SITUATION IN CHINA.

HL Deb 23 January 1947 vol 145 cc110-61

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER rose to call attention to the situation in China; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I make no excuse for bringing this subject to the attention of your Lordships. If I had any apology to make it would have been for not having done so before. For several years there has been going on in China a tragedy of world importance, fraught with—as I hope to be able to show—certain very great dangers, and so far I think we have had no discussion of it in your Lordships' House. I have brought forward this Motion largely to try and find out what the policy of His Majesty's Government is with regard to China, especially in view of the situation created by the high and honourable failure, but nevertheless the failure, of all the efforts of General Marshall to compose the contending parties in China.

An article on Hong Kong appearing in The Times a short time ago—I think early this month—which your Lordships may have read, stated, as if it were an obvious fact, that diplomatically Britain has had no real policy in China since the surrender of Japan. If that is so, I suggest it is time we had diplomatically, and in every other sort of way, a real policy in China. I propose to be bold and suggest what that policy ought to be. But, before I go any further, I want to inform your Lordships that I am well aware that much of what I have to say is highly controversial. I used to think that there was no country about which and in which there was so much cross-swearing as Russia, but perhaps there is more cross-swearing in China. I do not pretend that I do not take sides in this matter. I do. I have a fairly clear view as to which Party is most to blame in the present tragic failure. But I think it best to begin by saying to your Lordships that I know that these views are controversial. I do not expect your Lordships to take my word for gospel—God forbid that you should, even if there was any need that He should so forbid!

I also want to say that I consider myself to have what I should call a first-class knowledge with regard to China, especially Communist China, up till a year ago. But the first-class evidence on which I then depended, and which I think in some ways was rather unique, is no longer available. My information about what has happened in this last year is nothing like so good, in my estimation. It depends upon American sources and American articles. It is as good as I can get, but I do not guarantee it with anything like the confidence with which I can guarantee statements as to what were the minds of the Communists in China up till a year ago, what was the structure of their. Government, how far they were Communist, and so on.

That may seem to your Lordships to savour of over-weening confidence. I do not speak as a philosopher, because, speaking as a philosopher, one knows hardly anything. In ordinary parlance, however, I think I know. It is good enough. I would die in ditches for it and I would do more things than that. But as to how far recent events have maddened the Communists in North China, how far they have been intolerably unreasonable—and they have been pretty unreasonable—I do not know. I can only state my opinion from the evidence I have. But I do not know that that matters very much, because we may disagree quite a lot about the proportion of blame to be properly assigned to either side in China. I do not consider that anybody who knows the facts, however, can disagree about the tragedy of the situation and the extreme danger involved in it.

The other thing I want to say in preface is this. I have come reluctantly, slowly but surely, to hold a very, very low opinion of the people who now run the Government of China. But I do not think we ought to dwell on that without remembering their past glory. I should feel ungracious if I did not recall to your Lordships how the Generalissimo, in the now long ago days of 1937, stood up against the onslaught of Japan; how against desperate odds and with extraordinary courage he maintained the resistance of China against Japan; how he formed—and justly formed—a symbol for all the forces of fighting China. Had it not been for that great service which Chiang Kai-shek performed, nothing would have been there to stop Japan. However much we may deplore, as I deplore, what has happened since, I do not think that that fact should ever be forgotten.

I can remember when I first began to be disillusioned. It was, I think, in 1942, when some members of the Deputation from another place who had gone to China came back. An old member of my college, a most respectable Unionist M.P. for a Scottish Division, told me that the common impression which everybody had acquired in China was that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were keeping what arms they were getting from America, and whatever they were getting from us, not to use against the Japanese but to use against the Communists. I began to hear that more and more. There is an honourable explanation which is, I think, consistent with the conduct of an honourable man. The Generalissimo is a patriot of the kind who believes in the old order of China, who has a great admiration for Confucius and all that Confucius stood for, and who believes as sincerely as a patriot can believe that the salvation of China is to be found in a reversion to those ancient and honourable practices of Confucius, and not in listening to any heretical views which come from the West, whether they come by sea or whether they come from Siberia. Whether they are democratic views or Communist views, they are equally Western views, and they are equally views far inferior, in his opinion, to the views of China.

I can imagine a man holding those views, and therefore being determined so far as he could to have nothing to do with anything which seemed to come from Moscow, or from America, not to speak of anything coming from this country—if anything had come from this country—but to hold on, so far as he could, to the patriotic views of Confucius. I can imagine a man holding that view, being prepared to stomach a good deal of corruption, misgovernment and misbehaviour on the part of his Party, allowing himself gradually to get into the hands of people whom I may describe as the Kuomintang bosses.

I wanted to say that to begin with, and I should like now, coming to the framework of my main remarks, to take as my text the statement that General Marshall made when he finally gave up his noble, long and patient attempt to bring the two sides together. There was a long extract of it published in The Times of January 8, and I have with me here a full account of it and a verbatim report in the New York Times of the same day. The report itself was made on January 7. I want to call attention to where, in that statement, he sums up the situation and the reason for his failure and to five points that he makes. The first thing he says is that in the Kuomintang Party there is a dominant—and observe the adjective—group of reactionaries. I think it may help if I read that portion from the verbatim report in the New York Times of January 8. It states: On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang Party, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition Government. This has usually been under the cover of political or Party action, but since the Party was the Government, this action, though subtle or indirect, has been devastating in its effect. They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that co-operation by the Chinese Communist Party in the Government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue. This group includes military as well as political leaders.

Secondly, he says that he found among the Communists a definite Liberal group, of whom I will say more later. He states: On the side of the Communist Party are, I believe, Liberals as well as Radicals.… Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite Liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who would put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future. Then he says that there is a Party of dyed-in-the-wool Communists quite prepared for the wreck of the economic structure. He goes on to complain, I think in some ways justly and in some ways unjustly, of virulent Communist propaganda in its unfair and unscrupulous attacks on American policy. When I say, "unjustly", I do not suggest for a moment that those attacks on American policy were not virulent and unfair, but considering what America was doing in the meantime I feel that one ought to remember the remark—I have forgotten what the animal was—"Cet animal est trés méchant: quand on l'attaque il se défend.": "This animal is very vicious: when it is attacked, it defends itself." Considering what the Communist Party have suffered from American action since V. J. Day, but not before, I do not think one could expect them to be very restrained.

The last point I want to make out of his speech is this. He says: The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on a substantial American support regardless of their actions. That point comes up again and again in his description of the situation. May I go back for a minute and amplify some of those points? I do not think I need go on much further about the reactionaries in the Kuomintang. All the evidence which I have—and I think it is first-class evidence—shows that at least by the end of 1943 the Kuomintang Government had made up its mind that the war was going to be won by America and this country and that they need not bother—a not unnatural view considering how much China had suffered. But the evidence is not only that they kept their best armies away from fighting the Japanese and kept them watching the Communists—that was the cause of the row between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek—not only that they had (as they have) concentration camps and secret police, and use them very freely, but also that until the Americans equipped Chinese divisions their troops were so starved, so deprived of their rations, so ill treated in all kinds of ways, that they became a completely ineffective fighting force. Up to, I think, the year 1944, no fewer than seventy-two Chinese Generals deserted to the Japanese, and in regard to the large proportion of Japanese puppet troops it was difficult to tell when they were fighting for the Japanese or when they were encouraged to fight against the Communists.

However, that is in the past. I should like to quote a passage out of the Atlantic Monthly for 1946, which says this: In spite of Britain's exhaustion and America's strength, the American position in China is more awkward than the British position in India. Chiang Kai-shek, like the head of any government, calculates in terms of the total support he can muster. Chiang's domestic support has dwindled at a terrifying rate until American policy has become a support without which he would have to surrender a great part of his power and alter his whole philosophy of government. Even the support of industrialists and business men in his own country is now negligible. In the economic debacle of post-war China there are only politicos and bureaucrats mismanaging a financial and industrial structure which is in chaos. Washington is soberly aware of the fact, though of course it is not widely publicized, that the only orderly production of either food or commodities in China is in areas controlled by the Communists, who in theory ought to be subversive and disruptive, but in practice are good managers and administrators.

I found in America in the autumn that even those Americans acquainted with China, who, for various reasons, approved of the then policy of the American Government and wanted it prosecuted more actively, admitted freely, time and again, the complete corruption of the present Kuomintang Government and the integrity and honesty of the administration of Communist China. I believe the whole evidence bears that out; I do not really think there is much doubt about it. I want to say certain things about the Communists, and I will begin by quoting a statement from an American book called Thunder out of China, written by a Mr. White and a Miss Jacoby, partly because it bears out what I know from other sources. It states: The entire Communist political thesis could be reduced to a single paragraph. If you take a peasant who has been swindled, beaten and kicked about for all his waking days, and whose father has transmitted to him an emotion of bitterness reaching back for generations—if you take such a peasant, treat him like a man, ask his opinion, let him vote for a local Government, let him organize his own policy and gendarmes, decide on his own taxes and vote himself a reduction in rent and interest—if you do all that, the peasant becomes a man who has something to fight for, and he will fight to preserve it against any enemy, Japanese or Chinese. If, in addition, you present the peasant with an Army and a Government that help him harvest, teach him to read and write, and to fight off the Japanese who raped his wife and tortured his mother, he develops a loyalty to the Army and to the Government and to the Party that controls them; he votes for that Party, thinks the way that Party wants him to think and in many cases becomes an active participant. That sounds human nature and ordinary.

The actual facts about the Chinese Communists are very funny; they are not ordinary. People sometimes say they are not Communists. I used myself ignorantly to refer to them as "so-called Communists." But they are Communists so orthodox, such orthodox Marxians, that they are heretics from the point of view of the Bolsheviks. Marx (as I suppose everybody outside Russia knows, who has read Marx's uncouth work) was perfectly clear that you could not possibly have Communism except as the final stage of the development of capitalism. He therefore held that Communism ought to come first in a highly developed country like England. It was, in consequence, rather awkward to hold that Communism could come in Russia. There was a long argument between Lenin and a redoubtable scholastic and pedantic German called Kautsky on this subject, where Kautsky had by far the best of the argument and Lenin, on the whole, the best of the facts.

