HL Deb 19 July 1961 vol 233 cc652-69

2.38 p.m.

LORD HENDERSON rose to call attention to the international situation; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. The international situation confronting us to-day is one which I think must give all of us cause for deep concern. It is a sad fact that, contrary to the hopes of those who thought that the election of Mr. Kennedy to the Presidency of the United States would lead to a new unity of purpose in the West and to a conciliatory response from Mr. Khrushchev, the world situation contains more dangers to-day than it did a year ago.

The first meeting between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev may have served to give each a better insight into the mind of the other; but instead of developing understanding and conciliation, the one concrete result that came out of it was in the form of a political time bomb handed to the President by Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev's aide-mernoire on Germany and Berlin was bound to create an atmosphere of crisis; the Soviet Government must have known very well that such would be the result. The Soviet objective was stated in summary terms by Mr. Khrushchev himself in his television broadcast after his return from Vienna. He declared that the Peace Treaty with Germany must be signed before the end of 1961, and added that, when a Peace Treaty has been signed, countries wanting to maintain connections with West Berlin will have to negotiate them with the Government of the German Democratic Republic. This is the real crux of the dispute between the two sides which may flare up into a grave crisis before the year is out.

We have all been able to read the Note which the British Government have given to Soviet Russia in reply to their aide-memoire. It states the Western position on Berlin with a firmness and clarity that we shall all approve. Joint four-Power responsibility for Greater Berlin is set out clearly in various Agreements. The fact that the Soviet Government has incorporated in East Germany the sector of Berlin for which it was responsible does not invalidate the Agreements, and does not affect the legal rights and obligations under the Agreements. The incorporation was itself an illegal act. The statement in the British Note that the status of Berlin cannot he altered without the agreement of all four interested Governments cannot, surely, be controverted. I think Her Majesty's Government were right in their Note to call both Soviet and world attention to the fact that the City of Berlin does not belong to the Soviet Union, nor to the so-called German Democratic Republic. I do not believe that there is a single Member of your Lordships' House who is not completely steadfast in support of the right of the West Berlin population to be free to decide their own way of life and to have uninterrupted communications with the outside world; and of the right of the Western Allies to station limited troops, or limited forces, in West Berlin, and freely to exercise the right of access to which they are entitled.

Mr. Khrushchev has said that West Berlin should be established as a Free City. But it cannot be free if access to the outside world is to be at the discretion and courtesy of the East German regime. In the light of the Berlin blockade I find it difficult to understand how the Soviet Government could imagine that the West would submit to a situation in which the legal status of Berlin is destroyed by the unilateral action of one of the partners to the Agreement, and the right to deny or control access between West Berlin and the outside world is given to the Russian-maintained regime in Pankow.

It may be desirable—I think it is—to negotiate a new statute for West Berlin, as was attempted in 1959. But negotiations now, as then, would have to be between the same four Powers. I hope that the Soviet Government will not ignore the statement in the British Note that Her Majesty's Government have accepted the possibility of practical arrangements intended to improve the present position in Berlin until such time as an overall solution can he given to the German problem. Such practical arrangements were discussed in 1959 and related, among other things, to the fixing of a ceiling for Western troops in West Berlin, reciprocal arrangements to control what were called "activities" which would be likely to cause a breach of public order and the carrying out by East German personnel of all functions connected with access procedures. It is my view that the West should definitely propose new negotiations. They can stand firmly by their essential rights as well in negotiations as in Notes. They should not leave the Soviet Government in any doubt as to their readiness to do so, and so allow the Soviet leaders to turn an artificial crisis into a real crisis.

The question of a solution of the larger problem of Germany is a far more difficult matter. As the British Note states, effort after effort has been made to get agreement between East and West that would lead, through free elections, to an all-Germany Government with which to make a Peace Treaty, as was envisaged in the Potsdam Agreement. The Russians say that the absence of a Peace Treaty is a cause of tension in Europe. I would say that the absence of mutual confidence is a cause of the failure to get a Peace Treaty.

