NAVY ESTIMATES

HL Deb 13 May 1953 vol 182 cc462-512

2.56 p.m.

VISCOUNT HALL rose to call attention to the First Lord's Statement Explanatory of the Navy Estimates (Cmd. 8769); and to move for Papers. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, on the whole the Estimates for the Defence Services this year have not been subjected to any serious criticism in the debates in another place or in your Lordships' House, and it is not my intention to be unduly critical this afternoon, although in the allocation of the global defence expenditure between the three Services the Admiralty have just cause for complaint. It is admitted on all sides that each of the three Services has a vital part to play in the defence of this country, the Commonwealth and the free world. The fact that £1,636 million is the estimate of expenditure during this current year is an indication of our determination, with the other free nations, to do so.

In the allocation the War Office and the Air Ministry are getting substantially more than the Admiralty—though I would make it quite clear that I am not suggesting the War Office or the Air Ministry are getting too much. But the fact remains that the Admiralty is getting much less than was expected, or, indeed, desired, to meet naval requirements. Allowing for the counterpart receipts (amounting in the case of the Navy to £35 million) the estimated expenditure for the Admiralty is £329 million, or £5¾ million less than last year and only 22 per cent. of the total amount set aside for defence expenditure. But the reduction of £5¾million is not all, for of the three Services the Admiralty is the only one which, with a smaller programme of construction, modernisation and conversion, has to draw upon its vital stocks of oil fuel, some of which have been built up over a long period, and upon stores such as guns, torpedoes, mines and ammunition. Moreover, these commodities are to be produced during the present year on a reduced scale.

The raiding of vital stocks of this kind, when you are building up your defence forces, is unprecedented, and as one who has had some experience of the difficulties of building up and maintaining a fuel oil stock I am surprised that the Government have thought fit not only to reduce the build-up, which I can understand, but also to use up the reserves to the extent of over £4 million per annum. The same thing can be said in relation to the stocks of stores to which I have referred. I am sure that the First Lord must feel very strongly that this "rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul" method is not only unwise but very unfair. Indeed, in his speech on the Estimates in another place the First Lord said this (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons; Vol. 512 (No. 74), col. 1842): I warn the House that this is a situation which cannot be allowed to continue in future. The raiding of these stores and stocks would mean that in the event of emergency—or, indeed, in the event of need to prepare for an emergency—all those stocks would have to be replaced. Without the raiding of these stores—fuel oil and other stores—and with the same provision made as last year for the purchase of fuel oil and stores, there would have been an expenditure of between £15 million and £20 million more than the present estimate. So the real reduction in naval expenditure during the current year is something like £25 million to £30 million.

In addition, unlike the other two Services, for whom provision has been made in their Estimates to meet rising costs of production, the Admiralty has to meet rising costs from reduced expenditure. As a result of this, it is regrettable to note, there is to be some reduction in the naval programme as previously planned; and it is expected that output, and therefore deliveries, will be less this year than last year. Last year there was a decline in output and deliveries, owing to shortage of steel and other materials. This year there is a decline in output because the Government have not seen fit to vote the necessary money to obtain an output very much higher than that obtaining in the pre-Korean war years.

I should like to inquire whether there is any delay in completing the present new construction, such as the four Hermes fleet carriers and the "Ark Royal," and whether there is to be any slowing down of the modernisation and conversion work in the dockyards. It is pleasing to note that the work in the dockyards is proceeding well. The recent Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Appropriation Account Naval Services, 1951 and 1952, indicated that the conversion programme of destroyers, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine craft is carried out very much more cheaply in the dockyards than in the private shipbuilding and ship-repairing yards. Indeed, the Comptroller and Auditor General in his Report estimated that the saving, as a result of the conversion work being done in the dockyards, amounts to not less than between 25 per cent. and 30 per cent., which is a substantial sum on an expenditure of something between £600,000 and £800,000 for each destroyer converted.

There is a growing concern among many people about our cruiser position. At the present time we have twenty-six cruisers—eleven in the active Fleet, two training and experimental, and thirteen in reserve. I should like to repeat Lord Strabolgi's description of the cruiser. He said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Lords; Vol. 181, col. 825), that it is: …a self-contained unit…it has considerable force of itself,… It carries a ship's company of the right number and well balanced. It is the all-purpose ship of the Royal Navy. Its worth has been proved, particularly in the last two years. This type of ship can be sent at short notice to any part of the world. It is a very welcome ship in peace or, indeed, in war. It is absolutely indispensable to the Navy and it does appear at the present time that, apart from the battleship, it is our most neglected ship.

Since the end of the war, the Admiralty have been conducting research and experiments into the most suitable cruiser for the future; and this year I was expecting an announcement by the First Lord that a new cruiser programme had been agreed to and that building would commence at the latest early in 1955. It cannot be realised that at that time five of our existing cruisers will be almost twenty years old, eight will be over fifteen years old and all but three of the others will be over twelve years old. All of these ships have had a very hard war. They have been repaired and refitted several times, and unless something is done, unless a rebuilding programme of cruisers is undertaken, I am afraid this nation will be faced with great difficulty—especially in view of the fact that the estimated life of a cruiser, which was discussed at the London Naval Conference in 1930, was laid down there as being twenty years. The Board of Admiralty must be deeply anxious about this situation, for the First Lord in his speech on the Naval Estimates in another place (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons; Vol. 512, col. 1833) warned the House: …that a great part of the Fleet is of pre-war or of war-time construction and that a steady replacement programme…is vital if the Fleet is to exist as an efficient and a balanced fighting force. This is a problem which is becoming more pressing as time passes. He said further (col. 1834): …I make the following prophecy—that in a few years' time the First Lord of the day will be asking the House to vote funds for an increasing shipbuilding programme. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty in the same debate echoed those sentiments.

Why should even the consideration of this matter be delayed any further? There is no controversy as to the need for these ships. I remember that at about the same time after the First World War there was controversy about the building of five cruisers. But the five cruisers were the beginning of a very extensive building programme for the Royal Navy; and we may be faced with the situation that we shall have to make up in the not too distant future for the lack of spending at the present time. We have received warnings, both from President Eisenhower in his First Annal Report on N.A.T.O. and also from the First Lord of the Admiralty, as to the increasing strength of the Soviet Navy. The Soviet have now about twenty powerful, fast cruisers, well armed with powerful guns and equipped with the most modern fire control, radar and other modern equipment. All these ships are well manned. In addition, it is known that they have over a hundred destroyers, including some large ones. These destroyers are of the fast, hard-hitting type, and incorporate many lessons learnt from the Germans. Against them we have the "Darings" which, for their tonnage, are the best warships in the world, but they are all too few; and we have also our ageing cruisers. For some time the cruiser "Cumberland" has been used for the purpose of trying out new naval equipment of all kinds. It has tried out new gunnery systems, together with the associated radar equipment and fire control which will give additional gun-power. All of this work was directed mainly to testing equipment to be embodied in the new cruisers: first, the three "Tiger" class cruisers. There is no prospect of our proceeding with the work to bring about their completion, and I should like the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, who is going to reply, to inform your Lordships whether the Admiralty are doing even the preliminary work on naval ships which should, with the knowledge that has been obtained from trials and research over many years, give us a cruiser which will be the most powerful and the best in the world.

Further delay in the commencement of a cruiser programme will place this country in great danger. Sometime in the future, the Commonwealth may have to rely for its own protection upon its own naval and military strength, and without the necessary naval power it will not be able to do so. Some two years ago, when I was First Lord, I said that when the "Cumberland" had completed her then trials she might be used for the trial of guided missiles. If this ship is not used for that purpose, I should like the noble Earl to tell us what means are available for the trying out of the many forms of guided missiles which are now becoming available. I saw a report a short time ago that the United States and the United Kingdom are likely to have a fixed standard for all weapons of this kind. Some of those which are being developed are most suitable for the Royal Navy because they are used for anti-aircraft work; indeed, they are used M the anti-aircraft frigates which are being built at the present time. The medium missiles for cruisers can be used against ships and shore targets and carry an armour-piercing atomic warhead. It is said that they will eventually replace the heavy guns now in use on the ships. These are some of the new weapons which it is reported will become available in the course of the next few years. I have also read Press reports about the new weapons which are to be made available to the British Army in Germany. They are smaller weapons but of a similar type. I trust that the First Lord will soon be able to give the same publicity to some of the new naval equipment which may become available.

I was very pleased to see the First Lord's reference to the success achieved in the use of the gas turbine for ship propulsion, on which research and trial have been proceeding since 1947. Its effect upon ship propulsion when fully developed can rightly be described as revolutionary. In addition to its success in the torpedo boats, the "Bold Pioneer" and the "Bold Pathfinder," a successful trial was carried out in a tanker of the Shell group where one of the diesel alternators was replaced by a gas turbine alternator. It was used satisfactorily on a voyage of over 13,000 miles and has resulted in an order being placed early this year for a marine tanker propelled by gas turbines. Recently the United States Navy bought several British gas turbines for experimental purposes. This form of propulsion has obvious advantages, particularly for warships which may need their maximum speed only in short periods. Admiral Sir Michael Denny, the late Controller of the Navy, and those who worked with him, both in the Admiralty and in civil engineering, should be congratulated upon the result, for in this type of propulsion Britain leads the world.

I mentioned last year the question of atomic propelled ships and I received a reply that the Admiralty were conducting research in relation to this matter. We now see that further progress is being made in the United States in this method of propulsion, for the United States Atomic Commission, in the report covering its work during the last six months of 1952, reveals that the assembly of the power unit of the atomic propelled submarine is almost completed, and that contracts for the development of engines for larger naval vessels, such as aircraft carriers of the "Forrestal" class, have been placed. In addition, facilities for the testing of nuclear power plants for aircraft are being constructed, which implies that prototypes of these units are nearing completion. It is interesting to note that the submarine referred to will have a high underwater speed of from twenty to twenty-five knots. Its engine is understood to be a fairly low-temperature project in which heat from a small amount of uranium serves as a source of power. It will be able to travel underwater almost indefinitely, without sur- facing for air or for refuelling. It is expected that this submarine will enter the United States Naval Service in 1954. I should like to ask the noble Earl if Her Majesty's Government are kept informed of this important development, and whether the Admiralty are continuing their research on those lines, for I was surprised in reading a report of a speech made in January this year by the Minister of Supply, who said that it is not proposed to undertake work on the application of nuclear energy to propulsion until more experience has been gained in the development of stationary nuclear plants. Does that mean that the Admiralty have discontinued their work in research on this matter?

