HL Deb 14 March 1938 vol 108 cc45-52
LORD SNELL

My Lords, I beg to ask the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary whether he has any statement to make respecting the position in Austria. I do not propose to run the risk of commenting on those happenings before hearing any statement that His Majesty's Government may be able to make respecting them, and after I have heard any statement that may be made I should wish, in the public interest, to consider carefully before discussing it. At this stage, therefore, I reserve the right on behalf of my noble friends of asking for a debate at a very early date on this most disturbing crisis.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, before the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replies to the question put by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, I desire to say as few words as possible in what I think has to be considered the most serious situation that has confronted any Government of His Majesty during the last twenty years. I will merely confine myself to saying that I trust confidently that His Majesty's Government will not only, as one feels they are bound to do, continue safeguarding British interests all over the world, but will be prepared—and in this I am sure they will receive the support of all Parties in the country—to maintain so far as is in their power the principles of liberty and of equity all over the Continent of Europe so far as those principles may be threatened in any quarter, and by whomsoever the threat may be made. I agree with the noble Lord in thinking that it would be far better to defer for a short time any fuller discussion of the situation until we have had the advantage of hearing from the noble Viscount opposite—it may not be, I feel, a very great deal—what he is able to tell us to-day.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT HALIFAX)

My Lords, I think that the noble Lord opposite and the noble Marquess are no doubt wise in suggesting that it would be more appropriate to defer our debate on the matters before us for a day or two, and I accordingly do not comment at this stage on the general observations that fell from the noble Marquess, which can, perhaps, more properly be examined when we have that debate. The main sequence of events of the last few days will be familiar to the House, but with the permission of noble Lords I will make a statement upon them in fairly full terms. The results of the meeting at Berchtesgaden on February 12 between the German and Austrian Chancellors was stated by the former to be an extension of the framework of the July, 1936, Agreement. Noble Lords will not need to be reminded that that Agreement provided, inter alia, for the recognition of the independence of Austria by Germany and the recognition by Austria of the fact that she was a German State. Whatever, therefore, were the results of the Berchtesgaden meeting, it is clear that the Agreement reached was still on the basis of the independence of Austria.

On Wednesday of last week Herr von Schuschnigg decided that the best way to put an end to the uncertainties of the internal situation in his country was to hold a plebiscite under which the people could decide the future of their country, for which provision is made in the Austrian Constitution of 1934. This decision on the part of the Austrian Chancellor was unwelcome to the German Government, as it also was to the Austrian National Socialists themselves. Matters appear to have come to a head on the morning of March II, when Herr von Seyss-Inquart, who had been appointed Minister of the Interior as a result of the Berchtesgaden meeting, together with his colleague Dr. Glaise-Horstenau, presented an ultimatum to the Chancellor. They demanded the abandonment of the plebiscite and threatened that if this was refused, the Nazis would abstain from voting and could not be restrained from causing serious disturbances during the poll. The two Ministers also demanded changes in the Provincial Governments and other bodies. They required, so I am informed, an answer from the Chancellor before one o'clock in the afternoon.

The Chancellor declined to accept this ultimatum, but he offered a compromise whereby a second plebiscite should be held later with regular voting lists. In the meantime he said that he would be prepared to make it clear that voters might vote for his policy but against him personally, in order to prove that the plebiscite was not a personal question of his remaining in office. Later that day, feeling himself to be under threat of civil war and of possible military invasion, the Chancellor gave way to the two Ministers and agreed to cancel the plebiscite on condition that the tranquillity of the country was not disturbed by the Nazis. There seems to be little doubt that this offer was referred by the two Ministers to Germany. In any event, the reply which they returned was that the offer was insufficient and that Herr Schuschnigg must resign in order to be replaced by Herr Seyss-Inquart. It appears that the Austrian Chancellor was given until 4.30 p.m., Greenwich time, in which to reply and was informed that, if his reply was not satisfactory, German troops would be ordered to move at 5 p.m. This fact seems to show that Germany was behind the ultimatum.

