§ LORD DAVIES had given Notice that he would move to resolve, That, with a view to promoting an early settlement of the tragic conflict in Abyssinia, this House calls upon His Majesty's Government to propose the creation by the 654 League of Nations of an impartial Commission on the lines of the Lytton Commission to investigate the issues involved and to submit to the Council and Assembly recommendations for the just and equitable solution of the conflict having regard to—
- (a) the welfare of the Ethiopian people, the maintenance of order in, and the internal development of, their country;
- (b) any legitimate Italian claims for economic and colonial expansion in East Africa; and
- (c) the economic interests in this part of the world of other nations, Members and non-members of the League.
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name. In doing so, may I remind your Lordships of the events which have brought us to the deplorable position in which we find ourselves to-day? It is a truism that we cannot expect to prevent war unless we provide some substitute for effecting peaceful changes in the relationship of nations. This principle was recognised by the framers of the Covenant when they drafted Article 19. They intended, no doubt, that the provisions of this article, wholly inadequate as they were and as they have since proved themselves to be, would be implemented by their successors in order that an effective procedure could be developed which would enable treaties to be revised from time to time and ensure that all disputes would be referred to the arbitrament of reason and not of force. This intention to institute a peaceful procedure has since been reiterated in many quarters, and I should like to quote from a very notable speech which was made at Geneva by Sir Samuel Hoare last September:
§ " Something must also be done to remove the causes from which war is apt to arise. Some other means than the recourse to arms must be found for adjusting the natural play of international forces…. Yet the world is not static, and changes will from time, to time have to be made. The Covenant itself admits this possibility. But such changes will have to be made when they are really necessary and when the time is ripe, and not before; they will have to come about by consent and not by dictation, by agreement and not by unilateral action, by peaceful means and 655 not by war or threat of war. The Members of the League must address themselves to this as well as to other aspects of security if the rule of law in international affairs is to be established and confirmed."
§ Unfortunately, however, in spite of these declarations Article 19 has remained static.
§ On the two occasions when it was invoked, the case of Bolivia and Peru in 1920 and of China in 1929, no progress was made in elucidating the problem of peaceful change, and it is clear that if one of the parties to the dispute refuses to take the advice of the Assembly, then the whole process of revision is completely blocked. The only attempt during the past seventeen years to implement the underlying intention of Article 19 was the appointment of the Lytton Commission in 1932 to investigate the issues which had arisen between China and Japan. This Commission was composed of impartial and disinterested persons, who were appointed not by their respective Governments but by the Council of the League. Consequently it was not intended that they should act as the spokesmen of or should represent the views of any Governments. They acted as individuals in a collective capacity, and were charged, after the fullest investigation, to recommend a just and equitable solution of this dispute to the Council and Assembly of the League. Your Lordships will remember that after many months of exhaustive inquiry in the Far East, they produced a Report which was adopted unanimously by the Council and Assembly, but was rejected by Japan. This Report was not merely concerned with judicial questions or the interpretation of existing treaties, but laid down general principles and the procedure through which these principles could be applied. Broadly speaking, the Report of the Commission was based upon the concept of equity, that is to say, a fair and reasonable adjustment of the claims put forward by the contending parties, coupled with more general considerations regarding the common interests of all States-Members in the peaceful settlement of this dispute.
§ Here, at any rate, was a peaceful procedure for effecting changes in the relationships of States which was endorsed by the representatives of forty-two nations. Article 19 was obviously 656 beginning to work; but this Report, acclaimed at the time as an outstanding document and a signal contribution to the problem of treaty revision, was, as we know, consigned to the waste-paper basket. Why? I suggest for two reasons. Firstly, because the Commission arrived upon the scene too late and started its investigations after the mischief had been done. Secondly, because the provisions of Article 16 were ignored. There were no sanctions in this case. I do not think I need labour this point, because everyone realises that a judge is useless without a policemen; but I also submit that the converse is equally true—namely, that a policeman cannot function effectively without a judge, and that both are complementary.
§ Then why, it may be asked, was a Tribunal or Commission not created to examine, all the issues involved and recommend an equitable settlement in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, when it was decided to honour our commitments under Article 16 and to impose sanctions? Surely a procedure that was considered to be appropriate in the case of China and Japan could also have been applied to the conflict between Italy and Abyssinia. Perhaps the Government can tell us why this valuable precedent was discarded. Had such a Commission been in existence as part of the permanent machinery of the League, its services could have been invoked in the early months of last year, when the military preparations in East Africa made it clear to everyone that Italy intended to attack another State-Member of the League. I think it was apparent at that time. It was also apparent that the bilateral treaty of arbitration between Italy and Abyssinia, humorously described as a treaty of friendship, had only become a pretext for delaying any action by the League; and at a later stage, when it had become obvious that further negotiations and conciliation were useless, and that war was imminent, then, surely, the whole question ought to have been referred to an impartial Commission.