I was pleased that the First Lord paid a tribute to the 25,000 officers and other ranks who were retained in the Service after their time expired and also to the Reservists who were called up during the past two and a half years. I should like to join in that tribute because I had some responsibility in the early days for initiating the call-up. These men have carried on uncomplainingly with their duties and have done excellent service, not only in Korea but wherever the Service called them. There are still 12,000 of these men serving and they are expected to return to civil life before the end of the present financial year. We are told that with this release in manpower there will be a decline of something like 10,000 in naval personnel. This reduction must mean a reduction in complement in a number of ships at sea which we are told it will take two years to restore to present strength.

What some of us are concerned about is that to meet what must be a very unsatisfactory situation it is proposed that the intake of Regular recruits should be only 1,000 more than last year. This cannot restore the position created by the loss of the 12,000 men who have to leave before March next. I do not know of any shortage of Regular recruits offering themselves for service in the Admiralty, and I would beg the Admiralty to reconsider their intake during the course of the present year. In 1949, before there was any trouble in Korea and indeed, before the call-up, there was an intake of 5,000 more than the intake during the course of the present year. I beg the Admiralty to reconsider this matter, for unless there is a substantial number of ordinary seamen and boys serving in the Navy there must be an unbalanced manpower situation during the course of the next two or three years.

My noble friend Lord Pakenham is going to deal fully with naval-air matters. It is not my intention to say anything about the officer entry or Dartmouth. I understand that the Committee set up last year to consider this matter has now reported and the First Lord has promised to publish the Report as soon as possible. We shall await this publication with interest. Notwithstanding the many changes which have taken place in our defence organisation, because of the geography of the United Kingdom and our overseas commitments the Royal Navy has still a vital part to play in the defence of this nation and of the Commonwealth, and, by its contribution, in the defence of the free world. A large sum of money is and will be required to maintain it in its traditional, highly efficient state, for it should always be remembered that Britain has grown great because in the past Britons have made a habit of standing on their own feet. My Lords, if we lost that habit, how much else might we not lose with it? I beg to move for Papers.

3.24 p.m.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, I feel sure that the Government will give very careful consideration to the grave but in no way exaggerated warning, coming, as it does, from a former First Lord, given by the noble Viscount on the subject of the growing obsolescence of so many units of the Fleet. And in view of the very few numbers which the Fleet musters at the present moment, it is indeed a very grave warning. The first thing that I should like to do this afternoon is to call attention to a very strong impression, in my mind at any rate, about a certain diminution in the status of the First Lord of the Admiralty, involving, of course, a diminution in the status of the Board. The prestige of the office seems to me to have been declining for some time, and to-day the First Lord of the Admiralty is not even a member of the Cabinet. I regard that as a most lamentable state of affairs, and a very sad break in the naval tradition of this country.

Side by side with this diminution in the prestige of the First Lord's post there seems to me to be an increasing public indifference to the Navy and a growing unawareness of the Navy's rôle. Let me give your Lordships certain instances which have come to my notice recently. In the last Defence debate in another place, neither the Prime Minister nor the Leader of the Opposition even mentioned the Navy or the Mercantile Marine. The Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence who wound up that debate would also have said nothing about the Navy, except for the fact that at the very end of the debate he was reminded of its existence by Captain Dudley Ryder. Mr. Noel Baker, who was winding up for the Opposition, spoke of the Navy as if it were of no account. He said: Aircraft are now the deciding factor in modern war. Air Commodore Harvey asked what the Navy would really be able to do in the next war. If the Air Commodore goes to the next war I have no doubt he will find, before that war is over, that he has reason to be very thankful indeed to the Navy. Arthur Bryant, who of all men should know better, accuses Admirals of having Magi not Line mentalities. He too may be thankful that the Admirals "know their stuff" better than he knows his history.

Then, the Statement on Defence in its twenty-three pages and eighty-seven paragraphs, gave the Navy exactly eighteen lines. The Times used to be a good friend of the Navy, but lately I have seen none of those articles from its naval correspondent which at one time used to be such excellent reading and kept the Navy so well before the public. It now warns the public against "a greater naval bias at the expense of the Royal Air Force." The Daily Telegraph recently began an editorial with the words, "Publication of the Navy Estimates," after which, save for the words "The high standards of the Navy are being maintained," the entire leader was devoted to the Army and the Royal Air Force. There seems to be—I would not say a concerted effort but certainly a tendency, to relegate the Navy to the position of an ancillary Service. That being so, no wonder the Admiralty has encountered such difficulties in pressing its modest claim for a high performance fighter aircraft.

My Lords, is all this going on because some people say that the American Navy is big enough, so why should we bother? In other words, are we to allow our responsibilities to devolve upon American shoulders? I think that is a despicable doctrine, and one which, to my mind, points the quickest road to the end of the Commonwealth. I believe that it is time that doctrine was repudiated, and that those who are able should do something to revive public interest in the Navy and a realisation of its importance. As things are going on, people will forget what their forebears instinctively knew, that sea power is essential to us. In my view, those who talk about air power in terms which discount sea power are rendering their country a very ill-service. Spain, France and Germany were all, in turn, defeated by our control of the seas; and if Russia were to try where those countries failed, she will travel the same road, unless we neglect our Navy. Wars are won by the nation which can move troops, weapons and material across the seas at will. So much for that.

I should like now to say a word about dockyards. It was with great pleasure that I heard the noble Viscount give those excellent figures which have been produced by the Comptroller and which are a great credit to the work of the dockyards. When I raised the matter of the dockyards last year, the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, disagreed with me. I was not altogether surprised, because in a sense each had a private interest in the matter, one having been First Lord of the Admiralty and the other First Sea Lord. Therefore, if things were amiss in the dockyards each would bear his appropriate share of responsibility for that state of affairs. I know that the noble Viscount will believe me when I say that I speak in the friendliest manner possible. But I reread his speech last Sunday, and I noticed that at the outset he promised the Minister who was to reply for the Government that "no troublesome questions would come from me. "I must say that I thought that seemed a rather curious commentary on the work of his honourable friend, Mr. Albu, who was a member of the Select Committee and who might fairly have looked for a little support from the noble Viscount in this matter. I re-read the speech, and the noble Viscount must forgive me if I say that I noticed a certain note of complacency in it, and I finished it with the feeling that according to his view all was for the best in the best of all possible dockyards—which is at variance with the Report of the Select Committee.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, charged me with making a "caustic attack on the Admiralty on sailors, and on the dockyards," and with saying that "the dockyards are rotten and their appliances useless." Heaven forbid that I should ever re-read a speech of my own after I have struggled through it, but I really cannot recollect using any such words as those! I should like to point out that I did not put my own views before your Lordships; I put forward the views of the Select Committee which I felt it was right and proper your Lordships should have laid before you. And far from attacking all and sundry, I probably quoted the Committee's Report which said: Only the versatility of naval officers and the efficiency of the managers can enable such a system to work at all. I would say that that is a tribute to naval officers, and to the dockyard staffs and officials who produce such excellent results in face of very great difficulty. I think the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, overlooked the fact that I was putting forward not my own views but the views of a great cloud of witnesses—an Admiral Superintendent, Admiralty witnesses, dockyard officials and workers, and naval officers—who testified before the Select Committee and whose views the Select Committee very largely accepted and embodied in their Report.

A Select Committee is a very important and responsible body which acts upon the evidence of the witnesses who come before it. What I did was to put forward the findings of that Committee. In any case, in attacking me I think Lord Chatfield was a little more Royalist than the King, because the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, when replying to the debate was kind enough to refer to "the extremely temperate manner" in which I had "introduced this rather controversial subject," which is hardly the same thing as saying that I had made a caustic attack upon all and sundry. But the real point is that there was a difference of opinion between us. I endorsed the view of the Select Committee; Lord Chatfield was opposed to it. I think that the reply made by the Admiralty to the Select Committee's Report, though I do not wish for one moment to put it too high—in fact, I put it a little too low—shows that their Report has made a very distinct impression indeed upon the minds of the Admiralty.

I think the experiment which is going to be tried of appointing an Assistant Superintendent (Industrial) to work with the Admiral Superintendent is a most interesting and valuable experiment, and I shall be very much surprised if it does not result in considerable reforms being effected in the dockyards along the lines recommended by the Select Committee. Between the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, and myself there was only a difference of opinion, and there is no need to make harsh remarks about a difference of opinion. Opinions will always differ. Lord Chatfield will remember that he and his fellow Chiefs of Staff were of opinion that the Southern Irish ports could quite safely be handed over to Eire. The Government of the day accepted their opinion and, of course, in so doing, took the responsibility—the responsibility was not on the Chiefs of Staff but on the Government which accepted their advice. Many people held another opinion, including the present Prime Minister, who said: It was incredible to me that the Chiefs of Staff should have agreed to throw away this major security. Further, he said; I remain convinced that the gratuitous surrender of our right to use the Irish ports in war was a major injury to British national life and safety. A more feckless act can hardly be imagined. Many a ship and many a life were soon to be lost as the result of this improvident example of appeasement. That merely goes to show that opinions can differ.

Lord Chatfield's opinions are always arrived at after careful thought and with a high sense of responsibility and duty. That he has now and then been wrong when he has so very often been right entitles him to moderation and courtesy in any criticism of his views. And those who differ from him may fairly expect the same treatment. I would commend to the noble and gallant Lord's consideration the immortal boatswain, Mr. Chucks, of Peter Simple, who always prefaced his admonitory remarks with the phrase: Allow me to observe in the most delicate way in the world. It is true that on one occasion he went on to tell the man he was addressing that he would cut his liver out if he spilt any mere tar on the deck; but, anyhow, he began politely, and that is a great thing when opinions differ.

I should like now to go on to say something about naval aviation, which came very much to the front in the recent Defence debate. I think that "Victory through heavy bombers" is a fallacy. The noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, is not here now, but really at times it seems to be almost an obsession with him. In 1940 he campaigned for more bombers, when I think I am right in saying that fewer fighters would have lost us the Battle of Britain. Lord Trenchard then seems to have thought that the war could be won by giving the Air Force bombers at the expense of its fighters. Now at times he seems to want to starve the Navy and the Army of the aircraft which are necessary for their co-operation with the Air Force. It is in this way that the old Service rivalries are kept alive, to the very great harm of our defence arrangements. No doubt I am wrong, but at times, listening to Lord Trenchard, I wonder whether he has assimilated the true doctrine about co-ordination of the three Services in war. The Minister of Defence is not taking part in our debate to-day, but if he were I should like to address to him what I think is a very important question indeed. I should like to ask whether common doctrine on this subject of the co-ordination of the three Services, in war is taught in all Service staff colleges, because I believe that the three Services ought to be trained and administered in a common doctrine on that particular point.

