watch the newspapers and are only too anxious to take advantage of widows who have had no previous experience. My noble friend Lady Summerskill talked about the experienced widow's bank balance. But these are not experienced widows; they are very inexperienced widows. They are mostly widows who, apart from £5 a week or whatever sum it is, have never had any experience of handling capital monies at all. As the average period for which it remains in court is five and a half years, and it is gradually taken out for very sensible purposes, I should be inclined, on balance, to think that, there having been no real complaint against the law as it has been for the last forty years, it should be retained and my noble friend Lord Chorley's Amendment supported. But, at the least, I would suggest that the provisions made in the Bill should be supported—namely, that control should be retained where there are dependent children.

LORD CHORLEY

I think we really ought to find out what we think about this. I have moved only one of my Amendments so far. The other two I will move formally and divide the House.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

LORD SILKIN

If the Committee is content to have a Division on Amendment No. 6, I am content to move it formally and divide. But if it is thought that there ought to be further discussion, then I should like to say a few words in reply to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. But I am

Clause 19 agreed to.

Clause 20 [Increase of amount determining county court jurisdiction to make administration orders, restriction on presentation of bankruptcy petitions and minor amendments about such orders]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after subsection (1) to insert: (2) Her Majesty may by Order in Council vary the said section 148(1) and 148(3) by substituting, for the references therein to £250, references to such greater sum as may be specified in the Order. The noble and learned Lord said: This clause deals with administration orders where a man is insolvent to a limited extent, and it enables an administration order to be made in a county court, which saves the costs of what I might call a full-scale bankruptcy. But there has, of course, to be some limit as to the amount of the debts in question, and the limit at present is £50. It was fixed at £50 in content to leave the decision to the Committee on the discussion as it stands now. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 16, line 28, leave out ("the money") and insert ("so much of the money as is or was recovered or ordered or agreed to be paid to or solely for the benefit of the infant").—(Lord Silkin.)

6.31 p.m.

On Question, Whether he said Amendment (No. 6) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 11; Not-Contents, 34.

CONTENTS
Attlee, E. Morrison, L. Strang, L.
Champion, L. Rennell, L. Summerskill, B. [Teller.]
Gaitskell, B. Silkin, L. [Teller.] Winchester, L. Bp.
Mitchison, L. Somers, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Addison, V. Dilhorne, L. Lindgren, L.
Amherst of Hackney, L. Falkland, V. Merrivale, L.
Ampthill, L. Ferrers, E. [Teller.] Morris of Borth-y-Gest, L.
Auckland, L. Forster of Harraby, L. Oakshott, L.
Bossom, L. Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.) Rea, L.
Carrington, L. Geddes of Epsom, L. St. Oswald, L.
Chesham, L. Goschen, V. [Teller.] Sandys, L.
Chorley, L. Greenway, L. Shepherd, L.
Coleraine, L. Guest, L. Strabolgi, L.
Colville of Culross, V. Ilford, L. Tweedsmuir, L.
Craigton, L. Kinnoull, E. Wardington, L.
Derwent, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

1869, and, as a result of the fall in the value of money, the whole thing has become virtually a dead letter. The unamended part of the clause increases this to £250, which is about to-day's equivalent of £50 in 1869. It is always happening that laws become out of date and do not work properly simply because, since before the turn of the century, the value of money has steadily fallen and nothing could be done about it because of the difficulties of finding Parliamentary time to alter one figure in an Act of Parliament. The object of the present Amendment, therefore, is to provide that this new sum may itself be altered by an Order in Council by substituting for the reference to £250 references to "such greater sum as may be specified in the Order." It will, by the next Amendment, be subject to the Negative Resolution procedure. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 16, line 43, at end insert the said subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is a consequential Amendment, and provides, as I said, that the Order shall be subject to the Negative Resolution procedure in either House. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 17, line 38, at end insert— ("() The power conferred by subsection (2) above to make an Order in Council shall include power to vary the Order; and an Order in Council under the said subsection (2) shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 20, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 21 to 26 agreed to.

Clause 27 [Amendment of War Pensions (Administrative Provisions) Act 1919]:

LORD AIREDALE

This is almost a drafting amendment. Clause 27 deals with the qualifications of Service members of appeal tribunals dealing with war pensions, and the Amendment seeks to amend the proposed new sub-paragraph (ii). It has several advantages. It reduces the sub-paragraph as now drafted from three lines to one line; it gets rid of the ungainly word "demobilised", which appears twice in the course of the three lines of the sub-paragraph as now printed; and it gets rid of the expression "an officer … or a man", which hardly seems an appropriate expression to use in relation to the Armed Forces nowadays. The expression "an officer … or a man" implies, I think, that for certain purposes a Service man is as good as his officer, and if that is so then I think that a Service woman is entitled to say that she, too, is as good as her officer for these purposes. As regards this part of this Amendment, I have received the greatest encouragement from the place that matters most upon these occasions, and I rather think that this Amendment may prove acceptable but we shall see. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 21, line 5, leave out lines 5 to 7 and insert:— ("'(ii) a person who has served in Her Majesty's Forces.'")—(Lord Airedale.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is clearly an improvement. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale. It will make for simplification, and I gladly accept it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 28 to 30 agreed to.