Of course the worst of having a Bible is that if you make up your mind what ought to have been in the Bible, you then have to show that it is there. If you make up your mind about what Marx ought to have thought (and clearly from the Russian experience he ought to have thought that there was no need to go through all these stages) he must, being infallible, have somehow said so. Therefore the orthodox Russian doctrine is that he did say so. These poor benighted Chinese Communists, however, who read that book (it is bad enough in the original, but it must be very odd in Chinese!) come to the innocent conclusion that when Marx made these remarks about having first to go through capitalism, he meant it. They, innocent creatures, quite firmly hold that you cannot have Communism in China until you have run the whole gamut of development from a feudal agricultural society, through that elaborate and developed private enterprise which so many of your Lordships prize so highly, to (after one or two generations, but not before) Communism.

Let me give you an example of what they did while the war was going on. I do not know if they still do it. They had an effective law that if landlords would, not cultivate their land, the land had to be sold. The landlords, however, were encouraged to put the proceeds into private enterprise, capitalist industry, and they were not taxed at all. They are an odd kind of Communist, and not quite recognizable. I think it is roughly true—not entirely, but roughly—that the Russians follow the curious but very prevalent psychological law which makes you hate the heretic far more than the infidel. I know that my grandmother, who was the mildest of women, could get on very well with an atheist, but not with a Unitarian. I know of unbending temperance reformers who kept all their venom and their hate for the people who liked the Carlisle experiment. So the Russians are not enthusiastic admirers of the Chinese Communists and have not, until possibly quite recently, given any help to them.

I want to make this point because I think it is a very interesting illustration. These curious Chinese Communists (who are in theory Communists, and in practice radical agrarians) comprise the one dominant Communist Party of which I know which insists on not having a one-Party Government. They have a principle called Three-Three. Why Three-Three I do not know, but that is what it is called. They insist that their Government should be a coalition of equal parts of Communists, members of the Kuomintang (when they can find them and they are not excommunicated by the regular Kuomintang) and non-partisans. At one time—I do not know whether it happened often, but I do know it happened once—when the Communists discovered that they were likely to have elected more than the desired one-third, they withdrew some of their people in order that they might preserve this beautiful balance.

I do not say that because they have these odd ways of behaving they are therefore necessarily good in everything, but I do not think the poor things should be wiped off on the ground that they are Communists, on the assumption, which is prevalent in many quarters, that if you are a Communist, that is that, and no attention except hostile attention should be paid to you. The evidence of their having received support from Russia, until possibly quite lately, is, so far as I can follow, very small, unless you describe getting help from Russia in this way. When the end of the war came, the Russians allowed the Communists to take such Japanese arms as were left on the spot, and did not entirely subscribe to the (as it seems to me) preposterous line taken by Chiang Kai-shek, that the Japanese should surrender only to him and should not surrender to the Communists, even in those parts of China which had for many years been occupied by the Communists.

Therefore I think we ought to recognize certain things. One is that you cannot expect the Communists to coalesce in any sort of coalition with the Kuomintang unless they have guarantees, which really means in practice unless they keep their arms. What has happened in Northern China is that for the first time for many generations the militia area controlled by the peasants, and because that is so they can keep their land and keep their crops, and can surmount these periodic lean years which are the curse of agriculture in Northern China. I do not think you could possibly expect the Communists, knowing how firmly the dominant elements in the other Party believe in force, to give up their force and to disarm them-selves. I am sure they are bound to hold out.

It has been said to me several times by people who come from those districts that it does not matter what the Generals may do in negotiations, nothing will make those peasants all over North China—who, for the first time for generations and generations, have had this experience of not being oppressed and being able to get over these terrible years—give up that land and give up those conditions. One of the most sinister things which I saw reported in the American papers was that the Kuomintang in those parts of Northern China which they have got hold of—thanks to American support—are bringing back the old evil agricultural conditions from which the peasants of North China have escaped.

I do not think that you are going to get a solution to this problem unless you can make Chiang Kai-shek or the Kuomintang—I do not really care which of the two it is—give up some power and allow, if necessary within a Federal Ch Lila, parts with such independence that they can control their own economy. As was said in that quotation I read from. General Marshall, the dominant reactionaries in the Kuomintang believe that the thing can only be done by force. Why the Com munists are bitter against the Americans is that before the end of the war most people in China—at any rate, people in Communist China—were confident that the armies of the Kuomintang were so weak, so corrupt and so hopeless that they would recognize that they could not possibly defeat the Communists, and therefore must come to some abiding relations with them.

That situation has been changed. It has been changed largely, if not entirely—and I think entirely—as a result of American action. I want to point out what a tragedy this is. America has an extraordinarily honourable record of generous and disinterested action towards China. For many years back, beyond the time when America gave up its share of the Boxer Indemnity, there has been far more interest about China in America than there is in this country. I do not subscribe to what people say about British Imperialism—I consider it is mostly nonsense—but nobody can think that in all that long record of American interest in China, help in China and devotion to China, there was any element of grabbing or Imperialism. I think that the American interest in China is extraordinarily fine.

How has this tragedy come about? For a long time in the course of the war America gave most devoted help to China: all those cargoes of ammunition, flown at enormous danger and peril over the Hump to China, right up to the end of the days of that great and gallant General, General Stilwell. He made up his mind that he could not go on giving effective help to China unless he had what he no doubt called a "showdown" with Chiang Kai-shek. He demanded that the Kuomintang armies, then immobilized in watching the Communists, should be used against the Japanese; and Chiang Kai-shek refused. General Stilwell took a high line and, with the support of President Roosevelt, demanded that Chiang Kai-shek should reverse his policy. Chiang Kai-shek refused; and won. General Stilwell was relieved and went home, and instead there was the disastrous embassy of General Hurley, with whom I think the trouble began.

General Hurley, from all accounts, believed nothing but his own intuitions, his inner conscience and what he was told by the Kuomintang. It was common talk that he disregarded his own experts and the masses of information available. He believed all the stories which the Kuomintang told about the Communists and so on, with the result that when the end of the war came Americans believed the statements and pronouncements of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. The result of this changed American policy was that whereas on V.J. Day the Kuomintang had thirty-nine divisions equipped and trained by Americans, since V.J. Day they have had fifty-seven divisions. Since V.J. Day the Americans have transported eight Kuomintang armies of 300,000 men in all to Manchuria and four Kuomintang armies of 160,000 men to Northern China. Since December, 1945, they have given Kuomintang armies equipment to the value of over $1,000,000,000—twice the value of all the American equipment given to China during the war. That statement is not quite fair, because it was very difficult to get stuff there when it had to go over the Hump, so we would expect it to be more. But can America really be surprised that the Communists think that American policy is to help Chiang Kai-shek exterminate them?

I will not detain your Lordships for more than a few minutes, but I want you to consider the possibilities of the future. If necessary I could give chapter and verse to prove this but it is really there in the statement of General Marshall as it is in that of Dr. Leighton Stewart. It is no use supposing that the dominant Party in the Kuomintang or Chiang Kai-shek himself are going to change their policy unless they have to. I omitted to call your Lordships' attention to one other point in General Marshall's statement. You remember that he says: The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. I think the difficulty throughout has been that the Kuomintang have always banked on the belief—and, so far, rightly—that they are not going to be turned down in favour of a Party which calls itself Communist.

Your Lordships will remember the remark of Charles II who said to James II: "No one is going to kill me, Jamie, to make you King." Chiang Kai-shek has been fairly clear that no American—and, I think I might possibly suggest, no American since the last elections—is going to turn down the people who call themselves all sorts of respectable names in favour of people who call themselves Communists. Time and again Chiang Kai-shek has gone a long way to appease the Americans so long as it has not meant anything—so long as it has not meant giving up real power. It was always presupposed, in dealings with General Stilwell, that if Chiang stood out and said "No," America would have to choose between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists, and that he would always choose Chiang Kai-shek, who has held on and on, in that knowledge and assumption, with extraordinary cleverness. He has made no real changes, and I am sure that state of affairs will continue.

The other and more subtle point about which I want to say something is this. Part of the explanation of this American behaviour is an explanation which would apply to our conduct very easily—the assumption that it is our business to support the legal and authorized Government of China. Because the Kuomintang professes and claims to be the regular and legal Government of China, therefore they get all the credit that China, as a great nation, with all its sufferings and endurance deserves, and richly deserves. I do want to ask your Lordships whether this is not legally mistaken. I submit that since the time of the troubles, since the time of the war lords, Chinese unity has been an ideal and an aspiration, and never an actuality. Areas held by the Communists in Northern China (but not all of them) have never acknowledged allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek.

Earlier on, Chiang Kai-shek supported quite well a campaign, which had everybody's good wishes, for trying to make Chinese unity an actuality. Chiang Kai-shek was a symbol of Chinese unity, as he then deserved to be; but he never was, in effect, the master of the whole of China. His relation with the Communists was a relation of alliance, a working arrangement. To say—as both America and this country have said—that there is a Government of all China now under the Kuomintang is quite remote from the facts. I would very much like to know whether that is good international law, but it is no good asking a lawyer until we get the facts. I am, however, very doubtful about this point, and I very much hope that the Government will in quire into it. I am not an international lawyer and I should have to go into the history of the matter, but I think the line that both countries have taken—we more than America—that we must not communicate with Yen an unless Chiang Kai-shek gives the lead, has very doubtful legality and is a mistaken policy. I think that point is very important. I am not trying to be dogmatic, but I want to state my opinion.

May I get back to my remarks about the future? There are, I suppose, various possibilities. There is the possibility that there should suddenly be a change of power. There is just the possibility now, as a result of General Marshall's message, which is very emphatic in some ways, that Chiang Kai-shek or the Kuomintang may see that they will not contine to get American help. They will not, therefore, be able to keep 8,000,000 or 6,000,000 men in arms, and they will have to make a reduction; and that is what we should all pray. It is possible that with those fifty-seven American-equipped divisions the Kuomintang might exterminate the Communists. From my inquiries, however, I do not think that it is likely that the Communists will do worse against the Kuomintang than they did against the Japanese. In the fight against the Japanese they contained, at one time or another, between 40 and 60 per cent. of the Japanese forces and about 90 per cent. of the Japanese puppet troops. They could never make a stand in a fixed battle against well equipped Japanese armies. They fought with home-made hand grenades and home-made land-mines, but the Japanese never conquered them. They held the roads; they held the forts and they held the towns. But the Communists held the hills. This lasted for years, and I do not see any reason why the Kuomintang should do any better. Therefore on that basis you are going to have a long drawn-out civil war which will go on sapping the forces of China more and more.

