§ 2.43 p.m.
§ Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved yesterday by Lord Carrington: to resolve, That this House approves the Report on Defence, 1961 (Cmnd. 1288).
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords, towards the end of the last war, I found myself, rather to my surprise, in Athens on the night of the German evacuation of that city. To disguise the fact that I had only a dinghy load of troops under my command I had been "jacked" up to Brigadier for the occasion. So I hurried round to the top Greek General I could find to impress him with my exalted and, I must say, quite bogus rank. He only spoke French, so I proudly introduced myself to him, "Je suis le Brigadier Jellicoe". He was not impressed. Unfortunately, I had forgotten that in French "brigadier" means "corporal". However, I would ask your Lordships to remember, as I am only too well aware at this moment, that sandwiched between my noble friend the First Lord, who opened this debate so ably, and my noble friend, another "former naval person", who will close it, is a young corporal and not an old brigadier.
I think our debate yesterday was a good one. We had characteristic speeches from the noble Lord, Lord Rea, and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. May I add, in passing, since this is the first opportunity I have had of saying so from this Box, how much our Armed Forces and, in particular, the Navy, stand in debt to the noble Viscount? May I also thank those noble Lords who from this side of the House gave broad support—not uncritical, but always constructive—to my noble friend's Motion. Again I listened with particular interest to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. I felt yesterday that he made an important contribution to what is badly needed in this country—dispassionate but searching discussion of the great problems of arms control and disarmament.
On our contribution to the strategic deterrent, I wish to say very little. Indeed, as becomes the corporal, I shall be leaving some of the broader issues of this debate, including the two noble Lords' Amendments (if those are broad issues) 856 to be dealt with by my noble friend the Leader of the House. My job, as I see it, is to try to clear away some of the underbrush and to answer some of the questions posed by noble Lords, so that my noble friend can follow majestically behind. But on our contribution to the deterrent I wish to say just this. I believe that Bomber Command is to-day a force of unparalleled efficiency. Both my noble friends Lord Merrivale and Lord Ampthill wondered whether paragraph 16 of the White Paper might not minimise the difficulties our V-bombers would meet with in penetrating to their targets. I can assure those noble Lords that the words in the White Paper:
The force"—that is the V-bomber force—has the capacity to penetrate to its assigned targetsdo represent the considered opinion of the Air Staff. Incidentally, having visited the headquarters of strategic air command at Omahah some eighteen months ago, I know that our special contribution to the heavy deterrent is very fully recognised by the responsible American military authorities. I believe we have been right to make this contribution in the past and that within the measure of our resources we should continue to do so.My noble friend Lord Merrivale asked two rather searching questions about Blue Steel and Skybolt. Consistent with security, to use his phrase, I am afraid I cannot go into any detail about the operational availability of Blue Steel. The position is this. The firing trials of Blue Steel, which began in this country last year, are now continuing at the Woomera range in Australia; and, as the Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates indicated, rounds are being made available to the R.A.F. this year for handling and maintenance trials preparatory to the introduction of the weapon into service. As regards Sky-bolt, I would refer the noble Lord to the assurance given by my right honourable friend the Minister of Defence in another place recently, that provided the development of the weapon proceeds satisfactorily—and we have every reason to believe it will—we shall receive it on time and without strings.
A good deal of attention was given yesterday to N.A.T.O. I was glad to note that none of your Lordships 857 queried the basic purpose of the Alliance or our membership of it. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a fairly general feeling on both sides of the House that we may have got the balance between the shield and the sword in N.A.T.O. (to use perhaps rather out-of-date phraseology) wrong. There appeared to be a fairly widespread feeling that N.A.T.O., as a whole, and the British Army of the Rhine, in particular, may possess too small a conventional capacity. The argument, as I understand it, is partly based on the strength, equipment and training of B.A.O.R. As regards strength, it is true that the Army of the Rhine is at present slightly below strength. As regards equipment, it is a question of some "jam" now and a lot more in the next few years. Broadly speaking, I believe it is true to say that virtually all the equipment, personal or otherwise, with which the soldier in B.A.O.R. was familiar in 1957 has been replaced, or will be replaced within two or three years. I repeat, all the equipment.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHMy Lords, on that point, may I ask whether, in the course of the noble Earl's speech, we can have an answer to a point I put yesterday: that is, whether it is Intended that the personnel of B.A.O.R., which has been reduced progressively on two occasions, is to be further reduced in the current year?
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords, I think I shall be wise to stick fairly closely to my brief here. But I should like to reply in this way to the noble Viscount. While the Army is being reorganised, we cannot sometimes avoid having units which are under strength. Nevertheless, it remains our intention to maintain the strength of B.A.O.R. as close to 55,000 men as we can in the circumstances, and we shall certainly keep N.A.TO. generally informed of the position.
Now a word as to training. It is true that major training exercises in B.A.O.R. often assume the use of tactical nuclear weapons. We possess those weapons in Germany, as indeed do the Russians. It would, we believe, be criminal stupidity in these circumstances not to train B.A.O.R. in exercises which assume the use of nuclear weapons. To do so, indeed, is an essential part of the deterrent. But from the fact that we do so 858 it should not be held—and I emphasise the word "not"—that B.A.O.R. is not prepared to fight a purely conventional battle.
