THE MIDDLE EAST

HL Deb 15 March 1956 vol 196 cc451-80

2.48 p.m.

EARL ATTLEE rose to call attention to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and in Cyprus; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion on the Paper in my name. I rise with some trepidation in your Lordships' House at making a maiden speech. If, after thirty-three years in another place, any rags of oratorical virginity still cling about me, I crave your Lordships' indulgence if I should make any mistakes or commit offences against correct procedure. I am the more disturbed by the fact that I know that on these Benches there are many noble Lords with a far greater and more intimate knowledge of the areas with which this Motion is concerned than I could possibly have. I understand that a maiden speech should be non-contentious. I may find some difficulty in observing that, but at least the substance of my Motion, that there is deterioration of the situation in these areas, will, I think, be generally approved.

I read with great interest the debate that took place in this House in December on the subject of the Middle East, and I recall that the noble Marquess the Leader of the House then made a wide survey. He said that one must see incidents in their proper proportion—I take it that that means both in space and in time. I shall endeavour not to put too great a strain on your Lordships' attention by going too far, either geographically or historically, but it is necessary that we should see recent incidents in their proper proportion. Therefore I am not intending to take your Lordships a long way back. I thought that that was admirably done in the last debate in this House by my noble friend Lord Henderson.

We have this problem of the Middle East area. I have never been able to find out who invented the term "Middle East" or what has become of the Near East, unless, indeed, the Near East is now those areas that have become satellites of the U.S.S.R. I should have preferred the old name of "the Levant" for this area. During our term of office, which was not an easy one in the international sphere, we were occupied with two major problems: one was the defence of the West after the Berlin blockade, and the building up of N.A.T.O., and the other was support of the United Nations in Korea. We realised that, apart from those East and West preoccupations, there was this large area, and we were quite sure that sooner or later the rulers of Russia, who are the inheritors not only of Lenin but of Catherine the Great, would be likely to turn their attention to these places.

To my mind, there has been taking place in Asia during these years a contest—not just a physical contest but a contest in the world of ideas—between the totalitarianism that runs right across the North from the Ural mountains to the Pacific, and the area in which we have the beginnings of democracy and freedom, the central point of which is India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, which inherits our own tradition of freedom. That is an obvious field for trouble. During our lifetime, we have seen a wave of nationalism—I might almost say "Asianism"—spreading right across Asia in various manifestations, and it is quite clear that that reaches the Middle East, right through the Arab countries. There, there are areas with a low standard of life: there, there are rather insecure Governments: there, there is the centre of Islam. And in that area there are many difficulties which certainly could not be attributed to the present Government or even the Government of which I was a member.

Not the least of the conflicting issues in that area results from the double promises given at the end of the First World War to the peoples of Israel and the Arab States. It has led to the rivalry of the dynasties of the Hashemites and the Saudis. Not to go into great detail, I realise, and always have realised, that while there is an Israel case, there is also an Arab case. I have never taken a view prejudiced in favour of one or the other. What we must obviously endeavour to do is to try to get peaceful co-existence as the beginning of a real friendship, if possible, in all that area.

Since we left office, the difficulties have increased. Various new factors have come in. I think there are two major changes. First of all, there is the advent of the hydrogen bomb, with its wide implications in the sphere of strategy. We saw that notably in respect of Egypt. At one time the protection of the Canal was thought to be of vital interest; but we had a declaration in another place from Sir Winston Churchill that the hydrogen bomb had changed all that. I think, too, it has changed the position of Cyprus—but of that a little later.

Another major change has been the great development in oil production which has put money into the hands of States formerly much impoverished. We see various uses made of this wealth. At the top, I think, stands Iraq, where 70 per cent. of this wealth is being used for the benefit of the inhabitants. In other areas it has put into the hands of rulers the possibilities of intrigue and bribery, which are not uncommon there. But it is rather a sad thought that, in all these countries, from Greece right across Arabia, which really owe their freedom to Britain, we are not so popular as we could wish to be. It is deplorable that there should be so much ill-will. I am not minimising the difficulties. One of the great difficulties is that, in dealing with affairs in the East, one is apt to depend very much on single personalities. One of the great tragedies in the whole of this question was the assassination of King Abdullah, whom I personally regarded as the wisest statesman there. We also saw the death of the work of years of Ibn Saud.

Now we come to the immediate matters which have given rise to this debate. I think there are two concerned particularly with the Middle East, and one concerned with Cyprus. We have in this Motion linked Cyprus and the Middle East because I do not think they are really severable in a broad survey of the whole field. We had the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. We must all deplore the method employed. To my mind, its importance is that Glubb Pasha, who did great work in building up the Arab Legion, was one of the great influences against rash breakings out of violence. The other has been the giving of arms from Communist countries to Egypt—modern weapons too, particularly aircraft. That makes the danger of another outbreak of war more imminent. Our interests there are, first of all, peace and the fulfilment of our obligations, both to Israel and to the Arab States. Secondly, there is the need to raise standards of life in order to remove the soil in which the seeds of Communism might sprout; and, thirdly, there are the interests of the West, both strategically and economically, in oil—an interest which we share with the United States.

I cannot think that we have been sufficiently clear in our policy. My Leader in another place set out, I felt, admirably and clearly, what should be our objectives. We need full talks with Jordan. I do not think that the sending of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was a particularly happy thought. Then, I believe, we need to get an understanding with the United States. With all friendliness to our American friends, I sometimes feel that they are apt rather to stand on the sideline and leave us to carry on the fight. They are not participators in the Baghdad Pact, the shield intended to protect the whole of that area; yet they draw more oil from what might be called the soft underbelly of that region than we ourselves do. In my time, they were not always helpful when we had to deal wit difficulties in Persia and Egypt. I think it is partly due to an outdated anti-colonialism. I am not sure that there has always been a proper link-up between the State Departments and the commercial interests of the oil firms, but certainly we need a full understanding there. We are often put to considerable difficulty over Israel, for whom there is naturally much support in the United States of America. While one would welcome an interest, one would have liked a little more responsibility.