§ It will no doubt be said that in September this task was entrusted to the Committee of Five. The Committee of Five did its best in the time available, but how was this Committee constituted? 657 It included representatives of five Governments, Spain, Poland, Turkey, France and ourselves, three of whom were directly interested parties because they possessed vast tracts of territory in Africa. Consequently I suggest that this Committee, composed of members who were bound to act upon the instructions of their respective Governments, could hardly be described as a purely disinterested and impartial body, however honestly and sincerely they might endeavour to discover a just and equitable solution. Secondly, the Committee had no time to undertake a complete and exhaustive inquiry into all the issues involved. After a short interval of hasty investigation they submitted a brief Report to the Council. Then, after that, despite the fact that war had begun, further attempts at conciliation followed, terminating, as we well remember, in the Hoare-Laval proposals, which, as we know, outraged the elementary sense of justice throughout the British Empire and in many other countries as well. Had there been an impartial tribunal these proposals, I venture to suggest, would never have seen the light of day, and the Government would have been saved the necessity of repudiating them.
§ This Resolution is not intended to be a gesture to save the face of the League, nor, on the other hand, an eleventh hour expedient. What it proposes is a system, or at any rate an integral part of a system—namely, the resign of law. I submit that it is no use talking about the necessity for peaceful change, the need for disarmament, the collective system and other international reforms unless we are prepared to establish those institutions through which the reign of law can be made effective. Above all, there must be equality in the sight of the law. I would also suggest that it is no use proposing one law for Hitler and another law for Mussolini. You cannot demand sanctions against Germany because she has re-occupied the Rhineland and allow Mussolini almost a free hand to bomb and gas the people of Abyssinia. You cannot suggest a Commission and a High Permanent Arbitration Court for Europe, as the French Government proposes in its plan, and at the same time refuse point-blank to appoint a similar Commission to ensure a League settlement in East Africa. If the League is to survive, its States-Members must insist upon the 658 same law, the same procedure, and the same, sanctions for all.
§
That point was emphasised in a speech delivered in another place a few days ago by Mr. Winston Churchill. Mr. Churchill is a statesman of great experience in these matters, and this is what he said:
We hear talk of the encirclement of Germany. I thought the last speaker quite justly said that war encirclement would be intolerable, but peaceful, defensive encirclement may be inevitable before the alarms of the nations are allayed. I say we would impose no arrangement on Germany that we would not submit to ourselves. It is not a case of the encirclement of Germany but of the encirclement of the potential aggressor. If we are the aggressors let us be encircled and brought to reason by the pressure of other countries. If France is the aggressor let her be restrained in the same way; and if it be Germany, let Germany take the measures meted out to her by countries who submit themselves to the law which they are prepared to take a share in enforcing.
I imagine that most of us will agree with Mr. Churchill that it is the aggressor, whoever he is, that must be impounded. Moreover, it would be deplorable that any policeman should connive at the escape of the murderer, and it would be still more deplorable if a murderer was invited to play the part of a policeman. "He that is not with us is against us." In this case he that maketh war is the enemy of peace, and should therefore be outlawed as an enemy of the human race.
§ Consequently we may well ask why has Article 16 not been carried out in its entirety? The spokesmen of the Government at Geneva told us that the policy was that the Covenant should be carried out in its entirety. Why have diplomatic sanctions not been imposed? Why are the oil, coal and steel sanctions periodically postponed? Why has the Assembly of the League or the Committee of Fifty-two not closed the Suez Canal? These sanctions are still available but they have not yet been put into operation. The League, however, is not beaten until they have been tried, and there is no reason why we should anticipate their failure if they are energetically pursued. But, on the other hand, if as we are told the transfer of fifteen French Regular Divisions from the Italian frontier to the Rhine is considered to be worth more than fidelity to the League and the solemn obligations of States-Members under the Covenant, then it is inevitable 659 that the League should perish. If this institution is to become the cloak of bandits and the plaything of their abettors, then it is doomed.
§
Not long ago Mussolini summoned the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen, Senor do Madariaga, to Rome. Why this proposed new pilgrimage to Canossa, dictated by an aggressor who has flouted and defied fifty-two States Members of the League for the last nine months, and at the moment has announced his intention of exterminating the Abyssinians? We are indebted to the Foreign Secretary for the firm stand he took against this insulting proposal. It only illustrates the cynical attitude of Italy towards an institution of which she is still, at any rate nominally, a Member. Why is she still a Member after having broken every rule and regulation of the club? Why has she not long ago been expelled from its membership? I repeat, why has the last paragraph in Article 16 not been put into force? It reads as follows:
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.
What is the alternative? A dictated peace, a peace imposed upon Abyssinia in defiance of the League, and the subjugation by force of arms of one State-Member by another.
§ Therefore I think we are entitled to ask when we are confronted by this unfortunate dilemma: What do we propose to do? Of course, there are risks, whatever course we may take, but I submit that the greatest risk is to abandon the victim of aggression. This would mean that not only Italy but all the Members of the League in their collective capacity would have repudiated their solemn obligations under the Covenant. It would mean that the first chapter of a new era of bloodshed and murder will have been closed, but its far-reaching results will not be confined to Africa. Its repercussions will be felt throughout the world and especially in Europe, where the forces of anarchy are preparing themselves for the final onslaught.