And when China is an open sore, as we know from what ha happened before, world trade suffers, and British trade, not to mention other things, suffers terribly. I do not think that we can stand by and see that going on and on, draining the life of China, as I am sure it will unless we do something about it. Finally, one must mention this, and I do it with great hesitation and reluctance. My evidence, for what it is worth, is that Russia, on the whole, has behaved towards the Chinese Communists with correctness. That is consistent, I think, with the fact that they took the opportunity to do a certain amount of looting in Manchuria; but that is by the way. I do not know if there is any evidence that she gave active support to the Communists. But how long is Russia going to endure looking on and seeing what is happening? I consider this is a more dangerous relation between Russia and the Western Powers than exists anywhere else in the world, without exception, and I do not think it is any good trying to minimize it. I can imagine nothing more dangerous.

What then are we able to do? I am quite sure that we should insist on sending our own representative to Yenan. We should get in direct touch with Communist China and learn the facts about it. We do not learn the facts now direct; we get them second-hand. We get them, of course. They are not heard in this country, but they are heard in America on the Yenan radio. We do not, as I say, get first-hand information and we ought to insist upon it. What I should like to happen—I speak here with great hesitation—would be for us at once, if we have not already done so, to consult with America on the lines of saying: "Something must be done about this. Can we agree as to our common view about the facts and our common policy?" That seems to me to be elementary, and it may be that we have already done it.

I should like to go further and bring in the United Nations, though I do not know how it is to be done. I should like to bring in Russia, and say: "Let the three nations who are concerned"—because Russia is concerned—"America, Russia and this country, freely consult about the Chinese situation and the question of what is to be done about it." There I leave it. I am not a Statesman but only a person who happens to have heard something about China and to have a very deep cencern about it. But I think it is monstrous to leave it alone.

I feel bound to end upon this note. It will be intolerable if we do leave China alone, if we acquiesce—and I say this deliberately though regretfully—in the destruction of an honest (for it certainly was honest before the present fighting began), sincere, and agrarian community, and if we agree in the holding of a large part of China by a Government compared to which in its present behaviour, the Government of Franco Spain (and I share the view which is usually held on this side of the House about that Government) is liberal, democratic and civilized.

4.53 p.m.

LORD AILWYN

My Lords, the House has listened to a very interesting and thoughtful address. Lord Lindsay warned us at the beginning that his speech might be controversial. Your Lordships may agree or disagree with the main theme of his remarks, but at least all will recognize the complete sincerity with which he put forward his views. I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if I do not follow him fully in his analysis of the political situation as it exists in China to-day—wellnigh overwhelming though the temptation is—other than to say just this. It seems to me that the noble Lord appeared to ignore the existence to-day of the National Assembly. He will know that the National Assembly sitting in Nanking today comprises delegates from all the major parties in China with the one regrettable exception of the Communist Party. Moreover the noble Lord—I hope I am not misquoting him; he will correct me if I am—appeared to bracket President Chiang Kai-shek with the reactionary group in the Government.

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER

May I just say that it depends a little on what you mean by "bracket."

LORD AILWYN

The noble Lord is a far better exponent of the English language than I am. I thought that the word "bracket" was a fairly simple one. Let me say that he referred in the same breath to President Chiang Kai-shek, and the reactionary group.

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER

May I say that I should not have made that flippant remark. I would not identify President Chiang Kai-shek with the reactionary party, but I think the facts have shown that he is in their hands—that eventually he comes down on their side.

LORD AILWYN

The view that President Chiang Kai-shek has no lot or part in the views of the reactionary group is largely borne out by an article which I came across the other day in The Scotsman, written by that very well-known—may I call him—expert on Chinese affairs, Mr. O. M. Green, who for forty years has lived in China, has written about China, and has been intimately concerned with Far-Eastern affairs. He is very definite in what he writes. I quote from his article: The National Assembly's success is the more welcome in that it began badly on November 15, a number of middle Parties grouped in the Democratic League having suddenly decided to join the Communists in boycotting it. This would have made the Assembly a farce by leaving it wholly under Kuomintang domination. Then, however, the two most important parties in the Democratic League—the Social Democrats and the Young China party—broke away and entered the Assembly which, with representatives from overseas, Chinese Tibet, and Mongolia and professional and business independents, thus became fairly representative of the nation. Then this is an important part: What is acknowledged by all is that General Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly used his great influence to check reactionary manœuvres for securing the old ascendancy of the Kuomintang. That is fairly convincing. The article goes on: The draft Constitution of 1936 had been expressly revised to prevent this by the Political Consultative Conference of all Parties in Chungking, last January—again largely through General Chiang's influence: and he meant the revised draft to go through. His action in this respect is regarded as a sufficient answer to the vituperations of the Communists and their friends abroad. The noble Lord further quoted somewhat extensively from General Marshall's Report. Here are two paragraphs which he did not quote. They are as follows: In the interests of fairness, I must state that the Nationalist Government publicity agency has made numerous misrepresentations, though not of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda. Further on it is stated: I have never been in a position to be certain of the development of attitudes in the innermost Chinese Communist circles. Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a conference table with Government representatives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists have broken off negotiations by their last offer, which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly, and a return to the military positions of January 13"— that is last year of course— which the Government could not be expected to accept.

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER

Will the noble Lord allow me. I could read other parts of General Marshall's report which could be held to weigh the other way. It is a very fair statement. It includes a lot on behalf of all sides. I think it is quite clear what General Marshall thinks, whether rightly or wrongly, and he gives some evidence to show that the Communists have an incurable distrust of any professions made by Chiang Kai-shek. But I do not want to apportion the blame for that. My main point is the distrust there.

LORD AILWYN

The noble Lord will forgive me if I do not follow him any further on that line. I have other points to make, and I would only say that it is devoutly to be hoped that the Communists will be led to see the unwisdom of what I am bound to call their intransigence and take the seats which are waiting for them in the National Assembly. As The Times said the other day in a leading article, when pointing out that the Government is in process of being formed on an all-Party basis, "Nanking will not wait indefinitely for Yenan." I was glad to hear the noble Lord pay some tribute to that great man, General Chiang Kai-shek. It would be most unfortunate if there went out from this House any real criticism of a man who has borne the immense burden that General Chiang Kai-shek has borne. He has guided the destinies of his country for twenty years; he directed their war effort for eight years, and any suspicion of casting aspersions in your Lordships' House on a man with the incomparable achievements of the President of the Chinese Republic would be very unfortunate.

It is not of the political set-up in China that I wish to speak this afternoon—I hope that other noble Lords may further develop that subject—but of certain points arising from the economic and commercial situation which exists to-day. I understand that His Majesty's Government are in the process of negotiating a new treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the Chinese Government. It will be recalled that a Sino-American Treaty was concluded recently, and it is greatly to be hoped that the Sino-British negotiations will be carried through in a short time. It is in connexion with these negotiations that I wish to say a word or two regarding certain matters. The first is shipping. This country has a double interest in shipping in Cilina—first, that of its ocean-going vessels calling at ports and places in China in the course of their legitimate world trade and, secondly, that of its very extensive coast-wise and Yangtze River shipping which for many years has formed an important part of China's domestic lines of communication.

With regard to the first, it is greatly to be hoped that His Majesty's Government will be able to provide in the Treaty for freedom for British ships from overseas to call at all ports and places in China which are accessible to them in the course of their legitimate world trade. There appears, however, to be possibility implicit in certain recent regulations in China an intention to close the Yangtze River to foreign-flag shipping of all kinds. Any such intention, one cannot but feel, would be greatly detrimental to China's own interests as well as being inimical to the interests of foreign shipping generally. The Yangtze River, as your Lordships know, is one of the greatest waterways in the world, and is navigable in the summer high-water season for some 600 miles, up to the port of Hankow, by ships of 10,000 tons or more gross register. There is no doubt that a grave loss of trade would result if the port of Hankow were to be denied to ships coming from the east across the Pacific or from the west from Europe. We have ports on the Amazon, the Mississippi and the Hudson Rivers, the use of which is a very great convenience in the handling of cargoes originating far inland. It is greatly to be hoped that His Majesty's Government will do all they can to dissuade our Chinese friends from any restrictive legislation with regard to the navigation of the Yangtze by oceangoing vessels.

A more vexed problem is the coastwise and Yangtze River shipping proper. For some sixty or seventy years British enterprise has provided China, on its very extensive coastline and on its navigable inland waterways, with shipping services which have been an example both of efficiency of operation and of the immense contribution which a well-run communication services can make to the prosperity and development of any country. I venture to think that these British shipping services have done more to benefit China than they have to benefit this country, and it certainly would be difficult to show anywhere in the world private enterprises which have ploughed back into the business a greater proportion of their profits than have these great China companies whose names are household words in the Far East, and whose reputation throughout the commercial world is of a very high order.

Under the Treaty which was negotiated with China in 1943, this country agreed, and rightly agreed, to relinquish all the privileges and rights of extraterritoriality. No one could quarrel with that Treaty. The time had certainly come for us to recognize China as an equal in international stature with ourselves, and one looks forward to the development of a new and fruitful intercourse between our two countries under a system of equality and no privilege. This Treaty specifically brought to an end the system of treaty ports under which British shipping had operated in China; and again one has no criticism of that provision. May I express the hope that under the new conditions China will give due recognition to the interests of the British shipping companies to which I have referred, and that when our new Treaty with China comes to be written the great position which these British shipping companies have built up will not be just thrown to the winds, but that their services may still be made available to China.

I think I am right in saying that these British shipping companies are very willing to conform to the laws of China as regards the flag under which they sail and as regard company formation. All they now ask is that these laws shall be sufficiently liberal to allow them to serve China as they have done in the past, and that the British proprietors may be allowed to continue to have a full and adequate share in the management and operation of these ships, which is so essential for efficiency. I have gone to some lengths in discussing this point because my understanding is that at the present time efforts are being made by certain elements in China to eliminate this British shipping interest entirely. I do ask His Majesty's Government to do all they reasonably can to prevent the destruction of an instrument of communication which must surely be of the highest value to China.

So much for shipping. The next matter to which I wish to refer is the subject of land and property holdings. In China there is a very heavy investment of British money in land and buildings. Many of the great British industrial organizations have very big investments in property in that country. Under the provisions of the 1943 Treaty the titles to these properties are agreed to be indefeasible, and I understand that under the terms of the recently-negotiated Sino-Americas Treaty provision has been made for the nationals of either country to buy and own land anywhere in the country of the other party. This, if I may say so, is all to the good, and I hope that His Majesty's Government will be able to arrange for similar provisions in the Sino-British Treaty.

