HL Deb 24 November 1954 vol 189 cc1892-932

2.42 p.m.

Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved yesterday by the Marquess of Salisbury: to resolve, That this House approves the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Western Europe as expressed in the Agreement reached in London on October 3, 1954, and in Paris on October 23, 1954.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, from what I heard and read of the debate yesterday, I felt that there was evidently very general agreement with the Resolution moved by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. But just as it is said that while all men are equal, some men are more equal than others, so I feel that some noble Lords gave their approval with less approval than others. In particular, I felt that the approval of my noble friend Lord Stansgate stopped a very long way short of enthusiasm, and that had he been on the Reception Committee he would not have accorded the Foreign Secretary a ticker-tape drive. At the same time, I am bound to say that I felt there was a good deal in what the noble Viscount said on the illusory nature of the twelve German divisions.

The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, paid a most striking tribute to his old chief, the Foreign Secretary, with whom he once went into the wilderness, only to make a most triumphant return to the Promised Land. I would not dissent from one single word of that tribute, even if I do utter a modest word of caution. I have seen a great many of these waves of enthusiasm such as are now rising round the Foreign Secretary. I remember, for instance, Locarno. I was in Vienna at the time and in those days I was a Liberal. I remember writing to Isaac Foot, whom I always regarded as the spiritual father of the Liberal Party, begging him to urge some restraint upon the Party in giving approval to that particular episode, because it was clear to me from the beginning, as I am sure it was to many others, that we simply did not dispose of the forces which would enable us to implement the pledges which we gave under Locarno. Well, both Foreign Secretaries. Sir Anthony and Sir Austin, got the Garter. I hope Sir Anthony's Garter will be associated with more lasting results than was Sir Austin's and will not be one of those instances which Lord Melbourne had in mind when he said that there was "no damned merit" about the Order.

The essential thing to remember, I feel, is that the London Agreements represent nothing final. I remember that in a recent speech the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, used a mountaineering analogy about one word bringing down an avalanche. That was quite an erroneous analogy, but I must say that these Agreements do remind me of another experience which all climbers know—that is of surmounting a shoulder which one supposes is the last, only to find a long further series of shoulders opening out to one's eyes. That is the position with these Agreements; they represent the surmounting of merely one shoulder. I agree that to do that is always something, and the only way to get to the top is to go stolidly on, surmounting shoulder after shoulder. But we shall not get to the top with these Agreements, and I feel that a very weary ascent still lies before us, in which our national genius for calm and tolerance in international relations will be most certainly required. In that respect I would urge the Government: be not too impatient to press on. Again it is in our national genius to treat time as a friend and not as an enemy to be wrestled with. That is a friendship which has served us well, and at this juncture I believe it may serve us well again to be calm, tolerant and not too impatient.

I noticed two points of great interest in the noble Marquess's speech, especially where he was dealing with the question of the Commonwealth and the old argument that it was difficult for us to go in with any European combination because our prime duty is to the Commonwealth. I have never been able to follow that argument, because it seems to me that whatever strengthens our position in Europe must automatically strengthen the position of the Commonwealth. I feel quite sure that as the result of the commitment in Europe into which we have entered under the London Agreements, the position of the Commonwealth is also immensely strengthened. If these Agreements and this commitment make our position more secure here in Europe, then I am sure that automatically the position of the Commonwealth is also strengthened.

Then the noble Marquess dwelt at some length on the controls of German rearmament which are provided by the London Agreements. He used the word "considerable"—"considerable" control, I am a little sceptical about that. I think this "considerable" control exists only on paper, and in the past, as we know to our cost, German generals have shown themselves very clever indeed at evading such controls. These paper controls will not give us safety: the only safety lies in Germany becoming a good European—if, indeed, to do so is within her powers. Then there will be no need of control. The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, in his speech yesterday, very cautiously but I think very advisedly reminded us of the German war crimes, that ghastly record of crimes against civilisation. But those crimes were at any rate committed in war time. On my way home my ship happened to put in at Walvish Bay in German South-West Africa, and I read an account of German colonial rule in that Colony and of the sickening and abominable crimes which they committed against the natives. Those crimes had not even the excuse of being committed in war; they were committed in time of peace in cold blood, and they stain the German name. The noble Earl has said that one great difficulty about the Germans is that they can be stampeded (that was the word he used) like sheep. That is only too true; but the unfortunate thing is that they are a nation of carnivorous sheep.

I should like to say something about the question of the re-unification of Germany, which was touched upon in yesterday's debate. I feel it would be asking too much of the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who is to reply, to say much about this subject, especially as I have not given him notice that I was going to raise it; but he is always, in my experience, most courteous and helpful, and if he can say something on the subject of the re-unification of Germany I feel it would be helpful to many noble Lords. I read the Press statement which was issued after Dr. Adenauer visited Washington. It ran as follows: The demand for a reunited Germany is viewed by us as the legitimate demand of the German people. We are convinced of the necessity of continued efforts toward this goal and are agreed that such efforts will be made by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany together with the United Kingdom and France. That reads very pleasantly, but on analysis it is revealed to be completely academic. There is nothing objective whatever in that joint statement, and the London Agreements contain nothing to bring reunification nearer.

I think the matter is particularly important, because I take it that the arrangements in the Bonn Convention still hold, that in the event of Germany being reunited she would then be free to develop her national armaments without any of these considerable controls about which we heard yesterday. I wonder whether anyone really believes that Germany can be reunited by strokes of the pen, or by free elections in Eastern Germany. I believe that that is impossible, and I imagine that nobody knows the impossibility of it more clearly than the West German Government. I believe that reunification is dead for as far as we can see, I believe that Dr. Adenauer must know that that is so, and that it is not Russia's refusal of free elections which now keeps the two Germanies apart. Year by year, East and West Germany have been steadily growing further and further apart, and at this moment one might just as well talk about reuniting the old Austro-Hungarian Empire as of reuniting East and West Germany as parts of the same country which are being forcibly kept apart.

I do not feel that anyone can think any longer in terms of a single German people. It is more realistic and accurate to think in terms of two distinct German peoples, who are getting along quite tolerably in independence of each other, but with marked features of dissimilarity. Western Germany to-day more or less resembles pre-war Germany. Her reconstruction has taken part along traditional lines; but East Germany has been developing quite differently. Life there has changed in all its aspects. In particular, the way of thinking has altered. The young generation in East Germany know nothing about pre-war Germany. The boys and girls of the young generation have been brain-washed. They belong to a post-revolution race, and if they were to visit West Germany they would find there a way of life alien to their way of living; alien, also, to their way of thinking, and alien to the way of life to which they have now grown accustomed. They have received an education which sets them apart from West Germany. They may grumble about this and that, as we all grumble about the conditions under which we live, but I do not think they grumble fundamentally about the East German way of life, which they now regard as normal and largely satisfactory.

Economically, also, East Germany has become independent of West Germany: new industries have been established, new sources of raw materials have been developed, and new export markets have been searched out. Admittedly, East Germany is not as prosperous as West Germany, but the East German economy more or less suffices for the 19 million people there, who have no acquaintance at all with life in West Germany. The conditions of life for the East Germans are different from what they were. Three or four years ago they were a poverty-stricken, half-starved, pathetic people. To-day, there is good employment, if not indeed, full employment—in fact, I have been told that there is even a shortage of manpower. The economic situation has greatly improved; controls and restrictions are being lifted or modified; rationing grows less; there are more goods in the shop windows; prices have come into fair relation with wages—in some cases, indeed, prices compare favourably with those in West Germany. For instance, I am told that in the State restaurants in East Germany prices are lower than those in West Germany. The upheavals of land reform are tending to settle down. The farmers, like all farmers, grumble and are not content; but it is noticeable that there is no longer the flow of refugees from the land in East Germany into West Germany. As regards the position of a worker, again my information is that if he can get a three-or four-roomed flat (and building is proceeding apace in East Germany, where the housing situation is rapidly improving, which, of course, improves morale) he will pay a rent of £5 or £6 a month for it.

