TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN MALAYA

HL Deb 23 February 1949 vol 160 cc1120-38

5.20 p.m.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement regarding the increased scale of terrorist activities in Malaya, and what further steps they propose to take to deal with this problem. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, it is little over three months since we had a debate in your Lordships' House on the subject of the terrorist activities in Malaya. I think it may be said that during the intervening period the conditions there have worsened rather than bettered. Probably one of the reasons for this is the successful advance of the Communist armies through China, and the encouragement thus given to the terrorists, who are assisted also, probably, by money and the infiltration into Malaya of Chinese terrorists, coming from China through Indonesia. There is little doubt that the success of the Communist drive through China will have its repercussions throughout the Far East. From these repercussions Malaya is hardly likely to escape—and she is evidently not escaping. This makes it all the more difficult to clean up the position, as it has given the terrorists encouragement to endure hardships, which otherwise they might not endure, in the belief that they are probably only temporary. I am glad that Siam, which is also assailed in the same manner by Communist problems, is taking her problems seriously, and is coping with them to the best of her ability. And I am glad to read that there is considerable co-operation between the Malayan and the Siamese forces on that border. I hope we shall hear from the noble Earl that everything will be done, and is being done, towards the closest co-operation between the two countries.

I turn to a matter which is perhaps a little more controversial. In my opinion it is exceedingly fortunate that the Dutch have determinedly tackled their problem in Indonesia, as the propinquity to Malaya of the islands composing the Indonesian group, especially Sumatra, constitutes a grave and added danger to a situation already filled with many grave problems. Even as it is, with Sumatra lying geographically parallel with Malaya, with only a narrow sea passage between the two, there is and always has been "come and go" between the peoples of the two places. And this has always been difficult to control. In the past it has provided means for the smuggling of rubber and other articles, and for the escape of criminals. At this point I want to make a suggestion which may or may not be practicable. I suggest that a number of armed patrol motor launches should be obtained and employed in this narrow passage to guard the western coast of Malaya from the infiltration by canoe or other means of terrorists or suspects from Sumatra.

I do not know how many launches would be required, or how many miles each launch could patrol and control, but the scheme would require both a day and a night patrol. Each launch should be fitted with a small gun and a small searchlight, and should have a well-armed crew. I understand that it would be possible to purchase suitable second-hand launches in this country. So far as the crews are concerned, I suggest that they might be recruited from amongst the Malay police, many of whom are motor car drivers and natural engineers, and who have been trained in the use of arms. Such a patrol, presumably, would come under the Navy. I believe there are certain launches that are used on the other side of the passage and I imagine it as an extension of the same system. In other words, it would be a combined operation of the Navy and Army and, in this case, not the Air Force but the police. I do not know whether the expense and the man-power involved would be worth the results achieved—that is a matter upon which local naval and military experts would be able to pronounce. But I make the suggestion as worthy of consideration.

I should like for a moment to pass to the main difficulties with which the local government, and the military and police forces, are still confronted, because I wish it to be understood that I have not asked this Question in any spirit of hostility, but rather with the idea of being helpful to the Government in finding a solution to the difficulties in which we find ourselves. The situation is too far-reaching and dangerous for it to be made the subject of Party politics, and I feel sure the debate will be conducted to-day in a spirit of appreciation of that fact. Although in the long run the problem of dealing with the terrorists may be one mainly of efficient police supervision, this will take time to organise. In the meantime, I submit that if the job is not to drag out for a dangerously long time, there is great need of more troops than are at present available. Time is the essence of this job.

We have been informed through the Press that 2,000 Gurkha recruits are arriving shortly in Malaya to reinforce the Brigade of Gurkhas. These recruits, of course, will take some time to get into their stride and become really useful. Perhaps the noble Earl who is to reply will tell us more about these Gurkha reinforcements and how they will be utilised. I should like to ask at this point why the famous jungle scouts, the Dyaks from Borneo, were sent back there and were not retained in Malaya. It seems to me that they were the best type of troops that we could have had in the country. We were never told why they were withdrawn.