To produce three types of heavy bomber for the Royal Air Force seems to me to be over-indulging one Service. The Navy is not granted the same over-insurance in regard to fighters required to secure the North Atlantic sea communications against shore-based aircraft. Command of North Atlantic communications can be obtained in no other way than by carrier-borne fighters supporting ship-and shore-based anti-submarine aircraft. It was proved conclusively in the last war on the Mediterranean and Archangel convoy routes that convoys are helpless without fighter cover. Yet the Navy and Coastal Command have been deprived of the requisite aircraft, and while the R.A.F. apparently get three types of heavy bomber, the Navy is fighting in Korea with World War II type piston aircraft.

In the last war, the doctrine of strategic bombing endangered our Atlantic communications. That war taught us that while the air has great power to dominate narrow seas, and also in anti-submarine warfare, it has not the equivalent power to disrupt the enemy's war production and break civilianmorale—which is the idea behind the doctrine of strategic bombing. Looking back to the history of the war, we find that the war did not begin to take a turn in our favour while bombing was at its height, but only when we realised what long-range aircraft could do in the Battle of the Atlantic, and when we devoted sufficient of our aircraft production potential to provide such long-range aircraft for the service of our convoys. War priority number one is to keep the enemy out of the Channel and Atlantic ports and to ensure that those ships, without whose safe arrival we should fold up in three weeks, continue to arrive in N.A.T.O. ports with the petrol, oils and food they bring. We could not even mount an offensive against the enemy unless these ships arrive. These merchant ships cannot be defended by warships alone, even if we had enough of the right type of warship. Aircraft must play their part in defending our communications, but the Navy have not enough of the right aircraft.

Looking back to the story of the war, we find now that our losses at sea delayed our offensive. Not only that: the war was unduly prolonged, piling up losses of life and treasure, losses of treasure which still impede our post-war recovery. That was the price we paid for this doctrine of strategic bombing, which should have come after, and not before, our offensive had started. Next time, if a next time comes, we must adopt a true strategy; and one factor in that is to give naval aviation its proper rôle and the aircraft with which to play that rôle. The 1,000 bomber raids failed in their final purpose. There were 1,000 bomber raids, but the Atlantic got only sixty long-range aircraft. Strategic bombing risked us losing the war at sea. In my opinion, Lord Trenchard's heavy bombers can never damage Russia so much as Russian bombers can damage us. After all, we have found in Korea that heavy bombers have not cut the enemy's communications, nor have they held up his supplies. They have not been able to accomplish these two objectives.

I think that too much has been claimed for what air power can undertake alone. In 1942 the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, claimed that bombers could destroy the sources of submarine production. Shipping cannot be defended by attacking the enemy's submarines in their bases; shipping has to be defended at sea by ships and ship-and shore-based aircraft. In the last war 550 submarines were destroyed at sea. Half of that number were destroyed by aircraft, and only thirty-seven were destroyed in their yards. That, I think, conclusively answers the theory of destroying enemy submarines in their bases. These figures prove that our needs would have been far better served by more aircraft for securing sea communications. We did not see the light in this matter until 1943, and it has been estimated that as a consequence we lost no fewer that 3,250 merchant ships, worth £250 million, while our armies all over the world were hung up in their operations for lack of supplies due to the bottleneck in shipping. I spoke of the two objectives of strategic bombing. The Germans rebuilt the factories we destroyed far more quickly than we were able to build replacements for the ships which the German submarines sank. The bombers never cracked German civilian morale. The Air Force cannot obtain command of the air without the supplies which the Navy must bring them. The A-bomb is a potent weapon, but it depends on many things—on precision instruments, on highly trained and skilled crews, on bases and maintenance and factories. But all those things go for nought without fuel. The Navy must convoy the fuel across the seas. And without fighters the Navy cannot guarantee the arrival of those supplies.

Aircraft carriers come in for heavy criticism in your Lordships' House. Carrier-based aircraft can start operations right off the enemy's coast and bases, and can move to any desired point. During the war, American carriers, operating 1,500 aircraft, destroyed no fewer than 5,000 Japanese shore-based aircraft. I think that is a great testimony to the capacity of carriers. The aircraft performance figures show that air cover for naval and military operations cannot always be provided by land-based aircraft. Until such cover can be provided, in my opinion carriers are a "must." The base must go with the aircraft, if only to provide their fuel, as no fighter built or projected has the radius to work with the fleet from a shore base. We are told that the carrier is vulnerable, but it has a good record. During the war we operated fifty-eight carriers. We lost only eight of them. Four of these were of World War I type, not modern carriers at all, and one of these was the "Glorious," which was lost while acting as a transport and had no aircraft on board. During the same period the Americans operated 110 carriers and lost only ten or eleven. I think that is good testimony for that point. The aircraft carrier is by no means so vulnerable as its opponents make out.

The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, has spoken on this subject of naval aviation, and he told us, I am sure in completely good faith, that: The Attacker is giving satisfaction to the pilots who fly it. I am sorry to have to disillusion the noble Lord, but that simply is not the case. I can tell him of a very capable and skilful jet pilot who was most anxious that attention should be drawn to the fact that the defence of the Fleet cannot possibly be carried out with the Attacker. I am sure the staff do not regard the Attacker as a battle worthy, fully-operational aircraft. The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, described the Attacker as a "stopgap." That in itself shows that it is not entirely satisfactory. If we were to find ourselves at war before the replacement for the Attacker was fully in service, would the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, be able to tell us what gap the Attacker could stop in such a case? And the same thing applies to the Sea Hawk. The incontrovertible truth of the matter is this. The naval pilots have not got, and they see no immediate prospects of getting, an aircraft which will do the job they are expected to do—that is, to defend the Fleet at sea against modern high-speed, high-flying aircraft, and to carry out strikes at the range required. I think I am right in saying that that was one of the lessons which emerged from Operation "Mainbrace"—the N.A.T.O. operation.

What can he done to remedy this state of affairs? Super-priority will not do it. Much as I dislike dependence upon America—and I have spoken to-day against it—Ishould like to ask whether there are any American aircraft available. To-day, some of the R.A.F. squadrons are fitted out with stopgaps, with Sabres from Canada. Has America any carrier-borne fighters with a better performance than the Attacker and the Sea Hawk? The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, admitted that the position perturbs even the Government. The Government's perturbation will be largely relieved once they take the plunge and firmly make up their minds that the Navy must have more antisubmarine aircraft arid many more over-sea aircraft, and set about getting them. The Navy must have them before war breaks out—if, indeed, a war is to break out—or it will never have them until it is too late. We are told that the Sea Hawk, like Christmas, is coming. Which Christmas is it: Christmas, 1953, 1954 or 1955? We hear that there is something to replace the Attacker which is to enjoy super-priority, and that Vickers have an order for a substantial quantity of those aircraft. But what we want to know is whether by "substantial quantity" is meant enough to meet our needs. We should be in a pretty mess if war came before that replacement for the Attacker was in service.

What a shocking record it has been as regards naval aviation! Naval aviation has always been at the tail end of the aircraft production quene. I do not know why successive First Lords and successive Boards of Admiralty have "stood for" such a state of affairs. I should like to ask how this super-priority queue stands. I understand that there are lined up in that queue four jet bombers, three civil aircraft and one naval fighter. Do they get equal treatment; or is there a priority in super-priority? Those of us who repeatedly press this matter of naval aviation must not be reproached for our insistence. Peter Ree, the naval pilot who was killed in the fly-past for Marshal Tito, was of the type of our really incomparable naval pilots. One must continue to press by all means in one's power to give such gallant fellows the aircraft they deserve, but which, so far they have never had.

I fear that I have detained your Lordships too long, but there is one other point I should like to make, and it is on the subject of Russia. There was a time in this country when a speech by our First Lord frightened the enemy. Now, apparently, that has all changed, and he frightens his own side instead. Certainly his remarks about the Russian Navy caused considerable concern amongst the public. I am not going into that speech in detail this afternoon, but I have not yet seen a really authoritative statement putting in their proper perspective the facts about the Russian Navy, in which case, I believe they would bear a much different aspect from that conveyed to the public mind by the speech of the First Lord. Nevertheless, I feel that in the event of a war with Russia the situation will be very grave. I believe that we shall face a more severe attack upon our sea communications than we suffered in either of the last two major wars. It is on that account that I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, will be able, amongst the many other matters to which he is going to reply, to say something to put the facts about the Russian Navy in their proper perspective.

3.58 p.m.

LORD CHATFIELD

My Lords, I do not propose to say a great deal in this debate. Like most of those of my age and rank, I feel that the day has passed when we should expound naval affairs to your Lordships and others, and now I come to the House on these occasions only to learn what I can. That is probably why I am the only Admiral here this afternoon. I learnt a great deal from the excellent and thoughtful speech (as usual) of the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, who did so splendidly when he held the tiller at the Admiralty. I was particularly interested in what he said about the cruiser situation and with regard to the lack of building-up in our oil and other material reserves. I have the highest opinion of the present Board of Admiralty—if I may be so rash as to say anything like that. I do not think that any other Boards of Admiralty have ever been in such a difficult position as that of the Boards of Admiralty since the war came to an end. Why is that? It is because the problem that is set the Board of Admiralty today is a different one from that which was set in the past. In the old days, the duty of the Board of Admiralty was to build fleets, greater than those of our possible opponents. Now those days have gone, and it is no longer the duty of the Board of Admiralty to build great fleets. However, it is still their duty to defend the seas.

In considering what money the Navy should have compared with the other Services, the Admiralty in the old days had their standard of strength to put up to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and could say, "Unless you give us so much money we cannot maintain that standard." The three Services then were competing against each other as to how to defend this country, possibly in fighting a war single-handed against an enemy. To-day it is different. We in the United Kingdom and in the British Empire have become part of a combination. We now have to balance our strength, not as regards each Service one against the other, but as regards what is required from us particularly as a nation in order to ensure balance in that combination which we trust would fight a probable or possible—perhaps I might say it is less possible now—enemy. Therefore, the problem which faces the Admiralty, the Minister of Defence and the Cabinet is a different one from that which existed before.

