OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICES

HL Deb 08 December 1954 vol 190 cc287-326

3.40 p.m.

LORD BIRDWOOD rose to call attention to the Summary of the Report of the Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Overseas Information Services (The Drogheda Report, Cmd. 9138); to ask Her Majesty's Government what action is proposed to be taken thereon; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in presenting this Motion, I would first say that I well realise that there may be some of your Lordships with more experience of the operation of information services overseas, and of the great issues involved, than I can claim. It so happens, however, that at one time I was very mildly associated with the Central Office of Information. My only other qualification for raising this matter is that, having spent most of my time abroad, I have, perhaps, seen my own country as others see it. I therefore feel very deeply that the message which goes forth from these shores should be a strong message, a clear message, and a message that reflects all that is great and enduring in the life of our country, whether it be in the sphere of culture or technology, or in the projection of our views in international affairs. At this stage I would say that, for my pant, I regard this matter as beyond the reach of Party politics, and I aim no shafts at any Government or at any particular Party or individual.

It may be of use to your Lordships if I first recall briefly the story of these services. The departments concerned are the overseas information departments of the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade. In addition, there are three agencies—the Central Office of Information, The British Council and the external services of the B.B.C. Typical of our method, these offices grew up haphazardly, unrelated to any central plan. If it is true that we achieved a Commonwealth and Empire in absentmindedness, the same might be said of the way in which we told the world of our achievement. That is not necessarily a criticism; it is merely a statement of fact. To a very real extent the pace was set for us by others, particularly by Italy and Germany in the 1930's. Then came the war, when again, characteristically, we throw ourselves wholeheartedly into the great purpose of harnessing every information agency available to the one purpose of defeating the enemy on his home front as the indispensable complement of the defeat which our armies had to inflict in the field.

Before we come to consider the details of the summary, I would emphasise that once again there is an enemy undefeated on his home front. If I may elaborate that idea for one moment, I believe that some of your Lordships would agree that fear is now a motive so entrenched in the minds of the leadership on either side of the Iron Curtain as to make the prospect of a Third World War recede so as to become but a hypothetical issue. I think the noble Marquess the Leader of the House subscribed to that view in the recent debate on foreign affairs. But in deriving any satisfaction from the new situation, let us note that all we have done is to transfer our warfare from the battlefield to the conference table; or, more specifically for the purpose of this debate, to millions of listening sets in millions of homes all over the world. Therefore, to-day the weapons are not guns but words, For these reasons, I have thought it only intelligent not to confine myself to urging Her Majesty's Government to implement the positive recommendations of the Drogheda Report but also to drawing attention to the profound implications of psychological warfare behind this machinery of information, this great weapon which is ours either to use or misuse.

To continue the story, after the war it was rightly seen that the high-pressure measures which had operated under the Ministry of Information could no longer be sustained. The M.O.I. went and the Central Office of Information took its place. This time responsibility for policy was transferred to four offices, the "policy departments" of the four Government Departments that I have previously mentioned. The C.O.I. became a servicing agency, supplying material, mostly in the form of literature and films, to the four Government Departments. That, I think, is a logical situation which we all accept as satisfactory. I am certainly satisfied, after talking to many of those concerned and after studying the Drogheda Report, that it is a far more economical arrangement that the alternative, that each of the four Departments should be entirely responsible for handling its own publicity. The Drogheda Report drew attention to the fact that the C.O.I., unlike the B.B.C. and the British Council, has no charter; it senses itself isolated up in Baker Street, and rather feels that it is nobody's child. I hope that that matter may one day be put right.

There followed after the war the scramble for economy and, of course, the information services were the first to suffer. Here I do not think I can do better than quote from the Report: So far as we can judge, this has not been done in accordance with any plan which took into account the needs of the country for propaganda abroad but by a series of annual cuts in which the total amount available for all overseas information work was reduced by an arbitrary figure. The Departments were then left to fight out among themselves how the reduced total should be divided between them. To complete the story, in 1952 an official Committee was set up to examine the problem. That Committee reported on July 14. Sixteen days later, on July 30, we were told of the appointment of a Committee of unofficial individuals outside the Government. Accordingly, in October, 1952, the Committee, under the chairmanship of the noble Earl, Lord Drogheda, assumed their task. They worked hard and fast, and their report was with the Government in July, 1933, although it was not until April, 1954, that the public knew anything of the matter, when the summary which we are now discussing was published. On July 6 there was a long debate in another place, when we were given to understand that the Government were still considering their action. On November 8, in answer to a Question in another place, the Foreign Secretary gave us some hope, in that he indicated that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to implement the recommendations of the Drogheda Report provided that rising costs had not, in the meanwhile, eaten up the extra funds made available.

I have drawn attention to this timetable in order to indicate that, to some of us, this matter seems to have pursued its rather laborious course, without that sense of urgency which we might have hoped would be attached to so great a task as telling the world of our methods and our intentions. Let me give your Lordships the main figures concerned. In 1952, we were spending about £10 million a year on these overseas information services—a figure which at that time represented one-quarter of one per cent. of the national expenditure. The Drogheda Committee have recommended increases amounting to £1,845,000. That figure excludes rising costs, and it also excludes certain urgent capital expenditure which the B.B.C. consider essential if they are to place their overseas services in adequate competition on the international air. Allowing for these two contingencies—rising costs and capital expenditure—the total annual sum which the Committee regard as necessary is 12½ million. The amount spent by the Americans for similar purposes, I would point out, is £65 million, and I note that in August of this year President Eisenhower, addressing the American Legion in Washington, said that for every dollar spent in America on propaganda the Soviet were spending the equivalent of 50 dollars in their own country. If his figure is anywhere near correct, our own estimates of Soviet expenditure are certainly far short of the mark. So much for the figures. In passing, let us note that an expenditure of some £20 million, which is the sum I personally should welcome, would be a little over 1 per cent. of the Defence Estimates for this year, which stand at the figure of £1,640 million—an interesting comparison, in view of the legitimate conclusion that words are equally weapons with guns.

Now I come to the actual recommendations of the Committee, with some of which, I may say, I find myself in disagreement. I would also stress that I found this summary a most refreshing and able review of these great matters; if I may say so with great respect, for me, unlike many reports, it was good reading. I can highlight only a few of the matters of priority importance as I view them. It is a matter of opinion only, and I cannot touch on any other subjects which I do not view as of primary importance. We have seen only the summary and I think we must be content with that, for obvious reasons. Certainly it gives us sufficient food for thought on the main principles. All I am going to do is to select two of the agencies, the British Council and the B.B.C., for some comment on the recommendations. I will say a word about the higher organisation of information services, and I link with that this vital matter of psychological warfare.

The British Council has been criticised and even ridiculed. I feel that to deny the value of the British Council is to deny the whole contribution which arts and the sciences can make to life itself. I regard the British Council as merely a manifestation that we in these islands sometimes set store by values other than those of economic advantage. But there is this to note about the British Council: that it works to long-term methods and it looks for long-term results. It has no association whatsoever with politics—indeed, if it had, its work would immediately be suspect in many countries. It strives to make known our achievements in the arts and sciences; it exhibits British pictures; it looks after British artists; and it teaches the English language, surely a vital matter in connection with the expansion of our overseas trade. All those are matters which might be described as representing an invisible asset and paying an invisible dividend. Nevertheless, I suggest that over the years visible results emerge, certainly in the political sphere, and sometimes even in the sphere of economic advance.

I understand that the recommendations of the Committee in regard to the British Council's activities in Europe have already been implemented, and it is therefore no use crying over spilt milk. The recommendations, of course, were to effect great reductions. But I would single out one controversial feature of the recommendations, and that is the Committee's tendency to put their trust in the cultural attaché working at an Embassy in preference to the British Council. If, as I have suggested, this British Council work is highly specialised work, it might have been more reasonable to suppose that the cultural attaché could with advantage be moved over to the British Council office.