In dealing with these rather mundane matters of numbers, equipment and training of our forces in N.A.T.O., I may be putting the cart before the horse. I suppose that the "64,000 dollar question" is whether, in the ordinary circumstances of nuclear equipoise, N.A.T.O.'s existing strategic concept remains valid. That strategy was evolved before the present balance of nuclear power between East and West was struck. As your Lordships know, we have taken the initiative in proposing to our Allies a comprehensive review, not of N.A.T.O.'s purpose or rôle—for that we do not in any way challenge—but of N.A.T.O.'s strategy, in which the whole question of the balance between nuclear and conventional forces, to which so many of your Lordships referred yesterday, and the provision of M.R.B.M.s and the control of N.A.T.O.'s nuclear armoury would be considered. So far we have reached the stage of defining the various problems which arise. We do not yet know what the answers will be, but I am sure that, in discussion with our N.A.T.O. Allies, they eventually will be found, although I would guess, in answer to my noble friend Lord Teynham, that these discussions, complicated and comprehensive as they are bound to be, are likely to take a little time.
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHMy Lords, may I ask a question on that last passage, which is very important? I have been looking up what the Minister of Defence said in another place about this question of strategic and tactical targets. I realise that the Minister spoke about the reappraisal in certain respects, but are we making any representations against the Norstad proposal that he should be given the right to use certain tactical weapons against targets even though they are inside Russian territory? Is that part of the matter to be discussed?
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords, I think I must deflect that question a little, because the whole question is now between Governments, and I think it would be quite wrong for me in any way to prejudge it.
859 I should like to turn for a moment to our extra-N.A.T.O. commitments, and to touch again on the question of strategic mobility, to which many of your Lordships referred yesterday. In this context I would draw your Lordships' attention to an aspect of Communist world strategy which we ignore at our peril. In his speech of January 6 Khrushchev drew a sharp and significant distinction between world wars on the one hand, and what the Communists term "wars of national liberation", on the other. Khrushchev says that world or local wars are not inevitable. However, wars of liberation, guerilla wars, like those in Algeria or Laos, are, to quote his words: "Not only permissible but inevitable". They are "sacred", and Communists should "support such just wars fully and without reservation."
We should take these serious words seriously. They mean, as I read them, since Khrushchev speaks of support "without reservation" that the Communists reserve the right, as it were, to extend aid, including military aid, towards any movement which they choose to deem a movement of national liberation. They may calculate that their growing resources allow them to take greater risks than hitherto. Sheltering under the umbrella of the Soviet-American nuclear equipoise, they may feel more disposed to exert nuclear blackmail on us and our friends, friends, especially in areas deemed not absolutely vital to our security. Thus Communist policy may grow increasingly adventurous in selected soft spots. There are already straws in the wind; Cuba; the Soviet unilateral intervention in the Congo, and the Soviet air-lift to the Kong Lae forces in Laos, carried out, I may add, with the same Soviet planes, or some of them, as were used in the Congo. Now I do not wish to cry "wolf" or "bear", but surely all this means that we and our Allies must be prepared to meet increasingly powerful, and possibly dangerous, Communist pressures in those vast areas which lie to the South, in Asia, Africa and, indeed, Latin America, the middle ground between the committed West and the committed East.
The problem of these areas has been debated in some detail in your Lordships' House recently. I think we are gener- 860 ally agreed that the best deterrent—and I use the word "deterrent" advisedly—to Communist pressure and infiltration in these areas, is for us in the West to do all we can to ensure, by a wise political approach, and by generous, imaginative and co-ordinated policies of aid, that the innate desire of these new nations for independence rests on secure political and economic foundations. We should try not to expose the Communists to what I would call the Congo temptation. Yet we cannot be certain that political and economic measures will always suffice.
This is one of the many areas where our defence and economic policies co-exist with our general foreign policy. In many areas of the world to-day, the crust of stability is very thin, and dangerous and dynamic forces lie beneath that crust. In our small and highly-strung modern world, situations can get very quickly out of hand, as my noble friends Lord Bridgeman and Lord Bird-wood made clear yesterday. That is why, to use the words of the White Paper, we
have to play our part in many parts of the world by maintaining conventional forces to prevent or contain minor incidents which might otherwise develop into major conflicts.Unless we believe that little England is the destiny of this country, we must continue to discharge many world-wide responsibilities, political, economic and, if necessary, military, outside the N.A.T.O. area. We must do so either alone or as a member of the Regional Alliances to which we belong, or in the framework of the United Nations, as the case may be.We cannot discharge these responsibilities unless our forces are well trained. well equipped, adequate in numbers and possess strategic mobility. I believe our forces possess the requisite strategic mobility, or have come a long way towards acquiring it. Two of the Services, of course, the Navy and the Royal Air Force, possess a high degree of built-in strategic mobility. For example, "Dreadnought" has an endurance inconceivable only a few years ago. A Valiant bomber, again as an example, using in-flight re-fuelling techniques, flew non-stop last year to Singapore, over 8,000 miles in 154- hours. Such mobility is naturally increased by the dispersion of our forces and 861 the network of bases on which that dispersion rests.
