NAVAL POLICY

HL Deb 23 February 1949 vol 160 cc1078-119

3.0 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM rose to call attention to naval policy; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Motion has been set down at the present time in order to put certain questions and observations before His Majesty's Government, which perhaps cannot be adequately covered in the customary debate on the Naval Estimates as a whole. It is, of course, true that the Motion is very widely drawn, and it is certainly not my intention this afternoon to range over the construction and design of ships or even their tactical employment, but rather to concentrate on the details of service and conditions of the personnel of the Royal Navy and the voluntary Service.

Before doing so, I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is satisfied that the Fleet has reached the standard of efficiency and training foreshadowed by the statement which he made, I think, in your Lordships' House about this time last year. I have little doubt that such a statement from the First Lord of the Admiralty would be very welcome, not only in this House but also in the country generally. We have certainly witnessed signs of great improvement in the Royal Navy since the dark days which were with us not so very long ago. We have heard of the Spring Cruise of the Home Fleet, and of the Flying Squadron which is now carrying out experimental operations in the Arctic.

This is a great improvement, but I suggest it is beset by a danger which may not be immediately apparent. That danger arises from the fact that men who are now approaching the end of their first period of regular naval service, which is twelve years, are failing to re-engage in adequate numbers for the longer and pensionable period. This must mean a very serious decline in the number of senior ratings in the Fleet. The heaviest loss is, of course, amongst the ratings below the rank of petty officer. I believe that at the end of September of last year, of approximately 840 ratings of this category, only 95 re-engaged for pension; and out of a total of nearly 3,500 of all ranks, including petty officers and chief petty officers, only some 830 re-engaged for pension. That is barely 25 per cent., as against the pre-war figure of about 60 per cent. In the course of time this failure to re-engage can mean only one thing, and that is, a very dangerous dilution of experienced ratings in many ships and even the possibility of some categories of ships being unable to put to sea at all. We might find the Fleet falling back to that precarious position which it was in not so very long ago.

Now what are the reasons for this failure of ratings to re-engage for long service? I suggest that it is due to a combination of a number of circumstances, some of which I feel sure could be remedied. One reason is undoubtedly the shortage of housing, which bears very hardly on the wife of a man serving at sea. I believe it to be a fact that some local authorities distinguish between a husband and wife living together at home and the husband who is living away from home because he is in the Service; in these circumstances it is becoming increasingly difficult for the wife of a man serving at sea to obtain a house. I understand that some local authorities go even further: a naval rating who may be appointed abroad for foreign service, and has to give up his council house and take up residence with his family in married quarters, finds the greatest difficulty on his return in obtaining a house again from the local authority. Frequently he finds that he is put at the bottom of the list. I hope the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty will draw the attention of the Minister of Health to that problem. Surely some preference should be given to the Service man's family in matters of accommodation. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that we shall not secure the necessary number of long-service men until the question of housing is seriously tackled, suitable provision is made and preference is given to them.

There is yet another reason I would suggest for the failure to re-engage; and that is the fact that full employment exists ashore to-day. I am not complaining about full employment, but the five-day week in industry is, of course, an attraction to the Service man, who has to work much longer hours. Moreover, in the Services a man has frequently to be on duty on Sunday. He has also to submit to discipline and the loss of personal freedom and of a settled home, both of which, of course, are inseparable from Service life. Another reason is the different rates of pay between petty officers and ordinary ratings. The difference has been so narrowed that the incentive to re-engage and serve in the higher ranks has undoubtedly gone. In addition, the level of pay in the Navy, compared with that pertaining to civil life, is still too low to attract a man to re-engage, in spite of the pension. Moreover, Service men see workers in civil life ashore obtaining improvements in their wages from time to time. Yet when improvements come their way the cost is mentioned with gravity, as if it were a special and heavy burden upon the nation.

Your Lordships will no doubt be glad to note from the recent White Paper on Defence that a scheme is to be worked out for the provision of openings for ex-Regulars in industry on completion of their service; and this will no doubt go part of the way in solving the present difficulties of re-engagement for long service. We welcome it, but further incentives will undoubtedly be required. In passing, I should like to say that I hope that this privilege will be strictly reserved for those men who leave their Service with an exemplary character. I think this reservation would have the effect of raising the standard of personal integrity and professional efficiency. I venture to suggest that until naval personnel do in fact enjoy a special position in the State, no real solution to the difficulty surrounding the proper establishment of naval long-service men will be found. And this applies not only to long-service personnel of the Navy but to the other Services as well.

I should now like to turn for a few moments to the subject of naval training itself. I understand that a Committee was set up some months ago to inquire into the difficulties between the Minister of Transport and the Admiralty as to the training of the Royal Naval Reserve. I should like to ask the noble Viscount who is to reply, when this Committee is likely to make its Report. A close liaison between the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy, and provision for the training of officers and men of the Merchant Navy in defence measures, is of vital importance—and especially the provision for their service in the Fleet. I hope we may hear that the question involved will be settled soon.

As regards the training of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, I cannot help feeling that this valuable force is not being used to the best advantage, either in the interests of the Navy or of the volunteers themselves. I should like to ask the First Lord what facilities are to be given this year to R.N.V.R. officers and men for actual service in the Fleet. Why should not some of our escort vessels and minesweepers in the Reserve Fleet be commissioned almost entirely by R.N.V.R. officers and men? It would, of course, be necessary to have continuous changes of the complements of any ships so commissioned, since, naturally, officers and men would be available for only short periods, but surely this should not be an insuperable difficulty. It is true that excellent training is given in the various R.N.V.R. divisions around the coast, but it cannot be compared with the actual service at sea and handling ships.

During the late war, as many of your Lordships know, a great number of naval vessels, including destroyers, were commanded by R.N.V.R. officers and men, and it is of vital importance that the Volunteer Naval Force should be given practical training at sea, whenever possible in their own ships. It may be argued that money spent on training would be better employed in refitting our Reserve Fleet. But it is no use refitting our Reserve Fleet if, when the emergency comes, we have not the trained men to put into the ships. When we come to look at the training facilities of the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve, we find them practically non-existent. Why endeavour to arouse the enthusiasm of a first-class body of men and then damp it all down again by providing no training or sea experience? The total strength of the R.N.V.S.R. now exceeds 7,500, which is very satisfactory, and it has been divided into twenty-two units over various pars of the country. I know that the Admiral Commanding Reserves has personally made great efforts to give this Force some training by making arrangements with various shipping companies to give them a little sea-going experience. All this is admirable, I know, but there must be a direction from the top.

I was glad to see that at Portsmouth, for instance, H.M.S. "Vernon," the Torpedo School, is to "father" the local R.N.V.S.R. contingents, and to arrange for lectures and instruction. I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether any similar arrangements are to be made at our other naval ports. Why not make arrangements for batches of this class of volunteer to go to sea in our minesweeping flotillas for day cruises during the summer? I fully realise that at present no money is available from public funds for the R.N.V.S.R., but I feel that such day cruises as I have mentioned might be organised and carried out with little or no expense to the Admiralty. It might be argued that if extra money is to be made available for training facilities of the R.N.V.S.R., it would be better employed by using it to enlarge the R.N.V.R. But I think it must be realised and remembered that R.N.V.R. personnel have to be paid and victualled, whereas the R.N.V.S.R. receive no pay at all. Therefore, I am sure that, for a given sum of money, far greater value to the Navy would be obtained by expenditure on R.N.V.S.R. training than by enlarging the R.N.V.R.

I should like to refer for a few moments to one matter in connection with the recruiting to the R.N.V.R. I understand that there is a scheme by which boys of seventeen who wish to do their National Service in the Navy and are unable to attend the necessary weekly drills of the R.N.V.R. service can join up with this service on what is known as List 2; and if they reach a sufficiently high standard during their fourteen days' annual training, they are assured of doing their National Service in the Royal Navy, rather than in the Army or Air Force. That, of course, is an admirable arrangement, but it is subject to a limitation that a boy must be able to undertake to rejoin the R.N.V.R. on List 1 after completion of his National Service. If a boy is living and working in the Midlands after his National Service in the Navy, how will he be able to give that undertaking? It is impossible for him to do so. This limitation is bound to have the effect of excluding boys living in the inland towns, and I hope that the First Lord of the Admiralty will consider the establishment of R.N.V.R. training centres in one or two of our main inland cities. If we do not have an inland R.N.V.R. division, it will leave untapped large centres of population which in the past have always been a fruitful source of recruitment for the Navy, and which would be specially valuable to the R.N.V.R. It may interest your Lordships to know that many of the Royal Canadian Reserve divisions are established in inland centres, even in the prairie towns a thousand miles or so from the ocean. Again, in South Africa there has been recently opened an inland naval division at Johannesburg. I sincerely hope that the noble Viscount will give this matter his due consideration.