The present position is that we see arms piling up—modern arms—in what is called the beginnings of an arms race. We all deprecate an arms race. I always think it is a little hard on the people who have not already got off the mark. We seem to allow an arms race, but then we deny any arms to the people who are far behind. No one has suggested that we need to pile up arms in Israel to create an equality in quantity with other States. What I think Israel requires is a certain amount of modern weapons, particularly aircraft, as a deterrent. I do not regard that as falling in with an arms race, any more than I regarded it as such when we formed N.A.T.O. We did not form N.A.T.O. to compete in conflict with the U.S.S.R., but in order to give adequate arms as a deterrent against a sudden attack. I feel that to-day there is great trepidation in Israel because of the piling up of these arms.

It is not my purpose this afternoon to go into all these technical questions on Israel and the Arab world, or the serious question of the refugees, because the existence of a large refugee population anywhere always makes for a ready-made agitation for violent action. But I am sure we need positive action there. We formed the Baghdad Pact—an endeavour, so to speak, to put a hard skin around this soft area: a northern tier, purely defensive—as a defence against aggression. But that defence becomes hopelessly weak if there is turmoil and disturbance behind it.

That brings me to the Cyprus question. It seems to me that when forming the Baghdad Pact, great consideration ought to have been given to the Cyprus question, because here was a possible bone of contention between two of the greatest participants in the Baghdad Pact—Greece and Turkey, both of whom were good friends of ours. In my view, the Cyprus question ought to have been faced then. To-day, we are faced with a tragic position. We must all be disturbed at the murders which are going on there, and at the terrible position of our troops. No one can condone for a moment a murder campaign, but we have seen that kind of thing result from certain causes. There is a particular danger of a campaign of this kind in any country that is seeking self-determination and self-government. It seems to me that a régime that is created by the bomb and the dagger finds it most difficult to shake them off afterwards. That should be a warning to the leaders in Cyprus. The Cypriots have for a long time demanded union with Greece. To begin with, I think that was rather a sentimental demand; it was put forward in a quite impossible form—a kind of union with Greece next day. There are all the difficulties which one inevitably gets in a matter of this kind. There are always minorities to be considered.

There are, too, strategic interests. I should like here to say a word on the strategic interests, speaking with all due modesty in the presence of those with far greater experience. In the modern world we still are apt to attribute too great strategic importance to places like Cyprus. I am told, for instance, that if Cyprus were in the hands of some other country the Turks would feel that it was a menace to them. I do not believe that in the hydrogen bomb age a hostile Power would attack Turkey by a landing or an air attack from Cyprus. In this modern age, if a Power is contemplating anything like a major war, it comes right home. If we were engaged in a major war, this, and not any outlying place, would be the place of danger and decision. We realised that in regard to Egypt; but old ideas die hard. We have to consider this area because undoubtedly we have strategic interests there. It was clear from the start that, with our friends the Greeks, they were perfectly willing that, whatever happened in Cyprus, we should have our bases, as, I understand, they are willing to provide bases themselves. If we were all in the Baghdad Pact together there seems to be no reason why there should be a quarrel over bases. I feel that there has been a rather slow acceptance of the validity of the Cypriot claim. The lesson to be learned in dealing with matters of this kind is that the Government should make up their mind early on how far they are going and not allow concessions to be dragged out gradually.

In considering the concessions made by Archbishop Makarios it must be remembered that he is not only the spiritual leader but also the political leader of the Cypriots. The reason for that goes back a long way, to the old days under Turkish rule, and it is quite impossible in such a matter to say that it is all wrong for the Archbishop to be a politician. Probably nowadays we look back with some surprise to the activities of some of our own Archbishops in the past; but it is no good applying our present principles to the past, and Cyprus is not exactly in the same position as we are in to-day. We had the talks with the Archbishop. It may be said that the Archbishop has been connected with people who are dealing in terrorism. One has to make up one's mind whether one is to say: "This person is a person with whom we cannot deal, because he is mixed up in terrorism," or, alternatively, "Despite the fact that he is mixed up in terrorism we ought to talk to him." I believe Her Majesty's Government were very wise to go into these talks, because in the course of the year the Archbishop has gone a long way. When we were in office there was this demand practically for Enosis next day; now there is in contemplation a period of constitutional government by the Cypriots over a period of years.

I have a strong idea that if the Cypriots once got to manage their own affairs they might be less inclined to put themselves under a Government which no doubt has many virtues but, so far as I can make out, has even more parties. If I were a Cypriot I should hesitate about coming under the Greek Government at the present time. Talks took place and declarations were made. One must bear in mind what is the position of a popular leader. In any nationalist revolt there will always be people whom we regard as comparatively reasonable and there will always be the extremists. We even find that at home, in both Parties; and one has always to be prepared to stand up to these extremists. In negotiations it will always be our endeavour to give as much power as we can to the reasonable people, because if we do not give them the chance of standing out as leaders, then inevitably leadership passes to less responsible hands.

We have had full discussions in another place, and we have had a White Paper showing the points on which negotiations finally broke down. I think they were very narrow ones. There was the question of whether there should be a majority for the Greeks. It was said that that would be left to a special Constitutional Commission which was coming over. In, my submission that is quite wrong. It is a political decision, not a decision to be left to a Commission; but it was a question of the Greeks having an overwhelming majority. In these matters it always pays for the majority to be generous in according representation to a minority. One must not, however, be over-generous. I can remember proposals being put forward some twenty years ago, when I was going round India, in which, by the time the claims of all the minorities were totted up, the majority had not a look in. I believe that there was certain need for clarification here. It was quite obvious that there was representation for a Turkish minority, but what was not so clear was whether there would be a nominating majority. I do not believe in this kind of limited responsibility.

That goes also to the question of law and order. In setting up a new Government anywhere there is always the temptation to say, "We will let you run things but we will retain law and order." I saw that done in India. I believe it is fatal, because it means that responsibility for law and order is then in the hands of what is considered to be an alien Power. I have always thought that one of the mistakes we made in the interim period in India, the period of diarchy, was that we gave the Indians all the pleasant things to do and retained all the unpleasant things for ourselves. If we are going to give self-government, it is better to give responsibility, for if they have responsibility, they will look after law and order in their own interests.