It is necessary, however, to call attention to the fact that a very large amount of property of all kinds belonging to British subjects is held to-day by the Chinese authorities and has not been returned to its British owners since the conclusion of the war with Japan. These properties were, of course, occupied by the Japanese during the war and in most cases were taken over by the Chinese authorities on the conclusion of hostilities with Japan. Yet it is a little disturbing that at the present time, some seventeen months after the end of the war with Japan, many of these properties have still not been returned to their rightful British owners. It may well be that this dilatoriness results from a lack of effective control by the Central Authorities, by which I mean that, whereas our Ambassador in Nanking is able to obtain assurances from the Central Government that this matter will be put right, the Government appear to be unable to get their mandate obeyed by their subordinates. In particular, the very large numbers of small craft—Augs, lighters, pontoons, and things of that nature—which have not yet been returned to their rightful British owners is a matter of grave complaint, and urgent representations should be made by His Majesty's Government with a view to the early rectification of this situation.

There is another matter of major concern. It may not be generally known, but at the end of the war with Japan the Chinese Government made special representations to His Majesty's Government asking that British coastal shipping be directed back to the China coast as quickly as possibly in order to aid with relief work in those parts of the country which had been occupied by the Japanese. His Majesty's Government promptly agreed to this request, and the Chinese Government undertook that they would release to the British companies without delay their properties of all kinds. Here was a specific agreement between Governments, dealing with certain well-defined properties, and yet to-day, fifteen months after that agreement was entered into, those properties are still under confiscation. I feel that your Lordships will think that it is not unreasonable to ask His Majesty's Government to make the full rendition of all British properties to their rightful owners a pre-requisite to the signing of any new treaty.

I will not detain your Lordships for more than a very few minutes, but there are two further points upon which I must shortly touch. There is the question of the position of certain Settlements and Concessions. I understand that at the present time joint committees are sitting in China to discuss or to negotiate the arrangements under which the assets and liabilities of these Settlements and Concessions will be assumed by the Chinese Government. I hope that His Majesty's Government will watch over these negotiations, and will use their influence to see that the British members of the staff which formerly administered these areas receive not only what is due to them under the contracts of employment which they formerly enjoyed, but also fair compensation where enforced loss of employment has occurred.

I would recall that the areas to which I refer, namely, the International Settlement in Shanghai, the British Concession in Tientsin, and the International Settlement in Amoy, set a very high standard of efficiency and economy in their administration, and although it is certainly fair to give some part of the credit for this high standard to those who formerly constituted the Councils of those areas, there is no question that the major share of that credit is due to the integrity and excellence of those men and women who formed the administrative staffs. The international communities who have lived in these Settlements owe a great debt of gratitude to these men and women, and I should like to see His Majesty's Government take upon themselves the responsibility of seeing that they receive fair treatment on the termination of their employment.

To come to my last point, another aspect of the same subject is concerned with the interests of those who hold investments in the loans issued by the various municipalities. Here there is a clear case of liabilities which must be taken over by whatever authority assumes responsibility for these areas, and I have little doubt that His Majesty's Government will do what they can to see that these liabilities are honoured not only in the letter but in the spirit. I make that last remark because I have in mind that the value of the Chinese currency has declined a very great deal since these loans were raised, and it would clearly be inequitable if the debts of these municipalities were refunded on a straight dollar-for-dollar basis. I think the Chinese Government have themselves recognized this inequity, in regulations which have been passed since the conclusion of the war with Japan. I do not wish to say any more at this time than to express the view that the bond holders whose money was used to finance the development of what are now healthy and prosperous areas should have fair treatment. I hope that nothing I have said may be misinterpreted as showing anything but the warmest friendliness towards China and the Chinese people. I pray that political unity may soon be established in that war-torn country, and I ask His Majesty's Government to take due note of the points which I have endeavoured to make, with fairness and justness, before your Lordships' House.

5.19 p.m.

LORD TEVIOT

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lindsay, began by saying that he was going to be controversial. I intend to be the same. In the whole of my political life I cannot remember hearing a speech more likely to do harm between two countries than the speech delivered by the noble Lord. I think it is most regrettable. He used rather strong expressions about the Government of a country with whom we fought against the aggressor in the war, and I do hope that nothing that he said in this direction, which comes from the Panty in power in this country, will convey the impression in China that the views expressed by the noble Lord are the views of the present Government. I hope to be reassured on this point by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack when he replies to this debate.

The noble Lord said that he wished the Government would enunciate some policy in China. Ought it not to have been "with China"? Can another Government go and initiate a policy within the country of a friendly power? Surely not. It must be that the Government try to initiate a policy with another Government, the Government of China, but not inside China. The effect of that policy may affect China internally, but certainly not, in the light of what the noble Lord said—

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER

May I just interrupt?

LORD TEVIOT

You are going to reply to the debate.

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER

I ought to have said: "with regard to China."

LORD TEVIOT

Other people want to speak and we have to get on. I was delighted to hear the noble Lord pay a tribute to that great man, Chiang Kai-shek. I met him when I was out there, and I know a great deal about him. To me he is one of the most outstanding men of this century, and may be for all time, in the East. The noble Lord seemed to regret that American arms, or some of the arms supplied by America to the Chinese Government, to Chiang Kai-shek, had been used against the Communists. I do not know whether the noble Lord agrees that a political Party is entitled to have an army and to fight against the Government of its country. I do not think we would stand for that here. I think it is quite conceivable that some of the arms which the Government have would be used against revolutionary action on the part of the Communists in China.

I would like the noble Lord to have this information. He seemed to be very sure that his information was reliable, and I think my information is just as reliable. I believe that Chiang Kai-shek and his Government have avoided fighting with the Communists as far as possible. I know from the very highest authority that that is what Chiang Kai-shek has tried to do. I believe that if he had gone all out to beat up the Communists it would have been easy, but he went on trying, over and over again, to come to terms with them. The noble Lord referred to arms that the Americans had poured into China. They could not pour in arms there for a very long period of the war. As the noble Lord knows, China was completely isolated after the closing of the Burma Road.

I do not know whether he has ever heard of the American General, General Chenault. He was one of the finest characters I met in China. He had a very difficult job. He told me that his greatest difficulty in helping the Chinese to fight was that whenever he wanted to operate with the very limited number of aeroplanes which China had, for reasons which are well known—they had no petrol in the country and therefore had to fly their petrol in over the Hump—he had to send his orders up to General Stilwell and back again into India. By the time he had got what he wanted the opportunity of beating up the Japanese in that particular area had passed.

I will not detain your Lordships very long, but I would like for a moment to go back into the history of the late war in regard to China. When China was looking forward justifiably to help from here and America, what happened? We had disaster after disaster—Pearl Harbour, Singapore and Dunkirk. Did China waver? I believe the terms that the Japanese offered to China then were very remarkable. Just let us for a moment suppose that they had thought: "Well, our allies are all beaten up by the Germans or by the Japanese." Supposing they had said: "We are going to come to a sticky end if we back those people and cling to them." They did not do that; they went on fighting.

It is all very well for the noble Lord to say that a lot of the Chinese army was not really fighting. They were faced with the tremendous army of the Japanese, fully and modernly equipped, but they stopped them. They definitely stopped them over-running the whole of China. As I say, they ignored the peace terms that were offered to them and went on fighting for the cause for which we were fighting. Does that not give one a feeling of great reverence for Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Government, the Kuomintang, who have been so abused by the noble Lord, and who fought through that war and in the end—not without assistance, of course—managed to hold off the Japanese until the Allies recovered themselves and were able to take part in the war and help them? If China had gone in with the Japs, the war might possibly not be over now. I say that we have a debt of gratitude to China which the world should never forget.

The noble Lord criticized China and Chinese internal troubles. Let us not be too sure that we have not got such troubles in our own Empire. What about our troubles in India, our troubles in Palestine and Egypt and our own internal troubles here? The noble Lord referred just now to politicos and bureaucrats as being the things from which China is suffering. Surely that is what we are suffering from here? Before talking about China, as the noble Lord did, I think we have to be a little careful, otherwise I am sure that my intelligent Chinese friends, looking away from China and seeing all that is going on, will say to themselves: "What are these people doing? Are they going in for a totalitarian State or a Fascist State?" Let the noble Lord take himself in thought out there and ponder what the intelligent Chinese might think in view of our present situation.

So far as the internal difficulties of China are concerned, you have there an enormous country with very few communications and very little transport, occupied by very nearly a quarter of the population of the world. I would ask my noble friend with whom I went to China to be lenient with regard to some of these things that have not happened as quickly as we would like, for I feel that the difficulties which the Chinese Government have in rectifying all the evils of the war are bound to be vastly greater than those that our Government have in dealing with matters here, because we are near to the troubles we have got while in China the trouble may be a thousand miles or more away.

I should like to ask the noble Lord, when he replies, to say what sort of Government there would have been in China if there had not been the one organized by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. After all, we did not have during the war what we look upon as quite a legitimate Govern ment; we had to have a more or less selected Government. That is what he had to do; he had to organize a Government to tackle a situation which was one of great gravity, and no doubt mistakes were made, as they were made here. I wonder what the noble Lord suggests the Kuomintang should have done. They had to tackle the situation because they were the official Government of the country, as they are to-day.

That leads me to another point. Over and over again Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has begged the Communists to come in and to take a part in the government of the country. Even with the new Constitution, to which my noble friend who has just sat down has referred, we know that the only Party of any consequence in China which will not come in is the Communist Party. We know quite well that China to-day is in no state to carry out a proper democratic election as we understand it. Ninety per cent. of the people, I believe I am right in saying, are illiterate. China must be educated up to the democratic idea. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek told me himself that his whole idea was to have the most perfect democratic Government possible, and I believe that that is at the back of the minds of all the great men in China whom I met. I saw preparations being made for this; I went to a school where they were educating administrators and civil servants. All that sort of thing is on a very small scale in China, and it has all to be built up.

With regard to the Communist trouble, we have all got it. We have Communists here, and there are Communists in America, France and everywhere. I do not believe that this Communist question in China is anything but part of a world question; it is part and parcel of one menace we have all to face. I believe that the amount of individual freedom in China to-day is probably greater than it is here. It certainly was when I was there. There are not the controls and the restrictions on the individual liberty of the nationals of China that we have here. I want the noble Lord to think on these things. Before we begin to criticize other countries, let us be quite certain there is not a mote or a beam in our eye.

