THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

HL Deb 19 July 1961 vol 233 cc670-82

3.30 p.m.

Debate resumed.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF HOME)

My Lords, not even the studied care which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, employed in his review of world affairs, nor the measured language which he used when he described current events, nor the wider tour round the world which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Rea, could conceal from your Lordships that we are living in a situation which can be described only as one of international anarchy. When the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and myself are added up to-morrow, they will be found to contain a catalogue of violence, of threats, of coups d'état, of incitement to rebellion, of the use of force, from which few areas of the world are exempt; and these incidents, breaking out like a disease across the face of the world, are making a mockery of the claim of twentieth century man to have devised an international code of conduct which could be called the code of the good neighbour. The Congo, Cuba, Korea, Kuwait, Angola, Algiers, South Vietnam—all these areas are involved in conflicts of one kind and another which entangle others outside their own borders. And, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has reminded us, one false step over Berlin could easily plunge the Continent of Europe into war.

Part of this turbulence is explicable. Many new nations have emerged into independence before they had been properly prepared, at any rate before they had found their international legs—and we therefore could expect outbreaks of nationalism, and even racialism, before countries had learnt the responsibilities which go with independence and with power. But far the largest share of the responsibility for the breakdown in law and order which is evident all over the world to-day must be laid at the door of international Communism. My Lords, it was the deliberate finding of the Conference of World Communist Parties in Moscow in November that civil strife, wherever it occurred, should be exploited in the interests of the final victory of the Communist Party. If that is not a direct incitement to discord and riot, I do not know what is.

That is bad; but, even so, local disputes, however violent, could be settled if the conciliation machinery of the United Nations was allowed to operate according to the spirit of the Charter. But in order to make chaos doubly sure, the Communist Parties decided, simultaneously with their resolution about the exploitation of civil strife, on the all-pervading use of the veto, transferring it from the Security Council in the United Nations right through the whole structure of the United Nations itself—and, indeed, associating it with any bodies connected with the United Nations.

In such a world, as the noble Lord, Lord Rea, has pointed out to us, Britain has to try to steer a true course, to find a principle of international conduct and to apply it consistently. If I may respond to him, I think I would name the principle thus: that we should use the influence of our country everywhere to maintain international law and order. Because upon law and order depends political stability, and upon political stability in the world depends, ultimately, the peace. It has been—and, indeed, it is—our philosophy and our practice to try in our own country, and in the territories for which we are responsible, to maintain law and order as the basis of political stability. It is our belief that there is no other way in which civilised nations can live together unless it be by observing the sanctity of treaties and agreements freely made.

Then, again, if I may name another principle in response to Lord Rea, I think it would be this: that we have never insisted on the status quo—never in our own country, whose history has been, throughout all the years, one of peaceful change; nor in our Colonies; nor in our Commonwealth partnership. But if there is to be change, then it must be change by consent. So when the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party in this House asks me on what principle we operate, that is my answer: that the weight of this country should be thrown behind the maintenance of law and order in international affairs.

My Lords, that sequence of values—law and order, the sanctity of agreements and change by consent—has proved of good value to 'ourselves, and I think experience tells us that it has a much wider validity. It was that code of conduct which brought us to act only a few weeks ago, when Kuwait was threatened with what I can only describe as an attempt at snatch and grab. The propagandists are already questioning our action, and so I should like to remind the House, if I may, of the sequence and order of events. On June 19 Britain signed an Agreement with the Ruler which took 'account of the Kuwait Government's sole responsibility for the affairs of their country. Kuwait's independence had already been recognised by a number of countries, including Iraq, and this Agreement with the United Kingdom confirmed the independence beyond doubt. Under that Agreement we had told the Ruler that if he asked for assistance in the case of danger, then we would come to his help.