To be fair to the Committee, they do make it clear that they make their recommendations in regard to Europe with an eye to economy, so as to be able to make funds available elsewhere; and by "elsewhere" they leave us in no doubt that they mean Asia, and particularly India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Unfortunately, at about this time a Government decision was taken to reduce the British Council work in India, Pakistan and Ceylon. I am making no criticism; I am concerned only with principles. I ask myself, as a matter of principle, a simple question: Are the interests of the British Commonwealth served or not served by an increase in the work in those three countries? To my mind, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the answer. If I could frame a specific question to Her Majesty's Government, it would be to ask whether they are prepared at this moment to put up extra funds for a revival and an expansion of the work in those three countries.

If one is justified in applying the test of Commonwealth interest in one area of the Commonwealth, one could equally apply it in another, and the answer would surely be the same. I therefore find the Committee's recommendations that the work should be reduced in Australia and New Zealand somewhat confusing. Once again the cultural attachés at the High Commissioner's offices are to be used. It seems to me that the Committee have applied a regional basis for their judgment, rather than treating the matter as one for one overall Commonwealth policy. We are concerned to encourage the great conception of a multi-racial Commonwealth. Therefore, to send out the same message from these shores, whether the recipients at the other end be Asians, Africans or Anglo-Saxons, can only be an assistance towards that great goal. For these reasons, I would urge that the British Council be allowed to put into force their own ideas about work in Canada, where there is overwhelming cultural pressure from Canada's great neighbour, and where, indeed, anything to do with the life of this country and its projection is welcomed by Canadians themselves.

Before leaving the subject of the British Council I would refer to their work on behalf of students. I hope that perhaps one of your Lordships who is to speak may refer to that great work. It would be tragic if anything were done to jeopardise the work on behalf of Colonial students which was assumed from the Colonial Office in 1952. The Committee have recommended increases for the British Council of £630,000 a year, thereby restoring the Council's total grant roughly to what it was in 1948–49. But, more important for the British Council, is the fact that they would at last know what their position is. They would be able to plan. Hitherto they have lived from year to year, unable to plan, unable to recruit, and unable to offer security of tenure of appointment, without which they will never be able to enlist the best material available in the future. I am sure your Lordships will all agree that in this kind of work anything less than the best is a danger rather than an asset.

I come now to the recommendations in the case of the B.B.C., where the Committee have recommended increased expenditure of some £485,000 a year. Again I can only highlight, as I see them, the matters of urgent priority. I am going to refer to the recommendation to decrease the work in Europe and to cease broadcasting to seven European countries, and also to the work in the Far East I will take, first of all, the controversial recommendation to cease broadcasting to France and six other European countries. I take the case of France only because many of the features that apply to France apply elsewhere. In a general sense, it may seem strange that at the very time when we are attempting to cement both the friendship and the defensive strength of Western Europe, departing from some of our most ancient, firmly entrenched traditions, we should be considering the abandonment of these information services. Our Army in Western Europe is an expensive but essential feature of a "New Look" in our policy. But if our information services are not in step with that policy, I suggest that we are neglecting the elementary principle of co-ordination.

In France the daily listeners to the B.B.C. number 500,000. The casual listeners might number anything up to 4 million or 5 million. Moreover, the daily listeners—who number, incidentally, a figure greater than the daily circulation of the newspapers Humanité, Figaro and Le Monde—may be regarded as men of discrimination and intelligence, but it is not what one might term an "Embassy" audience. I emphasise this point because here it seems there is a fundamental difference of approach between the B.B.C. and the Committee. The Committee take the view expressed in Paragraphs 7 and 53 that it would be better to reach the influential few, thereby implying that the influential few would pass on the message to the many. It is an attractive proposition, but it cuts right across the whole principle of broadcasting.

LORD HADEN-GUEST

May I ask the noble Lord whether he can say at what time of the day the French people listen to broadcasts?

LORD BIRDWOOD

I am afraid I have no information on that point. The B.B.C. figures are taken and accurately checked by many means, and doubtless they would have the answer. I am afraid I do not know at what time of the day actual listening is more predominant.

The services to France and Italy were started in 1938. Others followed in the latter years, to Spain and Portugal in 1939 and, subsequently, to the Scandinavian countries. Many of the permanent listeners in those countries will feel that a friend has wilfully cut off his friendship, and all for a saving amounting to about £135,000 a year. The Drogheda Report indicates in Paragraph 53 that the Committee consider that the money would be better spent by building up the Foreign Office Information Services, thereby reaching the influential few in preference to a mass audience. This exclusive fringe is, of course, not a cross-section of the public. It consists mainly of professors, journalists and editors—and I agree that it is essential to reach the foreign Press. But the voice that reaches the public is the voice that comes straight from London, and how invaluable that is. It is able, therefore, to put a British interpretation on such a matter as the North Atlantic Treaty, in contrast to a local interpretation which would be placed on it by the local editor who receives his Press hand-out from the local Embassy Press officer. It has been claimed for the B.B.C. that they do more effective work for the North Atlantic Treaty than do the home services themselves in those countries, and I can well believe it.

But perhaps even more important is this: that as we go off the air, somebody else inevitably comes in and snatches up the vacant wave-length. Bearing in mind that Western Europe still harbours perhaps the most effective Communist groups outside the Soviet orbit, it needs little imagination to know the very great danger to which Europe would be exposed. Therefore, I urge that no action be taken on these recommendations to terminate the broadcasting to seven European countries. I suggest that broadcasting is not to be used like water out of a tap, to be turned on and off at will. But if and when a decision is taken to reduce broadcasting to these countries the fade-out must be so gradual as to be almost imperceptible.

I come now to the recommendations in connection with the Far East, and here I suggest it is imperative that the recommendations for developing the friendship of Asians be implemented. Specifically, the proposal is that the transmitting station at Tebrau, near Singapore, be developed from its existing two high-powered transmitters to four high-powered transmitters. At present, the station may be regarded as firing on only four out of six cylinders. The Committee say in Paragraph 63: The B.B.C. signal, though relayed from Tebrau is much too weak to be well heard. I say, with a full sense of responsibility and weighing my words, that those who are responsible for the conduct of our affairs in the Far East in these days are not so much concerned with the distant intentions of Communist China as they are with the confusions of policy and purpose in which Malaya's nearer neighbours are floundering—confusions which offer all those familiar opportunities for bringing down these citadels from within by the familiar "Trojan horse" technique. If that be anywhere near the truth, what overwhelming significance attaches to the message which should go out widely and strongly from this station, Tebrau! I have picked on this one item as of priority importance and, indeed, so far as broadcasting is concerned, the needs of the situation are concentrated in this single demand.

Now I come to the final feature, and that is, some observations about organisation in general and, linked up with that, the need to try to reach this vast mass of mankind from whom we are now separated. In Paragraph 7 the Committee say: Winning the cold war is but one of a number of the current aims of our information work. That is true. But if that particular war could be won, perhaps all the other aims and objects would fade. There is, of course, no central command, nor does it seem there can be one unless we are prepared to revive the Ministry of Information under a responsible Minister. At present, the official committee under Foreign Office chairmanship meets rather too spasmodically. For day-to-day purposes of co-ordination, I believe it works happily enough as a team, but I am wondering whether its operation for purposes of more importance is successful.

Your Lordships will remember the Drogheda Committee comment in Paragraph 4 to which I referred earlier, suggesting that there was a certain amount of inter-departmental scrambling when it came to a matter of carving up the available funds. Is this official committee sufficient to settle a matter of that nature? For example, suppose the B.B.C. and the Central Office of Information fall out, as indeed they well might, the B.B.C. clamouring for more money to set up its radio services and the Central Office of Information needing the money to increase and place on a proper basis its London Press services which of course service all the Foreign Office information bases abroad. If there is a tussle of that sort, who decides? It may be that the existing machinery is adequate, but the Drogheda Report seems to think that that is not the case. If the noble Marquess in his reply can offer any solution to that problem I shall be grateful. There are two alternatives mentioned by the Committee. The first is that a permanent advisory committee of independent people should sit at the elbow of the official Committee. One wonders whether it would ever be able to devote the time or offer the concentrated knowledge which alone could make its work effective. I prefer the other alternative suggested, namely, that there should be a kind of periodic administrative audit of the work.

