HL Deb 07 May 1930 vol 77 cc394-428

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH rose to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the increasingly serious state of the West Indian Sugar Industry, and to press for a further statement of policy; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I make no apology for drawing attention once again to this very important question, and I say that for various reasons. In the first place, when we last discussed this matter in the House the Report of the Commission that went to the West Indies had only just been issued, and we had not had time to examine it in detail, nor to refer to it in any detail in this House. Now, of course, we have had that opportunity, and we shall be able to go more into detail as to the recommendations of the Commission. In the second place, since we had our debate the Chancellor of the Exchequer has unfolded his Budget, and to the extent that that Budget affects Imperial Preference the position has been modified. In the next place, what I consider the most important, the situation in the West Indies with regard to this industry has become very materially more serious than it was a month ago.

I should like to remind your Lordships very briefly of the course of events in connection with this matter. By last year, as a result of very sharp depreciation in the prices of sugar, it became quite clear that the West Indian sugar industry would not be able to carry on except at a loss. The Government fully realised the seriousness of the situation, and in September last they sent out a Commission, over which Lord Olivier presided, to go into the whole question and to make recommendations. I must for a moment say something about the delay that there was in issuing this Report. The noble Lord, Lord Olivier, considered the position so serious that at the end of December he telegraphed home a preliminary Report, and by the end of January the whole of his Report was, I believe, in the hands of the Government. Throughout this Report and, since he made it, in your Lordships' House the noble Lord has continually stressed the immense importance of immediate publication and a declaration of policy on the part of the Government, and yet in spite of this the Report was not published until the end of March.

One could have understood that if it had been the intention of the Government to take some action in the matter, but as it appears to be the intention of the Government to do nothing whatsoever, I venture to say not only was that delay inexcusable, but it did a very great deal of harm which, if they had acted otherwise, might have been averted. A big salient point which this Report has brought out is this, that unless something is done, and done very soon, the sugar industry in the West Indies must virtually cease to exist. There are many passages in the Report which make this point abundantly clear, and I do not intend to trouble your Lordships by quoting them now. Another feature which struck me in reading through the Report was the somewhat pathetic faith which the Commissioners had in the good intentions of the Government with regard to the matter. In one place they say this:— The communities likely to be principally affected are themselves, indeed, small, but an economic find social collapse in any of these old-established British Colonies would be an event which, we take it, the Government would not he prepared to risk. In another place they say:— We think ourselves, therefore, entitled to assume from the assurance given of the sympathy with which His Majesty's Government regard West Indian interests, that they are prepared to take some really effective action for their preservation. The truth appears to be that the Government are not prepared to do anything.

In March last they made certain proposals, but those proposals were really so unimportant that I do not intend to refer to them in detail. In so far as they could affect the situation at all, unless they were in some way supplemented they could only aggravate it rather than improve it. They apparently intend to sit still and watch this West Indian industry being gradually crushed out of existence—and not through any fault of its own, and in the face of what everybody admits are entirely unfair world conditions. And that is the point that I really want to stress. As I saw it very correctly stated somewhere, this is a contest not for the survival of the fittest, but rather of the richest, and in that contest it is inevitable that the producers of the West Indies must go under.

The reasons for the depression in the sugar industry generally are very clearly set out in the Report. The Report states that:— The primary cause of the present depression is the over-production of sugar in excess of the effectual demand at offered prices, due to increased production stimulated by various forms of assistance by Governments, creating a world surplus which must, for a considerable time to come, continue to depress the markets. That is very fully borne out by the very sharp fall in the price of sugar during the last years. The price of sugar in 1923 was 25s. 9d. a cwt. At the end of last year it had fallen to 8s. 3d. a cwt. and I believe I am correct in saying that since then the price has fallen by very nearly another shilling a cwt. It is therefore abundantly clear that the industry in the West Indies, even taking the preference that we give them into consideration, can only be carried on there at a very considerable loss, which they cannot possibly sustain.