As I said before, how can Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Govern ment of China put up with a Party which will not join the Government and which has an army which is all the time threatening the official Government of the country? I feel that the whole of this debate is most regrettable, and I can only hope that what I have said will show the Chinese that there are some people in this country who realize their difficulties, who are not prejudiced against the Government of China and who admire the wonderful way in which they stood up to an appalling situation. I hope, like my noble friend who spoke previously, that anything I have said will not mean further difficulties for this people for whom I have a great affection.

5.35 p.m.

LORD DERWENT

My Lords, it is with some hesitation that, from the depths of my relative ignorance, I rise to speak on this all-important subject which the noble Lord, Lord Lindsay, has raised. It seemed to me to be so important that I thought I would, all the same, rush in where angels fear to tread. I shall venture to disagree absolutely with him in one essential respect, and that is with regard to the conclusions which are to be drawn from the present situation; but as he has himself described the subject of the debate as highly controversial, perhaps he will not object to that. Before I come to the main part of what I have to say perhaps your Lordships will allow me to make one or two, as I consider them, constructive suggestions. All the information I have received goes to show that at this particular juncture China is a part of the world in which we have a real opportunity to make ourselves useful, but I am afraid (and I hope to demonstrate this too) that if we do not attempt to do it now, in all probability the opportunity may be lost once and for all.

The three spheres in which it seems to me our potential utility still exists are the cultural, the political and the economic. One aspect of the economic side was very ably dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, and I had great pleasure in listening to his remarks. It is with one particular place that I wish to deal. It seems to me sometimes to be forgotten that we still have a perfectly legal foothold in China in a place where our record has, in many respects, been a good one; a place which does not for the moment wish to be returned to its native country, although I imagine that that issue cannot be indefinitely evaded. I refer to Hong Kong. Hong Kong is, as a Times correspondent recently put it, the "shop window of Britain in China," and our behaviour there can do very much to influence the effect of British policy on a larger stage. The first step there, after consultation with the Allies, should doubtless be to determine the future status of the place itself. We could then probably build up a competent and progressive administration which does not exist at this moment and which could make proper contacts with Nanking and instal labour experts, as we have done elsewhere—and very rightly—to assist the Chinese workers to form their necessary labour organizations. Hong Kong University was destroyed during the war, and now, it seems to me, would be the golden moment to re-establish a new and better one (which, I gather, would not be difficult because it was not a very good one) where we could send British scholars to teach. Such a University would exercise a real attraction for the Chinese and might become a real power in China.

There is one further point in that connexion. The broadcasts from the Hong Kong radio station have at present a range of only thirty miles. It seems to me that we are neglecting the opportunity of informing China as a whole about British affairs and the British way of life. We could also, for instance, have a permanent trade exhibition on the lines of "Britain Can Make It," as well as British films, British information centres, British periodicals, and so on. These, it seems to me, should form part, when we can arrange it, of our cultural infiltration—if I may use a word for which I do not care very much.

The situation at Hong Kong seems to be analogous in many ways to that with which we are confronted in the Middle East. We should not forget that Britain was the first to open China to the impact of Western civilization. It is our duty in that case to ensure that by now benefits, and not disadvantages, accrue to the Chinese themselves from this accident in their history. We are—and we should not forget it—no longer feared. We can, all the more easily for that, exert moral and educational influence. It is an established fact that the Chinese would find it not at all satisfactory—I might even say they would find it odious—to become the pawns of Russia or America; and yet it seems that all intelligent Chinese are agreed that they need, as do the Middle East regions, technical and educational assistance from the West, and in particular with regard to such elements as agriculture and coal. The very weakness of our position is, it seems to me, a guarantee that Nanking would see very little harm and a great deal of good in our offering to supply this at the moment.

On the political plane a certain amount of excitement has been caused, and certain hopes raised, by this new Constitution which has been passed by the Political Consultative Council in Nanking, whereby it is ostensibly intended to introduce more liberal elements into the Government from outside the Kuomintang, in which—as the noble Lord, Lord Lindsay, has stressed—the military and feudal elements still seem to exercise far too predominant an influence. But is this Constitution really going to be implemented? The political confusion reigning in China seems to afford no certainty of this, and the Chinese themselves seem to be much more preoccupied with wondering what on earth would happen if President Chiang Kai-shek were to retire from the scene. It is possible that a more liberal Government might make approach to the Communists easier, although personally I doubt this, for reasons which I shall give in a moment.

I think in any case it is our bounden duty to demonstrate that we are willing to follow up what I hope I may be per miffed to call the excellent gesture made by His Majesty's Government in sending Lady Cripps and the Trade Mission. We should help not by direct interference but by giving judicious encouragement behind the scenes to whatever more broad-minded elements sooner or later will be found in the Nanking Government, and, if necessary, try and bring pressure to bear on the President himself to increase liberal representation, in our sense of the word, and to carry out a really practical programme of agrarian relief. We must not forget that four-fifths of China's population is agricultural. There is another point which I consider to be of extreme importance. We must also strengthen our diplomatic and consular representation. Their present work has been doubled, but they are grossly under-staffed. I have it on excellent authority, that we have not one first-class Consul-General in China to-day, and that seems to me to be a scandalous state of affairs.

I have ventured to suggest a variety of ways in which we can still play a part in encouraging the 400,000,000 inhabitants of China to conjugate their millennial civilization with our much younger and more pragmatic one. I should now like to explain why I feel far from optimistic as to our success, unless we devote all our energies to it at this moment, and convinced that if we do not act now we shall not get another chance at all. If I may give a brief historical sketch, I do not think it will weary your Lordships, because it brings out a number of facts which are not generally realized at all, and are, if realized, for some reason completely forgotten most of the time. Modern thought and institutions were, I suppose we can say, introduced into China by the 1911 Revolution, which overthrew the outworn theocratic Manchu dynasty.

The Revolution was sponsored by Sun Yat Sen and other foreign educated intelligentsia and was carried through by the new bourgeoisie that formed the Kuomintang one-Party system. The Western democracies encouraged and adopted this new China, but they alternately bullied or humoured her, according to their needs and rivalries, without evolving any consistent policy with regard to the forces—incalculable ones—which were thus released. These forces were thus left to the mercy of local interpretation and the post-revolutionary warlords. Fate then threw up the Soong family—American educated Christians, if I remember rightly—a very remarkable family related by marriage to Sun Yat Sen and containing in its felicitous number of seven a financial genius by the name of Kung. With Chiang Kai-shek, this very remarkable family have been the dominating element in Chinese political life in recent years, the only one in a positon to maintain it against the opposing forces of Communism and chaos.

Their activities, with the exception of reasonably generous help given during the days of war, have not been supported according to any systematic policy either in the West or East. The Press both in England and the United States have wavered all the time between idealization of a very sympathetic ally and a good deal of exasperation at the expensive friendship of a somewhat mischievous partner. Not so in Moscow. There the Chinese problem was taken in hand from the outset, thoroughly studied, and incorporated into the system of Soviet foreign policy That foreign policy is guided by ideas that are international and not, as is now sometimes thought, national, and based on the Marxian dialectic, by which each social development of a country is labelled in advance. Nationalism is encouraged in both European and Asiatic Russia only on the grounds that the Soviet Union is the first bastion captured of the outer world for the new faith, and the base from which it can be propagated elsewhere. Available documentation shows that this leading principle, this sole aim of Soviet foreign policy, has remained unchanged since the Soviet authority came into power. The methods vary, of course, in their application, according to the stage of Marxist evolution the country has reached, but the Kremlin has not wavered in its purpose and it does not waver now.

In the case of China, the Russian revolutionaries of 1917 made great efforts to guide revolutionary trends there in accordance with those principles. If we may judge by one of Stalin's more brilliant reports to the Comintern, China was, according to Marxist terminology, a "colonial" country; that is, subjected to the exploitation of imperialistic foreign powers in which feudal elements, landowners and bankers were assimilated with the foreign oppressors of the people. Foreign influence would have to be broken and expelled by the nationalism of the rising bourgeoisie. The latter were to be eventually destroyed by the final socialistic revolution, so that the early Kuomintang was viewed favourably. It was represented as a temporary alliance between Communists (a small and weak element at that time, which would have to be boosted as being the seed of the future) and proletarians on the one hand, and bourgeoisie intelligentsia and small land owners on the other. Certain reactionary outgrowths should be thrown out of the Party. Unfortunately these, however anti-foreign in their attitude, refused to surrender what they possessed in the interests of the Communists, and it was they who ended by throwing the Communists out of the Party.

That was a most important milestone in China's history, because it created a schism between the democratically capitalistic-minded bourgeoisie and the Moscow-minded Communists, along the lines followed later by the iron curtain, and the schism has deepened ever since. The Communists, being subjected to serious vexations, then undertook in the end the famous long march north-west through China to the Province of Shensi where they liquidated the existing ruling class—according to the fashionable manner—and where they still are to-day. Their capital Yenan has remained the headquarters of the Communist faith, and the strategic position on the cross roads to China, Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkistan and the Soviet Union, may be said to have been judiciously chosen.

Stalin maintained that in spite of this set—back he had been right, and that the Communists must continue their old role, but from their new position. The German and Japanese aggression, however, turned these countries into Public Enemies No. 1 and No. 2. The victories over them, preferably through the agency of the Anglo-Americans, became all-important. The violent Press attacks of that time against the Kuomintang ceased abruptly, and China was graciously admitted to the honourable position of "Big Fourth." When it became clear in Moscow as early as 1943—I was there at that time, and I think I am accurate about this—that Japan had lost the war, the old former policy was abruptly resumed and the Kuomintang again became the victim of furious qualifications of capitalistic China.

It was to be compelled to broaden its Government by the inclusion of liberal or anti-Fascist elements, certainly not liberal in the sense in which we understand the word—this doubtless in order to persuade China's capitalist supporters to saw off the only branch on which they could sit. At the same time the Shensi Communists were proclaimed as the only real democrats and patriots in China. Seeking a pretext for an attack on Japan, Stalin was given one by the Allies, who thus ended by opening the door for him towards Japan, Korea, and the Chinese Continent. The Russians have profited amply by this development in pursuance of their general aims in Eastern Asia. The result is before us: open clashes in a permanent cam paign, to which all General Marshall's, efforts have been unable to put a stop, and a ruinous war budget for the Kuomintang, which interferes hopelessly with any constructive work it would like to put in hand.