My Lords, there have been occasions when I have felt that we in the West have failed to understand how deep are the genuine fears of German militarism which exist in the minds of the peoples of Eastern Europe, especially those of Russia and Poland, who saw their cities overrun and their families killed by the million. On the other hand, I doubt whether the rulers of Russia realise the fears and anxieties which were aroused in the Western World by their blockade of Berlin, which inspired the first serious post-war suspicions of the power policy of the Soviet Union. It is my personal view that that cynical and ruthless action was the real father of N.A.T.O. and of the race in armaments that has bedevilled world affairs ever since.

The fact, as I see it, is that the achievement of unity is not within the grasp of the German people at present. The Soviet aide-memoire states that the Soviet Government does not propose any changes in Germany. It wants a Peace Treaty to record the situation that took shape in Europe after the war to consolidate de jure existing German frontiers, and to normalise West Berlin. If I read that statement correctly, it means that Soviet Russia wants its political expansion in Eastern Europe as far as the Western frontier of East Germany accepted and recognised, and it wants the Polish-German and the Czech-German frontiers as they are at present made the legal permanent frontiers. In his interview with Mr. Walter Lippmann, Mr. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Government would not accept a non-Communist Germany, and that the West would not accept a Communist Germany. The West's position is as set out in the British Note—namely, that their proposals have been directed towards the reunification of Germany in freedom and by stages, and Mr. Khrushchev knows that the end result would be a non-Communist Germany.

Despite the discouraging prospect with which we are faced, the West should persist in efforts to lessen the causes of tension in Central Europe. I person- ally regret the cavalier way in which the West German Chancellor has brushed aside the serious proposal made by Herr Willy Brandt, the Chief Burgomaster of West Berlin, for the convening of a Peace Conference of all the 52 countries who had by 1944 entered into war with Hitler Germany. While none of us could feel confident that such a conference would bring about an immediate settlement of the dispute, it would nevertheless serve to involve in the settlement of the German problem many countries whose practical sympathy and understanding might help towards a solution.

I also regret that since Mr. Macmillan returned from his visit to Moscow in 1959, nothing more has been heard of the proposal to discuss the idea of limitation of arms and armaments in an agreed area of Central Europe. Nothing has weakened my conviction that the Berlin problem can be securely settled only within the framework of a broader European settlement which will involve some form of disengagement and some sort of limitation of armaments, with effective control over East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as the creation of a nuclear-free zone.

It is probably true that in present circumstances progress along these lines may not be possible and that the achievement of German reunification will have to be delayed indefinitely. We may have to be content, for the present, with seeking an agreement limited to West Berlin. That will be a good thing to get. We must all hope that Mr. Khrushchev has not become a prisoner of his own pronouncements. It is little use his talking about the vital need for peace and then recklessly endangering for it must be obvious to him, as it is to the Western Governments, that if he carried through his plan it would lead to "a most serious situation". He must realise that his demand, "Agree to what I want or I will do it without your agreement", is a bad substitute for negotiations. The whole world recognises that hard bargaining is far better than hard fighting. It is for Mr. Khrushchev to return to the path of genuine negotiation.

I turn now to the question of nuclear tests. All of us must regret that the Geneva nuclear test ban talks appear to have reached complete deadlock. I can recall Soviet insistence that nuclear tests should be dealt with apart from general disarmament. Some of us pressed the Government to accept this point of view. We urged that separate negotiations should be conducted to bring an end to nuclear tests. The voluntary moratorium on tests created a helpful atmosphere. Progress towards an agreement was slow, but there was progress. I think there was more promise of agreement on the banning of tests than in any other field of disarmament discussions. Noble Lords may remember that I have on more than one occasion expressed my belief that success in this particular field may provide a breakthrough to wider disarmament agreements.