Although the Commission undoubtedly did make some minor criticisms with regard to the conduct of the industry, it at the same time made it perfectly plain that this deplorable state of affairs which existed was not due to any lack of efficiency in the industry. That point is drawn attention to in one or two places, and I do not intend to read you any quotations. And I think it will be equally admitted that the costs of production in the West Indies are not in themselves a cause of this state of affairs. We have only to look to certain figures which are quoted in the Report to see that sugar in the British West Indies is produced as cheaply as, or more cheaply than, anywhere else in the world, except in Cuba and in Java, where, it must be remembered, the labour is considerably cheaper than it is in the West Indies. To put it in other words, two-thirds of the world production of sugar is produced at an average cost considerably higher than in the West Indies.

It is made quite clear in another portion of the Report that if the industry was given a fair chance it would prove itself to be not only entirely economic but prosperous as well. The Report states:— If all the sugar the world now demands for consumption were produced and exchanged on principles of free trade the West Indian sugar industry would be in a satisfactory and even prosperous economic position. Yet, in spite of these facts, the Government refuse to take any action. If the industry had been inefficient and uneconomic, and if it had not been unable to compete in the free markets of the world, one might have understood—I say "might"—the Government adopting this attitude. But in the circumstances that I have attempted to relate I really look upon the Government attitude as almost unintelligible. Besides this, there is another point I should like to draw attention to. This position with regard to sugar throughout the world, although I admit that, as the Report states, it is likely to persist for some years to come, at the same time is a temporary position. I think that is implied throughout the Report. In the course of some years we may expect the situation gradually to right itself, and we may expect prices in that industry to become normal. But it is perfectly clear that if we allow the industry in the West Indies to die then it will not be possible for that industry to be resuscitated when the time comes, in face of what will still be very strong world competition.

Now let me examine for a few moments what the position would be if there were a general abandonment of cultivation of sugar in the West Indian Colonies. It is quite clear that the position would be perfectly disastrous. In most of the Colonies of the West Indies almost the entire population depends upon the sugar industry—in Barbados 66 per cent., in St. Kitts 100 per cent., in Antigua 100 per cent., in St. Lucia 25 per cent., in British Guiana 50 per cent., in Trinidad 33 per cent., and in Jamaica 10 per cent. If the industry ceased to exist the whole population of some of these islands would be faced with famine and starvation. We make this appeal this afternoon to the Government not only on behalf of the pro- prietors and the producers of sugar in the West Indies, but also on behalf of the great mass of the labourers, who are entirely dependent upon the maintenance of that industry.

I can say that the position in the West Indies is becoming worse and worse every day. They are now approaching what is going to be a very critical time. In the course of a few weeks I understand the planters out there will have to make their arrangements with regard to the next crop—that is, the crop that would be reaped in 1932; and the banks (and this is more important still) will have to make up their minds whether they are prepared to lend money on the same conditions as they were before. From what I have heard I believe it to be very doubtful whether they will be prepared to do so in the present circumstances. I have evidence that the abandonment of cultivation in the islands is actually beginning. Of course it is quite natural that this abandonment would not take place all of a sudden. It is quite obvious that if a man has the whole of his capital invested in an industry he is not going to let it all go, without struggling to the bitter end in order to save it. But this process is actually beginning, and estates are being let down.

I am also informed that there is a very great danger of serious developments in some parts of the West Indies unless the Government are prepared to take some action to deal with, or to ease, the situation. The situation undoubtedly is becoming, as I have said, more and more serious. But apart from these points, it seems to me that this policy of doing nothing, if it is the policy of the Government, and I hope it is not, is utterly shortsighted. What would be the first result of the extinction of this industry in most of the Colonies? Most of them would be unable to carry on at all and would make application for financial help to the Imperial Exchequer. Instead of being assets to the Empire, as they are now, from the trading and industrial point of view, they would become burdens. I am convinced that if such a state of affairs is allowed to occur the demands upon this country in one way and another would be considerably greater than if we took the only just and sensible course—that is, to help those Colonies to tide over the next few critical years.

