INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

HL Deb 30 October 1946 vol 143 cc851-918

2.28 p.m.

LORD ALTRINCHAM had given Notice that he would call attention to the international situation; and also move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am sure all your Lordships will share with me deep regret that our leader, the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, is unable to be in his place to-day to move the Motion that stands in his name. I am glad to say that he is not seriously ill and hopes to be back next week. But inasmuch as the noble Viscount cannot be here to-day I am moving the Motion in his place at his request. My sense of responsibility in doing so, which is very great, is lightened by the fact that I have been able to discuss the matter with the noble Viscount and that I at least have his approval for the selection of topics with which I shall deal out of the very varied field which is open to us, and also for the broad purport of any remarks which I may have to make.

There is much material for a debate on foreign affairs at the present moment. The Foreign Secretary has recently given a massive and exhaustive review in another place. I do not propose to follow him on that remarkable tour de raison, but to concentrate on what was really the main topic of his speech, which was Germany. But before I come to Germany I would like to say a word about one or two other things which were either not mentioned by the Foreign Secretary or are raised by events which have occurred since the date of his speech. The first of those is the Egyptian negotiations, or whatever they are to be called. I must from this side of the House express the greatest anxiety about the confusion which seems to have entered into these discussions during the last few days, for reasons which we do not understand. It is difficult to grasp the distinction which is apparently drawn between conversations and negotiations, more particularly since the Egyptian Prime Minister, Sidky Pasha, does not appear to appreciate it himself. I do not quite know what that distinction means, if initialled documents have passed, as we are told they have passed; but I need hardly tell the noble Leader of the House that we accept the Prime Minister's assurances on the general purport of all these discussions absolutely.

While doing that, I desire only to emphasize two points. The first is in regard to the Sudan. It is obviously the case that the Egyptian Crown has a claim to equal status in the Sudan, which is a condominium, and it is equally true that Egypt has been responsible for very considerable expenditure in the Sudan, particularly in the original reconquest of it. Both those considerations, apart from propinquity and history, give Egypt a very solid claim to recognition as an equal partner in the condominium. But we have spent life and treasure too; we were responsible—it is true we had Egyptian help, but in the main we were responsible—for the original reconquest of the Sudan from the Mahdi. We have been responsible for its steady rehabilitation over a long period of years and we were responsible for its defence in the war from which we have just emerged—a defence which we conducted entirely at the expense of the British Empire, and not of Egypt, in treasure and in life. We are linked to the Sudan by a responsibility from which we cannot abdicate until the Sudan itself, by the wish of its inhabitants, shows its readiness for self-government. I am glad, therefore, that the Prime Minister has emphasized that responsibility. On this side, we count on no departure from that principle in whatever may be arranged.

The other point concerns what I would rather call the security of the Isthmus of Suez than the security of Egypt—at any rate, the great question of Egyptian defence which we have been, discussing with the Egyptian Government. Manifestly that can never be possible for Egypt alone. Egypt can no more guarantee her own security without the aid of friends than Britain can guarantee her own security without the aid of friends. We are in exactly the same position. Britain used to be cut off from danger by the sea, but she is no longer cut off by the sea—at any rate to the same extent. Egypt used to be cut off from danger by the sands, but she is no longer cut off by the sands—at any rate to the same extent. The position of Egypt and the position of this country are very much alike. I know that in Egypt great confidence is placed in the security given by the United Nations Organization, but I do not think responsible people at this moment need any warning that the United Nations Organization in still in its infancy. Nor, I think, do they need to be told that the ultimate value of that Organization—the security which it ultimately will give to any people—will depend upon what each people puts into it. It is not going to be an automatic safeguard for Britain in Europe, for Egypt in the Middle East, or for any other nation in any part of the earth. It will depend upon the contribution which any nation is itself prepared to make. The Charter provides for and enjoins the establishment of regional security systems, and I have always believed that that is the right method for securing the Isthmus of Suez against aggressive attack. All the Arab States share with us a vital interest in working out such a system of regional security.

I hope that in due course the negotiations may take that broader scope and provide for a regional security system in partnership between the Arab States and ourselves as well as Egypt, which would be in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, and indeed enjoined by it. In the meantime, I must emphasize that we rely upon the declaration made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in another place on May 24. May I read his words? He was speaking in Committee in another place: There is one thing on which I will give the Committee an assurance. I will be no party to leaving a vacuum. There must not be a vacuum. If the Egyptian Government try to force a situation in which there is a vacuum—meaning that we have gone and that there is nothing there for security instead, regional defence or other organization—to that: I can never agree. That declaration of the Foreign Secretary is of great importance and a reassurance to us. We know that he is a man of his word and we are sure that there will be no departure from that.

Now a word about Palestine—not about Palestine itself or about the solution we are seeking there, because I do not think this is a convenient moment at which to discuss that. I only want to raise one point which is germane to a discussion of foreign affairs, and that is the position of the displaced persons in Europe, and particularly of the displaced Jewish population, which the Anglo-American Committee estimated amounted to 500,000 and which may indeed amount to more. I am sure you will all agree that our duty to those persons is very great. I am sure you will also agree that there is no possibility, whatever the form of the solution in Palestine, of providing for more than a small proportion of them in the Holy Land—no prospect whatever. It is, therefore, a most urgent matter, a duty incumbent upon the civilized Christian States, to see that something is done for these displaced persons who are at present for the most part languishing in what are called concentration or passage camps and who have no prospect before them—no idea of what the future holds for them.

I must say that I welcome in this respect signs of initiative by the United States Government. We have been told by the President that he is prepared to make proposals to the coming Congress, and I understand that inquiries are being made of other Governments by the State Department in America. What I would like to ask is whether we are acting vigorously too, because the responsibility on us is very great and action upon this subject has been delayed month after month. It is a terribly urgent human problem and a solution of it is essential to any workable compromise in the Middle East. In this as in everything else, Anglo-American co-operation is indispensable to peace. I will only say one other thing about the Palestine issue, which is indeed only a repetition of what was said on his own behalf by the Leader of my Party in another place. On this matter all Parties are divided and, as he did, I will speak for myself. I am bound to say that if the United States continues to claim to dictate a policy for immigration into Palestine regardless of the facts while we bear the brunt, then the only course for us is to return the Mandate to the United Nations and to ask them to take action upon it. I hate abdication. I should like to see us carrying on with the great task which we undertook. I believe it still to be possible, provided we get the absolutely essential international agreement and support. But it is wrong to sacrifice British lives on what other Powers will have made an impossible task.

Now I come to Germany. I should like to say in the first place that I have no intention whatever of trenching on next week's debate. There is to be a debate on Germany next week, and I presume that in that debate there will be very full treatment of our responsibilities in the British zone in Germany and other questions relating to it. What I propose to discuss today—and it is highly germane to a debate on foreign affairs—is the international aspect of our present responsibilities in Germany. There is no doubt that the situation in Germany is deteriorating very rapidly and that our Government, our country, and our people have been losing heavily and have been sacrificing at a deplorable rate the confidence which they once held. All observers report that, and it is reported in an official document which has just been published, the Report from the Select Committee on Estimates to another place, which sent a sub-committee to Germany, who took evidence there, all of which is published and made into the most factual and impressive report. There can be no Party difference over this, since the Select Committee itself reflects the proportion of Parties in another place, and the sub-committee which went to Germany contained a majority of the supporters of His Majesty's Government.

The Committee concluded that the following problems must be immediately faced:

1. "(a) the economic reintegration of the zones of occupation;
2. (b) the formulation of a firm, long-term policy for the whole of Germany, or, in default of the reintegration of the zones, the formulation of such a policy for the British 856 zone and such other zones as may be brought within the framework of a single economy;
3. (c) the breaking of the present vicious circle—shortage of food, shortage of coal, shortage of consumer goods."

Now a good deal of these recommendations comes within the limitations which I have imposed upon myself, but a great part of it has an international bearing and it is that part of it which I wish to discuss.

The future of Germany is the most crucial issue facing us in international affairs. It is not only the ultimate test, but the immediate and most certain test of the possibility of a better understanding between the great Powers. Fortunately, there are many recent utterances which can be quoted to show that the need is appreciated amongst all the interested major Governments. We have had more than one remarkable statement from Mr. Byrnes, the American Secretary of State; we have had the very careful reference to the subject at considerable length in our own Secretary of State's speech, and we have now the second reply to a questionnaire which Prime Minister Stalin has put out.

In the near future the Foreign Secretary goes to represent us at a Conference of Foreign Ministers on Germany, and I need hardly say that from this side of the House we warmly wish him success. But in the meantime, and in anticipation, it is, I think, important to show on what principles and for what broad purposes and ideals we on these Benches give him our support. I would make one preliminary remark. In his speech in another place last week the Foreign Secretary protested—very rightly I think—against any courting of Germany. I should like to quote his words. He said this: It is extremely distasteful to see victorious nations courting a defeated enemy for ideological reasons. I think all your Lordships will agree with that. The sooner we can get away from this, and consider objectively what is demanded by justice and by the long-term interests of Europe and the world, the better it will be for ourselves and for Germany as well. Now we agree absolutely with the Foreign Secretary that there can be no question of allowing Germany to figure as a balancing factor in a line-up of military strength, and if any suspicion exists on that score we should like to see it dispelled at once. Such an idea would, I think, be hateful to us all.

I think all the Powers, of Europe are agreed upon the complete disarmament of Germany. The last time that we attempted it we did net set to work with much efficiency or meet with great success, but on that occasion we had not the support of the United States, and we had not the support of Russia. This time we have the American offer, a definite undertaking, not to dissociate itself from the maintenance of disarmament in Germany and of peace in Europe, and giving an offer of forty years' guarantee. I think that that offer shows the greatness of the Administration. To put such a proposal to the people of the United States is a tremendous departure in their history, considering its past. I do not think that Russian resolve on the disarmament of Germany can be in the least questioned. There is no doubt whatever of that, and frankly, therefore, I do not understand Russian hesitation to accept the American offer of forty years' guarantee. I hope very much that that this misunderstanding, hesitation, or whatever it may be, will be cleared up. I believe the air would be cleared if that could be done. Disarmament, then, is axiomatic, and it is an indispensable condition of any political and economic framework which we attempt to set up in Germany at the present time.

There is more difficulty about the other requirement which the Foreign Secretary very rightly lays down, considering objectively what is 'demanded by justice and by the long-term interests of Europe and the world. Objectivity is hard where religious faiths clash, and we must face the fact that in Germany, as in many parts of Europe at the present moment, there is a clash of political and economic doctrines, as deep, as keenly felt, and as likely to cause division amongst men, as the old wars between religious faiths. Take our Select Committee's first recommendation, the economic reintegration of the Rhine. That is most important to us. It is from the East that the west of Europe, and more particularly the Rhineland and the Ruhr, draws its food supplies, and we should pursue any course which is likely to ease the food situation. But let us be clear as to what this involves in the international sphere. There are various considerations to be reconciled. The Com mittee say produce and retain more coal in Germany. The Foreign Secretary endorses that. There is no doubt that: Russia will demand a quid pro quo if she agrees to that—other countries also who are requiring more coal, particularly France. Finally, there is the matter of exports, which can only be at the moment very largely of coal. Exports are essential to reduce the financial burden on us. All these things have to be reconciled. I think that this means—and this is really what we hope to see—a complete revision of the Potsdam Agreement, which no longer works; a revision of the coal control machinery, which is imposing very heavy expenditure upon us without giving us a corresponding voice; and a revision, too of the level for steel production in Germany. I am glad to say that the Foreign Secretary in his speech in another place last week endorsed all this.

But more coal implies more food, and I think we must face what this involves for us at the present time. The Committee give the position, so far as I know, in detail for the first time and they show that the present German ration of 1,052 calories a day costs us £100,000,000 a year. The total of our expenditure in Germany and Austria is £130,00,000. We have recovered so far £50,000,000 of that, so that the net charge to us is £80,000,000. The Commitee, prove, I think, beyond doubt, that Germany cannot recover, or begin to recover, on a diet of 1,052 calories a day. Somehow we have got to get beyond that. But if the diet is raised to 1,500 calories that, it is calculated, would involve an additional expenditure of £84,000,000 as between the United States zone and ours. If raised to 2,000 calories it would mean, I suppose, as much again. That is a terrible charge to face, and if we are going to face it we must know to what it is leading and whether we are going to get anything in the form of security, of peace in Europe, in return for what we are expending upon the maintenance and recovery of a beaten foe.

The Foreign Secretary urged us to indulge in no sloppy sentiment. Certainly there is no desire to do that on this side of the House. All we want to-do is to consider the long-term interests of Europe and the world, which are certainly involved in this. If the United States and Britain are going to undertake this burden which so far as I can see, is certain to increase, we must know where we are going, and there must be no repetition of what happened after the last war, when we paid money to Germany in order that Germany should pay reparations to other Powers. On that basis, I am sure, there can be no peace. But that is actually what happened—this country and the United States paid German reparations. I do not think that there is any question about that, and we should remember it.

Premier Stalin spoke of the necessity of having economic unity in Germany. So far so good, but on what terms? We have heard of a reparation demand amounting to 10,000,000,000 dollars on the western zone. Let us be absolutely clear that if such a claim is going to be met it is going to be paid by us. It cannot be paid by anybody else except this country or the United States. It is also to be observed that Premier Stalin coupled economic with political unity. He said "political and economic unity" laying emphasis, I think, on the political side. I do not suppose that any of your Lordships have any doubt as to what that involves. He went on to speak of the liquidation of Fascists and of democratization in Germany on a really comprehensive scale.