Later in the day a fresh ultimatum was delivered, which appears to have been brought from Germany by aeroplane. The demands made were the resignation of the Chancellor, his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds were to be National Socialists, the Austrian Legion to be readmitted to the country and given the duty of keping order in Vienna, and the total readmission of the Nazi Party. A reply was required before 6.3o p.m., Greenwich time. To these demands the Chancellor announced a little later, on the wireless, that he had, in view of the German threatened invasion, yielded in order to avoid the shedding of German blood. He said that he wished the world to know that the President and he had yielded to force and that Austrian troops had been instructed to oppose no resistance to German troops if and when the latter crossed the frontier. The subsequent entry of German troops into Austria and the visit of the German Chancellor to Linz will be known to your Lordships.

His Majesty's Government have throughout been in the closest touch with the situation. I saw the German Foreign Minister on March 10 and addressed to him a grave warning upon the Austrian situation and upon what appeared to be the policy of the German Government in regard to it. In particular, I told him that His Majesty's Government attached the greatest importance to all measures being taken to ensure that the plebiscite was carried out without interference or intimidation. Late on March II our Ambassador in Berlin registered a protest in strong terms with the German Government against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence. Such action Sir Nevile Henderson pointed out was bound to produce the gravest reactions of which it would be impossible to foretell the issue. Earlier that day my right honourable friend the Prime Minister made earnest representations in the same sense to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom I also had two further interviews on that day. To these protests the German Government replied in a letter addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin by Baron von Neurath.

I think I should read the terms of that communication in full. They are as follows: Monsieur l' Ambassadeur, In your letter of March 11th Your Excellency stated that news had reached the British Government that a German ultimatum had been delivered in Vienna demanding the resignation of the Austrian Chancellor, his substitution by the Minister of the Interior, the formation of a new Cabinet with a two-third majority of National Socialist members and the readmission of the Austrian Legion. Should this news be correct the British Government protested against such coercion by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence. In the name of the German Government I must state in reply that the British Government is not within its right in claiming the rôle of a protector of the independence of Austria. In the course of the diplomatic conversations regarding the Austrian question the German Government have never left the British Government in doubt that the form of the relations between the Reich and Austria can only be regarded as an internal affair of the German people which is no concern of third Powers. It is superfluous to recapitulate the historical and political bases of this standpoint. For this reason the German Government must from the outset reject as inadmissible the protest lodged by the British Government, even though only conditional. At the same time, in view of the information quoted in your letter that the Reich Government had made demands of the character of an ultimatum in Vienna the German Government does not desire to omit, in the interests of truth, to make the following statement respecting the events of the last few days: A few weeks ago the German Chancellor, recognising the dangers resulting from the intolerable position which had arisen in Austria, initiated a conversation with the then Austrian Chancellor. The aim was to make yet another attempt to meet these dangers by agreement upon measures which should ensure a calm and peaceful development in consonance with the interests of both countries and with those of the whole German people. The Berchtesgaden agreement, had it been loyally carried out on the Austrian side in the spirit of the conversation of February 12th, would in fact have guaranteed such a development. Instead of this, the former Austrian Federal Chancellor, on the evening of 9th March, announced the surprising decision, taken on his own sole authority, to hold within a period of a few days a plebiscite, which having regard to the surrounding circumstances and in particular the detailed plans for the carrying out of the plebiscite, was intended to have, as it could only have, as its purpose the political repression of the overwhelming majority of the population of Austria. This proceeding, standing as it did in flagrant contradiction to the Berchtesgaden agreement, led as might have been foreseen to an extremely critical development of the internal situation in Austria. It was only natural that those members of the Austrian Government who had taken no part in the decision to hold a plebiscite should raise the strongest protest against it. In consequence there ensued a Cabinet crisis in Vienna, which in the course of the 11th of March led to the resignation of the farmer Federal Chancellor and the formation of a new Government. It is not true that forcible pressure on the course of these developments was exercised by the Reich. In particular the statement subsequently spread by the former Federal Chancellor—to the effect that the German Government had delivered an ultimatum with a time-limit to the Federal President, in accordance with which he was to appoint as Federal Chancellor one of certain proposed candidates and construct the Government in conformity with the proposals of the German Government, failing which the entry of German troops into Austria would have to be contemplated—is pure imagination. As a matter of fact the question of the despatch of military and police forces from the Reich was first raised by the fact that the newly-formed Austrian Government addressed to the Government of the Reich, in a telegram which has already been published in the Press, an urgent request that, for the re-establishment of peace and order and for the prevention of bloodshed, German troops should be despatched as soon as possible. Faced with the directly threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the Government of the Reich decided to meet the appeal then addressed to it. Such being the case, it is completely inconceivable that the conduct of the German Government, as is stated in your letter, could lead to unforeseeable consequences. A general review of the political situation is given in the Proclamation which the Chancellor of the German Reich addressed at noon to-day to the German people. In this situation dangerous consequences could only come into play if an attempt should be made by any third party, in contradiction to the peaceful intentions and legitimate aims of the Reich, to exercise on the development of the situation in Austria an influence inconsistent with the right of the German people to self-determination. Accept, etc., FREIHERR VON NEURATH. I do not, my Lords, wish to enter into any long argument as regards the historical sequence of events described by Baron von Neurath, but I am bound at once to refute his statement to the effect that His Majesty's Government were not within their rights in interesting themselves in the independence of Austria, and that as, in the opinion of the German Government, relations between Austria and Germany are a purely internal affair, His Majesty's Government, as a third party, have no concern in them. The interest of His Majesty's Government in this question cannot, however, on any tenable ground be denied. In the first place, Great Britain and Austria are both Members of the League, and both were signatories, as was also the German Government, of treaties which provided that the independence of Austria was inalienable except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Quite apart from this, His Majesty's Government are, and must always be, interested in developments in Central Europe, particularly events such as those which have just taken place, if only for the reasons stated by the Prime Minister only a fortnight ago, that the object of all their policy has been to assist in the establishment of a sense of greater security and confidence in Europe, and that that object must inevitably be helped or hindered by events in any part of Europe.