With mobility in mind, I am sure your Lordships approve the decision to commission H.M.S. "Albion" as a second commando carrier. I had the mixed pleasure of following the noble Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, in this debate a year ago, and I was struck by his description of "Bulwark" as a fish without a tail. I am sure he will welcome the fact that there will soon be two fishes at sea. "Bulwark" and "Albion", and that they will acquire at least one tail in the new assault ship. Again, I hope that he will welcome the complementary decision of the Army to start replacing their old LST.s in the coming year with new, bigger, speedier and more efficient logistic supply ships. When executed, these decisions will considerably increase the ability of our Armed Forces to swim, an important matter in these days of Lord Ampthill's air barrier. Having served in one of the earliest commandos, I am very glad that we are planning to form a new Royal Marine Commando.
The same pattern applies in the air. The R.A.F. are continually carrying out exercises to practise and extend the mobility of R.A.F. squadrons and R.A.F. units. Detachments of V-bombers have regularly flown to Malta, Cyprus and the Far East. Mobility is also being extended by the increased use of in-flight refuelling, and last year a detachment of Javelins, your Lordships will recollect, flew to Singapore with the aid of in-flight refuelling.
To snuff out the candle of some local conflagration, troops on the ground are obviously needed. If the forces immediately available are not sufficient, there are theatre reserves deployed in the Midde East and in the Far East. Behind those stand in this country the three highly trained and well equipped brigades of the Strategic Reserve at a high state of readiness. May I say here that I was surprised by what the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, said yesterday about the Government's alleged coyness about our troop dispositions. I confess I rather sympathise with his æsthetic inhibitions about the White Paper's strip cartoons. But then he went on to say with reference to the map on page 4 that the symbols in it were, and I quote his words [col. 843]:
merely a protective device on the part of the Departmental Ministers to protect themselves form criticisms in this country".862 This did surprise me. In both the Naval and the Air Estimate memoranda very full maps are included showing naval and military dispositions. In view of these I really feel the noble Earl was rather over-egging the pudding.The steady growth of Transport Command has already greatly added to the mobility of our strategic reserves. The admirable strip cartoon at the back of the Memorandum on the Air Estimates illustrates the growth of this vital Command. For the strategic lift, Transport Command now has all its 23 Britannias, in addition to the 10 Comet 2s. Comet 4Cs are on order to replace the Comet 2s and we are now actively considering the possibility of further increases in the strategic Transport Force. Fifty-six Argosies are now on order for the medium-range force, the backbone of whch remains the very useful Beverley and that old friend, the Hastings.
§ LORD SHEPHERDMy Lords, before the noble Earl leaves that matter, can he say anything about the Britannics, when we may expect them in service?
EARL JELLICOEI can say this; they are now called the Belfast, and we may expect them in service in what I think is now becoming the fashionable phrase, the mid-'sixties.
§ THE EARL OF SWINTONOne White Paper says in 1964.
EARL JELLICOEI was being more cautious than the noble Earl, but it does say 1964, as he says.
Have we sufficient strategic and theatre air mobility? As in the United States, I think the straight answer must be, No, and that is why the Government, like the American Administration, propose still further to expand our air transport force. However, just because we have not yet got all we should like, we should not be blind to the very striking growth of Transport Command. In the last ten years its air-lift potential has expanded threefold, and it will continue to grow. I have often heard Transport Command referred to as the Cinderella of the. Royal Air Force. If so, she is growing up very rapidly, like that precocious young lady, Lolita.
My Lords, it is no good having mobility unless we have the men to be 863 mobile. Two noble Lords, my noble friend Lord Bridgeman and the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, focused attention in our debate yesterday on the manpower problem. I would remind your Lordships that yesterday the First Lord stressed the advantages of volunteer professional all-Regular Forces. The noble Earl, Lord Lucan, quoted Cromwell at us. May I quote Cromwell back at Lord Lucan? In a letter in September, 1643, to Sir William Spring, with which no doubt the noble Earl is familiar, Cromwell wrote "A few honest men are better than numbers". And as the First Lord said, the Government are mildly optimistic about the numbers.
The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, asked if paragraph 48 of the White Paper of 1957 stands. The answer is, Yes. He also asked if we were thinking of National Service. Obviously, in a matter of such importance it is only prudent for the Government to consider all possibilities. All courses of action must be examined, including some form of selective service. But I would again draw attention to all the other possibilities to which the First Lord of the Admiralty referred yesterday, and emphasise that we are planning for success in this matter, not failure. In planning for success, I quite agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, that we cannot afford to ignore the youth organisations as aids to recruiting. We can, of course, explore this aspect in greater detail in our debate on the Army. Meanwhile, I would merely draw the noble Lord's attention to the fact that the War Office intend to spend 20 per cent. more next year, as compared to this on the Army Cadet Forces.