As to that I need only quote our own Prime Minister in the speech which he made to the Trades Union Congress on October 24. As to the liquidation of Fascism, I commend this sentence: Every one who does not take orders from the Communists is described as a Fascist. I am afraid that that is true, and the liquidation of Fascists in Germany would be an undertaking on a considerable scale if construed in the Communist sense. In regard to democratization, the Prime Minister said: If in any part of the world the Communist party, no matter by what means, is in power that is democracy. I am afraid that we, also, on this side of the House, recognize that that is the only definition which works in the eastern part of Europe at the present date. It is no service to peace to gloze this issue. It is there and it has got to be faced. Russia means to have a Communist Germany, and she means with all the faith and fervour, with all the ruthlessness and all the efficiency which she commands, to set about making Germany Communist. I do not complain of that here. If people have a faith they have every right, if they can, to spread that faith. I do not think we can object to that, provided that they do not spread it by force. I am afraid that there is considerable danger, without our intervention, of that. But we have an equal right to spread our own faith, and we must show that we hold it with equal fervour and can pursue it with equal efficiency. That seems to me to be absolutely essential in Germany and Europe at the present time.

There have been some very interesting articles in The Times in the last few days, concerning the Russians in Vienna. They throw a great light on the Russian attitude at the moment in the West. If any of your Lordships have read them, I am sure that you will agree. The Russians, undoubtedly, think of us at the present time as compromisers and cynics. I believe that firmness of purpose on our part—which they do not expect—will command their respect. I am convinced that Russia does not want war, and there is no reason for war on this ideological issue provided Germany is kept disarmed—and there can be no question of one part of Europe seeking to arm Germany against another part; that would certainly be fatal—and provided also that there is frank acceptance of the issue between us and no appeasement in a self-deceptive sense.

We all feel that the greatest danger to peace is illusion. On the one side, it creates wishful thinking—a state of mind in which people will refuse to recognize that a danger exists, and go on hoping for the best. We all remember that terrible period through which we passed before we were overtaken by the catastrophe of the second world war. The other danger corresponds to it, that where aggression is possible, it easily comes to be supposed that no opposition is to be met. Therefore, illusion is the great danger, and a general knowledge of the facts is the greatest safeguard for peace. For that reason, the country should thank Mr. Churchill for the clarity and courage with which he recently made known to the general public, to this country and to the world, his appraisement of the facts. And the facts which he stated have not been questioned. As everybody knows, the question of how many soldiers are there is one which is open to argument, because the size of a division is perpetually changing. I do not believe, however, that there would be any serious difference between the experts who advise His Majesty's Government and the information which reaches us as to the real figures of Russian strength. And that, after all, is the real test.

Whatever the facts may be, I have no doubt that it is highly desirable that the United Nations should institute an inquiry, and I am glad to see that Mr. Molotov is apparently ready for such a course. If it is to be a real investigation with freedom of inquiry on every side, I think it is a thing which we for our part should welcome warmly. Apart from that, I am bound to say that I regret very greatly that Premier Stalin should have allowed himself to make the personal reflection on Mr. Churchill that he did make. It is not: merely a reflection on an individual, it is a reflection on this country, and one which we all feel very much. I am sure that it would not have been made if direct contact had been maintained between those two very great men. No one in this country wants war. It is absurd, and it is just foolishness to talk of anybody in this country, whoever he may be, as an incendiary. We in this country would be the most immediate and the worst sufferers from a war, so that accusations of that sort are absurd, and I think that; I may say that Mr. Churchill's statement in reply to Premier Stalin's remarks is worthy of the greatest living Englishman.

To return to Germany, there is very welcome evidence that British and American ideas, at any rate on the American set-up, and to some extent on the political set-up, are in broad accord. American support is indispensable and, as I say, it is a very great change. We must not forget, however, that the natural tendency of the United States is towards isolation partly because of their history and partly because of the composition of their population, which is built up so largely of people who have deliberately turned their faces away from Europe and hate its divisions and its dangers more than they hate anything else. We have no reason to criticize that isolation, because it is very largely our own tradition in the past. That tradition towards isolation is certain to be renewed by disunity and conflict of purpose amongst the European States. Therefore Mr. Churchill's call to Europe for unit)' at the present time does seem far-seeing and wise. The methods by which such unity is to be pursued are open to discussion. If Western Civilization is divided against itself, if that call to Europe, so eloquently put forward by two great men is not answered, then indeed Germany will never become part of the Western Civilization, which will be in jeopardy from that date.

Yet there are hopeful signs. The German elections are a hopeful sign. We must remember that although Augustus drew the boundaries of the Roman Empire from the Danube and the Rhine, a part of Germany east of the Elbe has been part of the Western Civilization ever since Charlemagne. We must remember that the Herrenvolk mania is an absurdity without arms. It is possible that the German mind may at long last accept, under the compulsion of disarmament, a position of peaceful membership in the larger unity of the European States. If Western Civilization proves that it: has unity and efficiency, and faith in itself, why should ideological divisions necessitate war? Europe was once divided by wars of religion. Now that creeds respect each other and live at peace, why not the political religions of our time; although undoubtedly the divisions which they cause are equally deep? The real danger, I repeat, is German rearmament. It would inevitably create a struggle for the balance of power. Given German disarmament, I believe that Germany and western Europe can make the choice of peace, and achieve, as between the religions of the East and the religions of the West, a state of mutual tolerance and peace. The Russians are a great people with a new gospel which they are determined to propagate, but they are not warlike, and, given a sense of security, they share our need of peace. They are also men of faith—unquestionably, men of deep and fervent faith. If we recognize that, I am convinced that they will respect strong British leadership in Western Europe. It is that for which we from this side call—strong British leadership in Western Europe, which aims not at war, nor anything resembling it, since war would destroy the civilization which we British aim to re-create, but at practical and convincing proof that Western Civilization has vitality, unity and faith in itself.

3.8 p.m.

THE EARL OF PERTH

My Lords, the questions on which I intend to touch differ in many ways from those mentioned by the noble Lord who introduced this Motion. Your Lordships will remember that in the last debate on foreign affairs, which took place in this House on July 29, many noble Lords who spoke—and I include the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition, and whose absence we cannot but regret; we wish him a most speedy recovery—devoted a large part of their speeches to the causes of the divergencies which had arisen between the Soviet Government and the Western Democracies. I do not intend to pursue that analysis to-day. I would only note that apparently those divergencies have not become less since July, and that it is no easier to reach agreement at the present moment than it was then. But to my mind there is something even more important than reaching agreements. It is that agreements when reached should be executed; otherwise you have no stable basis whatever for international relations. You must have respect for the pledged word.

There are three important agreements which have been laboriously reached between the Governments of Soviet Russia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, The Soviet Government, unhappily, has failed to implement them so far. The first agreement to which I would refer is the Moscow Declaration of 1943. That agreement, among other things, provided for a free and independent Austria. Yet, owing to the resistance of the Soviet Government, no discussion of the Peace Treaty with Austria has yet taken place. From what the Foreign Secretary said in another place, it is quite clear that His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the urgency and importance of the question of Austria, and I think all of us—certainly all those who care about Austria—must be extremely grateful to the Foreign Secretary for his declaration the other day. I want to refer to other questions concerning Austria in a moment or two.

The next agreement is the Crimea or Yalta Agreement. That Agreement, among other things, provided for free and independent elections in Poland and Rumania. To-day it seems improbable that any such free elections will take place in either country. Yet the Soviet Government are a party 4to that Agreement, and I think if, as we might have expected, they had exercised their influence on the Governments of the two countries concerned, those Governments would have yielded and the elections would have been held. Lastly, we have the Agreement referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, the Potsdam Agreement, one of the cardinal points of which was the economic unity of Germany. I am not going to dwell on that, because my noble friend Lord Beveridge will deal with that question at a later stage. I would only again observe that it is due to Soviet resistance that delay has taken place in giving effect to what I may call the good clauses of that Agreement.

Apart from the failure of the Soviet Government to implement those Agreements, there is another point which has recently emerged and which causes me—and I think other people—considerable anxiety. The Soviet delegate to the Paris Conference stated recently—I am quoting from the Press, of course—that in his view only interested nations ought to decide matters of particular concern to them. If that theory were widely accepted, much of the progress which was made prior to the war in international morality would be lost. In what I may call the League of Nations era it had become generally accepted that no nation should be a judge in its own cause, and conciliation committees and arbitration tribunals were drawn from nationals of totally disinterested countries. The suggestion made by the Soviet delegate cuts at the whole root of international arbitration, and indeed, to my mind, at the root of the Court of International Justice. I hope therefore we shall strenuously oppose it.

On the other hand, I am completely convinced that the Soviet Government—whether they have 200 divisions or 60 divisions mobilized in Europe; personally I do not think it makes the slightest difference—are not in any way desirous of war. I am equally convinced that the United States of America, the sole possessor of the atomic bomb, does not desire war; and when I come to this country my conviction becomes an absolute certainty. It that diagnosis is at all correct, it is by patience, by tolerance, accompanied by firmness on essential principles that a better relationship between the three great Powers can be established. As I have said, not one of them wants war. On the other hand, I believe that each of the Governments of all three countries must surely most earnestly desire the betterment of the social and economic conditions of the peoples living in the territories over which they have control. It may well be that political troubles cannot at present be settled by the Security Council of the United Nations. But co-operation between the nations may, in a large measure, be secured by the labours of the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations, which works quietly but continuously and without that extremely wide publicity which I think, unfortunatefy, has been given to the proceedings of the Security Council.

There are one or two specific subjects which I should like to bring before your Lordships. The first is Austria. I hear rather ominous echoes of the old propaganda against the thesis of a free and independent Austria, which said, "Austria cannot stand on her own legs." This is simply the story put forward by Goebbels that Austria was not viable. He put that forward as an excuse why Germany should invade Austria and attack her independence. It is not true. Austria is not part of Germany, and she can stand on her own legs. I find that some Austrians are rather nervous lest their country should suffer a diminution of its pre-war territory. I would venture to ask His Majesty's Government for an assurance that they will resolutely oppose any suggestion to Austria's disadvantage for an alteration of her pre-war boundaries. I hope I may be given it, particularly as, so far as I can remember, one of the arguments put forward why the South Tyrol should not be given to Austria was that the Moscow Declaration had fixed the boundaries of Austria as they were before the war, and that that decision had been confirmed later in London by the Council of Foreign Ministers. So much for Austria.

I now pass to the draft Treaty with Italy. Frankly, I am very unhappy about some of the provisions of that Treaty. I fear they are likely to endanger the economic and, therefore, the social stability of the Italian people. It is not so much the political aspects that I have in mind. The question of the South Tyrol has now been happily settled owing to the good sense and spirit of compromise which animated both the Italian and the Austrian Governments. The two Governments by their negotiations have largely rectified the unhappy decision taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers when they departed from the principles of the Atlantic Charter. I think the debate on the South Tyrol in another place and in your Lordships' House did contribute to the happy settlement now reached. The problem of Trieste seems also to be on the road to a solution. There is just one point which I would like to mention and of which I would like to remind His Majesty's Government: that is the: question of the ultimate withdrawal of the troops from that area. I have no doubt that His Majesty's Government will have in mind that after the last war certain adventures took place in respect of Vilna and the State of Memel. Due precautions will, I hope, be taken against a recurrence of any such episodes; and there, I fear, we must bear in mind the existence of the right of veto in the Security Council.

It is chiefly the economic clauses of the Treaty which alarm me. The Foreign Secretary said in another place that the Foreign Ministers had made every allowance for the services rendered by Italy after the Armistice, and he added that he was ready to discuss trade and other difficulties at the earliest possible moment after the Treaty was signed. Meanwhile, the immediate economic future of Italy is extremely bleak. After the end of the U.N.R.R.A. relief programme at the end of this year Italy will have to manage entirely out of her own resources, which I fear are completely inadequate. Italy requires wheat, she requires coal, and she requires oil fuel and raw materials, and there is little sign that she will be able to obtain the foreign currency which is necessary if a serious economic and social collapse is to be averted. I hold that the reparation and restitution clauses of the Treaty are distinctly harsh. I do not believe they are capable of fulfilment.

There is one specific clause to which I wish to draw your Lordships' attention—Article 66 dealing with the renunciation of claims by Italy. In Section 5 of that Article; it is stated that Italy must waive any claims or debts arising out of the Conventions on Prisoners of War now in force. I should be very glad if I could be told what this implies. Does it mean that the arrears of wages earned by co-operators, and even their savings deposited in camp accounts, will be taken as reparations? If it does, that seems to me a peculiarly mean provision. Our prisoners of war benefited greatly from the Geneva Convention, but it seems that Italy is being compelled to waive the benefit accruing under the same Convention to Italian prisoners. Just think now in what state of mind these prisoners of war will go back to Italy. Will they be inspired with friendly feelings towards this country? I do not want to talk of slave labour but I would appeal to noble Lords opposite and to the members of His Majesty's Government to examine these particular provisions and see whether they can conscientiously approve of them. Finally, I do not think it is really right or wise to ask the Italian representative to sign a Treaty which contains undertakings which he has solemnly declared at the Peace Conference that Italy cannot fulfil.

I do hope very much that the Foreign Minister may be able to reconsider his attitude about intervention in favour of the release of Archbishop Stepinac. If ever proof were required of the need for a charter of human right what happened at that trial shows it is essential. Marshal Tito, who is, I understand, both head of the Yugoslav State and Prime Minister, declared, before the trial even began, that the Archbishop was guilty. The Foreign Minister has so far taken the line that the trial was an internal affair of the Yugoslav State, but I would suggest to His Majesty's Government that the spirit of the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations is being systematically violated in Yugoslavia. If that is so, it is a matter of general concern.

Just a word or two on the proposal so eloquently advocated by Field-Marshal Smuts and Mr. Churchill for a European Federation. That is certainly a magnificent idea and a magnificent ideal, but I cannot feel that it is practicable to-day, or that it is likely to be practicable for a long time to come. Let us begin by promoting a close association, economic and otherwise, of the Western Democracies. I have often pleaded for this and I have always had a sympathetic reply, but, so far as I can ascertain, no practical progress has been made. Yet the French approached us on the subject many months ago. The objection is sometimes put forward that such an association would be contrary to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. Surely this is a mere excuse for delay. I see nothing in the provisions of the Charter forbidding or even deprecating an association of this kind. It is clearly not directed against any other Power or group of Powers; it could in no way be held to be aggressive, and it cannot be held to be imperialistic. If it really were contrary to the spirit of the Charter I should not advocate it for a moment, because I hold that in the United Nations Organization lies our main hope for peace and for social and economic progress, and I am most happy that His Majesty's Government have made support of it the most prominent plank in their foreign policy.