The Commission have made various suggestions for helping the industry. I gather that none of these suggestions makes any very great appeal to the Government. But I can assure your Lordships that we on this side of the House intend to keep on pressing this matter in the hope of moving the Government from persisting in a course which we believe to be unjust, thoroughly shortsighted and a complete betrayal of our responsibilities. The Commission halve proposed a scheme which entails a single buying agency for all sugar in this country with a fixed price for Imperial sugar. I do not intend to go into that matter this afternoon; I dare say that the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, will elaborate the point. But the Commission said that this can be done at an infinitesimal cost to the consumer in this country, and, seeing that the consumer is getting his sugar really at very low prices indeed—a great deal lower than he was getting it at a few years ago—I do not think it is too much to ask him to make some small sacrifice in order to avert this coming disaster.

There is another method by which the Government could help, and that is by means of increasing preferences to these Colonies so far as their sugar is concerned. I know that the Government have not very much liking for that method; but it is a way in which we can help, and help very substantially and it is, after all, in accordance with the past Imperial policy of governments. Ever since the present Government came into office the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused until the Budget to divulge his intentions with regard to this question of preference, with very dire results. He stated in July of last year that it was his hope that during the lifetime of the present Government it would be possible to wipe away all duties upon foodstuffs and that would naturally entail the wiping away of preferences at the same time. The result of this was that the uncertainty was so great that it was almost impossible to market West Indian sugar in this country at all.

We have eventually had the Budget, and the position is clarified to this extent, that I presume there will be no change at any rate for this year. But the planters and people in the West Indies have to look a great deal further ahead than that, and so far as the future is concerned—I presume that the Chancellor's statement still holds good—the uncertainty is just as great and people engaged in this industry in the West Indies still have this threat hanging over them. The very least that the Government can do, it seems to me, is to make it plain that this preference will at any rate be retained during the present crisis. We on this side of the House would urge that this preference should be substantially increased with a view to easing the situation so far as the industry is concerned.

There is one other method by means of which the Government could help. I mean by granting loans at very low rates of interest to the various Colonial Governments in order that they might make arrangements themselves with the people concerned to tide over the present difficulty. In one or two Colonies they are themselves making efforts on these lines. In Jamaica, I understand, they have introduced some scheme of subsidies; it is true at very great cost and at the exhaustion of their resources; still, they have introduced some scheme and are making their effort. In Trinidad I understand they are contemplating a similar scheme of some kind. But the other Colonies simply cannot afford to institute schemes on those lines. Many of them are in a very difficult financial state, particularly British Guiana. I say, therefore, that it is the duty of the Government to take up their cause. I believe the Government could do a very great deal to help on those lines, and I hope that they have given and are giving the matter very serious consideration with a view to doing something which will be of real material help.

I only want to say a word or two in conclusion. The Government appear to have rejected the various alternatives which have been suggested. That would appear to be so from the White Paper which they issued at the same time as the Report. They say there that the proposed grants would in effect require the community of the United Kingdom to contribute some millions of pounds a year to the sugar industry in the Colonies concerned, and that His Majesty's Govern- ment are not prepared to ask Parliament to impose on the community a burden of this magnitude. I believe that something might be done at considerably less cost than the Government suggest. In any event, I think that the Government are making a profound mistake in having come to this conclusion. I am convinced that the people of this country would be prepared to shoulder what is, after all, a comparatively small additional burden in order to save those loyal Colonies and their inhabitants from virtual extinction and, at the same time, our own country from an everlasting disgrace.

I think it would always be the wish of all of us to keep Imperial and Colonial questions out of Party politics, but I feel bound to say that the attitude of the Government on this question puts us in an almost impossible position. This, after all, is a test case. If the Government refuse to do what we conceive to be the right thing in this matter we, at any rate, shall do what we can to see that justice is done in regard to it. I frankly admit that the attitude of the Government so far is almost inconceivable. They appear to have thought the situation was serious enough last year to send out a Commission with such an authority as the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, at its head to inquire and report. Since then the situation has become materially worse, and the Commission have issued a very forcible Report indeed. Yet, apparently, the Government intend to do nothing. I ask this: Why, if that was their intention the whole time, did they go to all this trouble and all this expense? If the Government persist in this course, they and they alone will be responsible for a state of things of which they will be thoroughly ashamed in time to come. I therefore earnestly beg them yet to make up their mind to take some action which will materially help these Colonies in the terrible predicament in which they find themselves. I beg to move.