§ The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, in a speech to your Lordships the other day, asked this very pertinent question: "What is it that the democracy of this 660 country is prepared to fight for? "May I venture to suggest to your Lordships that the answer to this question is to be found in the eloquent and moving appeal to the women of this country which appeared to yesterday's Times from the seventeen-year-old Princess of Abyssinia. This is what she said:
§ " Do I ask you, purely selfishly, to do this? No! We are only a small race, but I am seventeen and its leading daughter, and I know, as you know, that if mankind lets bombs and gas destroy my country and people, civilisation will be destroyed too. We have common cause, you and I Why, therefore, do not all do something to drive off this common danger to humanity, this agony, this death by bombs, shell, and gas, before it again establishes itself as it is doing here now; soon to spread fatally to your homes, to your men-folk too? Italian aggression and gas have set humanity a test. If you fail to help us now, we all shall die."
§ In effect, what this young Princess pleads for is the upholding of the rule of law. That, I believe, is the only cause the democracy of this country is prepared to fight for, because it is the only thing worth fighting for. It embraces our national existence and security, because it is based upon the idea of justice, which alone can be the foundation of any permanent peace.
§ Therefore I would most earnestly appeal to the Government steadfastly to pursue its policy of sanctions until, sooner or later, Italy is compelled to withdraw her armies from Abyssinia, and simultaneously to urge the creation of an Equity Tribunal or Commission which would be entrusted with the onerous task of recommending the terms of an equitable settlement within the framework of the League. In conclusion, I may say that a society of which I have the honour to be a member, has recently presented a petition to His Majesty's Government in the sense of this Resolution. It was signed by about 7,000 persons, representing leaders of all shades of public opinion in this country. I think I may say that those of us who have signed this petition believe that the idea of equity in its widest sense has played an important part in the development of law and order in this and other countries. We also believe that in the existing international chaos, when the reign of law is still in its embryonic stage, this idea can be usefully employed in the sphere of international relationships. It 661 is in order to accelerate its application, and to hasten the conclusion of a just and lasting peace in Europe as well as in Africa, that I have ventured to put down this Motion, which I now beg to move.
§ Moved to resolve, That, with a view to promoting an early settlement of the tragic conflict in Abyssinia, this House calls upon His Majesty's Government to propose the creation by the League of Nations of an impartial Commission on the lines of the Lytton Commission to investigate the issues involved and to submit to the Council and Assembly recommendations for the just and equitable solution of the conflict, having regard to—
- (a) the welfare of the Ethiopian people, the maintenance of order in, and the internal development of, their country;
- (b) any legitimate Italian claims for economic and colonial expansion in East Africa; and
- (c) the economic interests in this part of the world of other nations, Members and non-members of the League.—(Lord Davies.)
§ LORD RENNELLMy Lords, it is quite unnecessary for me to say how we all of us esteem—and no one more so than myself—the constant and sincere efforts which are made by my noble friend Lord Davies to bring about some solution of this tragic conflict, and also the testimony that he constantly bears to his unshaken belief in the instrumentality of the League for that purpose, in spite of its having notoriously failed either to avert war or to arrest war. However, it still has a framework, and that framework is invited to do a very great deal for us. The noble Lord's Resolution has been cast in terms which invite investigation of both sides of the question, but in view of the history of the case I think it must be manifestly regarded as directed against only one of the parties involved. Therefore I would ask him, before pressing this Resolution, to weigh with due ponderation whether the stop he proposes should be taken is really at the present moment, I do not say justified, but opportune, as it does not seem to me to be for reasons that I shall try briefly to submit.
662 Those of us who have had this matter under constant survey for perhaps a year and a half, and given it earnest and objective consideration, can have very little doubt as to the reasons for the League's failure to take in hand in good time the essential issue—namely, the menace of war—or for its failure, after ignoring the menace of war for the best part of a year, to put in practice forthwith all the measures laid down in the Covenant for such an eventuality. In any case, the experience that we have been left almost alone to make representations on the subject and, generally, to become the mouthpiece for all propositions advanced on the subject at Geneva, has convinced me of the uselessness as well as the undesirability of our monopolising the initiative at Geneva, so long as the whole position of the League has not been reconsidered and so long as we cannot have some assurance that its influence and action can be other than platonic.
If international friendships and interests are to direct the policy of the League rather than the very definite prescriptions of the Covenant, it seems likely to me to become a danger rather than a safeguard to peace. I am not here criticising any particular country but rather the League itself, the implications of which may demand from some States sacrifices which, in view of their own security, they do not feel able to make. Only occasionally I may admit that very intemperate criticisms in the foreign Press, and the attribution to us of motives for which there is no justification whatever, do remind me of those lines which the poet Blake addressed to his friend William Hayley after a quarrel:
Your friendship oft has made my heart to ache,Do be my enemy, for friendship's sake!We have been ready, if most reluctantly, to sacrifice old and valuable friendships when we believed a principle was involved. Hesitation shown by others to imperil friendships which coincide with interests may well deprive those sacrifices of their anticipated effect, but now we are invited to follow a precedent which in the case of Japan—with all due deference to my noble friend Lord Davies there was no real analogy in the occasion which gave rise to it—only resulted for 663 us in weakening an old established and valuable association without achieving any practical result beyond placing on record an unacceptable expression of disapproval.In the present instance the decision of the vast majority of Member-States was recorded in their verdict that under the conditions contemplated in the Covenant Italy was the aggressor, and I can see no practical advantage until the first object in view, the re-establishment of peace, has been achieved, in promoting a Commission to pronounce upon issues or make recommendations which there seems no disposition to accept and no power to enforce. So far as paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Resolution are concerned, the respective interests of Great Britain, France and Italy were clearly laid down in the Treaty of 1906, the first article of which recorded the agreement of those three Powers to maintain the territorial and political integrity of Ethiopia, Surely it is rather for the other nations, non-members of the League, than for the League itself to look after their particular economic interests.