It is true that the proceedings of the Security Council have up to now tended to disillusionment, but I do not feel too discouraged. After all, the world is still seething after seven years of devastation and destruction. No peace treaties have yet been signed, and people have not had opportunities to settle down. All this unrest and turmoil cannot but be reflected in what is happening at the Security Council. The Assembly of United Nations, which is meeting now, is tackling what is to my mind of far greater importance in international problems—namely, the control of nuclear energy. It would be futile to attempt to forecast what the result of the deliberations of the Assembly may be, but there is one sign, a very good augury, which is that all the nations have acknowledged the need for control. The only thing now is that differences exist on the methods of control. I would like to say how much I, and I think all on these Benches, appreciate what Premier Stalin said quite recently about this particular point. That is going to be most helpful and ought to make progress much easier.

Then there is the question of the veto. I am quite convinced that the veto is a bad thing in itself, but I am equally certain that it would not be advisable to-day to attempt to secure its total abolition. The origin of the veto lay in the fact that some of the great Powers feared that decisions and even actions would be taken contrary to what they neld to be their vital interests. Therefore they said they must have at their disposal the power by which such decisions could be annulled or such actions averted. To secure its ultimate abandonment we mast therefore try to remove these suspicions, and that can only lie done by showing in practice that: these fears felt are unfounded and that the United Nations are working for the benefit of all the members and not for one nation or group of nations. It may take a longtime fully to give effect to that and to dissipate the atmosphere of distrust, but until that happens the Organization can never reach that full efficiency which is necessary if all the hopes which we have placed upon it are to be fulfilled.

Finally, I would like to make a concrete suggestion about the veto. Your Lordships probably realize that what are known as "procedural matters" in the Security Council—that is to say matters of procedure—can be decided by a qualified majority vote; but nothing is laid down in the Charter as to what is or is not a matter of procedure. Therefore a decision on the point, as to what is, or what is not, a matter of procedure, requires a unanimous vote of the five great Powers;; that is to say, the power of veto can be exercised. What I want to suggest is this. If the Council cannot agree as to what is a matter of procedure—and I think it very likely that it will not be able to do so—then the subject should be referred to the International Court of Justice for a definition. I assume that the decision of that Court would be respected and accepted, and the use of the veto would then be restricted, at any rate to some extent, and the possibility of its abuse would be distinctly lessened.

3.33 p.m.

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK

My Lords, I have considerable hesitation in following two speakers who have such an intimate knowledge of foreign affairs, and I cannot hope in any way to make a contribution to the debate on their level. But I start with the same views as they do—namely, that the future peace of the world depends upon friendship with the United States, a good understanding with Russia, and the restoration of a completely disarmed Germany. I have only a word or two to say about our relations with the United States. Like many of your Lordships, I from time to time read American newspapers. They are at times stimulating, sometimes surprising, and occasionally very irritating. They are irritating because they from time to time express such a complete ignorance of British ideals, British policy and the British manner of life. Behind our statesmen a number of Americans still seem to see the menacing form of George III.

What I want to ask His Majesty's Government is this: What steps are being taken in Washington, New York and elsewhere to give a fair and accurate picture of British views and British policy? During the war there was an excellent secretariat—I think we called it a "Secretariat of Information"; we did not use the word "propaganda." That did disseminate throughout the United States a great deal of most valuable information about this country. I think that there is a real danger in the ignorance of us which is displayed in certain quarters in the United States at the present time. We find that we are accused of imperialism. At another time the Americans are told that we have plenty of spare food in this country and ought to help to feed starving Europe. At other times we are accused of bad faith. I have no doubt that these accusations come only from a minority, but accusations repeated time after time are very often accepted as true. Therefore, I think it is a matter of the greatest importance that we should have some accurate and popular sources of information in America to counteract the propaganda which from certain quarters is quite deliberately directed against this country. Having said that, I ought to go on to say that I am quite certain that if again there ever came a world crisis, whether there was a definite alliance or not, we and the United States of America would be standing side by side in defence of the freedom and democracy which we both value so highly.

Unfortunately the peace of Europe does not depend entirely upon our friendship with the United States. It is equally necessary that there should be a good understanding with Russia. If that fails, then in the years to come we shall drift inevitably towards war. Opinion in this country in the last two or three years has considerably changed in regard to Russia. Two years ago Russia was looked upon with admiration and enthusiasm by great masses of our fellow countrymen, particularly those in the industrial centres. Today that has been replaced by a feeling of perplexity and a considerable element of disappointment, although there is still the desire for friendship and understanding. I have no doubt whatever that the great majority of people in this country are anxious for friendship with Russia, but they are perplexed over the policy which is adopted by some of the Russian leaders. We wish we could remove from the Russian people the suspicion which some of them have towards this country.

When we are talking about Russia and Russian policy, I think we must always remember not only the endurance of Russia during the war but the quite terrible way in which the Russians suffered. I shall never forget not only what I saw of Stalingrad a few weeks after the siege was raised but also what I saw within some thirty miles of Moscow of the widespread and deliberate devastation caused by the Germans. No wonder the Russians are most anxious to avoid in the future any possibility of another such invasion. I agree, of course, with all that has been said by the noble Lords who have spoken about firmness with Russia. It is useless for us to attempt to conceal our own convictions. Our ideals and our way of life are different from those which are held by the Russians. We do not wish to interfere with their ideals and their way of life and they must respect ours. It ought to be possible.

One of the hopeful signs I see in Russia to-day—and I only refer to this in passing—is the very great revival of Christianity there and the strength of the Orthodox Church. While in various directions some churches have been losing their strength and influence, in Russia the numbers belonging to the Church have been steadily increasing and the influence of the Russian Church is now felt far beyond the borders of Russia. I will only say again about our attitude to Russia that with firmness there must go conciliation. We must make it perfectly plain that although we are not going to surrender any of our principles, we are most anxious for a good understanding with Russia. We realize that without it the peace of the world will be threatened and unless it can be achieved it is very difficult to see how the German problem will be solved—and that, of course, is the greatest of all the problems before us to-day.

On the strength of a brief visit to Germany early this month, I make no pretence to speak as an authority on conditions there. I would only say in passing that the position is approaching something like a catastrophe. Their hunger is evident and obvious, and if the winter is severe something like a catastrophe must occur. The reserves which were in hand last winter have gone; stocks of food, fuel and other kinds of material have all been used up. I am not going to dwell on that for there is a debate on that subject next week. I noticed something else, and I heard of this on every side. There is a widespread sense of frustration. The people feel that the outlook is hopeless, and in the younger generation this is turning into a dangerous type of nihilism; the past seems to have been meaningless, the present is black and the future is hopeless.

Where you have nihilism of that kind, it is a kind of paralysis, destroying all sense of responsibility and initiative. On all sides I heard that. The only way of removing it will be to put before the Germans some definite hope for the future; in other words, that we should state our policy for Germany. Not only did I feel that sense of frustration among the Germans themselves, but I had some suspicion that it was felt by some of our own people out there. They are doing splendid work, for which I have the greatest admiration; they have done wonders in Germany in the restoration of order since we have been in occupation, but they feel they are hampered by decisions which are taken on a level entirely beyond their reach. Until there is some policy accepted and announced for Germany as a whole we shall have this sense of frustration and hopelessness.

Very closely connected with that is another subject. There were two words which I heard again and again in Germany; one was the word "frustration" and the other was the word "coal." Those words are very closely connected. We cannot restore hope to Germany until once again the chimneys of the factories begin smoking and the wheels begin to go round, but that is impossible unless there is coal. I know there are difficulties about this problem of coal and I do not wish to underrate them. It is a very serious matter. If we withdraw coal from France or Czechoslovakia, it may mean unemployment in those countries. On the other hand, unless the factories are set going in Germany and coal is provided for that purpose;, Germany will steadily and increasingly deteriorate.

I find it almost impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the position in Germany to-day. What is needed is an economic policy—if possible for the whole of the country, but at any rate for as large a part of it as can be managed. I agree with what is said; agreement must be completely realized and the Potsdam clauses dealing with the economics of the country must be carried out both in the spirit and the letter. Until that is done, Germany will go on drifting into an ever more dangerous condition. I know there are some who feel there is very little to be done, but that is a fatalistic outlook. I feel that those who are out there representing us have a most difficult task and that they are carrying their work through with great sympathy and understanding.

Perhaps I may say in passing that I sometimes wonder, although I am not competent to speak on this, whether St. James's Square is the best place from which to administer Germany. I know there are some who say that Germany has brought this upon herself and that these sufferings are due to her own actions. I entirely agree with that, but that is not sufficient. We cannot rest content with saying that all this misery has been brought upon the world through Germany. Our Christianity calls upon us to feed even our enemies; our economists know that Europe cannot ever be restored to prosperity if in the midst of it there is an impoverished slum; and the statesmen of the world know that the peace of Europe cannot be secured until a disarmed Germany is restored to some prosperity and strength.

3.48 p.m.

LORD VANSITTART

My Lords, it would be natural that on an occasion of this sort I also should say something about Germany, but I have noticed that there is a Motion down by two noble Lords for next week, and therefore I have decided to withhold any comments on that subject that I may possibly, but not certainly, be called upon to make until I have heard what they have to say. I do that for two reasons. First of all, I do not wish to inflict myself upon your Lordships twice on the same subject; and secondly, I wish to expend my small ration of your Lordships' time on other points.

The presence amongst us to-day of the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel however, puts me in mind of a parenthesis, which has nothing whatever to do with next week's debate. Before the war, our difficulty was to find people who knew anything about Germany, but now everyone knows everything about Germany. Accordingly last night I listened to a Brains Trust (of which the noble Viscount was a very lucid ornament) in which he, at close quarters, and I, at a distance, heard Professor Joad explain that the Germans really do not take at all kindly to discipline. 'Therefore, I think your Lordship will understand that nowadays my innate modesty prompts me to hang about under the tree of knowledge and occasionally to give it a jolly good shaking in the hope of picking up some of the fruits of omniscience.

To-day, I shall begin with a few words about the Paris Conference and, even so, I shall not go into any details of that sad story. I wish to point out only one reason why it was a sad story. In former and more hopeful days we heard much of the vices of secret diplomacy and of the virtues of open covenants openly arrived at. We all agree on the iniquity of secret treaties, and we hope we shall see no more of them. We are all agreed on the virtues of open covenants and we wish them to be arrived at as openly as possible. But in this last respect there is a very definite limit. Look at Paris. In the jargon of to-day, "you have had it."The Paris Conference often degenerated into a platform for mere propaganda speeches, designed to show the s]eaker as the big boy of the home front, and to rap his critics with every imaginable device. That did not produce good results. I took part in nearly all the conferences after the first world war. We had plenty of publicity—I was often charged with it—but we never went to these length—never. We were more reserved and, I think, a little more efficacious. Of course, I am preaching entirely against my own interests, because as an occasional journalist I can only wish thai: the present dispensation would go on for ever. I would never be short of matter for comment or even satire, but from the public point of view I feel bound to point out that if we continue to go to the lengths of the Paris Conference we may continue to get the Paris results.

The mention of propaganda speeches recalls to me another subject which has been very much on my mind for the past twelve months. It is a subject of great potential gravity, but it is never treated as such and therefore to-day I shall say something about it. In my younger days I had a very young relative who used to collect moth balls and match boxes simply because nobody else wanted them, and I think this is a subject on which nobody else is likely to touch. I am referring to the mounting volume and venom of the anti-British propaganda which is put out by Moscow and its satellites. It goes all round the clock, seven days a week, and I have never heard a kind word. I have never heard anything like it in peace-time. It is indeed on the level of German propaganda in war-time. This rather dreary subject is really like Ernst Lissamer's "Hymn of Hate" without the poetry. I have heard it said by fellow-travellers in another place that we were to blame for that. That really is a servile falsehood. There are in Moscow large numbers of highly trained and skilful propagandists. I know most of them by name now, and I will say a word about them later. The Soviet broadcasters are hard put to it to find any British broadcaster to pick up, and their chief scapegoat has been Mr. Harold Nicolson. Anybody who has listened to him will do him justice and say that he is audibly anxious to avoid hurting anybody's feelings unnecessarily.

If this spate goes on unchecked it can only end badly. It is calculated to instil hatred into nearly 200,000,000 people who for ages—and never more than in the last fifty years—have been kept in Cimmerian darkness, and it is perhaps worth pointing out that that classical expression was applied precisely to Russians from the time of Homer onwards. I am very glad that the Prime Minister had the courage and the candour to refer to this Russian policy of enforced ignorance of the outside world. In return, perhaps I may offer him for future reference a passage from Disraeli's Sybil, which I hope he and your Lordships may find appropriate. Speaking from a distant memory, it runs as follows: Mr. Kremlin himself was distinguished for ignorance, for he had only one idea, and that was wrong. I think it is only fair to say that so far as we are concerned Mr. Kremlin has only one idea and it is wrong. Now our chief task is to get two ideas into Mr. Kremlin's head, but how? Has His Majesty's Government made any representations to Moscow on this subject? I sincerely hope not, because it would be perfectly futile. Mr. Kremlin has made up his mind to go on with this campaign regardless of facts, and in proof of that I would offer you the two latest instances.

We have now had two Press interviews from Generalissimo Stalin. These newspaper stunts are quite legitimate, but I do not think they are the best way of conducting policy. As to the second interview I shall say little, because it is too early to judge at present. I am bound to say that like the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, I do regret that in one passage Generalissimo Stalin descended from the eminence of a great statesman to the level of his own broadcasters. That was a pity, I think. On the first interview, it is fair to say something, and there I think the Generalissimo got rather less than fair treatment, because he had obviously not intended it to be taken quite so seriously as the boosters took it. If that had been his intention, of course the first thing he would have done would be to crack down on this campaign, whereas as a matter of fact it went on worse than ever—I repeat, worse—after the interview. We should of course have been entitled to reply in the well-known couplet: Perhaps it was wise to dissemble your love But why did you kick me downstairs? Six flights a day is really a little much.