EARL PEEL

Are we to have no reply from His Majesty's Government?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS AND THE COLONIES (LORD PASSFIELD)

I am prepared to reply before the debate is over.

EARL PEEL

We shall only be able to conclude if we get no reply from His Majesty's Government, that they have no reply to make.

LORD PASSFIELD

I do not suppose any noble Lord here has any impression that I should not be prepared to speak. I think I am entitled to ask for the indulgence of noble Lords if there are going to be a number of speeches after I have spoken, because I shall not be in a position to reply. Noble Lords must take their own course. I am very sorry to say that I am not in a position to give any assurance on this subject which will be at all satisfactory to noble Lords. I wish with all my heart that the Colonial Office had a fund out of which it could deal with cases of this kind, but it has not got any fund, and I have no opportunity of taking action such as has been suggested. The Government has expressed its policy in the White Paper, and, virtually, in the Budget as opened by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and as a matter of fact the representations which have reached us from several Colonies have been replied to as far as is possible. It is my duty to put before the House the substance of that reply.

I should like to point out that this is not a new emergency. This rapid decline in the price of sugar was before the late Government as well as before the present Government. The situation was, I think, serious before I had any opportunity of dealing with the matter. The late Government was unable to do any more than the present Government has so far done in order to ward off from the West Indian planters and the Mauritius planters the terrible imminent losses which could then be foreseen, which then already were pressing upon them. Already an overproduction of sugar had made itself manifest. Already there was an incubus of something like several million tons of visible stock in the market which has now been increased to 5,000,000 tons. In fairness to the late Government, I should say it was extremely difficult to see what could justly and properly be done to ward off the imminent loss which was already pressing and was already being incurred on a great number of estates a year ago.

I do not want in any way to minimise the calamity to the West Indies and to the other sugar Colonies, or the loss which is being experienced by probably-the majority of those who are producing sugar in those Colonies, but at the same time I would like the House to notice that we are not yet quite in a position to talk about the industry virtually ceasing to exist, or to talk about the extinction of the industry in those Colonies, to which I think the noble Earl more than once referred. He was, as he said, supported by several references in the Report of Lord Olivier's Commission, but I should like to point out that in some at any rate of those references in Lord Olivier's Report where the word "extinction" was used (or any phrase in that sense) it was in contemplation and in fear of the abolition of the existing subsidy. I cannot help feeling that a great deal of the alarm of the agitation of the last few months has been to some extent directed towards a fear of the abolition of the existing subsidy. Now with the retention of the existing subsidy at any rate there does not seem to me so obvious and plain an indication of the approaching extinction of the industry in those Colonies as some of the expressions of the noble Earl might have led people to believe.

If I may refer to the very valuable Report of Lord Olivier's Commission for what I am going to say, I would like to point out that his examination of the costs in various West Indian islands indicated an average cost of £11 17s. 6d. per ton—the cost in sack at the factory. Rather more than 7 per cent. of the sugar was produced at a cost of under £10 per ton, and 16 per cent. and rather more at a cost of between £10, and £11; making 23.7 per cent. produced at a cost under £11 per ton. With the existing preference of £3 15s. per ton., or something like that, and with the price of sugar at the ridiculously and extraordinarily low price of £7 per ton, £7 per ton plus £3 15s. preference gives £10 15.s. I do not say the West Indian planters can make a profit, or that many of them can even live at that price, but it is quite clear that a certain percentage of them can. I will not venture to say what the percentage is. The calamity and the danger which we have to face to-day is that a certain proportion of the least favourably situated factories and estates will be unable to continue. But a certain proportion of them will continue because the production at the factory is under £10 per ton on a small percentage. It is over £15 per ton on another smaller percentage. I am afraid there is nothing the Government could do, or that any Government could do, which would really maintain any industry that is unfavourably situated, or possibly inadequately equipped, or, for all I know, has badly managed estates which are producing not at the average of £11 17s. 6d. a ton but at £13, £14, and over £15 per ton.