Then there is the question of amnesty. We always display this feeling that "We will not shake hands with murderers," yet almost always it has to be done. Always, sooner or later, some kind of amnesty—a full amnesty may be the exception—ought to be given. I cannot think that we should have broken off negotiations on these points. The Prime Minister, speaking in another place, gave it as his opinion that, had we conceded these points, others would constantly have been raised. That was his intuition, but the intuitions of Prime Ministers are not always right. I noticed that The Times correspondent said that responsible opinion in the island took another view. I noticed that Mr. Francis Noel Baker, who did very good service in the negotiations and knew the Archbishop well, took another point of view. I cannot think that breaking off on that was at all wise.

That brings me to the question of deportation. Deportation is a very serious matter. It may be justifiable. If, for instance, there is a place ruled by some absent ruler against the will of the people, it might be wise to remove him; but I do not believe it is ever wise to remove the leader of a nationalist movement. What happens? I recall what Parnell said when they put him in prison. Someone said to him: "Who will take over now?" He said: "Captain Moonlight." That is exactly what happens. History affords a number of instances where attempts have been made to shut up a constitutional leader and always, as a result, power has passed to the irresponsible. Then you have to consider, when you have deported him, what is to be done next. More often than not, after a period of years or months the deportee has to be brought back.

The question has been asked—and it was not answered in another place: "Where do we go from here?" It is possible to try repression, but it is extremely difficult to repress a movement of this kind. As everyone knows, the terrorists tend to become the heroes; they tend to become nationalist heroes—very often quite undeservedly—and they get the support of the population. It is possible to suppress movements of this kind. Hitler did it and Stalin did it, but Britain cannot do it. The last occasion when this was tried was under Mr. Lloyd George's Government, with the "Black and Tans." This country would not stand for it. The result of that sort of thing is a period in which there will be executions and murders of our troops—and it is not fair to expose our troops to this. And, in the end, you have to go back and negotiate somehow or other. By that time you will have discredited constitutional leaders, and you will find yourselves having to deal with far worse people than the Archbishop. One can trace the history of that sort of thing in many countries. Fortunately, in some countries we have stopped short of that course. I am sure that what I have indicated would have happened in Burma if we had not dealt with the Burmese as we did. Now, we have an admirable and courageous Prime Minister there—our good friend Mr. Nu. It would have happened in India. It happened in Ireland over and over again. I cannot think that deportation is wise.

There is a further point. For our influence in the world we have to depend very much on public opinion. Times have gone by when, as Palmerston did in the past, we could send the British Fleet here and there if troubles should break out. We have not the greatest strength in the world; we have not the greatest wealth in the world. What we have is a great tradition for good will. And our role in the world, particularly in Asia—as we have exemplified in the British Commonwealth—is that we stand for freedom and democracy. As I see it to-day, in Asia particularly—as I said at the start—there is this test going on. We must not lose that position. I am afraid that events in Cyprus, as we know, have had bad echoes even in the United States of America. We need to remember the lessons of the past. I realise all the difficulties. I hold no brief for the Archbishop, but I remember that the rebels of the past generally tend, sooner or later, to become Prime Ministers in the British Commonwealth. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

3.24 p.m.

LORD REA

My Lords, it falls to me—rather surprisingly to myself, even to my horror—to be the first to congratulate on his maiden speech in your Lordships' House one who is respected and admired in every Parliamentary Party in this country, one who has held the highest office in Parliamentary life, and whose name is, indeed, a household word in five continents—and probably something like 100 million households. I am glad to think that my faltering words will not have that publicity but I consider it a great privilege to be the first to congratulate the noble Earl on speaking in your Lordships' House for the first time and to say how much we have admired his speech for its statesmanlike quality and its moderation, and also to say how much we hope that we shall hear him speaking frequently here and that his habit of oratorical proximity to the Dispatch Box in another place will not leave him in this Chamber. There is no doubt that this House will gain considerably in authority and debating force from the presence of the noble Earl.

I do not propose to break my own personal rule of speaking very briefly to your Lordships. The matters which are the subject of the debate to-day have, of course, been discussed in considerable detail—possibly too much detail—in the Press, and yesterday there was a full discussion of them in another place. It is interesting to me, and rather significant, that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has not thought fit to discharge his criticism of the Government—I think that is a fair word—separately from two completely different barrels, if I may put it in sporting terms. One barrel would normally be aimed at the Foreign Office and the other at the Colonial Office. But he has put up his gun and shot off both barrels at the noble Marquess who I understand is to wind up the debate for the Government. I think that is rather significant, because the difference between colonial affairs and foreign affairs has become more and more indistinct as time has gone by. Not only the barriers of customs and of language, but the obstacles to fellow feeling and internationalism are becoming fainter as we progress and as different parts of the world get to know their neighbours, better than ever before.

It is difficult to try to pinpoint to what that is principally due, but I would say that a very significant name in this connection would certainly be that of Signor Marconi. He has indirectly been responsible for the fact that the younger nations—what we used to call the backward nations or the submerged tenth—are no longer in the state in which they were before his great invention came into world-wide use. They have something of the equality and of the same civilization as older and greater nations, and clearly it will not be long before there will be almost complete equality. That rising resurgence in the younger nations of the world will mean that they will naturally go through teething troubles and growing pains. These teething troubles and growing pains are, in my submission, inseparable from the feeling of nationalism which has to be gone through, and it is a painful process which, as events have sometimes shown, affects other parts of the world. But it has to be faced.

We in this country and the other countries of the civilised world have gone through it, and even though one could then hardly call it growing pains the point at which we showed these attributes most clearly was about 100 years ago when we were very insular and very national, and very proud of it. There is a residue of that feeling amongst the people of this country now—and quite naturally. It used to be called "jingoism." I think it will be admitted that those people who do have these feelings are apt to belong, in the main, rather to the Party on the opposite side of your Lordships' House than to either of the Parties on this side. For that reason Her Majesty's present Government have, I think, our sympathy in this sort of brake in the background which makes them w some extent drag their feet when looking toward internationalism.

These international questions must be handled with international, and not with national, mentality, and such difficulties as those that we are now considering will have to be overcome before the world will be a peaceful and prosperous place again. It is, therefore, I repeat, very significant that the noble Earl has bracketed colonial affairs with foreign affairs in speaking on this question.

