HL Deb 25 July 1944 vol 132 cc1095-108

LORD STRABOLGI rose to ask His Majesty's Government, whether they are in a position to make a statement on the present political situation in India; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, for some time your Lordships have been promised by the Government an opportunity of discussing affairs in India and for the Government to make some statement as to what has been happening there. My noble friends were good enough to ask me to take advantage of this opportunity to-day, and also for my noble friend Lord Faringdon to raise the other side of the matter, the food situation in India. We deliberately decided to put down two questions, because we remembered that the charming manner of the noble Earl, Lord Munster, who usually replies on India, hides a very adroit debater, and we knew from the past that if we put the matter into one question he was quite capable of taking one subject at great length and ignoring the other. So we decided, in our wisdom (we also have some guile in political matters), that we would put down two questions. That is why my noble friend and myself are apparently separated, although I support him on the very important matter which he will presently raise.

My noble friends and myself, when we discussed this matter, decided that what we primarily need is information. We want the facts if we can have them from the Government. There has been a fierce censorship in India, both military and political. Even on the military side there has been complaint that the censorship seems to be aimed, at least in part, at preventing news reaching the British people and not primarily, or not wholly, at preventing that news reaching the enemy. But the political censorship has been most rigid, and it is very difficult indeed to obtain information as to what has been taking place on the political scene. I do not wish to go into the past. We decided that we would look to the future. I must, however, remind your Lordships that when we were in a weak position in 1942 and the Japanese threat to India was serious, the Cripps offer was made. My right honourable friend Sir Stafford Cripps was sent out to India on behalf of the Government and he was authorized to make certain suggestions and an offer to the various political Parties. This offer not only was made, but it was made perfectly clear, as has been reiterated since, that it stands. There was no question at all of the Indians of the various sections and groups having to accept it at that time or else it would be withdrawn. That was not the attitude adopted at all. There was no time-limit; indeed there could not be a time limit.

As I have said, we have no desire to dwell on the past, but we wish to look to the future, and now that the danger of a Japanese invasion has passed and the war everywhere is going well, it is surely unthinkable that what I have called the policy of the Cripps Mission should be thrown overboard. I am quite sure that no responsible British Government could countenance such an act of bad faith. We received one important piece of news from India, despite this censorship, about a fortnight ago, when Mr. Gandhi gave a long and remarkable interview to Mr. Stuart Gelder, a well-known journalist representing the News Chronicle, who saw him at Panchgani. This interview has been widely reproduced in the British and American newspapers. Certain features stand out from the pronouncement which Mr. Gelder made public. The first is that Mr. Gandhi was prepared to recommend to his colleagues on the Working Committee of Congress the acceptance of what was in effect the Cripps offer, that is an Indian National Government composed of leading elements and Parties, but with Army and Defence and war-like operations managed and controlled by the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. Secondly, Mr. Gandhi approved the proposed terms of a settlement of the Moslem question drawn up a year ago by Mr. Rajagopalachari, which in effect grant self-determination to the regions with Moslem majorities, these regions to be settled as to their area in advance. This was obviously, therefore, not only an acceptance in principle of Pakistan, but it gave a great advantage to its advocates in that they could draw up the boundaries of the areas which would vote or hold plebiscites as to whether they wish to remain a part of united India or to enjoy federal independence.

The third feature was that the right to independence in India after the war be agreed. In effect, this has been agreed, for Dominion status to-day does carry within it the same rights of independence as sovereign independence, and that was made perfectly clear on behalf of His Majesty's Government at that tine by Sir Stafford Cripps in his negotiations. That is all on record, we need not dispute about that. Fourthly, that there is to be no return to civil disobedience. I notice in to-day's News Chronicle that the same journalist had a further talk with Mr. Gandhi, and Mr. Gandhi makes no secret of the fact that he made a mistake over civil disobedience and he is prepared to climb down. Fifthly—and this is, of course, only a summary of this long interview of which I am giving only the main and salient features—Mr. Gandhi would not allow his creed of non-violence to obstruct the Congress in giving help in the prosecution of the war, which in effect means that the Congress would support the war effort. I am sure the noble Earl, or whoever speaks for His Majesty's Government, will not belittle the importance of those declarations, and those who know Mr. Gandhi personally, as I do, and as the noble Earl does, will recognize that this is a remarkable change of front. To raise unnecessary suspicions about it now and pretend it does not matter—as I notice with great regret that the Delhi correspondent of The Times has been busy doing—is to be below the level of events.