To return to the necessity for additional troops and to the reasons why, in the judgment of those with whom I confer on Malaya, they are necessary, the answer is that they are necessary in order to provide a reserve. It is not easy, perhaps not possible, to use those that are there to the best advantage. They no sooner become used to the area in which they are operating than further trouble breaks out elsewhere, and all—or some—of them are withdrawn. When they are withdrawn, trouble breaks out again in the area they have just left. There are obviously not enough troops in the country to meet that situation. Perhaps the 2,000 additional Gurkha troops may relieve that situation. As I have said, it is probably true that the troops must rely for their general support, not only in the long run but in the short run, upon the police forces.

I am advised that there is a serious shortage of experienced police officers for the newly recruited police and special constabulary. Those officers who have come from other countries are still obviously handicapped by lack of knowledge of the language and of the men they are handling, so that too great a burden is falling on the pre-war Malayan police officers, who are really being worked to a standstill. It is also alleged—I do not think that one can attach any blame to those concerned—that many of the British sergeants sent out have proved to be very raw material. I wish, therefore, to recommend on that point that much more should be done to make use of picked Malay and other local material for the purpose of providing the leadership for the newly recruited police and special constabulary. The Malays, as a whole, have behaved splendidly throughout, realising, as they do, that it is the freedom and the existence of their country which are at stake.

Another point which has been brought to my notice is the lack or shortage of radio instruments in the rural police offices. It is obvious that the more quickly the rural police officers can get into touch with their urban headquarters, the more effective are the measures that can be taken in case of attack or of important security information being received, especially as the terrorists almost invariably cut the telephone wires before launching any operation. Therefore, I recommend that this point—that is, the provision of more radio instruments to the rural police officers—be looked into.

There are two other matters which obviously are of considerable importance in the campaign against the terrorists. The first is the troublous question of Chinese squatters. The second is the important question of protection money paid by a large percentage of Chinese to the terrorists in some form or another, which is causing the Malay authorities grave concern. Both of these questions will be dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Man-croft, in his speech, and therefore all I wish to do is to emphasise their importance in the campaign which is being waged. What is the effect of the almost daily murders of Europeans upon the life of the community? The morale is wonderful, but the strain is fearful, especially on the planters and miners and their womenfolk, who have to live and carry on their work in armed camps and behind barbed wire. Each planter or miner murdered stretches the machine a little more; the shortage of experienced men becomes more noticeable and their places more difficult to fill, whether locally or from the United Kingdom. Prospecting for new tin producing areas has almost ceased, as the operation of exploring lone spaces is too dangerous. But those who are there and are still alive carry on working on the mines and on the rubber estates, exhibiting that true spirit of British grit and endurance.

The G.O.C. of the Singapore district, in a Press conference about five or six days ago, made a statement, which it was pleasing to note. It was that the number of bandit-inspired incidents since he took over in September had decreased, and there had not been a successful attack on a British-owned estate in Johore since last September, although there had been minor incidents. That is all right for Johore, which is in the South. One is very glad to hear that. But that condition of affairs does not exist everywhere. There are other States where the position is just as bad as it was. For instance, there is Selangor, in which is situated the capital of the Federated Malay States, Kuala Lumpur. A few days ago, I had put into my hands an authoritative but staggering statement from a general manager of large rubber estates regarding the conditions in the district of Selangor. I do not wish to mention the particular district, but if the noble Earl likes to have it, I will give it him. This is what the statement says: The Kapar district, in the State of Selangor, is still one of the worst bandit-infested areas, so that I could not even think of sending a European to reside on the estates. In fact, the police authorities flatly refuse to be responsible for a resident assistant's safety. The situation seems to be entirely out of hand. There were three murders of Europeans last week in the Rawang-Serandah area in which Kapar is situated.

Following this up—and this shows how serious is the situation—the general manager concerned then cabled to his board in this country, asking authority to purchase an armoured car and to build a guardhouse on their estates. The company granted his request. We talk about an emergency and an insurrection, but this is bloody terrorism of the worst degree, and only methods and measures vigorously and ruthlessly applied will stamp it out. It cannot be too strongly and too often emphasised that, apart from anything else, our whole position and prestige in the Far East are at stake.