I have no prejudice or bias about the Services and their money. The only thing that matters is that we defend the country in the best way. If it is the best way to have nothing but aircraft, let us have them. If it is the best way to have an amount of money divided equally between the three Services, let us have that. The only thing that matters is that we have the right distribution of money and that we achieve our objective in any future war. Three years ago, speaking in your Lordships' House in a Defence debate, I said that I agreed with the Cabinet decision to give the Royal Air Force the first priority in financial expenditure because they were our weakest point as regards the threat that was held over our heads. But I added, as I will add to-day, that all that is subject to the absolute certainty that you must not let down the defence of our trade in war time. It is difficult to say whether the threat to our trade is the first or the second greatest danger which this country faces.

It is very curious how often this question arises after wars: What should be done about the Services and their money? Curiously enough, I was reading some poetry last night. I do not often do that. As a matter of fact, I was looking for a clue in The Times crossword, and I had to refer to the book of Byron's poems. I came across a very famous poem called Don Juan, which in my early days used to be considered improper. I was looking at it not for any sensuous reason, but for the reason I gave your Lordships. I came across this most extraordinary verse, which was written by Byron in 1818 after the Napoleonic Wars: Nelson was once Britannia's God of War, And still should be so, but the tide is turned. There's no more to be said of Trafalgar, 'Tis with our hero quietly inurned Because the Army's grown more popular At which the Naval people are concerned. I thought that was an extraordinary example of "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose." What we are thinking to-day is what our fathers and grandfathers were thinking 130 years ago.

But at the same time there is really only one rule that always felt the Admiralty must bear in mind, and that is, that we must have every type of means of attack and defence that our enemy may have. There is nothing that he has that we can afford to be without. If the enemy has a battleship, we must have a battleship. If he has cruisers we must have cruisers. If he has submarines and antisubmarine devices, we must have the same. The reason is because at sea, in the various weathers, with fog and gales, one type of vessel may be able to act in the prevailing circumstances when none of the others can do so. If the enemy has that type of vessel and you have not, then you are going to suffer extraordinarily severely. That is why when people ask in a glib, amateur manner, "What is the good of a battleship?," the answer is, "To find and look after the enemy's battleship." The same applies to aircraft carriers or anything else. We must have what the enemy has, and we must have it in sufficient numbers.

I feel that the Navy is down to bedrock to-day. We have practically the smallest Navy we have had for many generations. I have no doubt that it is good and efficient, so far as it goes; but that is not enough. We are part of a combination. But suppose the combination breaks up: then where are we going? If you allow your vital factor, your sea communications, on which the Empire is built, to dwindle too low, you are prejudicing your future. You are living on the edge of a precipice, and if the combination does not hold, if you can no longer trust to the great volume of ships of the United States Navy being at your back, then you will not be able to recover in time. I hope that that is a point which the Admiralty will insist on being continually considered by the Minister of Defence and other Ministers.

I agreed with what the noble Lord, Lord Winster, said, that there can be no doubt that by having a Minister of Defence—we are not thinking of the present one, and, as you know, I was one myself—the Secretaries of State for War and Air, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, to a certain extent, lose their position. When I was First Sea Lord in the 'thirties I was asked by the Prime Minister whether I thought a Minister of Defence would be a good thing, and what effect it would have. I said: "One effect will be that to some extent the First Lord and the Secretaries of State will lose their prestige, and the Chiefs of Staff and their Committee will gain in theirs. "I feel that is the risk. The Minister of Defence, the Treasury and the Cabinet have only one man to knock down; before they had three, and it is much easier to knock down one than three. I know that the position of the Minister of Defence is very difficult, and I am quite sure that he does magnificently in the circumstances.

I must not keep your Lordships too long, but the noble Lord, Lord Winster, has made some remarks about my speech on his Motion on the dockyards about a year ago. As a matter of fact, I thought that I had been exceedingly moderate and careful in answering him. The noble Lord will, I am sure, admit that he has a rather caustic way of addressing the House, and perhaps one reads into his voice more than he means. I have read through the Hansard Report of that debate, to which your Lordships also can refer if necessary—though we do not want to have the dockyard battle over again. I can find in that Report nothing in what I said which was untrue or harsh. I always try not to be harsh—at any rate, I have always tried ever since I left the quarterdeck. I said that the noble Lord had been critical of the Admiralty and the Admiral Superintendent of the dockyards, and of the dockyards and their work.

Incidentally, my Lords, this is almost a humorous battle between the noble Lord and myself. In replying to the debate on that occasion, the noble Lord made reference to what I had said and used these words (OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 177, col. 323): If he reads my remarks he will find that I made no criticism of naval officers, and made no suggestion of their doing bad work, or of the dockyards doing bad work. I can only refer to what the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, said in opening the Admiralty's defence. He said (col. 307): But I will not disguise from your Lordships that I was somewhat shocked by the tenor of the noble Lord's speech. Apparently, he actually thinks that the Royal Dockyards have been run for years upon a vicious and incompetent principle. If that is his view, I can only say at the outset of my remarks that I must oppose it with an emphatic denial. He said that some officer had said that the dockyards were past praying for. That is what one might call "some criticism." Lord Birkenhead went on: I do not know who that officer was, but it certainly is not my experience of such dockyards as I have seen. Indeed, I must regard any imputations of that kind by the noble Lord as a dangerous reflection upon the distinguished naval officers who are in charge of our dockyards. I do not want to worry your Lordships with many more words. I feel the matter can be summed up in this way: that if the noble Lord says that I was harsh, then it is almost a case of the pot calling the kettle black. That, I think, fairly well describes the situation.

However, I know full well that the noble Lord speaks only from an entirely patriotic sense of duty, and that he is immensely keen on any subject which he takes up; and although he excuses himself under the Select Committee's Report, he did, I must say, carefully select just such points as happened to coincide with his view. I think that, when one quotes other people's views, one must accept some responsibility for agreeing with what they happen to say.

LORD WINSTER

I agree, but I did quote a very warm testimony by the Select Committee to the work of the dockyards, and in fact I have quoted it again to-day.

LORD CHATFIELD

The other point I wish to mention concerns the Irish ports. The noble Lord criticised the Chiefs of Staff. I could not quite make out what happened, but the noble Lord, when quoting Sir Winston Churchill's book, Volume 1, omitted to read this note: Readers should read Lord Chatfield's book, It Might Happen Again. That was Sir Winston Churchill's very proper and nice way of saying that there was another side to the case. I think that when Lord Winster quoted Sir Winston Churchill about the Irish ports he ought also to have quoted that note.

4.15 p.m.

LORD GIFFORD

My Lords, I should first like to say how gratified I was the other day to receive an invitation from the Board of Admiralty to the Naval Review, and how much I, and I am sure other noble Lords, shall look forward to seeing it from H.M.S. "Perseus" on that day. I am grateful, also, for the privilege of being allowed to wear uniform again on that occasion. I am only sorry that the administrative arrangements do not make it possible for us to stay and see the Fleet lit up.

I should like to say one word about the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth. I understand that the Report is just about to come out, so I will not attempt to anticipate it. But this matter has been dragging on for a longtime, and I hope that the Report, when it comes out, will be acted upon quickly, and that the criterion for giving the decisions on that Report will be what system is best for the Navy. I trust that the matter will not be dragged into the political arena and into controversy on the various forms of State or public school education. The main reason why the Navy is not getting enough of the right type of officer to-day is that the present system has not been a success. Let us hope that when the Report comes out something will be done to improve matters.

As an ex-specialist in naval aviation—one of the very few, I think, in this House—it has usually been my custom to say something about that important side of naval warfare. But on this occasion the subject has already been dealt with fully, first of all during the Defence debate, in a most admirable speech by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, who set out in a much more able way than I ever could the strategic value of the aircraft carrier. I am sure that all of us who heard the speech were most impressed by what he had to say. I would only add that the parallels of two wars show that naval planning and most naval battles devolve on getting a convoy from one place to another. The safe arrival of convoys is a matter of life and death to this country. I do not believe that convoys in the middle Atlantic and many other parts of the world can be safely protected by any other means than carrier-borne aircraft. I am entirely in agreement with Lord Winster on that subject.

The carrier is vital at the beginning of new campaigns; and when some small war, if you like to call it so, breaks out in some more or less distant part of the world, as seems to be likely now, judging by recent events, it is the only way of getting air support quickly to a combined operations force. And the faster and more modern shore-based aircraft we have, the longer it takes to prepare an airfield from which they can operate. The days of being able to improvise an airstrip in a few weeks are gone; and I feel, therefore, that the need for carrier-borne aircraft will continue. We must not neglect that side of the Navy. I was very pleased to read about the new angled flight deck, which I am sure will be of great assistance to our pilots using faster jet aircraft. I particularly have some feeling of sorrow that the angled deck did not come into being when I was flying, because, in one of my early deck landings, I succeeded in hitting the island and landing upside down on the bridge of the "Eagle." If the "Eagle" had had an angled deck, I should perhaps have avoided doing this.

I, too, am concerned at the lack of modern naval aircraft and the delay in getting high-performance jet fighters and anti-submarine aircraft into the Fleet. But in defence of I should like to emphasise a point which I do not think anybody else has mentioned—the great technical difficulties which have to be overcome in producing these carrier-borne aircraft, difficulties with which the designers of shore-based aircraft do not have to contend. Very often the dimensions of the aircraft have to be cut down below what the designer would like, because the aircraft cannot get down the lift or has insufficient headroom in the hangar. There is the very complicated and difficult mechanism for the folding of the wings of the aircraft. There is the stressing of the aircraft to take the arrester gear and so that it can be launched from an accelerator. All these requirements make the task of designing naval aircraft for carrier use a most appalling problem, which I think should be remembered. Sometimes the causes of delay, modifications and hold-ups are due to these facts which I have mentioned.

I was pleased to see that prominence was given in the Statement on the Navy Estimates to the use of the helicopter. As I see it, the helicopter, if it has not already done so, will soon make one great economy. Instead of every aircraft carrier which is operating aircraft needing a destroyer to follow astern to rescue any pilot who is unfortunate enough to go into the sea, this duty may be completely taken over by the helicopter, resulting in tremendous saving in fuel and the use of a valuable destroyer in unprofitable and boring work.

It is still true to-day that, when there is an emergency, at once the Navy comes to the fore in the most unexpected way. Little did we think that a flight of naval helicopters would be rescuing hundreds of Dutch farmers and peasants from one of the islands in South Holland. I am glad to see that the Gwen of the Netherlands recognised the valuable work which that naval squadron carried out.