The questions I propose to ask His Majesty's Government on behalf of my noble friends, of which I gave notice to the noble Earl, are three. First, what information have His Majesty's Government about these matters? Secondly, can His Majesty's Government see in this declaration and in these developments the long-awaited chance to break the present deadlock in India? Thirdly, what do His Majesty's Government intend to do or to advise His Excellency to do? In particular, we should like to know whether opportunities are to be granted to the imprisoned Congress leaders to consult with Mr. Gandhi and with each other. As I said, I am not dwelling on the past. I am not posing the question in a hostile manner. We are looking to the future. We certainly see more than a ray of hope, and we trust that His Majesty's Government are in a position to give us some good news. I beg to move for Papers.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord has put down this Motion, if only to enable some of us to express our views on the very important points he has raised. I am sure no one in this House or outside, who has followed the war so far as it has affected India, can help being impressed by the tremendous voluntary military effort that is being made by India towards winning the war. At the same time I believe that no sound thinking person either in India or in this country would consider the withdrawal from India at the present time of our troops so long as the war in the Far East is going on. It would be quite impracticable for such a thing to happen.

LORD STRABOLGI

That was never suggested by me in the few remarks I made, and it is not part of our proposals at all.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

I did not say that the noble Lord had said that. I have not come to his remarks. I am coming to them. I am not altogether in agreement with what he did say, and perhaps when I have finished he will be in utter disagreement with some of the things I shall say. If so, I hope he will forgive me. As I say, withdrawal from India at the present time would, during the war, be quite impracticable and quite wrong. That is the considered view of His Majesty's Government. I go so far as to say—and here perhaps I differ from the noble Lord—that the differences of opinion must be bridged over between the Hindus and the Mahomedans before our pledge in respect of Indian independence or Dominion status, whichever you like, can be fulfilled. If we were to permit Indian independence or Dominion status under the conditions existing in India to-day, in regard to the differences be- tween castes and religions, we should be failing in the responsibilities that we have, and towards our heritage and what has been handed down to us. It is certain if we were to do such a thing directly after the war, as my noble friend suggests, India would revert to a state of anarchy, and the progress India has made during the past two centuries under British guidance and with British help—I am proud to be able to state that fact—would be, if not entirely lost, at any rate nearly lost altogether.

There is one point I feel I must touch upon because it is of tremendous importance in this settlement of India. There is one individual in India—I have not the same regard for him as has the noble Lord who has spoken—who, I say without hesitation, is the greatest obstacle to a settlement and the biggest bamboozler of the century and in Far Eastern history. He has bamboozled many of his own countrymen for years, and I am sorry to say he has bamboozled a good many people in this country as well. One of his greatest tricks of bamboozlement is the art he has devised of self-inflicted starvation just up to the point of dying. In this way he preys on the sympathies of the Indian peoples and leads them into further difficulties. The noble Lord has suggested that a meeting between the Viceroy and Mr. Gandhi would be of advantage in obtaining a settlement. There has been a certain amount of criticism that Lord Wavell has not accepted the request of Mr. Gandhi that he should see him. There has been a good deal of criticism in India, and there has been criticism here, but I suggest that that is a matter which should be left to Lord Wavell to decide. The Viceroy has all the strings in his hands and knows what is going on. You must trust the man on the spot who has all these tremendous responsibilities on his shoulders to-day and knows all the turns of the game as it exists in Lord Wavell is a man of exceptional calibre, a man with fine administrative and military qualities, all of which he has shown. There is no question about his military qualities, and as far as his administrative qualities are concerned he has shown by his actions since he has been in India his outlook on these subjects, his keen sympathies with the peoples of that country, his intense interest in trying to lead India into that path which will enable her to achieve the independence which she is seeking.

Here I should like to add a word of commendation of the right honourable gentleman, the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Amery. I have known him for many years, and I know his keen sympathy with the Indian peoples. At a time when there was a good deal of controversy in this country, in which I took some part myself, I am aware of the attitude that Mr. Amery adopted to give India much greater control of her own affairs than many of us at that time were prepared to do. My own view is that, with Mr. Amery here and Lord Wavell in India, we should be prepared to leave these matters which the noble Lord has touched on very largely in their hands to solve. With the lack of information which we have in this country to-day, owing to the fact that so few people can go to India and see what is going on for themselves, and can only know of it by chance conversation or what they read in the Press, I am sure that we should trust the Secretary of State and the Viceroy to do the best for India in present circumstances.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE EARL OF MUNSTER)