There is full recognition in Malaya that this country is willing and most anxious to do all it can to restore peace. I am told that there is complete confidence there in the High Commissioner who, it is said, is being very firm. But there is not the same confidence in the Colonial Office. It is still widely felt and said that Whitehall do not fully appreciate the seriousness of the situation, and that if they did they would give a freer hand and more assistance to the High Commissioner. That is the feeling in Malaya and in many quarters here. With all respect, it is for the Secretary of State, who is going to reply, to refute it or otherwise. Finally, if we are to retain the support of those in Malaya who still believe in the value of the British connection, and win over the waverers, we must show them that we have a firm grasp of the situation all over Malaya and that we are determined to restore and maintain order. The time factor is not working on our side in Malaya. I beg to ask my Question.

5.40 p.m.

LORD MANCROFT

My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, has painted a gloomy picture to your Lordships. I wish that we could accuse him of exaggeration, but unfortunately we cannot. It is quite clear that the progress which the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, envisaged when he replied to the Malayan debate last November has not been maintained. It is difficult to say what is happening in Malaya at the moment, but it is painfully clear that we are not winning. What I think is happening is this. The first phase of the operations has now been concluded and small bands of outlaws numbering some fifteen or twenty have been harried together and have combined into larger bands of fifty or sixty strong. It is they who are responsible for the attacks on a larger scale that have recently occurred. There has also clearly been a marked improvement in their co-ordination, in their system of intelligence and I think also in their leadership. But the bill of costs does not make very good reading; the accounts are very unbalanced—5,000 bandits at the most, on the one side, and on the other side upwards of 20,000 troops, upwards of 50,000 regular and auxiliary police, supported by a powerful air force.

I am not certain that I agree with my noble friend, Lord Elibank, that the answer lies entirely in reinforcements, but that, of course, is something which only General Ritchie can say. It would be interesting to hear if the noble Earl can tell us whether General Ritchie thinks he has under his command all the troops he requires to finish off this campaign quickly. "Quickly" is the important word. We were glad to hear that there is going to be a reinforcement of the Gurkha brigade, and I hope the noble Earl will find himself in a position to deal with the rumour that the Brigade of Guards is to be brought back home in April. It appears to me that what is needed at the moment is still further training amongst the troops and the police, and better co-operation between the two. We have heard too many accounts so far of lack of co-operation, and we have also heard too much of the purely administrative jobs which the police are still forced to do—such as the issuing of dog licences, wireless licences, and the submission of returns of inner tubes for bicycles. Those things still apparently have to be done by policemen who are supposed to be engaged in a fight to the death. It must make them homesick to have to fill in those returns.

But, my Lords, more than anything I feel that what is required is more information about the bandits, their whereabouts and their tactics. To achieve that, the Government need the complete co-operation of the whole population of Malaya. In that connection I would like to emphasise the two great obstacles—namely, squatters and protection money. Unfortunately the payment of protection money comes almost as second nature to the Chinese. "Protection money" is only a polite term for extortion. During the months of October and November over £30,000 was paid by Chinese in protection money. The Government has now strong powers to combat this evil. May I ask the noble Earl how their efforts are progressing? Is there a reduction in the amount of protection money being paid? The squatters present an almost insuperable problem. There must be upwards of 750,000 of these squatters in Malaya—indeterminate, indefinite little communities who are able to offer food and shelter to the bandits, to keep them well supplied with ammunition and also, of course, to give them information about our movements. The Government has now taken drastic powers to deal with this problem. I should like to ask the noble Earl, how these extensive powers are being used and what progress is being made in the registration, resettlement and deportation of these squatters.

But it is, of course, upon the planters that the chief burden falls. The planters hold the key to the whole of Malaya's safety, and they are at the moment under an intolerable strain. I am informed that over 30 per cent. of the planters now coming home on leave have expressed their unwillingness to return to Malaya. If that goes on, the situation will be extremely serious. There will be a decline in the supervision of the native labour and there is a serious risk, if that continues any further, that Malaya will slip down into economic and social chaos—economic chaos because the mines and the rubber estates will not be able to be worked. We are already losing rubber at the rate of 10,000 tons a month, which amounts to about £1,000,000 a month and, more important, is equivalent to 4,000,000 American dollars a month. If the European supervision goes, social disaster will occur because the native labour will almost inevitably seek Communist protection. I need not tell your Lordships what the effect of all this will be. The exports from Malaya during last year were greater than the whole of the dollar exports of the United Kingdom put together.