6.45 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 30, to insert the following new clause:

Repeal of section 116 of Probates and Letters of Administration Act (Ireland) 1857. 1857 c. 79 (Ir.).

". Section 116 of the Probates and Letters of Administration Act (Ireland) 1857 (which requires the Treasury to prepare, and to present to Parliament, an annual return of fees and moneys levied, and salaries, expenses and superannuations, &c., paid, under that Act) shall cease to have effect."

The noble and learned Lord said: This new clause repeals Section 116 of the Probates and Letters of Administration Act (Ireland), 1857, under which the Treasury is required to prepare and present to Parliament an annual return of fees and expenses of the Principal Probate Registry, Belfast, and the District Probate Registry, Londonderry. The return, which involves not inconsiderable administrative expenditure, no longer serves any useful purpose: the expenditure recorded is borne partly on the Vote for the Supreme Court of Judicature, et cetera, Northern Ireland, and the remainder on the Consolidated Fund, details of which can be found in the Finance Accounts. The Accountant-General and the Chief Probate Registrar of Northern Ireland are both agreed that the return is no longer necessary. I beg to move the Amendment accordingly.

Amendment moved— After Clause 30, insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Remaining clauses agreed to.

Schedule l agreed to.

Schedule 2 [Obsolete, &c., Enactments ceasing to have Effect]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is the first of a number of Amendments which do no more than try to get rid of statutory provisions which, for one reason or another, are spent. The first Amendment repeals the Execution Act, 1664, the object of which was to prevent judgment debtors from taking advantage of certain technical difficulties inherent in the procedure for executing judgments against land by writs of extent. Writs of extent were abolished by Section 33 of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, and the Act of 1664 has therefore been obsolete for the last seventeen years. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 35, line 30, at end insert—

("16 & 17 Car. 2. C. 5. The Execution Act 1664. The whole Act.")

—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment repeals Section 11 of the Quarter Sessions Act, 1849. This provision was designed, at a time when quarter sessions were responsible for the supervision of much administrative local government work, to simplify the procedure for obtaining, in certain cases where an appeal lay to quarter sessions, a decision of the superior courts on a point of law. It enabled the parties, after giving notice of appeal to quarter sessions, and with the leave of a judge, to agree a case for the consideration of the superior courts, whose judgment thereon was equivalent to a decision of quarter sessions, thus eliminating the hearing before quarter sessions. Since the transfer of rating appeals to the Lands Tribunal, there has been, in practice, no form of proceeding to which Section 11 can usefully apply. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 36, line 46, at end insert—

("12 & 13 Vict. c. 45. The Quarter Sessions Act 1849. Section 11.")

—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment repeals Sections 341 and 342 of the Irish Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, 1857. These sections empowered the Court of Bankruptcy and Insolvency in Ireland to sell a debtor's interest in copy-hold land for the benefit of creditors, and made the necessary provision for the purchasers to be admitted as tenants of the manor. There is now no copyhold land left on which these sections can operate. I beg to move accordingly.

Amendment moved— Page 37, line 4, leave out ("section 68") and insert ("sections 68, 341, 342")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The Court of Probate Act, 1857, set up the new Court of Probate and transferred to it the existing probate jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and other courts. Sections 116 and 117 made provision for the old "College of Doctors of Law exercent in the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Courts"; Section 116 extends its powers to let, sell or exchange its real and personal estate, and Section 117 authorised it to surrender its Charter, whereupon it was to be dissolved. The College in fact ceased to exist in 1858 or 1859, although there is no positive evidence that it ever surrendered its Charter. It has, however, certainly been out of existence for over a hundred years and the two sections are spent. Section 32 of the Irish Act empowers certain categories of court officers to administer oaths; the words repealed brought within these categories those who were at that time already acting as surrogates of ecclesiastical courts. These words are now spent. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 5, at end insert—

("20 & 21 Vict. c. 77. The Court of Probate Act 1857. Sections 116 and 117.
20 & 21 Vict. c. 79. The Probates and Letters of Administration Act (Ireland) 1857. In section 32, the words 'all persons who at the commencement of this Act shall be acting as surrogates of any ecclesiastical court, and' and the word 'other' (where first occurring).")

—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment repeals Section 16 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, which made provision for the procedure to be adopted where a claim was made to goods seized in execution under process of the High Court of Admiralty. The matters for which the section provided are now covered by Rules of the Supreme Court and the section has not been invoked for a very long time. The President of the Probate Division and the Admiralty Registrar have been consulted and agree that Section 16 is now obsolete. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 9, at end insert—

("24 & 25 Vict. c. 10. The Admiralty Court Act 1861. Section 16.")