I am not going to keep your Lordships any longer than to say that we must recognise this spirit of internationalism much more than we have done in the past: and there are opportunities for this comparatively near home, in Europe. We on this side of the House feel rather strongly that the Government have frequently given lip service to the idea of joining in with our brothers and sisters in various European organisations, movements and ideals, and that when the time comes we are rather apt to drag our feet. I would say no more. I beg Her Majesty's Government not to allow the criticism which is going to be levelled at them this afternoon to influence them to dig in their toes too far. The political atmosphere of the new world—and by "the new world" I mean the newer nations which are now coming to maturity—is Radical rather than Tory, I can assure them; and if they bear that in mind, they will have the good wishes and good will of all.

3.31 p.m.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, may I at once follow the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party in equally sincere congratulations to the late Leader of the Labour Party on one of the best maiden speeches—in fact I think the best—I have ever heard in this House. I do not say I agree with all of it. He and I have been colleagues and opponents for a great many years, ever since we were at the same college together, but we have always been friends, and it is really delightful to have him here. I hope he is not going to declare his innings completely closed but will be up with a good bat very often, as he did on this occasion.

I should have been very content to give my silent, but firm, support, and vote if necessary, to the Government on this occasion: but, having been directly concerned as Secretary of State for the Colonies in dealing with a somewhat similar situation five and twenty years ago, I may be able to offer something which is pertinent and, I hope, helpful in this debate. Incidentally, I see that I figure in the opening speech in another place yesterday. The noble Earl spared me that.

In October, 1931, there was a serious outbreak of violence in Cyprus. The Government House at Nicosia, the capital, was burnt down, and there were similar, but not so damaging, scenes in other places. I regret to say that on that occasion church leaders figured prominently in incitement to not. The Bishop of Kyrenia actually led the rioters in the town where his See lay. The Bishop of Kitium also was involved and the Bishop of Paphos, who was in this country, was engaged in giving help from the sidelines. Of course, the cry of "Enosis" was raised. The disorder was effectively suppressed. Ten of the ringleaders, including the two Bishops of Kyrenia and Kitium, were deported, and a number of others who had taken part in the riots were brought to trial and convicted. My noble friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies is quite correct in what he said in another place: the deportations were actually made by my predecessor, Mr. J. H. Thomas, but I had taken over the Colonial Office just after the ship sailed with these people on board and I had to deal with the situation in the House and with everything that ensued.

In November, 1931, as soon as the House reassembled—I think it was after the General Election—I made a full statement to the House. I am not saying that history always repeats itself or repeats itself exactly, but it is interesting to notice that on that occasion the action which the National Government had taken in deporting the ringleaders, including the two Bishops, was universally accepted, certainly in another place and in this House. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, was at that time either the Leader or the Deputy Leader of the Opposition. I have been careful to verify from the OFFICIAL REPORT every statement I made and every question that was asked from any quarter of the House. No debate was asked for. Cyprus never figured in the debate on the Address. No debate was asked for later. Indeed, when the Colonial Office debate took place a few months afterwards, I think only one speaker—and he was a Liberal—in a roundabout way referred to Cyprus. The action was fully approved.

I can recall that Colonel Wedgwood, who sat on the Front Opposition Bench and afterwards was a very welcome Member of this House, particularly endorsed the action which had been taken against the Bishops and urged that, as a great deal of damage had taken place and as not a little of this had been due to incitement by ecclesiastics, ecclesiastical property should bear some share of the compensation. I recall Mr. Venizelos, whom we all respected so much, telling me at that time that it was contrary to the canon law of the Orthodox Church for Orthodox clergy to take part in politics. When I put that to the aged Archbishop of Cyprus a little later, when I visited the Island, he did not at all challenge that statement. I do not know whether that canon law still holds or whether we should accept, as the noble Earl suggested, that Archbishops of the Orthodox Church should always be national political leaders. But I am sure that the whole House, irrespective of Party, would agree that condonation of violence and murder and incitement to violence are contrary to the Christian ethic of every Christian Church.

At that time I had just taken over, and my first duty was to see that law and order was restored. Then I had to improve the conditions on the island and try and make it a happier and more prosperous place. We did a great deal. The moneylenders, who were the greatest curse of Cyprus, were suppressed entirely. We established a Land Bank and cooperative societies, which grew apace. The farmers, with the aid of Imperial Preference and free from their load of debt, were able to find a profitable market for all they produced for export—their tobacco, wine and citrus. We did a good deal to improve education—not enough, I think, but a good deal—and we did not forget the antiquities, in regard to which my noble friend Lord Mersey played so helpful and generous a part.

I visited the island some eighteen months later and received a very cordial reception. I should like to say a word or two on the impressions which I then formed, because I do not believe that an ancient people, living much the same life going back, not merely for centuries, as the noble Lord, Lord Winster, knows, but for thousands of years, without changing fundamentally, would change so very much in ten or twenty years. Incidentally, it is not without interest to note that, though Cyprus has belonged to many countries and has had many masters over its long history, in all its long history, Phoenician, Persian, Egyptian, Mace-, donian, Roman, Byzantine, Lusignan, Turkish and British, I am fairly sure I am right in saying that never in those thousands of years has it been a Greek possession. That is not uninteresting. Of course, it is not conclusive. I would give this impression of the people of Cyprus, as I found them: fairly easily roused (Enosis was a good battle cry and rallying cry then); inclined to flow or row with the flowing tide; subject a good deal to ecclesiastical direction and influence and not exclusively in matters of the spirit. But the lasting impression formed was that what the great mass of the population wanted above everything was to lead a peaceful, prosperous life. They were not much interested in Government, or political issues or "isms," except when politics or political Government action came down and touched their daily life.

LORD WINSTER

Hear, hear!

THE EARL OF SWINTON

I am greatly interested to find the noble Lord, Lord Winster, who has had a much longer and later practical experience as a Governor, agreeing with this impression. I greatly doubt whether a desire for peaceful existence and peaceful co-existence with their Turkish compatriots is not what, in their hearts, 90 or 95 per cent. of the people of Cyprus want to-day. I listened carefully to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and I think that we should be careful about national aspirations. It is always a little dangerous to generalise, and when you come to an island like Cyprus—and those who know it would, I believe, confirm this—you have to be particularly careful that you do not mistake terrorist coercion for genuine national aspirations.