I shall no doubt be told that if you believe a thing to be right you must stand by it. Yes, by all means, but it is not wise to endeavour to enforce it unless you are sure that you have the power to do so. I understand that even my noble friend Viscount Cecil, who I am sorry to see is not here to-day, would only expect this country to take its share in suppressing aggression on condition that an overwhelming superiority of force was on the side of the peace-keeping Powers. Those are practically his own words. Others, however, would go further than this. Well, my Lords, having made a lifelong study of foreign countries, I have never hesitated in my view that those who pressed for our premature disarmament and at the same time seem to insist on an attitude which other countries would consider provocative, can only be regarded as a national danger.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, this matter is of such very great importance that I think it will be agreed a few words are called for from this side of the House. The arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in support of his Motion, I must say, appealed to me very much, but I was not in so much agreement with his Motion ton the Paper. 664 Should he press it to a Division my noble friends and I could not support it, very largely for one of the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, who has just addressed your Lordships. Such a procedure, we think, will be too late now in all the circumstances of the present situation, and for that reason, if the noble Lord should divide your Lordships, we could not support the Motion. The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, said that the League had tragically failed to do certain things. I think it is a little premature to say that the League of Nations has finally failed, and I hope when the noble Earl who will speak for the Government, as he always does with such great ability and adroitness, comes to reply, he will make it clear that His Majesty's Government have not yet acknowledged failure in this matter, and that we are not going to begin to retreat or to extricate ourselves from the obligations we have undertaken. It is no good making matters worse than they are now. I do not for a moment accept the thesis that the League of Nations has finally failed. This game is not played out by any means and if only the peaceably inclined States-Members will stand firm, especially ourselves with the other great Powers, the case is by no means hopeless.
LORD STRABOLGIYes, I certainly will say what I mean by standing firm. In the first place keep on your present sanctions, and in the second place carry out the Covenant by intensifying sanctions. I think the time has come, for example, when direct help should be given to Abyssinia in this trouble. I was just going to address a question to the Government and I apologise for not having given notice of it, but I am sure the noble Earl is aware of the case, in reference to the prohibition on the use of the railway to Addis Ababa from French Somaliland for the carriage of munitions of war. Under the treaty which enabled that railway to be built, it has to be freely open for the carriage of munitions for the safeguarding of Ethiopian territories, and I understand that the French on one pretext or another have held up these munitions that have been paid for from reaching Abyssinia. We have a direct 665 responsibility in this matter because we were a party with the other States-Members in our endeavour to be so impartial at the beginning by prohibiting any munitions from going either to Italy or Abyssinia. That did not affect Italy at all in her war-making powers but it certainly affected Abyssinia. And now for the French to hold up munitions intended for the Abyssinians is a real act of treachery. I understand that the reason is that the French have made a bargain, that the railway will not be bombed or otherwise attacked in exchange for this breach of the treaty. I would ask the noble Earl who replies for the Government and for the Foreign Office in your Lordships' House whether any representations have been made to the French in this matter. I do not think we can divest ourselves honourably of responsibility in this business.
The noble Lord also said that we have been left almost alone in this matter. I think the noble Earl who replies for the Government will agree, and the Leader of the House who has taken a considerable part in these matters will agree, that we have not in all cases taken the initiative. We have not thrust ourselves forward in the quixotic manner which the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, describes and which the Italian propagandists have tried to fasten upon us again and again. Initiative has often been taken by other nations. In the case of oil, I think the initiative was taken by Mexico, of all countries; one of the great oil-producing countries. I think I am correct in my facts there. Mexico proposed oil sanctions and our complaint indeed on this side of the House—the Labour Party's complaint—is that the Government have been far too timorous in the matter.
May I put this argument before the House in a very few words, to try to sum up how I think the ordinary man regards the present situation? We will presently have a new French Parliament, rather more to the Left than the late Parliament, and I hope that the new French Government will be a little more active and bold in this whole question. Supposing that one single Italian soldier invaded British Somaliland or the Sudan. There are no great material interests concerned affecting the British public, especially in British Somaliland, which is a poor and small country, though there 666 may be some strategical interests. Supposing one Italian soldier set a hostile foot across the frontier, the whole British Empire would prepare to mobilise.
LORD STRABOLGIIf there was an invasion of a British Colony I venture to differ from the noble Lord, if he will allow me to do so. I think that if a British Colony were invaded the whole of our Forces would be mobilised at once.
LORD BELHAVEN AND STENTONThe noble Lord opposite said that if a single Italian soldier invaded Somaliland the whole of our Forces would be mobilised at once. No—not if a hundred Italian soldiers entered Somaliland.
