HL Deb 21 May 1936 vol 100 cc1161-77

LORD DAVIES rose to move to resolve, That this House, believing that recent international events provide overwhelming evidence of the inability of the League of Nations as at present constituted to fulfil those primary functions for which it was created, urges His Majesty's Government to accord the principles underlying the French plan their earnest consideration and to seize this further opportunity of establishing the peace of Europe on a film and durable basis.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name, and in doing so to fissure your Lordships that I have put it down not so much with the object of eliciting from the Government any considered opinion regarding the French plan, as to provide an opportunity for the expression of your Lordships' views upon this important document. The Government are no doubt engaged in studying these proposals simultaneously with those emanating from the German Government, and I trust the noble Earl opposite will acquit me of any intention of endeavouring to raise these matters prematurely, before he and his colleagues have reached their final conclusions. On the other hand, I submit that a document of such vital and far-reaching importance deserves a Second Reading discussion in your Lordships' House. To-day we are concerned not so much with the details as with the principles underlying this plan, and with any points of similarity there may be between it and the proposals put forward by the German Government.

What is the French plan? Broadly, it may be divided under three headings. First, there is the preamble; secondly, there are the proposals for collective security, and, thirdly, there are suggestions for economic development. The preamble, as your Lordships are aware, lays down a number of general principles, most of which will, I imagine, command the assent of your Lordships' House. These principles emphasise the importance of establishing the rule of law. They lay stress upon respect for contracted engagements and the necessity for mutual assistance and co-operation, equality of rights and the independence of all States. For instance, paragraph 3 is as follows: There is no real security in international relations if all conflicts which can arise between States are not resolved according to International Law, obligatory on all and interpreted by impartial and sovereign international jurisdiction, and guaranteed by the forces of all the associates of the international community. Paragraph 4 recognises the necessity for a more drastic pooling of sovereignty. It is as follows: Equality of rights does not prevent any State, voluntarily and in the common interest, limiting in certain circumstances the exercise of its sovereignty and rights.

Secondly, there are the proposals for collective security. These insist upon the sanctity of treaties, the organisation of mutual assistance, and the need for a wide measure of disarmament. Paragraph 12, dealing with the problem of mutual assistance, is as follows: In order that they may be able to accomplish their duties of mutual assistance, the States associated with the European framework, or in the regional framework, shall specially provide and permanently maintain, military, aerial and naval forces at the disposal of the European Commission or the Council of the League of Nations. Disarmament is referred to in paragraph 14 in the following terms: Collective security having been organised in the European or regional frameworks by mutual assistance, all the associates shall proceed to a wide measure of disarmament. This paragraph supports the contention which many of us have advanced—namely, that disarmament follows security, and not security disarmament, and that to put disarmament first is to put the cart before the horse.

Under the third heading come the proposals for economic development, including the suggestion for a European Customs Union, the international organisation of exchanges, and other propositions as the basis of economic cooperation. Paragraph 20 alludes to a revision of certain Colonial Statutes, not in the domain of political sovereignty, but from the point of view of equality of economic rights and the co-operation of credit between European States which, having assured themselves of collective security and mutual assistance, will accordingly have to be considered as associates, not as rivals. I have tried very briefly to summarise the proposals and suggestions contained in the French plan. I think I have said enough to show that they are far-reaching and that they deserve the most careful consideration. They are based upon two broad principles: first, a collective system of mutual assistance for the prevention and suppression of war; and, secondly, a recognition of economic solidarity and the removal in Europe of those barriers which impede the progress of trade and commerce.

One important principle, however, appears to have been omitted. There is no adequate recognition for the necessity of effecting changes in the relationships of States and the revision of treaties by some peaceful procedure. The dynamic principle is ignored—too great stress is laid upon the importance of maintaining the status quo, and no suggestions are made for implementing the provisions of Article 19. It is true that paragraph 2 says "No treaty should be regarded as unalterable "; but it does not tell us how it is proposed that the alterations shall be effected. Then it goes on to say that in the new European organisation, wherein all peoples with equal rights shall be freely associated, each State will bind itself to respect the territorial status of the members which cannot be modified without the consent of all. No demand for modification shall be submitted for twenty-five years. That, I venture to suggest, is the great blemish and the great omission of the French plan.