The noble Earl, Lord Lucan, emphasised (and I think I have his words right) that money is not the only thing that attracts men into the Services. I could not agree more. That is why, for example, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War is encouraging adventure training in the Army. That is why, while maintaining discipline and smartness in the Army, he is making it crystal clear to all Army units that there is all the difference in the world between good discipline and smart turnout and pointless "bull". The noble Earl, Lord Lucan, also asked whether television advertising, which will play an important 864 part in the War Office's vigorous and enterprising recruiting campaign, will be paid for. The answer is: Yes, if these advertisements are on commercial television.
Finally, my Lords, I should like to touch on two aspects of Defence expenditure. The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, complained that the Government had failed to live up to paragraph 72 of the 1957 White Paper. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, mentioned the rising level of Defence expenditure as a threat to the social services. I should like to try to get the record straight on this. The expectation in 1957 was that the five-year plan would reduce the burden of Defence on the economy. No undertaking was given that expenditure would come down substantially. Indeed, the 1957 White Paper specifically drew attention to the reasons why reductions in manpower could not be expected to bring with them comparable cuts in expenditure.
The 1957 expectation has, in fact, proved accurate. The burden of Defence on the economy has been reduced in the last few years, whether measured as a proportion of the gross national product, in terms of the manpower absorbed by the Defence programme or of the proportion of the metal-using industry working for Defence, or indeed by any other of the criteria which can properly be used in measuring burdens on the economy. In simple expenditure terms, too, the five-year programme is achieving its purpose. In 1957 we faced the prospect of a steep rise in Defence spending in real terms; in fact, if we allow for price rises over the period, expenditure has been held steady, as the diagrams in paragraph 38 of this year's White Paper make perfectly clear. And this, my Lords, is despite two important facts. First, receipts in aid of the Defence Budget had declined by over £80 million between the 1957–58 and the 1961–62 Estimates, due to the fact that we no longer receive substantial sums from the United States and Germany, and also because the sales of surplus stores have fallen away. Secondly, there has been a change in the items covered by the Defence Budget since the 1957 White Paper which has added about £90 865 million to it. But for these various changes, none of which has been determined by Defence policy, actual expenditure for the coming year would have been less than in 1957–58.
LORD REAMy Lords, are we to assume that at the end of the five-year period the actual recurring expenses will be reduced?
§ VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHMy Lords, I do not think the noble Earl will expect us to accept in toto what he has just said. I must say that he has done his level best to explain the position, but it does not mean that it can safely be assumed that the new plan, when it is fully implemented, will further appreciably reduce the burden on the economy. I think that his explanations, and even excuses, show nothing approaching that satisfaction which was promised four years ago.
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords, then it must be a failure in my powers of advocacy, because I thought I made it perfectly plain that it had reduced the strain on the economy as measured by any of the ordinary criteria by which strains on the economy are measured. I will try out my measuring tape another time.
We heard a pretty powerful speech yesterday evening from my old friend, the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote. I had the impression that the two main considerations which he put to this House commanded broad assent: first, that it was necessary in the national interest that new weapon systems, when adopted in principle, should be carried forward to completion with all possible despatch; second, that the financial stakes are very high—he rightly drew our attention to the fact that some 40 per cent. of the total Defence budget, £650 million, goes towards equipment. Consequently, it is, as I think the whole House will agree, of vital importance that we should obtain full value for money. I can assure my noble friend that the views which he put to the 866 House yesterday will receive most searching consideration.
Meanwhile, may I just say this? The total expenditure on the development of a major new weapon system, like a guided weapon or an aircraft, may run into many tens of millions of pounds. We must therefore be as certain as we reasonably can be in this world of accelerating technology that, before we agree to the start of a full-scale development programme, we are backing the right horse and have got the right odds. The noble Lord drew our attention to the comments of the Public Accounts Committee on three guided weapons projects whose total direct cost finally proved to be many times the original estimates. The Govment are not prepared to permit this sort of situation to continue, and I am sure your Lordships will agree that they are right in principle in demanding the most careful examination of proposals for new projects.
That said, I should like, nevertheless, to reiterate that my noble friend's remarks will receive most careful attention and consideration; and I would draw his attention to something of which I am sure he is already perfectly well aware—namely, that a Committee, the Zuckerman Committee, has been at work for some time on these particular problems. They are near to the end of their investigations now, and I am certain that their Report when it has been completed will help to reinforce measures already taken to improve control of expenditure and to insure that we get the best possible value for money.
My Lords, I know that there were several—indeed, a great many—questions posed yesterday which I have not answered. Rather than detain your Lordships longer, I feel that it would be best if I or my noble friend the First Lord were to write lo any noble Lords left out on a limb. For my part, that I gladly undertake to do. I think it is now high time that the corporal left the parade ground. In doing so, I merely wish to state my, belief that our Defence policy is coherent, that the balance of our forces is, broadly speaking, right, and that these forces are highly efficient. I therefore ask your Lordships to reject the two Amendments if they are moved, and to accept my noble friend's Motion.
§ 3.17 p.m.