More important, from my point of view, is a matter to which I can refer only as my belief that there is a missing link. In explanation, may I refer to the relationship at present between the B.B.C. and the Government. The procedure now is that the B.B.C. inform themselves of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and they then become entirely responsible for the subject matter which they broadcast. For normal purposes that is logical and probably quite adequate, but I suggest that we have to reconsider all ways and means when it comes to a matter of reaching the Iron Curtain public. My suggestion is that there should be a somewhat fundamental change. I put forward the suggestion in humility. I ask that Her Majesty's Government may be prepared sometimes to come to the microphone and take charge, and say quite clearly: "This is the voice of the elected Government of the people of Britain speaking. These are our views on the North Atlantic Treaty, and these are the reasons why we hold those views. You in the Soviets have heard that our workers are worked to death seven days a week, with no paid holidays. Come over to our country, if you believe that, and see for yourselves. We will give you the facilities for doing that."

The ability to do that seems to me to imply that there should be somebody in the Government studying the whole technique of psychological warfare, not only as a matter of general policy but in daily tactics. When I say "daily tactics," I admittedly include a whole range of activities outside the scope of information services. I would include such considerations as the possibility of sending pamphlet-balloons into the Eastern European countries, as the Americans do, or sending an invitation to a Soviet deputation to come over here and watch the operation of a free Election, and so on. Nothing would be excluded. I suggest that possibly there might be a small specialist office set up to study every move in the game, to study the thousand little incidents happening all over the world, to consider the action which is necessary and then to relate that action to the operation of the Overseas Information Services. It is the apparent absence of such an agency which leads me to suggest that there is somewhere a missing link.

All those who have returned from Iron Curtain countries tell us repeatedly that ignorance of our own country is complete. After all, we have nothing on the ground such as a local Communist party represents in relation to a Communist Embassy. We have only the B.B.C. and such other contacts as we can develop. The Committee have referred to the part that can be played by private enterprise. I am suggesting that, for this purpose only, the B.B.C., together with private enterprise, is perhaps not quite sufficient.

I would urge, therefore, that we should approach this matter of winning this war of ideas in something of a new spirit of missionary zeal. Our armies were brave enough in the field, but it seems to me that, when it comes to this other type of warfare, too often a kind of mental paralysis sets in, and time and again the initiative is left with the totalitarian States. "Let the message of democracy just spread itself and sow its own seeds, regarding time as some kind of a healer" —that is our mood. And yet, if we leave it at that, time will be against us. Does not democracy include every freedom except the one freedom which would allow itself to be slowly destroyed? In that sense, I suggest that we must borrow from the technique which is used against us, never, of course, in the content of the message but in the means by which we see that the message gets to its destination. In conclusion, I would say this. If I have talked of war or an enemy, I have done so in no sense whatsoever of setting nation against nation, Nor do I see these Overseas Information Services fitting into a co-existence as recently defined by Mr. Saburov of the State Planning Commission of the Soviet. Our duty surely is never to accept a stalemate; it is to pass over to the offensive; to win the mass mind in that other world to some understanding of freedom; to take the initiative, rejoicing in so great and so challenging a task. To that end, the speedy implementation of the positive recommendations in this summary is a good start. I beg to move for Papers.

VISCOUNT ESHER

My Lords, before my noble friend Lord Reading replies, would the noble Lord tell me what makes him say that the British Council has nothing to do with politics? It is well known that the British Council is under the complete control of the Foreign Office and that it switches its services backwards and forwards in accordance with that policy.

4.16 p.m.

THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING)

My Lords, I think it will be convenient if I follow immediately after the noble Lord who has moved this Motion and try to give your Lordships some indication of Her Majesty's Government's response to his various questions. Then, if necessary, my noble friend Lord Munster will reply at the end of what looks like being a short debate. May I say one word? I hope that it will be possible for me to be present right through the debate, but unfortunately I have another public engagement of some importance, and if I have to go before the very end I hope that the House will not regard it in any way as a discourtesy. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, raised this subject, and raised it in so helpful and constructive a mood. His speech, I think, has covered a great deal of the ground and raised a number of interesting points which have been in the minds of some of your Lordships for some time.

Her Majesty's Government decided, soon after they came into office, in October, 1951, that some long-term plan was necessary to deal with the question of the Overseas Information Services. As the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, indicated, the then existing system was an inheritance from the war-time Ministry of Information, and an inheritance which had come down in a somewhat chaotic condition and had to be sorted out and re-applied in the different conditions obtaining in peace time. But although these services were, to all intents and purposes, a new service in peace time, it had become quite obvious by the end of the war that they could not possibly be dispensed with or contracted to their former somewhat negligible size. But they had been, I think, in the years after the war, victims of annual financial slashes which may have been inevitable in the circumstances but were too often applied at the last moment and without any appearance of particular plan or policy being behind them. Clearly, that kind of summary reduction was discouraging and frustrating to those carrying on the service. It therefore became necessary to take stock and to try, so far as possible, to work out some settled policy which would guide the advance for some years ahead.

In those circumstances, after the official inquiry to which reference has been made, the Drogheda Committee itself came into being, charged to examine the political aspect and the necessities of information work overseas. Her Majesty's Government's gratitude is due to the noble Earl and his colleagues for the work of this Committee. My regret is that the noble Earl himself is unable, owing to, I hope, only temporary ill-health, to be here this afternoon, and I am sure that the whole House would desire his speedy recovery and return, not only in his official but in his personal capacity.

My Lords, this Committee did a notable and valuable piece of work. They not only considered a great deal of evidence, both oral and written, in this country, but they themselves travelled widely in order to see things on the ground. My recollection is that the noble Earl personally undertook a somewhat arduous journey to Singapore and other countries of South and South-East Asia and to the Middle East, in order to inspect the position on the ground; and in every way the Committee fully realised and discharged the considerable responsibilities placed upon them.

This is, of course, an immense and a complex problem. The Report which the Committee produced is a most valuable analysis, both of the potentialities and the limitations of the Overseas Information Services. As regards the British Council, and indeed the other services, may I say just this personal word? As your Lordships know, even if only on account of my occasional somewhat prolonged absences from your Lordships' House, I myself have, in the course of the last three years, travelled not inconsiderably on official duty, and I have tried to visit the premises of the information service and to discuss the position with those responsible for carrying on the work. I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, said in his speech about the value of the services which the British Council contributes.

In itself the Committee's Report is detailed and comprehensive and, not unnaturally, it has required considerable thought on the part of Her Majesty's Government. If the noble Earl and his colleagues feel that the delay has been excessive, I can only say to them, quite sincerely, that it has been due to the very real desire of Her Majesty's Government to go as far as possible with them in the recommendations which they have produced. But the trouble is—and it is obvious to your Lordships—that those services are extremely expensive Another factor which we must always bear in mind is that, owing to rising costs throughout the world, they become more expensive with each year that passes. The result, unhappily, is that much of the money that should have been available for the expansion of all these various services has to be devoted not to expansion but simply to meeting the increased cost of the existing services; and in all these cases the cost of expansion has to be added to the cost of maintenance.

At the same time, we realise how powerful a weapon these services are, and how large are the sums which must be spent upon similar, or largely similar, activities, in the Communist countries. It is easy to make comparisons and to say to the Government, "You are spending this much on armaments, but you are spending only this much on psychological warfare." That is a matter which stands out from any discussion of this kind. The noble Lord who moved the Motion need not be under the impression in any way that Her Majesty's Government do not attach importance to psychological warfare; nor need he be under the impression that those responsible in this country for carrying it on are inexpert in the task allotted to them. But my Lords, when that argument is put forward about the proportion spent as between the Iron Curtain countries and the other countries, we must remember that we have very little idea of how much those countries are spending on armaments. Although a proportion might be fixed between the respective allocations to armaments and to information services in this country, it is not easy to fix the same proportion in the other countries, because few, if any, of the figures necessary, are available from those countries.

