HL Deb 27 March 1947 vol 146 cc912-21

6.16 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I am sure all of you who have listened to this discussion will agree that the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, has put us once again under a debt of thanks to him for raising this matter, and enabling this very useful discussion to take place. The discussion has been memorable to me for various reasons, and not the least because we have had the opportunity of hearing a most interesting and well-informed maiden speech from the noble Lord, Lord Kershaw. He told us he had been minded to make his maiden speech on some other topic. It is fortunate, perhaps, that events made that impossible and that he chose the subject on which he was so able to speak, and to which he had obviously given so much care. The Motion of the noble Marquess is "to call attention to those recommendations contained in the Final Report of the Denning Committee which are concerned with machinery to be made available for attempting reconciliation between the parties."

The discussion, I thought, sometimes strayed rather far from that field. I am pot prepared to-day to consider the question which was raised by the most reverend Primate, the Archbishop of Canterbury, as to the form which the register office marriage should take. That has obviously nothing to do with the subject of the Motion, and I will spare your Lordships my views on the general social question which is here involved, because we need to devote no time whatever to recognizing the extreme gravity of the situation with which we are confronted. If you believe, as I do—and as I think do most noble Lords—that family life and the family are the basis of all our civilization, you must all deplore the fact that the marriage tie has shown itself to be so uncertain and so weak as the figures for divorce cases to-day show. I therefore say nothing about that matter at all. I come to consider purely practical questions, and I will try to devote myself to them in a practical way.

Before I do so there is one debt of thanks I would like to pay; that is a debt of thanks to Mr. justice Denning and his colleagues for giving us this most valuable Report. I expressed my indebtedness to him and to his colleagues on the occasions of the First and Second Interim Reports. and I certainly think this Report is no less interesting and gives us great food for thought. The next thing I would say is this. I have been asked whether I would take prompt steps to do this, that or the other. To my mind we are here dealing with a very delicate and difficult question. I had better be a little angelic, rather than rush in too quickly, for if I rush in now to try to do something very promptly and speedily, and in consequence make some mistake, then the whole of the hopes that we entertain will be largely frustrated and destroyed. There is another reason that makes me say this. At the present time we have this alto- gether abnormal flood of cases in our list. We are dealing with what I have estimated at something like 50,000 cases in a year, and I think that with the river at that state of flood, it would be rather unwise to attempt to launch a frail boat upon it. I would rather wait until the number of divorce cases has got down to 10,000 or thereabouts, which I hope is going to be our normal number.

I divide the recommendations of the Denning Committee into two: First of all, those relating to the purely voluntary work of the societies to which people can, if they are so minded, go; and, secondly, those relating to the appointment of Court welfare officers who are to have some functions extending quite beyond the merely voluntary rights of the parties to go and ask for advice. I will deal with the first category first. I am absolutely satisfied—good Socialist though I am—that it would be completely disastrous if the State were to try to undertake this task. It is a task which must be carried out by the voluntary societies. Secondly, I would emphasize that the time at which it can be usefully carried out is, I believe, as the Committee state, in the early stages, and not when a case has got into the hands of solicitors, and a petition has been presented. With regard to the voluntary societies, I recognize that they are doing very good work, and His Majesty's Government are favourably disposed to make contributions in order that their work may be more effective. But, I have this fear, which I must state quite frankly. You very often find that when State funds go in voluntary funds dry up; and if, as a result of making contributions, we find that the voluntary nature of the work done by these societies ceases and they become organs of the State, then I think that, by our contribution, we shall have done something very unfortunate and very unwise. Therefore, in deciding what contributions we shall make and for what services we shall make them, we must watch that most carefully.

May I say here that I agree entirely with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, that we must be quite clear that we have no lot nor part as a State in that part of the work which relates to anything beyond the work of reconciliation? We must have that absolutely clear. It is no part of the duty of the State—and I would deplore it if any one thought it were—to give instructions as to the spiritual or religious conception of marriage. So long as that is clearly understood, we are prepared favourably to consider giving grants-in-aid to these societies, always providing that the amount of the grant which we give is not so great as to prevent the voluntary nature of the work. Thus, to that extent, I confess I am convinced by this Report. I am only saying what the Committee have themselves said in stressing that. Throughout this Report, they state repeatedly their view about it. And it is interesting to note that they do not accept the scheme which the President of the Divorce Court, Lord Merriman, put before them—a scheme to which I know he had given very great thought—because they think it breaks down for two reasons which they call "conclusive." The matter is dealt with on page 12 of the Report. The Committee there say: We have given the scheme the careful consideration which it deserves, but have felt unable to adopt it for two reasons which in our opinion are conclusive. The first reason is that reconciliation must be attempted at the earliest possible moment—that is to say, long before proceedings are begun. I agree with that. The second reason they put in this way: The work of reconciliation is, we are convinced, necessarily a personal task for those who undertake it, and if it is to appeal to the Englishman's character must be removed as far as possible from any suspicion of official supervision or interference in the private affairs of individuals. Let us bear those two points in mind. Reconciliation must be attempted at the earliest possible moment—long before proceedings are begun. Secondly, the work must be free from any suspicion of official interference.