The cost is formidable. We have heard of the losses in rubber and tin, but there is more to it than that. At the moment it is costing us £35,000 a day to fight these battles in Malaya, and Sir Henry Gurney (whose work and whose determination we all so much admire) has stated recently that he feels some contribution should be made by this country towards that huge bill. I believe there are many people, not only in your Lordships' House but elsewhere, who feel that he is right. That expenditure of £35,000 a day is a large sum. It happens to be almost exactly the sum by which His Majesty's Government miscalculated the cost in their Health Estimates last week. Some 600 of His Majesty's subjects, both European and Asian, have lost their lives since this campaign began. We British are losing our fellow countrymen at the rate of 120 a year. Is that a situation which should be tolerated? At the moment, unfortunately, there seems to be prevalent too much over-optimism in official circles in Malaya and a shocking amount of complacency about Malaya in this country. I hope the noble Earl will do something this evening to dispel that complacency.

5.47 p.m.

THE EARL OF AIRLIE

My Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships for more than one or two minutes, but I, too, would like to emphasise the points which have been raised by the two noble Lords, and I desire as much as they that we should get some satisfaction in regard to the question of whether His Majesty's Government are really aware of the seriousness of the situation. I read the other day a report about an Air Vice-Marshal who came home on leave and commented on the situation as being well in hand—that the Communists and terrorists were well on the run. Our information is exactly the opposite. Indeed, it is that we are making very little if any headway at all.

I wish to say at the outset that I have no financial interest in Malaya. I have been there and I have seen the jungle, but that was before the war, and I understand it is now in a very different state, due to the Japanese occupation, as a result of which communications are a great deal more difficult. The task of the troops and the police is extremely difficult. My information comes mostly from those of whom the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, made mention—namely, planters coming home on leave. Many of them come from Scotland, and some from the part where I live, around Dundee. I am bound to admit that the general opinion I obtained from them, so far as I have been able to gather it, is that it is not so much a question of increasing the number of troops, because it is not now entirely a military problem, but that there is an absolute need to have an entirely new approach to this situation. Frankly, as I understand it from troops of whom one knows, the bullet is failing. It is not so much a question of the bullet as of cutting off from the terrorists all supplies and, above all, information about our troops. It is in that regard that our troops experience difficulty. They find that they cannot go out without their whereabouts being given away to the terrorists, and that makes it practically impossible, or at least more difficult, to carry out their tasks.

I hope your Lordships will not think that I am in any way criticising what the troops, the police and the volunteers have done. I understand from all sides that they have been marvellous under great tribulation. I would like just to deal with the question of casualties. The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, said that the figure of casualties on the side of law and order was 600. I thought it was nearer 900, and that our toll of the terrorists was only a matter of 700—not a very good comparison. Those who are working out there and trying to overcome this problem are getting extremely disheartened about it. In fact, as has been said, these people who have come home believe that it will soon be impossible to maintain Malaya as one of the foremost—if not the foremost—dollar-earning countries in the British Commonwealth.

This may seem a somewhat mercenary point of view, for it is certainly one relating rather to pounds, shillings and pence. But there is another aspect. What of the Malay? What does he feel about all this? After all, he was extremely loyal during the war; he did everything in his power to fight alongside us and to help us; and he is doing so now, under these great difficulties. What is he thinking? Is he wondering whether he is going to go, perhaps, a little along the road and then be liquidated, like a number of other parts of the British Empire? One hopes that that aspect of the case will be most carefully studied by His Majesty's Government. The general situation was described in extracts from a letter read by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank. I also received a copy of that letter, but, as the noble Viscount has dealt with it, I will not refer to it again except to draw attention to the last sentence. This letter was written by a general manager who has gone back to Malaya after six months' leave. He finished it by writing: I consider the situation much more serious than at any time in the past. Then, as your Lordships know, he cabled home for an armoured car.

The chairman of another estate, which is largely worked by people from my part of the country, told me that the situation was becoming so untenable that very soon what he called "the thin red line of Europeans"—among them many Scotsmen—would not be able to go on holding out. He said that he believed that some of the rich Chinese were so sure that we would not be able to hold the situation that they were just sitting there, waiting to step in and, when the right moment came, buy up at a "song" some of these valuable estates. I see planters, and I receive letters (as other members of your Lordships' House probably do) from people who are serving out there, and it is always the same story. They want to know: Do the people at home really realise the seriousness of the situation? Do His Majesty's Government appreciate what is happening? And, if so, what are they going to do about it? I am asking, on their behalf, what His Majesty's Government are going to do to deal with this very serious situation.