I was pleased to read in the Statement that among the important works carried out were improvements to the runways and the modernisation of our naval air stations. It is essential that squadrons should do a great deal of air training on shore, and we must have modern air stations for them to use. In that connection, I noted that money was being spent on the living accommodation in these stations, and no doubt that would include married quarters. As I see it, one of the greatest forces for recruiting for the Navy and, alternatively, one of the greatest hindrances to re-engagement are, respectively, a contented or a discontented naval wife. If we can make the wife of the senior petty officer happy and give her a nice house, she will encourage her husband, who is so valuable to the Navy, to continue with his long service. But if to the contrary, she will say, "I am not prepared to put up with this any longer. Let us go back to civil life where we can have a home in which to bring up our children. "I think that the importance of those naval wives in that respect cannot be too strongly emphasised. I will not keep your Lordships any longer. I think the Statement is generally satisfactory, and that the progress which has been made is interesting. There is, however, no cause for complacency. A great deal more remains to be done before we have a modern Navy fit to cope with anything that it may be called upon to do.

4.26 p.m.

LORD AILWYN

My Lords, my intervention will be short. It is for one purpose only, to draw attention to a subject of which I have given notice, though rather short notice, for which I apologise to the noble Earl. It is a question which I have not heard brought up before in this House—a question of Admiralty administration. It has to deal with the Admiralty courier service. So far as I recollect, there was no such thing in existence as an Admiralty courier service before the First World War, nor during the period between the wars. It was essentially a war-time organisation, and what I should like to be told is: what are the circumstances to-day which necessitate the maintenance of this service in peace-time? Why are couriers required to carry packages and letters and to accompany sacks of mail when, prior to the war, the normal channels of communication—that is, the Post Office—operated perfectly adequately and, so far as I know, perfectly efficiently?

I should like to know what the composition of this service is. How many couriers are there? What is the method of recruitment to this service? Are they confined to retired Army officers, as I seem to remember they were during the war? If so, why are retired Naval officers not considered for what one would have thought would be a priority job for them, if indeed couriers are required at all? Is this service a daily one, or does it function two or three times a week; and at what figure do the man-hours work out per week or per month? Again, what are the geographical limits of their operations? I understand that they do not operate beyond the United Kingdom. I do not know whether there is an Army courier service or an Air Force courier service. If there is, would it not be possible to combine the courier work of all three Services—again, I say, if indeed couriers are required at all? Could not the Queen's Messengers undertake whatever personally conducted transport of confidential secret matter is required?

I ask these questions, of course, to try to elucidate the circumstances necessitating the continued existence of an erstwhile war-time organisation. This leads me to my final question, which is the kernel of the whole matter—namely, what is the annual cost of the maintenance of this courier service? Under what Vote does one find it in the Estimates? I have been quite unable to trace it. Presumably, in addition to the couriers themselves, there must be a headquarters staff of some sort at the Admiralty, and there must be motor cars and chauffeurs to take them away. I understand that there are scale payments for railway porters who handle the various sacks and parcels, and matters of that sort. All this must tot up to many thousands of pounds a year, and when one remembers the great reduction in the number of ships and establishments of the Fleet, compared with what it was in earlier years, when no courier service was in existence, one feels constrained to ask whether the maintenance of a separate courier service for the Navy is really justifiable at a time when the need for cutting down administrative costs and of retrenchment generally remains, as ever, an urgent necessity.

4.32 p.m.

LORD PAKENHAM

My Lords, the noble Lord who has just spoken has raised more than one point which, I feel sure, will tax the well-known powers of the noble Earl who is to reply. We are all looking forward to that reply, delivered with the full authority of the Admiralty. I only say that I hope the noble Earl will not restrict his powers of wit and humour—so long as they are not exercised at my particular expense—but may deflect his energies in the direction of the noble Lord, Lord Winster, and the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, as a beginning.

I propose to speak almost entirely on naval aviation, and mainly on naval aircraft. Before coming to that particular topic may I express my respect for all that has been said up to the present by noble Lords, each of whom has had far more experience of the sea than I am ever likely to have. I am sorry that the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, who was called away, has not yet been able to return, but I was particularly pleased to hear the tribute paid so sincerely and convincingly by the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, to the speech and personality and record at the Admiralty of the noble Viscount, Lord Hall. Coming from the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, that tribute will, I believe, give very great pleasure throughout naval circles and far beyond them.

I remember that when in 1951 I became for a few months First Lord of the Admiralty, I was informed that the one admitted weakness of the Fleet at that time was the shortage of naval pilots. From what the First Lord and others have told us lately, the position in that respect appears to be somewhat better to-day, though I know that the First Lord and the noble Earl will not claim in any way that we are yet out of the wood. But to-day there is a widespread conviction—it has been voiced once more by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, and has certainly not been resisted very violently by Government spokesmen on recent occasions—that the supply of our naval aircraft, actual and prospective, is well below the standard which the Navy has a right to expect, and well below the standard that we have a right to find in the Navy. Therefore, I am sure the House will not feel that I am ignoring the human and administrative sides of naval aviation—to which I and, I have no doubt, others will wish to return on another occasion—if I concentrate to-day on naval aircraft. I shall do so in general terms. We have had detailed discussions here and elsewhere quite lately, and I may not raise detailed topics this afternoon. But, as I shall show in a moment, I intend to press the noble Earl for various statements or, at any rate, assurances which I hope he will be in a position to give us.

My argument, painful though it may be, can happily be kept entirely clear of Party dialectics. As I ventured to say on an earlier occasion, all Governments of recent years, whatever their complexion, must stand together in this matter in the same while sheet. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Winster, was at rifle hard on past First Lords. I frankly sympathise with his feeling in the matter, and I repeat what I said on an earlier occasion: that this is not a possible opportunity for past Governments, whatever their Party, to throw stones at the present Administration. But the relative importance of naval aviation admittedly grows ever greater as time passes, and the penalties and perils that threaten our country, as a consequence of failure or inadequacy in this vital sphere, grow greater with every day that passes. Though the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, is not here—and I do not wish to assail him in his absence—I should add that nothing that I say to-day is intended to modify in any way the balance of argument between myself and the noble and gallant Viscount, as it was left after our last debate. Thus, I will not return to it this afternoon. I desire to be as uncontroversial as possible, and in that connection I would say simply that the recent history of Coastal Command does not suggest that the Royal Air Force could have handled this matter of naval aircraft any more effectively than the Royal Navy has, in fact, handled it, although in one respect the Royal Air Force would have had a certain advantage within the Ministry of Supply.

I am sure that the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, would be the last to deny the widespread disquiet which exists, among all who follow these matters, in regard to the naval aircraft position. In view of the public anxiety expressed by the Chairman of the Navy League and other distinguished officers at an earlier date, I should not like to claim, as it were, to have initiated this disquiet in any way; but I do recall a debate in your Lordships' House in February when I offered the opinion that the Navy had never had worthy aircraft, whatever Government were in office. I said that boldly. I am bound to say that I did it with some sense of rashness, although with full conviction, because I expected to find the opinion challenged in some quarters at least. But, on the contrary—and it is now three months or so ago—that view now seems to have become accepted as a sort of platitude—a kind of starting point in any discussion. Certainly it has been expressed, or implied, on a number of occasions since that debate in February, both in your Lordships' House and in another place, by those with great experience of the sea.

With no kind of personal animus, indeed with no desire to make any personal criticism at all, I would remark that Ministerial statements in various debates in this House and another place have not done much to raise our spirits. I do not say that it was possible for those spokesmen to create any more optimistic impression—it might not have been honest to do so. But certainly I think there are few who are of the opinion that a new page has been turned over, and that the failures of the past are to be compensated by successes in the future. The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft (I am glad to see he has rejoined us), it will be recalled, wound up the debate on aircraft in this House on February 17. I think I am right in saying that he described the naval aircraft position as unsatisfactory. I am sure he is a devout reader of The Times. If so, he will recollect that next morning The Times commented: This is tantamount to an admission by a pre-1939 Government of the inadequacy of the main armament of the Battle Fleet. That was the comment of The Times on the authoritative pronouncement of the noble Lord in February.

Since then, we have had various debates. The First Lord has spoken fully and eloquently on this among other matters in another place. But since the debate on the Navy Estimates in another place, we find the Manchester Guardian supporting the following view in a special article. It quotes this view with approval, as held by competent observers. Using the words of the Manchester Guardian, I think the view can be summed up in this way, that the Royal Navy is equipped almost entirely with obsolete or obsolescent aircraft. I think that is going rather far. I am not going to quote further words of the Manchester Guardian because I think one can spoil a good case by over-statement. But the Manchester Guardian is a newspaper of the highest integrity and standing, and after all these debates that is how it sums up the position. Indeed it sums it up a great deal more pessimistically in some sentences than in the one which I have quoted. I do not think that the fact of the existence of disquiet, whether justified or not—and I submit that it is largely justified—in well-informed circles in this country can seriously be disputed. The very distinguished Government spokesmen in our recent debates in this House were no doubt extremely cautious, and it may be that they did well to be canny, but we are left with a position to-day which is described by Mr. Oliver Stewart, with editorial support in the organ of the Navy League, as: Air danger in the Navy. I do not possess the necessary qualifications for either accepting or rejecting the full details of Mr. Stewart's argument, but I offer my personal conviction in favour of his main line of thought. There is, I submit, truly and beyond argument, an air danger in the Navy, in the sense that at the present time naval aircraft appear to be the Achilles' heel of our whole defence system. I place myself wholeheartedly behind the clear and firm words of the editor of The Navy, the organ of the Navy League: The whole question is too vital to our security to be glossed over, the Government should come clean; tell us how, where and why these delays have occurred and give the most explicit assurance that they have been eliminated.…Otherwise what reason have we to assume that super-priority"— he is referring to the new jet fighter— means anything at all? There is the point in a nut-shell. No one questions—I am sure that I do not—the ability, the energy or the devotion of the present First Lord or his colleagues on the Board of Admiralty, but unless the approach and the system are improved, what reason is there to think that they will do better than their predecessors? In the words of the editor of The Navy, unless we can obtain something clearer and firmer: this is simply not good enough. What, then, am I asking Her Majesty's Government and the Board of Admiralty, in particular, to do? I am not, I repeat, criticising individuals; I am certainly not dragging politics into it, and I am not to-day, whatever may be the case on some other occasions, referring to particular aircraft. But from this side of the House I am putting forward two proposals and adding a third as a personal submission—I must not try to involve the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, in it at this stage—and I have given the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, notice of all three suggestions. First, I ask the Government for a clearer and more definite and more unambiguous statement than any made yet that they recognise that a new emphasis and a higher priority must be given to naval aviation than those which have hitherto been accorded. I am not asking just for stronger emphasis and for nigh priority: I respectfully call for new emphasis and for much higher priority. May I suggest, with proper deference, to the noble Earl, who possesses a great command of words, and through him to the First Lord, that statements of the kind I am asking for can be phrased so as to mean virtually nothing, or, as I hope on this occasion, to make it clear throughout the Admiralty and the Fleet that the First Lord to-day recognises that something is seriously amiss. I beg the noble Earl for an assurance that the First Lord intends to give this question of naval aviation and naval aircraft in particular his unceasing personal attention, and for an assurance that" heads will roll" if a better report cannot be given to us next year.