LORD STRABOLGIOf course if there was only one single soldier concerned we would ask for explanations and there would be notes, diplomatic conversations and so on, but if that soldier was followed by a division of soldiers either into the Sudan or British Somaliland, the noble Lord himself would dash to the colours and we all would be called up, including myself. I am not one of the elderly pacifists accused of sending young men to their deaths. I am on the emergency list, and I could be called up to-morrow on any emergency even with a mobilisation proclamation. I would go to-morrow if it were my duty, and the noble Lord would probably go, whether he was liable to be called up or not. Everyone knows that for that reason no British Colony would be invaded by any country in their senses unless they were desirous of a great war with ourselves opposed to them. Look at the particular case we are discussing on the initiative of the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Our honour is just as much involved in the protection of Abyssinia as a Member of the League of Nations—whether she ought to be a Member is another matter, but in fact she is a Member—just as much as our honour would be engaged in protecting a British Colony or a British Protectorate like the Sudan. The Covenant of the League of Nations may have been ill-conceived and 667 too ambitious. That is a different matter. But we are bound to carry out our present obligations under it. Yet the moment anyone like the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, proposes real sanctions, straight away people say that they may mean war. This nervousness about going too far, as it is called, is being exploited by the disturbers of peace in the world.
Now may I ask the representative of the Government when he replies not only to answer the very cogent arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and to express the Government attitude to the Motion, but also to tell us, if possible, what the Government propose to do in these present circumstances. The last debate we had on this subject was just before Easter, and a good deal has happened since then. The Abyssinian military position is a good deal worse. I believe according to the Prime Minister's statement that the Poison Gas Convention has been proved to have been definitely broken. Doubt was expressed about that in the last discussion in your Lordships' House, but since then that doubt has been removed, I understand, according to the Prime Minister's public statement. What are the Government going to do? I think that the people of this country are very exercised as to whether we intend to continue with the policy so far followed, and above all as to whether we are considering intensifying the sanctions. We have the choice now. In a few weeks time it may be too late, and what the noble Lord opposite, Lord Rennell, said will have come true—the League will have been proved a complete failure.
§ LORD RENNELLMay I be allowed to say that I only spoke of it having entirely failed first to forestall the menace of war and then to prevent war. I said it might be in danger of becoming a peril to us rather than a security. I did not assert definitely that the League of Nations had failed. I have always been a great supporter of the League of Nations, and I wish it to be reformed so that it may be a success.
LORD STRABOLGII am grateful to the noble Lord for correcting me in the matter and I am glad to hear that he is a supporter of the League. It will certainly need supporting in the near future, in view of the writings in large 668 sections of the Press which normally support the Government and of the utterances of some of those in your Lordships' House and in another place who normally support the Government. It will need much stronger nerves on the part of the Government and Government supporters in the events which will immediately come upon us. I thought it right to say a few words on this extraordinarily important subject, and I do not think I have misrepresented the recent and present attitude of the Labour Party.
VISCOUNT ELIBANKMy Lords, it seems to me that the noble Lord who has just sat down did not really complete the speech which he was making. Otherwise he might have told us that, in the event of Italy making peace arrangements with Abyssinia which the League of Nations did not like, he would be prepared to lead this country or to go with this country into Abyssinia and to alter those terms by dictation to the Italians located there. It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Lord who has just spoken on behalf of the Labour Party, are leading us, or would lead us if they were in power, into such an impasse that we would have no alternative but to go to war with Italy. The noble Lord has just told us that our whole honour is bound up with this question of Abyssinia, but he omitted to state, as he has often stated from those Benches, that he believes in collective security. If he had stated that the collective honour of the League of Nations was at stake there might have been some truth in the statement, but to tell your Lordships' House that the honour of this nation as an individual nation is at stake, if it does not proceed as he wishes it to proceed so far as Italy is concerned in connection with Abyssinia, I believe to be utterly untrue and utterly beyond the facts.
We listen to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, making these speeches with regard to the League of Nations, and I am quite sure that there is not one of your Lordships who does not believe in the great sincerity with which the noble Lord delivers these speeches or who doubts that he believes most thoroughly in the proposals that he propounds from time to time. I suggest, however, that in these matters the noble Lord is a visionary rather than a realist. He 669 springs on your Lordships' House proposals which are quite impracticable and quite unlikely to effect the object which he has in view. Once more he has presented to your Lordships' House a Resolution which is of the most impracticable nature. He has compared the Commission proposed in that Resolution to the Lytton Commission set up in connection with the trouble between China and Japan two or three years ago. He told us that the Report of that Commission was committed to the waste-paper basket, but he did not go on to tell us the real result of that Report. It was that Japan, our old ally, regarded, and does regard to-day, the Lytton Commission as a British Commission and not as a Commission appointed by the League of Nations.
If such a Commission were set up today in order to investigate affairs in Abyssinia that Commission could not be effective. In fact, I doubt very much whether, under the conditions which exist in Abyssinia to-day, it would be able to collect any information which was worth while or to visit the places which it would be necessary to visit in order to obtain that information. I venture to believe that the only effect of that Commission would be to be consigned, like the other Commission, to the waste-paper basket and, on top of that, merely to exacerbate the bad feeling which has unfortunately arisen between Italy and Great Britain as a result of the perhaps too active part which we have played in the League of Nations in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian affair. I sincerely hope that the noble Earl who will reply on behalf of the Government will reject this suggestion—I hardly like to say with contumely—because I believe that it is utterly impracticable, will lead us into an entirely wrong position, and will only add to the difficulties which already surround this extremely difficult question.
§ THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL STANHOPE)My Lords, I confess that I have never looked on myself as a pacifist, but I am bound to admit, when I compare my views with those that have been expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, opposite, and by Lord Strabolgi, that I am one; because there is no question whatever that the courses they advocated would have meant plunging this 670 country into war. The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, told your Lordships that we were just as much implicated in defending Abyssinia as we were in defending any part of the British Empire. I must entirely and absolutely disagree. It is absolutely the duty of this country to defend every part of His Majesty's Dominions, but as regards the rest of the world, there our obligation is merely confined to that which falls on any Member of the League.
The League is not an individual and collective responsibility, it is purely a collective one, and therefore this country is entitled to be called on to perform to the full up to what other nations are prepared to do, but not to take action independently of the rest of the Members of the League. If in fact that were the case, quite obviously collective action would be a thing of the past and unilateral action by this country or by some other would be the rule which would be followed at Geneva. That is not the view of His Majesty's present Government, and I hope it is never going to be the view of the Labour Party opposite, because undoubtedly, if it received any support at all we should find the situation of this country far more difficult and dangerous than it is at the present moment. I find myself much more in agreement with what was said by my noble friends Viscount Elibank and Lord Rennell.
I was asked a number of questions by Lord Strabolgi, with which perhaps I might try to deal first. He asked me whether the French were holding up munitions on the Jibuti Railway. I have heard rumours to that effect, but have no information about it whatever. So far as I know, it is not happening; no complaints have come from Abyssinia in regard to it. It may be so, but it may not. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that it is far too early to say that the League of Nations has failed. I was taken to task by certain sections of the Press for saying that a short time ago, and I suppose I shall be taken to task again to-day—
§ EARL STANHOPEBut that leaves me unmoved. May I remind those of your Lordships who have not thought about 671 the matter fully, that it is perfectly true to say that the League has failed to prevent war beginning by the threat of sanctions, and has not succeeded in stopping the war. The war, however, is not yet over, and the Italians are faced with the most appalling difficulties as they get farther and farther from their base. The weather and the geographical conditions are such as to test to the utmost the extraordinarily fine provision which has been made by the Italian administrative staffs, and I am bound to admit that the more true the implications that Italy makes against Abyssinia—that the Abyssinians are a hostile, warlike and savage race—the more true is it that their difficulties are immense and that it will be months, if not years, before they can reduce their forces in that vast country of Abyssinia. Very few people seem to realise that Abyssinia is one and a half times the size of France, something between 350,000 and 420,000 square miles; therefore, even with her present forces, Italy would have very little more than one man per square mile over that territory. To be able to maintain sufficient garrisons to prevent hostile action by even small remnants of the Abyssinian forces is a task that is going to test her finances and all her resolution.
At the same time the present economic sanctions are having their effects. I was thought by your Lordships last October to be a pessimist when I said that it would be some months before sanctions began to take effect. Perhaps I shall be called an optimist now in saying that sanctions are having their effect, and a rapidly increasing effect as the months go on. With Italy faced with that vast expense of maintaining her forces in Abyssinia, with the stranglehold of the present sanctions still continuing, it is absurd to suppose that we are at present in a position to say that the League has failed. So long as we can maintain the sanctions front, I still believe that Italy will find that she is in a far worse position—her people, her finances, her trade—than she would have been if she had never gone to war at all. If we succeed in proving to the world that war does not pay, at any rate we shall have achieved something of which nobody need be ashamed and something which may tend to discourage the hostile action 672 which other nations, perhaps, are beginning to think they may take in the future.
§ EARL STANHOPEYes, but that war was lost by the side that started it. I have no doubts, and I think very few of us have any doubts, that Germany was the aggressor in the last War, and I think Germany has fully realised that the last War did not pay. The point, however, is to prove to the winning side, if there is a winning side, that even having won she is very much worse off and has failed. That is the point that I am trying to make, and the point that will really have an effect on the views of other nations hereafter.
The noble Lord opposite asked what His Majesty's Government were going to do in the future. I can put the answer in one short phrase: exactly the same as our fellow-Members of the League; no more, but no less. It is quite true that we have on many occasions had to take the lead at Geneva. The noble Lord was right in saying that many other nations had on occasion taken the lead, but I am afraid that is more true of the time when sanctions were beginning than it has been in recent months or weeks. We are not, however, ashamed of having taken the lead, and if the League eventually fails, it will not be because of any inaction on the part of this country, but because of inaction on the part of some others who should equally have taken their share in the work and the proposals of the League.