I understand that it was the intention of the noble Earl, Lord Beatty, to raise the question of the conditions of service of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, but unfortunately the noble Earl is unable to be with us to-day owing to a sudden attack of influenza. There is no doubt that in their conditions of service this very important body of men do fare badly when compared with other personnel. These are the men who design and construct our warships. The Navy consists essentially of three things—namely, men and ships, to which to-day, perhaps, should be added aircraft. The highest efficiency and morale can be attained by the men that fight our ships, but in the supreme test of battle that will be of little avail unless those ships are the best that can be designed. I therefore suggest that it is of paramount importance to see that the men who design, build and repair our fighting vessels have the highest qualities and receive all the encouragement they can be given. It is essential that the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, whose work touches the life of every officer and man in the Fleet, in peace and in war, and upon whose skill may depend the survival of our Fleet, should be given every encouragement.

I believe that their position was reviewed in 1925, but very little was done: I think a small rise in pay was given. Since that date, nearly a quarter of a century ago, there have been few major changes in their conditions of service. The result is that one can safely say that the pay of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors is about 25 per cent. less than that of the Naval Executive and Engineering branches. In 1945, a Committee was set up under the chairmanship of an eminent Judge, Sir Thomas Eastham, to investigate the Corps but apparently, after more than three years, no decision on the findings of this Committee have been given. I hope that the noble Viscount will be able to tell us something about this, and when it is likely to make a report.

There is one question in connection with the income tax of officers and men serving abroad which I should like to put to the noble Viscount. I understand that there is a differentiation between the income tax liability of officers and ratings domiciled abroad on duty, and those of civilians employed, for example, in His Majesty's dockyards. Perhaps the noble Viscount could inform your Lordships on what basis this differentiation is made. It would appear that such differentiation bears unfairly on the Service man. There appears to be yet another income tax differentiation. I understand that, in the case of service in a Government-owned cable ship, no income tax is payable. Yet an officer or man doing two or three years' service abroad on a foreign commission, has to pay income tax at the full rate. I raise this matter because there appeared in the Press recently an advertisement calling for officers to serve in Government cable ships abroad and stating that "the question of income tax does not arise." I feel that there must be something wrong there.

Finally, I should like to draw your Lordships' attention for one moment to the whole question of secrecy. This matter has been raised in your Lordships' House on previous occasions, and we have been met with the reply by His Majesty's Government that they cannot make the Navy List free for public use, or disclose the numbers and category of our ships on our foreign stations, because it may be giving information to a potential enemy. A complete list of ships in commission, and those in Reserve, has, however, been published in the Navy Estimates for this year, and therefore, there appears to be no reason for not publishing the Navy List. I hope that the noble Viscount will now consider freeing the Navy List for public use. I beg to move for Papers.

3.20 p.m.

VISCOUNT CUNNINGHAM OF HYNDHOPE

My Lords, as a newcomer to debate in this House, I ask your Lordships' indulgence if I make some observations on one of the subjects which the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has raised. The subject to which I refer is the pay and conditions of service of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. It is a highly important one, and closely affects the efficiency of the Navy.

If I may go into the past history of this question, I would point out that the delay and lack of action in adjusting the conditions of the Royal Corps is very similar to the delay and lack of action after the 1914–18 war, when the results for the Navy were unfortunate. After that war, improvements in the pay of the Navy, the Army, the Air Force and the Civil Service were quickly settled, but years elapsed before the conditions of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors were dealt with, and then the proposals were considered so inadequate that the question had to be referred to arbitration. The Corps gained their case, but the award was applied in such a niggardly way that many of the officers derived little benefit. Moreover, the award did not apply to the senior officers, who were left on the old rates of pay; in fact the anomaly existed that promotion from constructor to chief constructor entitled the promoted officer to a reduction in salary! This was not put right until 1936, but in the meantime the results were such as might have been expected. Between the years 1918 and 1936 new entrants to the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors averaged no more than three a year, and in some years the standard was low; but at that time the Director of Naval Construction was in the position of a beggar who could not be a chooser.

In 1936, faced with the risk of war and a large rearmament programme, hurried efforts were made to improve matters. The pay of the senior officers was increased by relating it to the award for the junior officers; the area of recruitment was broadened and the help of the universities was enlisted. But, my Lords, it was too late. It is impossible to rebuild a highly technical body in three years, and when the war came the Constructor Corps was woefully short, in particular of men who were in the prime of life and who had enough experience to take over the many more senior and responsible posts entailed by the expansion of the Fleet and the many additional activities that the Corps had imposed upon them as the war developed. There was only one thing to do, and that was to undertake drastic dilution. That brought a heavier burden than ever on the senior officers, and had the result that in the construction of ships many jobs that demanded the attention of a constructor-officer had to be left to subordinates. Somehow or other the Corps pulled through during the war, but the Navy paid a price. Undoubtedly there were occasions when a ship was lost or serious damage was done in other directions which might well have been prevented if a trained constructor-officer had been on the spot.

At the end of the war senior naval officers, I think without exception, placed the highest value on the services of the constructor-officers on their staffs, but they considered that the rôle in which they served (a sort of civil-cum-naval rôle) was anomalous and out-of-date, and not in the best interests of the Service. Many recommendations were put forward, among them the suggestion that the Corps should be given naval status and made an integral part of the Navy. This view was widely held among the constructor-officers concerned. It was in the light of these considerations that the Eastham Committee was set up. The Report of that Committee has not been published, but it is generally known that that Committee decided against the grant of naval status to the Constructor Corps—unfortunately, as some people think. But they also made recommendations for entry, recruitment, post-graduate courses, training and, I believe, more sea service, and also for improvements in pay and status and conditions of service, with the object of ensuring that the Navy had the best possible constructor service.

My Lords, it is two years and more since the Eastham Committee reported, and so far as is known nothing has been done to implement those recommendations. In these days, when the opportunities in every other walk of life for good men, such as one would wish to attract to the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, are so many and so attractive, I think the parent of a youngster who looks into the question of the conditions of service of the Corps to-day would probably decide to leave it alone. To say the least of it, that is highly unfortunate. At the present time, when the problems confronting the naval constructor are so formidable and complex, it is essential that the best men should be attracted to this fine profession. I am sure that if early action is not taken on the recommendations of the Eastham Committee, the Navy will suffer for it as it suffered after the 1918 war. I have been told that even now there is a tendency for young men to leave the Corps and to seek a career under better conditions elsewhere. Whatever shape the Navy of the future may take, it must have a first-rate Constructor Corps, and one that the Navy recognises as being first-rate. Moreover, if the standard of naval architects in Government employ falls short, there may well be a reaction in the standard of British ship-building in general. It is to be hoped that when the noble Viscount the First Lord speaks, he will be able to assure us that early and sympathetic action is being taken on this question, which is of such great importance to the Navy and, indeed, to the country as a whole.

3.29 p.m.

EARL HOWE

My Lords, it seems nothing but an impertinence that an R.N.V.R. officer should follow the gallant and distinguished officer who has just addressed your Lordships, and should endeavour to pay any sort of compliment to the great speech to which we have listened; but I am perfectly certain that every one of your Lordships will join with me in saying how much we hope that we shall hear the gallant Admiral of the Fleet many times in your Lordships' House. In the circumstances, I feel in some difficulty in approaching the subject of the Navy to-day. I have gathered from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, that he did not wish to mention questions of ship construction and matters of that sort. I shall, therefore, not refer to anything of that kind. On the other hand, we have the Explanatory Statement issued by the First Lord on the Navy Estimates for this year, and there are several matters in that Statement upon which I would like to touch. The first is that of the Home Fleet's cruises. These cruises are of the utmost value, not only to the Navy but also to those members of the Reserve Forces who are privileged to take part in them.

A good deal has been said this afternoon about the R.N.V.R. It is of the greatest importance, if the R.N.V.R. officer is to be able to make his way up and be of real use to the great Service with which he is connected, that he should be allowed the opportunity to obtain a watch-keeping certificate. I would like to ask the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty whether special attention is being directed to facilities for obtaining watch-keeping certificates by R.N.V.R. officers. Often when they go to sea for short periods, opportunities for obtaining a watch-keeping certificate are few and far between. An R.N.V.R. officer must serve for so many months on the bridge in the aggregate before he is entitled to obtain such a certificate. It is a matter of the greatest importance—this I think was proved by the service which the R.N.V.R. were able to render during the war—that these officers, if they are to attain the state of efficiency which will enable them to be of real use to the Navy, should have the requisite opportunities. I submit to the First Lord that every effort should be made to encourage R.N.V.R. officers to obtain watch-keeping certificates if it is at all possible.