There is a great deal of evidence to show that conditions are improving considerably and with fair speed in East Germany—I believe that there is even a little private enterprise to be found there nowadays. If we take the vital matter of iron and steel, a new industry has sprung up there. They are producing pig-iron at the rate of 500,000 tons a year and steel at the rate of 250,000 tons a year. I agree that they are small quantities, but it is a beginning. The ore comes in from the Soviet Union, and the coke comes in from the Donets basin—and that industry will go ahead. It is also noticeable that so great now is the separation between East and West Germany that the Russians evidently feel able to ease, to some extent, the ban on contact between East and West, because they know that such contacts no longer resemble those normally prevailing between people of the same race. I hear, also, that there is little interest in East Germany in politics, and that politicians are distrusted. The East Germans at present are thinking in terms of themselves. They dislike Russia and the Communists, and they consider that West Germany did very little to help them in the time of their need and distress. That view modifies their feelings about West Germany. If all these things are true, I feel it is evidence on the side of those who say that if reunification were to come about at the moment it would be enforced and not voluntary: it would mean an economic and social unheaval in both West and East Germany, which neither wants.

To turn for a moment to another aspect of this matter, I think that France would have this fact to consider about reunification. As I understand it, a reunified Germany would be free to create her own national armed forces, to which East Germany would bring an army and air force of, together, 300,000 men. If France feels that German rearmament is safe because the controls provided include a ban upon the manufacture of nuclear weapons, I can find nothing in the London Agreements to prevent such weapons from being given to Germany. It seems to me that this is the thin end of the wedge, because—as we know from Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery and, in fact, from others—all N.A.T.O. planning is based on the employment of nuclear weapons. Lord Montgomery has said in the most clear and candid terms that that is what they are doing, and that they certainly are planning to use nuclear weapons should the need arise. If German divisions are to be integrated into the N.A.T.O. Forces, then Germany must be given such knowledge of, and training in, nuclear weapons as has to be given to the other member States of N.A.T.O. I feel that these are matters which France, with her apprehensiveness about German rearmament, has to take very carefully into consideration. About this Armaments Control Agency, history shows quite conclusively that a nation such as Germany which sets its mind to "diddling" such an Agency always manages to do it; and it is simply wishful thinking to imagine that West Germany, once she has regained her independence, and whether she unites with East Germany or not, will not, little by little, create the forces that she wants and arm them as she pleases.

That is all I want to say on the subject of reunification, but I should like to conclude with two remarks which have nothing to do with that particular subject. I noticed only this morning that that well-known and able commentator, Mr. Sulzberger, in an article on the London Agreements said this: It is surely time that normal customs of diplomacy be resumed. The post-war trend towards diplomacy by conference, diplomacy by loudspeaker diplomacy by insult has been hysterical. He pleads very strongly, as I have said, for a return to the normal customs of diplomacy. I venture to say how strongly I agree with Mr. Sulzberger there. I think the one great valid criticism of flying is that it has enabled Ministers, statesmen and other such people to "flick" about the world far too much. I believe that it would be far better if they stayed at home more and left the conduct of diplomacy in the hands in which it was efficiently conducted in the past—those of our Ambassadors and our representatives abroad. I venture to hope that Her Majesty's Government will in future exercise what restraint they can upon these hectic methods of carrying on diplomacy to which Mr. Sulzberger has referred. The last thing I wish to say is this. In this matter of the London Agreements, I wish the Foreign Secretary most sincerely what I am sure is at this moment his own dearest wish: that the honour, the praise and the congratulation which he has received may be proved by time to be even less than his deserts, and that his immense, unselfish labours may work out in terms of greater security for Europe.

3.5 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

My Lords, although I was unavoidably prevented from being here yesterday, I hope I may be allowed to support my noble Leader's Resolution in a few words from the standpoint of defence. That, I am afraid, will prevent my following the noble Lord, Lord Winster, except in the last words which he spoke, which, of course, I heartily echo. I suppose it would be true to say that neither of these White Papers nor any Treaties of this kind can be of real, practical value unless the state of affairs for which they provide can be defended against the dangers which are envisaged.

I do not think it is too much to say that it has been a weakness up to now in the whole N.A.T.O. position that, whereas the Treaties themselves were thoroughly sound and admirable, they have not been matched by defence measures of equal strength. I have always felt that we could never match our defence measures to the Treaties unless the Western Powers were able to avail themselves of German territory and German manpower. We all realise that this has brought us to a very difficult subject. No one finds it easy to think kindly of the proposals made in the White Papers if, at the same time, we think of the two great wars and of war crimes. One has to go a little further back into history to recollect that, whatever may have been the experience of the 20th century, in the 18th century it was common for British and German troops to fight alongside each other, as the battle honours of many of our regiments show. From another point of view, no one who can think as far back as even 1939 or 1940 likes the idea of starting one's defensive arrangements with a front line on the Dutch and Belgian frontiers. That made no sense last time, and would make even less sense this time. But although those may be the lessons from the past, it does not in the least follow that the past will be the right guide to the future. In some respects, Yes, and in other respects, no doubt, No.

May I dwell for a moment on this question of where is the Eastern boundary of Western defence? We are in the same position as we were in 1940—the line is on the Dutch and Belgian frontiers. Even if front lines have not the same strategic meaning now as they had then, the position is really much the same. I think the position is much the same whether we are forced to think only of Western Germany, or whether it were possible to think of a re-unified Germany which, as the noble Lord, Lord Winster, has just said, is not possible at all. At any rate, from about 1947, when it was clear that the Russians were going to refuse Marshall Aid and that the Iron Curtain was coming down, we have in fact been faced with this choice of evils—if you like to put it so in respect of Germany—which the White Papers and the Nine-Power Agreement have now gone so far to resolve. We have either at this point to set our face against German rearmament (if we do that we have to take all the risks of an Iron Curtain on the Dutch frontier, and of air bases behind it) or we have to take what I suppose is a calculated risk—namely, to aim at a friendly Western Germany, at the same time accepting the risk of a reversion to Prussian or to Nazi ways.

I quite agree with what I read in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, that it is far too early to express optimism on the subject. It is far too early to express anything of that sort, particularly for anyone who has read that striking book The Nemesis of Power. But, to my mind, it is not really a question of optimism or pessimism; it is a question of whether we have here the possibility of something better. It is clear to me that without German rearmament we have the possibility only of confusion and disaster. With German rearmament we have a possibility of something better, and that is a possibility that Dr. Adenauer has brought much nearer to a probability than ever I thought was possible.

We then came to E.D.C. and we supported E.D.C., although, quite rightly, we reserved our own position under N.A.T.O. That is the position to which we have now come. But, whatever may be in the White Papers which we are to approve this afternoon, I consider that ever since the days of S.H.A.E.F. and General Eisenhower's early command we have been morally committed to making very much the same contribution as is now being laid down in the White Paper, in Section 3 of the Final Act and on page 37 of the Protocol. The change, the abandonment of E.D.C., does not affect the position of the United Kingdom a great deal so far as our commitments go, because, as I say, I think they have been morally there the whole time. What it does is to provide a much sounder military organisation, in that all the forces are now placed under the command of the Supreme Commander in Europe. There is a logical system of command, which it is always just as well to have if you are trying to make a defensive plan; and there is a control of supply, armaments, ammunition, transport, petrol and all those things which are not only necessary for a proper unified command but are bound, in themselves, to provide as much safeguard as anybody can provide at this stage against the dangers which some people see in German rearmament. Furthermore, that plan means that research into armaments is under proper control. So long as the German Agreement stands, that means that research into atomic energy will be for civilian purposes only.

So we get to a position where we are taking this calculated risk and are hoping to organise Western defence, including German rearmament, in what is described in the Nine Power Act as an atmosphere of "growing friendship." Those two words are very important, because, unless we thought that we could develop these plans in an atmosphere of growing friendship, it would be completely wrong and false to take the steps which we are taking now. That development of growing friendship, to my mind, is one of the prime necessities if these plans are to develop on the lines that we wish—growing integration of forces and growing common training on N.A.T.O. lines. A good deal has been done, with Germany outside, in last year's inter-Allied exercise "Battle Royal" in Germany, but we shall have to go a great deal further than that, and the Germans will have to come into the atmosphere which those who saw "Battle Royal" tell me was created there. We shall have to be especially careful and far-sighted about the arrangements for the training of leaders and specialists.