§ LORD SHACKLETONMy Lords, I should like first of all to congratulate the noble Earl. Not only have we on this side, and I have personally, a great affection for him, but we have welcomed his many valuable contributions in the past as a critic of the Government. It is rather sad when these more forthright critics are silenced and brought into the silent Lobby of the Government. Luckily, there is always a continuing "refreshment" going on in the other direction. It is one of the most surprising things that, as soon as a distinguished member of the Government, especially if he is concerned with Defence, leaves the Government—this is particularly true of another place—he immediately proceeds to attack the Government with regard to their Defence policy. It is most fortunate for the Government this year that the noble Lord, Lord Head, is in a far distant "other place", so that he is not here to join his criticisms to those which have come, as the Government freely admit, from both sides of the House
Clearly, the Government must be aware of the seriousness of the criticism of their Defence policy. Although much of what I have to say will be critical, this does not mean that I, or anybody who is critical, thinks that this is an easy task. It is, as has been said before, one of the most extraordinarily difficult jobs to produce an effective Defence policy and to sustain it. Our first complaint is that the Government will go on pretending—although the noble Earl departed a little from that course—that all is pretty good; that we have the right plan and that, on the whole. we have not much to worry about. This White Paper really is a pathetic document when we remember the original grandiose words in relation to the first year of the five-year plan. Now we get a document which consists of little more than a notice on the door of the Ministry of Defence, saying, "Not at home", or, possibly, "In conference".
We should like them to come out of their conference and face the consequences of their attempt to carry out a policy much of which is already in ruins and I shall attempt to show later the way in which it is in ruins. And we are not helped by the fact—and I am sure 868 the noble and learned Viscount finds it as painful as we do—that there are so many terrible clichés and bits of jargon in the White Paper. There is the extraordinary statement in paragraph 28 that:
At this time of rapid scientific development, even advanced weapons are almost sure"—very careful!to be superseded by something still more advanced.The noble Lord, the First Lord of the Admiralty, said almost the same thing in his exceedingly cautious speech. I do not think this is worthy of a statement that could be called a statement on Defence. It is, in fact, a soft-pedal on the five-year plan. The only good thing I have to say with regard to these publications is that the Service Memoranda seem to be very much better; they go into a great deal more detail. But I caution Her Majesty's Government, as did my noble friend Lord Lucan yesterday, to be a little careful about these cartoons. All kinds of interesting information might go in. We could have pictures of all eleven Ministers of Defence since the Defence Plan was created. They must not overdo that.The main criticism we have of the Government springs from this attempt to have the best of all worlds. It is a temptation to all Governments outwardly to try to show this, although nobody knows better than Governments the impossibility of achieving it. I would start by referring to paragraph 8 of the Report on Defence, 1961, and draw attention to the difference between the statements in that paragraph and paragraph 31. That in paragraph 31 is a fairly modest statement. It says:
How to keep our place, to preserve a proper balance in our effort, and to avoid the risk of deploying our limited resources of manpower and money over too wide a field has been the subject of much study.But in paragraph 8 we get back to the original Sandys:The primary purpose of our defence policy is, therefore, that it should protect us, our allies and our friends against the whole spectrum of possible aggression and military threats, from the small local action which might be the beginning of larger and more dangerous adventures through 'nuclear blackmail' to nuclear war.Her Majesty's Government cannot really suggest that it is possible to provide defence against the whole spectrum 869 of aggression right through to nuclear war itself. This may be a matter of misunderstanding, and I do not doubt that we can have a jolly time trying to interpret those words; but our complaint is that there are too many of these loose and rather pompous statements. The main issue between critics of the Government (and these are critics, again, on all sides) is, of course, the question of the deterrent. I, for my part, do not question that we now have a powerful deterrent force. I do not question that our V-bombers are equipped and able to deliver most devastating retribution. It is certain, too, that they are at a high standard of efficiency and that the reaction time is as good as, and may well be better than the Government have already claimed; and although there may be only 200, and only a proportion may get through, it is fair enough to argue that they represent a tremendous force.Our criticism of the present position is not that we have not, at this moment, an effective deterrent, or contribution to a deterrent, or whatever the Government like to call it, but that it has been secured at the cost—and too high a cost—of other aspects of defence; and furthermore, that it will become a wasting asset (and nobody can be more aware of it than the Government) unless they are really going completely to eat the words in the 1957 Defence White Paper, where we had, in paragraph 61. the statement that:
Having regard to the high performance and potentiality of Vulcan Victor medium bombers and the likely progress of ballistic rockets arid missile defence, the Government have decided not to go on with the development of a supersonic manned bomber which could not have been brought into service in much under seven years.Our criticism is in regard to the development of the missile and the position that will exist at some time—to use the felicitous phrase— "in the middle' sixties". There is in the White Paper this year a statement that:Equally we must be ready to scrap anything that has served its purpose, become outmoded, or whose ultimate cost may prove to be beyond our resources.This, of course, is a piece of recent hindsight in relation to Blue Streak and is part of the epitaph of Blue Streak. But we have scrapped the main part of our defence policy in the scrapping of 870 Blue Streak, and, as one who in earlier years defended Blue Streak and has defended, and is still a believer in, the strategic Western deterrent, I would say I believe we have in fact scrapped our continuing contribution towards it. We Dave not in this House, this year, had any talk about an independent deterrent. I ask the Government to stop talking about an independent contribution. Cannot we just call it a contribution? There was an attempt last year by the noble and learned Viscount, as he may remember, to define what an independent deterrent was. I think we might just call it a contribution and have done with it.The question is: what in fact is its value—and this is the test by which it has to be judged in the whole pattern of Western defence—in the main purpose of preserving our position and the position of the Western world? I do not myself regard it as particularly moral to say that one should disapprove of atomic bombs as opposed to other weapons, nor, indeed, do most of my noble and honourable friends in either House; and we may as well face the fact—and I am sure the Government and most of us will agree—that it does not make us any more moral because we are inclined to walk on the other side of the street from the atom bomb and dismiss it from our sight. But the question, and our criticism, is whether, in fact, this emphasis on the deterrent that we have sustained despite the collapse of the original main part of the policy, is right to-day.
