THE WAR SITUATION.

HL Deb 08 September 1942 vol 124 cc273-85

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

My Lords, while the House will be aware that no noble Lord has put down any Motion on the Paper for the discussion of the war situation I have thought that it might be for the convenience of the House if I gave a general but brief review of the events which have occurred since your Lordships met. I suppose that the most significant and most dramatic single happening of this period has been the hazardous journey of the Prime Minister to the Middle East and to Russia. Of this my right honourable friend has already spoken himself earlier to-day very fully in another place, and it would be futile and impertinent on my part to seek to interpret or amplify the story he has himself told; but I think I can say that no one could overestimate the importance of that voyage both for its vital bearing on the position in the Middle East and on the close co-operation between ourselves and the Government of Soviet Russia. The voyage was, I think, characteristic of those combined qualities of daring and political flair which always animate the Prime Minister, and I know that the House would wish me to express to him our gratitude for undertaking it and also our deep relief on finding him safely home again.

I will not dilate any further on that journey, but will pass, if your Lordships will permit me, immediately to the more general developments in the war situation. On the last occasion when I had the honour of addressing your Lordships there was a situation in the Middle East of great anxiety and tension. Our Armies in Libya had suffered a severe and unexpected reverse. We had been driven from prepared positions covering Tobruk. We had retired first to the Egyptian frontier, then to Sidi Barrani then to Mersa Matruh, and finally we had turned to face the enemy in the strong position at El Alamein, flanked on the left by the Qattara Depression and on the right by the sea. But I think none of us felt at that time any complete certainty that we should be able to hold even that line, and there was among numbers of noble Lords in this House quite clearly acute anxiety lest we should be driven back to the Nile Delta and to Alexandria. He would indeed have been a very sanguine man who had professed with absolute confidence that any further advance of the enemy could have been prevented. Since then over two months have passed, and I think we can say without undue boasting that our main anxieties have been relieved, and that the situation on this front at any rate is far better than we could have expected at that time.

It is true that we have not yet been able to recover the ground which we have lost, and that such advances and such attacks as we have made during the period between our last meeting and now have met with strong opposition; but the German advance was stopped at El Alamein and the loud and, as it turned out, premature shouts of triumph on the part of propagandists in Berlin and Rome have been most abruptly stilled. How far the situation has improved is, I think, shown by the fate of the attempt of the Germans themselves to advance during the last week. Perhaps the House might like me to give some few details of the events of that week. The general activity during the week immediately preceding the night of August 30–31 was confined to patrolling on both sides. On the night of August 25–26, New Zealand troops had carried out a successful raid and captured prisoners. During August 29, slightly increased enemy activity in the southern sector was reported. Early on the morning of August 31, German forces, including armoured units, pushed forward against the southern flank of the Eighth Army. They were engaged by our light forces. At 5 p.m. on that day the foremost enemy tanks were halted a few miles east of Qaret el Khadim, which is twelve miles to the south-east of the Ruweisat Ridge. A weak enemy thrust made previously against our main front was repulsed with loss to the enemy. On September 1, the enemy columns on our southern flank swung northwards towards the central sector of our front. In spite of repeated attacks by their armoured units, they only made progress by skirting our strong points and concentrations. They were held wherever they made direct attacks.

The head of the main enemy column reached Alem el Bueib, thirteen miles south-east of El Alamein, while the tail was attacked by our troops from the south. During that evening the enemy appeared to be forming up for an attack with tanks on one of our armoured formations. His attack did not materialize. It seems that the enemy was tapping in along the front to test our strength. In the northern sector in the meantime our troops made a successful minor raid, taking one hundred German prisoners. During the following day, the 2nd September, the main enemy armoured forces remained concentrated in the area southwest of Alem el Halfa, fifteen miles southeast of El Alamein, their right flank being protected by an armoured car screen and the left flank by the Italian Ariete and German 90th Light Division. Our armoured forces remained in their battle positions all day without being engaged. The enemy mechanical transport columns offered good targets and were continuously engaged by our artillery and Air Force. The excellent results of the Royal Air Force bombing were confirmed by reports by our land forces. In the south our mobile forces destroyed sixty vehicles. During the night of the 2nd-3rd September enemy laagers were attacked by some of our mobile units, while the Royal Air Force carried out successful bombing on the best enemy targets yet seen, at the eastern end of the Deir el Ragil feature, fifteen miles south-east of the Ruweisat Ridge. On the 3rd September the enemy began to move westward harassed by our mobile forces. Some of our tanks were also ordered to harass the north-east flank of the enemy's positions. Air reports about midday showed a general enemy movement westwards. This movement, as the House knows, has continued ever since and the enemy are now back in their original lines.