The Protocol refers to four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force. Seeing that we are bound to be on the brink of far-reaching changes in the organisation of defensive forces, both land and air, and no doubt sea, that expression "four divisions and the Second T.A.F." sounds perhaps a little old-fashioned; its meaning may have changed very much in a year's time or in two years' time. I do not know; but what is quite clear is that the shape of our contribution to Western defence and the shape of the contribution of every other nation will develop rapidly, and must do so, in the next few years, if it is to be of any defensive value against an aggressor from the East. I will leave that question there, because this is not the time when we should go at any length into the future of defence organisation in the West or anywhere else. I do not regard the future with such alarm as perhaps I might. I feel we have now a defence plan which includes all the Western nations whose inclusion is demanded by geography; and geography is something which we cannot alter and which we have to accept. It would not be true to say that our forces are yet fully adequate to the task which they have to do, but, at any rate, the White Papers give a sound basis on which to build and a sound organisation for command that is likely to work.

I do not think we can complete the picture for this country unless we take a short look at our other commitments as a member of the British Commonwealth. To start with, our home forces are not under N.A.T.O., and strategically it is extremely difficult—in fact, I think it is impossible—to separate the considerations affecting our home defence, which includes our civil defence and the use of our reserve forces in this country, from what is happening in Germany. If the White Papers do not provide for those two things to be studied together, common sense, I am sure, does provide for it. We shall find that those forces which before the First World War or the Second World War were at Aldershot or on Salisbury Plain will now be in Europe. It may easily turn out that that is a better place to station them, having regard to atomic warfare and other things. In any case, apart from the South African War, there have been few times when Europe was not the place for which we should hold our reserves. We have done so for the last fifty or sixty years and we have seldom found the need to send more than a small part of our free reserves to any other part of the world. So there again we are reaching a situation which is nothing new.

What, then, of the position of the other Commonwealth countries? We have the South-East Asian Treaty and we have the A.N.Z.U.S. Pact; but all these Treaties and Pacts really stem from the same source. They are all Treaties made in different regions of the world to take care of the same broad danger. I do not see for a moment how our commitment to keep these four divisions and the Second T.A.F. in Germany really conflicts with our obligations in other directions as a member of the Commonwealth, provided, of course, that we have enough troops under our own command to deal with emergency operations such as those we have had to deal with in Malaya and Kenya and which may arise again, though I hope they will not. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, I think made the same point at the beginning of his speech, and I agree with him. Canada is a party to these arrangements, and therefore she is in a different position from, shall we say, Australia and New Zealand. So I see no practical danger in any of these arrangements. In fact, one could put it the other way and say that these arrangements are completely complementary to S.E.A.T.O. and to A.N.Z.U.S. in their own spheres of the world.

As to cost, I doubt whether anybody who thought for a moment could say it was likely to be a sound basis for the Europe of the future that we should go on having our Army paid for by the Germans. I feel that if we attempted to keep up that state of affairs it would put off the day when a grand design like this could be accomplished. If there is to be any excess cost to this country in such arrangements it will be far outbalanced by the result, which I think will be a sound defence organisation, which can be built up (I hope not too slowly) to provide the strategical support which every diplomatic arrangement, however good, must surely need. Therefore, from the defence point of view, there should be nothing but relief that we have reached the diplomatic position to which we have now come.

3.22 p.m.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, unhappily it falls to my lot to be the last speaker on this subject from this side of the House. I say "unhappily," as it is only because my noble friend Lord Henderson is unwell that he is not able to take his proper part in this debate, in which his peculiar knowledge, gained from his Foreign Office experience in connection with the administration of affairs in Germany, would have been invaluable. It is a great loss to us to be without him to-day. Yesterday we had a remarkably good debate, and I felt that the longer I sat and listened the more humble I ought to be. I just could not take notes; I sat and listened. Except for two short parts of two speeches which were made during my absence, I heard all that was said and sat the whole time in the Chamber. One could not help but feel that one was up against very great issues, which one ought to approach in the most sincere manner possible. I thought these things over and remembered my experiences in Opposition in the years from 1931 to 1940, and all the great events which occurred then; and when I heard so many almost similar problems being debated the thought that struck me most was one that came to me first as a very young man, when reading Emerson's Essays—that we were once again at the hardest task in the world. I felt that very much yesterday. Emerson said: What is the hardest task in the world? To think, I would put myself in the attitude to look in the eye an abstract truth, and I cannot. I blench and I withdraw on this way and that. I seem to know what he meant who said 'No man can see God face to face and live.' We are dealing with such matters in the Treaties and Agreements that we have before us to-day, and the greatest consideration is required for what is the truth, as far as we can possibly find it out, before we come to our final criticisms or our final decisions.

The debate was opened by the noble Marquess the Lord President of the Council in his usual able and charming manner, and I have no criticism to offer of his brief presentation of the case to the House. I should like, however, to refer to one short passage in it, in which he expressed his view that the Brussels Treaty was brought in to protect Western Europe against a resurgent Germany. Whilst there is a background which would perhaps give some support to that impression, might I say to the noble Marquess, as I was connected directly with it, in that I signed with Ernest Bevin the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 and then was consulted on the defence aspects of the Brussels Treaty, that even before the Dunkirk Treaty in 1947 we were not, in the main, considering a resurgent Germany—at least not a resurgent Germany for a great many years to come. But there were immediate dangers to be faced if we were even to begin to approach such a process of stiffening in Western Europe as would give some hope of collective resistance to aggression.

I have said this before, but perhaps it is worth saying again. I remember that after about two and a half months of discussions in the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, a leading Frenchman said to me, "It is all very well for you, A.V., to talk as you are talking now, but tell me what is to prevent the Russian tanks from being in France in five to six days?" That was in 1946, nearly two years before the Brussels Treaty was signed. Anybody who went through that nightmare of discussions all day and very often all night for three and a half months could have few illusions about the direction in which a good deal of the Communist thought of the world was not merely going but had already gone. We must not lose sight of that fact.

I thought my noble and learned Leader yesterday made an excellent presentation of both the pros and the cons of the situation with which these agreements seek to deal, and I find myself very much in agreement with what he said. I have a great affection for my old friend, Lord Stansgate. We have perhaps more opinions in common than most. But I really could not understand why, in some of his comments yesterday, such a special attack was made upon the points of view expressed by our noble and learned Leader in this House. My noble friend, Lord Stansgate, was full of vigour and had plenty of scorn for the references made by the Leader of the Opposition here to the Navy and the Army; and Lord Stansgate commented on the fact that the noble and learned Earl had made no reference to the Royal Air Force. That was not quite a fair comment, because my noble and learned friend was referring to the Victorian period in which he had been brought up, and to the facts in regard to the main arms of defence in the Navy and the Army. He was not saying that at the present time the high maintenance and expansion of the Air Force should not be continued, but that he did not think that we had done quite enough in the naval direction. That is all he really said yesterday, and it hardly merited the sharp wrath which seemed to be behind the particular comment of my noble friend.

Then, I was rather struck with Lord Stansgate's reference to the comments made by my noble and learned Leader about the twelve divisions of German troops which may be added to the general Western Allied strength as a result of these Agreements. I wrote down what the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, said—namely, that it would not make a snap of the fingers difference to the balance of power as between the atomic powers, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. Well, I must say that I beg to differ very sharply from that view. Before I say why, the question springs to my mind right away: if my noble friend is right, why is Mr. Molotov so upset about it? That is the extraordinary thing. If, as the noble Lord, Lord Winster, said, speaking along the same lines as my noble friend Lord Stansgate, the twelve divisions from Germany are so illusory, how illusory must be our four; and yet how valuable those four divisions have been regarded by every one of the Western Allies with whom we have proceeded along the road to these Agreements! The question of whether or not the twelve German divisions would mean any difference in the balance of strength is perhaps best commented upon by Mr. Molotov's announcement. He says, "If you ratify these Agreements"—and, as my noble Leader said yesterday, everything depends on whether or not all the signatories ratify—"we will call a conference and go on with whoever may say they will come in." For what purpose? In order to strengthen still further the military security in Europe from their point of view. So he must feel that the effect of these Agreements will bring much added strength to the balance of power to which my noble friend referred yesterday.

