HL Deb 30 July 1953 vol 183 cc1149-57
LORD SILKIN

My Lords, I beg to ask the Government the following Question, of which I have given them private notice: Whether Her Majesty's Government were consulted on the statements made by Mr. Dulles at his Press Conference, as reported in The Times of yesterday, July 29, and what are their views on these statements?

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)

My Lords, the answer to the first part of the noble Lord's Question is quite simple. It is: No; there is no reason why Mr. Dulles should have done so, since by long custom every Government has the right to make its views known as it thinks proper. The position of Her Majesty's Government is clear. Our policy is firmly based on the United Nations, and we intend to work through the machinery of the United Nations. I have already explained to the House in detail yesterday how Her Majesty's Government hoped events would develop in the forthcoming Session of the General Assembly and in the Korean political conference. Furthermore, I should tell the House that I have sent instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington which are designed to remove any possibility of doubt as to our attitude on all these questions. In doing so, I have urged the United States Government to make every endeavour to induce President Syngman Rhee to abide loyally by the policy of the United Nations both at the forthcoming Session of the General Assembly and at the political Conference.

LORD SILKIN

My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Marquess for his reply. Of course, one must agree that every Government is entitled to explain its own policy. But would not the noble Marquess agree that many of the statements made in the Press Reports are in marked conflict with the White Paper and with the speech which the noble Marquess himself made yesterday.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, my answer to that supplementary would be: No, not on basic objectives. We are both of us in favour of peace; we are both of us in favour of the United Nations. The main broad aims of policy, I should have thought, were identical in both cases. Of course—and nobody seeks to dispute this—there are always individual issues on which we may not see eye to eye. But it is really, if I may say so, far more profitable to us and the world to concentrate on our points of agreement, rather than merely to emphasise points of difference.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, would that not be a good thing with the Russians, too?

LORD SILKIN

My Lords, of course we are in agreement when we deal with generalities. But when you bring these generalities into practical terms, it does look as if the purposes are not ad idem. I should like to mention one point in particular. Mr. Dulles is reported to have said that he has offered his terms and there can be no concessions, whereas the noble Marquess gave us to understand that the position has been kept absolutely open.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

With regard to what?

LORD SILKIN

With regard to the political negotiations that are to follow the truce.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I do not quite understand the meaning of the noble Lord's question. I think the position with regard to the negotiations following the truce is perfectly clear. A Political Conference is to be set up, and the countries concerned at that Conference are to negotiate for a permanent settlement for Korea, or if they cannot get immediately a permanent settlement, at any rate a temporary settlement in Korea agreeable to all Parties. I think that is common ground between me and Mr. Dulles and our Governments.

LORD SILKIN

This is my last supplementary—perhaps I have not made myself clear. In his statement Mr. Dulles is reported to have said that the Communists have got to accept the American terms, and that if they do not then there will be no peace, whereas the noble Marquess gave us to understand that these terms would be freely negotiated and questions which are in dispute—and there are a good many—are open and would be subject to ordinary discussion.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I understood Mr. Dulles to say that if, within ninety days, a settlement had not been reached, in that case he reserved the right not to continue the negotiations any longer. I may be wrong, but I cannot believe that he actually said that the Communists have to agree to the American terms without more ado. For my view, I would say this to the noble Lord. He is judging entirely from newspaper reports, and newspaper reports, though I do not say they are in the least inaccurate, are often truncated, and to that extent they do not give a full account of all that was said. I cannot answer for Mr. Dulles; it is not possible for me to do that. But so far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, I stand by what we have said in the past. If we go into negotiations we do so with a view to getting an agreed settlement.