I have given a fairly full account of the events of those days. What conclusions are we to draw from them? I think they are these. To what extent did this attack constitute a real major operation? People may of course hold different views in regard to this. The Germans have remained silent about it practically through the whole operation and now they pretend that nothing really happened. Probably their plans were elastic and depended upon success of the preliminary thrust. But all the evidence which is at the disposal of the Government goes to show that it was not a mere raid. The whole Afrika Korps was brought into the fight. It pushed forward to swing north pursuing exactly the same sort of manœuvres as were employed by Rommel at the beginning of the attack on the Ghazar position. Now had this first thrust gone well, I think we might fairly assume that the whole forces of the enemy would have been hurled into the battle. On the contrary, owing to the skill of our dispositions and owing to the courage and fortitude of the British Forces, which, after all the gruelling experiences they have been through, apparently remain as high as ever, the result at the end of the first week was that the battlefield was entirely in our hands, that the enemy had suffered very material losses, and now, as I have explained, they have retired to the original positions which they left a week ago.

Of course your Lordships would be the first to say, and it is true, that it is most unwise to be over-confident. Before now we have had shocks about battles which started very well. But I think there is no doubt that General Rommel and the German forces have suffered an undoubted reverse in this area and these events certainly give a very encouraging indication both of the morale of our troops and of the leadership of General Alexander and General Montgomery, who are now commanding these forces. This, I submit, is no reflection on General Auchinleck. In spite of what is said by the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, who I am sorry not to see in his place to-day, I still feel that we have no reason in this country to be ashamed of our Generals. But General Auchinleck, as your Lordships know, had borne the burden and the heat of the day during an exceedingly long and difficult period and it is not surprising that he should need a certain amount of rest and refreshment. It is hoped, as the Prime Minister said in another place earlier to-day, that his services will be available to the country later in the war.

The improvement in the position in Egypt and the Western Desert may be said, I think, to apply in some degree to the whole Mediterranean. As your Lordships know, one of the by-products of our retirement in Northern Africa was the increased isolation of Malta. That very staunch fortress became more and more difficult to feed and supply. It is true that we have managed to get through certain convoys in the past, but we did it at the expense of heavy losses. That is not surprising when one considers how close Malta is to the sea and air bases of the enemy. But within the last few weeks, as your Lordships know, by an operation which will, I think, rank very high for courage and heroism in the annals of the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service, however long the history of those two Services may be, and which I think rivals the greatest feats of those Elizabethans of whom we are so proud, assistance has been forced through, in spite of the utmost efforts of the enemy, and there has been given to our troops there, and to the gallant Maltese people, not only the means to defend their shores and maintain the means to sustain life for many months to come, but the ability to continue a vigorous offensive against the lines of communication of the Axis forces. Seldom a day passes but we hear news of some Axis supply ship sunk off the coast of Crete or in the Central Mediterranean, as the result of the offensive efforts of this great fortress.

It was my very good fortune in recent weeks, in fact only just before this convoy arrived, to be able to go myself to Malta. If ever anyone needs a stimulus and an inspiration I strongly advise him to make such a visit as that. It is most moving—the spirit of the people of Malta. It is not merely that they are undefeated, but that they appear to be quite undefeatable. They are entirely serene, they are cheerful and they are confident. In the shattered streets of their towns and along the country roads, shimmering in the summer heat, fringed by oleander trees in blossom, you see people going about their ordinary business and children playing in the sun almost as if times were normal. It is only the drone of the aeroplane engines high in the sky out of sight and the constant rattle of machine-gun fire that make one realize the unceasing battle that is going on. The Maltese people hate the Germans and despise the Italians. What we suffered here for a few months they have been suffering for years; but they have emerged, I can assure your Lordships, triumphant. Whatever may happen in the war one thing is absolutely certain, that the defence of Malta will go down as one of the great epics of history. I would like to pay here a tribute both to the gallant Maltese people and to the troops who are under their Governor, Lord Gort, showing the world of what the human spirit is capable.