5.53 p.m.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, very warmly for the helpful, constructive and unpartisan tone of his speech. It was, if I may say so, a useful contribution towards the solution of this complex and baffling problem. I am sure that his speech, and the speeches of other noble Lords which followed, and which expressed lively concern for the future of Malaya, will be an encouragement to people out there. In the time at my disposal at this somewhat late hour, I should like to answer as many as I can of the points raised by noble Lords. The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, asked me about the employment of the Dyak trackers It was not intended, when they were sent to Malaya, that they should serve permanently there. They were sent originally for a period of three months. Since then it has been decided that some of them should be retained, and they are serving in Malaya for a further period. I can assure the noble Viscount that his suggestions with regard to further measures that might be taken by the Government of Malaya, and by the military forces there, will be carefully noted and seriously considered, both here and out there.

The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, put a number of questions to me. He asked me about the future of the Guards Brigade. I am sure he will agree that it is undesirable to divulge the disposition or the movements of British troops overseas, and information of this kind is not as a rule published. All I can say—and I should like to give the noble Lord this assurance—is that the total strength of our forces in Malaya will not be reduced. On the subject of military reinforcements, I can tell the noble Lord that the High Commissioner takes the view that further military reinforcements are not at present required. I will explain rather more fully later on his point of view on this subject. He regards the obtaining of the co-operation of the Chinese as being the most important immediate step. I think noble Lords must realise that. I believe that the noble Lord was mistaken when he said that we were losing rubber. The figures show that the average monthly output of both rubber and tin has increased in 1948 as compared with 1947.

The noble Lord also asked about a contribution from His Majesty's Government towards the extremely heavy cost of the security measures. I can assure him that this question is being considered very carefully indeed at the present moment, and with a full realisation of its weight and importance to Malaya. I agree with all noble Lords who have spoken that the situation in Malaya is still serious and gives no grounds to anyone for complacency. The local situation in certain districts continues difficult and dangerous. In other parts of the country, our skill in jungle fighting, and their lack of popular support, have severely restricted the movements of the bandits, and they have been forced to withdraw. It is not, in fact, true that the activities of the bandits have recently been on an increased scale, or that progress has not been made in dealing with this menace. So I do not agree either with the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, or the noble Earl, Lord Airlie, that the general position in Malaya is worsening. While the situation, I repeat, is still serious, there are some encouraging features.

The number of attacks carried out by bandits, for instance, has shown a steady fall, from a peak figure of 278 in November to 232 in December, and 198 in January of this year. Murders of civilians have dropped from an average of 48 a month during the period June to December to 31 in January of this year.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

Do those figures refer to Europeans?

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

The figures cover the total number of civilians of all races who have been murdered. These improvements have been maintained during the present month. But progress is not, by any means, to be measured solely by the decline in casualties and incidents, and no concentration of military and police forces can altogether prevent sporadic murders and destruction of property.

The Malayan police force has been expanded by some 3,000 recruits since June last. Their training has been completed, and they are now available for duty. The number of the officers of the force has also been considerably increased, and its organisation has been improved. I should like to pay a special tribute to the part which the Malayan police have played in the successful operations of the last eight months against a cunning enemy. It must be remembered that the armed forces in Malaya are acting strictly in aid of the civil power, and it is upon the police that there devolves the main responsibility for planning the offensive against the bandits. The police force has not merely been enlarged to its present strength of over 14,000; its equipment, in arms, wireless and transport, is being brought up as rapidly as possible to the most modern standards. Methods of collecting and collating intelligence have been improved, and one of the most satisfactory features of the present situation is that the authorities are now getting word more often of bandit movements and bandit plans, thus enabling swift counter-action to be taken, and, in some cases, bandit attacks to be forestalled. The special constabulary, the force primarily responsible for the static defence of estates, mines, and vital points, now number some 30,000, while auxiliary police, including the Kampong guards raised for the protection of the Malay villages, number nearly 19,000.