LORD WINSTER

Mr. Molotov may be thinking more about the political consequences, rather than of military considerations with these Agreements.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Certainly.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My noble friend Lord Winster seems to agree very closely with the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, in this matter, and I will say a word about that. But I would observe that the noble Lord, Lord Winster, in his speech, though he agreed with a number of points made by Lord Stansgate, yet came to a completely opposite conclusion. He was certain in his mind that there was no possibility of ever getting a united Germany; for him, the division in Germany was final and complete. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, on the other hand, pointed out in his speech how widespread and deep is the feeling throughout Germany in favour of attaining a unified Germany. He indicated, by certain passages in his speech, that that feeling must be taken into account and that our action may do something to prevent that unification.

My noble friend Lord Winster spoke of there being possibly a political reaction to these Agreements. I have had a great deal of experience of Mr. Molotov in personal negotiations, and in matters purely of defence, not in the course of ordinary Foreign Office diplomacy. I saw a good deal of him in the Paris Peace Conference and on other occasions, and I am sure that he takes political account of such things. The question of security is bound to affect a country's political views—it certainly does with Russia. I firmly believe that the Russians are concerned lest the gathering strength represented by a set of Agreements like this may make it permanently impossible for the U.S.S.R. to achieve the task which that country has set itself— that of splitting the growing unity of the West. On the other hand, the Russians may be looking at this development in the light of events there now, judging by reports of what has been happening inside Russia, even within the last ten days. They may be faced with so much dissension at home that they are forced to see what can be done about it. We hear that there has been a widespread purge within the past few days, with wholesale dismissals from the Civil Service, with transfers of ordinary civil servants to the logging camps of Siberia or into agriculture and industry. All that hardly seems to indicate that everything is for the best in the best of all worlds.

My last point: I thought my noble friend Lord Winster overlooked the fact that my noble Leader, in his speech, went on to refer to the fact that it was not only the growing military strength gained by the twelve divisions that was important; there was also the hope of increasing unity in Western Europe which those divisions represented; the hope of perhaps doing something positive to bring to an end the long-standing bitterness between France and Germany. I agree with my noble Leader that one would be prepared to pay a fairly high price to achieve that end. As my noble friend Lord Stansgate feels so deeply on this question of German rearmament, I should perhaps say something more to him. He feels that it will not lead to the kind of unity in Germany that would reach the goal he himself has set in his mind. But during all the post-war years, until quite recently, I have been very fixed in my fears as to what the rearmament of Germany would mean. Unless there are proper controls, people are bound to have fears as to what will eventuate from that step.

The turning point in my mind, which took me finally and completely in the direction referred to by the last speaker on the other side of the House, the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, was my reading of the actual documents and papers presented at the Berlin Conference. As I listened to the case against the Treaty put by my noble friend yesterday, I could not help saying to myself "I wonder whether he has studied the papers put into Berlin by the Russian Government." Their plan then was certainly not to refrain from rearming Germany: they were prepared to see Germany rearmed, but rearmed on a basis different from that which will come about if Western Germany is integrated into the Allied forces of the West. In that way we should have seen a German rearmament without any of the controls that we seek to set up. I am not arguing that these are bound to be effective controls, but at least we are seeking to establish them. The Russian way would have meant rearming Germany straight away, with all the effect of this structure of a full German Staff, free to develop their own primary organisation of such forces in such manner as they desired for themselves.

I am sorry to keep on about the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, but he will understand that I do not want such heresies to remain in his mind. I would like to pluck him like a brand from the burning and see that he comes to a right point of view. The noble Viscount yesterday referred to the fact that it was strange that none of us on this side of the House had referred to the View of the Social Democrats in Germany. I thought that point was fully dealt with by our Leader in another place last week—and dealt with most effectively. I would ask my noble friend, if opposition to the agreements at the moment is so very important with regard to the German Social Democrats, what of the views of Social Democrats in France, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy? I will not say that all have always favoured, but certainly they now favour the basis of the Agreements that we are considering in this Motion to-day.

When I look back over the history of Socialist international conferences (and I can go back even beyond my noble friend's experience) I should say that, while we in this country have never regarded the German Social Democrats with anything but kind affection, we have not always taken them to be the best guide on policy of this kind. I should have thought, indeed, that our experience of the contribution of the German Social Democrats, which had so much to do with the break-up of the Weimar Republic after the First World War, offered at least a major warning to us of what may lie ahead. One other word before I leave this topic. The German Social Democrats had a big conference this year, and Herr Ollenhauer said this: Nor does our rejection of the E.D.C. signify refusal of a military contribution to the defence of the free world in all circumstances so long as Germany remains divided. That, I think, was a very important statement by the leader of the Social Democrats, even though they have not come to full agreement with ourselves about the matter. I apologise to the House for having had to clear these things up as between the noble Viscount. Lord Stansgate, and myself, and I am sorry to have taken up so much of your Lordships' time. I will try to be brief in dealing with one or two other matters to which I wish to refer.

I listened yesterday to the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, who spoke in his usual calm and thoughtful way. I do not want to mention anything of what he said, except that very effective part of his speech in which he referred to the belief held by some people that foreign policy and the practice of diplomacy necessarily mean the choice between evils. I do not think any of us who has had responsibility for some length of time in the past can ever have been far away from having, at some time or other, to deal with the problem of which is the lesser of two evils. The noble Earl will forgive me if I say to him that one of the most difficult choices his Government had to make before the war was in connection with a matter which led to the visit by representatives of the Opposition in another place—of which I was a member—on the night before Mr.Chamberlain was to fly to Bad Godesburg. I would recall it to the noble Earl's memory. I would recall it for the sake of my noble friend Lord Stansgate, because I do not think he will then feel that I am quite so much at variance, with all his radical ideas as he might have believed.

Mr. Chamberlain was going to fly to Bad Godesburg. We saw nothing but disaster in his doing so. Our view, which we stressed, was that when he went to Bad Godesburg Hitler would put up his price—as in fact he did. We said that if Mr. Chamberlain was going to leave this country to fly somewhere, the best place for him to fly to was not Bad Godesburg but Moscow; but the choice had to be made, and the Government made their choice. They, no doubt, thought that they were choosing the lesser of two evils. And that is the position: it is an election of the risk which has to be taken. With all the rest of the speech of the noble Earl, I agree. The choice which we have to-day to make is that of the lesser evil, and I have no doubt which is the lesser evil. We have to choose whether to approve the Agreements or, as some people have been advocating so eloquently, to do nothing until (as my noble friend Lord Archibald said) we have reached a greater measure of common ground between ourselves and the Soviet? What happens in the meantime? Is it possible to maintain without stress or break the present status quo in Western Germany, while matters remain the same in Eastern Germany? I can see no answer from that point of view at all. That is one of the main reasons why I feel that I must approve the action proposed by the Government.

I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Harvey of Tasburgh, who spoke to us yesterday, on his maiden speech. I thought it was an excellent one. I wish that I had more time left to comment upon it. Certainly in his final words he seemed to me to state the position clearly. If he will not mind my doing so, to satisfy myself I would just add this to what he said: half of Europe united and free is better than no European unity at all in face of the danger of losing freedom altogether. So the noble Lord will see that we are completely at one in what he said in his peroration yesterday evening.

Now I should like to refer briefly to the question of the cost of this Agreement. I was rather unhappy about the debate on this subject in another place. I thought that the case put by my right honourable friend Mr. Hugh Gaitskell was very reasonable, effective and searching, and none of us seems to have been completely satisfied with the answer made on that occasion by the present Minister of Defence. I am, to say the least, a little unhappy about it. I do not think it is any answer to say that the forces which we are to have in Europe would cost just as much if we had them at home: I do not think they would. I think that if they are not tied to the extra commitments in Germany at any time, there are ways and means of economy which become open to the military authorities. But I am not arguing upon that aspect. I am arguing that there is such a change occasioned in the financial burden falling upon this country for our continuing maintenance of the four divisions, and the other ancillary British forces required for the purposes of the Agreement in that country, that unless we are very careful, we shall be landed in a position in which, compared with some of the other partners in this particular Alliance, Western Union, as well as the other nations within N.A.T.O., we shall be bearing far more than our fair share of the burden—which means, of course, a heavier burden on the British taxpayer.