Now let me turn for a moment to the German proposals. If we contrast them with the French plan, there are at least two points of resemblance. First, there is the proposal for a European air pact. Paragraph 5 is as follows: The German Government are prepared, in order to strengthen further these security agreements between the Western Powers, to conclude an air pact calculated to prevent in an automatic and effective manner the danger of sudden air attacks. This means that if any signatory to the pact is subjected to an attack from the air, the Air Forces of all the other signatories shall automatically go to its assistance. What therefore is the difference between the purpose of this combined force and a force at the disposal of the League? I suggest that this undertaking is very similar to the provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the French plan, whereby: the States associated within the European framework…shall specially provide and permanently maintain…aerial…forces at the disposal of the European Commission or the Council of the League of Nations. Secondly, the German proposals of March 30 allude to the setting up of an International Court of Arbitration which shall be responsible for the observance of the various agreements concluded and whose decisions shall be binding on all parties. We are not told what are the precise duties which are to be entrusted to this Court. But there appears to be a striking resemblance between it and the International European Commission of the French Plan alluded to in paragraph 13, which lays down: The permanent control of the carrying-out of treaties within the European framework or the regional framework shall be organised by the European Commission. Here are at least two points of similarity which point in the direction of the establishment of what is described in the French plan as a competent international authority.

I now turn for a moment to the French suggestions regarding regional pacts or ententes for mutual assistance and the German proposals for bilateral pacts of non-aggression. I submit that the only effect of the latter will be to defeat the former and, just like the Pact of Friendship between Italy and Abyssinia, they will only provide the other States-Members of the League with an excuse for doing nothing until the crisis is upon them. The same is true in regard to regional pacts for the purpose of providing mutual assistance because they are apt to degenerate into military alliances. I believe that all such pacts will only undermine the authority and detract from the responsibility of any European collective system which it is proposed to constitute within the framework of the League. Moreover, it is obvious that the value and utility of the collective system is its ability to exert the maximum pressure, both moral and physical, upon the aggressor and to throw its overwhelming weight into the scales on the side of equity and justice.

If it is proposed to split up Europe into a number of watertight compartments each regulated by its own pact, then I submit that we are courting disaster. I believe it is recorded that when Solon was asked which was the best protected city, he replied: "The city where all citizens, whether they have suffered injury or not, equally pursue and punish injustice." If we compare the League of Nations to a city, and regard its States-Members as the citizens, it follows that the best system of collective security is one in which all States, whether they have received injury or not, "equally pursue and punish injustice "—in other words, that they are prepared to join in the collective hue and cry in pursuit of the aggressor.

I think it has been said that the task of the British Government is to construct a bridge linking up the French and German standpoints, in order to effect an amicable agreement between these two great nations. The task of bridge-building will always be a difficult one and it will obviously be still more difficult when the stream over which the bridge is to be erected happens to be in full spate. But however this may be, the point I would like to emphasise is this, that the task of co-ordinating the views of France and Germany does not absolve the British Government from the responsibility of putting forward constructive proposals of their own which, in their opinion, will strengthen the organisation and develop the functions of the League and give stability and solidarity to the system of collective security. In the past British Governments have rather shirked this responsibility. In 1924 when the Protocol was discussed at Geneva, and at least on two occasions during the last five years, we have failed to make contributions of our own to the reform of the League and to the revision of the Covenant. It will be remembered that when first of all M. Tardieu, and afterwards M. Herriot, put forward their plans at the Disarmament Conference we certainly failed to support them, or even to suggest how they might be amended and improved.

Now the plan referred to in this Motion may provide the last opportunity of grappling with this vital and difficult problem. I submit, therefore, that this chance should not be allowed to slip away. We are glad to know that an assurance has already been given by the Government that the present proposals will be considered seriously, and that the reform of the League is no longer to be regarded merely as a pious aspiration. A few weeks ago the Chancellor of the Exchequer, speaking in another place, said: When that time comes, we shall have to review the whole conditions, the whole constitution, functions and scope of the League of Nations. I am sure your Lordships will welcome this assurance that there is to be a revision of the Covenant, and I trust that it will be undertaken in the light of recent experiences, and that the flaws revealed during the last twelve months will be recognised and remedied.