A week later, on June 25, the Prime Minister of Iraq declared Kuwait to be part of the Province of Basra. He said the Ruler of Kuwait was the Iraqi Governor, and that he would be punished if he misbehaved. Iraq had enough troops already within reach of the Kuwait frontier to overrun it without reinforcement, but information reached Kuwait that those troops were in fact reinforced by a tank regiment which was moved to near the locality of the frontier. Language and action could scarcely have been plainer, and the Ruler of Kuwait, if he was to save his city without a bloody battle in the streets, and to prevent war, was almost bound to ask for our assistance, which he did.

The rest of the story is familiar to the House. I would say only this: that. having undertaken the obligation, and having received the request, Her Majesty's Government had to act with speed and with decision—and both were done. In the event, my Lords, in this matter of dispute in an area which, as the noble Lord, Lord Rea, has said, is traditionally inflammable, not one drop of blood was shed, and the independence of Kuwait was secured. I would associate myself with what the noble Lord has said about the performance of the Services. So often they get the raps that it is right that they should be commended when, as in this case, they really have done a magnificent job.

My Lords, I said that the propagandists were busy. When I see the accounts of our motives in going to Kuwait, I marvel at the imagination and really boggle at the malice, because those are the only words by which I can describe such distortions as this, when it is said that the reaffirmation of the independence of Kuwait is an act of imperialism. It is said that we went to Kuwait in order to ensure our oil supply. Since when has it become a crime to see that the food and raw materials on which the world's population depends can be freely transported around the world without payment of ransom to the highwayman? The future is difficult to forecast, so far as Kuwait and the protection of the Ruler's security is concerned, because there are a number of questions which I cannot answer to the House to-day. I cannot say whether the Arab League is going to elect Kuwait a member. I cannot say, if the membership of Kuwait comes before the Security Council again, whether Russia will veto it or not. All I would say, in response to Lord Henderson's questions, is this: that none is keener than the United Kingdom to find solid international guarantees upon which the Ruler can really rely for his security. When he is confident that he is secure and that the threat is over, then the United Kingdom can withdraw.

It was our desire for law and order and political stability which led us consistently to support the United Nations in the Congo. After months of indescribable confusion, there is some improvement to report. The relationship between the Leopoldville Government and the United Nations is better. There is a closer working arrangement between the United Nations forces and the Congolese army, and, in fact, training schemes are going to be devised which will improve the quality and the responsibility of the Congolese forces. But the central problem still remains, and it is one which only the Congolese can settle for themselves. What is lacking is a Government of national unity. There is, therefore, a need—and I have said this before in this House—for the provincial leaders to come together and to agree upon a political structure which will result in a united Congo. Month after month we have had to watch this process, and by our Western standards it is exasperatingly slow. But it is being clone by Africans, and Africans have to take their own time, and therefore we must exercise patience. There is a chance for a settlement and a chance of co-operation between the different factions.

But just at this moment, when it seemed that Parliament might be recalled, when it seemed that the different provincial leaders might come together and arrange a political settlement for themselves, a mission has been flown in from Moscow to Stanleyville. This is horribly reminiscent of the opportunism of Russia twelve months ago when the strife in the Congo started, and of the carelessness which Russia showed at this time for the true welfare of the Africans, which is, above all, to avoid the ideological war being imported into the countries of Africa. Russia will carry the heaviest responsibility if, at this time when success and co-operation seem possible, they intervene in order to set the different factions of the Congo once more at enmity with each other.

My Lords, may I go from Africa to Asia, and to the Laotian situation, which Lord Henderson again mentioned? Britain's sole interest is to assist a settlement which will enable Laos to be genuinely neutral and which will prevent any attempt by outside Powers to intervene in their internal affairs. It is the same principle, if I may respectfully say so to Lord Rea, that I mentioned earlier. Our sole interest is to see law and order and political stability in this country without interference from outside. Again there is some progress to record. First of all, there is a cease-fire. Secondly, the International Control Commission is back in Laos, although I must report to the House that it is hampered in its activities because the Pathet Lao are preventing its going into their territory except at their own request. But there is also a Conference in being at Geneva, and although it appears that there is deadlock, there are certain indications that I can give to your Lordships that an agreement might be possible. First of all, the delegations have declared that, if there is a declaration by Laos that it wishes to be neutral, that declaration will be respected by every member of the Conference. Secondly, I believe it will be possible, if there is a declaration by the Laotians that all the forces they need are forces for internal security, that that too would be respected by the members of the Conference.