On the question of National Service I speak with feeling, for I was the Minister responsible for introducing it in peace time in another place. There is a good deal of feeling in the country about the length of service now required. My own view is that, while the strength of the Forces concerned remains what it is at present, we have not yet arrived at the stage where we are in a position to reduce the length of service. I do say, however, that it is very unfair on parents and families in this country generally, that we should have to bear the burden of two years' National Service while other nations which are our partners in the Agreement do not bear an equal burden. The same thought must come to our mind with regard to the apportionment of costs.

After listening to the views of the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, as to what would be the possible changes in shape, form, organisation, equipment and objectives of the forces on the Continent in the future I imagine that there is likely to be heavy and increasing expenditure. Indeed, only yesterday, in one more of those declarations by the Supreme Commander of S.H.A.P.E., I noticed that he said (I do not know where he got his figures from) that the Russian strength in the air was something over 9,000 machines, mostly jet fighters. And he went on to say that we should require to increase our strength. I wish that when military commanders make use of figures like these they would say where they obtain them. Moreover, I am really getting sick to death of these big pronouncements being made by military commanders and not, as they ought to be, by the proper representatives of the responsible Governments. But it serves to dot the "i's" and cross the "t's" of that part of the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, which related to the possible increase in cost. I think it has been well said in another place that we ought to be considering what line we should take at the Council of N.A.T.O., as well as at whatever Council may be set up for Western Union, to see that every country concerned bears its legitimate and proper portion of the cost of this system of collective defence into which we are proposing to enter.

The other thing I would say about the Agreements is that there is a widespread dubiety about the system of controls. In another maiden speech of great power made yesterday, the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, ventured to express what he thought was neither a bias of hope nor a bias of fear, and I think his speech showed fairly clearly that he shared the doubts in the minds of many other people about whether the controls to be set up by the Agreements are really going to be effective. Two speeches from above the gangway on this side of the House, by the noble Lords, Lord Layton and Lord Grantchester, also showed this widespread doubt about the effectiveness of the control. I cannot speak on the question of checking supplies, ammunition and the rest like the noble Lord, Lord Layton, with his long experience at the Ministry of Supply, but I know a little about it, and I should have thought that we needed a great deal more clarity from the Government before there was general ratification, so that we might understand exactly how far we were committed to a control which was effective and which safeguarded our interest, as well as the interests of everybody else, and which would clearly be some guarantee against any regression of the other side.

I come to my last point, which I am tempted to make because of what the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester said yesterday, and I make it in the most humble way I can. The right reverend Prelate declared (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 189, cols. 1874–5): … the integration of Germany with the Western Allies provides the necessary foundation of stability, and a common purpose in the West, which is the only basis … for seeking an understanding with the East. I want my noble friends who may have had a few arguments with me this afternoon to believe me sincerely when I say that I am very anxious to have an understanding with the East. I am shocked at the idea in the Molotov statement to Pravda which says in advance that if we ratify these Agreements, then there is no value in any subsequent negotiations. I sincerely want there to be negotiations, and effective ones, but I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester that the most effective change that could possibly be imagined at the present time is a change of a spiritual kind. I do not know whether other noble Lords listened to that part of his speech in which he made reference to the work of the German Evangelical Church in forming one, at least, if not more, of the bridges linking West and East Germany which have been mentioned from time to time. I am very glad to hear that.

The right reverend Prelate said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 189, col. 1875): … the German Evangelical Church is the one corporate body which unites both East and West. And he spoke of a great conference, a Kirchentag at Leipzig recently of a great number of representatives both from the East and West German Protestant Churches. Could we not help in that direction? The right reverend Prelate said he hoped that the Churches would be able to help. After all, those of us who have been through all kinds of political experiences have to sit down very often and acknowledge our failure—not a personal failure entirely, but often due to collective policy, to Party and the like—and it does us good sometimes to study history a little and see what past experience has been. I would say, although I am sure it is only a generalisation and a very rough one, that the greatest days of this country were when we had an efficient lead under a Protestant policy. Nobody could have been more moved than I was two years ago, as I should have been at any other time in similar circumstances, to see the Lord Chancellor of your Lordships' House approach the Throne on his knee, to present to the new Sovereign the solemn Declaration to maintain the Protestant Faith before the new Sovereign could open her first Parliament.

When we hear from the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester of what the German Evangelical Church are already doing, apparently as between East and West, to bring about good feeling and communion, I should like to think that when we are dealing with these matters we shall be pursuing the same kind of anxious endeavour to raise the tone and continuity of effort of our spiritual life here. I do not believe that there is going to be any cure for the problems that man has set for himself when, as now, he is so near the Creator in handling all the concomitants of the earth but has neither justice nor the integrity of God to know how to handle them properly. Unless we can have that spiritual approach, I do not believe we shall ever reach in our time, or in our children's time, the kind of progress towards eternal peace that we all so much desire. I approve of the Agreements.

3.57 p.m.

THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING)

My Lords, the ratification of the various Agreements entered into in Paris is, of course, an Executive act, but in a matter of this importance it is obvious that any Government would desire, before carrying out the final stage of ratification, to secure the express support of Parliament; and, by Parliament, I mean both Houses of Parliament. It is in those circumstances that this Resolution standing in the name of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House has come to be debated in your Lordships' House. If I may say so, the quality of the speeches to which we have listened yesterday and to-day evidences the wisdom of any Government in consulting the opinion of your Lordships on a matter of this moment. In addition to speeches from noble Lords with whose performances we are more familiar, we have had admirable maiden speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Harvey of Tasburgh and Lord Russell of Liverpool, speeches instructed and impressive, with all the added weight behind them of the speakers' own personal and recent experience of two of the countries vitally concerned in the whole of these arrangements. On behalf of noble Lords on this side of the House and certainly on my own behalf, I would add how much we regret the absence from this debate of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, whose contributions for many years past to these discussions of foreign affairs have been so moderate, so wise and so appealing to all sides of the House, that we particularly regret his absence on an occasion of this importance.

Her Majesty's Government are grateful for the very substantial measure of support for these Agreements which they have received from Members of your Lordships' House in the course of this debate. There have been signs of opposition from one or two noble Lords but, on the whole, even if there have been reservations—and reservations are not really surprising in a matter of this range and complexity—those who have expressed uncertainty on some points have given their general support to the Resolution of my noble friend. I would also express to noble Lords on all sides of the House appreciation for what has been said about the part which my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has played in enabling these Agreements which we are now discussing to be reached.

It is never an easy task to wind up a debate of some length, although I admit it is somewhat less onerous if there has been a break in the debate. This subject has been so widely and fully discussed, both inside and outside Parliament, that I should not feel justified in taking up a great deal of your Lordships' time; but in the course of the debate a number of specific questions have been put to me which I should like to answer, so far as my competence permits, as I have always endeavoured to answer questions raised by your Lordships. Then, having done that, I should like to deal briefly with the major arguments which have been raised against the Treaties which this Resolution desires to approve. Much of the ground I proposed to cover in my speech has already been most helpfully covered by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. He took up a number of points which it would otherwise have fallen to me to take up, and dealt with them so effectively that I can omit them. May I then attempt to deal with these specific questions, if that be a convenient method of proceeding?

The first question which arose in the course of the debate was the inquiry made by the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, as to what would be the position if one of the signatories failed to ratify the Agreements we are discussing. The position as he put it was perfectly correct: the Agreements stand or fall by the assent of all. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, in the course of his speech asked what my noble friend meant when he said that we should have to pay for our forces, whether they were in Europe or not. What I take my noble friend to have meant was no more and no less than this—and in it, surely, he was perfectly correct. So long as we have our forces in Germany we have really two different types of expenditure: we have capital expenditure, which has to be spent on barracks and accommodation of various kinds; and we have a certain measure of running costs. Whether the troops are in Germany, in England or anywhere else, we have throughout carried the burden of paying them and rationing them. That cost has not fallen upon the Germans.