Throughout these events His Majesty's Government have remained in the closest touch with the French Government, and the French Government have, I understand, also entered a strong protest in Berlin on similar lines to that lodged by His Majesty's Ambassador. In the judgment of His Majesty's Government the methods adopted throughout these events call for the severest condemnation, and have administered a profound shock to all who are interested in the preservation of European peace. It follows that what has passed cannot fail to have prejudiced the hope of His Majesty's Government of removing misunderstandings between nations and promoting international co-operation. It might seem unnecessary to refute rumours that His Majesty's Government had given consent, if not encouragement, to the idea of the absorption of Austria by Germany, were there not evidence that these are being sedulously put about in many quarters. There is, of course, no foundation whatever for these rumours. The statement which I have already made shows clearly that His Majesty's Government emphatically disapprove, as they have always disapproved, actions such as those of which Austria has been made the scene.

The attitude of Czechoslovakia to these events is a matter of general interest, and in this connection I can give the House the following information:—The Czech Government have officially informed His Majesty's Government that though it is their earnest desire to live on the best possible neighbourly relations with the German Reich, they have followed with the greatest attention the development of events in Austria between the date of the Austro-German Agreement of July, 1936, up to the present day. I am informed that Field-Marshal Goering on March 11 gave a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin—an assurance which he expressly renewed later on behalf of Herr Hitler—that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German-Czech relations. In particular, on March 12 Field-Marshal Goering informed the Czech Minister that German troops marching into Austria had received the strictest orders to keep at least fifteen kilometres from the Czech frontier. On the same day the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was assured by Baron von Neurath that Germany considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of October, 1925.