Much has been said to-day about the R.N.V.S.R. With everything that the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, said on this subject, I most cordially agree. I have mentioned it before in your Lordships House, but little enough seems to have happened as a result. No training is laid down for the R.N.V.S.R. These men eat their hearts out; they feel that they are not wanted because the Navy does not give them any form of voluntary training. They do not want pay. The same question arose before the last war. It was then my job to enter a great many of these officers. I entered over 1,000 of them. All had the same complaint—that no training was provided and that it seemed as though no one wanted them. If it had not been for the action of the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork, when Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, I do not believe that any training of any sort or description would have been provided for these officers. Fortunately, an appeal was made to the noble Earl and, by administrative action on the spot, he was able to ensure that they did get a little training while they could.

I pass to the allusion made in the Statement to the reinforcement of the Fleets on the East Indies and America and West Indies Stations. That brings up at once the question which has already been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham—I mean the question of secrecy. Why cannot we be told, as we always were in the years before the war, what the strength of our various squadrons overseas is, and what is intended to be done? What can be the object of keeping all the information "under the hat," so to speak? Any intelligence officer worth his salt knows perfectly well and could tell your Lordships exactly what is the strength of our various squadrons. We are not given a Navy List now. I have an old copy. It is for 1945; it is the most recent I have been able to get but I do not quite know whether I am really entitled to have it. Why cannot we have a properly issued Navy List just as we used to have before the war, and be told exactly what the composition of our squadrons overseas is, and, if it is intended to alter the composition, what alterations are contemplated? A departure has already been made in the case of the "Vanguard." We are told that she is going to the Mediterranean. But why cannot we be told about these matters? Why should a mystery be made of them?

I pass from that topic to the "Return of Ships" on Page 6 of the Statement. I do not wish to touch upon the design of new ships or upon matters which may come up in a subsequent discussion on the Estimates in your Lordships' House. But your Lordships will see that it is stated on Page 6 that we have 129 frigates in reserve in the Royal Navy and 25 in commission. There are also 19 listed for training, experimental purposes and so on. Now frigates are all very well—no doubt they are as good as anything else for showing the flag overseas—but if it ever comes again to dealing with modern submarines (vessels which can do 20 knots and upwards under water, and which need to surface for only very limited periods) are we quite sure that these frigates will be of much use? Is it not obvious that we shall again need, for anti-submarine duties, our already overworked flotillas of destroyers? Are we sure that we have as many destroyers as we ought to have, and destroyers of the right type? I will not say more about this subject now. I anticipate that further discussion upon it will take place in your Lordships' House later on, and I shall then endeavour to contribute a few remarks concerning the suitability or otherwise of our present destroyer flotillas for this work.

Now I come to the question of naval aviation. I have raised this before in your Lordships' House, and I maintain that it is a matter of the utmost importance. We are told that we have so many carriers in the Fleet, some on the active list and some in reserve. I would ask, have they their full complement of aircraft? Are those aircraft ashore somewhere, ready to be embarked, or is it possible that these ships have not got aircraft provided for them? After all, an aircraft carrier is not of much use unless she has aircraft to fly off her.

Next I would mention the works programme for 1949–50. Much is said about increasing the educational facilities and the training facilities of the Fleet, and that sort of thing, including facilities at the engineering school at Manadon, near Plymouth. But what is happening to that wonderful mechanical training establishment at Rosyth, equipped as it was—when I last saw it—with the most valuable machinery that could be got together in an equivalent space? I do not expect that the First Lord will be able to give me an answer upon this matter to-day. Perhaps on another occasion he will be able to do so. But I do want to point out that we have at Rosyth a magnificent training establishment equipped with the latest types of machinery. Is any use now being made of that, or has it all been scrapped?

Now, as to the question of personnel. Under the heading of "Naval Pay and Marriage Allowance," much credit is taken for the increases in pay granted and no doubt gratefully received, but I recently raised in your Lordships' House a question which may have seemed minute and relatively unimportant at the time. That was the question of purchase tax on compulsory articles of uniform. At the present time the naval officer has to pay £14 purchase tax, over and above the £50 which he gets from the Government, on compulsory articles of uniform. I submit that the First Lord might consider whether some rebate in respect of purchase tax can be granted. I next pass to naval flying duties. I see it is stated on page 10 of the Statement that it has been decided that "flying duties in naval aircraft should be performed by officers." I wonder whether that policy is right, because, after all, I should have thought that the right man to be in the air is the best man for the job. That man may come from the lower deck or the wardroom. It is a debatable question and I do not want to lay down the law about it, but I would ask the noble Lord, the First Lord of the Admiralty, for information. Is he certain that the alteration of policy which is outlined here is really wise and will give us the best pilots?

I should like to touch on one other question before I sit down. It concerns the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. It was laid down between the two wars that the highest rank in the R.N.V.R. was that of Commodore and that there were to be two of them, one on the active list and another on the reserve list. In the last war, the R.N.V.R. played a big part in the activities of the Fleet, and probably the Royal Navy realised that the R.N.V.R. could be of some real use to them. To-day we are in the position that there are two Commodores in the R.N.V.R., both on the retired list. Surely, in view of what they did during the last war, it would be only right, as a matter of policy for the future, to lay down that the senior serving R.N.V.R. officer should be given the rank of Commodore or, if that is not possible, the acting rank of Commodore. I would go further and suggest that the two senior officers should be given this rank. It costs the country nothing. It is almost an honorary distinction. It may seem only a minor point, but to a service like the R.N.V.R. it means a lot. I assure the First Lord that if he were able to make some concession in this respect, it would mean a great deal to a Service in which they are as keen as mustard and need only an occasional encouragement to give the country their very best at all times.

3.43 p.m.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

My Lords, I hold the opinion that the Naval debate to-day is something of a mistake. In view of the statements that have now been made, we ought to have waited until the whole defence policy of the country had been debated, and should then have turned to naval policy. However, the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has introduced the subject. What we have to discuss is how to fit the Navy into the general defence, and what is the best way for the Navy to take its part in a combined effort. If we are to consider that, we must know all the circumstances of the case and we must know something about the foreign situation. At the moment we are rather better placed for summing up the situation, because the line-up is becoming clear. It is no use hiding our heads in the sand and pretending we do not know where the danger is and where it is coming from.

The war that lies ahead of us, if it is to come, will not be one of the great naval wars we have had in the past. The principal opponent we shall have to face not only has not the material to fight that sort of war, but she also has a geographical position which is a great handicap to her. Her only two outlets into the oceans are both through bottlenecks. Her ships have to travel from their bases to the bottlenecks in daylight and through narrow waters. It seems to me certain that the strategy of an opposing force will be to protect the narrow seas—the Baltic and the Black Sea. I realise that they have a large and efficient submarine force. That may be efficient, because they have a great number of German officers in it, but it cannot have the same weight as the force we had to stand up against in the last war when the German and Italian navies combined against us. Taking all that into consideration, I think that nobody can find any fault with the Admiralty's decision not to press on with the construction programme and merely to have a completion programme.

In the first place the Western forces will be fully employed in keeping back the enemy's advance to the West Coast of Europe and Scandinavia, and there our somewhat reduced Army and Air Force will be stretched to the very limit. We shall have to contend for the control of the entrances to those two narrow seas—the Black Sea and the Baltic—and that is all the more important because of the recent acquisition to the Western Union. We shall have to act with speed, not only to help our proclaimed Allies but also to help) our sympathisers. We may be sure that the enemy will be fully alive to our doing this, and that they will take the necessary steps to hinder in every way, by air and sea, our egress from our home ports. Before we know where we are, we shall find that our harbours are mined, and submarines lying outside waiting to attack those ships which manage to escape the mines. That is not fancy; it happened before and can happen again, if we are not prepared on the instant.

We were told in the Statement on Defence that there was only a moderate programme for the refitting of ships in the Reserve Fleet. In the past week the Government have seen the light, but in view of the sum of money now asked for refitting those ships, one is entitled to wonder what sort of state they have been allowed to fall into, and, what is more, whether that change does not indicate a fearful want of appreciation of the urgency of the situation at the present moment. We are not far removed from the position we were in in 1939. We have a powerful nation hectoring, bullying and intriguing, with a large force in arms. What are we going to do? We have the ships. That is good—so far as it goes. I remember what happened at Portsmouth in 1939, when the First Lord of the Admiralty at that time went down to an entertainment and it was disclosed that the guns on the ships were actually manned against possible action—and the whole balloon went up! There was an outcry at the time because the secret was let out. But that was what was needed. And it is needed now, to let a potential enemy know what will happen when they come.