But, important though these events in the Mediterranean undoubtedly are, and material though their contribution must be to the final victory, it is not there that the main struggle is being waged at the present time. The focal point of the vast panorama of war exposed before our eyes to-day must inevitably be Russia. When I last addressed your Lordships' House the clouds were gathering and the preparations for the present German offensive were almost completed; but the storm had not yet broken. Now the storm has been raging for over two months. For fourteen weeks the Russians have been sustaining the heaviest assault in the history of war. For both sides this struggle is vital. Neither side can afford to give way easily and as a result, as your Lordships know, every inch of ground has been contested. Under the violent impact of the enemy, supported by every known instrument of war, the Russians have been obliged to retire. They have had to abandon rich provinces; they have been driven in some places across the Don; the Volga is threatened; the Caucasus is threatened. But the main object of Germany clearly was, and clearly must be, to destroy and break up the Russian Armies. Unless they can achieve this object their strategy will not have been successful. So far as one can gather from what information one can obtain, this vital aim they have singularly failed to achieve. Losses on both sides have been heavy. But the Russian Armies are still full of vigour and they are still resisting strongly.

Soon new factors will come into play—first the rains of October and after those rains the Russian winter. The whole world is to-day watching this titanic struggle with bated breath, and our hopes and prayers are with the gallant Russian people in the terrible ordeal through which they are going. It has been our aim to divert in any practical way the forces marshalled against them. No doubt Russia would wish that we had been able to do more—I think most of us wish ourselves that we had been able to do more—but I think it would be a mistake to belittle the contribution which has been made; and there is a tendency to do that. I do not intend this afternoon to say anything about the Second Front, in the ordinary accepted sense of that term. Any statement which I might make here, whatever that statement might be, would tell the Germans things that they are very anxious to know. But this can be said, and I think should be said: there is already in existence a powerful Second Front in the form of our bomber offensive. And this is something which neither we nor others should ignore—in spite of a worse summer, from the point of view of flying weather, than even we in this country often experience, we have continued to strike heavily at the enemy in his own country, in the occupied territories and on the sea.

Tremendous blows have been inflicted on the heart of German productive capacity and on military and naval targets. In the two months of June and July—and I would emphasize these figures—13,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany, as against 8,500 tons in the same months of 1941, and 3,500 in June and July, 1940. That, I think your Lordships will agree, is a formidable increase in tonnage of bombs dropped. Moreover, it is accompanied by that greater concentration of effort and that greater accuracy which our ever-growing experience, improved tactics and improved technical developments have brought. This has been achieved in spite—and this is a point which I think it is proper to make—in spite of the ever-increasing demand on the Bomber Command, not only for patrol work and attack over the seas to counter the serious threat which had developed, and still continues, to our communications, but also for the reinforcement of our forces in the Middle East, which has involved the dispatch not only of medium bombers but also of the heavy four-engined bombers which are now operating with great effect against the enemy's supply ports for Libya.

It would, I think, be a great mistake to overestimate the effect of bomber offensive. It equally would be a mistake to underestimate it. One after another the German industrial cities are undergoing a fearful experience. With each great raid the industrial capacity of Germany, temporarily at least, is being reduced. A powerful raid on a key factory has just the same effect on the war as has a battle and the results may be as important. That, I think, was the evidence derived from the raid upon the Renault factory some months ago. Nothing that the Germans can do by their costly and spectacular advances in Russia can be effective in warding off from the German people these blows at their heart—blows which will become more severe and more effective as American production comes into full swing and American squadrons play an increasing part. Both from the strategic and from the psychological point of view the bomber offensive which is being carried out by this country has been a very material contribution to victory. It has imposed a heavy strain upon the German people and it has proved to them how untrustworthy were those promises which were made to them by their leaders in the earlier part of the war. Finally, it has prevented the dispatch of large quantities of aeroplanes and other material from the Western to the Eastern battlefield.