May I say this in addition? A League which depends upon the lead of one country is not a sound instrument, and therefore, if the League is eventually to take its proper share in the affairs of the world and to attempt to stop aggression and to bring forward conciliation, every nation must take its part. It is useless for some nations to think that they will get all the benefits, as they believe them to be, of collective security without giving their quota and occasionally taking the lead in the proposals which are made at Geneva. Now I am not going to contend that collective security exists as regards Abyssinia. It is obvious that when the whole of this unfortunate struggle is at an end both 673 the League and this country will have very carefully to consider the whole situation, and to decide upon what our future policy will be based. That was said by the Secretary of State in another place two days ago, and no doubt your Lordships saw and appreciated the statement which he made.
LORD STRABOLGIMay I ask a question on that important point? Does that consideration mean with regard to the Covenant of the League as a whole, or this particular case?
§ EARL STANHOPEI imagine as regards the Covenant of the League as a whole, and how the League may be made effective, and not as regards the present situation. My noble friend Lord Rennell pointed out that Manchuria was a very different case from that of Abyssinia, and I entirely agree with him. I am surprised that the noble Lord opposite, who is always asking about an Equity Tribunal and an International Police Force, should have hit upon the Lytton Commission as an example of what he meant. Let me remind your Lordships of what happened with regard to the Lytton Commission. First of all China asked for an independent Commission, I think about ten days after the so-called Mukden incident. On November 21, 1931, about three weeks later, Japanese representatives proposed a Commission of Inquiry on the spot. The Council, on December 10, 1931, adopted a resolution calling for the appointment of five members, and the names were approved by the Council on January 14, 1932. On April 20, 1932, the Commission arrived in Manchuria. When did that Committee of Five report? It signed the Report in Pekin on September 4, 1932, and the Report was considered by the Council, and a resolution embodying the first nine chapters was passed by the Assembly on February 24, 1933, the thing having been originally begun in November, 1931. Does anybody imagine that if we set up a Commission such as the Lytton Commission now we should get a report of any value in the situation as it exists in Abyssinia at the present moment?
Let us look a little further. The Lytton Commission wrote a long Report of some ten chapters. The first nine were accepted by the Council of the League. The first eight were, I think, entirely an historical summary. The 674 next one drew up the general principles for a settlement and these nine chapters were, as I have said, accepted by the Council, but Chapter 10—"Considerations and Suggestions to the Council "—never has been adopted yet. And, as regards the principles for a settlement, which were adopted by the Council, I think the noble Lord will agree that there is a great deal less chance of these suggestions being accepted by Japan to-day than when they were made three years ago. Therefore, when the noble Lord puts forward a suggestion that we should follow the Lytton Commission in Manchuria, I am bound to say that if I were he I should have chosen some other case rather than this one, where the Commission took over a year before reporting to the League, and even so has never had its recommendations brought into effect.
As the noble Lord said, the Committee of Five have already been into questions of this character, and although it is quite true they did not go out to Abyssinia and therefore had to deal with the documents which were presented to them at Geneva, there was this enormous advantage that instead of taking over a year to produce their Report from the time when the thing was proposed—the Committee of Five were appointed on September 6, 1935—they made their suggestion to Italy and Ethopia on September 18, and reported to the Council on the 26th of the same month. What happened? That Report, although in very general terms, covered every suggestion which the noble Lord has put down in his Resolution before the House, and the recommendations made by the Committee of Five were rejected by Italy as not being adequate to meet her aspirations. I see no hope myself, and I doubt if the noble Lord can see any hope, of a Commission being thought acceptable by Italy if approved by the League next month at its meeting at Geneva.
The noble Lord suggested that there should be an Equity Tribunal permanently established at Geneva. I do not know whether he thinks that would be more acceptable to a country such as Italy than an ad hoc tribunal appointed to go into the particular question. He says that the Committee of Five cannot be considered to have been an impartial body. Although Italy found all sorts of 675 objections to the recommendations made, they certainly never criticised the Committee for taking up an anti-Italian attitude by reason of the nations to which the members of the Committee belonged.
§ LORD DAVIESI think Italy objected to the presence of representatives of Great Britain and France on the Committee.
§ EARL STANHOPEAnd what was the result of the presence of my right honourable friend Mr. Eden, then Minister for League of Nations Affairs, and of the French representative, on that Committee? The two countries, the United Kingdom and France, were able to say that they were prepared to give up territories if that would enable a solution to be found acceptable to Abyssinia and Italy. So far from our being hostile to Italy the fact of there being representatives of this country and of France on that Committee enabled a proposal of great advantage, as we thought, to Italy to be made—a proposal which we considered it would have been much to her advantage if Italy had accepted.
The noble Lord asked me why Article 16 has not been carried out in its entirety. For two reasons. In the first place the proposal, which is part of Article 16, that we should withdraw our diplomatic representative seemed to us to be of no advantage either to Abyssinia or the League itself. We thought it would be, far more valuable for His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome to remain at his post, keeping himself informed and reporting to us as events went on. The second and more important reason was that we have persistently said that we were only prepared to go as far as other nations, and no further, and that unless and until other Members of the League were prepared to go to the extreme limit of Article 16, we in this country were not prepared to do more than they did. That is all that we are entitled to do, and that, as I have said, is what is meant by taking collective action.