Desperate diseases demand drastic remedies. We all realise the dangers which beset us and the peoples of Europe to-day. I shall not attempt to reiterate the prophetic warnings of so many distinguished statesmen, soldiers and publicists who have warned us of the catastrophic results which may be expected from the next upheaval. I cannot, however, refrain from quoting a striking passage from his rectorial address delivered at Edinburgh a few days before his death by a distinguished soldier and member of your Lordships' House—the late Viscount Allen by, whose loss is so deeply deplored to-day throughout the length and breadth of the Empire. This is what he said There is danger in delay, for it seems likely that, unless an effort in the right direction—a successful effort—is made soon, the present social system will crumble in ruin; and many now alive may witness the hideous wreck. Then will loom the dreadful menace of the dark ages; returning darker, black, universal in scope, long-lasting. What is the right direction? Is it a return to pre-War conditions, competing armaments and military alliances? Is it to turn our backs on the concept of justice and the collective system and retire, once more, into isolation, which the experience of a century has proved to be futile and illusory? Is it to emasculate the Covenant by striking out all those provisions which were intended by its framers to assert the rule of law?

If we listen to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who, although he is opposed to the employment of force for any purpose whatsoever, is nevertheless joined in an unholy alliance with anti-sanctionist noble Lords opposite, Article 16 will be consigned to the scrap heap. I am sorry the noble Lord is not in his place to-day. If we accept the advice of my noble friend the Marquess of Lothian, we shall be content with a round table. I am the last person in the world to detract from the merits of a round table. All I venture to submit is that it is not the only article of furniture which is necessary to complete the equipment at Geneva, and that the more austere furnishings of the halls of justice and equity and the constable's office have also to be provided. Surely when the magic of the round table has failed to produce an amicable settlement the last word has not been said. Diplomacy by conference was the motto of Lord Castlereagh a hundred years ago, but to-day, I submit, it will not suffice to save Europe from another catastrophe.

So, my Lords, I reiterate the question: What is the right direction—to go forwards or backwards? The answer, I think, is to be found in Lord Allenby's rectorial and, as it turned out, valedictory address from which I have just quoted. He said: Many former obstacles have been cleared away. Science has overthrown barriers and given egress in all directions. Man is now able to navigate the atmosphere, plumb the deep seas, travel in three dimensions of space, move anywhere at a speed unimaginable to our fathers. Willingly or unwillingly, he has become a world-citizen; and the duties of that citizenship cannot be evaded; duties calling for the wholehearted co-operation of every man and woman alive, joined in mind and purpose to promote the good and the advancement of all. And the machinery is ready to hand. The League of Nations is alive and active, while courts exist for determining and adjusting international differences, judicial and financial. The noble and gallant Viscount also spoke of the civil population being as open as the soldier to attack in any future war, and said: The knowledge of this may perhaps bring to the statesman a warning sense of his responsibility The choice lies within Will the hardness of his heart prevail; must the narrowness of his outlook persist until he is schooled by poison-gas and bomb; or will he some day call to mind the pact renouncing war as a solvent of differences; the pact signed by sixty nations, but now forgotten or disregarded? Is it too much to believe that the human intellect is equal to the problem of designing a world state wherein neighbours can live without molestation; in collective security? It does not matter what the state is called; give it any name you please:—League of Nations; Federated Nations, United States of the World. Why should there not be a world police; just as each nation has a national police force?

My Lords, that is the signpost which points in the right direction. It is a courageous challenge to the future from which we dare not run away. No doubt in some quarters we shall be told that the French plan and the German proposals are mere camouflage, and that they do not conform with the recent actions of either country. This may be true, but I submit that that is no reason why we should not take them at their face value in an attempt to reconcile and improve them. Let us recognise the failures of the past in order to prepare for the future. Let us adapt the powers and functions of the League in such a way as will enable it to vindicate the rule of law. At this stage I submit that mutual recrimination will serve no useful purpose. It is idle to apportion the blame for past failures. All the great Powers are involved to a greater or lesser degree—America for having deserted her offspring at the first opportunity; Great Britain for her obstinate refusal, until last October, to clothe Article 16 with flesh and blood and her rejection of every proposal to organise and develop a system of sanctions; France, the erstwhile protagonist of this system, for the abandonment of her traditional policy and the moral support she has given to an aggressor nation; Germany for her defection from the League and her unilateral acts in the repudiation of treaties; Italy for her cynical violation of the Covenant and her wanton and barbarous attack upon a fellow Member of the League, whose claims to membership she had so warmly espoused a few short years ago.

Let us admit that we have all sinned and fallen short of those beneficent intentions embodied in the Covenant which inspired the heroism of our comrades who fell in the World War and animated the peoples and their rulers at its conclusion. Obviously, this should be the season of repentance for all. Those who are not prepared to repent should not be included as Members of a reformed and remodelled League. Better that it should perish than that it should become once more a cloak for the perpetration of injustice and aggression. But repentance cannot be regarded as genuine unless there are guarantees for future good behaviour.