I now turn to the next matter with regard to which, I say frankly, I have very grave doubts in my mind. It is suggested that I should appoint Court welfare officers. They are to be recruited from the probation officers. The noble Lord, Lord Holden, has already told us—and anybody who has studied this question knows it well—how difficult it is to get probation officers; and when these Court welfare officers are appointed what, precisely, are they to do? They are to have the right to see all the petitions. They are, I suppose, to browse through the petitions and to endeavour to tell from them which of the cases are suitable for their intervention. Here, again, I agree with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon. You can, of course, gather from a study of the petition whether in a particular case there are children of the marriage or not, and it would be quite possible to confine your attention only to those cases where there are children. But the Report goes further, and seems to contemplate that there is something on the petitions which indicates which of the cases are suitable for the intervention of the Court welfare officers. There is no such indication. It is quite impossible to select from a pile of 50,000 pieces of paper cases in which you should intervene and cases in which you should not. It must be done purely at random. That seems to me to be a very real and practical difficulty.

Now, there is another practical difficulty. It is suggested that these officers should particularly interfere—I am not using the word "interfere" in an offensive sense at all; perhaps it would be better to say "concern themselves"—in those cases where the marriage is going to be dissolved within three years, and they should in these cases always, as a matter of course, endeavour to bring about a reconciliation. I refer to page 15 of the Denning Report which your Lordships have before you. In any event in our opinion it should be open to the Court on every application for leave to present a petition within three years of marriage, to refer the case for inquiry and report to the Court welfare officer as to the interests of any children and the question of reconciliation. I am bound to say, having had some knowledge and experience of this sort of case which, as the Committee point out, frequently involves some shocking depravity, that it is really much too tall a proposition to say in such a case that there should necessarily be any consideration of reconciliation at all. I have known cases recently in which my advice, and the advice of any of your Lordships, would have been that the sooner the girl got rid of the man the better. Therefore, it must not be thought that you can go more or less automatically at this, and say there is to be a reconciliation or that we should even try reconciliation in such cases.

There is one other matter. The Denning Committee seemed to think that I could appoint these welfare officers or marriage guidance officers, or whatever name they have, by mere administrative action. I have been into this matter carefully and have received the advice of my advisers. If I could do it at all I could do it only by some kind of subterfuge. Of course, I could appoint additional clerks in the Law Courts, and having appointed these additional clerks I could then christen them marriage guidance or marriage welfare officers. The President, could then authorize them to go and look at all the lists if those who had filed petitions. I very much doubt whether he or I could authorize them to communicate what is in the petitions to other persons. I very much doubt that. When we considered during the war a not dissimilar case under the Act which, I think, was called the Liabilities Adjustment Act (which the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Simon, passed when he was Lord Chancellor) we had this case. We had a large number of seaside people who were very badly hit and owing very large sums of money. We wanted to see if we could bring about some kind of reconciliation between creditor and debtor. We put our problem before Parliament and got the authority of Parliament to appoint these officers. I, for one, say quite definitely to your Lordships, whether I could do this kind of subterfuge or not, I should not think it right to do it.

If I were to appoint these officers I should think it my duty to go to Parliament and propose the necessary legislation and to get that legislation through. I am sure your Lordships will agree that that is the only candid and straightforward thing to do. At the present moment there is not the slightest hope of that legislation being passed and, therefore, so far as that part of the Denning Commission Report is concerned—interesting though the idea is—I cannot accept it yet. And as I have said, although I do not by any means turn it down, I have not made up my mind about it. I wonder whether this recommendation is quite consistent with the two grounds on which they turned down the President's scheme; first, that the only chance of reconciliation is at a very early stage, long before proceedings have been started; and secondly, that the chance of reconciliation is completely vitiated if there are any suspicions whatever of official interference. Here you have official interference and, quite frankly, I have some little difficulty in seeing how the second set of recommendations fit in with the first.

There is one other matter I would like to see, to which the Denning Committee, in my view rightly, attached great importance, and that is the setting up (if I get my Bill through next year, as I think I shall) of the Rushcliffe scheme. It seems to me that there we shall have a scheme which will enable us to do some very useful work in this connexion. After all, a very large number of cases will come before the committees which (if the scheme goes through) the Law Society are to set up in all parts of the country, at a stage long before there is any question of divorce. That will be covered by the Rushcliffe scheme. It seems to me that the most hopeful line of approach is to try to tackle the problem when these people come to ask if they can have assistance in bringing cases. Then is the time to see whether or not you can do anything to facilitate reconciliation. It is obvious that the Denning Committee realized the bearing and importance of the Rushcliffe Report on their recommendations, and it is obvious that they want (if I may use a current vulgarism) to "gear in" with the Rushcliffe Report. I very much hope we shall be able to do that, and I think, for the time being at any rate, that it is really a more practicable way of approaching this problem than attempting to introduce further legislation which, for reasons I have given, I am quite satisfied will he necessary in the way of Court welfare officers.