While the police force must bear the primary responsibility, the armed forces are becoming more and more skilled in the highly specialised form of warfare in which they must engage. The Guards Brigade, which was sent to Malaya in the autumn, has completed its jungle training and is fully deployed. A third battalion of the Malay Regiment has been raised and trained, and will take the place of the battalion of Gurkhas which was sent at the end of December to Hong Kong. Two thousand Gurkha recruits will shortly arrive in Malaya to reinforce the Brigade. There is no doubt that the joint police and military operations which are being carried out throughout the length of the Peninsula are achieving useful results. In the week ending February 10, 71 operations were carried out, in the course of which 32 enemy camps were discovered; and in the week ending February 17—the last week for which I have figures—70 combined operations took place, in the course of which 16 camps were located and destroyed. The Navy and the R.A.F. have also given invaluable assistance—for example, by preventing, by sea and air patrols, any possibility of infiltration of Communist reinforcements on the east coast. The R.A.F. have carried out strikes against known bandit strong-points, supply drops to patrols, and extensive air reconnaissance, while His Majesty's ships have taken part in combined operations against bandits in coastal areas. There are signs that the main bandit forces have been unable to continue the fight in some of the areas which they formerly infested, and have been forced to withdraw to more remote parts of the jungle, leaving behind in the settled areas small killer squads and numbers of intelligence, propaganda and recruiting agents.

One of the most difficult problems facing the security forces has been the need for joint action with Siam in the neighbourhood of the Siamese frontier. The noble Viscount mentioned this and I gladly give him full particulars about the action which has been taken. A successful conference of high Siamese and Malayan officials was held at Songkhla in South Siam on January 6 and 7. A further conference was held at Kota Bahru on January 28. Not only have these meetings resulted in much valuable exchange of information, and in establishing contacts between the responsible authorities on both sides of the frontier, but a jointly-planned operation has been carried out in the frontier area during the post fortnight by the forces of both countries. It marks an important stage forward in what we trust will be an increasing degree of co-operation between both countries. I am also glad to be able to say that, in agreement with the Federation Government, the Government of Siam have closed the frontier to prevent the crossing of undesirables.

My Lords, I said earlier that military operations alone were not the answer in Malaya, and I am sure I have the agreement of the noble Viscount opposite on this point. Strong measures, which have received general approval, are being taken against those who are suspected of assisting the bandits. The problem of the alien Chinese squatters, who have in certain areas provided the bandits with supplies, shelter and information, and who have failed to collaborate with the security forces, is being tackled vigorously. The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, has asked me about this and I will give him as much information as I can. Some squatters are being resettled in areas where they will be subject to close police supervision; others are being repatriated to China. During the last three months of 1948, 456 persons were banished or repatriated, and during the first two months of this year the repatriation of over 1,600 persons has been approved. Four of the worst areas have been dealt with under a new emergency regulation which enables the Government to deport en masse the inhabitants of certain areas who have consistently and deliberately declined to co-operate with the security forces against the bandits.

LORD HAWKE

Will the noble Earl make it clear whether these gentlemen have actually gone back to China, or whether their deportation has been merely approved?

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

I said that during the first two months of this year over 1,600 persons have been approved for deportation. I cannot say at the moment at which I am speaking whether they are on ships on their way to China, or are still in camp awaiting embarkation on vessels. That is merely a matter of administration. The point is that they are going back to China and will, therefore, be unable to assist the bandits as they have done in the past.

LORD LLEWELLIN

They will be kept safe until they go?

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

Yes, they will be kept safe.

My Lords, these operations, and the subsequent repatriations, are being carried out with humanity but with extreme thoroughness. Compensation is paid for animals that cannot be removed, and the most careful investigation is made to see that relatives are given the opportunity of accompanying the repatriates if they so wish. This drastic action, far from creating new bandits, has increased the willingness of the squatters to co-operate with the forces of law and order. For example, in some areas squatters have requested the Government to buy their rice crop, rather than they should submit to the importunities of the hungry bandits. That is one of the results observed as a result of this firm action. Those squatters whose real desire is to be left in peace in order to make a living have been encouraged by the knowledge that the Government have under consideration proposals for the settlement of squatters on the land. These proposals are the most effective answer to Communist propaganda. The Report of the Federal Committee which has been studying this subject is now under urgent consideration by the State Governments, and it is hoped that they will accept its recommendations.