As the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, has already told the House, Her Majesty's Government are spending £10¼ million a year on these information services. That is not a contemptuous sum. If the recommendations of the Drogheda Committee were adopted, they would add another £2½ million to that figure, without taking into account the element, to which I have already referred, of rising costs. That would be a substantial extra burden. After all, even in these days, when we are accustomed to talk in very large figures, £2½ million is not a small figure, particularly when Her Majesty's Government are trying to cut down wherever they can the level of spending by the Government, which is a regular subject of criticism. If one were to respond to all the requests for extra expenditure, of course no possible cutting down would occur anywhere.

I agree that priorities have to be taken into account, and we have given every possible consideration to the claims of the information services. But Her Majesty's Government have been forced, reluctantly, to conclude that although this £2½ million—and, no doubt, a great deal more if it were available—could be usefully spent on the lines of the Drogheda Committee recommendations, nevertheless they must confine themselves, in present circumstances, to a more modest increase. It is vitally important that these services should not be treated like an accordion and alternately expanded and contracted. So far as possible, there must be a basic plan which is both flexible and efficient. It is no use building up in one year an impressive superstructure if it is going to be knocked down the next year because the money is not there to maintain it in working order. A practice of that kind only disorganises the services themselves and creates great resentment in the countries which they are supposed to serve and in which they are designed to promote better relations with this country. As the Drogheda Committee themselves firmly emphasise, there must be continuity.

Therefore, my Lords, rather than attempt anything spectacular but precarious, Her Majesty's Government prefer to work to a more sober and a more durable plan. They intend, therefore, first to consolidate and to streamline our existing services, and gradually to expand them in what are judged to be the key areas. The question of key areas is one of considerable importance because, after all, these are apt to vary as the whole international situation changes. Her Majesty's Government want to protect, so far as they can, the whole system of information services from the financial vicissitudes of the future. Our expansion programme has therefore, admittedly, been modest.

After meeting the rising costs (a not unimportant element), about £100,000 was provided in this financial year. Next year, we hope to provide approximately the same sum. With this additional money, combined with some re-allocation of our existing resources, we hope to continue next year, at something like the same rate of advance, the expansion programme initiated this year and to do so along the following broad lines. First, further steps will be taken in 1955–56 to strengthen the Foreign Office Information Service in South-East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Secondly, there will be some expansion of our information service in Canada, to which the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, made particular reference. Thirdly, so far as the Colonial Office aspect goes, three information offices are being established this year in the Colonial Empire, at Lagos, Accra and Port of Spain. These will be brought into full operation during the next financial year.

Then, as the Drogheda Committee have themselves recommended, expenditure by the British Council in Europe is being somewhat curtailed, and the money thus saved used to improve the headquarters services towards key areas. Apart from this, new money will be provided in 1955–56 in order to strengthen British Council Offices in South-East Asia, to establish an office in Kuwait, on the Persian Gulf, and to reopen the office in Persia. An office will also be established in British Honduras. Finally, the Central Office of Information is taking action to improve the London Press Service, which, as noble Lords will know, is essential for the efficient running of our information services overseas, and also to increase the supply of films for use overseas, including films suitable for the important new medium of television in countries where that device is available to the population.

Those steps forward follow the general course of the Drogheda Report. There must, however, be a certain flexibility in our plans if only in order to meet new needs as they arise with changing circumstances. Indeed, some of the needs of to-day could not have been readily anticipated by the Drogheda Committee when they were considering their Report. I have just referred to the need for the British Council to return to Persia; that is an example of the new demands which changes in international circumstances prescribe. Another example is the need, for which we are making provision in the plan for 1955–56, to play our part in various cultural activities in which a number of countries are prepared to take part. In particular, if I may give another illustration, we attach a good deal of importance to the interesting experiments in cultural co-operation of this kind which have been carried out under the Brussels Treaty Organisation, and which will no doubt continue to be carried out on similar lines when the Brussels Treaty Organisation changes (as we hope it will change) its identity into the Western European Union. I have in mind, as an example, a project now afoot for a meeting in this country next year of heads of various universities in the area covered by the Brussels Treaty who will meet to discuss common cultural questions arising out of their common experience of university life in their respective countries. Those are useful activities which are likely to grow in scope and importance as time goes on.

Apart from the Brussels Treaty development, Her Majesty's Government, in common with their partners in membership of the Council of Europe, will in the very near future be signing a European Cultural Convention within the framework of which cultural co-operation will be carried out among the member States of the Council of Europe. That principle will, I believe, appeal to noble Lords. These are, of course, new ventures in the early stages of development but capable of being of very substantial value, and financial provision is being made for them.

The External Services of the B.B.C. have presented a difficult problem he-cause, if for no other reason, of the much larger sums of money involved in broadcasting as compared with other media for the dissemination of information. The current grant in aid to broadcasting amounts to over £4½ million, which again is a substantial amount to produce from the Exchequer; and to carry out any of the major schemes for expansion which the Drogheda Committee recommend would not only add considerably to that figure but would require substantially larger sums than Her Majesty's Government feel able at present to provide. The noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, devoted particular attention to Tebrau, and there may well be advantages in increasing the power of that station on the lines suggested by the noble Lord, although other considerations, apart from the financial aspect of the matter, would have to be taken into account before a favourable decision could be made. In fact, to do the actual construction at that station as advocated by the noble Lord would cost, by way of capital expenditure, £550,000; and in addition to capital expenditure there would be an increased operating cost annually of £140,000. Those are large figures when one has, at best, a limited total available and one must be very sure of getting one's money's worth, before actually embarking upon a project. One must be very sure of being in a position to produce the money which, frankly, at the moment Her Majesty's Government are not.

It is our policy at present to maintain approximately the existing level of broadcasting, which includes, of course, programmes directed to the Iron Curtain countries, the importance of which we by no means underrate; but I think it is not unfair when looking at this picture to take into account the whole mass of the broadcasting from the free countries. The full blast of broadcasting from N.A.T.O. countries and Yugoslavia com- bined, reduced into terms of hours is very substantially in excess of the output in hours which flows from the Iron Curtain countries. If one takes the whole into account—as think one must, because, as with all N.A.T.O. activities, it is a combined operation—the picture is more reassuring than if one were to take each country in isolation.

The noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, said something about the position of Europe in regard to broadcasting. It has been decided not to abolish for next year any of the Western European Services. Towards the end of his speech the noble Lord said something about the position of the B.B.C. and his recommendation—his own recommendation, not the Committee's recommendation—that someone, I do not exactly know who, should go to the microphone and address the Iron Curtain countries. I am inclined to think that the great strength of the B.B.C. is that it is not the voice of the Government, and that anything on the lines that the noble Lord has suggested would, even though only intermittently resorted to, undermine the independence of the B.B.C. in these matters, and would lend to give form to the suspicion already prevalent in many countries that what the B.B.C. said was the voice of the Government. One would require to give the matter long and careful consideration before one committed oneself to a change which aright affect a valuable principle of independence.

Finally, I should like to say a word on the subject of commercial publicity, which is, of course, designed to assist our exports and generally to build up our prestige in the world overseas as a great industrial power. At a very rough estimate, about one-third of the output of our information offices overseas is now devoted to commercial publicity, and this proportion is considerably higher in certain areas—I instance Latin America—where our main interests are essentially commercial rather than political. But there is a limit to what the Overseas Information Services can be expected to do in this field, and effective results must depend on the combined efforts of Her Majesty's Government and private enterprise. Again, to give an illustration of what can be done by that combination between Her Majesty's Government and private enterprise, I would cite what was, by all accounts, an extremely successful industrial fair which has very recently been held in Baghdad. The fair itself was the production of British industry, but a great deal of assistance was given to it by Her Majesty's Government through the Information Services.

