HL Deb 22 October 1952 vol 178 cc823-33

2.36 p.m.

EARL JOWITT

My Lords, I beg to ask Her Majesty's Government a Question of which I have given them private notice—namely, whether they have any further statement to make on the military situation in Korea.

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE (EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS)

My Lords, since my last statement in your Lordships' House in July, there has been considerably more military activity in Korea. But this does not mean that there has been any great change in the general military situation. Your Lordships will have seen reports in the Press of bitter fighting over the last few weeks. I should like first to give you some idea of the significance of these operations. During September and October, the enemy have launched a series of attacks against a number of dominating features along the United Nations front. These include some forty hilltop positions, in advance of our main defence line, which the Communists were most anxious to include in their own lines at the time when we were negotiating with them about a cease-fire line.

Many of the recent attacks were only in platoon or company strength and may well have been diversionary. But at several points the Communist troops pressed forward in a determined and often fanatical manner and attacked again and again despite heavy losses. These assaults have been accompanied by very heavy artillery and mortar fire. In some localities the United Nations forces were forced to give ground initially in the face of these attacks. But generally they have been successful in winning back the ground lost in quick counter-attacks. However, we have lost to the enemy a small number of these outpost positions in recent battles. At no point across the entire front has the enemy managed to occupy any part of our main defence line. During one of the most determined of these attacks near Chorwon at the beginning of this month, Chinese troops did succeed in penetrating a small part of our main line for a few hours, but immediate counter-attacks threw the Chinese out of these positions.

We are not sure of the reasons for these attacks. The Communists may have wished to strengthen their tactical position in one or two key sectors, possibly before an armistice is signed. On the other hand, they may well have taken the offensive for psychological reasons. So far, at any rate, the fighting has been local and on a relatively small scale. Last week, our own forces took the initiative and captured two hilltops to the north of Kumhwa; but in turn they have been heavily counter-attacked by the enemy.

There is no evidence of any enemy build-up or abnormal movements which would suggest that they are preparing for a major offensive. So the general situation remains much the same as I told your Lordships in my last statement. The enemy is capable of launching a major offensive at any time and without advance warning. The opinion of the responsible commanders on the spot is that the Communists could break in, perhaps to a considerable depth, but they would not be able to exploit a break-through. They would be under constant attack from our aircraft, which are in command of the air over the whole battle front (although this does not mean that we might not have to cope with a surprise attack by the Communist air forces). The enemy supply lines would also be seriously interfered with by air attack. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Communists will think hard before under-taking a general offensive when they know it will cost them very dear.

However, the enemy build-up continues. The Communist ground forces in Korea now number over one million men—quite apart from their air forces sheltering behind the Yalu River. Seven hundred and fifty thousand of them are Chinese troops. They have some eighty divisions, although these include artillery and anti-tank divisions and divisions employed on security and coastal defence duties. The enemy can, of course, always reinforce these armies with further divisions from China. They are also improving the equipment of their forces. They may now have as many as 600 tanks and self-propelled guns; this is about one hundred more than the figure I gave you in the spring. They are making full use of their increased strength in guns and mortars. In the first week of October, the enemy sent over on an average 27,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire each day; enemy gun fire has never been so heavy before.

Although our troops are facing a formidable enemy, your Lordships must not think that this increase in military strength is one-sided. Our own forces have continued to strengthen their main lines of defence across the whole peninsula. I should like to take this opportunity of paying a tribute to the South Korean troops, who have recently shown remarkable improvement in battle efficiency—coupled with a very fine fighting spirit. In the early battles of the war, they were on many occasions overrun and suffered heavy casualties because of their poor equipment and lack of training. As a result, their morale was low and the positions which they held in the battle line were vulnerable. Now it is a very different story. The South Korean divisions have been given intensive battle training and have been equipped with artillery, mortars and tanks on a similar scale to American divisions. In the recent fighting they have shown themselves just as determined as any of the other United Nations troops in the face of heavy Communist attacks.