That is the real calamity which it seems extremely difficult for any Government to deal with—this fringe, this margin. I do not know how far it will be possible to help all the more unfavourably situated estates and factories, so that they will be enabled to maintain their position in face of the low price which we must unfortunately foresee for sugar in the near future. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has not seen his way to any remedy for that, and I think I may suggest that the previous Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had the same problem before him in substance, did not see his way to any remedy either. I am very careful to notice that the noble Earl in the speech he made—of which I have no complaint to make; it was a very carefully phrased speech—was hardly able, I think, to put forward any suggestion of how these estates could be helped, these estates which are struggling with the greatest difficulties and which are those, unfortunately, who are likely to be unable to maintain the struggle.

We do not need to give a bounty to that proportion of the sugar production which will be able for this year at any rate to produce without loss. We do not need to give a bounty to them, and no prudent Chancellor of the Exchequer would suggest that any bounty should be given in that case, or that any subsidy should be given in that case. It is difficult to see how that fringe, that margin of the less favourably situated estates and factories can effectively be helped. I hope the Government will not fail in their duty. I am not prepared to admit that they will. I do not at all say that we shall sit still and watch this industry crushed out of existence. But I would say to the noble Earl that you must give us a little time. The industry is not going to be crushed out of existence in the next few weeks.

I have said there is difficulty in helping those proprietors of estates and factories who now are producing at considerably more than the average cost per ton, not necessarily from anything which is their own fault, but after all, if there is overproduction of sugar in the world, it is presumably those who are producing at the greatest cost who will have to close down. There was a time, as the noble Earl reminded us, six or seven years ago, when they got £25 a ton, or nearly four times the present price. No doubt during those years production was increased. The tendency, of course, when the price is high is for production to increase and a number of estates and factories which could not pay otherwise are able to live. That is part of the tragedy. It is just that overproduction of sugar from which everybody is suffering in his own degree which has brought the price down with this resounding smack.

What the present Government did—I will not say anything more about what the last Government did—what the present Government did was to ask Lord Olivier and Mr. Semple to go out to inquire into the causes of the present depression, and secondly to inquire into— the measures, whether by means of research, improvements in cultivation, better organisation of production, transport, manufacture, and marketing, or otherwise, which you consider are required, in order to place the industry in the best possible position for the future, and the means by which such measures could be financed and carried into effect. Then they were asked to inquire into— Any measures which may be desirable for the temporary assistance of the industry, for the provision of other employment, or for the relief of distress; and finally— the advisability and feasibility of replacing sugar by alternative crops in any particular areas, and the measures incidental thereto, including any schemes of migration of labourers or land settlements. We have sent to the Governors of these Colonies copies of the White Paper giving the decision of the Government and they have been told, naturally, about the temporary measures which the Government have taken in order to prevent the banks being compelled to refuse their ordinary crop advances. We do not pretend that that is any remedy, but I am sure your Lordships will agree that if the banks had suddenly restricted their ordinary advances it would have been an aggrava- tion of the trouble. The Government took that action under advice in the hope that the banks would not be led—as we had reason to fear they would be led—to restrict their ordinary crop advances. We do not say these are measures which in any way will save the industry, and we have drawn the attention of the Governors of the several Colonies to the very considerable number of minor recommendations in Lord Oliver's Report, which were those which he was particularly asked to bring to the notice of the Government, and we have asked the Governors to consider what could be done first of all to improve methods and reduce costs.