My Lords, I have no desire to play the part of the Fat Boy in the Pickwick Papers and make your flesh creep. It should be borne in mind by the peace-loving that no war is intended or need result, and that it is much more probable that Moscow is only trying out the weaknesses and unpreparedness of its opponents on the spot in order to scare them out of perfectly sound diplomatic positions. These bloody clashes, and the untold misery they bring to the miserable population concerned, are I think, but the fringes of modern diplomatic methods in which we find the usual ways of international intercourse supplemented by more barbarian forms of interference in other people's affairs. In reality, I am sure that no Government to-day can be more fearful of war than the Soviet Government. They may well feel that up to the present day their most far-reaching victories have been diplomatic, beginning with the memorable Moscow Conference in the autumn of 1943, in which they gained so much in the shape of equal rights, not implemented by a clear definition of the common democratic principles involved.

I feel that this particular aspect of the Chinese problem is the most important from an international point of view, because it involves the very principles which are so dear to us and on which all sorts of international relations are based. We have, after all, two Parties opposed: the Kuomintang, representing the Chinese interpretation of capitalistic democratic evolution, and the Reds who, so far as I am concerned, in the final issue are nothing but an outpost of Moscow. Both of them are dependent on foreign supporters, and both are perhaps more Chinese than the former suspect. Nevertheless, my Lords, on the side of capitalistic China there is more to lose by a wavering policy with regard to what is, in the end, an old fundamentally liberal heritage of cultural assets such as are far more easily destroyed than replaced. Their opponents in Yenan and Moscow, on the other hand, are formidably equipped in the diplomatic field. They have a world-wide system of thought-propulsion, and they make promises calculated to rouse the dissatisfied and war-worn masses in China against careless or unsupported authorities.

The position briefly is this. In China to-day we find ourselves confronted with extremely unsettled and dangerous conditions, in which Parties are moved by deeper motives than adjustable political or economic trouble. The fact that ideological differences under remote control are involved seems to indicate that adjustments should proceed on the ideological level, even if this to-day appears to be a precarious and as yet hardly approachable region of diplomatic activity. It is also clear that adjustment can hardly be expected to take the form of compromise unless we should wish to fall into the error of seeking appeasement by surrender.

So far as Communism is concerned, I think we may say that it has its virtues, and that it may yet play a notable part in the evolution of humanity. I have seen the Russians at close quarters, and I should be the last to exaggerate the danger of our brave Russian ally's proselytizing zeal. I am equally fully aware, too, of the apparently augmenting and often distressing difficulties with which they find themselves confronted in the many countries in which they have been in a position to exercise that zeal. Nevertheless, I would venture to point out that by their continued zeal on the diplomatic fronts they will inevitably create further disturbing reactions and violent counter-currents which may indeed be regarded as the result of unwarranted interference in the peaceful and democratic evolution of other nations and of humanity as a whole. The latter being what it is, divided into many nations and communities with different traditions and living conditions, we must, to a certain extent, leave to each community and nation the choice of their creed and the interpretation of it according to their lights. Only then can we expect the different sections of humanity to develop peacefully towards the sort of thing which we recognize as democracy.

In the meantime we must be careful to maintain the freedom of thought inherent to our traditional liberties. We should, as a duty, in friendship to others, make it clear that to-day we still find that mutual respect, precluding—even through indirect channels, such as the Chinese Communists of Yenan—interference in other people's affairs, forms the best basis for orderly and constructive international relations and progress at home. Friendly governments such as the Chinese Government of Nanking should be supported in that spirit and with that purpose, if we do not want to see it gradually undermined, worn out and over-run, like so many others, as the result of monopolistic tendencies in the ideological field. I trust to-day, therefore, that at the end of this rather long and extremely interesting debate, His Majesty's Government will bear this in mind when formulating any plan they may have for the rôle that we now intend to play in China, a country which I do not hesitate to say may very well, if we are not careful, biome the Poland of the Far East.

5.58 p.m.

THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH

My Lords, I have not the advantage of other speakers in having a first-hand knowledge of the Chinese problem, but in excuse for my speaking I would say that two years of my life were spent in the United States, and I know with what very deep concern the Americans view the Chinese situation. I do not feel that this debate should conclude without a very earnest plea going forth from this House that we should co-ordinate our policy with that of America. In the very interesting speech of the noble Lord, Lord Lindsay, there were continual allusions to American armament of Chinese troops. I believe it to be the case that no assistance has been given to forces of the National Government since last August, and that it is very doubtful indeed if more assistance will be given. As regards arms sent during the war, we should recall that the policy of arming the Chinese was the outcome of the Cairo conference, for which we have complete responsibility, and this arming might, therefore, be described as Anglo-American arming.

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Lindsay of Birker, stressed the great importance of consultations between the British and American and, I would add, the Canadian Governments, on the subject of China. I trust—and I expect to be told—that such consultations do take place. I have no doubt that we have Far Eastern experts in Washington and that they are in touch with the State Department. I cannot believe that that is a matter that has been in any way neglected. Certainly, any possible consultation with America would be wise. I regret that the noble Lord made a suggestion that we should send a Mission to the Chinese Communists. That is a suggestion which, as he well knows, is exceedingly unlikely to be accepted by the American Government. I regret that the suggestion has been made, because I, and he as well, can well imagine the misinterpretation that may be given to it in certain sections of the American Press. I would, further, very much regret any dealings with the Chinese Communist Party in their present mood.

The noble Lord told us that his information was about a year old. I think it is quite evident from General Marshall's statement: that the Chinese Communists, whatever virtues they may have possessed last February, have very much degenerated to-day. In the first place, I would allude to the extreme irresponsibility which they are showing in the destruction of communications. This is a matter to which General Marshall calls attention I would also briefly mention another matter which has not so far, I think, been introduced into this debate. I am going to quote a letter written by a very eminent and important Chinese, Cardinal Tien, Archbishop of Pekin. He is the first member of the Chinese race to be elevated to the Sacred College, and I think his opinions deserve respect. His letter appeared in a recent issue of an American publication, and it contains this passage: At present, throughout Northern China, our Catholic missions are facing a great crisis. Communism and the inflation are the causes. The fact is that our missionaries and Christians are undergoing a persecution, varying in intensity, in all areas occupied by the Communists Many priests and nuns have been imprisoned and maltreated by those enemies of our holy religion. Some of our apostolic workers have already died the heroic death of martyrs at the hands of the Reds, and at present, in one of our Shanghai missions, an aged Bishop is languishing at the point of death in a Communist prison. Whatever virtues the Communist Party in China may have possessed at one time, and however much the Communist element may have been accompanied by fellow-travellers imbued with the most liberal and excellent motives, I think we must fairly say that they are no longer a Party with whom His Majesty's Government can wisely, or with dignity, have any dealings.

6.4 p.m.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

My Lords, I rise to make, quite briefly, a few concluding observations on the extremely interesting debate that has taken place this afternoon. I am quite certain that no one in any part of the House will corn-plain of the noble Lord, Lord Lindsay, having raised this discussion upon the situation in China and on our relationship with that great country. The story of Anglo-Chinese relations is, as your Lordships all know, a very long one, and, on the whole, I think, an extremely happy one. China has long been among the best friends and best customers of this country. Moreover, there is, I think, something about the Chinese character, its wisdom, its patience, its tolerance and its capacity for taking the long view, which is extremely sympathetic to the British mind.

I have noticed, and I am sure that others of your Lordships have done the same, that it is very rare to find an Englishman who has spent any time in China who does not come back with a deep and abiding affection for the Chinese people. Moreover, China now—and it is well to remember this—is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. For every reason, therefore, national and international, it must, I should have thought be a major object of British policy to see China united, stable and prosperous, and it is certainly one of our main regrets at the present time to see the peoples of this great and ancient nation torn by continuing dissensions.

The causes of the present Chinese troubles, as always in such cases, are, no doubt, many and various. We have had several able accounts of recent Chinese history, notably from Lord Lindsay and Lord Derwent, who has just sat down. I thought that it was interesting to note that there was hardly a single point in common between the two accounts of these same events. It is a remarkable commentary upon the wide diversity of historical fact. I do not propose to enter the fray and give yet a third account. Therefore, I merely say, quite briefly, that the causes appear to be both economic and political and to arise very largely from the long and devastating war in which China has been engaged with Japan. And there is, in addition, an important factor, to which I think that perhaps we in the Western world give too little account, and which, in fact, has not been mentioned at all this afternoon. As was made clear in the famous Lytton Report on Manchuria, there was in the days of the Empire—at least if I remember the Report aright—no national spirit of patriotism in China in the sense in which we understand it here. There was a personal loyalty to the Emperor, and that was the whole basis of Chinese unity. When the Emperor disappeared, there disappeared with him the unity of China. That unity has had to be recreated on a different basis. And this, as your Lordships all know, has proved a long and very difficult task, which has not yet been surmounted.

During recent years, as we have been told this afternoon, recognition and support have been given by successive British Governments to the Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There has been a suggestion in some quarters—I think it was apparent in the speech of Lord Lindsay—that we are, at the present time, backing the wrong horse, and that the Communist Party in China has provided a better and more efficient and more responsible réegime. That is the suggestion, as I understand it. But I hardly think—and I was very glad to see that Lord Lindsay himself shares this view—that anyone who looks back over the war years will regret the line that we have taken during that crucial period. At the time when the Japanese invasion of China began and when, as I think has been pointed out to-day, there was a very real danger that China would lie prostrate before the feet of a conqueror, it was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, that great warrior leader, who came out as the leader of resistance. To him, whatever may be said about his réegime now in any quarter, is mainly due the fact that China is free to-day. Clearly, we were right, from every point of view, to give him all the assistance in our power. Indeed, I think we should have been eternally disgraced if we had not done so.

But, unhappily, the defeat of Japan has not ended China's troubles. As a result of this unhappy conflict now going on between the Nanking Government and the Chinese Communist Party, new divisions have been created. To-day—and we must face the fact—for the moment at any rate, unity seems as far off as ever. The question is—and it must affect all of us—what should be the attitude of Great Britain in this new situation? That really has been the purpose, as I understand it, of the noble Lord in raising this debate. The noble Lord himself, if I understood him aright, would like His Majesty's Government to recognize the Communist Party as representing a large section of the Chinese nation.