In order to secure the closest possible collaboration between the Information Services and British industry, the Board of Trade, as was announced on November 2 in another place, have set up a standing advisory committee of businessmen, the chairman of which is Mr. Lawrence Heyworth of Unilevers, who was himself a member of the Drogheda Committee. I am sure the House will approve of this step taken by my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade. This Committee is now at work, and Her Majesty's Government are confident that it will be able greatly to assist the Information Services in the very important commercial field.

Her Majesty's Government's policy for the Overseas Information Services can perhaps be summed up in a few words. It is one of stability and consolidation, combined with a realignment of the services in the general directions recommended by the Drogheda Committee. In furtherance of this policy there has been during the present year, as we hope there will be also next year, some expansion in what we judge to be the key areas. There is the picture. It is not perhaps all that the House or the country might wish if unlimited funds were at our disposal. But, though we realise the force of the claims put forward, we must move forward steadily and let the pace of the advance be governed by sound financial considerations. We have to do here, as in many other fields, not what we should like to do, but what we can do; and we are doing what we properly can, though we are very conscious of the need, when circumstances permit, for further steady expansion of the structure which we are now engaged in building on prudent, but certainly not on niggardly lines.

4.48 p.m.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

My Lords, I think we must all agree with the noble Marquess that we owe a debt to the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, for giving us the opportunity of discussing this important matter. The projection of Britain overseas is a matter of profound concern, not only to this country but to the whole of the Commonwealth and to the rest of the free world; and the present system, and any improvements and alterations that may be made in it, are surely matters that should be discussed on their merits and without regard to Party politics. And in the atmosphere of this House I believe that it is easy to discuss these matters in that way. Another thing that we owe to the noble Lord's Motion is that he has brought a galaxy of senior Ministers from the Front Bench opposite into this debate. I feel perhaps that the speakers —at any rate myself—are hardly worthy of the compliment that has been paid to them by the Government. I hope that the compliment was mainly addressed to the importance of the subject matter.

We have now heard from the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, a statement of policy of the utmost importance, and that will be a matter for very careful consideration by all concerned in our information services, and by Members of both Houses of Parliament who have taken a keen interest in this subject. I like to think that there is one thing, at least, which I share with the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood. I have, like him, taken a small part in the work of our Overseas Information Services. We have both been, for a short while, cogs in the machine. We spoke under the auspices of the British Information Services in the United States of America about two years ago. He went South, fortunately for him; I went to the bleaker regions of the North and East. But we both had a similar opportunity of studying the operation of the Foreign Office Information Service in the United States at first hand.

I had two distinct impressions; one of them happy, the other less happy. The first of these impressions was of the great value and importance of our Information Service, and of all those who work for it in the United States, as a means of influencing American public opinion. The second impression was of the disastrous effect of the uncertainty about the future on the morale of our information personnel. Some of them were leaving; others had already left, to take up secure, well-paid jobs in outside employment—and who can blame them? Many of them were wondering how soon another cut would be made which would result in their discharge from the service. These people in America are just an example of the many thousands employed at home and overseas in the Government's Overseas Information Services who have been in the same predicament of profound uncertainty and insecurity ever since these cuts started after the war. I am certain that the efficiency of these services has been seriously undermined by the uncertainty resulting from the absence of any long-term policy, and the Drogheda Committee Report, to which we all owe so much, would have been thoroughly useful and entirely justified if it had been limited to one recommendation: that there should be a long-term policy for our Overseas Information Services and that Her Majesty's Government should be pledged to find the finances for such a policy.

If I may, I wish to reserve my detailed comment on what the noble Marquess has said until I have had an opportunity of studying the OFFICIAL REPORT, but I should like to say this: I think that what he has said is, in fact, the foundation for a long-term plan or policy for our Overseas Information Services. It is a programme of the gradual expansion of these services, and Her Majesty's Government are pledged to find the money for this degree of expansion. That was how I understood the broad statement of the noble Marquess, and I think we shall all be grateful for that. At the same time—and I am sure he will not take it amiss if I say so—it seems to me that this was perhaps a half-hearted plan, at least from the point of view of those who would have liked something based on fuller acceptance of the recommendations of the Drogheda Committee's Report. I shall not say any more on that subject, which is by far the most important of all the matters that are likely to arise on this Motion, but I should like to comment on one or two of the recommendations and other points arising out of the Report, because I think your Lordships will agree that they are worthy of discussion.

I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, that the summary of the Report makes good reading, but there is one thing I dislike: your Lordships may think it no more than a personal prejudice, but I have a hearty dislike of the word "propaganda." I counted it no fewer than seven times in the first twenty pages of the Summary. What I have found, in talking to people overseas about this country—and other noble Lords may have found the same thing—is that they are suspicious of what you say if they think that you are making propaganda for your country. It seems that they associate the idea of propaganda with the activities of our enemies during and before the war. They have not forgotten the saying of Hitler—or was it Goebbels?—that if you repeat a lie often enough, it will be believed. In order to avoid these ambiguous associations, which may not relate to the dictionary but do relate to what is in people's minds, it is safer to use a perfectly colourless word, expression or synonym, such as Information or information service. After all, what we have to do is to correct misstatements and remove misunderstandings abroad about our policy. For this purpose it is not enough to tell the plain and unvarnished truth. Those to whom we speak have also to believe that what we are telling them is the exact truth. That is quite a different matter. And they will not believe this, whatever the facts may be, and however careful we may be to give them the precise facts, so long as we describe it in official publications as "British propaganda."

My second criticism of this admirable Report is more substantial. I hope that I do not sound as though I am hostile to it—on the contrary, I think it is an admirable Report, and I would probably go a good deal further than Her Majesty's Government in supporting its recommendations. I am not at all happy about the recommendation that our information services in Western Europe, apart from Federal Germany, should be severely curtailed: on this subject I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood. I agree, of course, that possibly Western Europe should receive less high priority than some other parts of the world, and less high priority than the Commonwealth. That may be an argument for not expanding the services in Western Europe, but it is certainly not an argument for the closing down of the British Council and the termination of broadcasting to our neighbours across the Channel.

After all, we are more closely tied to them by treaty and defence arrangements now than ever we have been at any time before In the last resort, these arrangements depend on the sanction of public opinion. These countries are all democracies, and it is the ordinary voter and not the influential few, to whom the Report constantly refers (and I think in this matter they decry the importance of the ordinary man), who counts. If we neglect to cultivate their good will, we may be quite certain that the other side will not make the same mistake. Our failure to state the case for free democracy in the way we have done hitherto will encourage the growth of Communism. This is the only major recommendation in the Report with which I venture to disagree, and which I hope the Government will never accept. If I may, I shall come to what I think the noble Marquess said on this subject in a moment.

I think it is worth looking rather more closely at the results which would follow if this recommendation were implemented in relation to the discontinuation of the British broadcasts to Western Europe, Seven countries are affected—France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Portugal. These countries would no longer receive our broadcasts. I think it is perfectly relevant to examine what would happen if this recommendation were accepted and implemented because, from what I gather from the noble Marquess's remarks, the B.B.C. have merely been reprieved for one year. What he said, I think, is that these broadcasts will be maintained for another year. But the noble Marquess does not know, the B.B.C. do not know—nobody knows—what will happen after that year has elapsed.

What we want to make sure is that, when the time comes for another decision on this subject, that decision will not be in favour of this recommendation which would cut off broadcasting to these seven countries, six of which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. France and Italy have the largest Communist Parties on this side of the Iron Curtain, and at the moment, according to the B.B.C., there are six million people in both these countries who listen from time to time to our broadcasts. And these twelve million people in key countries in South and West Europe would be cut off from this important link with the West. I cannot see who would gain from such a procedure except the Communists; and they certainly would gain—and all for a paltry saving of £135,000 a year, which may, of course, be a little more if the cost of the work rises. Surely a proposal of this importance cannot be justified on financial grounds, and is certainly most undesirable on political grounds.