I should like briefly to say something about the position of the Labour Party. If I am to accuse Her Majesty's Government of coyness in their statements, then we might as well face frankly the Tact that there are divisions in other Parties, as well, on other subjects, and that there a very profound division on this subject. It will do no good to the noble and learned Viscount to ask these innocent (and we all know that when he is innocent he is at his most mischievous) questions about the Constitution of the Labour Party. As a former Chairman of the Conservative Party, he knows perfectly well what it is. I should like to analyse the position of people critical of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and the range of criticism. There is the point of view of the pacifist to whom, I believe, most of us are sympathetic, and whose sincerity we recognise. Then there 871 is the position of the unilateralist who says that it will be a contribution to the peace of the world if Britain sets an example by opting out without agreement in regard to the use of nuclear weapons; and I do not propose to develop that point. Then there are those who are what are called "multilateralists". And finally, there are those who believe that the national advantage is best served by always pursuing a national policy which does not take full regard of the fact that we are part of a great alliance.
My Lords, there are signs still to-day in the Government, and particularly in the speech of the Secretary of State for Air in another place, that there are people who are harking back to this older view, a view which (as the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, in his most interesting speech yesterday suggested) has never been part of the British historical approach to these matters. As he pointed out, our defence has in the past always been based on the marginal intervention in regard to the balance of power. If you are going to choose a marginal intervention, the question is this: what, in fact, is the most effective part of it? The Government argue that the Americans welcome our nuclear deterrent. It would be difficult for them not to do so. We are their Allies, and a certain amount of politeness between Allies is reasonable. But it is interesting that much of the main support has come from air force commanders, who are inclined to support anybody who supports a manned aircraft. It is comparable with (and I shall have to be careful with the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough) the position of those people who have a very strong devotion to the Navy and its deployment.
But the argument that the bomber will always get through, which has been used frequently in another place and is also matched by rather excessive statements, again from the Secretary of State for Air, about clawing down enemy bombers (and the Government are continuing to boast about Lightning fighters) leads us to a position in which we find a state of complete confusion. I say this in regard to our thinking. Again, it is very difficult to be clear minded. Even with the development of Blue Steel and, one year later—which we are told is all there is 872 likely to be in it if the Government's hopes come off—of Skybolt, is that really going to redress the balance vis-à-vis the ballistic missile? I accept what the noble Earl said about the hopes that we shall get Skybolt and that there will be no strings and no double keys, one round the neck of a Royal Air Force officer and another round the neck of an American officer, and that it will in fact carry a British warhead. But we still have not got it; and the Americans have not yet, so far as I know, completely decided that this is going to be part of their policy. If we do not get it, then the final residue of our nuclear deterrent contribution will be in ruins.
My Lords, we now have to consider, not what is going to happen this year only, but what is going to happen in 1970 or, according to the First Lord, in 1990 in regard to some matters. The truth of the matter is that the Government have no idea at all. They have no idea what might replace the manned bomber when it has served its usefulness. Another aspect of this blindness which has been shown in our national planning and thinking is in regard to the development of atomic weapons by other Powers. This is a genuine dilemma. The longer we go on, the harder it will be to head off the French. It may well be argued that nothing will head off President de Gaulle, but we are not making any attempt on this subject. We are making no attempt whatsoever, other than in the attempt to get agreement with regard to general disarmament, to stop or to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons.
We then come to General Norstad's statement in which he talks about putting nuclear weapons into N.A.T.O.; and the Government have, very rightly, not made up their minds on this point. It is a matter which we shall have to face up to. I must say, speaking personally—and I emphasise that this is a personal point of view—that I am not ready yet to oppose, in all circumstances, the idea of the strategic deterrent being part of the N.A.T.O. setup. But it is certainly too early to think about it now, and it is certainly not right at the moment to think of it as part of the European, or SACEUR, Command in N.A.T.O. Why should N.A.T.O., or SACEUR, to be more exact, need it? 873 I should like to know what might be its use.