But this raises the question whether declarations are enough, and in the present situation it is clear that they are not, because it is uncertain, unless there is some independent supervision, whether outside nations will respect the independence of Laos and whether they would observe the ceiling on armaments which might be agreed. Therefore, the essence of the matter is this: the freedom of the International Control Commission, first of all, to investigate incidents, and secondly, to report them, probably to the co-chairmen of the Conference. I am bound to say, looking at the present, that the Communist forces have been uncooperative. The Government side in Laos has given complete co-operation and is willing to have complete inspection everywhere. That cannot be said of the Pathet Lao. But, nevertheless, there is a cease-fire, and, broadly, the International Control Commission reports that the cease-fire holds.

Looking ahead to the future role of the International Control Commission, no one wants to see it invested with such powers that it can overrule and infringe the sovereignty of an independent, neutral Laos—of course not. It must co-operate with the Government of Laos, because the whole point is to help it to be neutral and unaligned. But, nevertheless, after confidence has been so badly shaken, as it has been over these last few months, declarations of intent are not enough. Agreement must be seen to be kept, and Laos must be seen to be genuinely neutral; hence the importance of the role of the International Control Commission. I very much hope that, after more consideration, the Russians and the Chinese will agree to give the International Control Commission, not excessive powers—no one wants that—but adequate powers, to convince the world that Laos can be genuinely neutral.

As in the Congo, so in that country, what is really lacking is a National Government. The three Princes have had one meeting and they will shortly have another, and it will make a great difference to the chances of success in the Geneva Conference if they are able to appear at Geneva as one delegation representing their country and its need. So I have always felt that this might be one area in which we could come to an agreement with the Russians, because I should have thought it is here that Russia's national interest and our national interest and the interest of the West coincide. And so we must persevere in these negotiations.

The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, mentioned another Conference at present sitting in Geneva—indeed, it has been sitting there for some time—that is, the Conference dealing with the abolition of nuclear tests. Again I have felt that this is an area in which we must persevere to the limit to come to an agreement with Russia, because surely it is one where the national interest of Russia and the interests of the West should coincide. It cannot be in Russia's interests to see the spread of nuclear weapons, least of all to Germany on the one side and to China on the other. But the negotiations, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, indicated, have not foundered on substance.

The West came to Geneva with a number of very important concessions to the Russian point of view, and already the differences were very narrow—concessions on the moratorium and on the number of on-sight inspections, concessions which we thought would meet the Russian's point of view; but they were never considered. Instead two demands were made; first, that unless the Russian version of a settlement was accepted in its entirety, the question of nuclear tests should be absorbed into that of general disarmament; and, secondly, that the whole control system required for the abolition of nuclear tests should be subject to the Troika, the new Communist doctrine whereby every member would have the right of veto. And I would emphasise to your Lordships that this veto would not only operate in the political machinery which was set up to govern any nuclear test arrangements but, in the eyes of the Russians, it would operate through the whole administrative machine. This was a severe set-back.

But that was not all. There was another set-back. I do not know whether your Lordships read with care the aide-mémoire sent by Mr. Khrushchev to President Kennedy on the matter of disarmament, but one sentence in it reads like this: So long as States maintain their armed forces, no control can be free from intelligence; when the armed forces are abolished and armaments are destroyed, then, only, control will not he connected with intelligence. In other words, what Mr. Khrushchev says in this aide-mémoire is that, until armaments are completely abolished, all inspection and control must amount to espionage and therefore it cannot be entertained.