I also found at that time a large Turkish minority—loyal, contented, living peaceably with their neighbours and passionately anxious to remain within the British Commonwealth. The Turks were then a quarter of the population of the island. I understand that the Greek or Greek-speaking population, which was then three-quarters of the whole, is now nearer four-fifths. Do your Lordships know why? It is not, I think, that one race breeds more rapidly than the other. I believe it is true—and the Minister of State will correct me if I am wrong—that in the course of the last ten or fifteen years something like 100,000 Greeks have come into Cyprus from the Greek Islands or the mainland, because there, on that enchanted island, they could find a mote prosperous living and a happier place to live. I believe that all those who have first-hand knowledge of Cyprus would agree that I have given a fair picture of the island as it was before the Second World War.

I do not want to speak too long, and I am not going to traverse all the recent events; I think the facts have been fully stated in ministerial speeches and in Government papers. However, I should like to put to the House, and to the noble Earl who initiated the debate, this question: is it fair or reasonable to take such a very different attitude about the deportation of Archbishop Makarios from that which the noble Earl and his colleagues, and both Houses of Parliament, took twenty-five years ago on the deportation of the Bishop of Kyrenia? There is no doubt—and there cannot be any doubt in anybody's mind—that Archbishop Makarios was deeply and personally implicated in this campaign of violence. It is not really, if I may say so to the noble Earl, a case of contrasting a moderate leader with Captain Moonlight. It would be more true to say that Makarios had identified himself with Captain Moonlight and that there was not this antithesis at all. And, surely, there can be no question but that law and order must be reestablished. I do not think anybody can deny that the continued presence, complicity and influence of the Archbishop would gravely prejudice and retard the restoration of law and order. I am quite certain—and I do not say this because I am a supporter of Her Majesty's Government; it must be true of any Government—that, having entered into negotiations with a leader like Archbishop Makarios, nobody would want to bring those negotiations suddenly to a brusque conclusion, but would exhaust every effort before corning to the conclusion that it was necessary to act in this drastic manner.

I would ask this question: are the security, the stability and the good order in Cyprus less important today to the British Commonwealth, and indeed to the free world, than they were twenty-five years ago? Cyprus is a vital strategic place to-day, not just for Britain but for the whole Grand Alliance. It is more important than ever in the atomic age—I really must challenge the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on that point. Anybody who has taken part in the Defence Committee and who has had dealings with the development of atomic strategy—as I know the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, did in his time, with the greatest interest—must realise and accept that to-day as a base, as a necessary means of communication, Cyprus has increased tremendously in importance. If that be true—and I am certain it is—surely, we and our Allies must know for certain that that base will be safe and secure so long as the risk to peace lasts! And who can predict when that twilight period will end?

Let me assume for the moment that the majority of the people in Cyprus, if they had the opportunity, would vote, or be induced to vote, for union with Greece. Would that give the security which is vital to-day to the interests of the free world and the Grand Alliance? I am going to say something which perhaps I can say more easily than the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, or the Minister of State, but which we all must know in our hearts is true. Greatly as we hope for a free and firm Greece, steadfast in its alliance with the free world, there can be no guarantee that Greece might not go Communist or, at best, neutral. Greece and the free world should remember that it was, as the Prime Minister said last night, I think with complete justification, British intervention and British troops which saved Greece from Communist domination and from falling within the Iron Curtain at the end of 1944. I am sure it is utterly wrong to argue or to suggest that weakness in suppressing violence, disorder and subversion does not play into the hands of the Communists. Exactly the opposite is true. Surely, that is what we have always maintained in U.N.O.—that aggression must be resisted, and subversion and violence are only the aggression of the cold war. It is quite untrue to suggest that you beat Communism by appeasing that kind of aggression.

Finally, what about Turkey? Are the position, the rights and the co-operation of Turkey less important to-day than they were ten or twenty years ago? Turkey is to-day the bastion of the Middle East and the pivot of the whole of the defence of the free world there. Not only that, but this is not a question, as is so often assumed, merely between the people of Cyprus and us, or Greece and us. Turkey has a right. Not only has it got a population there, but in international law Turkey is entitled to be heard, and we are not entitled to act without her. After all, Turkey and Greece were both signatories of the Treaties of Lausanne which confirmed the British sovereignty in Cyprus. For all those reasons, I am convinced that the Government have gone to the limit in negotiation and conciliation, and that, faced with the situation which they have clearly encountered, they could do no other than they have done.

3.52 p.m.

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY

My Lords, in what I have to say I, too, shall confine myself to Cyprus, and it is only with great reluctance that I add any more words to the too many words which have already been uttered in many quarters about the unhappy affairs of that island. But Archbishop Makarios is head of the Autokephalous Church of Cyprus. With that Church, as with the Greek Orthodox Church, the Church of England has long been on terms of close fellowship and friendship. Great perplexity and distress has been caused to Christian opinion, both in this country and elsewhere, by the arrest and removal of the head of one of the historic Churches of the world. I think it is only proper to stress the shock and uneasiness which Christians in many parts are feeling. But the Orthodox Churches regard this event with indignation as an act of sacrilege, persecution and barbarism. From the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, from the Archbishop of Athens, from the Bishops of Cyprus and others, I have had urgent and emphatic telegrams of protest using those very terms. It would be resented throughout the Orthodox world if I said nothing in this debate; and the fact that my words will be scrutinised there as searchingly as those of the Government itself compels me to speak with a great sense of Christian responsibility.

Archbishop Makarios is the leading ecclesiastical and political figure of Cyprus. Whatever he does, he does simultaneously and equally as Churchman and as politician. The Eastern Churches find it hard to believe that the Archbishop of Canterbury is not also a political leader. They have not passed through that historical experience which has taught us that, while the concerns of Church and State are intimately related, and are equally involved in the issues of national well-being, yet under God the responsibilities and spheres of action of Churchmen and politician are different, and that when either tries to usurp the functions of the other disaster follows—whether it be the politician trying to stifle the free speech and free judgment of the Church, or the Church trying to operate by the methods of political power.