My Lords, I gather from the speech to which your Lordships have listened from the noble Lord who moved the Motion that it is the desire of himself and of his noble friend Lord Faringdon to discuss their Motions separately for reasons which he gave to your Lordships. On this occasion I shall confine my remarks to the political situation, but nevertheless my speech will be of some length on this and even longer on the food question. The noble Lord who moved this Motion will doubtless expect me to give some account of the pronouncements which have been recently made by Indian political leaders and upon which a good deal of misunderstanding and misconception have arisen. But before I deal with that important point I should like, if I may, to remind noble Lords of the speech which the Governor-General made to the combined Legislatures on the 17th February this year. This is, as I think was mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, the first occasion on which your Lordships have had an opportunity to discuss the affairs of India since the appointment of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, Lord Wavell, as Viceroy and Governor-General of India. I cannot help thinking that his personal and prompt intervention into the food problems from the very earliest days of his arrival in India has considerably enhanced the morale of the Indian peoples, and he has certainly imbued them with a sense of civic responsibility to one another. I think his actions in the political sphere have been no less striking and it would be true to say that in all his dealings he has displayed the qualities of a statesman with the characteristics of a great soldier.

In his remarks on February 17, besides referring to the important matters relating to the economic and reconstruction work, he reiterated Government policy. He said that he was speaking as a sincere friend of India. He announced that the Cripps offer was still open and remained in all its essentials, which he enumerated. He asked Indians to co-operate in the Government on the basis of that particular plan which, he said, was still open to any and all who had a genuine desire to further the prosecution of the war and the welfare of India. The noble and gallant Field-Marshal also advocated the setting up of a small authoritative body of Indians to make a preliminary examination of the constitutional problem and he promised that he would render to them any assistance for which they might ask. Finally, he asked for the full co-operation of all British and Indian peoples, including that of Hindus, Moslems, and other minorities, to prepare now for the great future which must surely and undoubtedly await that vast country.

I would ask your Lordships to let me remind you of the substance of the Cripps offer in two essential details. In fact, the proposals imply two things: first, that there must be agreement amongst the main elements in India as to the terms of the Constitution to be framed by Indians after the war; secondly, that any interim provisional Government must be within the terms of the present Constitution, with the Viceroy having all his existing powers—that is to say, on the basis of the retention by the Viceroy of his existing reserved powers. It will be remembered that the draft Declaration implicitly ruled out any major change in the form of Constitution so long as the war should last. I think the reasons for these stipulations were clearly inherent in the solution. We have to ensure that not only should nothing affect the continuance of the war but that everyone should assist in its successful prosecution, and also make quite sure that the activities of the Interim Government which would be formed would not prejudice the claims of the minorities with respect to the ultimate Constitution. His Majesty's Government have not departed in any way whatever from the intentions which were declared at the time of Sir Stafford Cripps's Mission and which have been repeated again by the Governor-General in the course of his speech to the combined Legislatures.

I would ask noble Lords to bear these important and essential points in mind for they are certainly relevant to the remarks which I intend to make in the course of a few moments. Before I pass on, however, let me remind Lord Strabolgi that it is wrong to say that because we were weak in 1942 we were prepared then to come to an agreement at once and at any price with Indians. These plans were being worked out before Singapore and Rangoon fell, and the fact that the arrival of Sir Stafford Cripps in India should have coincided with the fall of Rangoon had really nothing to do with the position we were in at that time. I hope that once and for all I can remove from the mind of the noble Lord those beliefs which he has expressed because in point of fact they are quite inaccurate.

Now, my Lords, I pass on to give the House such information as I have upon the recent political moves which have been initiated by Mr. Rajagopalachari and Mr. Gandhi. At the beginning of this month Mr. Rajagopalachari published details of correspondence which had taken place between him and Mr. Jinnah earlier this year on a proposed basis for a Congress-Moslem settlement which was proposed by Mr. Rajagopalachari. The latter stated that the draft scheme which he submitted was discussed with Mr. Gandhi at the beginning of his fast in March, 1943, and that he was authorized to say that it had received his full approval—that is to say, the full approval of Mr. Gandhi. But at no time, so far as His Majesty's Government are aware, did Mr. Gandhi append his signature to any document which was delivered to Mr. Jinnah by Mr. Rajagopalachari.