We are told of the long list of ships in reserve which will be available. It is also pointed out that there is a large reserve of men who learned their job in the last war. But do these men and ships ever meet? If we are to be able to take instant action with these ships in a moment of emergency, we must have a careful and efficient organisation laid down. I am delighted to think that the Admiralty are now taking in 10,000 National Service men a year instead of the 2,000 a year which they decided upon not so long ago. We know that in the last war 70 per cent. of the men who served afloat were volunteers, and if we take 70 per cent. of the Navy's strength—which we are told is to be 150,000—we shall need 100,000 Reservists to be in the same position. I hope the whole idea that we cannot make good use of men after eighteen months' training is killed once and for all and that we shall have a large force of National Service men as a reserve for the Navy. I am sure that the strength of any Armed Service is in its reserves.

I spent a very pleasant week-end reading a book called I Remember, written by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton. A particularly interesting chapter in that book was his description of how two divisions were organised from the West African troops, who supplied not only the infantry but also the technical branches, the signalmen and all other branches. Yet we are told that it is impossible to take a young fellow for eighteen months and make something of him. It is possible to make anything of him, if the enthusiasm is there. In my youth I often had dreams of having a ship manned with boys, and I asked the Admiralty about it. I never had the chance of doing it and, of course, I never shall. I would like to take this opportunity of saluting the man who has done it on so vast a scale and so successfully.

I shall be reminded that we have the Royal Fleet Reserve and the Pensioner Reserve, but almost all of these men are taken by building up the peace complements to war complements and providing instructors, and so on, in the ships. All sorts of duties absorb them. Consider what an old Admiral, with one foot in the grave, could do about this sort of thing! I took part in the last mobilisation that was carried out. Personally, I think it pitiful to read that the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve is to be 7,000 strong: 7,000 is no good; it should be 70,000. If these men are handled properly, and are found the right billets, they will be 70,000 jolly good men, if they are anything like their fathers were.

If I am right, we must be able to mobilise very quickly to get the fast craft and other ships away out of the ports, and it will need a large organisation. We want the ships berthed in the ports where they are to be manned. Imagine that this threatening nation does something that must make us go to war, or attacks us. Picture the scene in all the seaports: the "balloon has gone up," and at once the streets become crowded with omnibuses, cars, taxi-cabs and men running down to the docks to board their ships, every man in his job; they are out to sea almost immediately, covered by the aero-planes of the R.N.V.R. That is a question of minutes, not days. We do not want them all to be marched in, turned about and inspected before anything happens. I am sure that what I have envisaged could be achieved if only enthusiasm were aroused.

I have listened to all these recruiting speeches and tried to decide whether, if I were a young man, I would rush out to enlist. And the answer is that I would not. If I could see how important it was, and see some sense of urgency, then I should go. I am sure that all the young men of this country are ready to come forward if they know it is urgent; and in what better way could this urgency be depicted than by having the ships ready to sail, guns in position? Let the enemy know we are ready, and then they will not come.

There are one or two other small points which I would like to mention. If I were asked (I know I shall not be asked) what is really good for the Navy, I would say, overhaul the long-service system and take good stock of whether we are not carrying a lot of "dead wood"—men who are serving on only for their pension, who are getting through the hours with as little work as possible. They are known in all the Services—I think they are called "old sweats" in the Army. Then I would like to ask whether it would not be possible to follow the Air Force system—my noble friend Lord Trenchard's system—of taking on a large number of young men who may not wish to spend the whole of their lives in the Navy, but who are prepared to qualify for four or five years, who could go to build up a Reserve. That would be a tremendous strengthening to the volunteer formations all round the coast, and if the time came there would be a large number of Reserve lieutenants who were all of an age to be appointed. It is no good having on the Reserve a lieutenant who may come along on two sticks.

I wonder whether the same sort of thing could not be done as was done in the United States Navy (I believe it is still done)—namely, to allow a man to enlist for four years and, if he wants to, let him re-engage for another four years, instead of saying that he must sign for twelve years. The young fellow to-day may well say after four years: "My father is getting old. I must take over his business and help to keep the family." Why not give such men the chance of enlisting for four years and re-engaging for another four, instead of saying that to secure a pension they must enlist for twelve or twenty-one years? What is so sacrosanct about twenty-one years? I am afraid I have spoken longer and with more emphasis than I had intended, but I feel that we must be prepared for war to bring about peace.

3.57 p.m.

LORD SELSDON

My Lords, the few remarks I am going to address to your Lordships this afternoon will be directed towards the R.N.V.S.R. I was one of the thousands enrolled by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. We were all "mad keen," but keenness wears off if you cannot get anything to do. Before the 1939–45 war it was virtually impossible for the Supplementary Reserve to get training of any sort. Very much the same conditions exist to-day. It is my firm conviction that if there is another war the Channel and the North Sea will be practically un-inhabitable for anything larger than a minesweeper. Enemy air forces will make it impossible for carriers, or any other ship, to operate in the North Sea, let alone the Channel. That brings us down to the small ships—the M.Ls., the motor gun-boats and the motor torpedo boats, which did such magnificent service in the last war. They were almost entirely manned by volunteer or supplementary reserves. I believe that at the end of the war there were 18,000 petty officers and ratings on the books of H.M.S. "Hornet," and of that number 1,000, or a little under, were active service ratings. Those small ships required young men—young officers and young ratings.

I always remember a remark made to me by a gunnery officer when I first arrived at H.M.S. "King Alfred." He said: "When I say change rounds, you change rounds, and you change rounds darned quickly!" In a small ship everybody has to change rounds; it may be that the telegraphist has to go down into the engine room. One must know everything about everything, and that is not possible if you have nowhere to learn anything about anything. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, suggested centres in the Midlands where these keen, enthusiastic men could be trained. They do not need any encouragement; give them somewhere where they can practise, and they will practise—gunnery ratings on the latest attack teachers, and torpedo ratings on their tubes.

But I am going to make a further suggestion. During the war, when an M.L. or a motor torpedo boat was being commissioned, you were extraordinarily lucky if you had one active service rating. You were extraordinarily lucky if you did not have about eight people who had never been to sea before in their lives. You commissioned your ship and you went round to an excellent establishment, H.M.S. "Bee," where in the space of five weeks you came out with your ship's company absolutely top line and went straight into battle. Would it not be possible to have some sort of summer camp somewhere like Weymouth, where you could have a few M.L.s, a few M.T.B.s and perhaps a couple of minesweepers, where these people who have been doing their training during the winter months could come for the week-end? There would not be any lack of personnel to man the ships, because you could get them from the over-aged R.N.V.R. personnel. It would not cost very much, because I am sure many people would be only too pleased to do it voluntarily. In conclusion, I think that unless we do something about the young people who are just leaving school, and who want to come into the Service, we are going to lose them. And once you lose keenness you might just as well forget efficiency.

4.2 p.m.

LORD GIFFORD

My Lords, I want to say a few words this afternoon about the Air Arm of the Royal Navy. Before I come to that subject I should like to indicate what great pleasure it gave me to listen this afternoon to the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Cunningham, under whom I had the honour to serve during part of the war. His plea for the naval constructor was eminently justified. I think it is pertinent to remember that in the American Navy the constructor is a fully commissioned officer and that system has been a great success. We heard a remarkable speech from the noble Earl, Lord Cork. He told us that he took part in the mobilisation at the beginning of the last war, but he omitted to mention his very gallant leadership at Narvik in those early days, for which many of us greatly admired him.

In order to get the question of the Air Arm of the Navy into its proper perspective, I think it is pertinent to remark that in the latter part of the war the Air Arm proper, and the personnel supporting the Air Arm, amounted to somewhere about one-third of the entire officers and men of the Royal Navy. We are apt to think of the Air Arm as a rather small and ancillary part of the Navy, but in fact it is one of the biggest individual branches of that Service. I do not know what the proportion is to-day, but it is undoubtedly somewhat smaller.

Apart from its size, the Naval Air Arm is important because it is almost certain to be the first arm of the Service which goes into action. Your Lordships will recall that only a week or two ago we had an excellent debate in this House on the Motion raised by the noble Lord, Lord Waleran, on the subject of Hong Kong, and there were some very critical speeches. It emerged in the course of the debate that we had only one airfield in Hong Kong. It was very overcrowded and was on the mainland, not easily defended against land forces. Does it not stick out a mile what will be the first request if, in the next year or so, there should be any threat to Hong Kong? That request will be for a number of aircraft carriers to proceed to the Far East in order to provide an air striking force for the Hong Kong garrison. If that request comes there will not be much time for preparation—those ships will have to go off pretty quickly. I give only that one instance, because it is topical, but I am sure that the First Lord's planning staff can think of many other instances where the Air Arm is likely to be called upon for first aid.