I was one of those who felt that, despite the difficulties which had to be overcome, the three Governments involved in the talks all wanted an agreement. I was particularly convinced of this when at the resumed discussions in March of this year the new American Administration came forward with significant new proposals which seemed to open the way to a solution of most of the outstanding points at issue. The American proposals made seven important concessions to the Soviet point of view. They were constructive concessions. But instead of producing a favourable response from the Soviet Government, the conference was confronted with a new attitude and policy from the Russian side which indicated that the Soviet Government had gone into reverse, and in particular had gone back on its agreement to a single impartial administrator of the control system. It insisted on the application of the Troika principle to the control administration; suggested that even after a treaty had been signed, the control commission should not begin operations until a further four years had passed, and then, as an alternative to getting a treaty now, proposed that the Geneva negotiations be merged in the general disarmament negotiations, which have yet to be agreed upon, thereby postponing the achievement of a test ban treaty into the indefinite future. This cynical set back I believe will create depression and disappointment throughout the world.

I urge again two points which I raised with the noble Earl, the Foreign Secretary, a month ago: that the Western Governments should not become responsible for ending the Geneva talks and should not be first to break the existing moratorium on the tests. Both points are of vital importance. To do either would, I believe, be a grave mistake. And we welcome the decision of the two Allied Governments to ask the Secretary-General to place before the United Nations General Assembly in September an item on the urgent need for a properly controlled ban on nuclear tests. The Foreign Secretary is right not to weary in his efforts to get a properly controlled ban, and he will be taking a useful and worthwhile step to mobilise world opinion in its support.

We want the talks to go on, we want the tests suspension to continue and we want effective steps to be taken to begin negotiations on general disarmament once more. There are, it must be admitted, obvious difficulties. The Ten-nation Disarmament Commission broke down in failure when the Soviet Union and her four Communist associates walked out of the conference, but in my view it would be wrong to conclude that no progress was made in the Ten-nation conference talks or that no further progress is possible. There is no doubt that the revised proposals which were put foward by Mr. Khrushchev on June 3, 1960, and the American plan put forward on June 21, 1960, represented significant moves by both sides to concede points which had been made during the course of earlier exchanges. These two sets of 'proposals could provide the starting point for new negotiations, which should also have regard to the statement on disarmament which issued from the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference earlier this year.

My Lords, the immediate urgency is to find an agreed forum in which the talks can recommence, and in this connection I want to urge that the Government should associate themselves with the proposals that have been made for bringing some of the neutral powers into the next round of disarmament talks. One can hardly think of a situation less likely to lead to concessions than a commission consisting of five persons drawn from one side and five from the other, with neither a neutral chairman nor neutral participants to help to induce concessions from either side. The search for peace and disarmament is not a matter for the members of N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw pact Powers only but for all other nations who are not committed to the two-Power structure. I hope the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary will be able to give some indication of the Government's attitude to the renewal of disarmament discussions.

My Lords, the adoption by the Soviet Union of the Troika principle and the thesis as expanded by Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Walter Lippmann, that while there may be neutral nations there can be no neutral men, presents a threat not only to the establishment of a control system for tests and general disarmament but also to the future functioning of the United Nations itself. To accept this principle would be to condemn to total ineffectiveness the one organisation which offers the greatest hope for the peace of the world. We hope that Her Majesty's Government will stand firmly against such a destructive principle. The recent committee of experts set up to advise the United Nations Secretariat were all, with the exception of Russia, opposed to the Troika principle. Mr. Roschin was in a minority of one in his campaign to get rid of Mr. Hammarskjoeld.