My second instance is this. About a fortnight ago, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs solemnly and officially in another place disclaimed any British part or lot in the rising in Southern Iran. Now the Iranian Government behaved very decently about that; they accepted the disclaimer, but not so the Soviet Government. In the days following that disclaimer they went on with the same campaign just as if Mr. Bevin had said nothing at all. Now like the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York, and indeed like everyone here, we all desire the best possible relations with Mr. Kremlin, but we must face the fact that we are not going to get them so long as this kind of thing goes on, and we are not going to get rid of this sort of thing—this also is obvious—by the ordinary Foreign Office routine of protest and denial.

But there is a way in which we can at least attenuate the evil, and it is by invincible good humour combined with a much more liberal use of ridicule when the attackers lay open their flanks to it, as is so frequently the case. What I say there applies not only to Moscow but to the propaganda of the United States with which I will deal on another occasion. Britain is nobody's punchbag. Nobody wants to look silly every day, and the truth is that many of these Soviet broadcasters and Pressmen do say excessively stupid things, but nobody ever picks it up and nobody ever rubs it in. Our Press is almost as over-cautious as it was in the inter-war period, and the B.B.C. seems quite ineffective in that respect. Indeed I was very much amazed the other day when the B.B.C. were accused of being aggressive and pugnacious by Tovarich Pritt—that is the last charge you could ever lay against its door. Our task really is to save the Russians from themselves, because they really are in danger of becoming considerable bores, with their invariable imputation of every conceivable vice to others and their invariable assumption of every conceivable virtue to themselves. Take, for example, Molotov's repeated "pi-jaws" on the vices of Western Democracy. We had another only yesterday. There is absolutely no reason to get cross—not at all. We may smile, we may even yawn, but we must not frown.

Let us look at the facts. After all, up to the end of the thirties the word "democracy" was anathema in Russia. The issue was seen as a straight one between Communism and Democracy. In those days there was none of this modern rot about Eastern Democracy versus Western Democracy or Economic Democracy against Social Democracy. The adoption of the word there was an entire afterthought and you can see for yourselves that they have never really understood what it means. You had proof of that in Paris. It simply was not understood that the will of the majority should prevail. On the contrary, that was called dictation. The whole stand of the Soviet throughout has been that the will of the minority should always prevail. And that is very natural indeed because it is the will of the minority which does prevail all over Eastern Europe, and it hardly ever goes beyond ten per cent, of the population. We were told by The Times a fortnight ago that the real Communists in Rumania only number a few hundreds. So that when we hear Western Democracy abused or reviled we ought never to get cross or annoyed. We ought, on the contrary, to say:" Thank you, my dear fellow, for introducing a little comic relief into these lugubrious deliberations. It is very interesting to us to see who is stealing our clothes in the cool of the evening. They do not quite fit you, the sleeves and the trousers are both a bit too long and you do not look a bit comfortable. But wear them by all means, perhaps you will grow into them as time goes by."

There are opportunities for that kind of thing every week, perhaps every day. I am not going to inflict a list of them upon your Lordships, but I will take just one more example, that of our position in Greece. We have been arraigned about this in Paris and in the United States by spokesmen of the Soviet Union and of the Ukraine. But we are there by invitation and with a very modest contingent of troops indeed. Our answer should be: "Why, my dear fellow, you have got thirty times as many troops as that outside your country—250,000 in Northern Korea alone—and not by invitation. The Koreans are dying to get rid of you. A little while ago there was a most successful American comedy produced in this country. It was called 'The Man Who Came To Dinner' and it had a record run. My dear Russian friends, you perhaps did not see that, but the man who came to dinner very nearly stayed, for every that was the whole comedy. Why do not you put it on in Korea? It would have another record run because every native would immediately see the point of it. Or try it, for instance, in Hungary or still more in Austria. We do not want to stay for ever; we have had our dinner and we are quite ready to go; why do you want to sit on?"

In short, I think out attitude towards all this—and it is really a subject of gravity—should be: "We are not going to get cross, whatever you say. We like a bit of fun. The trouble is that we like it so much better than you do." Mr. Harold Nicolson, in one of his broadcasts from Paris after the day had been occupied by a consistent Soviet tirade, ended by saying that we ought to have enough complacency for two. I do not think that he put it quite right. He should have said that we ought to have enough humour for two, and if we provided it all, then half of it should be at Russian expense. That is only fair.

This is a world which even more than for lack of food is visibly dying for lack of two other things—one is good humour and the other is good faith. I hope that we shall continue to display both in the face of a campaign which shows neither. If we will adopt that attitude I think that we shall have a better chance of avoiding more scenes like those that occurred in Paris and may even attenuate the exhalations of the Moscow Radio. But again I am speaking entirely against my own interests. I have listened to the Moscow Follies for so long that I have become an addict. I do not know what I would do without them. I have even reached a stage—I confess it—when I have my favourite performers just as younger people have their favourite film stars. There are Milnikov, Belnikov, Davydov, Ivanov, Orlov, and Leontyev, and there is a very interesting gentleman who calls himself "Analyser." Then there are two delightful old ladies, Belskaya and Borisova. They are the Russian equivalent of "Arsenic and Old Lace." Indeed they murdered me only a few weeks ago, but I can assure them that the corpse bears no malice. I practise what I preach about my critics.

Above all, in this broadcasting there is Comrade Hoffmann. I am sure your Lordships have listened with pleasure to the music of Offenbach's "Tales of Hoffmann." I am thinking of making an anthology called "New Tales of Hoffman." There were echoes of some of his talks in remarks on foreign affairs in Brighton the other day. Your Lordships know the theme of the old song—how we (and that means particularly you) are intent on world domination. It is very often trotted out in the old Children's Hour, but I never listen to the "Follies" without being reminded of a scene which I once witnessed when two bridge players lost their tempers and one called the other every name under the shining stars. When the spate was over the victim took up his pencil and scoring block again and said: "Now would you mind saying that all over again? I had absolutely no idea that I was all those things and I know that I shall forget them if I do not write them down."

I hope your Lordships will not think that I have approached this grave matter in any spirit of levity. On the contrary, I think that this is one of the gravest subjects that we have before us in view of its possible consequences. But my whole point is that you can handle this deadly poison if you do not try to do so in deadly earnest. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. It is contained in a famous quotation from the most famous American novel published at the beginning of this century—The Virginian by Owen Wister. In that a stranger was admitted to play poker with a bunch of cowboys, real tough guys, in what was then the real Wild West. In the course of the game he called his neighbour a "son of a so-and-so" and the cowboy so addressed, gently toying with his gun, replied: "Stranger, when you call me that, smile."

Well, my Lords, I have spoken of Greece; I have spoken of propaganda. Now, I would like to say a further word about Greece. I am sure we should all endorse the words of the Foreign Secretary on that subject the other day. We should wish to see the Government of Greece broadened and liberalized. I am only sorry that it has not happened already. I am not sure that in that respect the faults are all on one side. We should all wish to see the administration wider and more clement, but there is one point which presents itself to my mind, and on which I would ask for a little guidance.

I thought that in the Atlantic Charter we had all pledged ourselves to allow our Allies, at least, to have a Government of their own choosing. I know that that did not apply to our enemies. Is it really open to some of us, when we get a Government of which we do not think well, to start shouting: "This is not my cup of tea. Take it away"? Or are we only entitled to do that if we repudiate our signature to the Atlantic Charter? It is true that the course of events in Eastern Europe has largely invalidated the Atlantic Charter, but I hope we shall never follow a bad example and that we shall always honour our signature, because I am profoundly convinced that there is no hope whatever of a safe new world—let alone a brave one—except in treaty observance.

I should like to go a little further on the subject of Greece. Again, I would fully endorse everything said by the Foreign Secretary about the withdrawal of our troops. We would wish to see them withdrawn as soon as possible. But only last week Marshal Tito said: "What is not ours to-day may be ours to-morrow." There has been a lot of that ominous talk across the Greek border for a long while past. On present form there is a distinct possibility that when our troops are withdrawn from Greece she may be infiltrated, if your Lordships prefer a euphemism, dismembered, if you do not mind plain English, by the amputation of, say, Western Thrace, to satisfy an impudent and cynical Bulgar claim. I would ask His Majesty's Government not to withdraw their troops until they have some reasonable security that there will be no such unhappy development. I think it is wise to ask that, not only in the interests of Greece but in the interests of the United Nations Organization, which at present is manifestly unable to cope with such a crisis. Premature withdrawal might prove the ruin of U.N.O. That is something of which we should be careful.

Finally, I would congratulate His Majesty's Government on the patience and moderation of their stand for more just political conditions in Eastern Europe. Surely, it is not only their right, but their duty. In the case of Poland, we are faced with a definite breach of contract, and surely we are entitled to press for its fulfilment, although I see that The Times of yesterday rather doubted the wisdom of pertinacity. Have the Government satisfied themselves that the elections in Bulgaria met their requirements? In the case of Rumania they most certainly do not. I very much hope that the Government will conclude no peace treaty with Rumania until they have at least some security that the great majority will be treated with reasonable tolerance and humanity by the minority. That, I think, is very little to ask.

I know that this is not an easy line for the Government to follow. It is rather thankless, anyhow; and they have my sympathy, more especially as they have run into a good deal of criticism from some of their ostensible followers who take their cue from the Kremlin rather than from Mr. Attlee. The line of argument of these people seems to be a striking one. It comes to this: that because the people in Eastern Europe have never known liberty, therefore they must not have it. One of them said that it would be madness to allow some of these people to start thinking for themselves. That seems rather an unusual line of argument for Socialists, if they are Socialists and not camouflaged totalitarians. I hope that His Majesty's Government will not weary of welldoing, and that they will continue to stand up to the apostles of oppression, both at home and abroad.

4.18 pm.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, may I crave the indulgence of your Lordships in making my first speech? I shall want all the kindness you can extend to mc, because although I have been in politics for more than forty years, taking a very active part therein, my introduction to your Lordships' House marked the first occasion on which I became a member of a public assembly. I therefore come to you as a very new recruit, and one with a good deal to learn. I speak to you to-day not as an expert on foreign affairs, with which type of men your Lordships seem to be well blessed. I am, however, a student of foreign affairs, a very humble student, and it is in that character that I wish to address you. If there be one reason more than another why I should do so on this occasion, it is that the occupation that I have followed through my life has afforded me opportunities of gathering the views of great numbers of men and women who. I feel confident, would like me to let you know something of what they are thinking.

I was very pleased with the expression of good will to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is now going to America, which came from the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, and his friends. We, on this side of the House, welcome those words with a great deal of pleasure, because it is said in some places that since the present Secretary o: State for Foreign Affairs has been in office conditions in Europe have become worse and the difficulties in the world greater—the implication being that if there had been another Foreign Secretary, we should not have been in the same deep trouble that now appears to exist. We on this sick: of the House have the greatest confidence in Mr. Bevin, and we are glad to know that he carries with him the best wishes of all sections in this House.

As on the last occasion, various speakers to-day have expressed some sort of doubt about the position of Russia. They have not been able to understand the moves that have been made or the moves that have been proposed. I can understand their difficulty, because as a general rule when we are discussing foreign affairs, we deal with particular cases rather than general moves. If, however, you want to know where Russia is going or what she is thinking, or what she is doing, you have only to recall to yourselves some of the decisions that have been made over a number of years. If you do that, you can be in no doubt about the future. Let me quote three. Just about the time of the outbreak of the war in Europe we endeavoured to secure an arrangement with Russia, by which she would come on the side of the Allies should a conflict ensure. Your Lordships will remember that we failed to secure that agreement and, at the same time, while declining to accept our invitation, the Russians entered into an agreement with the Germans. Your Lordships will know that, as a result of that agreement, a bargain was struck and the price was eventually paid.

The second illustration is that of Yalta, when the three statesmen of the three countries chiefly concerned met to consider the war against Japan. Up to that time Russia had not been involved in hostilities with the Japanese. An agreement was reached, as a result of which, towards the closing stage of the war with Japan, Russia came in with her forces, again as a result of a bargain, again as a result of an agreed price, and that price has been paid. The third instance that I would mention would be that surrounding San Francisco. The statesmen of the Allies were anxious to establish a United Nations Organization under a Charter that would provide for future relationships between the countries throughout the world. Your Lordships will remember that we were informed last week in another place by the right honourable gentleman the Member for Woodford that the only condition upon which we could get Russia to enter that United Nations Organization was an agreement to provide a veto, a veto which would permit Russia to enter into agreements if she thought they were of advantage to her but which would safeguard her against agreements if they were likely to (militate against her interests.

With those three points in mind, I think we ought to look at the situation now existing, arising out of the Peace Conference and out of the world situation. It seems to me that there are three countries mainly concerned. There is the United States of America; there is the British Commonwealth and there is Russia. They are the three countries which, if they could reach agreement, could settle the peace of the world for a long time. But they are experiencing very great difficulties in reaching conclusions. Their difficulties do not arise out of a desire to wait. They do not arise out of a feeling that they cannot trust one another. They do, however, arise out of the knowledge that, with the present claims of these three countries, or with the present position of these three countries, there must be some give and take on a very wide scale, and, therefore, it must be something that must be very carefully looked at before it is accepted.

Let us, in the first place, take the case of Russia. Russia claims that she must have upon her boundaries in Europe a number of friendly States. Russia, however, is not prepared merely to establish good relations by cultivating friendships. She is using methods to ensure that in those countries near her borders there shall be forms of Government wielding power that will be answerable to her will. It must be admitted at once that with peace treaties making these things permanent, Great Britain and America will be met with enormous difficulties. Perhaps the matter would not be so bad if we could be sure that the momentum of aggrandisement had run down. But we know, or at least we feel, that such is not the case.