LORD HENDERSON

In the communiqué it is said that the Governments agree that they will proceed with their common policies vis-à-vis China, pending a further conference or further discussions. It is well known that the two Governments have a different position as regards the entry of China into the United Nations, or the Pekin Government taking the China seat in the United Nations. Mr. Dulles has stated the position of the American Government on that particular issue. He has not waited for any conference. He has declared now what is the position of the American Government, and for a long time ahead. Is there any reason why Her Majesty's Government should not tell us and the world now what is their position as regards the entry of the Pekin Government to the China seat in the United Nations.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

On that point I would say this; and it has particular relevance to what I said earlier. I do not believe that the newspaper report—from accounts I have heard later—was completely accurate on that point. I think the point of the question which was put to Mr. Dulles, as I understand it, was: would it be competent for the United States to use the veto for this purpose; and he said it would be competent. But I think he made it clear that he would be extremely reluctant to do so. The effect given by the first newspaper report was a definite statement that if it was put forward they would veto it. Perhaps I should make that more clear. If the proposal were put forward that the People's Government of China should become a member of the United Nations they would veto it. I think what I have told your Lordships puts rather a different slant on it from that. If noble Lords want the policy of Her Majesty's Government, I would refer them to a statement which was made by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary on June 18, of last year. He was speaking in answer to a question and he said (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 502, Col. 1183): As to the wider question"— that is the question of general policy— I am in complete agreement with my predecessor's observations of last June, which I may, perhaps, quote: 'His Majesty's Government' "— it was at that time "His Majesty's Government"— '…believe that…the Central People's Government should represent China in the United Nations. In view, however, of that Government's persistence in behaviour which is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, it appears to His Majesty's Government that consideration of this question should be postponed.' Her Majesty's Government have not in any way gone back on that declaration: but I would just make this proviso, which I think it is only right that I should do—and I did it yesterday. I said that the three Powers in Washington recently agreed that it would be premature, and indeed quite impracticable, that there should be any immediate automatic change of policy and I elaborated that by saying that the situation was still very uncertain and it was for that reason that it was premature. But I added that the situation was being kept absolutely open and that we reserved the right to raise the matter if we thought a proper time had come. If the noble Lord will allow me to repeat that, we stand by the statement of the Foreign Secretary, with the proviso which I added—and I believe that is the only attitude one can take up at the present stage. The Armistice is about three days old, and the Political Conference has not begun to sit. Obviously, there must be a breathing space, in order to see how the situation is going to develop. With that proviso I would assure the House again that we stand by the statements that have been made.

LORD HENDERSON

I am much obliged to the noble Marquess for that reply. Of course, since the statement to which he has referred was made, there has been the Armistice, and I agree that it is only of short duration so far. But it may be that at the United Nations Assembly next month this question may be raised. Should I be right in understanding that, if it is raised, in the light of the new situation Her Majesty's Government would support the sitting of the Pekin Government in the seat for China in the United Nations?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The noble Lord would only be right in assuming that we should judge for ourselves of the state of the circumstances, when the subject was raised. I am certainly not going to tie Her Majesty's Government here and now to go any further than that. But as will have been seen from the Foreign Secretary's own statement, Her Majesty's Government's view is that the People's Government of China should represent China in the United Nations when the time is ripe for them to do so. That is our view and we must be left to judge whether that moment has arrived. For me to say now, three days after the Armistice, the time that on the 16th, 17th or 18th of August the time will have arrived, would be quite improper, and impossible for me to do. But we shall certainly judge the matter with a completely open mind when the time comes.

LORD HENDERSON

The only point I wish to emphasise—and I hope the noble Marquess will allow me to do so—is this. Whatever the circumstances may be when the matter comes up, if it does come up, at New York (I do not question the position adopted by the noble Marquess as regards the consideration that should be given to it then by Her Majesty's Government), the difference is that the United States Government has declared a ready that it will not agree; and that, I think, shows a very serious division of opinion between the two Governments, and a division of opinion that must show itself if the matter is raised at New York during the Assembly in August.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The United States Government are entitled to take whatever positron they like. The purpose of foreign policy and diplomacy and negotiations between countries is to ease off those differences and try to obtain the policy that one wants. I cannot say that at any given moment the United States Government would be willing to do this or that. It would be improper for me to try. I have described the policy which is to be followed by Her Majesty's Government and no doubt it will be our policy to try to persuade every other Government to follow the same policy.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