I agree with the Secretary-General that to apply the Troika principle would be a violation of the United Nations Charter which lays down that members of the United Nations staff should be of undivided loyalty to the United Nations. Nevertheless I think Mr. Hammarskjoeld has been right to recognise, as the experts' committee pointed out, that the Secretariat as at present constituted is unrepresentative of the member States. The present membership is almost double the original membership of the United Nations. I therefore welcome Mr. Hammarskjoeld's assurances that energetic efforts are being made so that Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe will be more fully represented on the staff, and I think his proposal to establish five assistant political secretaries, one from Russia, one from America and three from uncommitted States, is a good idea. It will help to ensure that the Secretary-General is fully in touch with the various groupings in the United Nations without undermining his right to act.

My Lords, it is of vital importance that the United Nations should in every way be strengthened at this time, in view of the challenges that may well be before us. While we may feel a sense of relief that the situation in the Congo has taken a turn for the better—and this is due very largely to the constant and strenuous efforts of members of the United Nations Secretariat, and to the loyalty of the countries which have continued to supply troops to the United Nations Forces—we must surely see that the developing situation in Angola and in South-West Africa may call for united action by the United Nations. It is my own view that many difficulties in the Congo might have been averted if the United Nations had been given a broader mandate; if it had, in fact, established an administration for the Congo by an extension of its trusteeship responsibilities. It may be that there will be a vital role for the United Nations to play, not only in helping to bring peace and prospects of independence to Angola and South-West Africa, but in providing the administration during the period of time when adequate preparations are being made for the assumption of full responsibility by the peoples of the territories concerned.

This is, perhaps, looking into the future, so far as Angola is concerned, but I must say a few words about the situation there. The whole world has been shocked by the tragic events which have occurred in the past few weeks in Angola. Our factual evidence is limited. Because of the rigid censorship of the Salazar Government we must rely largely upon the evidence provided by the Christian missionaries, and in particular by the Baptists. For my part, having seen some of the sworn testimonies of the Baptist missionaries I cannot conceive that they are wilfully painting an inaccurate picture of the situation in Angola. The Times on June 28 stated that The evidence of repressive measures has become so overwhelming lately that it is hardly possible any longer to plead ignorance and to appear neutral. The noble Earl the Foreign Secretary recently arranged for his own observers to visit Angola. I would ask him whether he has received any report from them yet, and whether he is able to give the House any information to-day on the situation.

My Lords, Dr. Salazar and his Government in Lisbon appear to have learned nothing from history. How can he imagine that the winds of change can somehow omit to blow through Portuguese territories in Africa? The African people, from North to South, and from East to West, are on the march and will not be content with anything less than real independence.

EARL WINTERTON

My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me, as one who used to know Angola, to ask him if he is aware that factual information supplied by the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph does not altogether agree with the views of the Baptist missionaries, who have said nothing about the appalling atrocities committed by the rebels in the early days of the rebellion?

LORD HENDERSON

I am sure that anybody who has taken a serious interest in the situation is well aware of the atrocities to which the noble Earl refers, and nobody would seek to excuse them. They are part of a situation arising out of a political control.

To return to what I was saying, I believe that nothing can hold up this march, and this is a point that touches upon the question that has been raised by the noble Earl. What is clear is that a Government which tries to stem or disregard the forces of history can bring upon the people of the territory concerned terrible destruction—and people of the territory, of course, include both sides. Most of the Free World has made known its view against the oppression in Angola. The United Nations, by a large majority, both in the Assembly and in the Security Council, has expressed the condemnation of world opinion. Unhappily Her Majesty's Government refrained from associating themselves with what was virtually a world-wide denunciation. It is only fair to say that the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, in reply to my noble Leader, has stated that in future the British vote would be directed to the substance of a United Nations resolution on Angola. But Her Majesty's Government have continued to take other actions which can be read by others as signs not only of friendship and respect but of condonation.

I believe that unless the Government express their view clearly and directly to the Portuguese Government—and I feel sure that the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, did not omit to do that during his recent visit—and also publicly through the United Nations, not only will the Western Alliance greatly suffer but British prestige and repute in Africa will be seriously undermined. For, above all, it is a British interest to use its moral authority in aid of those who are oppressed.