My noble friend Lord Lindsay, who spoke to the House just before the Recess, made a most valuable contribution in which he indicated the sources that prompted Russian action, the sort of views that Russians held on Socialist problems and the fear they had that, unless they could maintain something like an autocracy in their own country, by whatever name they might call it, and a similar kind of organization in countries near to them, they would be in danger of being surrounded, or in danger of being beaten-up at some time. We fear that in this policy of theirs, based at it is upon principles that they have accepted, we have not yet reached the end of the demands of the Russian people. We ourselves are experiencing some difficulty in Greece, as previous speakers have said. Russia objects to our position in Greece, not because she loves the Greeks, not because she wants to see established a particular form of democracy in Greece. She does not want the British in Greece, nor does she want a strong Greece, because she is afraid of the strategical problems that may arise therefrom. Russia is now anxious to secure some control of the Dardanelles. A short time ago we had some trouble with Russia about the position in Persia. These are not isolated cases. They are all linked up, and they are an indication that there may exist in Russian minds a desire to spread southward so as to secure their entry into the warmer seas and into the oceans of the world. I do not think I am exaggerating that picture for a moment; and I believe that that is the position so far as Russia is concerned.

Now a word or two about this country. We profess ourselves to be satisfied with the limits of the Empire we now control. We are not at all anxious to take on problems for ourselves in any part of the world. There are some countries who can scarcely believe what we say about that; but whether that be the case or not, we have to ask ourselves whether, in accepting that limitation to our present Empire and in decreasing the liabilities we have in the world, we are making it easier to achieve final peace. We have, for instance, to keep our lines of communication open, and, as your Lordships know, that means keeping the Mediterranean open so that we can get right into the Indian ocean. That policy of ours may be justified. It is a policy we may have to maintain. But we must accept this point, whether we like it or not: that the Russians look upon that policy with very great suspicion, and that we may have to face, before very long, demands by the Russians that would cause us to be brought into communications or discussions in which these points would arise.

It has been said in your Lordships' House this afternoon that America has been inclined to an isolationist policy. That isolationist policy has been dictated by the very size of the United States and the developments that were required there to make it a great country. America is now reaching the limit of her consuming power in relation to her great productive power, and so she will be looking to other parts of the world for markets. If she finds these markets closed to her, then international problems will certainly arise which will bring the United States into the arena of which I have been talking. There is another factor. America is now the greatest naval and military power in the world, and that power can only be exercised providing it has liberty of action. If that power were restrained in American waters, its influence on the rest of the world would be very small indeed. In consequence, during the war arrangements were made by which bases within our own Empire were provided for the Americans. The Russians now fear that America will not be content solely with the bases that she has in her possession; they think she will be looking to other parts of the world.

I have mentioned these three things, these three great interests which appear to be clashing, solely for the reason that I believe that the problems that wall arise amongst these Powers will not be settled by themselves. They have too many interests affecting others that may prevent that, and I believe that the only way in which they may ultimately be solved will be through the United Nations Organization enabling something in the nature of a World Parliament to lay down the plans that must be followed by all the nations in the world. If the United Nations Organization is to be useful, if it is to be effective, if at is to override the endless discussions that have been taking place, then certain other matters will have to receive attention. The first of these is that of sovereignty. Sovereignty to-day is not the same thing as sovereignty of a thousand years ago In those days, when peoples were small and scattered, unilateral decisions had perforce to be taken if tribes and communities were to be ruled. In these days, when population is so thickly spread on the ground, when time and space have almost been annihilated, sovereignty must mean something different, for it must have become modified-in its exercise.

In my view, every treaty signed by a modern nation in the years that have gone has been a modification of the sovereignty position, but I think you have got to go a bit further than most nations have been prepared to go from the idea of sovereignty as it did exist years ago. Hitherto, we have looked upon it as something dealing purely with Armies and Navies and with borderlines. It is my personal view that you would not suffer in yielding sovereignty to an international organization like the United Nations. And I think that other matters, which may appear to be purely matters of home concern, will also have to come up for consideration. Take, for instance, the question of wages in any country under an international scheme. Obviously, if the United Nations Organization gets the world into one great economic field for the maintenance of full employment and economic safety, then if any country arbitrarily were to reduce the wages of its people and thereby upset the plans that had been arranged, that would be a danger which the world at large would not tolerate. So in yielding up sovereignty, or part of sovereignty, we have to think in terms not merely of Armed Forces and the like but also of other matters which by their operation must have an effect upon the world.

The last point I want to make is this. If the United Nations Organization is to work effectively then we have to got to cease dividing the nations of the world into saints and sinners. That kind of thing is all very well between political parties at election time, but when peoples of the world, whether they are advanced or whether they are slow, have got to work together for the common good, no useful purpose is served in describing nations in that way. For instance, I was asked a question the other day at one of my meetings: "Is Germany really as black as she is painted?" My answer to the question was this: that if Germany is really as black as she has been painted then we ought to exterminate the German nation because she is a danger in those circumstances to the world at large. I do not think that the German nation is entirely black. I believe within that country, as in all countries, there are men and women good and true who are prepared to do everything they can for the world at large. At the same meeting I was asked this question: "Is Great Britain as white as I she paints herself?" And I had to admit that we had somewhat of a murky past in some things. We had tried to live up to what we considered to be for the good of mankind in the main, but there were streaks in our history of which we ought rather to be ashamed than proud. If we can only get into the United Nations Organization a spirit which will admit the good things in all nations and will treat with the evil things in these nations, we can then make sure that the Organization will be effective and that these great troubles I have mentioned will be brought to a successful conclusion because the nations which now fear one another and suspect one another will begin to understand one another, and, therefore, trust one another.

4.39 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD JOWITT)

My Lords, when we started our proceedings in the House today we were discussing the Hill Farming Bill, and I heard the noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, say that it took at least ten years to make a shepherd. I can only say, having listened to the delightful maiden speech which has just been made, that I am quite sure it cannot be done in ten years; and though the noble Lord says he has never before belonged to a public assembly, your Lordships will readily understand why it is that we have kept him in the background to solve for us all the difficulties which we could not solve ourselves. We are indeed fortunate in having the noble Lord to take part in our deliberations, and I very much hope that we shall often hear him. The noble Lord made in particular one interesting reference, I thought, to the conception of sovereignty. It is a very odd thing—and I dare say the noble Lord knows it—that there has been no jurist who has ever been able to define what "sovereignty" is. The reality we can understand, but the word means different things to different people. Yet many a time and oft in the world's history there has been trouble about the word, whilst so far as the realities were concerned there was no need to bother at all.

I now pass to consider briefly the various speeches that have been made. I shall be brief because His Majesty's Government to-day have had the experience of having practically no criticism at all levelled against them. Questions have been asked but it is quite obvious that the policy which the Foreign Secretary has been pursuing, and the statement that the Prime Minister has made, meet with general approval in all quarters of your Lordships' House. I come, first of all, to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham. He mentioned the Egyptian negotiations. They were not negotiations. The noble Lord said he did not fully realize the distinction between negotiations and conversations, but I think he will realize that there is all the difference in the world. When you come to negotiate you come to see whether you can reach an agreement, but when you come to talk things over you get to know each other, and each is able to explain to the other his point of view, in order that when negotiations do take place, you will be in a position to understand one another and arrive at some happy solution.

For myself, having been in this matter, like the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, was, for so long, a little behind the scenes, I would like to say this. I think it was a gallant thing of Sidky Pasha, no longer quite so young as he was—he is seventy-two years of age; and he was not very well—to come here to see that his point of view was understood by the Foreign Secretary and to learn the Foreign Secretary's point of view, and I am hopeful that as a result of the fact that they have had this opportunity, albeit under difficulties, because he was unwell, of understanding each other's point of view, those two points of view may be reconciled. But so far as the de facto position is concerned in the Sudan, so far as I know—and I do not pretend to have any complete knowledge of the discussions or conversations—there has never been any question but that Article 11 of the 1936 Treaty, which is the one which deals with the administration of the Sudan, shall continue in force. Speaking for myself, I agree with the noble Lord, that no arrangements will ever be satisfactory for the Sudan unless in due course it is plain that it is for the people of the Sudan to determine their future destination.

The next question the noble Lord asked was about Palestine.] think, in view of the fact that the conversations are for the moment delayed, but are coming on again shortly, it is desirable that we say very little about the matter at the present time; and, indeed, the noble Lord did not ask me to. The noble Lord wanted to know whether we were alive and press- ing on this question of displaced persons. I think we all realize that this problem of displaced persons is a great European, indeed a world problem. It cannot possibly be solved by Palestine and Palestine alone. Consequently we have now a delegation in New York co-operating energetically in the establishment of an International Refugee Organization under the United Nations, and we are stressing the extreme importance of the resettlement side of the work of that body. We, like the United States, are members of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, and we are now giving full support to that Committee in its negotiations with certain Governments on the question of the absorption of displaced persons. I can, therefore, assure the noble Lord that we do realize the importance of this problem, and we are doing all we can to meet it.

The noble Lord then touched on the problem of Germany, not, as he said, in great detail, because, in view of next week's debate, it would be inappropriate for him or for me to go into the matter at any length. I am bound to say that I did not feel there was the slightest difference between the point of view which the noble Lord put forward and that which I take. I think the idea that anybody should use Germany as a kind of balancing factor is such a wicked idea that one need say no more about it. The problem, as I see it, is this. We have got to do two things. On the one hand, Germany must be disarmed and kept disarmed; she must not hereafter be a menace to the peace of Europe. That is fundamental. But, having said that, I do think we really must try to see that we establish a self-supporting Germany. It is an intolerable thing that the British taxpayer should go on paying reparations—because that is what it comes to—to Germany to the extent of £80,000,000 a year. We simply cannot afford to do it, and the only way we can avoid it is by making Germany self-supporting.

Further, if we do not make Germany self-supporting, if we treat Germany as a pariah State and a plague-spot in the middle of Europe, the whole standard of life in Europe will go down. Therefore, so long as we always preserve as the first fundamental the question of disarmament and keeping Germany disarmed, I maintain that we must do what we can to bring about a self-supporting Germany. I agree that that means more coal, it means more food, it means more exports. It means that, unless we are to treat Germany as an economic whole, there must be a complete revision of the Potsdam Agreement.

So much for the views on Germany. I think I have dealt very shortly with the main topics which the noble Lord raised, and I now come to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Perth. He, in his great experience and wisdom, gave us a word of advice which was re-echoed by the most reverend Primate, the Archbishop of York, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart. He advised us to try to exercise patience, tolerance, and firmness in the difficulties of to-day. The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, would add "and a good sense of humour" and the noble Earl would probably agree with that too. That is all we can do. I claim that Mr. Bevin, in a time of great difficulty when there must have been a great temptation to retort, has conducted himself on our behalf with the greatest possible dignity.

As to the specific questions which the noble Earl asked me, he asked first of all whether I could give him any assurance in regard to the diminution of the Austrian territory. I can give him a complete assurance about that; this country will not stand for any diminution of the pre-war Austrian territory. Then he asked me a question about the Italian Treaty. I do not pretend, of course, that the Italian Treaty is exactly the Treaty I should have prepared had I had to consider nobody else, but I do say that on the whole it is not an unsatisfactory document. So far as we are concerned, I need hardly say that we are not asking for any reparations, subject to what I will say in a moment, although the cost to us of the Italian intervention in the war ran into thousands of millions. They are having to pay reparations to Russia, to Greece, to Yugoslavia and to Abyssinia (the total amount, I think, is $225,000,000) but we are getting nothing.

Then he asked me particularly about claims and debts arising out of prisoners of war and the conventions now in force. This is the position. We have claims against the Italians arising out of these prisoners of war and they have claims against us. I have very little doubt that the claims we have against them are substantially greater than the claims which they have against us. What we are proposing to do, therefore, is to set off our claim against their claims, leaving it to each Government to settle the claims of their own nationals. In view of the fact that we are not asking for any other reparations, I think that that, is a very reasonable and sensible attitude to take up. That, at any rate, is the position. Then the noble Earl asked about the position with regard to Archbishop Stepinac. I cannot say more than that His Majesty's Government are looking at the reports which they have received, but the noble Lord must realize that this is a matter of administration of justice in Yugoslavia. I can say nothing one way or the other more than I have said.

THE EARL OF PERTH

Might I ask the noble Lord if he will ultimately put the suggestion I made—that it does involve a question of the violation of the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations—before the Foreign Secretary?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I will certainly do that. Then the noble Earl touched on the control of nuclear energy and said, I think—if he did, I agree with him, and if he did not, I agree with him also—that it was really by far the most important topic in the world. There are two courses you can take. You can either get all the nations of the world to destroy all these things and stop this experimentation, which is quite impracticable, or you can get some measure of real control. If that is not done, then I think the prospect for the future of the world is very gloomy. I was very cheered to see that in his recent speech Premier Stalin seemed to realize that in this respect, at any rate, some international action might be desirable.

As to the veto, although I have had to stand up in your Lordships' House and say it is a very desirable thing to have and so on, I have always disliked it very much indeed. Quite frankly, I think it would be very foolish to try to get rid of it at the present time. I think we have got to build up confidence and better international relationships before we try to get rid of the veto. But, as the noble Earl, Lord Perth, said, if you could define the use of the veto, if you could at any rate ascertain what were matters of procedure and to what extent the veto should be used in those matters, you would have done a great deal. I am a little doubtful about the practicability of his idea to refer this to the International Court, because if some question of procedure arose you would probably want rather a quick decision, and although international courts of justice, like our own national courts, are admirable institutions, they are rather slow in grinding out their results. But certainly the idea, coming as it does from him, is one that shall be considered.

Now I come to the speech of the most reverend Primate. He asked particularly what steps were being taken in the United States of America to disseminate our views. We do not go in for propaganda and I do not apologize for that. I believe that in the long run the best form of propaganda is truth—absolutely plain, unvarnished, reliable statements of fact. You give those to your journalists and they can dress them" up in suitable headline array if necessary. We have a service in the United States. It is called the British Information Service. Its main office is in New York, with branches in Chicago and San Francisco; it works under the Embassy, and its function is to supply information of the sort to which I have referred—reliable, truthful information—to anybody who wants it. That service is being made use of very considerably. Then the most reverend Primate talked about Russia and Germany, and I think the replies I have given already really cover what he said.