Simultaneously with the bomber offensive, Fighter Command has continued and developed the day offensive against the German Air Force. Their operations consisted, in the first part of the year, of great offensive sweeps in which a marked superiority over the enemy was established, and, more recently, in the provision of escorts for British, and now also for American, bombers attacking vital points. During August they have for the first time been escorting formations of American-manned Fortresses in daylight raids over aerodromes, power stations, and other important targets in France and the Low Countries—raids which, though only on a small scale as yet, have not only been effective in the results achieved, but have given the enemy some inkling of the meaning of that continuous bombing by day and by night which it is our ultimate aim to achieve.

Perhaps at this point I might say a word about the Dieppe raid. The Dieppe raid, as your Lordships' know, was not, as the German propaganda has tried to make out, an attempt at invasion which failed. It was exactly what it purported to be—a raid; just such a raid as we remember in the last war. It was a reconnaissance in force. It was a try-out of our methods of combined operations, and it also aimed at giving direct aid to the Russians by staging a great air battle. We crossed the Channel, we landed troops and material in a strongly defended area. We fought the German planes on equal terms on their own ground, or in their own air, whichever is the correct phrase. What is significant is that it has given the Germans such a shock. That is why, at the present time, their propaganda machine is taking such immense pains to explain away the raid. That also is why we owe such a tremendous debt of gratitude to the brave Canadians and others who took part in the raid.

And while even on this very limited scale by land and air the Allies are returning to the offensive in the West, there is a similar tendency visible in the Far East. The battles of the Coral Sea, the battle of Midway Island, and the American landing in the Solomon Islands, all indicate that the Allies are beginning to show the initiative. The Japanese, who are glutted with success, have, as we all know, many hostages to fortune. They are more than a satisfied nation, they are a nation which, temporarily at any rate, is suffering from indigestion, and the Allies are beginning to take advantage of that uncomfortable condition. At sea, too, the situation is beginning, at least temporarily, to improve. Our shipping losses are less, especially along the East Coast of the United States, where, as noble Lords will know, in the past months they were particularly heavy. Moreover, we are continuing to take toll of U-boats. As the Prime Minister said to-day, the last two months were particularly profitable months. They are in fact the best months we have had. I would not suggest that the battle against the submarines is won, because it is almost certain that the U-boats in service are still increasing in numbers. But then, so is the pace of destruction and so is the pace of American shipbuilding. In this long unceasing contest we are not falling behind, and the heroism of our merchant seamen in the past three years is beginning to bring its reward.

If then, my Lords, I were to try to strike a balance sheet on the last three months, I would say that there is no need for pessimism. If the tide of battle has not turned definitely in our favour, it has certainly not turned against us. The fight as we all know, is likely to be long and arduous yet. But we are still gathering strength. We have an unimpaired spirit and we have powerful Allies. We have added to our Allies in the last week or two in the shape of the great nation of Brazil whom we cordially welcome to our side. We have, above all, in the Prime Minister a leader such as we might have prayed for. We may, I think, enter on the fourth year of the war with sober confidence that the forces of darkness will be finally defeated and that peace and freedom will be restored to the earth.