My Lords, we on these Benches have already made it clear that we consider that the Government had no other course than to respond to the appeal of the Ruler of Kuwait to go to his assistance when Iraq threatened its independence. We also expressed our satisfaction at the speedy and efficient manner in which the operation was carried through. It seems that the success of the operation was to give General Kassem time for second thoughts and to discard any immediate plans for the annexation of the newly independent State. Already it has become possible to begin the running down of our forces, which is a good thing, in view of the fact that Moscow has been casting suspicion on our motives and seeking to stir up Arab hostility.

It would be a good thing if responsibility could be taken over by the United Nations and a United Nations force, composed in the main of Arab contingents, brought in to relieve the British forces of the international task which they rightly assumed to protect Kuwait against the threat to its independence. Once the immediate threat to Kuwait's integrity has gone, the need for the presence of British forces will have ended; and it is important that a British service to peace should not develop into an embarrassment to Britain, by our over-staying our welcome.

The last area of international trouble I wish to refer to is Laos. On this I should like to congratulate the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary on his success since our last debate in getting the International Conference brought into being, and on his selection of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald as his representative. It is clear that the Communist members of the Conference are proving difficult, and that progress towards getting the Control Commission properly functioning is slow. I hope we may hear from one of the Government spokesmen during this debate what are the prospects of achieving the conditions for a settlement that will ensure peace and independence for Laos, and put an end to the civil war there.

My Lords, I have taken a good deal of time. Finally, I want to say that I will not weary your Lordships by raising the question of the Common Market which is receiving so much attention. We recently had a full debate on this matter in your Lordships' House, and since then Ministers have been on tour for discussions with Commonwealth Governments. Their return is so recent that the Cabinet may not have had time fully to consider their reports. We shall, no doubt, have a statement from the Government before Parliament rises for the Summer Recess, and I am content to leave it at that for the present. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

3.13 p.m.

LORD REA

My Lords, once more we are indebted !to the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, for bringing his Motion on Foreign Affairs before the House; and once more I think we must thank him, not for the first time or for the second, for presenting his case in a way that, I think, may be described as fair and square. In any debate on Government policy the Opposition are necessarily in the rather difficult position of having to prove a negative—a negative of commission or of omission on the part of the Government—with this further handicap that if any cards are up any sleeves, the chances are that they will be Government cards up Government sleeves.

Nevertheless, in this debate we, on this side of the House, advance to the charge in perfectly good heart, because the field is wide; and notwithstanding the record of our Foreign Secretary who, on occasions, makes things so difficult for us as an Opposition by his liberal and enlightened outlook, which of course no Tory is entitled to have—not-withstanding this most acceptable disadvantage of sometimes having our thunder stolen, !perhaps we in turn can take a leaf from the Conservative book and endorse the view—quite a recent view; I think it was expressed last month—of a Government supporter who said: I tell the Government frankly that my constituents are as doubtful as I am about what the Government is after; and perplexed by the lack of a coherent principle of European policy. That was said by a so-called Conservative supporter, abut I believe that that bewilderment exists far too widely in this country for the healthy flourishing of confidence or for the soothing of over-anxiety and of apprehension, which, as your Lordships know, can lead so easily in the international field to antagonism, from antagonism to hostility, and from hostility down the fearsome gradient to war.

It is, of course, difficult in these matters to take the public into the Government's confidence if the Government's confidence is a matter of day-to-day improvisation, for public opinion and public support will not withstand the continual jar of being jammed into forward gear and jammed into reverse gear at too short and too frequent intervals. I do not, of course, suggest that there is a premeditated continual reversal of policy; but it is difficult to see whether there is any consistency in any long-term policy, or even, indeed, what that long-term policy is, apart from the general aim of all civilised peoples and of all Parties to establish peace and prosperity and to abolish war, poverty and ignorance. Of course that goes without saying. There are to-day many international problems of what I would consider a rather simple, two-sided facet, where we really do not know where the Government stands—but we should like to know.