For fifteen days at the beginning of this month, in the Chorwon area, the South Korean 9th Division had to face repeated heavy attacks by Chinese assaulting troops. At first they had to give ground, although not without inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Then they fought back and recovered almost all the ground that was lost. And in doing so, they are believed to have inflicted nearly 10,000 casualties on the Chinese forces. Again, at the beginning of September the South Korean Capitol Division withstood bitter and continuous attacks on Capitol Hill and Finger Ridge, near Kumsong. The fighting lasted fourteen days and ended with the South Koreans still holding these hills. Their casualties were heavy, but enemy casualties were two or three times their number.

The British Commonwealth Division have not been involved in the recent fighting. They hold all the dominating features in a vital sector of the front covering the approaches to Seoul. They have continued to develop and consolidate both their forward positions and those in the main line of defence. They have, of course, been engaged in active patrolling, which has led to one or two small clashes, but I am glad to say that their casualties recently have not been heavy. I think we should recognise the outstanding leadership of their late commander. General Cassels, in welding the various Commonwealth units into such a fine team.

The Communist air forces continue to grow and they now have some 1,200 Mig 15s compared with the 1,000 jets which I referred to last May. But our United Nations pilots have recently had notable successes against the Mig 15s. When I returned from seeing General Clark, I told your Lordships that the Americans were confident that they were well able to hold their own in the air. The recent successes of the Sabre jets show this to be true. In August and September, our aircraft destroyed or damaged some 200 Mig 15s. Sixty were destroyed in September alone. The losses in air combat were ten to one in our favour. I am glad to say that the R.A.F. pilots serving with the American air forces have also had a number of Mig 15s to their credit.

Probably the most effective weapon we can use to weaken the enemy is our air power. One of the main tasks of the United Nations Air Forces is to cut the enemy's main lines of supply by attacking targets such as railway lines and bridges. In addition a series of attacks have been made with the purpose of destroying enemy supply dumps and depôts, communications facilities and the factories and plants on which the enemy rely for operations or for equipping their forces. To prevent supplies reaching the enemy front line troops, fighter bombers at last light create road blocks on the main and secondary roads leading down from Pyongyang to the battle area and across country to Wonsan. Then, during the night, our night bombers attack the convoys of lorries caught in the congested areas. So the enemy are finding supply operations during hours of darkness a much more difficult task.

But it is not only in the air that the task is unremitting. The unspectacular daily work of the United Nations navies goes on without a pause. Commonwealth naval forces continue to play an active part. Last week a naval task force carried out a mock landing below Wonsan. In advance, the guns of the American 7th Fleet and American aircraft destroyed coastal defence guns and other targets in the Wonsan area. The enemy were seen to be hurriedly digging coast defence positions. This operation brought home to them that the United Nations forces, with their naval and air strength, can at any time carry out amphibious operations behind their lines. In addition, naval aircraft from the American carriers continue to cut the enemy supply routes daily along the east coast as far north as Chongjin.

The Royal Navy's main area of operations is the west coast, where with other Commonwealth naval forces they give active support to the land forces by firing on enemy troop concentrations, gun positions, rail and road bridges. Our ships continue to play a vital role in securing our own sea lines of communication and, at the same time, preventing enemy movement by sea on the west coast. Our carrier H.M.S. "Ocean" has so effectively cut the enemy supply route on the west coast from Pyongyang down to Chinnampo that by the end of September there was hardly one serviceable, railway bridge along the entire line. It is not without interest to note that aircraft from H.M.S. "Ocean" have had their first contacts with the Mig. 15s. They have come out of these encounters most creditably, having shot down one Mig. and damaged others with no loss to themselves.

The United Nations casualties since the beginning of the war, including those of the South Koreans, now amount to about 350,000. Fifty thousand men have been killed. Since the armistice talks began, total casualties have been about 130,000. This means that the United Nations have suffered nearly 50,000 casualties since my last statement in July. Our United Kingdom casualties since the war began are 3,400, including almost 500 killed. The other Commonwealth countries have had about 2,000 casualties. The seriousness of these casualties must never be overlooked. I am sure your Lordships will wish to join with me in expressing our sympathy with the bereaved, and with those families who are anxious about prisoners, missing or wounded.