During war the wastage of Fleet Air Arm personnel has always been high and, as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has said, the number of operational squadrons to-day is extremely small—one might almost say, pitifully small. The noble Earl also asked whether they are fully manned or whether some of them are merely on paper. What have we in the way of reserves? First of all, we have four R.N.V.R. squadrons. These, quite rightly, have first priority, but they comprise fewer than 100 pilots, or, I think, about 4 per cent. of the naval pilots trained in the war. Behind the R.N.V.R. squadrons we have the Air Branch of the R.N.V.S.R.—the Supplementary Reserve about which other noble Lords have spoken this afternoon, but not in connection with the air side. I think that the Admiralty policy towards the R.N.V.S.R., and particularly the Air Branch, has been extremely discouraging in the past two years. Admittedly the Admiralty's Order, which sets out what you might call the charter of the R.N.V.S.R., is not very encouraging; it says that it will get no pay and practically no support. Still, that does not matter. That is proved by the fact that no less than 7,500 officers have joined the Supplementary Reserve. Not only have they joined, but most of them pay £1 a year and they take great trouble to keep up to date and make themselves efficient. They produce this excellent booklet The London Flotilla Bulletin and other literature.

It is pertinent to note that out of over 7,000 officers, only 850, or some 12 per cent., belong to the Air Branch. I should like to ask: Why is this percentage of Air Branch officers so low? It is not very difficult to find an answer. There is little incentive for Air Branch officers to join the R.N.V.S.R. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, there is not much incentive for the deck officer, but at least he gets training in merchant ships and some opportunities, though not great, of going to sea. The Air Branch officer has no opportunity at all of flying, which is obviously what he wants to do and what he is keenest about. This is no fault of the Air Branch of this organisation, because they have worked as hard as they can to get some support. Although they have been knocked back four, five or six times, they have returned to the attack and they never seem to take "No" for an answer.

When the Air Section was formed, its objects were set out. They were as follows:

1. "(1) To promote interest in all aspects of aviation and to foster enthusiasm and efficiency in all aeronautical matters amongst its members, in collaboration with the Air Division, Admiralty;
2. (2) To enable members of the R.N.V.S.R. who served with the Fleet Air Arm during the war to keep up to date with naval flying duties;
3. (3) To provide facilities for members of the R.N.V.S.R. wishing to learn to fly and to keep in flying practice ("A" licence standard);
4. (4) To enable members of the R.N.V.S.R. in possession of civil licences, but who did not serve with the Air Arm during the war, to be trained in naval flying duties;
5. (5) To provide facilities for members of the R.N.V.S.R. interested in ground duties in support of flying personnel to be trained."

Practically none of those objectives has it been possible to fulfil. I think it is much more important for naval pilots even than for Royal Air Force pilots that they should "keep their hand in" at flying, because in every flight on and off a carrier—which all operational flights are—the pilot has not only to carry out his operational duties in the air but must carry out the by no means easy manoeuvre of deck take-off and deck landing. So it is essential that his judgment as a pilot should be kept up by regular flying.

Now let us see what, on their own initiative, the air branch of the R.N.V.S.R. have done. They were told that there were no aircraft available. What did they do? They went to the Ministry of Supply and found out that there were a number of Tiger Moths available and doing nothing. They had an assurance that if the Admiralty asked for them they could be got. They went back and told the Admiralty, "We can get the aircraft." The difficulty of maintenance was then raised. They went to certain naval air stations and found that the commanding officer and the officers of that station, although they could give only an unofficial answer, said that if they could get Admiralty authority they were perfectly prepared to maintain these aircraft. Then the question of expense to the Treasury cropped up, and the Admiralty were informed that these pilots were perfectly willing to pay up to 25s. an hour—more than enough to cover the cost. They even said that, if the aircraft could not be maintained at a naval air station, they would maintain them through the flying clubs, without any cost to the Admiralty. They only asked help in obtaining the actual aircraft.

Well, my Lords, they got nowhere, in spite of deputations to the Admiral Commanding Reserves, because the Admiralty policy was that they should have no financial support. What has been the result? No fewer than 100 of these officers have resigned from the R.N.V.S.R. and have joined the R.A.F.V.R., where they are getting their flying without difficulty. It seems a pity that the Navy should have lost these gallant officers. I should like to quote from some words of Vice-Admiral Sir Wilfred Pattison, Admiral Commanding Reserves. At a dinner in November he said he could not help feeling that the Flotilla had all too little for which to thank him, and he thought that members might well be saying, "God helps them who help themselves, and why can't A.C.R. follow His example?" Obviously A.C.R. found it very difficult to give such a negative answer to his officers. I think there would have been a little barracking as the result of this answer if these officers had not been very good mannered, and one could not altogether blame them. Needless to say, however, they treated their guest with courtesy. I should like to ask the first Lord if this Admiralty policy with regard to the Air Branch of the R.N.V.S.R. cannot be reviewed. These people are not asking for vast sums of money and they have put up some excellent plans; but because of the present policy they cannot get anywhere at all.

4.15 p.m.

LORD AILWYN

My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships for more than a few moments. I should like to add my plea to that of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for the restoration of the Navy List. It seems a monstrous situation that, three and a half years after the shooting war is over, we are still not able to know what is happening and who is where. I personally had in my home the most entrancing collection of Navy Lists, dating to my early days at sea. They were the apple of my eye. But my wife "bagged" the lot for salvage when I was away at the war, and so I am completely bereft. But, apart from my own little domestic tragedy, I do ask the First Lord whether he cannot see to it that we get our Navy List back.

In the White Paper, Cmd. 7631, which is the Statement on Defence, we read that 19,700 regular other ranks were accepted for the Navy in 1948. The numbers for the Army and Air Force are then given and we are then told: … a greatly increased flow is necessary. Presumably this remark applies to the Navy, as well as the other Services. We are then assured, in the following paragraph, that Much thought has, therefore, been given to methods of stimulating regular recruitment and re-engagement. I imagine the stress there was on the re-engagement rather than on recruitment. Then in the second White Paper, the Explanatory Statement on the Naval Estimates (Cmd. 7632) we are told, on page 9: Owing to a continued high rate of wastage, however, total numbers did not increase so rapidly as had been hoped. Re-engagements also remained below the pre-war level. A very well known naval writer and critic has written that until His Majesty's Government realise that this matter of voluntary recruitment and re-engagement is essentially an economic problem, not all the oratory of even Mr. Churchill, who was roped in to assist in encouraging recruitment on the wireless the other day, will have the desired effect. I do not believe any amount of verbal persuasion will bring men in or make them re-engage if they do not see that it is going to be an economic possibility. The naval critic then writes: Never before to-day has there been such general impoverishment in the Fighting Services. There is hardly an officer who is not in debt, and the economic Position of the lower ranks is correspondingly bad. I must say that, from letters I have received from officers of the Navy and the Army—I have not seen any from the Royal Air Force—I believe that that statement is not exaggerated. This is a deplorable situation. I believe this critic is right when he says that the basic trouble is that the pyramid of Service pay has been too much flattened. It has been squeezed so flat that it is now impossible to raise the pay of the lower ranks without encroaching on the ranks immediately above.

We heard appeals in your Lordships' House a little time ago for greater recognition to be accorded to the able seaman. My noble friend Lord Cork supported that appeal with his usual vigour. But what I should have liked to hear him say is, "Double the pay of an Admiral of the Fleet, of a Field-Marshal, and of a Marshal of the Royal Air Force, and then you will be automatically helping your able seaman by elongating your pyramid." How many of your Lordships know that an Admiral's pay has increased since 1816 by only 65 per cent.—that is, over 130 years—while civilian wage averages have trebled since 1914? I know all about the "table money" that these Admirals get, but that is all quickly swallowed up by feeding a large staff and by the official entertaining that they have to do. Incidentally, pretty "fat" allowances are given to some chairmen of industrial boards. Why should a National Service dentist be allowed to earn £4,800 a year while the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet gets £2,920? I am taking the figures as I have seen them. The noble Viscount in front appears to be shaking his head, but I do know that the Minister of Health said that he would not penalise a dentist under the National Health scheme so long as he did not increase his earnings to more than £400 a month. I make that £4,800 a year. Why should the chairman of one of the nationalised industries' boards receive twice the salary of the First Sea Lord? So long as it remains more remunerative to be an area gas manager than to command the Fleet of England, as my naval critic so tritely put it, so long will you have difficulties in getting men, if not to come into the Service, in any case to re-engage.

4.23 p.m.