My second point is more complex. I hope your Lordships, most of whom, I think, are fairly familiar with these rather involved matters, will bear with me if I appear to dwell on something which does not seem, at first sight, of major importance. I am trying to put my finger on the weak spot in the present arrangements. The topic to which I wish to refer is, I understand from a Government statement elsewhere, under governmental examination at the present time. That, I know the House will agree, does not preclude a brief reference to it here, though perhaps to avoid any possible misunderstanding I should hasten to give an assurance that I am not speaking from any kind of unofficial Admiralty brief. In this particular part of my speech I am putting forward a personal view after discussion with my noble friend Lord Hall. As the House knows, aircraft for the Navy are ordered through the Ministry of Supply. I think most of us who have gone into this matter at all are far from satisfied that the present set-up enables the Admiralty case in the Ministry of Supply to be argued and applied in practice as effectively as it should be.

If we turn to the last available number of Whitaker's Almanack (and the system has not, I believe, been changed since it was issued) we find that the control of ordering the aircraft on the executive side—all aircraft for air force—is in the hands of an Air Marshal, with an Air Vice-Marshal as Assistant Controller. We find that in the Ministry of Supply the Controller of Supplies (Air) is a very distinguished Air Marshal, while there is a Deputy Controller of Supplies (Aircraft Production) who is a civilian, and an Assistant Controller of Supplies (Air) who is an Air Vice-Marshal. That is the picture on the executive side. The officers I have mentioned are extremely capable officers—I know they are. And it is they and their subordinates who have to take a whole number of vital executive decisions affecting naval aircraft—to give one example, the allocation of space in aircraft factories between one kind of aero plane and another. It is not so long ago, for instance, since these officers or their subordinates decided that the production of Sea Furies at a factory near London should be transferred to Black-pool in order to make way for Meteors. I am not now arguing whether that decision was right or wrong. Indeed, I think we may assume that it was right. At any rate, when I was First Lord I concurred in it myself, so I am in no position to criticise it. But it merely serves to illustrate the arrangements which exist and which I am trying to bring out. The fact is that vital decisions of this kind and the equally vital task of maintaining a constant pressure on the manufacturers falls in its executive aspect to officers of the R.A.F.

Your Lordships will ask: "What about the Navy?" We learn from Whitaker's that they have a Chief Naval Representative, an officer whose main work lies at the Admiralty, as Vice-Controller Air. He is Chief Naval Representative in the Ministry of Supply. The present holder of the office is an outstanding man, as was his predecessor, whom I dealt with at first hand, much to my own advantage. The present Chief Naval Representative in the Ministry of Supply is a Rear-Admiral: that is to say, he is a rank lower than the R.A.F. officer in control of aircraft supplies in the Ministry of Supply. That difference of rank is not my main point, though I suggest it is not to be overlooked. My main point, of which I have given the noble Earl notice, is that on the face of it the Navy are seriously handicapped by a system under which they are represented only in an advisory capacity within the ordering Department. The executive decisions are taken by representatives of another Service. Prima facie one would think that the Navy were handicapped. The results in the past year seem to suggest that something is amiss, and I suggest to the House that the whole matter is worth exploring a good deal further than it has been explored in public. I am not expecting the noble Earl, who, although he has received notice, has not had very much time, to make any precise or decisive statement on this matter to-day, but I hope that at least he will give us the assurance that the matter will be considered very seriously and urgently within the Admiralty.

In my last few sentences I will throw out a further suggestion, entirely in a personal capacity—I must not seek to involve my noble friend Viscount Hall in flying a kite—but I hope the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, will at least do me the justice of supposing that this suggestion is not put forward without a good deal of thought. I believe that there is a general desire (we are told there is) on the part of the Board of Admiralty to give naval aviation its due place, but I believe also that within the Admiralty there will always be an unceasing struggle confronting those charged with the responsibility for naval aviation if the expansion of the status of naval aviation is to keep pace, so to speak, with the growing importance of its rôle. Noble Lords, a large proportion of whom have had high administrative experience, will perhaps agree with me, and perhaps I shall carry the noble Viscount, Lord Waverley, with me on this matter. I know that he and I are anxious to agree more than we are able to do sometimes in these discussions. In the last resort, if we want to give a subject a higher position within the Governmental hierarchy—andI think this is true even more of the Fighting Services than of the civilian Services, though it is true of them, too—the one sure way to do it is to improve the status of those in charge. I know of no other way of doing it. Therefore, I desire to ventilate publicly the thought that the status of naval aviation would be improved, and understood far and wide to be improved, and that the hands of those concerned with it would be very much strengthened, if an adjustment were made within the Board of Admiralty.

I suggest that the Fifth Sea Lord who, as the House knows, is now concerned with naval aviation, be moved up to Third Sea Lord. The Third Sea Lord, who is concerned with production and construction, would become Fourth Sea Lord and the Fourth Sea Lord, who is concerned with supplies, would become Fifth Sea Lord. I can imagine, without straining my limited mental powers unduly, that the noble Earl will tell me that this would make no difference. I hope he will not tell me too emphatically to-day that there is no difference in status between the Sea Lords and that they are all equal on the Board. I hope he will not say too dogmatically that a change of this kind will make no change, either for good or for ill. But I make this suggestion. The stone is thrown into the pool and we shall see what happens to it.

There is one aspect, which is not a chief aspect but again is not negligible, which I think will follow, not quite automatically but usually in practice. At the present time the Fifth Sea Lord usually starts his term as a Rear-Admiral and becomes a Vice-Admiral, and the Third Sea Lord usually starts his term as a Vice-Admiral and becomes an Admiral. Whether we are looking at the struggle for naval aviation within the Admiralty or, what is perhaps more important, at the struggle for naval aviation outside the Admiralty, I believe that stepping up the rank of those officers most directly concerned with naval aviation would be a considerable advantage. That is not the whole or, indeed, the major implication of my suggestion. I have argued that if we increase the status we shall strengthen the hands of those concerned with naval aviation. I hope the noble Earl will be able to say that my suggestion will at any rate receive some consideration and that he will allow public opinion to operate on it before too definite a decision is made.

I will not detain the House further. We are all equally devoted to the Navy, if those who have such a short contact with it as I myself may place themselves, perhaps impertinently, besides such distinguished sailors as we possess among your Lordships and a really splendid First Lord like my noble friend Viscount Hall. We all reverence the Navy and we are all anxious to serve the Navy. I know the noble Earl will recognise that any suggestions that have been made from this side of the House or from any other part of the House are directed purely to the one end—to serve the Royal Navy, the pride of the British people.

4.56 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM

My Lords, I feel I owe an apology to the House for arriving so late to take part in this debate. I have a good excuse, because I have been engaged on behalf of a society which looks after the welfare of sailors, and without sailors the Navy Estimates would not be of great value. I understand that the period for which officers and men are being retained beyond the expiry of their normal engagements will be progressively reduced during the coming year and that by early 1954 they will all have been released. Whilst fully appreciating the great services rendered by these officers and men, I hope that Her Majesty's Government will be able to give an assurance that this speed of reduction is not too rapid for the maintenance of efficiency, and that real efforts are being made to enlist and train the vital technicians so necessary for a modern warship and, of course, men to replace those who are going out. Only recently, when I was carrying out the steaming trials of a frigate on behalf of my firm, it was only too apparent that in some departments the shortage of skilled men was detrimental to the efficiency of the ship. In fact, the total complement was some 40 per cent. below the standard of a fully manned ship. There is no doubt that the manning question in the Navy is a very serious problem, and I hope that Her Majesty's Government are satisfied with the state of recruiting in all branches of the Service. If they are not satisfied, what do they propose to do about it?

In the recent debate on Defence, I ventured to inquire whether the effect of spreading the rearmament expenditure over a longer period would have the result of reducing the number of conversions of destroyers to anti-submarine units in the coming year. Unfortunately—no doubt owing to the many questions that were put to the Minister of Defence—my question was passed over. Perhaps the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, who is to reply to-day, can deal with that point. I see in the Statement on the Navy Estimates, on page 7, that there is a paragraph which refers to this matter. It says that the Royal Dockyards and ship-repairing industry will be more occupied this year than they were last year in modernising and converting ships. I hope this means that the rate of conversion of old destroyers to anti-submarine frigates will be maintained and not reduced. I am afraid that I am still by no means convinced that we have enough anti-submarine forces to keep open the sea lanes and to protect our convoys. I hope that the emphasis on the conversion programme will be maintained.

I have little doubt that the position of the supply of naval aircraft has been covered by many noble Lords, in addition to the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, many of whose views I support, and I do not propose to go over the arguments again. But I am glad that the First Lord of the Admiralty in another place was honest in his review of the re-equipment of naval aviation with modern types of aircraft. I hope to hear something more from the noble Earl about this whole matter. I am a little disturbed at the apparent complete lack of provision for auxiliary aircraft carriers that can operate with convoys. As many of your Lordships are aware, these auxiliary carriers were mostly converted from merchant ships, and they did invaluable service in the late war. It may well be that the naval staff now have other ideas of convoy protection, by supporting task forces, and other methods, and perhaps the noble Earl will be able to say something about this matter in his reply. I cannot help feeling that the provision of a number of auxiliary aircraft carriers would be of great service to the Fleet. They could be provided at no great cost, and would be a welcome addition to our convoy protection forces.

The First Lord in another place indicated that in the next few years a substantial rebuilding programme would have to be commenced to replace our worn and out-of-date ships. I feel that we must seriously consider, in spite of economic difficulties and the claims of the other Services, whether rebuilding can be safely postponed much longer. The modern warship, as I am certain the late First Lord knows, is a very complex structure, and takes a long time to build. We must consider now laying down our new ships. It is true that the four old cruisers, about which we hear so much, are still on the stocks, awaiting either money or new developments in armament, but I suggest that it is time these four cruisers were completed. I do not want to enlarge on the Russian cruiser menace, about which we have heard so much in another place, but this formidable force of some twenty modern ships should be treated with great seriousness, in view of our own shortage of modern cruisers. It is all very well to suggest that our "Daring" class destroyers are really cruisers in disguise. The disguise would be pretty thin, I suggest, if they were to be matched against these Russian ships.