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER

May I just put a point? I may have said so, but what I should like is to make it clear that we might be prepared to do so if the other Parties did not meet them. I only want us to say that in the last resort we might be prepared so to recognize that Government. I do not want us to go out and do it now, but my information is that the strength of the reaction is based on the assumption that this will never be done. I want to make it quite clear that unless the Kuomintang are more reasonable and make what are considered to be possible terms, we will, in the last resort, recognize the Yenan Government.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

That is practically equivalent to recognizing them, so far as I can see. The noble Lord said he thought that that would be good international law, and I can well believe that precedents could be found for action of that kind. But I am reminded of the Spanish Civil War. Would the noble Lord, Lord Lindsay, have supported the recognition of General Franco? Let me remind him of the facts of that position. If I remember aright—I am speaking without the book and it is a good many years ago now—the Spanish Government polled only just over 50 per cent. of the votes at the General Election which preceded the outbreak of that civil war; and presumably General Franco represented the other 50 per cent.

There were some people in this country who, in those circumstances and in view of the fact that General Franco represented a considerable section of the Spanish nation, would have liked to see us recognize him. I was at that time at the Foreign Office, and I was all against recognition: I was all against intervention in the war on either side. I was a perfectly genuine non-interventionist because I thought that ultimately the Spanish people must settle their own affairs for themselves and that they would resent outside interference. Events, I believe, have proved that view to be the correct one. The intervention of Germany and Italy cm one side and of Russia on the other side merely lengthened the Spanish civil war and increased the suffering of the Spanish people. Although this is no doubt not an exact analogy, I am bound to confess that there are similarities in the position of Spain at that time and of China to-day, and I cannot believe that the policy which the noble Lord advocated to-day would, as he hoped, tend to shorten the conflict in China.

Nor if I may say so, with very real deference; was I greatly impressed by the suggestion of the noble Lord that Britain, the United States, and Russia should meet together to decide the future of China. I can imagine nothing more calculated to offend, and offend most bitterly and very naturally, the pride of the Chinese people. China is one of the Big Five of the United Nations. It is one of the great Powers, and how could she accept without humiliation a proposal of that kind.

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER

I did not, for a moment, use the words "to decide the future of China". I hoped that the three nations I mentioned might meet to decide their policy towards her. That is not the same thing.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

I am very sorry I misrepresented the noble Lord. It was not my intention. But I repeat that my, difficulty in accepting his suggestion is that it does appear to indicate what I would call a patronising attitude on the part of the other great Powers. If the question of the present dissensions in China had an international flavour, then no doubt it would have to be discussed by the United Nations themselves. But so long as it remains an internal affair of China, I do not feel that action of that kind, either by the United Nations or by the great Powers, would be practicable or desirable. Indeed, I am bound to say that I disagree entirely with the policy which was put forward by the noble Lord. I respect his views very much, but I do not agree with his policy.

I feel we should be wise to keep ourselves entirely aloof from anything which could be considered as intervention in China's internal affairs. There is always the danger that intervention on one side or the other in the internal affairs of a great nation only results in perpetuating the existing cleavages. Both sides in the conflict hang on, relying on outside support. There is also the very real danger that a proud people like the Chinese would deeply resent outside interference and that the traditional friendship between this country and China might be seriously jeopardized. Finally, there is the danger that ultimately there would be an acute anti-foreign feeling stimulated throughout the country, as has happened only too often in the past.

Our position vis-à-vis China surely is that we are old, commercial friends of that country. We have no territorial or political ambitions there. We are concerned only with the healthy commercial development of the country, from which both the Chinese people and ourselves would benefit. We do, of course, want to see the end of these present most melancholy divisions. For we believe profoundly that if a stable Government could only be set up through the length and breadth of China, Chinese industry and Chinese resilience would soon restore her fortunes. In short, the happiness and prosperity of the people of China and our own commercial interests are our sole concern there. It is for those reasons that we urgently desire to see the end of the present strife.

I hope His Majesty's Government will continue to make that clear to all Parties alike in China. It does not matter how often they say that to them. But I hope we shall not go any further and advocate intervention in their internal affairs. At the same time, as old friends of the Chinese people I feel we may fairly ask the Nanking Government to make some gesture on their side. It has been mentioned this afternoon—I think by the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn—that there is a question of a new commercial treaty between the two countries. I would like to ask the Lord Chancellor what is the exact position regarding that treaty. We have been told, I do not know how correctly, that the treaty is actually under negotiation. How do matters now stand? The United States, as we have heard, has already concluded a treaty with the Nanking Government which gives her very considerable commercial advantages. That treaty was signed so far back as November last. Why are our negotiations lagging behind? Is the fault with us, or with Nanking? If the Nanking Government is responsible, I would beg them, as an old friend of China myself, to recognize that the present sympathy of the British people must inevitably be chilled if there is not forthcoming a similar attitude on their side. We may fairly hope, and fairly ask, that more rapid progress should be made in the negotiation of this treaty.

In conclusion, there is just one observation I would make of general application, to His Majesty's Government. I hope very much that they realize that our relations with China, as with other nations, depend upon the prestige and authority which we enjoy in the world. Two years ago, at the end of the war, our name stood probably higher than at any time in our history. To-day, less friendly elements in the United States are beginning to talk of the United States, Russia and Great Britain as the "Big Two-and-a-half"; and we are the half.

What is the reason for this sad change in our position in the world? I am afraid it is quite a simple one. It is just this. Ever since they came into office—this is controversial, but I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me for saying what I feel most sincerely—this present Government have, to all appearances, pursued a policy of undignified scuttle from one country after another, without ensuring, before leaving, according to our past traditions, that the countries concerned are ready to take over the trust which we are surrendering. We are scuttling out of India; we are scuttling out of Burma; we are abandoning the defence of the Suez Canal. We have given the impression, or the Government have given the impression—perhaps they will not ask me to take a share in this responsibility—that this country is clearing out and abandoning her responsibilities both to the local peoples and the world, wherever she can.

In these circumstances, I do not think that it is surprising that our prestige has fallen in the estimation of other nations, and I can well conceive the effect which this spectacle has on neighbouring countries. So long as that policy continues, so long, I believe, will our position in relation to these other countries continue to deteriorate. I do, therefore, beg His Majesty's Government, in the foreign field, to pluck up greater courage and show a little spirit. We are a great nation. We are probably still, in wisdom and experience if not in size, the greatest nation in the world. Let us show this in out attitude towards the many problems with which we are faced, and I believe we shall regain the confidence and esteem of our friends—and there are very many—not only in China but throughout the world.

6.25 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT JOWITT)

My Lords, if I may say so, I think it is a little unfortunate that at the very tail end of a most interesting debate on China we should have had dragged in the question of our foreign policy throughout the world, and in particular have reference made to what is described—quite inaccurately—as a policy of scuttle. If I were to deal, or attempt to deal, with any such allegation, the noble Viscount who has just spoken must know quite well that I should have to embark upon a discussion on the various countries to which he referred—India, Burma, and the Suez Canal. Each one of them would require treatment for something like a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes. It is impossible that I should attempt to deal with any of them.

I may, however, tell the noble Lord this. Of course this country is in some difficulties to-day which I am certain will prove to be temporary difficulties. We are no longer in a position where we can advance loans to foreign countries. We cannot send coal to those countries that desire it. But as soon as we have placed things right at home, which by hard work and energy we shall do, we shall once more be in a position where we can resume our old attitude with regard to those matters. I pass these matters by merely to say that I repudiate the suggestions altogether, and I think it is a pity that in this context and at this time they were ever made.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

The noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, is, of course, perfectly entitled to feel that those matters which I mentioned went a little wide of the subject of to-day's debate, but he is surely not entitled to say that there is no connexion between my remarks and the substance of to-day's debate. I feel strongly that our relations with foreign countries are being bedevilled by the causes which I have described.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The fact that the reputation of a Government affects its foreign policy everywhere is quite obvious. Nevertheless, as I said before, I think it is a pity that these matters were dragged into what was, I thought, otherwise a very interesting speech.

I entirely agree with what the noble Lord said about the relationship of this country and China. I believe that deep down in his heart every Englishman has a profound regard for China and the Chinese; a recognition of what we owe to their culture and a sense of humiliation when we consider the age of their culture as compared with ours—truly a culture half as old as time. The desire of this country is to see once more a prosperous, happy, and unified China. I, too, was impressed as the noble Lord who has just spoken was impressed, with the vast display of erudition which has come from all quarters of the House, but, like him, I was left with the impression of the truth of the old adage that "truth is many sided." I do not propose to go into these matters more than I can help, and, indeed, in view of what was claimed to be the controversial nature of the statements, I think, like Agag of old, that I had better walk a little delicately. That is what I propose to do.

It is, however, odd that no reference has been made to the Joint Declaration by the three Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December, 1945, because it is, after all, by that Declaration that we are bound, and it is to that Declaration that we adhere. May I remind your Lordships what that Declaration was, and will your Lordships notice that it falls into four parts? The Declaration stated that the three Foreign Secretaries were … in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic: elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife, and they reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs Of China. By those four propositions we are bound, and we desire to be bound.

May I take the first of them—"the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government"? This, of course, implied our continued recognition of the Chinese National Government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the legal Government of China, and our support of the efforts of that Government to achieve unity and democracy. This has been and is our policy. It is quite untrue to say, as I have sometimes heard said, although I have not heard it said to-day, that we desire to see a disunited China. Our desire is exactly the opposite, to see a strong, united and democratic China taking her rightful place as one of the leading nations in the whole world. But if we want to see China a great democracy and truly democratic, it follows that she must not be subject to totalitarian rule imposed by any one clique or Party, and therefore we would welcome the fulfilment of that part of the Moscow Declaration with regard to the "broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government."

Great efforts have been made during the past year to bring into being such a broad-based Government. On behalf of His Majesty's Government I should like here to pay a sincere tribute to the patient and untiring efforts of that great American, General Marshall. It is not his fault that his attempts, at reconciliation have been unfruitful. Your Lordships will have seen from his published statement how exceedingly difficult his task has been. He has certainly done everything he can to bring some agreement between the two Chinese factions. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that such agreement may still be possible and will do everything they can to help in bringing about such agreement.