The German contribution has been devoted to the capital cost—the building of living accommodation and storage accommodation; the provision of signal communications; the cost of moving troops and freight, and, to a substantial extent, the supply of labour force, the supplement to the R.E.M.E. strength, and so forth. If we brought the troops back to this country, or sent them elsewhere than Germany, we should still have to meet the costs of their normal pay, of their rationing and their clothing. That. I believe, is what my noble friend meant when he said that we should have to pay for our forces whether they were in Europe or not. But there do remain what have come to be called support costs, which are the provisions under the various heads I have specified which Germany has been making; and some measure of those costs, though not necessarily all, will in the future have to be borne by this country. But that was going to happen at some moment in any case, unless we contemplated that the Germans would be prepared to continue paying the costs of Occupation into the indefinite future.

The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, also asked, in a slight geographical divergence from Germany, what we were going to do to reassure Czechoslovakia and Poland about their frontiers. I cannot help thinking that the noble Viscount, in putting those questions and suggesting that there might come a moment when the Germans would turn upon Czechoslovakia or upon Poland, had an erroneous conception of what the position was going to be. He seemed to think that if we entered into these Agreements with Germany, and enabled Germany to produce a certain number of troops, we were then going to form a protective screen round Germany and let her go for anybody she wanted to go for. But that is not the basis of this arrangement at all. The basis of this arrangement is that all who come into it integrate their forces into it; they become even partners in the organisation which is set up; and the Germans are not free to go off and carry on some armed expedition of their own. The whole of the German forces come under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander. Unless it is thought that all the members of the Council of Ministers of N.A.T.O. are going to approve of Germany's assaulting the frontiers of Poland, or assaulting the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, and that the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe is going to lend himself to a venture of that kind, the situation which the noble Viscount was pressing upon us surely could not possibly arise. I think that is the answer to the point that he was then putting. I will deal later with some of the other things which he said.

The noble Lord, Lord Layton, asked me a certain number of questions which I should perhaps have endeavoured to answer in the chronological order in which the speeches were made. The first point he raised was whether the military arrangements under the Paris Agreement were as good as those in the European Defence Community Treaty. It may be that to some people the arrangements in the European Defence Community Treaty look better than those now under consideration, but I think the advantage in appearance is largely a paper one, and that actually the arrangements which we are now seeking to adopt will prove to be the more practicable and the more workmanlike. Anyhow, the arrangements which we are now discussing have the substantial advantage over the European Defence Community, from the European angle, that they do contain these four British divisions. The noble Lord also asked a question about the inspection of factories, and whether it covered all the production of the countries who were parties to these Agreements or was in any way limited, The noble Lord will find that it is expressly provided (I think it is in Article 9 of Protocol No. 4) that the operations of the Agency will be confined to the mainland of Europe. We are not part of the mainland of Europe; nor are the French possessions in North Africa. They are excluded.

The noble Lord also asked about the proposal for an arms pool which has been somewhat ventilated, particularly by the President of the Council of Ministers in France. If the noble Lord looks at the White Paper he will find on page 51 what he wants, because this proposal was considered when these discussions were proceeding—and they were proceeding at a fairly intensive pace, as the noble Lord will realise, and there was no time to deal with everything in detail—but it was not thought possible to come to any firm conclusion about it without a good deal more investigation. A Working Party representing the various countries concerned was set up to consider the possibilities. It is due to meet in Paris on January 17. No detailed scheme has yet been received from the French or, indeed, from any other quarter.

LORD LAYTON

In regard to the previous question, what I asked was whether, in fact, the production of this country would be subject to inspection and, if so, whether it would apply only to the production of the armaments to be supplied to the troops in Europe. It seems to me a little difficult, if there is to be a check upon British armament production, to confine it to part only of the British production.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I rather hoped that I had dealt with that matter. It will concern only the actual operations of the Armaments Agency, the inspection of plants and so forth on the mainland of Europe, and the plants, depôts and forces in the United Kingdom will not be subject to inspection. I think that answers a little more fully what the noble Lord had in mind.

He also raised the question of our relations with the Council of Europe, and the same point was made, I think in slightly different terms by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, who spoke later yesterday. It is, of course, quite accurate to say that the Paris Agree ments provide for a separate Assembly, a Western European Assembly. There are two reasons which make it impossible for the Council of Europe Assembly to deal with the matters which the Western European Union has to consider. The first is that the parties to Western European Union and the parties to the Council of Europe are not the same. The second is that the Council of Europe, if my recollection is right, is not in a position to consider matters of defence. As these are essentially matters of defence, it seems that we should require a separate body to deal with that, consisting of the nations which are directly concerned. It is very important, I think, that there should be a close liaison between the two bodies, and that liaison can perhaps best be maintained by making the persons who attend these two bodies as far as possible the same persons, and by having both meetings at Strasbourg and even, possibly, one following upon the other. In view of those two difficulties, I think that is the nearest one can get to a satisfactory arrangement between the two, and I see no reason why it should not be perfectly satisfactory.

The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, asked in whom was the political control of these arrangements vested. I do not think I can answer him more categorically than by quoting to him what was said by my noble friend the Foreign Secretary on the 17th of this month in the first day's debate in another place, in which he said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 533 (No. 182) Col. 416]: All the Foreign Ministers will be members of the Western European Union. They are representatives of their countries. … It would be N.A.T.O. which would deal with that. A military event of that kind affecting Europe would be one which we, as members of N.A.T.O. … would deal with. It is the organisation which would deal with it. He goes on a little later to say: It is not an organisation to take military action in the sense of moving because there has been an attack. It is an organisation, so far as it is military, to see to certain controls, A report would be made to the Council of Ministers and it would be for them to take decisions. The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, also asked whether the German contribution to Western defence was a maximum and a minimum contribution. It is in effect, as has been said more than once, a ceiling. It is to that extent a maximum contribution, but that does not mean that one does not hope that they will not be able to attain to that maximum as soon as possible.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, asked about the timetable for the formation of these German contingents. There is no timetable laid down in any of the documents concerned. The two years' period which has cropped up on various occasions in the course of these discussions comes, I think, from a statement which was made by Herr Blank some little time ago, and which was subsequently published in the German official Gazette, and thereby given an official backing. But I do not think that anybody has ever clearly committed themselves to two years. It was merely an expression of opinion, and it may be found that it will take rather longer than that to achieve.

I shall attempt to deal with the other questions which came up when I turn to the general principles raised in the course of the debate.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Is the noble Marquess in that part of his speech going to refer to the prospects for the conference with the Russians?

THE MARQUESS OF READING

Yes.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Thank you.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

The first of these main questions is the question, which has been raised not only here but in a good many other contexts, about the advisability of arming Germany at all. Of course, that has been gone through over and over again. As my noble friend Lord Salisbury said in opening this debate, the question is not as between arms and no arms: the question is as between controlled armament or uncontrolled armament. But this question is not, after all, a new question any more. It goes back over almost exactly four years, to the statement made by the late Mr. Bevin in another place on November 29, 1950, when he said: If, unhappily aggression were to take place in Europe, we are satisfied that its defence would have to take place as far east as possible and that means that Western Germany must be involved; and if Western Germany is to be defended, it seems to us only fair and reasonable that the people of Western Germany should help in their own defence. On that basis, laid down by the late Mr. Bevin, the Government of this country, Labour and Conservative, have proceeded ever since.

It is not only we who have come forward with proposals for the arming of Germany, because, in March, 1952, amongst other documents received by us from the Soviet Government was a draft of a peace treaty for Germany, containing what they called the fundamentals of peace. Under the heading of "Military Provisions," these two items occur: Germany will be permitted to have its national armed forces (land, air and naval) necessary for defence of the country."— I would ask, in parenthesis: Who says what is necessary for the defence of the country?— Germany is permitted to produce military materials and matériel, the quantity or types of which must not go beyond the confines of what is required for the armed forces established for Germany by the peace treaty. Looking at that document, I wonder whether the Russians themselves always bear it in mind when they are denouncing what they call the resurgence of Nazism in Germany; because one of the paragraphs in that document lays down as an express term of the conditions of peace for Germany that: All former Servicemen of the German Army, including officers and generals, all former Nazis, save for those who are serving terms on convictions for crimes which they committed, must be granted civil and political rights on a par with all other German citizens for taking part in the building of a peace-loving democratic Germany. If, in 1952, the Russians thought that these Nazi generals were capable of "taking part in the building of a peace-loving democratic Germany," then it is a little difficult to see why in these past two years they have got so excited about the possibility—and it is only a possibility—of any of them appearing in the reconstituted army of Germany. When we are considering this question of the remilitarisation of Germany, ought we not also to bear in mind that there are now up to 130,000 armed men in East Germany who have been armed with the permission, and indeed with the active encouragement, of the Russians, and not take to ourselves all the blame for the remilitarisation of anybody in Germany?