If those words are taken literally—and the Russians choose their words with care—and if they are not departed from, this means that there can be no phased disarmament at all. I do not know whether your Lordships can think of any other way in which we can disarm, but I cannot think of any other way, except of disarmament by stages, and disarmament by stages in which at any given stage no nation would have an advantage over any other. This is an illustration which I would give now. Having negotiated in one way or another with the Russians on these matters for a year, after years of negotiation, this new doctrine of the Troika is interposed. It would result in this. We may devise the best disarmament scheme in the world, with the most perfect scheme of inspection, but it would mean that anyone, even at the lowest level, on instructions privately given, could frustrate the whole scheme.

I have reluctantly come to one conclusion, and that is that in this matter of nuclear tests and disarmament it is at present too great a wrench for the Russians to open their closed shop and their closed military circle to inspection, and that so far this consideration has overridden the other national interest, which is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. But so much is at stake, as both the noble Lords who have preceded me have said, that we must persevere and mobilise world opinion in favour of a separate nuclear test treaty and staged disarmament. And in that I agree that the agreement which we achieved at the Prime Ministers' Conference—and, after all, there are unaligned and uncommitted nations within the Commonwealth. The document which they produced, and which since then has been sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for distribution, is a document which we can use with great influence on the Assembly of the United Nations. I still hope the Russians may change their minds.

Difficult and dangerous and frustrating as the situations I have described may have been, none is so threatening as that concerning Berlin. Of course, the situation of the city of Berlin is abnormal, and abnormal it must remain so long as half the people of the country are prevented from saying in a free vote how they wish their country to be governed. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has recalled the proposals put forward in 1959 for the reunification of Germany by free elections within a framework of European security. That scheme is mentioned, as noble Lords may have noticed, in the American reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire. That scheme offered self-determination, and offered the Germans the right to decide the shape of their country's future, but it was rejected. Therefore, we are left with the abnormal situation, because the Russians refuse to put into practice the self-determination which they so assiduously press upon other people.

Clearly, the two parts of Germany cannot be united by force, but an opportunity must be given to them at some time to declare their wishes for the future, and that opportunity kept open. Meanwhile, we are faced with the assertion of Mr. Khrushchev that he will sign a separate peace treaty with the East German Government. Of course, he has the physical power to do so. If he wishes to do so, this is a matter for him and it is his own affair, so long as he realises that the conclusion of a peace treaty by Russia with East Germany—and this is a point which all the replies to Mr. Khrushchev emphasised—cannot by itself make any legal difference to the right of the Allies to be in Berlin. That is not a matter Which Mr. Khrushchev can decide. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, says, "Do not let us stand on our legal rights, which may be weaning thin," but, of course, the right of occupation, a right deriving from the assumption with the Russians of responsibility for the whole of Germany, which followed the German surrender, is not the only right. We are there in West Berlin for another reason, and a very good one—because the West Berliners want us to stay. And if Mr. Khrushchev, or anybody else, has any doubt about that, it can easily be proved again.

LORD REA

My Lords, I was not suggesting that that was the case. I was merely asking that it should be made clear that it was not.

THE EARL OF HOME

My Lords, I think that I have responded to what the noble Lord said. So far as we are concerned, the position is very simple. Although we are content with the present position in Berlin and do not think that there is any need for change, we have never insisted upon the status quo. But I repeat what I said in the general context only a few moments ago: if there is to be a change in Berlin, then it must be a change by consent, and a change by the agreement of the Four Powers upon whom the responsibility for the whole of Germany is laid. We have never said, and we do not say in the Notes in reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire, that we will not meet round the table with the Russians and talk and negotiate. What we have said is that in respect of West Berlin three essentials must be secured: the right of West Berliners to preserve their free way of life—that way they have chosen; the right of the Allies to be present in the city so that we may guarantee the West Berliners' freedom; and the right of unrestricted access to the city.