I should like to tell your Lordships the latest position about the armistice talks. Since my last statement, the United Nations Command have made continued efforts to reach an armistice agreement. On September 28 they put forward three new proposals for a solution of the prisoners-of-war difficulty. These have been fully reported in the Press and, with your Lordships' permission, I will not go into the details of them. But it was the view of Her Majesty's Government that they represented a fair and generous offer which the Communists could accept with dignity and confidence.

On October 8 the Communists rejected the United Nations Command's proposals and went on to reaffirm their insistence on the principle of total repatriation of prisoners-of-war on both sides. The United Nations Command, therefore, proposed a recess of the plenary meetings. So the negotiations stand suspended. But this does not mean that they have been broken off. If the Communists are prepared to discuss our proposals, or wish to put forward fresh proposals of their own, the plenary meetings can be renewed at once. The proposals which they made to the United Nations Command by letter last week, although accepting certain secondary features of the United Nations Command proposals, such as the exchange of prisoners in the demilitarised zone, still insisted on the principle of total repatriation.

My Lords, it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to take every step in their power to bring the armistice talks to an early and honourable conclusion. Meanwhile, the United Nations Command, and our own forces serving under it, are doing their utmost to maintain the position which they have won. I believe it is our duty to give the Command all the support we can in their very difficult task.

2.54 p.m.

EARL JOWITT

My Lords, we are exceedingly grateful to the noble and gallant Earl the Minister of Defence for making a plain unvarnished statement, as he has done. The statement seemed to me to be not unsatisfactory; that is to say, so far as any statement can be satisfactory, short of an armistice, which is what we all want to bring about, and which I realise, from the concluding passage of the statement, is the object of Her Majesty's Government. With regard to the South Koreans, I was glad to hear what the noble Earl was able to say. I should infer from what he said that approximately one-quarter of the enemy forces were North Koreans. He said that there were 750,000 Chinese, and a total of about 1,000,000. I infer that the other 250,000 are North Koreans. I should like to ask the noble Earl: Does he suppose that the proportion of South Koreans serving in our army is approximately the same—that is to say, about 250,000 of all arms? The report about the air figures is most satisfactory, and I very much hope that by an intensified effort in the air, if that be possible, we may succeed in making it even more difficult for the Chinese to build up the large supply services which they must have to maintain in the field an army of 750,000 men.

EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS

My Lords, in answer to the noble and learned Earl, with regard to the relevant strengths of the South Koreans and North Koreans relative to the forces to which they are attached, he is quite right. The Chinese figures are somewhere in the nature of 700,000, and the North Koreans are a little more than 300,000. Offhand, I cannot give the figures of the South Koreans, but I have it at the back of my mind that the South Koreans compose ten divisions, which are probably small divisions, not of the strength of an American or British division. However I will not speculate, but will let the noble Earl know what the exact figures are. I think it is pretty well the same sort of proportion. With regard to the air, I am sure the United Nations Command are very much alive to the fact that that is really the only sphere in which we can gain superiority over our enemy, because they do outnumber us on the field of battle. It is in the air that we are superior. I am certain that the commanders out there, who are experienced and wise men, will take full advantage of the air arm.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, the noble Earl the Minister of Defence will be aware that there is a great deal of uneasiness and disappointment at the long period which these negotiations have taken—and not only in this country. I wonder whether he can tell us what has happened to the proposals of the Indian Government for trying to find some way of saving the reputation and prestige of both sides and, above all, of bringing the fighting to an end.

EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS

My Lords, I will do my best to answer the noble Lord's question. Nothing has come of any of these proposals. There were three proposals put forward, according to the latest information which I have. One was that all prisoners-of-war should be taken to a demilitarised zone, and that individuals should be allowed to do what they like, either go north or south. The second proposal was that all prisoners should be sent to this demilitarised zone, where they would be screened by teams from both sides, arranged by agreement. There was then the third proposal, which was that the prisoners refusing repatriation on being released in the neutral zone would be free to go north or south, without any interviewing or screening of any kind by neutral or other representatives. Within those three proposals the Indian proposal was embodied. I believe that what the Indians proposed was that, instead of the men going to a neutral zone, some country should volunteer to take in these people. They would be screened and allowed to do what they like.