The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, in a delightfully witty speech, which had great seriousness underlying it, advised us as to the right way in which to deal with the difficulties confronting us to-day. I am sure that in these problems, just as in one's own problems, a sense of humour is a saving grace. We will take to heart what he says. I devoutly hope that this country will continue to preserve its good humour, and its good faith, and if it does that, I think in the long run it will emerge triumphant from its difficulties more certainly than if it takes any apparently clever course.

As to the withdrawal of our troops from Greece, I say again that we want to withdraw them at the earliest possible moment. We must remember that these troops abroad in Greece and elsewhere are costing our taxpayers sums of money which we can ill afford. Therefore, the sooner our troops can come home the better we shall be pleased. On the other hand, however, in timing the withdrawal it will obviously be necessary to have regard to the sort of factors which the noble Lord mentioned. Then the noble Lord asked about the Bulgarian elections, which, if I remember aright, took place three or four days ago. We have not yet had time to ascertain whether they were satisfactory or not, but I should be misleading your Lordships if I did not say that such slight indications as we have at present are not encouraging. With regard to the Rumanian elections, they are still to come and our Government have indicated in a Note the sort of requirements they would deem necessary before they could consider that those elections were fair and above-board—fair that is to say, in giving the Rumanian people a fair opportunity to express their points of view. I hope I have dealt adequately, but certainly briefly, with the various points which your Lordships have raised. As always when we have a foreign affairs debate, it is most instructive to listen to it in this House, because we have so many speakers who speak with the greatest authority. Debates of this sort can only help His Majesty's Government in what I admit frankly is a difficult task and a most perplexing situation.

5.1 p.m.

LORD DERWENT

My Lords, at this relatively advanced hour I am anxious to call attention simply and solely to one or two passages in the Foreign Secretary's speech of a week ago passages which, although short, were perhaps rather significantly reported even in the inevitably curtailed versions of Parliamentary business which appear in the Press, that modern sink of iniquity, as it appears we must now get accustomed to consider it. I refer to certain passages that concern a region whose past importance is amply visible from, history and whose present im-portance, so far from diminishing, increases daily—I mean the region we call the Middle East. The Foreign Secretary began by pointing out that Great Britain and the Middle East have very close ties, and that no country has done more to promote the security an I develop the independence of the people in that area than Great Britain has done He went on to say that, apart from the Suez Canal, we have other interests in that region, and it should be borne in mind that this area is vital to the peace of the world and that the countries in it look to us for assistance in their development.

This is what I wish to stress in speaking to-day, and the point is amplified by a further remark of Mr. Bevin's when he said: The great task now is for those countries to build a healthy economy, based on a better standard of living conditions for the masses of their peoples. In this, the outlook of the new Britain particularly qualifies us to help; that is if our help is desired. We can assist by advising on labour laws and conditions, the development of agricultural and irrigation schemes, health services, and so forth, and we have said that we are prepared to put at the disposal of the Middle East countries all the experience and knowledge that we have gained of such things in the past. This is our attitude, not only to the Arab countries, but to all the Middle Eastern countries. It seems to me that the proviso "if our help is desired" is an essential one. Even if we join, as we must, in Mr. Bevin's protest against accusations from certain quarters that we in Britain wish to oppress and exploit the people of the Middle East—after all, even if we still wanted to, it would certainly by this time be impossible—we have very definite interests there, known ones, commercial ones and, unfortunately, strategic ones. So have other people besides ourselves by this time, so that I am at a loss to see why we should bear the brunt of such accusations.

But whether we consider it our duty to pay back to these countries what we gain from them in some other sort of coinage, or whether we consider it our duty to help them because we have, owing to accidents of history and possibly accidents of climate, reached by this time a higher degree of material civilization than the countries concerned, according to twentieth-century standards—and I trust that this is our permanent attitude—we have a duty towards the Middle East. That duty should consist in just what Mr. Bevin alluded to in the last passage I quoted, although, as I say, with the essential proviso "if our help is required." Personally, I have no doubt it is required. In all my too rapid tour of the Middle East countries last spring I found everywhere the more enlightened elements of the present governing classes—and these vary from country to country—only too ready to admit that they would need practical help from the West for a very long time to come. In this connexion I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to two steps which have already been taken, concerning one of which I am desirous of eliciting information from the noble Viscount who is going to reply. The first is the recent publication by His Majesty's Stationery Office of three admirable reports, originally prepared for the Middle East Supply Centre in 1944 and 1945, and compiled by two Englishmen, Messrs. Worthington and Keen and, what is not uninteresting, by one American, Mr. Allen of the Near East Foundation of New York.

These reports, called respectively Middle East Science, The Agricultural Development of the Middle East, and Rural Education and Welfare in the Middle East, give in an unexpectedly readable and, for me at least, passionately interesting form, all the details of the everyday practical problems that beset these countries in their efforts to improve the lot of their inhabitants. The publication of these reports seems to me a proof that the Foreign Secretary's observations are no mere idle promises made for selfish propaganda purposes. But more, I fancy, has been done than that. Shortly after the war, I think I am right in saying, a new section was formed in the Foreign Office which is now apparently called the Middle East Secretariat, to examine all these questions. Chatham House was, I believe, to be pressed into service for collecting and supplying information, and an organization was at the same time set up in Cairo under Sir Arnold Overton, which is called the British Middle East Office, as an opposite number to the Secretariat in the Foreign Office.

I think it would be of some interest to your Lordships' House if we could have what I might call a progress report concerning these bodies and also possibly be assured, if it is thought fit, that their work will not run a risk of becoming submerged in the general Middle East work of the Foreign Office, for the good reason that it might become sanded up in the dreary but inescapable wastes of pure politics. The political elements are gloomy and complicated enough in all conscience. But there is not only that: such a development might lead to the gradual submersion of what is potentially our most valuable contribution to the future of the Middle East in general. My own attitude, which I hope your Lordships will share, can be perfectly summed up in the concluding passage of Mr. Allen's report: We of the West should not attempt to impose our form of government or our way of life on the East; nor should we measure their standards of living by our chosen yardsticks. In fact there are certain realms in which the slow-plodding peasant or the freedom-loving nomad has much to offer to the hurried Westerner. At the same time we believe, and they know when they have an Opportunity to express themselves freely, that a degree of literacy is the right of every man and the beginning of general enlightenment; that the tilling of one's own soil is a powerful motivating force; that widespread suffering from preventable disease is not an inseparable part of human existence. It should be the combined responsibility of the more priviledged Powers of the world, during the next era of peace, to give unfailing support to these basic concepts. It is because I feel—and the noble Earl, Lord Perth, has already given me the lead in this by one or two isolated remarks he made—very strongly that Great Britain owes it to the less privileged areas of the globe to supply them, if called on to do so, with the benefits of her sociological and technical experience, that I am desirous of extracting this information from His Majesty's Government to-day, in the form of an assurance that we shall not only be ready but be able to produce competent and properly paid technicians and advisers for this purpose if and when the time comes.

If, as is certainly the case, during all the past years, through the sulphurous fog of our political difficulties in Egypt there has glowed unextinguished the light of the perfectly amicable collaboration of Egyptian and British engineers and experts over such vital matters as Egypt's life blood, the Nile and the distribution of its waters, there should be not only no reason why such collaborations should not continue, but every reason for encouraging them in the general cause of the world peace, even if it is depressing to think that such peace can only easily be attained on the technical level.

5.10 p.m.

LORD DARWEN

My Lords, the hour is late, and I do not propose to keep you for more than a very few minutes. I think that this debate this afternoon has impressed on all of us who have heard it the fact that every member of this House who has spoken has been measuring the foreign policy of the Government by how far it is contributing to the building of world peace. That is a great fact. We hear constantly that all the world wants peace, that every nation wants peace, and that it is only the stupid statesmen who cannot give the world the thing that all the peoples desire. One writer, recently, wrote something to the effect that the statesmen were all possessed with such obsessive suspicion that they were obviously in need of psycho-analysis. I believe it is true that all the world wants peace. I believe it is also profoundly true that many individuals in the nations of the world and most of the national Governments desire things which are inconsistent with peace, and that is the real root of the trouble.

May I remind your Lordships that when Jesus was about to make His triumphal entry into Jerusalem, as He saw the city before Him, He wept over it and cried: "Oh that thou hadst known the things that belong unto peace." And then He went on to describe the awful fate which was going to befall the city of Jerusalem. "Oh that thou hadst known the things that belong unto peace. "I wonder—and I am afraid that the wonder has grown as I have listened to this debate—whether we know "the things that belong unto peace." We are in the midst of a profound change in the world. I think that I regard the two great world wars through which we have passed as incidents in that change. In this changing and changed world, the pursuit of exclusive privilege or advantage by any nation is anti-social and anachronistic, and I would stress this—even the maintenance of a privileged position, even the maintenance of strategic and economic advantages which have been obtained through force in the past 01: through the accidents of history, even their maintenance to-day, if it is against the public interest of the world, may be: the cause of a world war again.

The world is changing, it seems to me, in three particular ways. It is changing from a world divided into separate self-contained units, divided, inevitably, by geography in many cases; it is changing from that kind of a world to a world completely united by inter-communication and inter-transport. Those old separate divisions are being inevitably destroyed. It is changing from a world in which very few nations had world needs and world interests to a world in which all nations are awakening to demand their rights in the world as a whole; are awakening to a sense of their world needs and world interests. I began my business career by selling cotton goods to Japan. It was the last order of that kind that my firm booked. That marked the beginning of a big change within my lifetime, the change from the time when Japan was a buyer of cotton goods to the days when she was a great exporter of cotton goods. That is the kind of change that has been taking place.

Lastly, the world has been changing from a world of nations governed by a few individuals for their own interests, to a world in which the whole of the manhood of the nations are uprising and demanding their share both in the government of their countries and in the fruits of their labours. It is a new world, and in it selfish national policy must lead to war. It is a world that is moving towards the world of the many for the benefit of the many, and the resistance to that movement by the retention of special exclusive privilege of any kind is going to be a cause of war in the future.

I would suggest that there are two fundamental principles which must inspire and guide our policy. The first is that the well-being of each individual unit can only be found ultimately in the well-being of the whole. It follows that we must all work for the well-being of the nations of the world. There must be co-operation and mutual helpfulness, which must be fully planned and co-ordinated so that all the nations may have equality of opportunity and a chance to develop their full capacity. We have got, somehow, to remove fear. The first fear from which the nations have suffered has been the fear of strangulation, of not being allowed to develop their industry or whatever it may have been. We have got to remove that fear of strangulation, and we can only remove it by co-operation and mutual helpfulness.

Then we have got to remove the fear of war. Nothing has yet been said in this debate about disarmament, but I believe that disarmament, while not a primary thing, is a very important secondary matter, and it is one of the things for which we, have to work, and work toward, very seriously if we are going to get world peace. We have had the great offer by M. Molotov, and I know there are many reasons why we like examining that offer very carefully. Let us remember this—there was one time in the past when Russia offered disarmament and when no effect was given to that offer. I hope that this time Mr. Molotov's offer will be given a very cordial reception, and that a real effort, a serious effort, an enthusiastic effort, will be made to see if it is not possible to work out a real basis for the policy he has suggested.

The second principle that should inspire all our policy is the principle of respect for personality. In our own country we have that respect for individual human personality. It is the basis of our morality. In the international sphere we have to extend that to respect for the rights of other nations. A great deal has been said about Russia. Quite frankly, I am more afraid of America than of Russia in this changing world, because America stands in the way of the change towards which the world is moving, while Russia is moving with the change. I think our reply to the Russian challenge is to show the value of our democratic Socialism. Russia does not yet know that there was a 1945 revolution in Great Britain; I do not think the world knows it. But there was a revolution in Great Britain. Great Britain, therefore, is to-day in an outstanding position to help along this great change in the world—from the world of the few to the world of the many—to help it along to see that it does so develop as to give a rich new life for all the individuals and for all the nations of the world.

I do not want great competition with the Soviet Government to see if we can sell our ideas more readily than they can sell their's. In spite of what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, I am not a camouflaged totalitarian but I do recognize the fact that there may be some countries in Europe who regard the Soviet system as a stage through which they will have to go before they can reach democratic Socialism. It is not our business to try and force them into our mould, but it is our business to let them and the world know that we are on the side of the common man everywhere; that we are seeking to build up the life of the common man everywhere; that we are seeking to help every nation to improve its standard of life and to make a great development in its national life; that we want to be helpful; and that that is the one thing we want to be. We must let the world know that this spirit of mutual helpfulness and deep respect for other nations is the spirit behind our policy. I think that has been the policy of the Socialist movement in this country for a great many years. I think it is the policy of the British Government and the Foreign Secretary to-day, and I feel that the only weakness is that we do not sufficiently reiterate, again and again, the policy for which we are working, and that we do not let the world know what it is.

5.24 p.m.

THE EARL OF GLASGOW

My Lords, I am entirely in agreement with the remarks on disarmament of the noble Lord who has just spoken. If Mr. Molotov is really in earnest, and shows later on that he is in earnest, then I hope that we shall take his offer with both hands. I am going to say some uncomfortable things which I think should be said. I only wish that I could echo the helpful and optimistic views which have been expressed by several noble Lords during this debate. What is it that gives rise to this uneasiness among all thinking people in this country to-day? We fought and won the war to put an end to Nazi tyranny. We fought not only for our own security, but to free Europe from the secret police. We fought for freedom of conscience, and for liberty for nations and individuals. We fought, in fact, for the democratic way of life. Now, eighteen months after the war, the world finds itself facing another tyranny, that of a Communist dictatorship which is as absolute as any in the world.