This document which is full of importance contains the terms of a settlement and I should like, if I may, to read the six clauses to the House. The first was that the Moslem League should endorse the Indian demand for independence and co-operate with the Congress Party in the formation of a provisional Government for the transitional period. Secondly, after the termination of the war, a Commission was to be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in North-West and in East India in which the Moslem population is in an absolute majority. In the areas which were thus demarcated a plebiscite of all the inhabitants was to be taken and would ultimately decide the issue of separation. Thirdly, that it was open to all Parties to define their points of view before the plebiscite took place. Fourthly, in the event of separation mutual agreement would be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce and communications and for other essential purposes. Fifthly, any transfer of population was to be held entirely on a voluntary basis. Sixthly and lastly, all these terms would be binding only in the event of transfer by His Majesty's Government of both power and responsibility for the Government of India. This, then, was the scheme which Mr. Rajagopalachari urged Mr. Jinnah to accept and suggested thereafter that both he and Mr. Gandhi should advise the Working Committee of the Moslem League and the Working Committee of the Congress Party respectively to accept. Mr. Jinnah was prepared to submit, though not previously to endorse, the scheme to the Working Committee if he received it from Mr. Gandhi direct, but he declined to accept the responsibility for agreeing to it or rejecting it before doing so.

The exact position is, I think, somewhat obscure but these negotiations seem for the moment to have been suspended. The publication of the scheme had a very mixed reception in the Indian Press, and it is difficult at the present moment to understand and appreciate their reactions to it. It does, however, appear that Mr. Gandhi's association with these particular proposals does mark a very significant change in his attitude towards the Moslem League position. That in itself might improve the chances of an agreement between the two major Parties. So far as this should prove to be the case we can, of course, only welcome the fact that there has been such an advance on the part of Mr. Gandhi. Your Lordships will, of course, appreciate that this scheme has not been put to the Moslem League, and it has not been possible to know their reaction to it. I understand, however, that there is to be a meeting of the Working Committee of the Moslem Party towards the end of this month when the position may become more clarified. So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, it seems hardly the time, and it might indeed prove to be very unhelpful, to discuss the practicability of these proposals which are inter-communal and have not been submitted or communicated to the Government at all. Your Lordships will observe that neither during the consultations between Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalachari nor during the correspondence between Mr. Rajagopalachari and Mr. Jinnah has the Viceroy received any communication from any one of the three participants.

What I have already said is, of course, by no means the end of the tale, for after the publication of this scheme there appeared a series of statements in the Press which were attributed to Mr. Gandhi. I think the more important of these statements contained seven points, and it was issued after the publication in the News Chronicle of an interview which Mr. Gandhi had with one of that newspaper's correspondents. Indeed, Mr. Gandhi stated himself that the premature publication of the interview with Mr. Gelder, the News Chronicle's representative, had led to some confusion and therefore Mr. Gandhi advanced these views. If your Lordships will forgive me I would like to go through them. Firstly, he said he would never use the weapon of civil disobedience during the war unless for a very grave reason such as the thwarting of India's right to freedom; secondly, that he would be satisfied with a National Government during the war with full control of the civil administration composed of persons chosen by the elected members of the Legislative Assembly; thirdly, that the Viceroy would be, like the King of England, guided by responsible Ministers; fourthly, that popular government would be automatically restored to all the Provinces, that is the Provinces which are at the moment under Section 93; fifthly, that while, under the National Government, the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief would have complete control of military operations, there would be a Portfolio of Defence in the hands of the National Government which would be genuinely interested in the defence of the country and might render great assistance in the shaping of policy; sixthly, that Allied forces would be allowed to carry on operations on Indian soil but the expenses of such operations would not be borne by India; and seventhly, and lastly, that Mr. Gandhi would advise Congress to participate in the National Government in full. I apologize for giving the details to your Lordships but the procedure followed is a little complicated and a little difficult to understand.

A few days after Mr. Gandhi had published these seven suggestions through the intermediary of the Press, he gave further explanations to Press correspondents in which he emphasized that the statements constituted a personal effort to end the deadlock, but that if his suggestions were unacceptable to Mr. Jinnah or the powers-that-be he would consider it a most unfortunate incident. In clarification, if indeed it be clarification, of his offer to Mr. Jinnah he stated that his proposals were wholly different from the Cripps offer which he said contemplated almost perpetual vivisection of India. Frankly it is difficult to understand whether these statements by Mr. Gandhi have in point of fact definitely improved the chances of inter-communal settlement. The main point so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned is this. Mr. Gandhi is still clinging to precisely that claim which wrecked Sir Stafford Cripps's Mission and put an end to negotiations in April, 1942, for he is no more prepared to-day than he was then to accept the formation of an interim Government with the Viceroy maintaining his existing reserved powers. He demands a so-called interim Government in full control of the civil administration with the Viceroy occupying the position of a constitutional monarch as we understand it in this country. Let it not be forgotten—this is really a very important point—that if an agreement is reached between the Congress Party and the Moslem League and an interim Government is set up under the present and existing Constitution, there are still a number of very important questions, not least of which is the protection of minorities, to be resolved. All these matters must be settled before a final Constitution can be evolved.