Some doubt has been cast upon the value of these twelve divisions. I think that the case for them was strongly and convincingly put by my right honourable friend the present Minister of Defence— and he was supported this afternoon by one of his predecessors, the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough—when he, with all the military advice which is at his disposal, said quite definitely in another place, in the course of the debate on that subject, that there was a real value to Western defence in the possession of these divisions. After all, that is the purpose of our seeking to raise them. We are not seeking to raise them as a sort of abstract gesture: frankly, it is because, in our view, they will be of value to us in building up the resistance of the West as a deterrent to any threat which might come to us from the other side of the Iron Curtain.

A certain number of doubts have been expressed as to the value and validity of the controls. The noble Viscount who spoke last asked for greater clarity in regard to controls. I think that if one looks through the White Paper it is not difficult to follow the system which is proposed. That is a system which has been carefully thought out and most deliberately devised as being the most effective that can be produced for the particular purpose. When comparisons are made between the system of controls to-day and the position in 1919, when certainly there was substantial evasion by the Germans of the controls which were then sought to be put into operation, one has perhaps to remember three things. The first is that then they were imposed upon the German people as part of the terms of the Peace Treaty; and some people, anyhow, having come to the conclusion that they were imposed on them against their will under what came to be known later as the diktat of Versailles, started out to get round these provisions. To-day the controls are not imposed; they are the result of the consent of the German Government themselves. They are voluntarily assumed, instead of being imposed from without. Moreover, we have now a different system in that after the First World War (and then only for a time) there was occupation of what may be called the fringes of Germany, whereas now we have British, American and French troops actually in Germany, and in a very much better position to see if there are evasions on a major scale in the areas where they are quartered.

I suggest also that it is likely that the Germans will accept the system of controls now because the conditions imposed in 1919 were imposed on a beaten enemy because she was a beaten enemy. They were discriminatory against her because they were directed against her alone. The present conditions of control are not discriminatory because they apply equally to Germany and to all the other countries who are parties to this arrangement. That, I suggest, makes a difference psychologically to the German approach to the controls to which they are now asked to assent. The system of inspection seems to me very thorough and practicable, and, although you may be able to raise certain points of criticism and say: "This is rather weak; this may be evaded," and you may pick holes in it from one angle or another, here again we have to remember that we are entering into the whole of this arrangement as partners with the other countries concerned and that we have to assume that there is going to be fair and proper collaboration between these various countries. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, talked about "growing friendship," and that I think is a very valuable object to have in mind.

There is, of course, a fear in the hearts of a great many people of a resurgence of the Nazi elements in Germany. Not only is there a fear for the future, but there is a memory of the past. Few of us can, I think, be so forgiving as to pretend that time has erased from our minds all recollection of what took place in that country, or, under the agency of Hitler's Germany, in other countries, for a number of years leading up to and during the war. What we have got to consider now is: are we going to encourage that sort of spirit to re-emerge, or are we going to do what is in our power to prevent its re-emergence? If we are to prevent its re-emergence, is not the most effective way we can set about it by leading Germany back into the community of Western nations, as an equal and a fellow and a friend? I know it is not easy for some people to swallow that proposal; yet, in the wider interests of the security of Europe and the preservation of freedom in the world, it is surely something which has to be accepted if we are to have any hope for the future. The best way of strengthening any movement of the kind that we have known in the past in Germany is surely to continue in occupation of Germany and to refuse to accept her in any sense as a partner in any military undertaking. If you do that, you can hope for only one reaction.

The dominating consideration in our minds in dealing with the question of the rearmament of Germany is to bring Germany back into the Western European community. It is quite true that some of the Social Democrats in Germany are opposed to any such idea; but, still, the freely elected, and not so remotely freely elected, Government of Germany is the body which has to make the decision in this matter. Surely, that Government, which, up till now, has shown itself a good and faithful friend and partner of ours and of the other Western nations in all the undertakings which we have shared with them, cannot be asked to wait indefinitely for re-admittance to the fellowship of United Nations.

When noble Lords talk about postponing this action for five years or eight years, or whatever period it may be, what do they think Germany is going to do in the interval? What do they think the position will be when those years have expired? Do they really believe that the opportunity which exists to-day is going to be kept somewhere in cold storage for eight years, until we choose to turn to Germany again and say, "All that we have withheld from you for the past eight years, by our benevolence and graciousness we give to you now"? What do they think will be the reaction to that? What do noble Lords who have expressed fears that Germany will turn to the East feel about the possibility of delaying this change in the status of Germany for five or eight years? Do they not think that nothing could be more calculated to make Germany look East than if she knew that she had nothing to hope for from the West until another period of five or eight years had passed away, and she was left in her present inferior status? My Lords, to my mind, that is the greatest danger of all. She is much more likely to turn to the East if we of the West fail her now.

May I, in passing from these more general observations, say only a few words about the speeches of the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and the noble Lord, Lord Archibald, for the reason not that I wish in any way to cause them to blush, but merely because they were the spearhead of such attack as there was upon the Treaty. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, plunged rather more deeply into past history than I have any intention of doing at this stage. He was inclined to make the case that in the past we have always endeavoured to make things difficult for Russia—if not actually to attack Russia, nevertheless to show our hostility to Russia in every way. He went back to the times of Kolchah and Denikin, and the rest. But can he come a little nearer the present than that? Can he remember the moment in the course of the last war when the Germans turned upon Russia, and when the Prime Minister overnight pledged the resources of this country to Russia's help? Can he remember not what happened some years ago, but the amount of help that we sent into Russia through Persia, and the lengths to which we went to make that help possible—the preparation of railways, of shipping, and everything else? Can he remember, too, the voyages which were undertaken to Murmansk and the losses which we incurred, not only in ships and goods but in lives, in carrying out that attempt to give to the Russians the fullest possible succour we could out of our own strained resources? And will the noble Viscount remember that we did not get a great deal in exchange for that, except grumbling about the inadequate quantity of goods supplied and some complaints about the absence of a second front.

My Lords, the blame does not rest exclusively upon us. I should only like to say this further to the noble Viscount. I cannot let what he said about Austria pass without some comment, because the position that he was trying to depict in regard to Austria was, as he said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 189, col. 1843), that It is imposing on the credulity of the public to pretend that by the simple signature of some document Austria can be put where she wants to be. The position of Austria is the same as that of Germany: she is one of The States in the balance, and until we get a general detente Austria cannot look for the full independence she desites. I cannot accept the argument that the position of Austria and the position of Germany are the same in this respect. In regard to Germany, there are vigorous differences between us and the Russians about the way in which the situation should be handled, and perhaps notably over the question of free elections.

But that is not the position with regard to Austria. So far as we and those associated with us are concerned, the position with regard to Austria is perfectly clear. There was a Treaty to which the Russians had proposed certain amendments. We said at the Berlin Conference that we would accept that, with the amendments that they had proposed. We thought, perhaps rather guilelessly, that having accepted all the Treaty provisions except for one or two points upon which they made amendments, and we having accepted the amendments, they would accept. Not at all. Back we went into a situation in which there were stipulations raised for the first time about the length of time troops were to be kept in Austria and so on; and in spite of the concessions which the Austrian Foreign Minister was prepared, then and there, to make in that regard, we got no further with an Austrian treaty. It is really quite wrong and unfair, and quite inaccurate in history, to say that the Austrian and German positions are the same; that they must be so regarded and that Austria must be taken as one of the States in the balance in these negotiations, just as is Germany. There is no obstacle to the signing of a Treaty with Austria to-morrow except the Soviet refusal to sign a Treaty to which, at one point, they had fully agreed. That is the real difference between the position of Germany and the position of Austria.