We have to face the fact—and I want to put facts before your Lordships, as far as facts can be facts—that the rulers of Russia believe their security depends upon world revolution. Their object is to establish a Communist dictatorship throughout the earth. They propose to do this by infiltration or, if that fails, by force. We have to realize that this belief of their's cannot be shaken, and that that is the reason they are unappeasable. They feel (wrongly, I think), that they will soon be strong enough to enforce their wishes on the world, and in order to prepare for that day Stalin has launched a five-year programme of rearmament. May I remind your Lordships that thirteen or fourteen men control Russia? These men are fanatical Communists, and they consider that all non-Communist States are enemies of Russia. Not one of them, reports tell us, is in favour of collaboration with the capitalist world. In his book Problems of Leninism, Stalin has expressed his approval of Lenin's statement that there can be no compromise between the Soviet Union and other non-Communist States. He says: We are living, not only in a. State, but in a system of States, and the existence of the Soviet Republics side, by side with Imperialistic States for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end, and before that end supervenes a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republics and the bourgeois States is inevitable. In the light of this, it cannot be said that the forces of civilization have not been warned. Russian policy seems obvious. The Russians know that the United States and ourselves hate the thought of another war, and they propose to take advantage of that state of mind while the going is good. Their policy is one of no concessions, and an endeavour, by the use of power politics and forceful pressure, to obtain from the Western Powers bases for goodness knows what—perhaps the conquest of the world. We should be fools not to face the possibility that, as soon as their military preparations are complete, rhey may put forward aggressive demands for territory which it would be impossible for this country to concede. Until they are ready—and they may not be ready for some time—their policy is to put every obstacle in the way of a settlement in Europe, and to prevent the ratification of the peace treaties. Tliey will keep Europe 'in a ferment with their propaganda and with their occupying forces, the most obvious example being the huge display of force by Yugoslavia, which is reported to have more than 500,000 men under arms. What is this enormous army for? Is it for aggression, or is it for the defence of Yugoslavia?

I wish here to draw the attention of the House to the lying propaganda put out against us from all countries of the Eastern bloc at the instance of Russia. This is a direct incentive; to those peoples to prepare for war. I know this matter has been brought up in the House before by, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart. Unfortunately, I was not present at the debate and did not hear what he said. I am given to understand that he brought it up with a considerable sense of humour. I am afraid I shall not be very humorous on this question. At this moment, from Moscow and from stations throughout Slav Europe, a mass of appalling vituperation is being broadcast against this country in sixty different languages. It is propaganda of bitterness and hate, venomous and abusive. It could not be worse if we were in a state of war. I believe that this hostility is a fateful menace to the peace of the world, and that it should be brought up at the Security Council of the United Nations Organization.

I would be very grateful to the noble Lord who replies for the Government—he need not do so, but I ask for his courtesy—if he would give an answer to the following: What are we doing to counter this propaganda? I think that every lie broadcast by these people should be answered. If this is looked upon as unimportant, then we are living in a fool's paradise. No doubt I shall be told that the British Council or some other body do broadcast British propaganda or culture to Europe. But that is not good enough. As I have already said, what we want is to see that none of their plausible untruths should go unanswered. Again I may be told, as was said in another place, that this would do more harm than good. Why? This is no time, in my opinion, for dignified silence. These continued aspersions on our country will gradually have their effect all over Europe, even on those people who have always believed in the fair-mindedness and justice of the British people. Surely that is an important point.

I should also like to call the attention of the noble Lord who will reply to the reports from Eastern Europe which seems to show that Russia is preparing for war. It has been reported in the Press that the Russian authorities have seized fifty large businesses in their zone, and that a large number of these places are turning out war materials exclusively for Russia; that these plants are believed to be operating at peak capacity; and that they include the large Krupp Works at Magdeburg and the Farben plants at Bitterfeld, which are making hydrogen peroxide for rocket propulsion. Other plants are producing special jet aircraft and rockets. New plants are being seized every day, and it has been estimated that the value of this cartel, which is called the Soviet Industrial Company, amounts to over £400,000,000. All this is being done with the help of German technicians and it is contrary to paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (18) of the Potsdam Agreement. I should like to know whether these reports are true or not, and, if they are true, what action have the Government taken.

In this country, owing to the reticence of the Press and the misleading statements of politicians, there is an almost despairing feeling—and I am speaking for very many people—that we are taking the easiest line and hoping for the best, and that, due to the inertia of impotence, we are drifting towards an abyss. It is time that some definite statement was made by the Government that the moment has come for the country to prepare itself for any eventuality, and that, together with the Empire and such friends as we have across the seas, we should call the bluff of those who are playing poker with us at Paris and elsewhere. If the Western Democracies have the courage for a showdown, they should put forward a clear demand for an investigation not only regarding the number of troops in the Russian-occupied areas but also as to what Russia is doing in other ways in her German and Austrian zones. If this demand is not conceded, then all conferences between East and West should be ended and the necessary counter-measures taken to meet the situation. These should include the rooting out and the political sterilization of the Quisling "fifth column" which aspire to act as the eyes and ears of the Soviet Union in all countries of the Western world.

The Government must have means of knowing what is going on. For instance, they will have some knowledge as to whether Russia is preparing for aggression or defence. What I am afraid of is that, knowing that there may be the possibility of a crisis, if not immediately, in the near future, or in the future, the Government will be afraid, for internal Party political reasons, to take the people into their confidence and tell them the truth—that the time has come again to prepare to defend the country and the Empire. In all this everyone will have considerable sympathy with the Government, because for years politicians of all Parties have been mouthing woolly sophistries about our Russian friends and the great Russian democracy, which were quite untrue and misleading. The Government have rightly done their best, during the last year, to get on friendly terms with our late Allies, and have met with nothing but snubs, hostile speeches and propaganda, in spite of the efforts of one of the best Foreign Ministers this country has ever had. On several occasions he has stood up for the cause of all free peoples with vigour and decision. I suggest that the time has now come when speakers for the Government, instead of boosting Russia as a friend and Ally, should be realistic and tell the people the truth, so that they may prepare and brace themselves for whatever may come.

I want to say a word on matters which, although not quite within the scope of a foreign affairs debate, yet, considering the times we live in, do bear some relation to it. Why is it, in these dangerous times, that we are reducing the numbers of His Majesty's ships? I realize that advances in science have made certain classes of ships redundant, but why reduce our destroyer and carrier totals? It is common knowledge that a large number of ships of the war-time programmes have been cancelled in various stages of construction. Some of these, such as battleships and heavy cruisers, may not fit in with the new scheme of things. But I wonder whether, due to the policy of the Treasury, the opinion of naval experts has been disregarded on the question of keeping in the Service as many carriers, destroyers and submarines as possible. Apart from ships scrapped when building, we have been giving away good ships to foreign Powers. Again I wonder if the Admiralty are in favour of a ship like the "Colossus" being even lent to France in these unsettled times.

Apart from this fine craft, we have sold or given away many submarines, and only the other day four of the useful "Cromwell."class of destroyers were handed over to Norway. The cruiser "Orion" has gone to Holland, and the famous light cruisers "Leander," ": Ajax" and "Achilles" have been given to India. Even if it can be shown that these generous gestures are justified, it would be interesting to know when, if ever, these ships, now lost to us, will be replaced. The Admiralty have had to take up a very realistic attitude in a difficult situation. Their appropriations have been cut, they have the greatest difficulty in manning existing ships, and no one seems to know what the fleets of the future will be composed of.

I am not qualified to speak about 'the Royal Air Force, but, in a recent statement, a certain gallant Marshal of the Royal Air Force said that the Force was dangerously short of recruits. I believe that most of the airfields—or a large num-bre of them—laboriously constructed during the war have been returned to their former use. Our main defence in the event of a crisis is the Royal Air Force apd the Royal Navy. Surely as many as possible of these airfields should be retained and kept in order, in case they are required. I hope they never will be required, but one never knows. In the United States they take a very different and a much more realistic view. They have not reduced their Navy. They are now spending more on the Navy than they did during the war. The United States is facing up to the serious world situation with realism, whilst we seem to be living in a land of dreams. The distinguished American diplomat, Mr. W. Bullitt, has the following to say in his latest book, words which ring true to me. The aim of Soviet poiicy is constant, to establish a Communist dictatorship throughout the earth. In its own eyes the Soviet Government is always engaged in warfare, open or concealed with the non-Communist States of the worjd, and when_ the Soviet Government embraces in friendship any non-Communist Government it is always with the ultimate intention of driving a dagger into its back. That is why Stalin is non-appeasable. That is why for our own preservation we must recognize the unpleasant fact that Stalin, like Hitler, will not stop but can only be stopped. To-day, all Governments, except the Soviet and its satellites, are working for peace. The Soviet Government appear—I hope they are not—to be working for conquest.

We, on our side, are sick and tired of war, but I do not believe we have lost the instinct for self-pressrvation, and I hope that instinct will force us to bestir ourselves to build up again our national forces in such strength that all potential aggressors, including the Soviet Union, will think twice before disturbing our peace. We have two alternatives. One is, when the threat materializes, to allow the Communist Party of Great Britain to take over the country under the direction of Russia. The second is to prepare ourselves now to protect our liberty. I admit that this is a hard decision for a war-worn country to take, but we must take one or the other. To drift is fatal, and the first alternative is unthinkable. In order to carry out the second, the Government must get the people behind them. There will be no difficulty in doing that if we are informed, for we are a people of great courage. Our countrymen should be made to realize that we are again existing in a world of power politics, and that unless we take similar action to that of the United States and face up to the menace and make ourselves strong again, we may find ourselves involved in a struggle for which we are totally unprepared.

This Motion has presumably been put on the paper with a view to extracting from the Government an avowal that they are well aware of the seriousness of the world situation. If that is admitted, surely it is pertinent to ask that the whole question of further demobilization, especially with regard to the Air Force and the Navy, should be reconsidered, and also that, within the bounds of the classes of ship that are advised as necessary by our naval experts, a building programme should be laid down and no more ships should be scrapped.

5.42 p.m.

LORD BEVERIDGE

My Lords, a fortnight ago I scrapped a rather full speech I had prepared about Germany. Hill farming got in the way of a debate about the German problem, and though we may have an opportunity next week of a full discussion on the German problem I hope that my speech will then have to be rather different. I have just now scrapped most of another speech which I had prepared on this Motion, but I do not apologize, even at this late hour, for rising to bring before your Lordships points that I wanted to raise on this occasion because they arise directly out of some things that were said by the noble and learned Lord Chancellor, and out of what was said in the debate on foreign affairs by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in another place. They relate not to the general problem of Germany but to the execution of the Potsdam Agreement and the revision of the Potsdam Agreement.

In another place, the Foreign Secretary said that the Potsdam Agreement was not being carried out. He referred particularly to the failure to establish the economic unity of Germany. There is also another important provision for the equal treatment of the whole German population throughout Germany which is being equally disregarded. He said "this cannot go on." The question I want to ask is: Why are we allowing it to go on? Why have we allowed it to go on for fifteen months? The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, said there had been no note of criticism of the Government in this debate. I venture to say that it is a legitimate criticism of the Government that for fifteen months we have sat down under a complete failure to carry out the essential part of the Potsdam Agreement, and yet have continued to carry on certain parts of it which were greatly to our disadvantage and to the disadvantage of Germany. We are still doing that, and that is the urgency of the matter.

We are still continuing to dismantle industry, to destroy factories, and to send reparations. In some articles which I wrote in The Times recently, I referred to one particular shipyard which I went to see in Hamburg, which, for some years, has been engaged on making nothing but fishing boats and similar small craft—things which are most urgently needed in Germany. Yet that was condemned to be destroyed. Not only did I write about it, I wrote also to the Chancellor of the Duchy who is in charge of Germany and I spoke to him about it. Within the last few days I have had the answer: that the dismantling of this must proceed because not to proceed with it would demand a revision of the Potsdam Agreement. So, carrying out that Agreement, which the Foreign Secretary says cannot go on, we are still having to destroy factories which are earnestly needed not only for the prosperity but for the feeding of Germany.

The same thing arises about denazification. I will not say much about that, I will only say again that we are proceeding to prescribe and dismiss Nazi technicians on the grounds that they are Nazis and dismantling their factories. There is no doubt at all that just as many of the factories go over to the Soviet zone, so many of the technicians follow. If there are any people who have thought we were destroying German industry which might compete with us, they will find we have only been transferring it. That is going on still today. These two conditions of economic unity and of equal treatment of the German population quite obviously imply a kind of friendly co-operation of all the four Powers, in the administration of Germany, which is not so today.

I want to urge that till we get that co-operation we should suspend our side of it, all the destroying and dismantling of industry. Suspend it at once and completely for reconsideration. That is the most urgent plea I make and it is an urgent question because we are still going on with this policy and destroying. The second point is as to the revision of the Potsdam Agreement. Even if it were being carried out in full, with German economic unity, I would be prepared to argue that it is quite inconsistent with the Atlantic Charter. Whether or not it is inconsistent with the Atlantic Charter, I want to go on to say that this policy of destroying and limiting German industry is entirely inconsistent with compressing the German population into a much smaller area. I believe it may be possible for the German people, who are a very able and industrious people, to contain themselves reasonably in a small area, but only on the basis of having as muchindustry as possible.

The urgency of this case is that when we are beginning to consider the German lactones on the East we ought to make it clear that any consideration of allowing Germany to be compressed in the East must depend not merely on free elections in Poland—that is comparatively unimportant—but on a drastic revision of the whole Potsdam Agreement. Our assent to the Russian and Polish factories in the East, and our assent to the French pleas for the Saar ought to follow, not precede, a complete revision of the Potsdam Agreement. Those are the two points I want to make.

I cannot but regret—and I venture to criticize the Government for—the loss of fifteen months. We have got nothing from Soviet Russia during those fifteen months, not even agreement upon the final reparations. We know that that big problem is still before us. During that fifteen months we have lost any amount of money. I do not personally regard it as reparations to Germany, because, after all, we are in control of Germany, but it is, at any rate, money which we have paid.