Then he asked me why Italy was not turned out of the League, and said that the alternative was a dictated peace. What effect would it have had if we had turned Italy out of the League? It would not have stopped her going on with her fighting in Abyssinia; it would not have stopped her using gas: it would have had 676 no effect except to make relations throughout Europe more strained than they are at present, and would have made the situation rather worse than it is at this moment. I think the letter which I understand the Prime Minister sent to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in reply to his Resolution, really has said in better terms what I have tried to say to your Lordships to-day, and therefore I have nothing further to add in regard to this Resolution except that I hope the noble Lord will not press it, because we shall certainly have to oppose it. We do not think that the suggestion he makes is either a practical or a sound one, and therefore we are certainly not in favour of the Resolution for the setting up of a Commission like the Lytton Commission.
§ LORD DAVIESMy Lords, at this late hour I do not propose to try to reply to the points raised during the discussion, but I cannot help saying that I feel disappointed that the noble Earl has not at least tried to make out a case for the particular procedure which he suggests in order to bring about peaceful changes in the relationships of nations—for that really is the principle involved in this Resolution. We are still left in the dark as to the precise manner in which His Majesty's Government propose to carry out the implications of Sir Samuel Hoare's speech last September at the Assembly of the League. It seems to us that if the Assembly is not a real legislative body we have to fall back on some system of this kind. The Lytton Commission was the best example of the functioning of the principle of equity in trying to bring about a settlement of these disputes. The noble Earl said: Why not have an ad hoc Committee every time? Well, before a crisis arises nobody knows whether such a Committee is going to function or not. If this system becomes a permanent part of the machinery of the League, then everybody knows that if conciliation fails, if negotiations come to a standstill, if you are faced with war, both sides have to go before some tribunal, or some Committee or Commission, and to state their case before it.
§ EARL STANHOPEThat is already part of the Covenant, to which every Member of the League of Nations is already pledged.
§ LORD DAVIESWell then, why cannot we set up this system and make it a permanent part of the procedure of the League? The Lytton Commission was not appointed until three months after the incident had occurred in Manchuria. I think the noble Earl told us that they took a year—over a year, they took eighteen months—to produce their Report. I submit that time, after all, is not the essence of the contract in this matter. The great thing is to have this procedure known in advance, and for these Commissions or Committees to operate before the crisis is upon us, before the act of war takes place. Therefore I cannot help feeling extremely disappointed that the noble Earl has not told us what he proposes to put in its place. I think he said that Italy would never have agreed to go before a tribunal of this kind, that Italy at the time objected to going before the Committee of Five. Of course Italy would have objected so long as she was determined to go to war, but had there been a procedure of this kind in existence long before the war broke out then it might have been a different story.
Then there is the case of Germany. Germany mistrusts the present Council of the League. She mistrusts the present Assembly of the League, because she believes that it represents the Allied and Associated Powers in the War, who are overwhelmingly against the German ease. If that is so, is it not possible that Germany might be prepared to accept, a Commission composed of entirely independent persons who are not the representatives of any particular Governments, and who are giving their time and thought to trying to bring about an equitable and just solution? I do not know whether the German Government would agree to a Commission of that kind or not, but in any case, as it distrusts the present organisation of the League for the purpose of settling disputes of this kind, the tribunal at any rate is an alternative. That is what I should like to ask the noble Earl. What alternative has he got? I should like to ask the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, who denounced this proposition in unmeasured terms—what alternative has he got to bring about peaceful changes in the relationship of nations? War has been the instrument of revision in the past. Is he still in favour of war? Does he still maintain 678 that these changes must be brought about by war? If this is not his position, then what alternative can he suggest?
VISCOUNT ELIBANKI do not believe in causing another war in order to stop war. The noble Lord evidently does.
§ LORD DAVIESI do not suggest anything of the kind. I tried to suggest that there must be some alternative, some substitute for war, and, if it does not exist at the moment, how it is possible to construct some system of that kind, which all the nations represented on the League—and we hope some of those at present outside it—may possibly agree to. Then the noble Viscount said that we should forfeit our friendships—I think that Lord Rennell said something of the same kind—if we carried out our obligations and responsibilities under the League to which we agreed when we signed the Covenant. I always think that, in international relationships at all events, the friend of to-day very often becomes the enemy of to-morrow. Why? Because it is simply a question of national interest, and the only sound foundation on which to build is what I have tried to describe as the reign of law. If we are going to support the reign of law, we have to take the risk of losing these friendships, which are not of great value if they cannot stand the strain.
I think I have said enough. I do not wish to detain your Lordships further, because I realise the hour is late and we can go on discussing these questions for a very long time. But I would implore the noble Earl not to turn down this proposition altogether. I hope that he and his friends will seriously consider the possibility of some alternative in order to bring about these changes in the public law. After all, what is going to happen now? We were told the other day by the Foreign Secretary or someone else at Geneva that whatever settlement was arrived at would have to be a settlement within the framework of the League. What exactly does "within the framework of the League" mean? As the noble Earl told us a moment ago, arbitration comes within the framework of the League. It does not mean that we are to allow the Italian and Abyssinian representatives to meet together and arrange their own peace terms without the League having any 679 say whatever as to what those terms are going to be. That would be a dictated peace, and would not be within the framework of the League. Therefore I suggest something should be done, some new procedure should be evolved, in order to meet this very difficult situation in which we find ourselves. I am obliged to the noble Earl for his reply, and I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.