Our friends in Greece and Cyprus must recognise that to us here it seems shocking that an Archbishop should take the lead in a political matter and involve himself in all the passionate partialities which political incitement always involves. I must ask our friends there to believe that, even though I am speaking in the House of Lords, I, as Archbishop, have had no share in these political matters and no previous knowledge of the actions taken. As a Churchman, I have one interest only, and that is in reconciliation: that hatred and division may be replaced by understanding, trust and co-operation. I trust that our Orthodox brethren will try, as I must try, to lay aside all political argument and, so far as possible, all national partialities and everything else which makes the way to reconciliation more difficult. We must all, as I would say, combine to seek an agreement which recognises not so much rights, on either side, as obligations, and which will hold together our responsibilities to one another and to the world—for it is a strategic issue—first in good order and then in peace.

We must, however, recognise that in the Near East the kind of distinction I have just made between the functions of Churchman and politician hardly exists. In this country the Government naturally judges Archbishop Makarios on his political record since he has chosen to play the part of a politician: but in Cyprus he will be judged as a Churchman doing what it is proper—whatever the Canon Law may say—for a Churchman to do. The British Government, therefore, must do a hard thing and recognise that, whatever his political activities, he remains the head of an independent Church, a religious and Christian leader, whose presence is indispensable to the proper functioning of that Church. There is bound to be uneasiness in any British mind when a political leader is arrested and removed without trial. It is even more alarming when such action has the effect of interfering with the functioning and the loyalties of a Christian community. It is important for the Government to realise that it is in terms of sacrilege that much foreign opinion is viewing their action.

We must realise, too, as the noble Earl said, that the Greek Orthodox people have in the past survived centuries of terrible oppression and have won existence and freedom for nation and Church by violent strife and violent means. This is engrained in them from their history. Archbishop Makarios was continuing a tradition of the past when once again he identified leadership of his Church with a struggle for political freedom. But in all gentleness we must ask our Orthodox friends to understand our position. Taught by our own history as a nation, we believe that it is impossible to combine the two functions, and that if a man tries to do so he must be judged by the political aims and the political methods which he employs or allows, as other politicians are, and must take the consequences. My Lords, forgive me for taking so long to state what is obvious enough to us. If there is to be reconciliation, it must be patiently expounded here that it may be understood there in the East.

So I come to the political field. Here, let me state frankly that in one matter of intense political and Christian concern, Archbishop Makarios has put himself very seriously in the wrong. To his own people and to others he has allowed himself to appear to condone violence (and the Government go further in saying that he connived at it) in a way which, wherever it occurs, Christian conscience must condemn. Archbishop Makarios has twice been a visitor in my own house. Last June I wrote a letter to him in which, after referring to increasing evidences of violence, I went on: I am somewhat worried lest the absence of any clear statement from the Church authorities and particularly from you as their undisputed leader may cause people to suppose that the Church is in fact supporting such outrages as have occurred. I asked him to give a lead in this matter. He said this in his reply: I am profoundly grieved by the course events have taken in Cyprus in the last few days. Unfortunately the serious situation which has been created here cannot be remedied by suggestions or advisory circulars. I am sincerely afraid that an official condemnation of events by myself would not find at the present stage the necessary response, but would involve the risk of exposing me rather unprofitably. I fear that he spoke then not as a Churchman called on to uphold a religious principle but as a politician calculating risks and chances, and ready to allow an evil which he regretted in private but would not publicly condemn. So he exposed himself inevitably to contradictory judgments.

I can fully sympathise with Mr. Noel Baker's estimate of the Archbishop's character. Indeed, there is good reason to suppose that Archbishop Makarios was a moderating influence on those extremists who were associated with him in the Ethnarchy Council. His moderating influence might have been utilised far more profitably to reach a solution had the Government, in the earlier stages of this quarrel, had a clearer imagination and foresight of where they would have to come in the end. At the same time, even if the Government have not established their case for the Archbishop's direct complicity in the policy of violence and outrage, the Archbishop has made it hard to doubt it; and his refusal to condemn has had the same public effect as complicity would have had.

Our Greek and Orthodox friends must be ready to recognise that the British Government in their political action have an absolute duty to restore civil order, and that they cannot stand idly by when confronted with civil disorder and incitements to kill and destroy. If our friends there wish to criticise the actions of our Government—and there is plenty of room for criticism, as in most human situations, and plenty of critics—they should criticise them on the grounds, not of insincerity or barbarism or sacrilege but simply of political unwisdom and misjudgments, especially perhaps in timing; and they should honestly recognise that such political unwisdom is to be found on both sides.

All that I have said, if honestly accepted on both sides, must lead to reconciliation Recrimination does not help. Nothing will help except a readiness to begin again the search for agreement and good will. For whatever reasons—and it does not help, in my judgment, to try to settle which side made the most or the worst mistakes—negotiations broke down. All that remained was the political fact of organised disorder and violence. In that situation, Archbishop Makarios and his companions were arrested and removed. Was that right or wrong? If it has brought the issue back to the funda mental political and Christian reality that what cannot be got by patience must never be sought by methods of terrorism or murder, then it was right. If, on the other hand, it has blocked the way to reconciliation unnecessarily, it was wrong. If, for example, there is any truth in the report that Archbishop Makarios, in visiting Athens, was hoping to get advice by means of which he could have advanced nearer to agreement, then indeed his arrest and deportation were wrong. However, it has happened. Reconciliation begins not by asking any one party to a quarrel to change his tune and attitude at once but by devising some temporary next step on which they can all agree.

I venture to suggest that the following three steps, taken quickly, should have the approval of all the Governments concerned—British, Greek and Turkish—and would have the support of all the Churches, including the Orthodox Church. The first is this. The correspondence between the Governor of Cyprus and the Archbishop shows a very large area of common agreement as to the future Constitution of increasing self-government. Let the Government appoint at once a competent person or persons to draft a Constitution along the lines of that correspondence, with freedom to consult whom they will and instructed to attach to it a suggested timetable for its application. This draft would bind nobody, except by its merits, but it would become the basis for discussion with Archbishop Makarios and others concerned. By this means, time would be gained in which passions could be cooled. Everyone could feel that progress was contemplated and was being made; and when negotiations were resumed, they would be greatly assisted by being related to a draft Constitution so that they could deal with defined proposals and not, as when the negotiations broke down, merely with fears and distrusted intentions. That is the first step.