What does the noble Marquess mean by "when the time is ripe"? Does not the qualification he has introduced undermine the position which, as I understand it. Her Majesty's Government and the country have taken up: that China has a right to a seat in the United Nations? Does not the qualification now introduced mean that the situation is going to be dependent upon China's behaviour?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The noble Lord might as well say that Her Majesty's Government were to do it when the time was unripe. I do not admit that. The whole essence of foreign policy is timing: to do a thing at the right time, neither too soon nor too late.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

What I asked the noble Marquess was whether his qualification does not undermine that situation in which China has a right to a seat in the United Nations. That was my main question. If it does not do that, it is all right.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, there are two points. One is the position of China—and the Security Council covers both peace in the Pacific and our trade.

We want to know what instructions he has given to our delegates. We are not cross-examining him about Mr. Dulles—he can give what instructions he likes. But the point is what instructions the noble Marquess has given. He talks vaguely about China's "behaviour." What behaviour? What conditions? Is the charge against China that she was an aggressor in Korea? Yes. If the aggression ceases, do our objections cease? The noble Marquess has left us completely in doubt, and to show how dangerous the doubt is, I would refer to M. Bidault's speech this morning, in which he said he cannot recognise China until she does something different from what she is doing in Indo-China. What instructions is the noble Marquess giving to our delegates for August 17 and, in particular, what conditions do Her Majesty's Government lay down for recognition of China's indubitable international right to sit on the Security Council?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I have already spoken about the position of China in the United Nations, and I cannot add to what I have said. With regard to instructions given to the British delegation, it would be contrary to the custom and practice of every Government to come down to tell the House, before an international conference, the detailed instructions given to their representatives. These representatives represent the Government of the day; and if Parliament disagrees with the action of the Government it is always open to Parliament to turn the Government out. That is the proper constitutional position. Certainly I am not going to be responsible for giving the House the detailed instructions which are to be delivered to this delegation.

So far as trade is concerned—I think the noble Viscount mentioned trade—we all want to see trade renewed between Britain and China at the proper time. At present there are only controls and embargoes against trade in strategic materials. These are to remain on for the time being. The noble Viscount says there has been an Armistice and asks why the controls cannot be taken off. The Armistice is only an Armistice, and the position is very uncertain. What the noble Viscount must recognise is that only a week ago China was fighting this country; they had armies in the field against our troops—and he expects us to remove the embargoes within three or four days. That is unreasonable. What I said yesterday was that the subject would be reviewed in the light of further developments, I think that is the only wise and patriotic attitude to take.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I am reluctant to continue this, but, after all, we are parting, reluctantly, from the noble Marquess now for many weeks, and this is our last opportunity. This meeting on August 17 of the United Nations in New York is going to be of outstanding importance. Who is it intended should represent Her Majesty's Government there? In particular, has the Acting Foreign Secretary himself any idea of repeating his triumphs in Washington by going to New York?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, the noble Lord will perhaps be glad to hear that that is not the proposal at present. The proposal is that my right honourable friend the Minister of State should lead the British delegation.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Since this is the last day on which there will be an opportunity, I should like to ask the noble Marquess another question. Mr. Dulles has announced that after thirty days—

A NOBLE LORD

Ninety days.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

—ninety days, it is possible that, in the event of certain behaviour on the part of the Chinese, he will walk out of the Armistice Conference. Mr. Syngman Rhee has announced that he will take further steps of an active kind. All we have from the Government on this point is that, in case of aggression by Mr. Syngman Rhee, we are entirely uncommitted; but we say that in the event of aggression by the Communists, the old rule stands and we are prepared to take up arms. What I want to ask the noble Marquess, because I am not at all clear about this, is what the situation is. Supposing you have the Conference and the United States delegate walks out, and Syngman Rhee walks out in a pugnacious mood. Do we stay there? It is very dangerous if we are left alone, if we stay there on the undertaking that we begin the war again—because that is what the New York Times seems to think is likely?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I think that is a fair and an important question. I have already indicated to the United States Government that, if such a situation should arise, in which the United States were proposing to walk out, they should take us into consultation first.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

That is very satisfactory.