There is only one final point, and it is a difficulty which may be in your Lordships' minds. If we take, as I think we should have taken during the last fifteen months, a more positive line, on the question of whether we shall split Germany, I know there are many people who will say that we must not: do anything to split Germany. The simple answer to that is that Germany is at present completely split, not by us, although I think we have made some contribution to it, and not only by Soviet Russia. I think some of the other occupying Powers are not sufficiently co-operative. Germany is at present split. A united Germany depends upon getting other Powers to change their policies, and we shall not get them to change their policies by silting down under them. If in the last resort we cannot get them to change their policies and make a real economic unit of Germany, with complete freedom of travel and inspection by authorized agents and everybody to see that there is real economic unity, then I think we must endeavour to make a success of our own zone. I would suggest that if we make a success of our own zone, and make it as strong as it can be for peace, we can always prevent it from being strong for war. Then when it is strong unity will come with the other parts of Germany wishing to join.

5.52 p.m.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

My Lords, with the permission of my noble friend the Leader of the House, I should like to say a word about the reference made by my noble friend Lord Altrincham to the Egyptian Treaty negotiations. As your Lordships know, I am the head, under Mr. Bevin, of course, of the British Treaty Delegation, and it would not be proper for me to deal with the matter of the negotiations. However, it might be of interest to your Lordships to know how the matter stands at the moment. I agree with what the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has said about Sidky Pasha. He is seventy-two years of age, and he is a sick man and went straight back to bed in Cairo. While here he carried on from his bedroom in Claridges with amazing patriotic courage. I think we all agree that that is admirable.

He did not come here to negotiate, and for this reason: that he was not authorized to negotiate. He came here as Prime Minister, as head of the Government, with his Foreign Secretary. The negotiations are advised on—I suppose that is the right word—by the Royal Commission in Egypt appointed by King Farouk and consisting of twelve members including no less than five Egyptian statesmen who have held the rank of Prime Minister in their own country. What Sidky Pasha came here to do was to explain quite clearly, and face to face with Mr. Bevin, how Egypt felt; and without going into the question in detail I can at any rate, after six months' work there, bear testimony to the fact that the feeling in Egypt is very strong and unanimous. Sidky Pasha has now gone back and on Friday he is going to meet his full delegation and receive their advice on the talks which he had with Mr. Bevin.

There has in the meantime of course been a flood of Press rumour. Sidky Pasha has, I believe, issued from his office in Cairo to-day, a statement denying the authenticity of one interview that was attributed to him. Hadi Pasha has also issued a statement asking the Egyptians—and the Arabic Press is extremely imaginative; pay it that tribute—not to be too much moved by what appears in the papers. I hope that may be the general spirit and that I am not going too far in saying that from this House there should come a wish that these negotiations should succeed and build an alliance upon what is an existing friendship.

5.57 p.m.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT ADDISON)

My Lords, I am sure every one of your Lordships will have heard with real pleasure and, I may say, with comfort what my noble friend behind me has just said. He consulted me beforehand. The noble Lord knew the facts much better than I did, and I felt it would be altogether to the advantage of the situation and to the satisfaction of your Lordships if he spoke on the subject, as he has done. As to the other subjects raised in the debate, I do not think myself that there are many points upon which I need add much to what was said by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, but there are a few additional comments which perhaps call for some short reply. It seems to me, my Lords, that the whole course of the debate shows that in this distracted world, torn as it is by all kinds of conflicting interests and ambitions, perhaps inevitable after a destructive and widespread war such as we have had, those who are responsible for guiding our foreign policy through this maze of difficulties are charged with an immense responsibility and one as difficult as can be imagined. Therefore one has only to call to notice what was said about the work the Foreign Secretary is doing.

I am not proposing to traverse the ground; it is not my particular domain although I am intimately familiar with most of what has been going on. I would like to say, however, how much I appreciate some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, with regard to the Middle East. He emphasized the necessity of adopting a policy which will develop the resources of the Middle East. I do not think he could have said a truer word. What strikes me, when I look at some of these vast territories, is how little the people have moved in the direction of bettering their conditions of life for a very long time, almost centuries. I am also struck—and the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, is more intimately aware of them than I am—with the possibilities of development in the Middle East. But that must depend on establishing confidence and friendship between ourselves and the Arab States. That only reinforces, amongst other things, the importance of the Egyptian negotiations.

The broad purpose of promoting the general development and well-being of all these territories in what we describe as the Middle East has been charged particularly as a duty to our Middle East Organization. This body has been set up and is charged to help in all matters affecting the problems of agriculture, irrigation, health services, social services and matters of that kind. I am quite sure, as the noble Lord said, that in seeking, as a more forward nation, to help to improve the lot of those less advanced, we are makings very material contribution towards the establishment of peaceful conditions. I put it no higher than that. I have said myself on more than one occasion, in other words, what the noble Lord, Lord Darwen, said, as to the necessity of Governments abating, shall I say, their conceptions of a narrow nationalism. It is perfectly evident that unless we are prepared and can persuade other people along with ourselves to abate the claims and ambitions of the narrower, old-fashioned type of nationalism, we shall never secure that co-operation in the world which is absolutely vital if we are going to have a world at peace.

I do not think I will follow him—or indeed the noble Earl, Lord Glasgow—in his admonition of the Government and his reflections upon some of the campaigns (with which we are just as well acquainted as he is) which are being inaugurated, and many of which are, as he says, full of disparagement of this country. We do not take the view which he would, I fancy, like us to take—namely, that the right policy if a man shouts at you, is to shout back at him louder than he has shouted at you. Somehow or other that does not strike us as being the way to get amicability amongst the nations, and therefore we do not propose to adopt trie method which I gather he wishes us to adopt. If we were to start replying, through our organizations, to every disparagement of ourselves we should be very fully occupied. In any case, we should most of the time only be giving the other man a chance to start another hare and we would be chivvying around in all directions to nobody's advantage. That is not our method. I myself do not think it is either wise or efficacious, and so I do not propose to follow him in that way.

Our suggestion is that we should use our organizations (and they are pretty comprehensive and fairly efficient) to spread the truth and to let the facts be known, in the confident hope that in the course of time they will wear down suspicions and that these flaming distrusts will die out. Apart altogether from any question of dignity, I am perfectly certain that the right policy for us to adopt when we are exposed to various disparagements is not to squabble with the other man about everything he invents but to pursue our course, making known the facts as efficiently and as well as^ we can, being studiously fair and moderate, pursuing peace by all practical means and, above all, helping other people to improve the lot of those in the world who are at the present time rather backward. Anyhow, that is the policy of the Middle East Office. I do not think myself, speaking generally, that the recriminatory method is the right one to adopt.

As to what he said about ships, I can tell the noble Earl that all those considerations have been present to our minds. The British Admiralty is not proposing to scrap ships which it thinks we ought to keep. None of these decisions have been taken except upon the advice of those concerned, particularly of the Admiralty. We are fully aware of what is being done with regard to the disposal of a certain number of surplus ships and I think your Lordships will agree that on the whole the right course is being taken and that it is not unreasonable that these small ships to which the noble Lord referred should be made over to the Norwegians and others in different directions to some of whom he referred.

I am sure that I wish the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, could do all that he wants, but] am afraid that if he lectured our Allies as I rather suspected he was lecturing us, he would find it was not a very advantageous method of proceeding and that it would not get him very far. We are just as well aware as he is of the fact that the Potsdam Agreement has not been carried out. We have said so many times and the Foreign Secretary has spoken with great frankness about it. We have formally given notice that we consider' ourselves free to propose a revision of it. I am afraid that it is not so easy as the noble Lord suggests to bring about the observation of the Potsdam Agreement as to treating Germany as an economic whole. This is, what we should like to do and what we have been striving to do, and, if the noble Lord could suggest some procedure whereby we could make more effective progress in that direction, I am quite; sure that nobody would be more grateful to him than the Foreign Secretary. Merely scolding people, however, will not do it; it does not have the slightest effect.

As to what the noble Lord said about the destruction of factories in our area, I can only answer that by saying that I should be glad if at some time he would provide me with details of the cases to which he refers. Although in the early months certain factories which could make fertilizers, for instance, were being dismantled, it was quite evident that that was a foolish procedure and those factories have been brought into operation again, because if you are going to produce food from the land, even in our zone in Germany, you must have fertilizers. The same policy is being applied to many other industries, particularly those industries ancillary to getting timber out of Germany. One of our biggest difficulties (it is very seriously handicapping our housing programme and will do so next year) is the delay in getting timber from Germany. But, when you come to look into the actual facts, to get timber from Germany means supplies of labour, supplies of tractors, river boats, repair shops and a hundred other things of that kind, all of which we have got in hand. It is no good the noble Lord shaking his head at me like that, because I happen to know the facts. That is so; we are making the most strenuous efforts and have been for months past with as efficient a timber organization as I should think there is anywhere. We got the very best people we could find and sent them over there, charged with this very duty. We are making very active efforts, and if the noble Lord can suggest any improvements I shall be only too glad to listen to them; but merely scolding us does not get us anywhere.

LORD BEVERIDGE

Would the noble Viscount allow me to suggest one improvement? His Majesty's Government could have got ahead more quickly with some reconstruction if they had not been expending energy on destruction. My suggestion is less destruction; stop destruction at once. That is my positive suggestion.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

That does not help me very much because we stopped destruction a long time ago. As a matter of fact, some considerable time ago we refused to go on with the dismantling of certain factories, although they were more or less allied to war industries, because we did not think it served any valuable or useful purpose. We are doing everything we can to develop, for example, the production of coal in the Ruhr, the provision of timber—getting it moved to the ports, getting it shipped and getting machinery to ship it—and the provision of fertilizers for the land. I quite agree with the noble Lord that it is altogether a lop-sided business to try to run Germany in separate compartments as it is now. Nobody knows that better than we do, and that is why we should like to treat Germany as an economic whole. If we could persuade all the others concerned to co-operate in that endeavour, it would be a very good thing. We have made an arrangement with our allies in the American zone and now we are beginning to get agreement on a pooling system which will operate very extensively with regard to food and many other things. I can only hope and pray that that pooling and co-operation will, as rapidly as possible, be extended to the whole of Germany.

That is the way in which to make Germany self-supporting and it is because these services have not been unified over the whole of Germany that the British taxpayer has had to pay for a lot of food to go into our zone. I think it is quite possible that if we had as much food as could have been got perhaps from the eastern side of Germany, we should not have to spend so much in sending food across the Atlantic to our zone. We are painfully aware of these facts and have been for a long time. We are striving our best to get them rectified, and we should be glad of any useful suggestions. I would only like to say, as I think the Foreign Secretary emphasized in the speech he made in another place a few days ago, that we are making special efforts in concert with our Allies to promote co-operation of the different parts of Germany and so to make it a self-supporting whole.

I quite agree with what the noble Lord said, or suggested, that it is impossible to imagine that we shall be able to make progress in the settlement of the world if we anticipate that there is going to be a sort of dependent State right in the middle of Europe, consisting of some of the most skilled people in the world. That is an impossible suggestion. It is one of the big series of questions which, as the House knows, is due to be taken up between the four Foreign Ministers after the end of the present conferences, and I only hope—and I am sure the whole House hopes—that success may attend their efforts. All I have to say is that nobody is more painfully aware of the distracted state of the world than His Majesty's Government. But we believe that the continuous practice of forbearance and patience, including firmness where required, will gradually help to allay suspicions which are plaguing the world at the present time. Somebody asked me in this House some time ago what my prescription was in connexion with these matters, and on the spur of the moment I made a reply which I would venture, without egotism, to go back to. I said it seemed to me that what was wanted in the world, above all, was at least twenty years of patence and straightforward dealing, and I believe, my Lords, that that is still true.

6.12 p.m.

LORD ALTRINCHAM

My Lords, I do not think I need detain your Lordships with an extensive reply upon the debate, but I should like, before withdrawing my Motion, to thank the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for the answers and assurances he gave me, and also to thank the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, for his intervention in the debate, which I thought, to say the least, a very timely one. It has removed some of our anxieties. We share with him to the full the desire that there should be nothing to cloud the complete friendliness 'between ourselves and the Egyptian people. What we want is a partnership of an equal kind. To be frank, as he knows, my heart is still very much in Egypt. The only thing I fear is that in Egypt everybody may feel—and I am talking now about the leaders of the Egyptian people—very strongly the importance of sentiment. I think we on our side have got to emphasize the importance of reality, to which sentiment is sometimes rather a stranger. That is very important at present. I think we must also emphasize the fact that there cannot be a vacuum. What we must ultimately have in future, if there is to be security in Egypt, is some broad arrangement on a regional basis, such as is contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. I am sure we are all agreed upon that.

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, introduced the subject of economic development, because that also I have very much at heart. There is only one correction I would make in what he said. That is that the Eastern Office presides over what remains of the Middle Eastern Office. It was very efficient in the past, but I am afraid it is not so at the present moment. That is the situation. The Middle Eastern Office has collapsed. I very much regret that I am profoundly in disaccord with His Majesty's Government. I very much regret they have allowed it to collapse and I hope they will revive it at an early date. The three reports to which the noble Lord referred are of the utmost importance. They are brilliantly written and based on the most careful study. I may say there is a fourth report which emanated from action taken in the period when I was out there, the report of Professor Pearse. I hope that that also may be made available. I do not know why it has not, because it is one of the most interesting reports, and the fact of its existence has been public knowledge for a very long time past. I think that fourth report ought certainly to be added to the three which have already been published.

As to the controversy between the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, and the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, I think I had better not intervene, but I think I should say this to the noble Viscount opposite; forbearance is a very good thing and, of course, we have got to secure to the utmost extent possible the co-operation of the other United Powers. I referred to this international question in my speech, but I hope that in pursuing forbearance and in trying to get agreement we shall not forget that ultimately everything depends upon our leadership in Western Europe. If we do not lead the thing will collapse, and if we have a criticism to make of His Majesty's Government it is that there has not been a clear enough lead in the last fifteen months. I began to see signs of it in the Foreign Secretary's speech in another place, and I believe His Majesty's Government are going forward on the right lines. We wish them strength of purpose; we wish them clearness of statement; and in the very vital conferences in which we are engaged we warmly wish Mr. Bevin success. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.