A disturbing feature of the situation, to which the noble Viscount also alluded, is the heavy payments extorted from the Chinese—more particularly the well-to-do—by the bandits. It has been estimated that the protection money extorted during October and November amounted to perhaps as much as 250,000 dollars a month, quite apart from payments in kind. The Government are taking resolute action against persons known to persist in paying, this blackmail; and some 300 persons have been detained for paying money and making contributions of foodstuffs or clothing. Thirty-five new arrests have recently been made. They may shortly be followed by more, and it will be shown that the Government are no respecter of persons in this matter. But here again it is not by force alone that the Government are tackling this problem. The only final answer is a determination on the part of those concerned not to submit to such blackmail, and it is encouraging to note that various Chinese associations, notably the Perak Chinese Mining Association, are taking a resolute stand against this practice. National registration, involving the issue of identity cards bearing photographs and finger prints, is now almost completed, and there have been many signs that registration has been one of the measures most disliked by the bandits. They realize that it will facilitate their detection.

In taking these measures the Government of the Federation have acted in the belief that the most effective way of quickly terminating the present troubles is by gaining the full confidence and co-operation of the great body of Chinese. Save in a few individual cases, the Chinese in Malaya have no sympathy with the bandits, but they are sometimes prevented by fear of reprisals from taking a determined stand on the side of the Government. It is not by increasing the forces available in Malaya that success will be achieved, but by giving the police and troops already there the information without which many bandits will continue to elude them. This information can be made available only when the Chinese decide to take up a positive attitude in support of the Government. A movement is under way to form a Malayan-Chinese Association, with the declared object of assisting the Government to restore peace and order. There is no doubt of the increasing success which the Government are having in building up the confidence of the Chinese community. An unofficial Committee, consisting of representatives of all communities, has been set up to consider the long-term problems affecting inter-community relations.

Here I should like to pay tribute to the wholehearted and active support of the Malay population, who are solidly behind the Government in their effort to eliminate the bandits. The Malays form the overwhelming majority of the police and local forces engaged. I am aware, as the noble Viscount has very properly pointed out, that the planters and miners, and their employees, who have borne with such gallantry and fortitude the heat and burden of these disorders, and without whose steadfastness the economy of the country could not be maintained, are feeling the strain. We are no less grateful to them than we are to the police and the Services for the resolute spirit in which they are meeting the present difficulties in Malaya. I am sure we wish them a happy and a speedy conclusion to their hardships and anxieties. I have answered as many points as I could cover in the time, and I apolo- gise for any that I may have omitted on account of the lateness of the hour.

6.11 p.m.

LORD LLEWELLIN

My Lords, before the House rises, I would like to say that we are all indebted to the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, for raising this matter, and also to the noble Earl for his full answer to the question. We are glad to hear that this firm action is being taken in regard to the people who are co-operating with these bandits. I am glad to think that those who are active co-operators will be sent back to where they ought to go—namely, to China, from whence they came. I am also glad to think that those who submit to this blackmail are dealt with not only by the blackmailers, but also by the civil forces.

There are only two points on which I am not entirely satisfied. I am not sure that it would be giving way much of a military secret if the noble Earl told us whether the Brigade of Guards were coming back before April. It seems to me quite absurd that, having the Brigade of Guards out there—and, as the noble Earl has said, they have just finished their training for jungle warfare—we should bring them home and replace them with other troops who will have to undergo similar training in jungle warfare before they can be fully effective in that very difficult country. I have great hopes that, as the Guards have been put through this training, they will not immediately be brought home. I consider that sometimes these security reasons for not giving information of that sort may be a little overdone.

The other point is this. I would like to know that wireless telephones, and equipment of that sort, will be sent out there as quickly as possible. If you are fighting this kind of bandit the great thing is to have your forces operating quickly, and that can only be done if the information from the isolated post is received at the main reinforcement centre at the earliest possible moment. I know the noble Earl said that the police were receiving wireless instruments of modern standard as quickly as possible, but I would like to know that some of these sets are being flown out there, so that they can be brought into use at once, because I am certain that that kind of thing will help greatly to curtail this cam- paign. I shall be glad if the noble Earl will have those two points considered. Apart from that, we are all obliged to him for the statement he has made in reply to the Question.