What are the guarantees? The first I suggest is the creation of a peaceful procedure for the settlement of all disputes and the revision of treaties. In default of a more satisfactory solution an Equity Tribunal holds the field. The second guarantee is the pooling of their military resources by the Members of the League in order to assert the rule of law. If air power is the decisive factor, as the campaign in Abyssinia has proved, let Europe be equipped with an Air Police Force under the control and direction of a neutral authority, a reconstituted League. But in order to provide the maximum deterrent effect, this force must possess superiority in numbers and equipment, in comparison with the national Air Force of any European State who refuses to join in the guarantee. If the 22 smaller European Powers, whose present contributions under the Baremo formula towards the maintenance of the League are equivalent to the contributions of the four great Powers, are prepared to contribute their appropriate quotas towards the equipment and maintenance of such a force, then its superiority will be assured.

These, my Lords, are the objectives which I trust the Government will keep steadily before them, and which, if they can be achieved, will redound not only to the security of Europe, but to the safety of the British Commonwealth and the welfare of all mankind. I beg to move.

Moved to resolve, That this House, believing that recent international events provide overwhelming evidence of the inability of the League of Nations as at present constituted to fulfil those primary functions for which it was created, urges His Majesty's Government to accord the principles underlying the French plan their earnest consideration and to seize this further opportunity of establishing the peace of Europe on a firm and durable basis.—(Lord Davies.)

LORD ARNOLD

My Lords, when I saw this Resolution upon the Paper I wondered if the noble Lord who had put it down intended it to be taken seriously. If so, I should imagine that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is the only man in England who thinks that the French plan furnishes an opportunity—to take the words of the Motion—of "establishing the peace of Europe on a firm and durable basis." This French plan contains all the vices of French foreign policy. Its cardinal feature is that there is to be no territorial readjustment for twenty-five years. That means in short that the French plan seeks to maintain for twenty-five years the status quo. It is indeed an attempt to continue the evils and injustices of Versailles, whereas it should be the duty of statesmen to get away from those evils and injustices and to make a fresh start.

The second main feature of the French plan is this extraordinary proposal for the establishment of a European Commission which it is claimed will be within the framework of the League of Nations—to use that hackneyed and meaningless phrase. As a matter of fact, the framework of the League is the most elastic apparatus that civilisation has yet produced. Anything and everything can be put into the framework of the League. Any proposal apparently fits into that framework. This fantastic European Commission is to be a sort of Super-State for the purpose of enabling France to maintain the status quo. France, with all her pacts and alliances and her influence with small nations, knows quite well that she can obtain—and this is the chief operative provision of the European Commission—the two-thirds majority necessary to put into operation so many of the decisions of the European Commission. I say, France knows she can get that two-thirds majority, and she also knows that with that two-thirds majority she can maintain the status quo and can to a very large extent maintain the present position which obtains in Europe as against Germany—because that is really what is the basis of the French plan. All this is really quite incompatible with the League Covenant. The devotion of France to the League is based really on French interests. When the League Covenant does not suit France the League Covenant is broken. That has been very clearly evidenced in the application of Article 16 in the Italo-Abyssinian war.

The third feature of the French plan is this international force. The noble Lord, as, of course, we all knew he would, dwelt at considerable length upon the International Police Force. That is a matter which he brings up from time to time in your Lordships' House. The International Air Police Force has been so battered by criticism in this House, notably from the Government Bench, that I cannot suppose this feature of the French plan will find much support to-day from the noble Earl. That is another reason why I do not think that the noble Earl, when he comes to reply, will have a great deal to say in favour of this French plan.

Next, I will call attention to the first part of the Memorandum on the French plan. This first part seems to make clear that the French Government do not expect their plan to be accepted, because the first part of the Memorandum purports to be a reply to the German case. It might have been designed to exacerbate the situation and to render any settlement between France and Germany virtually impossible. I do not think that is putting it too strongly if that Memorandum is read in its entirety and read carefully. Of course, the truth is that France has now got Great Britain committed to her by Staff talks and that she does not wish negotiations on the German plan to succeed. That is the plain truth. She wants them to break down, because what France desires above all is to maintain the status quo. She prefers the status quo to a European settlement, and therefore she will do all that she can to stop what most of the countries want, and what I certainly think Great Britain wants, and that is a real European settlement.