LORD ADDISON

My Lords, I am sure that everyone of us will appreciate the statement that the noble Viscount has made and will value the information which it contains. I was not myself made aware beforehand, apart from a short preliminary conversation, of the contents of the statement which the noble Viscount has made. I expect that most of your Lordships are in the same position, and therefore I do not think that we have had time or opportunity to reflect sufficiently upon the statement to enable us to discuss it with profit now. I am sure, however, that every one of us would like to associate himself with what the noble Viscount said about the visit of the Prime Minister to Russia, and to say with what relief we heard the news that he was safely home again. As to the other events to which the noble Viscount has referred, they present so many subjects for question, as well as some for anxiety and some for comfort, that I do not think that a general discussion would be profitable at the present time. Apart from a parenthesis, the noble Viscount omitted one thing from his statement to which I should like to refer. We have all admired and welcomed his journey to Malta, and we are all glad that he has come safely home again. We have all appreciated what he has had to say, but I myself do not propose to initiate any discussion on his statement to-day.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, I desire to add a few words to what has been said, and to thank the noble Viscount opposite for the very full manner—though showing, of course, the proper caution of a responsible Minister—in which he has spoken of the general situation. In the first place, we must all agree with what he said with regard to the Prime Minister's visits to Moscow and to Cairo. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of those visits in the particular circumstances, and it is quite evident that nobody else could have carried them out with quite the same effect as did the Prime Minister. His presence in Russia did something to remove the undoubted ignorance of Russian conditions on our part, and probably also some ignorance of British conditions on the part of the Russians, an ignorance which has so long existed, and which must have created a certain difficulty in the relations between the two countries, in spite of our unstinted and generally expressed admiration for the heroic part which the Russian people have played in the defence of their country. There has been much ignorance of Russia in this country, and I imagine that a certain degree of ignorance is bound to continue for a long time. The Russian system of government is absolutely no concern of ours, and we have no reason to discuss it in any way; but it is undoubtedly the case that, within the last three years, the foreign relations of Russia with Finland, with the Baltic States, with Poland and, most of all, with Germany, have remained somewhat of an enigma, and an enigma to which it would be impossible, and I think unprofitable, to attempt to find the answer. I am convinced, therefore, that the personal contact of the Prime Minister with the head of the Russian Government must be altogether productive of good.

Equally, I am sure that the Prime Minister's visit to Cairo was of the greatest value, in enabling him to apprehend at first hand the conditions prevailing in the Middle East, and to see with his experienced eye something of the great difficulties which confront our Armies on the Egyptian frontier. It must also have been of great advantage to him to have a conversation with General Smuts, the most experienced, and I venture to say the most distinguished, military figure in any country in the world. It is quite unnecessary, I think, to attempt to make any sort of comment on what the noble Viscount said about the situation in Russia, except once more to express our admiration for the marvellous resistance which the Russians have shown. Nor, I think, would there be any advantage in attempting to discuss the situation in the Far East, except to note that the pressure exercised by the United States is obviously beginning to be seriously felt by the Japanese, and must have begun to make them consider that things in their area are by no means plain sailing, as they evidently hoped would be the case.

I cannot help feeling that a certain degree of disappointment and disillusion must have been caused by the extreme productivity which Germany has shown in the matter of armaments and munitions of all kinds. It seems to show, for one thing, the singularly full use which the Germans must be making of the slave labour which they have collected from the various occupied countries, and which has evidently freed their own men for fighting purposes to an extent which must create some degree of disappointment in our minds. There is also, I think, a feeling of disappointment at the extent to which the Axis Forces in Libya have been able to be increased to the very formidable position which they have reached, both in numbers of troops and in the supply of tanks and other motorized vehicles—an extent which we may be almost able to equal but not, I am afraid, at present greatly to surpass. So far as the Air Force are concerned, I think we may be satisfied at what is evidently fair equality in numbers but undoubtedly superiority in the quality of our Air Force in Africa.

That increase, as I say, must be something of a disappointment to British observers. But I am sure it would not be right to blame the military, the Navy, or the Air Force for the fact that they have not been able altogether to stop the great influx of men and munitions, both German and Italian, to the African coast. But we have to consider what would have happened if it had not been possible for our Fleet and our Air Force to take the toll that they have of the Axis transports: just in the same way as, in considering the bombing attacks on Germany, we have to think what the position would have been if, as people sometimes have attempted to argue, they had been employed elsewhere and if the German centres of production had had an absolutely free hand in turning out tanks, aeroplanes and munitions of all kinds. I think we can look forward now with a considerable degree of confidence. Winter is not very far off, and I am convinced that the United Nations are in a far better position to face the winter, both morally and materially, than the Axis Powers of Germany and Italy.