I do not intend to follow the negotiations of the past year, or to assess the merits or allocate the blame, in view of the many conflicting statements which have been made in this debate to-day, but I do deplore, with General Marshall, the deep-rooted, mutual suspicion and distrust with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other. That, as General Marshall has said, has proved to be the principal obstacle to peace. I am afraid I always distrust labels. People are apt to label somebody with a particular ticket and to say that that is finished. It is not at all. All my political life I have done the best I can to steer clear of labels. I feel most earnestly that, leaving out the extremists of the two sides—because there are extremists on both sides—the sensible men of the middle may find some road upon which they can travel together.

The third aspect of the Moscow Declaration called for a cessation of civil strife in China. An armistice arranged by General Marshall only a short time ago proved unfortunately to be short lived and, as we all know, sporadic fighting is going on in various parts of Northern China and may easily still further increase. It is wholly lamentable and deplorable that a country which has gone through the terrible experiences which China has gone through, which stood up so bravely to the invasion by the Japanese in 1937 and which needs more than any other country in the world the blessings of peace, should still be torn by this internal strife. Surely one may appeal to both sides, to all men of good will of all Parties, to come together and do the best they possibly can in the interests of that great country.

In some quarters it has been suggested that because of the support of the United States Government in China, His Majesty's Government have been encouraging a perpetuation of the civil war in that country. Let me say that His Majesty's Government do not follow blindly the policy of any foreign Government. We look at each problem as it [...]ects us from our point of view. It is true that in China our general aims happen to be the same as those of the United States. They are to do business and conduct relations with a strong, stable Government which can honour its obligations and which is based on a broad democratic basis. Beyond that we have not committed ourselves. It is not for us to explain or to justify the policy of the United States Government in China. That policy has been authoritatively expressed by the statement issued by President Truman on December 18, when he said with regard to the American attitude on the Chinese Civil War, as he called it: We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. While avoiding the involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country. That is the policy of the United States authoritatively declared, and that is the same policy that His Majesty's Government wish to pursue.

So far as the supply of arms to China is concerned, it is certainly the fact that we are sending nothing, and I am informed that no war materials have been supplied to China from the United States for several months past. We are pledged under the Moscow Declaration not to interfere in Chinese internal affairs, and we shall continue to adhere to that pledge. We must avoid, as the noble Viscount who spoke last said, giving the impression of being patronising to a very great people. In the meantime we welcome the steps taken by the Chinese National Government under Chiang Kai-shek to terminate one-Party rule and to inaugurate constitutional government. A Constitution which follows much the same lines as agreed upon at the All-Party Political Consultative Conference in January, 1946, was promulgated on January 1, 1947, and is due to come into force next Christmas Day.

Meanwhile, an interim Government is to be formed and will, again in accordance with the recommendations of the Political Consultative Conference, be enlarged to include liberal democratic elements, and I understand that a number of seats will be left vacant for members of the Communist Party think it is unfortunate that the Communists, who accepted the decisions of the Political Consultative Conference, should have so far refused to associate themselves with the constitutional developments which implement those decisions. I earnestly hope in the national interest that they will not reject this further opportunity to participate in a representative, democratic government of China, thus bringing unity and peace to that country and its people, and I earnestly hope that the other Parties, for their part, will make it easy and possible for the Communists to come in.

President Truman has rightly said, in describing the difficulties of General Marshall's mission, that halting civil strife, broadening the base of the Chinese Government, and bringing about a united, democratic China are tasks for the Chinese themselves. I hope that American efforts at mediation will continue. His Majesty's Government will give all possible moral support for this purpose both to the United States Government and to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's National Government. Moral support may not sound a very effective weapon in helping to solve the unhappy dispute which now afflicts China; but our prestige in China stands high, and I venture to think that this country's age-long adherence to democracy, our historical position in the Far East and the world as a whole, and, above all, our long experience and sympathy of China and the Chinese, combine to give us an influence with the Chinese Government and people which can be usefully brought to bear in helping China to get out of her difficulties.

May I now turn to consider the British position in China. As has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, the Treaty of 1943 involved, and inevitably involved, the relinquishment of the extra territorial rights which we had enjoyed. That was, as the noble Lord said, right; that was, as he said, inevitable. We have to take tip the threads from there. Our merchants are now operating under Chinese administration in what were formerly foreign-administered Settlements and Concessions, and under Chinese law throughout China. They are having to re-adapt themselves and their methods to the new conditions. They have to face many difficulties which are, unfortunately, inseparable from the present unsettled state of affairs in China. Trade is hampered by the most fantastic inflation and by economic strain. It is hopeless to think you can get a full recovery until there is a cessation of this civil war which is straining Chinese economic resources and, through interruption of communications, preventing the free flow of the commodities which represent China's life-blood. Until that problem is solved, trade in China must inevitably be very seriously handicapped.

There have been delays in the recovery of British properties. We have tried, and we shall continue to try, to see that this process of handing over is speeded up as far as posible. In the interests of the rehabilitation of the world, His Majesty's Government will give all possible support to British trade to re-establish its position in China and to supply what China needs. A Trade Mission has recently been visiting China and its report is now awaited. When it appears, we shall be in a better position to assess the possibilities for the future and to formulate whatever steps may be necessary for the development of what is undoubtedly a field in which our trade can operate to the great mutual advantage of the two countries.

Meanwhile, as your Lordships have been told, a commercial treaty is at present under negotiation between the Chinese and British Governments. We have presented our draft and a Chinese counter-draft has now been seen and is under consideration. The noble Viscount, the Leader of the Opposition, might like to know that our draft was presented in June, 1946, and that it was not until this very month that we received the Chinese counter-draft. So there does seem to have been some delay, although I am not seeking at the moment to assess the blame. We shall do the very best we can under that treaty to secure satisfactory rights for our merchants.

In answer to the question which the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, put in a speech which obviously indicated his friendliness to China, may I say that it is, of course, of the first importance to our trade that there should be freedom for British ships to call at different ports and to navigate the Yang-tse. British shipping companies in particular, and British traders in general in China, have, as he said, a very honourable record, and the restoration of their trade would be a great advantage to China and to this country. We shall do what we can to see that we are given those shipping rights to which the noble Lord referred.

Then he asked about the restoration of British properties. As I have already said, we are going to do the best we can to see that this process is speeded up. He asked me whether we would insist upon the rendition of all British properties to their rightful owners as a prerequisite to the signing of a treaty. The noble Lord must remember that there are always two parties to a treaty and that it is very unwise for one of them to insist upon prerequisite conditions lest the other will not give them. We shall, however, certainly do the best we can to secure the terms for which he has asked and which I think are fair.

Then he asked me about the obligations arising out of the Settlements. It is provided under Article 4 of the 1943 Treaty for the relinquishment of the extra-territorial rights that the Chinese Government will make provision for the assumption and discharge of the official obligations and liabilities of the International Settlements and Concessions. We regard these obligations and liabilities as including the grant of fair treatment to the former British employees of the municipal councils concerned on the termination of their employment, and His Majesty's Government will do their best to ensure in the negotiations now in progress with the Chinese Government that such fair treatment is obtained.

With regard to the treatment of the bondholders, obviously the considerations which he has put forward have great force and they will be borne in mind by His Majesty's Government, who will do what they can to secure fair treatment, not only in the letter but also in the spirit, for those bondholders.

That really finishes all I have to say. In dealing with a difficult and delicate subject I have thought it wise to adhere much more closely than I generally do to that which I had made up my mind to say. I would conclude with the sentiment I have already expressed. I do not believe you will get prosperity in the world so long as you have such large sections of the world lying under these unhappy conditions of civil war and internecine strife. I do not believe you can start to bind up the wounds which China has so long endured unless all parties in China learn the blessings of tolerance. I can only say, as I have said, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that while rigidly adhering to our decision not to interfere in Chinese affairs, which are matters for the Chinese, we earnestly hope that there may soon be a happy issue out of these afflictions, and that we will do everything which lies in our power to assist anyone in bringing that about.

6.48 p.m.

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER

My Lords, I will not, at this late hour, try to answer the debate, but I think I am bound to answer an appeal from the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, who took me to task, and quite rightly, for talking about policy in China. I should not have said that; I meant policy in regard to China. I apologize for that statement. I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, to believe me when I say that I very much agree with what he has said about the noble part played by China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in saving world civilization, for that is what it comes to. I would also ask him to believe me when I say that it was with the greatest reluctance that I slowly came, on information from sources which I trust and in which I believe, to the opinions I hold now, and which I felt I had to express to-day. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, must have felt—and I think with some justice—that what I said was ungracious. I did not mean it to be ungracious, and I hope he will believe me when I say that.

May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, that when he talks about the Chinese Communists as though they were a Party in a position corresponding in the very least to the position of any other Communists in any other part of the world—I do not want to be rude—he is assuming something which seems to bear no relation whatsoever to the facts. They are not a Party; they are people who hold—and have held for many years—and govern a large portion of China. They have never been under Chiang Kai-shek. May I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, that although the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, found nothing between us, I found it difficult to see any difference, except in regard to the machinations of Russia; and they are not so very different. I think the Russians are capable of it, but in this case I do not think they have done it, partly because I think the Chinese Communists are not of the kind he describes.

I would end by saying this. I have no method for implementing my practical suggestions and perhaps I ought not to have made them. I made them because I think the position is much more desperate than some noble Lords seem to realize, and I think that it is a mistake to say there is peace when there is no peace. I have in mind the remarks made by the prophet Isaiah about people who plaster walls. How can we support the efforts of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to produce democracy when he does not make any efforts, and never has? I do not think that he believes in it. I am very grateful to noble Lords for taking part in this debate and I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack for his reply.

May I be allowed to say to the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, that except towards the end of his speech, when my irresponsibility seemed to be infectious, my remarks seemed worth while because they have called from him that very statesmanlike speech which I admired immensely. I think it is probably right that we leave China, but the trouble is that China has not been left alone. It was after the end of the war that the interference came, and not during the war. After the war China was given divisions and armed, and that has caused the muddle.

Now that America is no longer going to help China—I hope that the Kuomintang Government will realize that they are not to go on being helped—non-interference may be the best way of putting some sense and toleration into their heads. I do not change my views about the Kuomintang Government. We must realize that the situation is a very serious situation and we want to help China in every way we can. And when I say China, I mean the whole of China; not the Communists rather than the Kuomintang, or the Kuomintang rather than the Communists. I am not wise enough, and have not enough knowledge of the situation, to know how it should be done. I do not think it does harm to say controversial things, because it brings out these policies. I therefore beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.