—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Section 13 of the Court of Admiralty (Ireland) Amendment Act, 1876, made provision for the appointment of deputies by the registrars of the courts of the recorders of Cork and Belfast, but was limited to the registrars in office when the Act came into force. It is now spent. Section 1 of the Act of 1877 reduced the office of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in Ireland to equality with that of a puisne Judge of the High Court and made similar provision prospectively for the office of Chief Baron of the Exchequer on the occurrence of a vacancy. Section 4 was consequential on Section 1 and provided for powers which had been exercisable under Sections 72 and 73 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland), 1877, and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland), 1882 by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland in conjunction with the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Chief Baron, to be exercisable without any reference to the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Section 5 provided for the interpretation of these and other expressions. There is now nothing left for Sections I and 4 to operate on. Section 72 of the Act of 1877 and the references in Section 73 of that Act to the Judges other than the Lord Chancellor were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1953. The functions of the Lord Chancellor are now discharged by the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. Thus Sections 1 and 4 are spent and with their repeal Section 5 becomes inapplicable. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 17, at end insert—

("39 & 40 Vict. c. 28. The Court of Admiralty (Ireland) Amendment Act 1876. Section 13.
50 & 51 Vict. c. 6. The Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 1887. Sections 1, 4 and 5.")

—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment relates to Section 11 of the Act of 1897 which made provision for the exercise of the powers referred to in Section 4 of the Act of 1887 on the occasion of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer. It is now spent. The words repealed in Section 4(5) of the County Courts Act, 1924, made special provision for the retirement and pensions of the District Registrars of Liverpool and Manchester who were then in office. Section 5(4) made provision for the payment of a gratuity to certain categories of clerks in district registries who had attained the age of 55 by May 12, 1923. Both provisions are now spent. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 22, at end insert—

("60 & 61 Vict, c. 66. The Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) (No. 2) Act 1897. Section 11.
14 & 15 Geo. 5. c. 17. The County Courts Act 1924. In section 4(5), the words from 'but in the case' onwards.
Section 5(4).")

—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The proviso repealed by this Amendment provides for officers of the Supreme Court, with some exceptions, to hold office during the Queen's pleasure. The proviso excludes from this rule officers appointed before October 1, 1925. There are now no such officers still in office. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 23, column 3, at end insert— ("In section 115(2), the proviso.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment repeals Section 123(4) and the proviso to Section 126(1) of the Judicature Act. Section 123 provides for the appointment of registrars and clerks in the Chancery Division, and subsection (4) makes special provision (including pension provision) for those in post on August 19, 1921, which is now 43 years ago. There are now no such former clerks or registrars alive. Section 126(1) prescribes the qualifications required for certain officers of the Supreme Court. The proviso makes special provision for those in office on October 1, 1925. There are now no persons alive who can be affected by this provision. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 29, column 3, at end insert— ("Section 123(4). In section 126(1), the proviso.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment repeals Section 2 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1928, which makes special provision for the pension rights of district probate registrars who, having been appointed before October 1, 1928, applied within a limited period to be allowed to retire from office. There are now no persons left alive to whom the section applies. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 41, column 3, at beginning insert— ("Section 2."—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Section 2(3) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act, 1935, made provision for the precedence of Lords Justices of Appeal in office on February 12, 1935. The provision is now spent since there are no such Lords Justices still in office. The surviving provisions of Section 8 of, and Schedule 1 to, the Act of 1955 made transitional provisions for proceedings begun in the Mayor's and City of London Court before January 1, 1956. While litigation may take some time, we are not quite so bad as to require eight years or more for an action in the Mayor's Court and those provisions are now spent. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 44, at end insert—

("25 & 26 Geo. 5. c. 2. The Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1935. Section 2(3).
4 & 5 Eliz. 2. c. 8. The County Courts Act 1955. Section 8. Schedule 1.")

—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 3 [Enactments repealed]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential on the Amendment to Clause 10, which the Committee will remember I referred to when dealing with the Amendment to Clause 10, and I pointed out that this Amendment would follow. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 38, line 46, column 3, leave out ("(2) and (3)").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment repeals words in Section 175 of the County Courts Act, 1959, which provide for the construction of references to Rules of Court Contained in Section 63 of the Trustee Act, 1925. These references are themselves deleted by the Amendment made by Schedule 1 and the words repealed will therefore become inoperative. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 38, line 47, column 3, at end insert— ("'In section 175, the words' section sixty-three of the Trustee Act 1925 and'.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment corrects a mistaken citation of words in the Mental Health Act, 1959, which refer to Section 149 of the Judicature Act, 1925, and are repealed by Schedule 3. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 39, line 6, column 3, leave out ("fifty-nine") and insert ("forty-nine").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.

House resumed.

Bill reported, with Amendments.