It will be seen that His Majesty's Government have not departed one iota from the pledge that they gave some time ago, and, which I repeat now, that the proposals which were taken to India by Sir Stafford Cripps still stand in their entirety. May I say this in conclusion, and also in replying to a question which was addressed to me by the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi? He asked me whether the Viceroy was prepared to allow Mr. Gandhi to see the members of the Working Committee. I would refer the noble Lord to the letter which the Viceroy sent to Mr. Gandhi on the 22nd of June last. He said that any meeting between himself and Mr. Gandhi—and it followed also with the Working Committee as well—could only raise false hopes. He said that Mr. Gandhi had publicly stated that he adhered to the "Quit India" Resolution, which he regarded as innocuous. But the Viceroy did say that as soon as Mr. Gandhi had any definite or constructive policy to put up he, the Viceroy, would be very glad to consider it a t that time.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I am obliged to my noble friend Lord Elibank for his intervention. I must assure him again that there is no ground whatever for his believing that we on these Benches are suggesting that there should be any withdrawal by us from India at the present time. I do wish that he would disillusion himself of that fetish. The Labour Party as a whole does not stand for that policy. We want a settlement. We want to see the whole of India pulling its weight in the war. There is no suggestion on our part of any withdrawal of troops or of officials until after a settlement is arrived at, and not until after the war. I must further assure Viscount Elibank that I make no sort of reflection of any kind against His Excellency the Viceroy, for whom I have the highest personal regard. I did not even refer to his action in the past. I was locking to the future.

Before I withdraw my Motion, may I say that the statement which we have just heard from the noble Earl might have been worse? We shall read it very carefully. As I listened to him, though, I thought I detected one or two gleams of understanding and hope. I would have liked a little more warmth and sympathy. I think there is a chance now, of a wide settlement if we take it, but I suppose the noble Earl was bound to take the attitude which he did. He has become acclimatized to the atmosphere in the India Office all too soon. I do thank him for saying that the suggestions that have been made to Mr. Jinnah—I took his words down—might improve the chances of agreement between the major Parties, and that this would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. That is good, and it is also good to hear that the Cripps proposals still stand. I was sure that that was the case but I am very glad to have this reassurance from the noble Earl on that point. We could not possibly have made those offers at the time of the Cripps negotiations and then have withdrawn them. I agree that we did not make the offer because we were in a weak position and with some idea of withdrawing them later on. I am sure that no Government could possibly propose any such thing.

May I say one word in dealing with a delicate matter? That is upon the question which seems to excite some apprehension in the mind of the noble Earl. It is with regard to the proposal of Mr. Gandhi that a provisional Government can be set up; and I should have thought that if we could get this form of provisional Government of all Parties for all India, with of course the necessary safeguards, we should welcome it, and it would be a magnificant step forward. But it seems to have created some alarm that it should be suggested that the Viceroy should hold the position of a constitutional monarch with his reserved powers.

THE EARL OF MUNSTER

A constitutional monarch without his reserved powers.

LORD STRABOLGI

No, with his reserved powers—the position of a constitutional monarch with his reserved powers. We do not often discuss these things in this House, but we are entitled to do so. The constitutional Monarch by whom we in this country are honoured to be ruled has immense powers. They happen to have fallen into disuse, with one or two exceptions, in the last century and a half. That, I remember, was one of the arguments used in the negotiations with Congress in 1942. The constitutional powers behind the Monarch in this country if set down on paper look immense. It could, I am sure, be argued that as confidence grows and as democracy has its chance and Indian statesmen become trained to responsibility, these powers would recede more and more into the background. That is what has happened in this country, but the powers are there all the same. I really think that the India Office and the noble Earl make too heavy weather of that particular point. That was the impression I gathered from the noble Earl's speech. As I have said, however, there are some signs of understanding—some signs of grace, as a noble Lord beside me remarks—and I thank the noble Earl for them. I thank him for the things he said in his speech which were good. We shall read the whole of that speech with great attention. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.