I am sorry that the noble Marquess omitted any reference to the recommendation in the Report to strengthen our information services in the United States. Here again, I am speaking from my personal experience, and I had hoped that certain improvements might be made, and made speedily. Your Lordships will agree that there is no single country in the world whose good will is more important to us than that of the United States. It is not difficult to earn good will in America if only we are prepared to give the American public what they want. There is a friendly and insatiable appetite for information about our affairs. All we have to do is to provide the publicity material suitable for American consumption.

Outside New York and Washington I found our consuls—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, found the same thing—acutely conscious of their responsibilities in the matter of public relations, but, at the same time, hopelessly under-staffed for this work. The diocese of a consul is very large and densely populated, and some great cities, such as Pittsburgh, have no resident information officer. I am quite certain that if this work is to be done in the United States, the most important of all the foreign countries with which we deal, the information staff attached to our consulates should be substantially increased in numbers.

I am disappointed, also (I feel sure this disappointment is shared by the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, although I do not think he referred to this particular recommendation in his speech), that the Government have not been able to accept now, at any rate, the suggestion that our information service should be strengthened in India and Pakistan, and that the work of the British Council in these Commonwealth countries should be expanded. There are, in my view, two important reasons for giving Southern Asia the highest priority in any extension of our information services. I was recently in Moscow, and there, to my surprise and dismay, I observed a number of delegations from countries in Southern Asia, including India, Burma and Indonesia. There is no doubt—I am sure the noble Marquess, who knows far more about these things than I do, will bear me out—that the Communist Governments in Russia and China are actively wooing all those neighbouring countries that are not already definitely committed to the Western camp. If we are determined to make every possible effort to prevent the spread of Communism in these areas—and it has deep roots in those countries, and that is the danger; the danger is from inside, not from outside—we must surely do all we can to encourage the teaching of the English language and to go on circulating the ideas and values of democracy. The second reason why I regard India and Pakistan as such important countries is this. Whether we like it or not, I am sure we all agree it is a regrettable fact that the Commonwealth connection is less firm in Asia than it is in the countries of predominantly British origin. If this is the case, we cannot afford to miss any opportunity of strengthening the Commonwealth link in the Asian subcontinent, where we shall have to continue to counteract powerful anti-British influences.

There is one other recommendation on which the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, touched and which I hope the Government will consider with special care, and that is the proposal that the Financial Secretary to the Treasury should no longer be responsible for the Central Office of Information, It is difficult to know what the right alternative is but I cannot believe that a Treasury Minister is the best man for having responsibility for an expanding service. After all, it is the business of the Treasury to reduce Government expenditure, not, to press for increased expenditure, and this must be a most embarrassing conflict of duties. Moreover, the Financial Secretary is fully occupied by his own Department; and he is, of course, only a Junior Minister.

The answer may be—although it is much more difficult to find an answer than to state the problem—as the Report suggests, to transfer this responsibility to a senior Minister without a Department, such as the noble Earl, Lord Munster, who, I am sure, would discharge the job with the greatest efficiency and whose appointment would give your Lordships much satisfaction. That may be the answer. A senior Minister would be able to stand up to the heads of other Government Departments at Cabinet meetings and so on; and, if he had no Department of his own, he would be able to give more time to studying the organisation and the methods of our information services. In the 1945 Labour Government, of which I had the honour to be a member, the Lord President of the Council had responsibility for our information services, and I think, on the whole, that that system worked well.

I have not any other comments to make, but I should like to end with one broad statement with which I believe noble Lords opposite would agree. I hope that both sides and all responsible people will accept the view that our Overseas Information Services are essential to the success of our Colonial, Commonwealth and foreign policies. It seems to me that if that view is accepted, then the efficiency of those services must be a primary responsibility of any Government, and we shall never return to the practice of Chopping and changing from year to year, reducing expenditure and then increasing it, and reducing staff and then increasing it, but we shall, in fact, insist on the stability and continuity of policy on which an efficient service must depend.

5.8 p.m.

LORD REA

My Lords, I should like to support the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Bird-wood, for bringing up this matter, which I feel is of great importance, both nationally and, in its wide implications, internationally, and also in thanking the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, who, by the rather curious changes of arrangements in this House, has answered cur questions before we have asked them, and so rather taken the wind out of cur sails. But in view of the fact that this matter had a rather tepid reception in another place by the, Foreign Minister, it had been my hope that the noble Marquess, or the noble Earl, Lord Munster, would be able to go somewhat further. I hoped he might even suggest that something would be done on the lines of the Drogheda Report in an increasing way, not perhaps in one year, but over a period of time. It is rather disappointing that the tepidity in one place has been followed with the same feeling here.

The noble Marquess, unfortunately, has not been able to go so far as we hoped. I trust that both he and the noble Earl, in whose hands we are so pleased to see this matter, will be able to give it a little further thought and consideration in view of what has been said here this afternoon, before the matter is again raised and possibly crystallised—if not sterilised—in the Annual Estimates for the coming year. I, for one, feel that the matter deserves a far better fate than to be just another victim of the four stages of statesmanship: attitude, latitude, platitude, beatitude.

I believe many will agree that the development of the giving and receiving of authentic and genuine information between nations, on a scale infinitely greater than anything hitherto done, is of value and may be our one hope of avoiding another war. I admit that I am pitching my case rather high, but what we prosaically call "information" is, in fact, another word for enlightenment; and it is surely enlightenment which, throughout history, has created all that we value in this world and, equally, it is enlightenment which has achieved all victories over evil in the world. I am therefore suggesting that, by much more extended use of enlightenment, on the one hand to reveal the undoubted good will which exists in some degree in all nations in the world, and on the other hand to counteract the poison of misrepresentation and misunderstanding, either idle or deliberate, we have at hand a neglected weapon which has a potential infinitely greater to-day than that of the traditional engines of war, to whatever extent they may be developed.

From time immemorial the ultimate resort in cases of differences of opinion has been to physical and material force: the projection of a concrete object against the human body with the greatest possible velocity. Surely it is unreasonable now, and irresponsible, to consider the future of mankind in terms of bows and arrows, of bullets and, still more, of nuclear warfare. Yet we and all the other great nations of the world are at present building up a mountain of armaments which, if it be used, may well bring virtual annihilation on attacker and attacked alike. We are passing the age of bombardment of men's bodies; we are in the era of perversion of men's minds, and if we are not very careful we shall come to the final stage, the poisoning of men's souls. I need not remind your Lordships of the development in other countries of a process, utterly repugnant to us, known as "brain washing," in which medical and psychological applications are able to effect not only the change of a man's opinions, but also of his principles. Should we not be wrong to regard this merely as an isolated and fortuitous gambit in the resources of our possible enemies? For may it not be merely an early and limited foretaste of unlimited horrors to come?

But such things are only contrivances in use towards an ultimate goal; and in the case of Communism it is regrettably a goal which condones or applauds any means undertaken towards its achievement. We are therefore facing an ideology—to us a perfectly unacceptable ideology—in one way at a very great initial disadvantage; for we start on unequal terms as to the means which we are prepared to use to combat it. Not only are we at a disadvantage in that way; we are, I suggest, at a greater disadvantage in being ranged against those whose faith in their cynical and materialistic cause is deep-seated and, in present conditions, unshakable. We must face this. We are indeed confronted by something far more basic than the political quarrels which started the Wars of the Roses or even the two Great Wars of this century.