LORD CHATFIELD

My Lords, I do not wish to detain your Lordships for long. I should first like to add a tribute to what has already been said about the maiden speech of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Cunningham. From the calmness with which he delivered that oration, no one would have thought that he was the man who put the fear of God into the Italian Fleet. He saved Malta from capture by his inspiration to his sailors. Eventually, he was able to signal that the Italian fleet was safely under lock and key. I am sure that we all hope he will often contribute to our debates.

There is only one subject about which I am going to talk this afternoon. That is the subject about which the noble Viscount, Lord Cunningham, spoke. As a very old sailor, I feel great diffidence in speaking at all. I am glad that I am speaking last, because now that I have heard all the young sailors—or I might say the younger sailors—speak, and have observed what they think, I have learned a great deal. And I cannot be told afterwards that anything I say is wrong! For a few moments, I want to plead to the First Lord of the Admiralty the cause of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. I agree with everything that the noble Viscount, Lord Cunningham, has said about them. People do not realise their importance to the country and to the Navy. It is not appreciated—sometimes not even at the Admiralty—that they are the most important and the most responsible technical department in their establishment. Naturally, if one says that in the Admiralty, it will cause some slight measure of disagreement, and perhaps even of jealousy. But it is the fact that they are the only technical department in the country who, by making an error can cause a ship to be blown up with her crew, a destroyer to break in half in a North Sea gale (and both those things have happened), or a great liner like the "Titanic" with 1,000 passengers aboard, to be sunk in the Atlantic by an iceberg.

Is it not easy to imagine what a weight of responsibility rests upon the head of a great department of State like that? I remember one of the Directors of Naval Construction coming to me in the morning and saying: "I had a bad night last night, sir. I dreamed that all the ships I was designing were going to go to the bottom in the Bay of Biscay." He told me, also: "I often have that feeling." Yet how much did these men do for this country in the late war? They had an immense problem set them. Not one half of what they did has been told to their countrymen. In 1937, when that stupid Agreement with the Japanese Navy had come to an end, we were able to start rebuilding the Navy. Three years later, when that very large programme of design and construction, involving an immense labour on a depleted staff (as the noble Viscount, Lord Cunningham, has told us), was at its peak, there was superimposed upon it another huge programme for war purposes—a programme which was to cost no less than £500,000,000. Every penny of that £500,000,000 meant hard work and design and experimental work in the Haslar naval experimental station at Portsmouth, and other places, in order that it might be turned into material.

Then, with a depleted staff, repair bases had to be set up all over the world; docking facilities had to be provided for our warships and our convoys. New methods of naval construction had to be introduced, such as the building of ships by structural engineers and the construction of wooden minesweepers to cope with the German magnetic mine, and other forms of mine. In all these tasks the naval constructors did not fail. I do not say that a naval officer would answer "Yes," if asked whether everything that the Naval Construction Department did in his ship was satisfactory, but I would say this: that considering all that the naval constructors had to do, and the depleted staff they had, they worked magnificently; they did not fail in the great things.

What I want to impress upon your Lordships is this. With that immensely skilled and difficult work which lay behind all our war plans, they had one of the greatest responsibilities. The efforts of our war leaders would have been of no avail if it had not been for the efforts of the Naval Construction Department; nor would the gallantry of our Fighting Forces have been proved. It was the work of the constructors that lay at the back of everything that our war plans were designed to accomplish. I want to impress upon your Lordships' House, and upon the First Lord of the Admiralty, that so far there has been no just recognition of their services. It has been denied them, both in the Honours List and in any adequate improvement of their status and of their conditions of service at the Admiralty.

I can speak to you to-day not only as an old sailor who has spent years in the Admiralty fighting their cause (not merely once or twice have I been to the Treasury with the Director of Naval Construction and the Financial Secretary to plead their case); I can speak also as one who for six years has been President of the Institute of Naval Architects. That is an Institute which represents not merely the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors; it represents all our great shipbuilders and marine engineers. I would tell your Lordships that they are sad and grievously hurt by the neglect which they have suffered, although they suffer it without complaint.

How many of you my Lords, or how many of our countrymen, know the name of any of the great naval architects in this country? We know the names of the architects who have built our palaces, our bridges, our cathedrals; we have heard the names of Wren, Lutyens, Baker and many others. But who could tell me the names of the men who were responsible for building the British Fleet? Who knows the name of the naval architect who designed the liners "Queen Elizabeth" and "Queen Mary"? They are never mentioned in public or in the Press. For the little public recognition given them, they live a hidden life. I know that the Admiralty realise that, or they would not three years ago have set up the Eastham Committee. I was asked to give evidence before that Committee, and I did so. I said to them exactly what I have said to-day—and a great deal more. I believe, though I do not know, that they reported favourably—as Lord Cunningham told us—in the interests of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. But they did not agree, I believe, that it should become a naval instead of a civilian body.

I would ask the First Lord what has happened to that Report? I know that he has their interests at heart, just as much as I and my naval colleagues here; and I know that he is not all-powerful. But is it a problem which depends upon outside authority, or is it one that has to be settled within the Admiralty itself? Are the rivalries and differences between Departments in any way the cause of this apparent—I repeat, "apparent"—hesitation on the part of the First Lord in making up his mind what he is to do? We must have the best naval architects in the world, just as we must have the best marine engineers and shipbuilders, if we are to perpetuate our Imperial status and preserve our national life. But although the shipbuilders and marine engineers all come under this sense of grievance that I have tried to describe, it is the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors for whom I plead to the First Lord to-day. They are the corps élite in the world of our naval architecture, and I say: Let honour be given to those to whom it is due. I ask of the First Lord—I plead to him—that he should say one word of encouragement, one word of admiration for what they have done, and that he will look after their interests, not only for their sakes, but for the sake of the country and of the Navy.

4.35 p.m.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT HALL)

My Lords, notwithstanding the limitations of the debate which were agreed to between myself and the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, opposite, the discussion has been well worth while, for indeed it has produced a remarkable coincidence in the fact that all of the members of your Lordships' House who have preceded me have served in the Royal Navy, in ranks varying from that of a Lieutenant, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, to Admirals of the Fleet, and it can be said that all have rendered very gallant service. Listening to them, I felt how appropriate it would have been if my noble and gallant friend, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, the First Sea Lord, could have replied to this debate. It certainly would have been a very fitting conclusion to an interesting discussion. I could not ask my noble friend to do this, for although I have been closely associated with him for some years, I have yet to indentify his political views. Who knows?—it may be that he would be much too Left even for me, or much too Right even for his noble colleagues who have spoken; so I have taken the risk of imposing myself upon your Lordships for a short time.

It is interesting to note that of the five members of your Lordships' House who are Admirals of the Fleet, three have participated in this debate. The combined services to the Royal Navy of these three alone would amount to between 140 and 150 years. Indeed, had the noble Viscount, Lord Cunningham, remained in the Navy for another two years, he would have completed a full fifty years' service.

LORD CHATFIELD

He is still in the Navy, on the active list.

VISCOUNT HALL

Then he has completed more than his fifty years. I feel very privileged this afternoon to extend to him not only my hearty congratulations but the congratulations of the Royal Navy upon his forthright maiden speech. He has taken some time to make it and we have been impatient to hear him. How unlike one of his colleagues who was a namesake of mine, who, when elected to another place, was standing on his feet and making his maiden speech within two and a half hours of taking his seat! I would not like to say that his effort was in any way equal to that of my noble and gallant friend this afternoon, who followed the cautious example of the late Lord Balfour, of whom it was said that he took two and a half years—able Parliamentarian that he was—before taking the plunge and making his maiden speech.

Lord Cunningham's service to the Royal Navy is well known, not only to your Lordships and to the nation, but, indeed, to the whole world. He entered the Royal Navy in 1898. He started his fighting career as a midshipman with the Naval Brigade in the Boer War. As has been stated, he is still on active service. The record of the years which he served at the Admiralty, as War Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and, indeed, as First Sea Lord during the war, and the success of his great services, will occupy an honoured place in naval history. I have often heard him referred to as one of our greatest naval captains, for he has all the qualities which make a sailor fitted for all the important positions which he has occupied. His fighting spirit will always be regarded as an example for others to follow. His love of the sea and of sailors has been reciprocated with great affection by not only the sailors whom he commanded but by everyone who has been associated with him in the Royal Navy. He has an unbounded sense of duty and a great respect for tradition. All who sailed and worked with him had absolute confidence in him. As has been made clear this afternoon, he has never been afraid to speak his mind, which made him a great asset in the Royal Navy; and this will serve him well in defending the Royal Navy during his membership of your Lordships' House—and may that long continue.