Therefore, the conclusions I come to are these. First, that in regard to voluntary societies we should encourage them to go on in every way we can. We should give them all the assistance we can, always providing that they do not come to look upon our assistance as the only or the main source from which they are going to get funds b carry on their work. If they do, they will come to rely on the State and we will have transformed these useful societies into a State organization. There is another reason why I am very anxious not to have that. State organizations very often conform to a pattern. Here you are doing something experimental, and the greater diversity of forms you can get the better, in order that we can learn by experience which is the best form and method of approach to this tremendously important problem.

With regard to the proposal concerning Court welfare officers, I want to consider that much further. I want to consider exactly what is proposed. I am quite satisfied that I cannot at the present time do anything without legislation. There is no prospect of legislation at the present time with regard to that. Thirdly, when I set up the Rushcliffe scheme, as I hope to set it up in consequence of the Bill I believe I shall introduce (if I am still alive and still here) early next session, I shall bear in mind very particularly this question of reconciliation, and I shall see if I cannot make some real contribution towards this problem in that way. That is the attitude I take up. I do not want you to think I am dilatory about this thing. I am not. I do not wish you to think I want to put this Report into a pigeon-hole. I think I may fairly say it is not my habit. But, on the other hand, I am very anxious that, in a matter so delicate and so difficult as this, I should not spoil the whole scheme by making some false step by rushing in without proper consideration.

6.40 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

My Lords, I am glad that your Lordships feel that the debate on this Motion has been valuable. I certainly feel for myself that it has been. Like the noble and learned Viscount, I am glad that it gave an opportunity to the noble Lord, Lord Kershaw, to make his first speech, by giving to him a subject upon which he obviously had reflected deeply, and on which he spoke with much experience and sincerity. As to the reply of the noble and learned Viscount, I cannot think that it will give unqualified satisfaction to those concerned in the day-to-day working of these societies, who had perhaps hoped for a little more concrete encouragement. I confess that I was in some difficulty in following his argument that it would be very unwise to start this service when there was this vast number of divorces, and that it had better wait until the level had subsided to the 10,000 mark. Frankly, I do not find the logic of that contention very easy to follow, although I am sure it is there, or the proposition would never have emanated from the noble and learned Viscount. At the same time, I should have thought that the need for the service was greatest when the figures were highest, and it was just when you were dealing with war marriages which had been unsettled by these possibly temporary conditions that you had the greatest need for the institution, within proper limits and with proper safeguards, of a service of this kind.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Perhaps the noble Marquess would forgive me for interrupting. I obviously did not make myself plain. It is obvious that if you are going to have any adequate system to deal with this vast scope of cases, it has to be on a very large scale, otherwise you select certain cases purely arbitrarily. If you are going to attempt to build up a system which is to deal with these 50,000 cases, you will not get any system at all. You must start with a comparatively small system.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

I am disrespectful enough to be still puzzled. What does the noble and learned Viscount mean by "selecting cases"? Who is to select the cases? I thought we were talking—on one side of the service, anyway—of marriage guidance centres, where nobody would select the people who would go to them; the people would elect to go to them themselves. Therefore, why should we wait until the numbers have fallen to 10,000 before we give the necessary help to centres to which some of these 50,000 people can go, before their marriages are broken up in the hope of seeing whether they can come together?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

May I intervene again? I think there is a misunderstanding (no doubt it is my fault) which may do harm. I do not contemplate waiting. I have intimated that we are quite prepared to render financial advance now. I want to make that quite plain. What I have endeavoured to say twice now is that I do not want to build up organizations which are on a scope and scale to deal with 50,000 cases a year, or anything like that, because I think that to attempt to do so would bring the whole scheme to absolute ruin.

THE MARQUESS OF READING

We seem, by devious routes, to have arrived at the same finishing point, which is perhaps satisfactory to both of us. I certainly had not appreciated that the noble and learned Viscount had intended to begin immediate help, within such form as he may decide, to these voluntary societies. I confess, like him, that I am much more uneasy in my mind about the Court welfare officer aspect of the matter. I think that it is perhaps getting a little too near the shadow of compulsion and State interference. I hope that he will contrive to give every possible encouragement, both moral and financial, to the marriage guidance service aspect, and I trust that we may leave it in his hands to promote that end as far as possible. I now beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.