I am afraid that any of these proposals which have been put up have not been accepted by the Communists. It makes one think that either they do not want an armistice at the present moment, or, which is more likely, that they will accept an armistice only if it is entirely on their own terms. They will not look at anything except total repatriation. What they appear to say is: If you take a man prisoner-of-war he has no rights. When the fighting is over, or when there is an armistice, he has to be sent back to the country from which he came and he has no choice. That, I think, is where we are stuck. I regard it as a matter of principle. This is the Communist view—no rights for the people. They will not budge from that view, and I think it is a very serious thing, because I do not see how it is possible to get round it.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

May I ask the noble Earl whether the Government have considered discussion as soon as possible with our American Allies over a broad political approach to this obstinate problem, and whether he has noticed the proclamation issued from Formosa this morning about a whole-scale invasion of the Chinese mainland?

EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS

Her Majesty's Government have considered, or certainly will consider, anything to bring about an armistice. I can assure your Lordships that no stone will be left unturned to bring this unfortunate Korean war to a successful conclusion. I take it that the point about the invasion of the Chinese mainland appeared in the Press.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Yes, it was in The Times this morning.

EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS

I do not think there is any question of the invasion of the Chinese mainland by military forces. I do not think it is a military proposition at all. I know nothing about it.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Of course, the noble and gallant Earl is aware that these plans are being concocted in the island of Formosa, which is under the protection of our Allies. As regards the first point, would the noble Earl consider, or would the Government consider, putting to our American Allies the desirability of attempting an approach by inviting China to become a member of the United Nations now?

EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS

As Minister of Defence, I find myself being drawn into Foreign Office affairs. I do not feel able to answer these questions.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING)

My Lords, at rather short notice, may I say to the noble Viscount that of course we are constantly in touch with the United States Government, not only on the progress of the Korean war, but on any possible method that may be available for bringing it to a conclusion. As regards the noble Viscount's other suggestion, that is really an entirely different question which has no reference at all to the question we are discussing to-day. If he wants to ask a Question on that, I suggest that he puts one down.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

What has no reference to the question we are discussing? I do not follow what the noble Marquess means.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

The last part of the noble Viscount's question to my noble friend.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Does the noble Marquess mean that the exclusion of China from the United Nations has nothing to do with the war in Korea?

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I did not mean that at all. I meant that it had nothing to do with the statement which my noble friend has just made, or with any of the questions which arose out of it.

LORD STRABOLGI

With the noble Marquess in action, perhaps I may put a question to him rather on the lines of that which I put to the noble Earl. I think he is aware that there is great uneasiness and apprehension in the public mind, here and elsewhere, about these long-drawn-out negotiations, which do not seem to be getting us anywhere—there seems to be deadlock. Is it not possible, as my noble friend suggested, to consider widening the whole political approach to try, at any rate, to put an end to the ghastly fighting before the winter sets in?

THE MARQUESS OF READING

My Lords, I am inclined to say to the noble Lord what I said to his noble friend. I am not trying to shirk the question, but this is not an occasion on which we ought to be drawn into a wide debate and discussion on what are the possible alternatives.

LORD STRABOLGI

In the meantime, the fighting goes on. We have been in Recess for a long time, and this is the first opportunity your Lordships have had of hearing the facts.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT SWINTON)

My Lords, there are rules, even in this House, and one of the recognised rules of procedure is that when a full statement is made in answer to a private notice Question, supplementary questions should be applied to the subject of that statement, and that we should not abuse the privilege by trying to embark on a debate on foreign affairs.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

It is quite impossible for the noble Viscount to get away with that. The whole trouble is that the Government do not recognise that the obstinate armistice problem in Korea is related closely and fundamentally to the broad political issue. That is the whole question, and nothing could be more relevant.

VISCOUNT SWINTON

I think perhaps what is more relevant is that the noble Viscount has never recognised or accepted any of the rules of procedure of this House.

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