This Memorandum, which purports to be a reply to the German case, puts a very great and almost an intolerable strain upon the patience of Germany, because amongst other phrases this appears: "France insists that fidelity to treaties is the fundamental basis of French policy." Such a claim is completely at variance with what France has done during the last twenty years, particularly in regard to Germany. I will cite only two instances: first, the Disarmament Clause of the Treaty of Versailles, which France has never made the smallest attempt in any way to keep, nor has she attempted to honour the undertaking given there; and secondly, the illegal invasion of the Ruhr. In view of these things, it is really difficult to understand how these words about fidelity to treaties being the fundamental basis of French policy could have got into this Memorandum on the French plan at all.

Lord Rennell, a fortnight ago in a weighty speech in your Lordships' House, emphasised that the great obstacle to European unity was the spirit of mistrust which separates France from Germany. The French plan, so far from doing anything to remove that spirit of mistrust, emphasises it and intensifies it. The French plan is really one for encircling Germany with a network of pacts and alliances. That is what it comes to. That is the real reason why the Memorandum setting forth the plan contains these words. France says in this Memorandum: European security forms a whole, and the principle of collective security is not valid for only part of the Continent…France could not conceive of a settlement of Western security for which she would have to disinterest herself in the security of the rest of Europe. Those are the words which appear in the French plan, and they mean that, if the French plan were adopted by Great Britain, this country, as one of the signatories, would again be committed to all kinds of liabilities in Eastern Europe. It is quite true that under the League of Nations Covenant there are similar commitments, but everybody knows now that they will not he carried out.

In particular, Great Britain will not go to war to help France in her Eastern alliances which have been brought into being as part of France's policy of the encirclement of Germany. The fact is that the vast majority of the people of Great Britain are strongly opposed to being taken into war because of trouble in Eastern Europe. Take Austria. France, as everybody knows, is strongly opposed to Austria becoming part of the German Empire, but if Germany annexed Austria it is in the last degree likely that the people of Great Britain would be willing to fight in a war which might result from that action. I say that, despite Stresa and so forth, more, happily, is required than declarations such as that at Stresa to take the nation into war. So far as Great Britain is concerned, the aversion from and apprehension of another war are so deep-seated that the people of this country will not again go to war except on behalf of some clear and unmistakable British interest.

It is in this supreme matter of what their respective peoples might be willing to go to war about that a great cleavage is developing between Great Britain and France. Great Britain has given a guarantee to France and to Belgium to help them if they are invaded by Germany. It may be, if that invasion by Germany should ever take place, that the guarantee will be implemented. Personally, I do not think it should ever have been given, and that, having been given, it should be denounced as soon as possible. But apart from anything else that would be the most honest course, because in view of the French record during and since the War it will be very difficult to get the people of Great Britain to fight again on behalf of France. Your Lordships know that that is true. In the event, however, of the people of Great Britain being willing to go to war in defence of France and what is called the Western Security Pact, it is quite certain that they would not take part in a war concerned with trouble in Eastern Europe. That is the cleavage which is developing or, I think I might say, has developed between British foreign policy and French foreign policy.

There have been many debates in your Lordships' House on foreign affairs this year, a great many debates, and I think I have listened to them all. It has again and again been made manifest that hardly a single one of the supporters of the Government on that side of the House is prepared to undertake liability for France's Eastern commitments, and the bare idea of going to war on behalf of Russia arouses noble Lords opposite to fury. So far as I am concerned I entirely agree in refusing to undertake these widespread commitments. I am speaking to-day, as I have done now for some time on foreign affairs, for myself. I do not claim to be speaking for the noble Lords who sit on these Benches, although I know that some of them are in agreement with what I say, but I am actually speaking for myself. In these circumstances which I have been outlining, the Government cannot honestly give support to the French plan, knowing the minds of the people of Great Britain as they do. They will be obliged to tell the Government of France that this country will not undertake vast liabilities like those which are involved in the French plan. I have said that this French plan incorporates all the vices of French foreign policy, and it is French foreign policy which is largely responsible for the condition of Europe to-day. If after the War Great Britain had only had the courage to take the lead and have a foreign policy of her own instead of playing second fiddle to France time after time, things might have been different. But that was not done, and we see the result to-day. Therefore Great Britain should scrutinise very closely any proposal which comes from France, and certainly an important document like the French plan.

