§ Amendments reported (according to Order).
§ Clause 7:
§ Provisions in case of settled land and land held on trust.
§ (5) Where any land held on trust is in the possession of a person having a beneficial interest therein or in the, proceeds of sale thereof, his possession shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be the possession of the trustees, or if the person in possession is both a beneficiary and a trustee, his possession shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be that of a trustee.
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THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD MAUGHAM) moved to leave out subsection (5) and insert:
(5) Where any settled land or any land held on trust for sale is in the possession of a person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale, not being a person solely and absolutely entitled thereto, no right of action to recover the land shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to accrue during such possession to any person in whom the land is vested as tenant for life, statutory owner or trustee, or to any other person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or the proceeds of sale.
§ The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, there are certain Amendments which stand in my name to which I may refer. The most important of them is the first Amendment, which is due to a suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, who moved an Amendment on the Committee stage which I promised to consider. That matter is a technical one, and I am not surprised to find that, bearing in mind what the noble Lord suggested on the last occasion, it is possible to make a subsection—namely, subsection (5) of Clause 7—read in a more satisfactory way, which will avoid some of the difficulties that the noble Lord pointed out. The substituted subsection is now limited to the case of settled land and land held on trust for sale, whereas the old subsection applied generally to all cases where land is held on trust.
§ I think that meets the main criticism that Lord Mancroft made on the previous occasion, and in particular it meets a case which he had in mind—namely, the case where a purchaser enters into possession of land without obtaining a conveyance, and the legal estate is held on trust for him by the vendors. The new subsection does not apply to any case where the person in possession is the sole, or the sole surviving, beneficiary under the trust or settlement. In fact, as now drafted it only effects the object for which it was designed, which is to prevent one beneficiary under a settlement or trust setting up a title adverse to the rights of the other beneficiaries. There is another point that was raised by Lord Mancroft in reference to the subject of co-ownership of land. It is true that the Bill does change the law of limitation in relation to concurrent interests in land, but that change, or some change, is necessary owing to a change in the general law effected by the legislation of 1925, and this change is the right one, having regard 571 to the fact that concurrent interests can now only exist under a settlement or behind a trust for sale. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 36, leave out subsection (5) and insert the said new subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
§ LORD MANCROFTMy Lords, I wish to thank my noble and learned friend. I think he has met as far as possible the principle which I had in mind when during the Committee stage I ventured to bring criticisms before your Lordships' House. It seems now quite clear to me that the provision which is in the Government's mind does not affect, as worded afresh, the case of a purchaser in possession who has not a conveyance. It will merely affect settled land and land in trust for sale. That being so, I wish to thank the noble and learned Lord. I am much obliged to him for having moved the Amendment to Clause 7.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 25:
§ Effect of acknowledgment or part payment on persons other than the maker or recipient.
§ (5) An acknowledgment of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall only hind the acknowledgor and his successors, but a payment made in respect of the debt or claim shall bind all persons liable in respect thereof:
§ Provided that an acknowledgment or payment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of the action shall only bind the acknowledgor or the person making the payment, as the case may be, and his successors other than successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the acknowledgment or payment.
§
THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to leave out subsection (5) and insert:
(5) An acknowledgment of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind the acknowledgor and his successors but not any other person:
Provided that an acknowledgment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind any successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the acknowledgment.
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(6) A payment made in respect of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind all persons liable in respect thereof:
Provided that a payment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind any person other than the person making the payment and his successors, and shall not bind any successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the payment.
§ The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is simply a matter of drafting. Subsection (5), it was thought on reconsideration, was an exceedingly difficult one to understand and, as redrafted in the form of two subsections, it will be much more intelligible. We now separate the case of acknowledgments in respect of a death made after the expiration of the period of limitation and a case where there has been a pecuniary payment made. I think it is as well, as the Bill is exceedingly hard to understand, that it should be made as easy as it can be made in the circumstances of the case.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 8, leave out subsection (5) and insert the said new subsections.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 31:
§ Interpretation.
§ (2) For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be under a disability while he is an infant, or of unsound mind, or a convict subject to the operation of the Forfeiture Act, 1870, in whose case no administrator or curator has been appointed under that Act.
§
THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after subsection (2), to insert:
(3) For the purposes of the last foregoing subsection but without prejudice to the generality thereof, a person shall be conclusively presumed to be of unsound mind—
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The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the last Amendment is in reference to cases of unsound mind. On reconsideration it was thought that unsound
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mind as a ground of disability might be somewhat difficult in cases where a person was detained in the various ways in which he may be detained and it was possible to suggest that, though so detained, he was not of unsound mind. In order to meet that, I have an addition to Clause 31 which reads:
For the purposes of the last foregoing subsection but without prejudice to the generality thereof, a person shall be conclusively presumed to be of unsound mind—
(a) while he is detained in pursuance of any enactment authorising the detention of persons of unsound mind or criminal lunatics, or is receiving treatment as a voluntary patient under the Mental Treatment Act, 1930, being treatment which follows without any interval such detention as aforesaid;"—
that is one series of cases where a person may be detained as being of unsound mind—and
(b) while he is detained under any provision of the Menial Deficiency Acts, 1913 to 1938.
§ There should be a disability provision in the Bill in relation to a person who is a lunatic or a mental defective under restraint. From this point of view it does not so much matter whether a person is of unsound mind or not if he is shut up in any of these places or is under such detention as is possible under these Acts. When that happens, your Lordships will agree, it is unnecessary to inquire subsequently whether the restraint was in fact for unsound mind or not. Accordingly the Amendment makes it clear that the disability of unsoundness of mind applies to cases of mental deficiency where the deficiency is sufficiently serious to require the person to be restrained. I should add that the Amendment does not constitute an exhaustive definition of unsoundness of mind. The door is open to any person who can satisfy the Court that he was of unsound mind at the material date, whether or not he was under restraint, and accordingly he will be entitled to rely on the disability provisions of the Bill. The Amendment relates simply to the question of disability in the form which is mentioned on the Paper. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 39, at end insert the said new subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.