There is one other matter to which I should like to refer, and which I hear has been touched on to-day—namely, the Dartmouth entry. I know that the late First Lord is particularly interested in this matter. I understand that the Committee have completed their sittings and will shortly be making their recommendations. I hope that the findings will suggest that the entry for young officers should be extended, and not contracted. I should like to see a combination of entry ages of 17½ for the public schools, the present 16-year-old entry maintained, with the addition of the 13 or 13½entry age. I think, also, that it should be possible to devise an entry scheme from the universities at an age a little above the public school entry. I am sure that many of your Lordships will have read the extremely interesting article in The Times recently on the training of naval officers. I think that clearly brings out the need for as broad a basis as possible for officer entry. I hope that the noble Earl will be able to indicate when the Committee on the Dartmouth entry are likely to make their Report. I suggest that it should be brought forward as soon as possible, as each day brings more difficulties and uncertainties for the parents of boys who are anxious to take up a naval career.

5.4 p.m.

THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD

My Lords, it is my duty to attempt to sum up this debate. I trust that the date, which I have suddenlyrealised is May 13, will not prove to be too inauspicious for me. I fear that I shall have to detain your Lordships for a considerable time, but before I begin my reply I wish particularly to thank the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, not only for the extremelyable speech with which he introduced this debate, but also for the delightful courtesy with which he has treated me throughout this matter, a courtesy which is, indeed, proverbial of him. The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, asked me to exercise what he was pleased to call my wit. I can assure the noble Lord that, if ever there was any, it has long since been submerged and bogged down in a fog of statistics.

As noble Lords are aware, my right honourable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty said recently in another place in his speech on the Navy Estimates that, following a review of Defence policy, the rearmament programme has been spread over a longer period and held to a lower peak. The current Navy Estimates are, in consequence, more or less the same as last year. This policy has involved certain reductions in the naval programme, and in deciding in what directions expenditure must be cut I can assure your Lordships that great care has been taken not to interrupt production of the high priority elements in the programme. The holding of the rearmament programme to a lower peak has meant some spreading of the naval production programme. As regards new construction, it has been possible to achieve the required adjustment mainly by the spreading of follow-on orders, and it has not been necessary to resort to a large scale cancellation of orders. The emphasis of the new construction programme continues to be on the large programme of minesweepers and anti-submarine vessels, which remain the strategic priorities. The emphasis of the modernisation and conversion programme is on the conversion of destroyers to anti-submarine frigates, and the proaramme for 1953–54 is, if anything, larger than that for 1952–53, despite the fact that total naval production in 1953–54 will he somewhat less than in 1952–53. Four major conversions and three of the simpler conversions of destroyers to antisubmarine frigates were completed last year; and more than double that number of conversions are expected to be completed during the present financial year.

To sustain the high level of shipbuilding and modernisation and conversion, it has been necessary, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, rightly pointed out, to make reduced provision as compared with 1952–53 for ammunition, oil fuel and stores, and this has undoubtedly involved some drawing on stock. This can be regarded as a calculated risk, as, indeed, is the whole policy of spreading defence expenditure over a longer period. For example, it takes less time to provide these things in an emergency than to provide ships and aircraft, As my honourable friend, the Parliamentary Secretary, said in another place (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 512, cal. 2012): It is very much better to veer and haul on short-term items like stores than to disrupt the new construction programme and cancel contracts in the Yards. That I feel to be a sentence of common sense. Again, it should not be forgotten that in the first years of the rearmament programme energetic steps were taken to build up reserves of stores of all kinds that would be needed to enable the Fleet to be placed on a war footing.

I now come to the vexed question of cruisers, about which I know the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, is so concerned. I should be the last person to attempt to deny the indispensability of the cruiser. I can assure the noble Viscount that cruisers still occupy a most important part in naval strategy, and although I admit that cruisers do not feature in the current new construction programme, this results again from the question of priorities. It should be borne in mind in this connection that we have now at our disposal a force of cruisers which have been extensively modernised as a result of last war experience, or which are included in a modernisation programme, and hence are or will be well equipped to meet present-day operational needs, including our immediate requirements on the outbreak of a war.

The point I wish to make here is that the maintenance of a properly balanced fleet is obviously of the highest importance, and seriously to reduce the numbers of mine sweepers, seaward defence craft, frigates, et cetera, in order to increase our cruiser strength, would result in a balance unsuitable to our present strategic requirements. Even supposing that in the event of war our shipbuilding capacity should remain unimpaired, these essential vessels could not be produced so quickly and in such numbers as would undoubtedly be needed for the defence of the vital shipping approaches to the United Kingdom against mine and submarine attack. I must, however, remind noble Lords of the warning given in another place by my right honourable friend the First Lord, that he and the Admiralty recognise that, as much of the Fleet is of pre-war or wartime construction, a steady replacement by new construction will be vital if the Fleet is to exist as an efficient and balanced fighting force. Noble Lords can, I think, rest assured that in planning for such a replacement programme cruisers will certainly be given their due place. I hope that does something to answer the doubts of the noble Viscount, Lord Hall.

At the same time, I would invite the noble Viscount to bear in mind that for all practical purposes the "Daring" class vessels are in elect light cruisers, with a power of speed and an ability to manœuvre which is beyond the capabilities of larger cruisers. I might say that the "Tiger" class cruisers remain suspended, but during the financial year work will continue on gun mountings for them. I think the noble Viscount asked me about the cruiser "Cumberland. "The position about this vessel is that at about the end of April she had been fitted with equipment that is to have its trials this summer. She is now on her way to the Mediterranean, where she will carry out a sustained programme until the end of September, when she will return to the United Kingdom and reenter one of Her Majesty's Dockyards to be fitted for her 1954 trials.

The noble Viscount referred to the progress made in the field of propulsion and asked whether certain remarks made by my right honourable friend the Minister of Supply in another place were intended to convey the idea that nuclear-propelled submarines had been abandoned. I much regret to say that security considerations preclude me from saying very much on this particular subject. I can, however, say that the Minister of Supply's remarks referred only to the peaceful use of nuclear propulsion, and that the statement which I made in your Lordships' House on March 27 of last year, when I said that we were devoting a great deal of attention to this project, still holds good. I can also assure the noble Viscount that satisfactory shore trials of machinery using oxygen-bearing fuels have been carried out and that further development is continuing.

On the question of guided missiles, which is an ominous one which is in all our minds, I am happy to inform the noble Viscount that research and development into a naval ship-to-air guided weapon has for some time been undertaken at the highest priority by the Ministry of Supply on behalf of the Admiralty, and very encouraging progress is being made. At the same time, corresponding work has been in progress in the Admiralty into the purely naval and novel problems of launching and controlling these weapons from ships, and the Admiralty and the Ministry of Supply are working closely together to ensure that production of ships and ship equipment keeps in step with the actual development of the weapon. Air-to-air guided weapons are being developed by the Ministry of Supply to meet requirements for both Naval and R.A.F. aircraft.

There has been a certain amount of criticism about the Navy's share of the Defence Budget, and it has been hinted that the Royal Navy has not been given a big enough share. I must stress here the fact that the Navy Estimates in 1953–54 have not increased, while those for the Army and Air Force have done so. This must not be taken as an indication of a decline in the importance of the Royal Navy, or of a lack of determination on the part of my right honourable friend and his advisers to ensure that from year to year our resources available for defence are properly and to the best advantage allocated between the three Services. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, said that we were losing interest in the Navy. To that statement I oppose the most resolute denial. It is simply not true. But we must have regard to all the circumstances, including our war potential, our strategic requirements and the general economic position. Noble Lords will not have forgotten that my right honourable friend the First Lord prophesied recently in another place that in a few years' time the First Lord of the day will be asking the House to vote funds for an increasing shipbuilding programme.

I come now to the question of naval aviation. We have certainly had an extremely interesting discussion on this subject. I am tempted to preface my replies with general remarks on the rôle of the Navy in peace and war, but in the presence of so many distinguished authorities I shall refrain from doing so. I am bound to say, however, that in carrying out its arduous tasks in war, naval aircraft operating from carriers must play an essential part which cannot equally well be carried out by shore-based aircraft. The reason for this is apparent in the unique mobility afforded to carrier-borne aircraft in the defence of shipping, in anti-submarine operations and in air strikes against shipping. The only effective defence against the greatly increased air threat to shipping by modern long-range bombers lies at present in high performance fighters, which are essential to cover any maritime operation within the range of enemy strike aircraft. Shore-based fighters can provide this protection only within short distances of their bases. Similarly, enemy air reconnaissance in ocean areas, which greatly increases the effectiveness of U-boats, surface raiders and air strikes, can be frustrated only by ship-borne fighters. Carrier-borne aircraft are essential also for anti-submarine operations and air reconnaissance over vast ocean areas, to supplement shore-based aircraft—which can be employed only, of course, within a calculated distance from their bases.

It is, I think, a remarkable fact that, in the last war. of all the merchant ships sunk by submarines in the Atlantic theatre, only 1 per cent. were sunk in convoys which included air escort. So far as air strikes against enemy shipping are concerned, it is true that these can also be carried out by shore-based bombers. It must be borne in mind, however, that even when such bombers are available, and within range to meet a sudden call to attack, their bases may well be hundreds of miles from the target; and the consequent delay in their appearance might often result in the opportunity to attack being lost. Valuable—as I am the first to admit—as the uses of shore-based aircraft undoubtedly are in such sea operations, they are nevertheless complementary to the operations of carrier-borne aircraft, because of the distance they are likely to be from the area where they are immediately required. Both types of aircraft are necessary to the successful conduct of such operations, but a great tactical advantage lies in the carrier's ability to operate in direct support of the Fleet and convoys, since it means that air support is immediately available to help combat threat of any air, submarine or surface attack.

We have to consider the question of the vulnerability of carriers. We also have to consider—and the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham made this point—the performance of the carrier-borne aircraft. I acknowledge freely that in the past naval aircraft have usually been of lower performance than their shore-based counterparts. A better knowledge of aircraft design should prevent this occuring in future, though in order to achieve the same performance the carrier aircraft may have to be larger than its shore-based equivalent. In the long run, however, this tendency could be reversed by modification in design. My right honourable friend's announcement in another place that a substantial order had been placed for a new naval fighter of the swept-back wing type clearly demonstrates, I think, his intention to ensure that the Royal Navy is equipped with aircraft whose performance is beyond criticism.