If anybody seventeen years ago had prophesied that, within the short space of seventeen years after the War which was to end war, the condition of Europe would be as bad as it is to-day, that man would have been looked upon as a lunatic. And, I repeat, the condition is very largely due to France and to French foreign policy. So there is every reason why we should not continue to follow in the wake of France, and certainly every reason why we should not support this really preposterous French plan. There is every reason why we should have nothing to do with it; should not resurrect it but leave it where it is. As a matter of fact, the French plan was really put forward for two purposes: in the first place as propaganda for the French Elections; and in the second place to confuse the issue and to divert attention from the proper consideration of the German plan; and I say it is wrong for Great Britain to have any part in wrecking tactics of this kind. The French plan cannot possibly have been put forward with any hope of effecting a European settlement. The French Government must have known perfectly well that that could not follow from the French plan. Here again there is a great cleavage between Great Britain and France. Great Britain wants a European settlement; all Parties want a European settlement. We want a fresh start, we want to get away, as I say, from the Versailles spirit, and so on. France, on the other hand, wants the status quo; she wants that more than she wants a European settlement. France has done and is doing nothing whatever to bring about reconciliation with Germany. On the other hand, an Anglo-German understanding is desired by the great mass of the people of Great Britain, and only France stops it from being brought about. An Anglo-German understanding or settlement could be arrived at to-morrow if it were not for France. There is no real difficulty as between this country and Germany.

Before I conclude I would like to say a few words about the first part of the Motion. The Motion begins by emphasising the inability of the League of Nations, as constituted, to work, or, to quote the words of the Motion, "to fulfil those primary functions for which it was created." I was very much surprised when I saw those words on the Paper, under the name of the noble Lord, because when some two months ago I said very much the same thing, and suggested that a new League was needed, not based on force, I incurred the strong displeasure of the noble Lord. He contended, as Lord Cecil and others constantly contend, that the alternative lay between a situation like that of 1914, which preceded the War, and the League of Nations. We were told that again and again, and I should think that if the noble Viscount on the Cross Benches (Viscount Cecil) has said it once he has said it two dozen times. I cannot discuss that to-day, and so far as I am concerned I entirely deny the contention. It is quite wrong to say that there are no other courses open. There are in fact plenty of other courses open, and all of them better, I consider, either than the League of Nations as at present constituted or the Balance of Power which led to the Great War.

Here may I say that those of us who criticise the League of Nations do not do so lightly, particularly having regard to the place which it fills in the minds and thoughts of some of our best friends. To them the League of Nations is an almost divine institution. To attack it is like attacking a man's religion. It is really tantamount to blasphemy. Nevertheless there is a striking change in the attitude of Lord Davies since the middle of March. I then incurred his displeasure because I pointed to some of the obvious weaknesses of the League of Nations. Now, however, in his Motion and speech he says the same thing as I have said, but more strongly. He said that it would be better the League should perish than that it should become once more a cloak for the perpetration of injustice and aggression. Even I have not gone so far, and I should have to think it over before I did so. I wish to pay a tribute to the noble Lord's honesty in facing the logic of facts. His admission about the failure of the League of Nations deserves a certificate for intellectual integrity, and it is much to be regretted that a similar certificate cannot be given to many of the supporters of the League of Nations. They will not recognise the force of events, but still go on talking just as if nothing had happened, as if the League of Nations was still an all-inclusive League, and as if it had functioned well and had fulfilled all, or nearly all, of the hopes of its founders. That is so far removed from the facts that I think the attitude is to be regretted, to use no stronger language.

Some of us who have never been enthusiastic about a League of Nations founded on force nevertheless did hope, particularly in early days, the condition of Europe being what it is, and in view of the conditions contained in the Treaty of Versailles, that the League of Nations might do something to help disarmament; but unhappily after the complete breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, and other disappointments and failures, culminating in the almost unbelievable calamity of the League's action and inaction in regard to Abyssinia, we have been compelled to take the view that the League of Nations as at present constituted—a League of Nations based on force—so far from being an instrument likely to preserve peace is more likely to lead to grave international complications and disappointments, and possibly even to war. Therefore we feel the time has come when all these matters should be taken most seriously into consideration, and although the Government have intimated that that is going to be done, I have not seen any great indication, from what they have said up to the present, that they have any very drastic change in view. However, I may be wrong. With regard to this French plan, which is the main object of the noble Lord's Motion, I cannot help thinking your Lordships will not do other than condemn it.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT HALIFAX)

My Lords, as your Lordships are aware, there is to be a Royal Commission this evening at which the Royal Assent will be signified to certain Bills. I understand that it will be generally convenient that the Commission should take place now, and if your Lordships will agree to suspend the debate it can be resumed after the Commission.

House adjourned during pleasure.

House resumed.