The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has mentioned Angola and the supply of arms there. But what is proposed about it? We appreciate that Portugal is possibly our oldest Ally and that need for diplomacy and tact is obvious. But are we frozen on a pinnacle of indecision? After all, diplomacy and humanity must go hand in hand. What encouragement or advice, or sympathy, or succour have we given to our nearest, and what I call our dearest, ally, France (for I am certainly a Francophile), in all the great troubles that she has been going through lately? Are we still manacled by expediency in the matter of bringing China into the club of the United Nations? I am sorry to have to call it a club, but it takes on some of that air, that only accepted members are inside the United Nations, which, by its very name, should surely include all nations. Is it still considered ill-timed or inappropriate to lift our veil to the obvious fact, which we do not seem to want to face, that China herself is on the verge, potentially, of being, within a few decades, the master nation on this earth?

We should like to know the Government's attitude to the suggested combination, as I understand, of South American countries in some sort of commercial combine, some sort of common market. That surely is of great importance to this country. I admit that the man in the street does not know much about South America unless he has a particular interest in the area. I should think that most men in the street would be unable to describe the difference between Cuba and Chile. Nevertheless, this area is one of vast commercial importance, as your Lordships will know. I think, too, that we have had little or no enlightenment about the foreign policy and long-term intention towards the newest of independent nations—I refer to the new State of independent South Africa, that most important country in the international balance of political influence. I hope that we shall have a fairly clear-cut explanation on that important and powerful area.

In South East Asia, apart, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson mentioned, from a sort of passing interest in Korea and Laos, and perhaps an occasional glance to Malaya and the explosive question of Formosa, it seems to me that we are most unwise and most short-sighted in not concentrating a great deal of attention and interest upon Indonesia. Indonesia is a vast country, enormously rich in existing and potential production, with an enormous and greatly increasing population—increasing indeed, at the rate of one million a year. Yet I feel it is being virtually ignored by the non-Communist Powers such as ourselves in the spectrum of future developments.

I do not want to give your Lordships a geography lesson, but you probably know that if you were to turn to a map of South East Asia, an ordinary atlas would show Indonesia as a little island down at the bottom, not looking very important. But if you transposed Indonesia on to a European map of the same scale it would run from Aberdeen, not to Northampton or to London, but to Constantinople. Indonesia, where many of us have good friends, is, I think, psychologically the victim still of an over-prolonged and nationalistic resentment of her long-past role as a political dependency. She is oversensitive, I think, and over-quick to take offence in her new, or fairly new, independence. But, basically, I feel sure that she is ready to accept the fact that she needs advice and assistance towards the immense prosperity of which she is capable, provided that such an approach is made with tact and with recognition of her sensibilities. On the top level of commercial direction and planning there is really an adequate supply of talent there, and on the manual worker level there is an inexhaustible supply of labour. But on the intermediate technical level of engineering and scientific expertise, of management and administration, there is a very great vacuum maintained even now, as I say, by what I consider to be misdirected national pride—a vacuum which I think it would pay us a hundredfold to help to fill before it is exploited by other nations who would wish to gather Indonesia into the Communist fold. We are, my Lords, I think, neglecting a very vital and very important opportunity, and we are neglecting it dangerously.

Then, my Lords, we should like to know a little more about our policy vis-à-vis the Arab States. What actually are we aiming at, and who is working with us? This sudden and apparently unscrupulous decision of Iraq that Kuwait is now a component part of Iraq is, of course, an immediate problem. We congratulate the Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said, on their prompt and efficient action, and on its success; and we extend our congratulations and thanks to the Forces on the spot, not only the commandos, but all those who have been going through such an extraordinarily uncomfortable time. But what is our long-term policy in respect of Iraq—that nation of such a very ancient civilisation—apart from the immediate question of oil? Your Lordships may remember that the Garden of Eden itself was located in Iraq, and you may remember, more sadly, that the Tree of Knowledge, which flourished there throughout the centuries, actually withered and died in 1946, only fifteen years ago. Let us hope, my Lords, that that is not a portent.