It is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has said, that the terms of the Motion on the Order Paper are very broad, but the debate in the main has been limited to a few outstanding questions which might be regarded as of administrative character. The noble Lord asked me whether I could say something about the general state of the Fleet. It will be seen from my Statement Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, which was published on Monday, that the build-up of the Fleet during the present year has been completed in accordance with the forecast which I gave twelve months ago. With regard to the assurance for which the noble Lord particularly asked, that is, in relation to the standard of efficiency and training in the Fleet, I can certainly say that, having regard to the difficult period through which we have passed—and, indeed, are still passing, since at present nearly half the men have less than three years' experience—we are completely satisfied with the progress made, which has come up fully to our expectations.

Your Lordships will see that we have again provided this year the information regarding the composition of the Fleet which I gave twelve months ago and which, I think, was then very much appreciated. At the same time, I am afraid it is difficult or, indeed, impossible for me to give a complete statement of the disposition of the Fleet, even now. It is true that, by making inquiries, the facts of that disposition could probably be obtained. But that is entirely different from an official statement by the Service Departments as to the dispositions, not only of the Fleet, but also of the Air Squadrons and, indeed, units of the Army. But it will be seen—as was pointed out by the noble Earl, Lord Howe—that in the Explanatory Memorandum it is stated that certain of the overseas fleets have been reinforced. Almost every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate to-day has raised the question of the Navy List. I know that for some years this has been a very sore point. I am glad to be able to inform your Lordships that the practice of regular publication is to be resumed, and I hope that it will be possible to make the first reissue early in the summer.

The debate has centred mainly around questions of naval personnel. Perhaps foremost among them is that of the re-engagement of personnel to complete time for pension—many of them, the "old sweats" to whom the noble Earl, Lord Cork, referred. I think the noble Lord, Lord Teynham dealt fully with many of the difficulties which have arisen and which have prevented many of these men from signing on. It is perfectly true that the proportion of men who so re-engage on completion of their first continuous service engagement is, at the present time, considerably below the pre-war level. Indeed the pre-war figure stood at about 65 per cent. of the total; at the present time it is about 30 per cent., though there are considerable variations among the various branches. For instance, about 50 per cent. of the chief petty officer artificers and artisans are now re-engaging, and the proportion of chief petty officers in the seamen, communications, naval aviation and electrical branches, is roughly the same. The percentage of petty officers in the artificer branches is about 40, and in the seamen branch it is about 30. In certain other branches, especially the Royal Marines, the proportion is lower.

As I have already pointed out, the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has dealt with some of the difficulties which have arisen and which I think have interfered with the signing on, but we must remember that the men concerned mostly served during the whole of the war under the most trying and arduous conditions. Many of them have had long periods of foreign service since the war, especially after it became impracticable to draft National Service men to distant foreign stations. In addition, one aftermath of the war was the over-bearing of chief and petty officers which is only now disappearing. Noble Lords will appreciate that it was difficult to demote acting chief or petty officers. The policy of the Board of Admiralty was that they should continue in their acting rank until they could be absorbed. It can now be said that they have almost all been absorbed, and the possibility of promotion and advancement will soon be such that I believe it will have a very great effect.

I think it is not unnatural, in conditions such as I have described and having regard to full employment—and that again is a matter which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham—that men should find an overwhelming attraction to return permanently to their families. This is an inevitable feature, which we have been unable to overcome. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and others touched on another point which is of great importance also, and that is the question of married quarters. Lord Teynham suggested that we should consult with the Ministry of Health with a view to ascertaining what steps could be taken to see that an allocation of houses in the naval ports should be made to naval ratings. That has already been done, but we are experiencing great difficulty, particularly with local authorities. There is a great deal of pressure brought to bear upon local authorities to provide houses for persons resident in the naval ports, but we are taking urgent steps to improve the situation in regard to this matter.

I am glad to say that some men who have left the Royal Navy and have not found conditions in "civvy street" as good as they thought they were have re-enlisted in the Service within a few weeks. With the recent pay increases, the increased marriage allowance and the return to more normal conditions, both in civilian and Service life, we are hoping that the number of men who re-enlist to complete time for pension will increase. I can assure your Lordships that we attach considerable importance to this question, and that we shall take whatever steps we can to bring about an improvement. I had an interesting experience during my cruise on the "Duke of York." I met members of every branch of the ship's complement and I discovered—this was before the new pay increases were announced—that the senior leading seamen, petty officers and chief petty officers found that their status had been interfered with, not because anything had been taken from them, but because so much had been given to the ranks below them. From the information I have received, it seems that the new increased scales of pay will rectify much of that grievance.

All the noble Lords who have taken part in the debate have dealt with the question of reserves. I lay the greatest emphasis upon the importance of building up an efficient and substantial Reserve force, though I am afraid that I am not yet in a position to say what has been finally agreed upon as to the position of the Royal Naval Reserve. The Committee appointed to consider this matter have made their Report, and most of the difficulties have been surmounted, but the way is not yet clear to make a full pronouncement. I can explain, however, that the difficulty about receiving into the Royal Naval Reserve these excellent men from the Merchant Service is the question of priority in the event of an emergency arising—that is, whether their service in the Merchant Navy is as important as their transfer to the Royal Navy, or more important. The Minister of Transport is anxious, as I am, that there should be a complete understanding between us in this matter. We both realise that it is of little use building up the Royal Naval Reserve with persons whose services could not be called upon because they would be essential in the service in which they were already enrolled.

I am pleased to say that the reopening of recruiting for the patrol service section of the R.N. Reserve to new entrants is imminent, and your Lordships will be aware that there are already in the Naval Reserve substantial numbers of officers and men who have enrolled after previous service. We are doing all that is possible to improve the present training facilities for the R.N.V.R., and to refit the drill ships, in so far as we can make money and materials available for the purpose. Generally speaking, I think we may claim that some good work has already been done. Your Lordships will recall that H.M.S. "President" recently returned to her station on the Embankment, after being refitted and re-equipped, and is rendering valuable service to the London Division. All Divisions of the R.N.V.R. have sea-going tenders which provide practical training at sea during week-ends, and a substantial proportion of the Reserve carried out their annual training last year, some being attached to the Home Fleet during the autumn cruise to the West Indies. We hope that in the forthcoming year the numbers that can be given sea-going training will be greatly increased. I will certainly bear in mind the point put by the noble Earl, Lord Howe—that is, whether R.N.V.R. personnel can be used in the manning of small ships, though I am rather doubtful about this, in view of the fact that it is essential that men should be fully acquainted with all the improvements in equipment that have taken place since the end of the war. If the Reserves could be given training in sea-going units of the Royal Navy, that would be much better for them.

The noble Lord, Lord Gifford, referred to the R.N.V.R. air squadrons. They have all been brought up to nearly their full strength of flying personnel, and a substantial number of flying hours have been achieved. There are four R.N.V.R. squadrons, at Abbotsinch, Stretton, Culham and Bramcote. I will take note of what the noble Lord said in regard to doing what we can to extend the intake into this Service. I can say that the results of the annual training camp confirm that these squadrons compare favourably with the Regular first-line squadrons, and are thus well fulfilling their functions as immediate first-line reserves. Unfortunately, we have so far not been able to establish inland sub-divisions of R.N.V.R., as was urged by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. It is difficult to set up these inland stations with the limited amount of money available. It must be remembered that something like £1,000,000 is being provided in the Estimates this year for the Reserves.

Much has been said this afternoon about the R.N.V.S.R., which suggests that it would be profitable for me to give a fairly full explanation of the position. This Reserve plays a rôle in our Reserve organisation which is a somewhat different one from that played by the R.N.V.R. For good reasons, some limitation has to be placed on the size of the Regular Naval Reserves for whom training is provided, and on the facilities which can be made available for them. An additional consideration is that we cannot take more than our fair share of those who are prepared to serve in Reserve organisations of the Fighting Forces, and the limitation that is placed upon the size of the R.N.V.R. restricts this aspect of the matter. We want to balance the R.N.V.R. with the Royal Naval Special Reserve, which will commence when the first of the National Service men under the new National Service Act are transferred to the Reserve. It may be that a proportion of this Special Reserve will opt for the R.N.V.R.—at least, we are hoping so. But at the same time we have to make provision for the training of this Special Reserve which (as I think was pointed out by the noble Earl, Lord Cork) will amount to a substantial number, if the full period of the National Service Act continues to operate.

I am not going to refer unduly to the fact that the R.N.V.R. is costing money; of course it costs money. But we are quite prepared to spend what we can on building it up. The interesting thing is that there is no shortage of officers for the R.N.V.R.; indeed, there are many more officers who offer themselves than we can afford to take. The great problem is to attract ratings. I wish that in the twelve divisions which we have established greater interest could be taken with a view to bringing the number of ratings up to the target which we hope to reach before the end of the next financial year.