We have heard a great deal about this question of the vulnerability of carriers. It is not only in higher circles but also from the man in the street that we hear that this enormous thing, going slowly round, must obviously be very vulnerable. On that I can only comment that there is nothing in the past experience of carrier operations to indicate that they are unduly vulnerable—although, of course, in the atomic era, and against the background of the probable development of guided missiles, carriers, like any other potential target, must clearly be a matter of concern. On the other hand I am advised that a carrier force, with its concentrated defence, is without doubt better able to look after itself than any other vessel or group of vessels at sea. So it is all the more obvious that we must have carrier-borne fighter protection immediately available in direct support of the Fleet and convoys. Let me stress, too, that there can be no question of having only small carriers. The essential advantage of sea power is its mobility and the ability to strike at the enemy at any point in the oceans or near his coastline. To maintain this traditional advantage, carrier-borne fighters of comparable performance to enemy shore-based fighters must be available; and fleet carriers which are armed and can carry the necessary number of aircraft are necessarily required for this purpose.

On the question of production of the various types of aircraft required by the Royal Navy, I cannot usefully add much to what was said in another place during the Navy Estimates debate by my right honourable friend the First Lord. That statement was a full one, and it left in my mind no justification for any allegation that the Government are complacent in the matter of naval aviation, the importance of which, I can assure Lord Pakenham, is fully realised by the Admiralty. Noble Lords are well aware that changes in the aircraft production position cannot be expected to take place in such a short period. Nobody knows that better than Lord Pakenham, who has had great experience in these matters. I repeat, however, that the matter is being given the very close attention which it merits, and that we are by no means satisfied with the present position.

As regards the Sea-Hawk, the recent American off-shore purchase contract for 107 of these aircraft is to my mind a good indication of that Government's confidence in the aircraft, and shows welcome support for our own views upon it. Americans are not accustomed to buying bad aircraft. I may mention that No. 806 Squadron at the Royal Naval Air Station, Brawdy, received its Sea-Hawks in April. Again, a large proportion of the Avengers which are being provided under the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme have already arrived. The first Royal Naval squadron will be equipped them very shortly. We are very grateful for these aircraft and are satisfied that we can make good use of them, and we know that they are still in service with the United States Navy. Lord Pakenham was anxious that vigorous steps should be taken to improve the machinery and organisation in the Admiralty and Ministry of Supply for developing and producing aircraft. As was stated in another place some weeks ago, this matter is under consideration—I am sorry to have to go on using that phrase—by a Committee of the two Departments. I will ask my right honourable friend the First Lord to bear in mind Lord Pakenham's remarks when he comes to consider the report of the investigating body.

LORD PAKENHAM

May I ask the noble Earl to go a little further than that? Will he ask his right honourable colleague, the First Lord, to consider my remarks at an earlier stage—in other words while the Committee are still conducting their inquiries?

THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD

I shall be only too pleased to bring the noble Lord's remarks to the attention of my right honourable friend to-morrow morning.

I now come to the interesting suggestion of Lord Pakenham that the position of the Fifth Sea Lord should be altered to give him the title "Third Sea Lord. "My personal feeling, however, is that it is a case of "a rose by any other name…"Perhaps I might also remind the noble Lord that one advantage of having the Fifth Sea Lord join the Board of Admiralty as a Rear-Admiral—at any rate for the next few years—is that the prospects of obtaining a pilot for the post are thereby much enhanced. And that is, I should have thought, the one thing that the noble Lord wanted.

To come to the question of manpower, the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, criticised Vote A. It is a difficult and rather complicated affair, but I will deal with it as briefly as I can. In case there is any room for misunderstanding, I should explain that the Vote A figure of 151,000 shown in the Estimates is the maximum number that will be borne during the current financial year, and not the normal strength. We shall, in fact, run down by next March to a normal strength of about 140,000. The increase in strength since 1950 was brought about both by increasing the numbers of normal engagements and by the emergency measures of recalling reservists and retaining officers and men after their normal engagements had expired. Without the services of the retained and recalled men, we could not have brought the Fleet to its present level of preparedness. It is as a result of these additions that, for example we have been able to keep the Far East Fleet on a war complements basis and to improve the readiness of the Reserve Fleet. I am quite sure that noble Lords on all sides of the House will join me in paying tribute to those officers and men who, in spite of greatest hardship and sacrifice, have played such a part in enabling the Fleet to meet its commitments.

Clearly, these emergency measures could not be continued indefinitely, and that is why it was decided last year that the period of retention should be scaled down gradually from the beginning of this financial year, and that all recalled and retained men should be returned to civil life by April, 1954. The consequent reduction in the number of men serving will be offset slightly by the growth of the normal strength by about 2,000, but over the current financial year there will be a net fall of about 10,000 in the total strength of the Navy. However, as my right honourable friend the First Lord has said in his Statement, by means of various manpower economies, including the reduction of complements and the re-disposition of the Reserve Fleet, it has been possible to avoid a proportionate reduction in the number of ships in commission. Obviously, all these economies—in particular reductions—which we have imposed on the complements of ships afloat cannot be continued indefinitely without harmful effects on both ships and men, and I hope that it may be possible to relax the more severe restrictions as the Regular ratings acquire experience and qualifications.

The noble Viscount has expressed the view that the Regular intake should be increased. It is our opinion, however, that such a proposal over-simplifies the difficulties which the Admiralty has to meet. I have already mentioned that normal bearings will increase by about 2,000 in the current financial year. This increase represents a further stage in the build-up of numbers on normal engagements resulting from the full-scale recruiting and training effort which was started early in 1951, with the object of reversing the planned run-down of the Navy which was in operation before the Korean war started. It was not until December, 1951, that the reduction in the normal strength—that is, the strength exclusive of recalled and retained men—could be halted at 129,000. There has already been an increase of 9,000 in this strength, and by April next it should have grown to 11,000, giving a total Vote A strength of about 140,000, or some 2,000 above the strength at the outbreak of the Korean war.

During 1953–54, the expansion of normal strength will be checked by the outflow of large numbers of men who signed on for 7-year engagements just after the war. In addition to checking the rate of expansion, this process will have a serious effect on the numbers of senior ratings, actual or potential, which are already short due to the great reduction in Regular recruiting in the war years, coupled with a lower rate of re-engagement in the post-war years up to 1950. This shortage, and the very large increase in junior ratings which has taken place since recruiting was expanded in 1951, sets a limit to the numbers of recruits who could be usefully absorbed in the Navy in the near future, and it would be impracticable to increase entries sufficiently to replace all the retained and recalled personnel who would be lost to us in 1953–54, even if the recruits were available.

The real need is to expand the numbers of senior ratings, and this means that we shall have to take all possible steps to encourage men to remain in the Navy on completing their current engagements. We hope that the greatly improved pension rates and the terminal grant which has been paid since 1950, as well as the bounty of £100 to which every man is entitled on re-engaging, and which has been renewed for the current year, will continue to induce large numbers of ratings in all branches to make the Navy their career. We should like to see more of our best ratings who are within sight of the end of their twenty-two years' service take advantage of this. Although present shortages of senior ratings cannot be remedied by recruitment of new entries, we are nevertheless recruiting at present as many continuous service men as possible, in order to build up a sound and well-balanced age structure for the future. However, the tendency for the number of applicants in some branches to drop has increased the difficulty of maintaining the desired quality of entrants.

I should like now to say a word about the Cadet entry. The Committee which I said last March would soon be starting work have now completed their deliberations and have recently submitted their Report to my right honourable friend the First Lord. As was stated in another place on April 29, the First Lord has decided to publish the Report. The Report is, I am informed, a rather lengthy document, and the physical work of printing will take some little time. I hope, however, that it will be possible to publish it before very long. In the meantime, as its contents are sub judice, it is clearly evident that I cannot indulge in any comment.

I think your Lordships will expect me to say something about the Review of the Fleet by Her Majesty. I am delighted to know that many noble Lords will be able to see for themselves at the Royal Review of the Fleet next month indications of the composition of the Fleet under modern conditions. There will be only one battleship, the noble Lord, Lord Winster, will be pleased to know, but noble Lords will be able to see carriers, cruisers, destroyers and a most formidable array of anti-submarine frigates, minesweepers, submarines and midget submarines. In all, over 200 ships of the Royal Navy and Commonwealth Navies will be present, but this figure will total no more than one-third of the full strength of the Navies of the Commonwealth. Sixteen foreign nations will also be represented: America by the cruiser "Baltimore,'' France by the cruiser "Montcalm" and Russia by the modern "Sverdlov" class cruiser.

It has, I am afraid, been necessary to ballot for places on the guest liners, and those who were unlucky and failed to secure a berth in the liner will be accommodated in the aircraft maintenance ship H.M.S. "Perseus. "Every one, from both Houses of Parliament, who has asked to go should be able to have a first-class view. It will also be of interest to certain noble Lords that the fly-past of 300 naval aircraft, which will take place later in the afternoon of June 15, will be led by a Flag Officer—namely, Flag Officer, Flying Training, who has specialised in air since his youth.

My Lords, I have notes on two more points, but I will spare your Lordships these. I shall speak to the two noble Lords concerned after this debate, because I think it has been going on long enough. I will close by apologising to your Lordships for the inordinate length at which I have detained you. I fear that I have still left a number of questions unanswered, but I will try to return later on to those noble Lords who are unsatisfied. I only hope that what I have said has done something to convince your Lordships that the Navy is still as proud and vital a force as it ever was, and that it is fully capable at this very moment of preserving for the future the glorious traditions of the past.

5.42 p.m.

VISCOUNT HALL

My Lords, it is left for me to express my thanks to those noble Lords who have taken part in what has been a short but most interesting and useful debate on the Royal Navy. It has been interesting because each noble Lord who has taken part in the debate has had some connection either with the Admiralty or with the Royal Navy. I am doubly grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, for his kind remarks at the opening of his speech, and also for the amount of information which he gave the House. He certainly gave us some idea of the result of the research which has been going on over a long period. I am sure that not only your Lordships' House but also the country will be pleased to hear what he has had to say in connection with that matter. There are many points upon which I should like to follow him, but I will refrain from doing so. It is left for me but to express to him my thanks, and those of other noble Lords who have taken part in the debate, for the full reply which he has given. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.