Our choice of action in the face of this menace is, I suggest, one of three simple decisions. Either we resort to force and nuclear power destruction in the conventional recourse to arms in a defensive or offensive war; or secondly, we retaliate in a cold war of demoralising and spiritually undermining indecency; the sapping of morale and of confidence and of happiness, so that the suspicion and resentment now fostered by Communism throughout the world would be doubled by our parallel efforts; or, thirdly, we can awake from the 18th and 19th century dream that all the world knows, without being told, of Great Britain's high-mindedness, integrity and altruism, and we can, on awakening, get down to ensuring that our merits and our aims, imperfect but honest, are once more recognised in their true perspective.

Of these three choices it is, of course, a depressing fact that the first—that of preparing for war, a devastating war—is the one uppermost in the minds of all Governments. For unless general world disarmament more nearly approaches reality, tie armament race must, of course, continue in its wasteful and vicious circle, and no one nation can afford to fall out of line. The second choice, that of meeting villainy with villainy, is an ugly and unpleasant one. To a limited extent it may be necessary for survival, but it is alien to our national character, and although the more so-called "realistic" nations than ourselves doubtless have this sort of thing well organised, it is, I think, fairly apparent from the discreet figures in the Drogheda Report that we, at least, are not embarrassingly involved in black propaganda or covert subversion. At the same time we should face the fact that where the acceptance of truth is resisted, it may be necessary to use covert propaganda in giving support to those who may have greater facilities than Government Departments for, placing genuine and authentic information before those who would otherwise not have access to it. I speak of this aspect with slight personal experience of the great encouragement which, during the war, was given to the Resistance Movements in the various countries by factual knowledge as opposed to rumour and gossip and prejudiced propaganda put out by both sides.

The Drogheda Committee recommend an additional expenditure of something under £2 million a year towards meeting the urgent requirement of the six organisations concerned with overseas information all over the world. I do not propose to examine the allocation of that money, but at the beginning of this year I had the opportunity, when leading a Parliamentary delegation to Burma and Indonesia, of seeing how alarmingly small has become the British impact upon those two nations alone, and how the whole of that proposed £2 million—the noble Marquess will forgive my saying so—could be well spent in South-East Asia where these two young nations, among others, are lying fallow—invitingly fallow—for development on the right lines or, indeed, on the wrong lines.

In Burma, where the break from the British Empire has left no bitterness and no enmity, there is to me an unmistakable, implicit appeal to Britain, rather than to any other nation of the world, to take more interest in Burma and to help her back towards stability and, prosperity. But on all sides I found dismay at the extent that we had withdrawn, not only politically but in almost every other way, from the influential, position that we used to have there. From the Burmese point of view, it is difficult to assess whether Britain is now a first-rate, second-rate or third-rate Power. German and Japanese machinery is flowing in; Russian and Chinese Communist influences are making themselves felt. As a small instance, I may say that in the Burmese Upper House I found the library quite well stocked with books on Government, Administration, Politics and Law, prominently labelled "The gift of the United States Government." I saw not a single book given by this country, for the obvious reason that we are not able to spend money in that direction and we have to some extent dropped out.

In Indonesia, independent status has been achieved the hard and bitter way, and, as a result, there is still the xenophobia and the distrust natural to a young and adolescent nation. But there, too, I gained the strong impression that of all foreign helpers the roost acceptable or, perhaps I should say, the least unacceptable, would again be the British. Indonesia, like Burma, though perhaps not so reluctantly as Burma, is also looking to other fields for help for her internal development, and the lack of information about Britain in that immensely big and immensely rich undeveloped country is lamentable. I think sometimes that people over here do not realise that Indonesia, if superimposed on a map of Europe, would stretch from Glasgow to Constantinople, and that it has a population double that of this country and increasing by a million every year. It is, with its immensely rich, fertile and largely unexploited la ad, a most tempting target for some unscrupulous attacker, Whether the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation comes into being or not, I suggest that we are running a grave risk by the false economy of withholding adequate knowledge about our own intentions and potentialities, and thereby, of course, allowing others to fill that dangerous gap, to our detriment. Referring to another part of Asia, The Times two days ago started an account from Japan in these words—and I think they are most important words: Seen in retrospect, the ten-day visit by the members of the British Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union who left Tokyo on Friday, has brought out the great ignorance of each country about the other's problems. That was the main theme of the whole message.

The differing values which various nations set upon information and propaganda are unknown, but it is significantly shown in the Drogheda Report that propaganda was developed to a high and undeniably successful degree by the totalitarian powers between the two great wars. It also shows that in the short period between 1947 and 1951, a period during which we were reducing our rather pathetically small broadcasting output, the Communist States increased theirs by no less than 250 per cent. It also shows that according to the latest available figures of American information work—unless the noble Earl has something later—even two years ago America was spending many times what we were spending on overseas information work.

As well as the enormous amount of money spent by the U.S.S.R. on apparently open propaganda, I think it is generally known to your Lordships that they have cleverly sponsored, under seductive titles, a number of organisations for which the direction and the money quite obviously come from Moscow. These are cleverly named, and if your Lordships will allow me to read six or seven of them, you will see the type of thing which is so dangerous: The World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the World Federation of Teachers' Unions, the International Organisation of Journalists and the International Broadcasting Organisation. They are a sinister list, if you examine their titles. I will not weary your Lordships with a recital of the extent of the front on which we are menaced; I wish only to stress that we are faced with the most difficult of all things to fight against—an idea and an ideology. And I maintain that to try to match an unacceptable ideology with anything except a better ideology to take its place is both futile and obsolete. Force of arms has never really overcome a philosophy—if it can be called a philosophy—as deep-seated and as strongly held as is the Communist faith.

That is the problem with which we are faced, but I submit that we of the free world have the answer. We have religion; and by that I do not mean only the Christian religion. We have the distillation of centuries of civilisation, something which is not possessed by most of those behind the Iron Curtain. We have a valuable negative thing: we older nations have, after centuries of bitter experience, the invaluable absence of lust for unscrupulous domination. I submit that we are, most unwisely and unimaginatively, neglecting to exploit these great assets and our pacific aims by failing to make them known in all their force and all their implication all over the world. I submit that to spend, as we do, as has already been remarked this afternoon, £1,600 million a year on armaments, presumably to kill and destroy possible opponents who are unaware of, or do not believe in, our friendly intentions, while spending the comparatively insignificant sum (as I still regard it) of £10 million—one-quarter of one per cent. of our national expenditure on enlightenment, the most potent of all forces, is an extraordinary situation.

I suggest that in the present cold war we are being very cleverly misled and deceived. Our potential enemies are putting up the tremendous bluff of two fronts, on only one of which they have the slightest intention of fighting, for I do not believe that the Communist nations would welcome an ordinary conventional war any more than we should. But by clashing the cymbals of traditional physical warfare in our ears they are, I suggest, diverting our energies and our resources into a colossal armament programme while they subtly and increasingly penetrate our defences on the moral battlefield, and infiltrate us and our friends on no visible front at all but on all sides and at all times and from within, without our realising to the full our peril.

We are fighting the wrong cold war. I do not for a moment suggest that we can to-day afford to cut appreciably, if at all, our military contribution to the defence either of our Commonwealth or of the free nations of the world; but I appreciate what the noble Marquess has said about the difficulty of finding the money rot only for the proposals of the Drogheda Report but also for the greater proposals which some of us would like to see put into effect. On this financial aspect, I would point my finger not at the great armament expenditure of to-day but at the armament expenditure of tomorrow, for I believe that, in the long term, a few million pounds spent on international understanding will save hundreds of millions of pounds otherwise spent on preparation for war and destruction.

And if as this Report advocates, we are to bend some of our energies towards building up once more, as we did during the last war, the psychological approach, it is essential that those in charge should not be continually discouraged and frustrated by a vacillating policy. For this is a long-term business, and a single, unimaginative economy in this field, as I happen to know, can lay in ruins at one blow the painstaking and invaluable work of years. Such a transference of emphasis from the lion to the lamb cannot, of course, be taken unilaterally, but I do suggest that this country's allocation of funds between propaganda for peace and preparation for war in the present ratio of approximately one-quarter of one per cent. for the former and about 40 per cent. for the latter is out of all proportion. Surely that is unrealistic if the power of the written or spoken word has any value whatever.