Here we come to the problem of distinguishing between strategic and tactical weapons. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, I think, adjured us last night to try to avoid talking about "nuclear" or "tactical" weapons. Unfortunately, the beastly things must have some sort of name, and we must therefore go on calling them something. I quite accept the statement, which I think was made in another place by the Government, that a tactical weapon is a weapon which, at that moment, you use tactically, and that a strategic weapon is one that you use strategically; and that this is perfectly clear so far as things like Polaris are concerned. But the difficult), is for the other side to distinguish. To put it mildly, it would be very difficult for a potential enemy tracking a Polaris into his own territory to distinguish between the military interdiction and a strategic onslaught. I think we might find it rather difficult to expect him to refrain from strategic retaliation, even if he himself were to call it military interdiction. I think, for this reason, that the use of Polaris on land must be "out" so far as Europe is concerned. I say this very reluctantly, because I have prejudices on this matter. I think that probably the future of the Western deterrent may well lie in the Polaris submarine under American control.
Here again, we have a statement on the use of these nuclear weapons from a Government spokesman:
We believe it is essential N.A.T.O. forces should be seen to have mobile conventional forces and nuclear weapons from the smallest yield to the highest and that we should have the capability of using them in tactical interdiction or in strategical.What does this mean, and how can we regard the Government as having a clear policy when we have statements of this kind, again, I may say, from the Secretary of State for Air?I should like to touch briefly on the equipment of our Forces in Germany with regard to so-called tactical nuclear weapons. We know that the Army is under strength; the noble Earl made a rather shy admission of that. There are some rather stronger figures which I could produce. But it is a fact, which has been testified to by many people, that our Forces in Germany are exces- 874 sively dependent on short-range nuclear weapons, whether they be the 8-inch Howitzer or Honest John or the Corporal; and this is not true to the same extent of other countries. It is not true, I am told—and the Government will correct me if I am wrong—of the Americans themselves.
We understand, as has been made clear by Government spokesmen, that in the event of anything more than the smallest outbreak, these so-called tactical nuclear weapons will be called into use. This is something of which many people outside the House are extremely critical, as are other countries. It is not only a question, as someone suggested in another place, of a policeman being hit on the head in Berlin. There might be another kind of incident of the Korean type, even in Europe. There might be something in Greece; there might be something in North Norway, which is wide open in the event of a change in Russian policy. I do not think it is likely to happen, but this situation is what shield forces are for. It is wide open to a conventional military take-over. On the other hand, I would not make the suggestion—and it is no part of the official statements of the National Executive or the leaders of the Labour Party in another place—that we can at this moment take these short-range nuclear weapons away from our troops. We cannot do so. But we think we ought to step up the so-called conventional arms, and that these tactical weapons ought to be brought further back so, that they are not automatically called into use, as would be almost hound to happen to-day, with the inevitable development of (another curious term) escalation, which would lead on to an unleashing of the full, atomic fury.
My Lords, I should like to refer shortly to this question of the strength of our forces in Germany. We are in honour bound, and have been, to maintain certain forces in Europe. The original figure was four divisions. Then it was 75,000 troops. Later, it was whittled down to, I think, 65,000; then to 55,000; and subsequently, I think, it went down to 45,000. Now the number, nominally, is 55,000, although the Government know perfectly well, and we know, that I the number does not stand at 55.000.
875 The effect of this deficiency is far greater than the simple numbers, as the noble Earl and anybody with experience of these matters knows. A fall below establishment is a far more serious thing than the simple numbers that are missing. It affects the whole efficiency of the unit. It is no good Government spokesmen saying, as they did in another place, that it is normal for our Forces to be below strength and below establishment in peace time. These troops are meant to be in Germany, available, if necessary, for immediate action. They are there as part of a shield force to give us time, and possibly to prevent the outbreak of a full, strategic, atomic war. We, unlike the Americans, are below strength, and we are not fulfilling our obligations to our Allies in this matter.
The Government have been less than frank about recruiting. Last year they said that the target was 166,000 Regulars. Now it is this year; and last year's target was apparently 160,000, according to the White Paper. Are we really likely to reach our figure? Here I was mystified by a statement made by the First Lord, when he said that two or three years ago we expected to be 40,000, or possibly, 25,000, below the minimum needed, and that in fact we are going to do very much better. What I should like to know is: was it the same minimum, or was it the minimum of the Hall Committee, which said we ought to have somewhere round 200,000 or 220,000 Regular troops? I do not know whether, when the noble Viscount comes to reply on this, he can tell us. We should like to have some clarification.
§ THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM)My Lords, perhaps it would be convenient to say now—because when I come to reply, a lot of water will have flowed under the bridge—that it was the same minimum, the first of the alternatives put by the noble Lord.
§ LORD SHACKLETONI am grateful for that clarification. But we are, of course, faced with a dangerous situation. I am not going to go into this argument about National Service or selective service, which has already been widely canvassed. I think we are all agreed that the last thing we want is a reintro- 876 duction of National Service, and I should not be prepared, necessarily, to cross the Floor, as honourable Members in another place would, if the Government were to re-introduce National Service. Nevertheless, I believe that the Government have now to advance a little nearer to this bridge which they are refusing to cross. We have got as far as hearing that the Government might be prepared to face a reduction in medical and educational standards—this, I think, is an alarming prospect—and there have been suggestions, too, of more recruiting from colonial territories. I have no objection at all to recruiting from colonial territries; the only trouble is that it is apt to be extraordinarily expensive.