Sometimes Mr. Khruschev seems to concede these points and to recognise their validity. I noted with considerable interest a speech which he made only a few days ago to the military graduates. I should like to read to your Lordships one of the quotations (it is not the only one) from that speech. He said: The Socialist countries do not encroach upon the right of West Berliners freely to determine the social and economic order under which they want to live. Nobody is going to create obstacles to access to West Berlin. That is much nearer the language of diplomacy and reason. But in another breath Mr. Khruschev says: The control of access to West Berlin must remain in the hands of the East German Government. I will say no more about this now except that there are exchanges going on and that I should like to hear more about what Mr. Khruschev has in mind in this speech about guarantees and guarantors. I hope he will read with great care the replies which we have sent.

The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has made several suggestions as to what might be considered in the context of a negotiation about Germany and Berlin. I am not going to comment on the individual proposals that he made, for obvious reasons. I would say only this at this moment: that I think for the time being we have had enough of public speeches which tend to freeze the position and raise tension. In other words, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said (and I paraphrase his actual language) we are in danger of becoming prisoners of our own pronouncements and of a rigidity growing up from which no one can escape and which might possibly lead us into war. Therefore I should like to revert to the quiet, serious, patient techniques of diplomacy, free from the threat of force or from the use of force. I should hope that if we can treat this Berlin issue in that way we might find a peaceful solution.

I do not enjoy at all the kind of speech that I have had to make to your Lordships this afternoon: a "Cook's tour" of the trouble spots of the world, and no difficulty in finding them in every continent in the world. I do not enjoy making speeches from this box as Foreign Secretary in which I have to expose the differences between Russia and this country and Russia and the West. I believe that we all want to be friends with Russia. Certainly our people showed in the great welcome which they gave to Major Gargarin how much we wish to be friends with the Russians, if they will be friendly with us. I would go further and say to the noble Lord, Lord Rea, that there is a great desire to deal fairly with Russia's legitimate desires, her legitimate aspirations as a nation, and to take account of her legitimate fears—and some of her fears may be very legitimate indeed.

But it is my duty, however painful it may be, to repeat what I have said before: that there is a duality in Russian policy of which this country must take note. Time and again there is a Russian national interest which you would think would prevail; but time and again it is overborne by the doctrine of international Communism. And one has to remember that even the most flexible of the Russian leaders cannot deviate very far from the Communist doctrine without risking losing his place in the Communist hierarchy. So I must do two things. I must warn the people that there is a challenge from Communism on an unparalleled scale, which will be pursued quite relentlessly and will demand endurance from our people over a very long time.

I am not going to talk about the economic situation to-day, but I remember something like a year ago making a speech in this House—it was my first speech as Foreign Secretary—and saying that our authority and influence in the world would depend upon the economic foundation on which it rests, and that the people could have the foreign policy which they desired. That is still true. But if I have to give that warning, at least I will give this assurance to the House and to the country as we part for our Recess: that the Government will persevere in trying to find areas of agreement where the Russian interests and the interests of the West coincide.

All the way through this speech that I have made to-day there has been a refrain recurring in almost every section of it—namely, the theme of law and order; of negotiation; of change by consent. I hope that when the House reassembles, although the outlook is not propitious to-day, I shall be able to report some progress based upon those principles, because it is upon law and order, upon the sanctity of treaties, upon change by consent, that the only basis can be found on which civilised people can build any international harmony.

LORD KILLEARN

My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down may I put a point? I do not want to abuse his patience, but may I remind him of a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rea, about Indonesia, and ask whether he is disposed to say anything about it; because I personally share to the full the views of the noble Lord, Lord Rea, in regard to the political and other importance of that area?

THE EARL OF HOME

I will respond immediately to that by saying that I am sorry I did not mention this particular question, but we have only a few days ago had very useful discussion with General Nasution who was here. It is our desire to keep on good terms with Indonesia and to develop our relations with Indonesia. I hope that those discussions will make some progress, just as I hope the very useful discussions I had with the Foreign Minister of Japan will contribute to better understanding and co-operation between our two countries. My noble friend Lord Lansdowne will have more to say about this, but that is my short response to the noble Lord.