The second is that the Greek and Turkish Governments should then join with our Government in an immediate appeal to the Cypriots to end terrorism. Thirdly, Archbishop Makarios should be informed that his exile was temporary and would end as soon as public order in Cyprus was restored; and he should be assured that when a draft Constitution was in being direct negotiations with him would at once be resumed. Along these three lines it would seem to me possible for all parties to leave the past behind and go forward to a peaceful, orderly and generous acceptance of the mutual responsibilities of Cyprus and Great Britain to one another and to the peace of the world. It is in that direction, and for that end, that I trust that the Christian Churches of this country may work closely together with the Orthodox Churches with undiminished trust and with an ever-increasing fellowship.

4.11 p.m.

LORD HORE-BELISHA

My Lords, the intervention of the most reverend Primate testifies to the importance and gravity of the subjects which we have to discuss. I can only hope that the most reverend Primate has used language which will be interpreted in Greek ecclesiastical quarters as a sufficiently strong reprobation of the refusal of Archbishop Makarios to denounce violence. It is something new among spiritual leaders, I think, to adopt the attitude that you do not do what is right, upon the ground that you cannot do so profitably to your own position. Since when has personal profit been an accepted doctrine of religious leaders? The feeling in country is deep and strong and, as I say, I can only hope that the most reverend Primate has adequately interpreted it in what was a most important speech in this debate.

Before commenting, as I may venture to do, upon his constructive proposal, I feel that I ought to join with those who have made reference to the maiden speech of Lord Attlee. I never dreamed that it would be my lot, as it is certainly my pleasure, to join in congratulations to the noble Earl on a maiden speech, but I do so with the warmest and most welcoming spirit, having regard to the fact, in particular, that we were elected to the House of Commons at just about the same time and that we were sworn of the Privy Council on the same day. On that occasion we wore frock-coats—a garment which has since been completely discarded. As with clothes, so with foreign policies, they have occasionally to be re-fashioned and to he brought up to date.

Nothing could better illustrate the rapidity with which what remains of the old order in the Middle East is changing than the matter mentioned by the noble Earl at the operative outset of his remarks. He referred to the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. A long and loyal, indeed a lifetime of, devoted service to the Hashemite dynasty deserved a better end, and we must all feel that both General Glubb in his personal conduct and Her Majesty's Government acted with great restraint in provocative circumstances. In particular, when one casts one's mind back to the feeling of excitement which prevailed only a few days ago, it is just as well to praise Her Majesty's Government for not having entertained the proposals that we should try to reconstitute matters as they were by sending a parachute brigade and reinforcements to Jordan.

The Arab Legion is a picturesque force, as any who saw it in the days of King Abdullah will testify, with its camels and its horses; but it is also an efficient force, perhaps the most efficient Arab force in the Middle East. None the less, how much longer could we have expected to prolong a system under which the national army of a sovereign State had a foreigner for the commander of its forces, and a Westerner at that? The question now arises, how much longer the other vestiges of this old system can remain. Here is an Arab Legion, an Arab national army, maintained, not out of the taxes of the Jordan Government, but by a direct subsidy from this county —a subsidy, moreover, paid not to the Jordan Government but to the commander of the Legion, to the authorities of the Legion itself. Thus, neither the Jordan Government nor the Jordan Parliament have the administration of the funds dispensed upon their fighting forces. These forces are also the security forces of Jordan and are brought into play whenever there are internal troubles. My submission is that this is a very good opportunity definitely and finally to change that system; it is humiliating to Jordan.

The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, spoke with eloquence about the rising tide of nationalism. We cannot resist it—we cannot stop it—and we do not, I am sure, with our great record, wish to appear to do so. One of the central themes of Russian propaganda in the Middle East and in the propaganda of the anti-Baghdad Powers who co-operate with Russia is that Jordan is not a free agent but is acting at the behest of Britain and that it does not even control its own troops. A national Army is the symbol of national independence. It is not fitting that we should allow any longer the gibe to be thrown at King Hussein that he is under the control, or that he can act only at the behest, of the British Government. This is the time to revise those arrangements. A military mission, if it were desired by Jordan, would stand upon an entirely different footing; but, in my submission, we should free our relationship with Jordan from any suggestion of suzerainty, we should free it from any tinge of justification for the taunt that the old principles of colonialism are applying. If we did that, I think we should clear the air in the Middle East. With regard to the actual sum of money, by all means let us give it, and more, and let it be used for fructifying purposes.

My Lords, like the noble Earl who introduced the debate, I find it an easy transition to pass from Jordan to Cyprus, which is so interwoven with our Middle Eastern policy. I want to look entirely to the future. We went to Cyprus because it was a British Colony and we thought we should have a base there in which we could assure our own security —and, doubtless, we shall remain there and see our problems through. But we must have regard to the facts if we are thinking of how to direct our future policy. The utility of the base has been gravely compromised, as the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War on the Army Estimates shows. It says in that memorandum, at paragraph 30: Throughout the past year, internal security conditions in Cyprus have progressively deteriorated as the murderous attacks on British Servicemen, on police and on civilians have increased. Whereas the Cyprus garrison in December, 1954, amounted to four major units who had to devote only a small part of their activities to internal security work, the garrison now amounts to fourteen major units, twelve of whom are devoting 90 per cent. of their time to the task of maintaining law and order in the Island. Consequently, the value of the base as a haven for a strategic reserve, is compromised.

There is another factor. When we were looking for a base and eventually chose Cyprus, it was suggested that we should not repeat the situation from which we had extricated ourselves in Egypt; that we should not undertake as our sole, individual and exclusive responsibility the management of a base, but that we should do it on behalf of N.A.T.O. I myself spoke on those lines on more than one occasion in your Lordships' House. It is true that at that time there was no demand by N.A.T.O. to be interested in this matter. But the present circumstances are quite different: there is a dramatic change, of which I think we should wish to take account, and of which I am sure the Government will take account.