The Government must now take what I believe is the only way to attempt to meet our present commitments, and that is to put a tremendously greater effort behind increased mobility. A three-fold increase in the air-lift potential since Suez (I think it was) is not enough. We are told that it will be six times in an emergency. I do not know whether that means that Coastal Command will be brought into use again, whether it means the use of charter aircraft, or what it means.
§ LORD SHACKLETONI see. In other words, in an emergency, for a short period, they would be able to get this six-fold increase. My Lords, we have discussed this matter previously, and we know that the lift is still quite inadequate. We have had the figures with regard to "Operation Starlight", and the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Harding of Petherton, had some strong things to say on this subject earlier. We were told it was only 175 tons lifted. That figure has now been corrected since the White Paper was published and the amended figure, if the Government are not aware of it, is 600 tons. I do not quite know how this calculation has come about.
My Lords, where is the sense of urgency? Is the Belfast due in 1964, the mid-'sixties or 1967? Now is the time when we ought to have this; and it is now—I emphasise this, for it is the burden of our criticism of the Government—that we are falling behind on our 877 commitments. It might be well to the interest of the Western defence if, instead of trying to negotiate for Skybolt, we were to negotiate for a good supply of C130 transport aircraft, so that we could spread our vital Regular troops further.
We have an improved position with regard to mobility on the Naval side. We have the development of commando carriers. Again, we shall be debating the Navy Estimates, and I hesitate to go too far in asking the question: What are our large carriers for? But I feel that here is rather a striking example of the split in Government policy, in that they have a large Navy, trained and equipped for what might be called a conventional war—namely, anti-submarine war, even if it is with nuclear submarines—while our Army is at the moment equipped for a nuclear war. I have very grave doubts whether generalised submarine warfare is likely unless we are faced again by the full force of war—or is this a possibility? Do the Government in fact visualise this as one of the developments that might happen?
My Lords, I have not time to go into this question of commitments. I do not agree with the many people who suggest that our present commitments, or many of them, are necessarily a hang-over from colonial days. The presence of our troops in Africa, wherever they may be, may well be absolutely essential to the discharge of our responsibilities under the United Nations. But the painful fact is that we have not enough to go round; and, somehow or other, we have to solve this problem. I would sum up by saying that our main criticism is that there has been, as in previous years, and still is, too much emphasis on the deterrent. II: is a painful choice to make, but what is the most important contribution we can make—and again I emphasise this—to Western defence? Where is the shortage? It is surely not in regard to nuclear weapons: it is in regard to forces in the field. When the Government say that the main framework has not changed, I would reply that it has changed critically, and that our policy, or the carrying out of the policy, has not been adjusted to it.
My Lords, among many requirements we had was a reform of our Defence organisation from Mr. Duncan Sandys. I repeat what I think many noble Lords suspect: that this is a bit of a scramble 878 between the Services. This year, the Navy has got a bit more and the Air Force a bit less. It may be very difficult keeping these three Services going, but could not the Government contrive to take just a little wider look and study the situation against the background of our commitments to our Allies? Much of this difficulty clearly springs—and I say this in all sincerity—from the Government's fundamental unwillingness to face their relationship with Europe. We know that many of them believe in interdependence, and no one more so than the noble Earl who opened the debate today. But we still get statements like: "Our part of the air defence of Europe will remain under British sovereignty, and we can withdraw our fighters whenever we like."
The criticisms which are made are criticisms based on the need to judge coldly what is best for our country, and what is best for the world. I think we should concentrate further on improving N.A.T.O. There have been many criticisms of N.A.T.O., but here, my Lords, is a great Alliance: something of which we as a country should be very proud, and something which has played a unique part, in a way no other alliance in all history, I believe, has played, in preserving the sort of ideals of democracy for which we stand in this country. This country has played a tremendous part in building up N.A.T.O. I think perhaps our greatest contributions have not necessarily been only in the outward display of overwhelming force; they have also been in tactical spheres, staff work, and so on.
We have played a major part, but what is the balance that is best for the Western Alliance? The criticism which we have made is too wide, and has come from too many sources to be put down purely to Party political rancour. We know that the Government carry a heavy responsibility. The noble Earl has said that we get "a little jam to-day" and that we shall get some more to-morrow. The question is: have we enough jam at the moment, or enough material forces to deal with the situation? We were not ready at the time to cope with Suez. I am not going to go into the merits of Suez; but we know from the events which transpired that we were not ready. We in the Opposition—and this is one of the main reasons why we put down our 879 Amendment—believe that the Government have not only failed in their duty to ensure that we are ready to play our part in the Western Alliance now, but have also failed to produce any effective plans for the future.
§ VISCOUNT HAILSHAMMy Lords, it may be convenient if we interrupt the debate at this stage. My noble friend has a statement to make, and I would ask the House to consider this course.