Now it is perfectly true, and it is a satisfactory thing to have had reported to us, that the sugar industry in the West Indies cannot be said to be in any way inefficiently conducted speaking as a whole. A great deal of improvement has taken place, although, as Lord Olivier's Report makes clear, the economies and improvements have not attained the same degree as they appeared to have attained in some other places. Still, they have made improvements, and the industry cannot be said to be inefficiently conducted. The results, as I have already mentioned, are that a certain proportion of the estates are producing at under £10 per ton and a considerable percentage at under £11 per ton. Each of these improvements may be in itself a matter of a small amount, of a few shillings, but a few shillings a ton has got to be looked after in these times if the sugar industry in the West Indies is going to compete with the sugar industry elsewhere. I confess that it seems to me that there is something to be done in the matter of the transport of the cane from the factory and of the sugar from the factory to the ship. Again it may be only a matter of a few shillings per ton, but that is a matter which is clearly one of the things which ought to be looked to. This Government has asked the Governors of all the Colonies to consider all the proposals which have been made for the improvement of the industry or for the reduction of cost, with an assurance that any proposal which they can make along these lines with a view to putting the industry, or any particular factory in the industry, in a better position for meeting competition, will have very sympathetic consideration.

There is one possibility, and that is that anything along these lines might be assisted by the Colonial Development Fund, which was set up by this Government last year. I cannot make any definite statement in regard to that, because it depends on the Report of the Committee which is administering that Fund, but if in one way or another, whether by help from that Fund or otherwise, any measures can be taken to improve the industry and reduce the costs of production, recommendations to that end will certainly receive very sympathetic consideration. Even then I do not want to pretend that I believe that the whole of the industry can be put in a position to keep going. I do not think it is possible. I do not think it is possible, with any assistance which the Government can give those estates and factories producing at costs up to £15 per ton, to keep them in being unless indeed we went on the plan of meeting the deficit of every factory in every one of the islands. I do not think that is a feasible proposal. At any rate I will see to the best of my ability that the Government does everything which can be suggested to improve the condition of the industry, and towards making it more efficient; and if any portion of the industry is temporarily or permanently suspended, then we shall have to take means for finding some sort of alternative living for the workers displaced, and at any rate maintaining them if there is any appearance of distress.

All this we shall have to do, but I am not prepared to accept the view that the whole of the West Indian industry is threatened with extinction or that, even with the present price of sugar and with the present preference, so large a proportion of the estates will in fact give up. I do not think they will, any more than the coal mines of this country, a large number of which are producing at a loss at this moment. Coal owners are very reluctant to shut down a mine for the very proper and economic reason that, if they do, they have to write off the whole of the capital involved. The sugar industry in the West Indies is in a similar position. I am sorry for them, but I venture to think that it will pay the proprietors to make an effort and to go on as long as they can. I hope we can help them in one way or another to continue in existence.

If the situation became even more serious, if there were any obvious and immediate likelihood of the extinction of the industry in the West Indies, then, of course, a new situation would have arisen, and the Government—any Government—would have to consider what could be done. Whether anything that could be done is to be found in one or other of the proposals that the Commission have made is a point on which I am not prepared to commit myself at the present time. I would end with this note: That anything the Government can do to help the West Indian planters to reduce their costs or to make their methods more efficient in any manner whatsoever the Government will be eager to do and will, I believe, be able to do. But if it is suggested that factories or estates which are producing at so much more than those more favourably situated, even up to £15 a ton at the factory, can be maintained at the expense of the consumer in this country or of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, then I say that this is a proposal which evidently did not commend itself to the late Government and I do not think it would commend itself to any future Government. It certainly would not be possible for the present Government.

EARL PEEL

My Lords, I am not very much surprised that the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, exhibited a certain reluctance to get up in this House and reply to the very powerful criticisms of my noble friend Lord Plymouth, but I must do him this justice, that I think he was very conscious of the weakness of the defence that he had to put up. I do not accuse him of any lack of personal sympathy, and I think he was probably ashamed of the defence of his colleagues, of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and of the Government that he had to provide.