Finally, I would draw to your Lordships' attention the theme song of the whole of this objective and most moderately written Report. In every section and on almost every page the Report finds sound reasons for approving and supporting the work of the various departments engaged in the Overseas Information Services. It is a most convincing document. I urge Her Majesty's Government, if they can, to take a new and generous view of this whole matter and not to cast it aside with only faint and parsimonious encouragement.

5.28 p.m.

THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (THE EARL OF MUNSTER)

My Lords, before the conclusion of this interesting debate, initiated by my noble friend Lord Birdwood, I rise to reply as briefly as possible to one or two questions which were asked in the course of the discussion. My noble friend Lord Reading, in his observations, dealt, I think, with nearly every point which was made by the noble Lord who moved the Motion. There were, however, one or two additional questions which the noble Lord addressed to my noble friend which I should like further to emphasise.

The noble Lord asked about the students' work which the British Council is undertaking at the present time for the Colonial Office. As a former Chairman of the Students' Consultative Committee, and having worked closely with them for three years, I am well aware of the excellent work that the British Council do in that direction. Their task is not always easy, but I believe that these students coming from Colonial territories generally are deeply grateful for the work which the British Council do for them. There is no intention whatever of interrupting the actual work, which is now continuing. At the same time, I would just remind the noble Lord that, in addition to the new office which is to be opened in British Honduras, there will be increased representation in British Guiana during the next financial year. There is also this year an additional sum of money that was granted to the Colonial Office to meet rising costs of somewhat improved supplies and to open new premises in the Federation of Malaya.

The noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, also asked about the activities of the British Council in Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon. After prolonged negotiations, arrangements have now been agreed with the British Council about the future of their work in those three countries. Council representation in these countries is being withdrawn and the Council offices are closing. In both Australia and Ceylon an officer has been appointed to the staff of the High Commission who will act as British Council liaison officer. Under the High Commissioner, he will he in charge of all matters affecting the Council, and will, in fact, receive his salary from the Council. The services which the British Council have hitherto provided from London will be maintained in the future, and the facilities afforded to visitors to this country from those three countries will continue in the future as in the past. Under these new arrangements the essential work of the Council will therefore be maintained, but at appreciably less cost. In New Zealand, no liaison officer has been appointed. The essential Council services will, however, continue to be provided from London, and will be administered partly through local bodies and partly through the office of the High Commission.

The third point which the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, raised, expressed the fear that there is a scramble each year for the money available for the Overseas Information Services. I would assure the noble Lord, having seen the work at close quarters, that to my knowledge there has been no scramble. The figure between the departments is arrived at after discussion between the Ministers and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If, in fact, there were any dispute, the final decision would rest with the Cabinet. I think I can tell the noble Lord, without divulging any secrets, that during the period of this Government the Cabinet have not been called upon to decide how much money should be allocated from the central funds to individual departments.

I turn now to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Listowel. I hope, as he does, that the policy which we have announced will remove the uncertainty which may prevail in the minds of some of the staff to-day about their continuity of employment. Then the noble Earl mentioned our services in the United States of America. I am informed that the information services in America are, relatively speaking, much stronger and far better equipped than those in any other part of the world, except possibly Germany, where, as the noble Earl is well aware, we have a very large organisation. The increase in television films, which was mentioned by my noble friend, will be largely for use on the United States television, where we have a large and ever-growing audience. Indeed, noble Lords may be interested to know that last year 130 British information films were shown in the United States on television. That activity has steadily increased this year, and 99 films were shown in the United States in the first six months of the present financial year.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

Before the noble Earl passes from that point, may I know whether what he says means that the Government have accepted two points in the recommendations of the Drogheda Report in relation to the United States? The first is that an additional officer should be appointed in New York to handle television. The noble Earl spoke about the need for television films in the United States. The second is the need to strengthen the organisation outside Washington and New York, in order that there should be an adequate coverage in this vast country.

THE EARL OF MUNSTER

I cannot enter into the individual details at the present time because, quite frankly, I am not equipped with them. But I will certainly communicate with the noble Earl at a later stage by letter and give him the answers to the questions which he has raised.

My Lords, lastly I turn to the questions which were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rea. In the course of his remarks he gave your Lordships an indication of what he thought he had found during a recent visit to Burma and Indonesia. In the next financial year, 1955–56, the present United Kingdom-based British Council staff will be increased by one, to a total of six. In Indonesia at the present time there are eight British Council staff, and three Colombo Plan English teachers are shortly being added to that body. Through the information which is available to me I am told that adequate information services are operating in both these countries, and that the services which they undertake are, as I think the noble Lord pointed out, appreciated by the inhabitants of the two countries.

LORD REA

Would the noble Earl forgive me for a moment? I should like to make it quite clear that I was not in any way criticising the personnel, whose work is admirable but from my own personal observation I should have liked to see it more widely spread.

THE EARL OF MUNSTER

I realise that the noble Lord did not criticise the staff at all.

I think the last matter which I need mention is this. As my noble friend Lord Reading has said, the proposals which he announced in the course of his speech do not implement the whole of the Drogheda recommendations. It is entirely a question of money. If there were sufficient funds to meet these expanding services, I have no doubt that the relevant recommendations made in the Report could be brought into operation. But at he moment, at any rate, we must content ourselves with the observation and the proposals which were outlined in the noble Marquess's speech, which will undoubtedly go some way to improve and enhance the services which the British Overseas Information Services perform. I will say no more. I hope that the noble Lord who moved this Motion is satisfied with the reply which he has received from the noble Marquess and myself, and also with the observations which were made by noble Lords who spoke from the other side of the House.

5.38 p.m.

LORD BIRDWOOD

My Lords, I will detain your Lordships for only one or two moments before asking leave to withdraw my Motion. I should like to make clear the point upon which I was taken up in regard to the relationship between the B.B.C. and the Government. I agree entirely that for normal purposes the B.B.C. should be regarded as outside the Government. That is extremely effective when one is broadcasting to normal countries. But I suggest that in Iron Curtain countries the B.B.C. is already associated with the Government, and that therefore, in order to make it quite clear that it was the voice of the Government speaking, such a course as. I proposed might strengthen and underline the message and, at the same time, would ensure a more purposeful interest in the whole question of psychological warfare on behalf of the Government. It is important, in my view, that the Government should not only be interested in psychological warfare, but they should appear to be interested in it. Indeed, the keynote of my opening speech was to emphasise the overriding importance of this information weapon in psychological warfare.

I am grateful to the noble Marquess for his assurances that the European Service will be given another year of grace. I think I am right in saying that recently the Foreign Secretary paid a tribute to the help he received from a well-informed public in shouldering his burdens. If that is true of our own country, it is more assuredly true in the case of countries overseas, where we are trying to establish an understanding of the implications of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and so on. I am also extremely grateful for the assurances that the work on behalf of Colonial students will not in any way be jeopardised. I accept the noble Marquess's general proposition that, -if the recommendations cannot be implemented in full, then a policy of building up key areas will be pursued. I regret the decision not to take the plunge in the case of Tebrau, and not to go right out to make that station really effective as a voice in South-East Asia.

Finally, if I may touch again upon this question of rising costs, which seems to be the basis of the case of Her Majesty's Government, I agree that it presents a dilemma. But if, year by year, successive Governments are to take credit for not effecting reductions, and if costs rise, as they will, then surely one day the stage will be reached when our information services overseas will become completely ineffective. I suggest that it would be reasonable to assume that, as costs rise and as the cost of living increases, and as wages and pensions and similar payments are all increased, so the money spent on information services should keep in step. It would surely be rational to meet this situation by regarding the sum available for these services as a fixed percentage of national or defence expenditure. I should like to thank those noble Lords who have participated in this debate and have assisted in bringing this matter before the public. I now beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.