With regard to the R.N.V.S.R., this is a Reserve over and above the Regular Reserve for which training is provided; and therefore it is quite different in character from the R.N.V.R. It was reinstituted because there were many officers who served in the last war who were willing and anxious to preserve their connection with the Navy, although we could not take them into the R.N.V.R. because that Reserve already had its full complement of officers. The R.N.V.S.R. is, in fact, a list of persons who undertake to come up for service in the Navy in an emergency, and it is on this understanding that many have joined it. In this respect, the R.N.V.S.R. is the officer equivalent of the Royal Naval Emergency Reserve, which is a list of ratings who have seen service in the Navy and have notified the Admiralty, without incurring any obligation to do training, of their willingness to offer themselves for service in the Navy in the event of an emergency. I should, however, like to make it clear that we are grateful to the members of the R.N.V.S.R. for their great interest in the naval service, and particularly to those who are anxious to play a larger part than they can at the present time. While noble Lords have rightly devoted much attention to the voluntary Reserves, they will not forget that the Navy has, in addition, a substantial source of Reserve man-power in the form of the Royal Fleet Reserve.

EARL HOWE

Will the noble Viscount forgive me for interrupting? Before he passes from the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve, can he not make it possible for members of that Reserve who wish to do so to go to sea in destroyers or small ships without pay? They will probably pay their own messing. If they are given the chance to go to sea, and are made to feel they are wanted, it will give them a chance to bring themselves up to date, and they will be of some use in the future.

LORD GIFFORD

And to fly without cost to the Admiralty.

VISCOUNT HALL

We cannot do this at the expense of the R.N.V.R. We must create all the facilities we possibly can for the R.N.V.R. After all, noble Lords will realise that we are building up the Home Fleet. It may be that after the Home Fleet has been built up to its full peace-time strength, something can be done in relation to providing facilities for others than members of the R.N.V.R. But it must be remembered that when we have the Special Reserve—those men who have done eighteen months' full-time National Service—facilities will have to be provided for them to go to sea for something like twenty days a year for three years of their period of Reserve liability. They cannot be sent to ships on foreign stations; they will have to do their Reserve service with the Home Fleet, or in ships which are specially set aside for that purpose. There are difficulties. We should be pleased if we could see the possibility of providing facilities for the R.N.V.S.R., but I can hold out no prospect at the present time that those facilities will be forthcoming.

My noble friend Lord Cunningham, and indeed many other noble Lords, spoke this afternoon about the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. May I assure the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, at once, that I have a tremendous regard and a profound respect for the Royal Corps of Constructors. I have been brought into contact with the Corps during the three periods that I have had the great pleasure of serving at the Admiralty. I do not regret for a moment the very strong remarks which have been made here this afternoon in relation to the conditions under which the members of the Royal Corps of Constructors are serving. I am as conscious as any of my noble friends of the extent to which the strength and efficiency of the Fleet depend on the number and qualifications of the naval constructors. I think the importance which is attached to this is evident from the relative frequency with which the organisation of the Corps has been reviewed.

The facts are not quite as have been stated this afternoon. Indeed, there have been four investigations in a period of thirty-five years into conditions of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, and a substantial reorganisation took place before the war (this was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield) when the pay and numbers of the higher grades were increased and provision was made for the recruitment, as the noble Lord rightly said, of university graduates to widen the field from which we had previously recruited. But the experience and the development of the war showed the desirability of another review. Reference has been made to the Eastham Committee. That Committee took evidence from many sources, and its Report contains advice on every aspect of the problem for keeping the Corps abreast of requirements. I have already reached conclusions on certain important matters arising out of this Report. I want to say at once that we have come to certain conclusions in relation to the question of pay. I wish that this were a matter which the Admiralty could itself decide.

So far as rates of pay and career prospects are concerned, my aim is to be able to offer as soon as possible such revised conditions as will attract further recruits from the universities and the dockyards. But new conditions cannot be settled except in proper relation to general Government policy on the post-war organisation of the Civil Service as a whole. Discussions are proceeding on how the constructors should be fitted into that structure to which I have referred. These are well advanced and, as I have already said, I am hopeful that it will be possible to make an announcement before very long. This may be of some consolation to those persons who have waited a long time. I should point out that members of the Corps will in no way suffer as a result of the time that it has taken to clear away difficulties in this matter. The new salary scales, when decided upon, will take effect from January 1, 1946, which I hope will encourage them to be patient for a little longer.

With regard to the strength of the Corps, I am satisfied that an increase over the pre-war establishment will be necessary for a considerable period ahead. The number of permanent officers is in fact in excess of the pre-war figure, notwithstanding the conditions to which the noble Viscount, Lord Cunningham, and the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, have referred. Indeed, the rate of recruitment has been increased in recent years to a point which by 1953 (a long time ahead) will produce a cadre of about 140 per cent. of the pre-war size. Although an establishment of this order may be somewhat inadequate for the work which the Corps will be called upon to do between this time and the date to which I have referred, some of these tasks will be non-recurring, and I have reached a provisional conclusion that the number of permanent staff which should be available in 1953 might then be sufficient for all the work demanding the services of fully qualified naval architects, including duty with the Fleet. Meanwhile, assistance is being provided by the employment of specially selected technical staff and, of course, we shall keep the numerical requirements under review.

The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, referred to the question of income tax and a differential between civilian and naval personnel. In raising this point, the noble Lord has in mind the dispensation whereby certain unestablished civilian employees of the Admiralty serving abroad are not required to pay United Kingdom income tax. This dispensation is not peculiar to civilian employees of the Admiralty. It derives from a regulation made by the Board of Inland Revenue, and is applicable to any unestablished United Kingdom-based servant of the Crown sent abroad who qualifies under the detailed conditions published by the income tax authorities. I think the main condition is that the income must be below a certain limit. I believe the limit is about £500 to £600. I should point out that naval personnel abroad are, generally speaking, accommodated afloat or in barracks, but for those who, during their tour of foreign service, reside on shore in places where the cost of living is substantially higher than in the United Kingdom, a local allowance is provided which is exempt from United Kingdom income tax.

I was interested, as always, in the remarks made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, concerning the R.N.V.R., and on this occasion particularly in relation to the question of Commodores. I am grateful to him for raising this matter, and I will certainly keep it in mind and see whether anything can be done to meet the point. The noble Earl brought forward several other points which I am prepared—I do not want to detain the House any longer—to discuss with him and, indeed, with the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, regarding the question of the Fleet Air Arm. I do not want to embark this afternoon upon that matter, because I think it is the intention to have what may be regarded as a wide policy debate in relation to defence generally and perhaps also to the Navy, sometime in the not too distant future.

I will conclude by saying that my Statement Explanatory of the Navy Estimates will have shown that the Royal Navy has regained its sea-going strength as we planned. The training which is now in progress, and the further measures we are taking to bring the Reserve Fleet into an up-to-date condition, will add strength to strength. I can say from my personal association and connection with the Fleet itself that the Royal Navy is in good heart, and the country may be assured that it is as ready as ever to deal with any emergency that may arise.

5.17 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM

My Lords, I am sure that the House is very glad to hear, in the statement which has just been made by the noble Viscount, of the progress in the training and the efficiency of the Fleet. I am sure we are glad to hear—certainly the naval members of this House—that we are again going to see the Navy List. I must say that the figures given by the noble Viscount in connec tion with re-engagement are not encouraging. The percentages at the present time are certainly low, and I am glad to hear that steps are to be taken to improve the married quarters, because I am quite certain that that is having a grave effect on this question of re-engagement. I hope the noble Viscount will also continue to put pressure on the local authorities to provide housing for the families of serving men.

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, mentioned the question of the R.N.V.R. officers obtaining watch-keeping certificates. That matter is of great importance, and I hope the noble Viscount will look into it and enable as many officers as possible of the R.N.V.R. to obtain their certificates. The noble Earl, Lord Cork, made reference to the number of people in the R.N.V.S.R. I would like to point out to him that it is composed entirely of officers, and numbers about 7,000. I think this figure is a very good one. These men are energetic and keen, and they publish an excellent little bulletin which gives a great deal of information about them and their organisation. I much regret that no facilities are to be provided for the training of these R.N.V.S.R. officers. I am afraid that the statement we have had to-day will have a rather depressing effect on this very fine body of men. We were certainly glad to hear what the noble Earl said about the Constructors Corps. I hope we may hear something soon about the conditions of their pay, and that we may see some improvement in that direction. I also gather that the numbers are to be increased. I am grateful to the noble Viscount for making the explanation with regard to the question of income tax. I am sorry he did not mention the question of service in Government cable ships.

VISCOUNT HALL

They are run by the Post Office.

LORD TEYNHAM

I am grateful for the statement made by the noble Viscount, and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.