Then, of course, there is this great question of Berlin. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has covered that in a way that we on these Benches would endorse. It is at the moment a very great problem, and I do not propose to say very much about it. We are very glad, however, that Her Majesty's Government are advocating negotiation and discussion as obviously preferable to any sort of dug-in obstinacy on either side. But, in passing—and I do not take this point very heavily—I would say that I hope we shall not continue to make it a primary point, as we seem rather to have been doing, that we are there in Berlin because we have a right to be and that nobody has the right to turn us out, rather than on the merits of the case and whether it is advantageous that we should be there.

The attitude that we are there because we have a right to be there seems to me to savour too much of the nursery game "I'm King of the Castle". But, of course, the delicacy of the situation and its vital impact on things to come in the immediate future demand the most thoughtful and probably the most flexible handling. I am confident that our Foreign Secretary, in handling this difficult matter, will not be swayed at all by considerations of purely national prestige but may give thought, perhaps, to the suggestion that the United Nations Organisation should be brought into the picture in this inflammable and smouldering situation.

At the moment, of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, says, politically everything is rather overshadowed by the question of the Common Market. From the aspect of political rather than commercial desirability, the matter comes well within the range of this afternoon's debate, but I take it that we shall have other opportunities of discussing it. All I would say is, in answer to Sir Roy Welensky's recent remark that "If Britain enters the Common Market it may be the end of the Commonwealth", the reply might well be that "If Britain does not enter the Common Market it may be the end of Britain". But however the merits or demerits of this difficult question may be adjudged, we ask the Government not to lose sight of the damage which I think prolonged uncertainty is causing, and to come to the wisest decision of which they are capable in as short a time as possible.

The field for discussion on the noble Lord's Motion is, of course, almost unlimited. But I would close my remarks by saying that modern conditions have really wiped out our old reliance upon a general world stability advancing parallel with greater knowledge, greater wealth and greater intercommunication. We find ourselves involved in a cold war—a long, permanent, poisonous cold war—which I think your Lordships will agree must be eradicated from the international body politic. And in its place there must be achieved a reliable and longed-for state of peaceful co-existence. Disarmament, therefore, it seems to me, and, I believe, to other noble Lords on these Benches, takes first and foremost place; and we think it should do so in the minds and aims of all responsible nations and statesmen—total and world-wide disarmament. I mean, subject to effective inspection and control.

Of course, that last question raises a difficult point. That this is not just a pipedream or a stale and overworked pious hope is, I think, shown vividly, strikingly and convincingly by the declaration which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, referred to; the Declaration by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London on March 17 of this year. My noble friend Lord Samuel calls it to your Lordships' attention by a Motion standing in his name on the Order Paper for discussion at some future date, but I would earnestly beg your Lordships to look at that Declaration again and to read it again, because I think it is of the utmost importance.

Here is a constructive blueprint, with realistic detail, for immediate implementation towards what we all desire and what we all know to be an essential prerequisite of peaceful co-existence. Yet it seems to be neglected and overlooked, and many people seem hardly to have heard of it. The machinery for inspection and control exists, at least in embryo, in the United Nations Organisation, and to advance this to efficiency and strength is only a matter of application and determination by all the member States who, as your Lordships probably know, now number over 100.

I would urge the Government to give absolute and urgent priority to reexamination of this matter, this immensely important Declaration, and to seek every available means of initiating its implementation, however gradually, however slowly, whatever the difficulties and frustrations which are bound to accompany the emergence of a new era, the era of survival, to put it at its lowest—survival, if we can attain it, rather than the era of utter destruction and of the return of mankind to the primeval blackness of millions of years ago.