I would say one more thing to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. He accused Her Majesty's Government of being disciples of Senator Knowland in the sense that they regard peaceful co-existence as merely a Trojan Horse, by which he meant presumably that they are so afraid of Communism that they are unprepared to go anywhere or any way to meet the Russians. How often must my right honourable friend and other members of Her Majesty's Government repeat that the policy of peaceful co-existence is the one which they support as having the greatest possibilities for an arrangement for the future, in order to obtain the noble Viscount's credence? It has been said time and again, and why the noble Viscount now says we regard peaceful co-existence as a Trojan Horse I find it difficult to understand.

The noble Lord, Lord Archibald, in his speech asked a rather curious question: what was it we really wanted? Did we, he asked, want the twelve divisions or did we want a united Germany? That is a completely false alternative; we want both. We want the twelve divisions for the reasons I have given, because we believe they will be valuable in strengthening the defensive power of the West. We want the unity of Germany because we believe it to be wrong that Germany should be divided, and that if the unification of Germany can be obtained certainly that is the best solution to seek. The noble Lord suggested, first, that we did not want unification, and secondly, that we considered unification was no longer a possibility. Both those premises are inaccurate.

LORD ARCHIBALD

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Marquess for a moment? I did not suggest that myself. I said there are some people who take that view and I asked what was the view of Her Majesty's Government. I did not impute any view to Her Majesty's Government.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I am obliged to the noble Lord and apologise if I have misrepresented him, but I certainly thought, from what he said, that he regarded Her Majesty's Government as amongst those who were not very hopeful of German reunification. If that is not so I withdraw anything I may have said on that subject. What we do not accept is the notion put forward that ratification should not take place until there has been some form of prolonged negotiation and some further discussion. In our view it is essential that nothing should interfere with the process of ratification of these Agreements, for the reason not that we want them in order to block the prospect of further negotiations but that we want them in order to conduct those negotiations from a position which we have strengthened by bringing into greater unity the countries of Western Europe.

The noble Lord, Lord Archibald, also called attention to a report of an interview which Mr. Molotov had given to Pravda, in which he stated that he was prepared to contemplate free elections in Germany. The noble Lord said he did not think proper attention had been given to that matter. I would only say that at the time of the Berlin Conference my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary put forward perfectly plain and specific proposals in regard to the way in which elections in Germany should be carried out. Those proposals were rejected by the Russians and no constructive or detailed alternative has ever been put forward. If this was a change of opinion on the part of Mr. Molotov and if he was prepared now to accept the proposals for elections which my right honourable friend made at Berlin, surely it was very strange to communicate that change of view to a reporter of Pravda at a time when we were being almost showered with notes from the Russians making different proposals in regard to negotiations which might take place before ratification. If so much importance was to be attached to this particular proposal one would have expected the Foreign Office to receive it, rather than the reporter of Pravda.

When we talk about free and democratic elections and the use of the ballot box, and so on, it is perhaps not un-illuminating to look back just a few weeks to the elections which took place in East Germany and to reflect that those elections took place with a poll such as would be very gratifying in by-elections or even in general elections in this country. Practically 100 per cent. of the people turned out and recorded their vote, which again, if I may make a digression, does not quite fit in with what the noble Lord, Lord Winster, was telling us about the political apathy of people of East Germany. The fact remains that practically 100 per cent. of the East Germans turned out to vote, and, that election having taken place, we were informed by Communist worthies in various countries that it was a great triumph for democratic election methods and that we should regard with admiration the political consciousness of the people of East Germany. It is quite true that there were ballot boxes and that if people wished or were courageous enough to use them they could do so; but it is also true that the people were encouraged to demonstrate their admiration for the existing regime by recording their vote publicly outside the ballot room. So that anybody who did go inside to record his ballot was, by the mere fact of going into that room, a marked man. That may be an admirable method of electioneering but it does not happen to be what we regard as free democratic elections by secret ballot. The noble Lord will therefore, I feel sure, excuse us if we feel that before we leap at any offer of this kind we should have rather more details about how far the proposals which were put forward at Berlin would contain what we believe to be the indisputable characteristics of a free election, and how far those principles have now found acceptance with the Soviet Government.

But the position in regard to unification is as I have said. Certainly we believe it to be possible, and it is the prime object of our policy. I was struck by the same contradiction or inconsistency that struck the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, by which Lord Stansgate called our attention to the universal cry for unification going on in both East and West Germany, whereas Lord Winster painted us a picture of a rosy glow suffusing the whole of life in East Germany, and each country going forward quite happily by itself and wanting only to be left alone. It is clearly the view of Her Majesty's Government that the object to be sought is the reunification of Germany by peaceful means. That remains in the forefront of our policy as regards Germany. There have been many expressions of opinion in this debate as to the need for further conversations with the Russians, and from that view Her Majesty's Government certainly do not dissent. We are ready, and have always been ready, to discuss matters with the Russians, if we feel that there is, before we enter into those discussions, a real prospect of fruitful talks. Progress is not assisted by the failure of a conference. Before going into a conference one wants to know that there is at least a reasonable prospect of the results of that conference being, successful.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

May I ask a question? The noble Viscount is always so courteous on these occasions, and I know he will appreciate that we feel this is a matter which arises a very acute form, and that we hope for this conference. Yesterday President Eisenhower held a Press conference and he said that one of the first conditions was that it should be more fruitful—he used the very word which the noble Marquess has just used. Asked what that meant, he said that some measure of German rearmament must be in existence. The noble Marquess to-day, and M. Mendès-France yesterday, said that that would take two or three years. What is in our hearts—and the noble Marquess knows that we are sincere—is the fear that such a conference should be postponed and postponed. We believe that an arms race without a conference can have only one possible end.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

We have no desire to see an arms race. What we desire is that we should go into a conference with the added strength that would be given to us by the ratification of these Treaties. We want also the probability of a fruitful result, particularly on the question of free elections, on the lines that we have already suggested to the Russians. The noble Viscount, I think, is unreasonable if he expects me at this stage to say exactly upon what terms we are prepared to talk to the Russians. Certainly we are anxious to arrive at any solution which may lower still further the temperature in Europe. But in a public debate of this kind to lay down exactly what free conditions there are for actually meeting in conference, would not, I think, assist that conference to come to a valuable conclusion.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, we on this side are not very much divided on this one point at any rate. Our feeling is that if we are in favour of the Agreement, then as soon as ratification is finished, we should not be sluggardly, if I may use that term, in making the approach for a conference. If we have said to Russia: "We cannot go further in this matter until we have agreed." we should not in any way be ashamed of going a considerable way ourselves to initiate the conference.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I am not ruling out anything by what I have said. All I said was that I could not be expected to say on what exact terms we were going to talk to the Russians about these matters.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, I put the definite question to the noble Marquess. President Eisenhower said that it would depend on some measure of German rearmament, which could hardly be achieved by May. What has the noble Marquess to say to that?

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I have not even seen the precise statement made by President Eisenhower. All I am saying is—and I am not going to be persuaded by the noble Marquess to go further—

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Thank you.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

The noble Viscount demoted me just now, so I thought that I might perhaps promote him. As I was saying, one cannot at this stage state on what conditions and at what precise moment we are going to take any steps towards opening negotiations with the Russians. That does not mean for one moment—and I ask the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, also to bear this in mind—that we are not anxious, if we see any reasonable hope of these negotiations proving fruitful, to take those steps as soon as we properly can. That is as much as I, or anyone else, can say until the immediate future is clearer than it is to-day.

Much hangs on these Agreements, and among the important things that depend upon them is the increased possibility of better relations not only between East and West but between Germany and France. That is, in my view, a most important and most hopeful aspect of these Agreements, and that has been, I think, confirmed by speeches from both Dr. Adenauer and M. Mendeès-France in the immediate past. But as regards the main question, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, was right in saying that the point of no return with respect to these particular Agreements has now been reached. Risks there may be—risks to which attention has been called. Indeed, risks there are. But no great imaginative undertaking has ever proceeded without a substantial element of risk being involved in it. I believe that if we use these new Agreements with wise foresight and steady purpose—and that is what we shall strive to do—we can hope to use them in the best interests of the world at large, which is in the promotion of peace.

On Question, Motion agreed to, and resolved accordingly.