To read the Press and the comments upon Britain's policy in the Press, one would think that the great controversy was not between the Free World and the Communist world, but that it was a controversy within the Free World. If there is one thing more dangerous than the abandonment of a bipartisan foreign policy—I was glad to gather from the speech of the noble Earl that he had no intention of abandoning it; he made a most public-spirited speech, fully in accord with the general lines of policy of the Government—it would be the breaking up of the Free World in dissension, for then Communism would be presented immediately with the break through that it desires and the triumph which it has been seeking. Only Russia and her friends can get any satisfaction from the dispute which is at present raging.

But is there any substance in the case? President Eisenhower said yesterday—I am not taking the comments of Irresponsible Americans; I want to take the most authoritative, and I think there is value in treating them with respect—that there was no blinking the fact that American interests were very greatly jeopardised by what was happening in Cyprus, and that he would use every possible means to end the crisis in the Middle East. Mr. Hoover, the Under-Secretary, also said yesterday that the Cyprus issue involves the direct interest of close friends and allies of the United States. The political aspect of this matter, with which the most reverend Primate properly concerned himself, is one thing. That political solution will be pursued by Her Majesty's Government, I hope with the good will of all Parties in the State, whether on the lines constructively put forward by the most reverend Primate or upon others. The conditions which the Government have laid down as qualifying the achievement of a free Constitution and of self-determination are, in themselves, highly proper qualifications. The House is well aware of these. We must secure our strategic interests; we must have regard to the Turkish minority and to Turkish feeling. All these conditions are, of course, proper, and Her Majesty's Government cannot give that position away. But they will pursue a political solution. That solution can be achieved only by patience. There is no ready-made specific by which it can be achieved. It may take a long time; it will require patience and magnanimity, and therefore we must wait for it. But the strategic solution cannot so well wait —the cold war is proceeding; the face of the world is altering. Russia and her friends are taking action every day. We must solve the strategic problem in a manner which has regard to the susceptibilities of our own Allies, and it is for that reason that I refer to these remarks of President Eisenhower and Mr. Hoover.

It is possible to regard these comments by responsible Americans as interference; on the other hand, it is possible to regard them as an opportunity to consolidate our methods of consultation and common action. We are the first to complain when the Americans diverge from our policy or from what we conceive to be the general policy. The theme of almost every foreign debate and of many a speech by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister is that we cannot be expected to succeed unless the Americans and ourselves act together. Here is a case in which America is saying, as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, that she considers her interests to be involved; and not only is America saying that, but Germany and Italy as well.

Dr. Adenauer has been a constructive statesman who believes in co-operation. He offered France a federal solution of the European problem and would to goodness that offer had been seized! for France would have been very much strengthened. He has called for the expansion of the N.A.T.O. Alliance in a political instrument for the free world capable of a uniform defence against Soviet manœuvres or, even better, of forestalling such manœuvres. He said: You cannot call the Western policies in the Middle East a joint N A.T.O. policy. Italy's President Gronchi has been taking the same line in America, and the Italian Government are firmly of opinion that their interests in the Middle East are involved and that the problem should be tackled by all members of the Atlantic Pact together. France also has protested against divergences of policy and has said that she should not be expected to "go it alone" and that we should not do so. The Prime Minister had his conference with M. Mollet last week-end, and let us hope that it will put our relations on a uniform footing. These are very significant appeals by our Allies in N.A.T.O. and should not be ignored.

What is the separate interest in the Middle East which Britain is claiming? What is the interest which we have, divergent from the interest of the other N.A.T.O. members? Is it oil? But the whole of 'Western Europe is dependent upon Middle Eastern oil; 75 per cent. of the consumption in Western Europe comes from the Middle East. America, also, is an importer of oil from the Middle East, and not only an importer but far and away the biggest producer. She was responsible for producing 87 million tons last year, whereas British and Dutch interests produced 47½ million tons. There is no exclusive British interest in oil. The industry of Western Europe would stop without Middle Eastern oil; and not only the industry of Western Europe, for there are 14 million tons of tankers being built to-day in the shipyards of the world, in every continent, to carry Middle Eastern oil over the highways of the sea. We cannot claim that this is an exclusively British interest. Nor have we the military forces, nor the wealth, to assure the pursuit of an exclusive policy. We must have the association of our Allies.

What is it that we fear about the oil? Do we fear that the Middle Eastern countries would sell it to Russia? Do we fear that they would close down their sales to the Western world and dispose of their oil to Russia? They would have to build very lengthy pipelines to do that —and, moreover build them through Baghdad Treaty countries, territories which they do not control. Do we think they are going to seize the oil by military means? President Eisenhower said recently that a global war is unthinkable. He said that The world situation showed a world now awake to the fact that global war is well nigh unthinkable and in which the cold war was going to take a different direction entailing a great broadening of non-military programmes such as economic aid to our undeveloped countries. In those circumstances, we cannot expect the Middle East to bristle with bayonets in order to resist a Russian invasion. There is no sign of that. The danger is economic penetration by the Soviet Union and their undermining of the morale of the Middle Eastern peoples. It is the use of arguments, such as that Britain wishes to maintain a colonial system and the remnants of her colonial power in the Middle East, which advances their progress when they can produce any colourable instances in justification. Every expression of military thought on our part provokes a reaction of an economic kind. Russia is not employing military means or military arguments; she is not asking for bases. She is now sending trade and cultural missions, doing barter deals and generally trying to extend her influence. The danger from Russia comes in that she will assist the anti-Baghdad Powers in provoking, in the independent Sheikhdoms, discontent such as that of which we are now seeing evidence; that she will provoke the Arabs to put up their demands for royalties and otherwise compromise our position. That will not be done by military means.

But in any event, whatever the form of resistance that we offer to Russia, it surely should be a combined resistance on behalf of the whole free world. That seems to me to be the lesson to be derived from these events. Positions which we once regarded as positions of strength, relationships we once regarded as being essential to our defensive system, are no longer in that category. The free world as a whole must defend itself in common consultation and common action. For 100 years the British Fleet protected the integrity of America. It made possible the Monroe Doctrine. Why should we regard it as retrogressive or humiliating or in any way derogatory to our interests if, in entirely altered circumstances, we now have to rely for our security on the combined efforts of all the free peoples, most or many of whom owe to us either the establishment or the defence of their free institutions?