If he will allow me to say so, this is rather too serious a problem on which to indulge in any sort of Party recrimination. It is too often the practice, I am sorry to say, when a Government are urged to do something that they do not want to do or to take any responsibility upon themselves for doing, to try to argue that on some previous occasion some other Government did not do some- thing which they say they cannot do now. These accounts of what previous Governments did or failed to do are generally inaccurate. The noble Lord entirely forgot to remind your Lordships—I suppose these facts pass very rapidly out of memory—that one thing the late Government did was to stabilise the preference on sugar over a number of years. I should like to point out that this stabilisation, the fixing of the preference, was an immense advantage and must be of great value to the planters in that particular industry. Let me add that, just before the late Government went out, they were considering very seriously the question of what was lo be none for the sugar industry in our Colonies.

Since then the situation has changed considerably. First of all, the price of sugar has gone down very seriously in the last year. In the second place—apparently the noble Lord passed this fact over—we had not then the advantage (and it is a great Advantage) of having one of the most careful, thorough and sifting investigation that I should think it possible to have into the state of the sugar industry in the West Indies and elsewhere. This was not conducted by a man whose economic theories or political predispositions could be suspected by the Government. He was one of their own men, one of those in whom they had great confidence, one of those who, if I may be allowed to say so, was a Socialist forty years ago or more, at a, time when the majority of the members of the Government in this House were either good little Liberals or good little Conservatives and had not the slightest idea of the great transformation that was to take place in their opinions. They had this very solid contribution to the subject before them in Lord Olivier's Report, and, if I may say so respectfully of the work of a political opponent, it is one of the most thorough and convincing documents that I have ever read. As I ventured to say to the noble Lord this afternoon, everything concerning the matter is in this Report, and the difficulty that any speaker must have is that of really adding anything to the force of the Report and a feeling approaching despair at the idea that so forcible a Report has not brought conviction to the minds of His Majesty's Government.

I claim to have some little title to say one word upon this subject, because it is only four or five years ago that I had the honour of being the head of a Parliamentary Delegation that visited nine or ten of the West Indian islands. Both I and the other members of the Delegation had the advantage of making ourselves familiar with all the problems that are dealt with in this Report, so that, if I say a few words upon the subject, they will really come from some degree of personal knowledge of the subject and, let me add, a great deal of personal sympathy with those whom we found in that most difficult situation. I wish one could show one's sympathy in rather a more practical manner. I know very well the tremendous pressure of all kinds of subjects that are weighing, and must weigh, upon a British Government, so that sometimes they cannot, perhaps, give sufficient attention to certain classes of subjects that may be outside their usual ambit. But I believe that if any of your Lordships, if any member of this House, whatever his political views might be, had gone, as one had opportunity of going, round these islands and seen the conditions there, he would have approached this subject with a very different degree of sympathy, and with more imagination, than has been displayed by the Government.

The noble Lord indicated, I think, one or two additional points on which some assistance might be given, but, I think he exaggerated very much the question of the figures and costs of production in these islands, because he told us that it was really impossible to save all the industry. He alluded to the large percentage of sugar production which costs from £14 to £15, and he told us that he thought that in those cases a small reduction in the cost of transport, or improved conditions, might possibly be of no effect. If, however, he will look at page 12 of the Report he will see what an exceedingly small proportion of the sugar produced in those islands is produced at that greater cost. Taking the percentages, he will find that only 1.8 per cent. is produced at a cost of over £15, and only 5.9 per cent. at a cost of between £14 and £15. If you add those two figures together you only get 7 per cent. produced at that high cost, while no less than 93 per cent. of the sugar there produced is produced at a cost less than £14 That makes an immense difference to the argument which the noble Lord was addressing to us.

His argument also is based on the continuance of the existing sugar preference. A great deal turns upon that. It that sugar preference is taken away by the taking off of the duty on sugar the whole of that advantage, as the noble Lord will admit, would be lost. I will ask him whether he could not persuade the Chancellor of the Exchequer, owing to the very serious condition in which he admits this industry is, to relax a little of that sternness with which he considers the future, and either say that for the next two or three years he will give a little relief to the industry and be preference will be maintained, or that he will go further and frankly say that for a period of years he will stabilise the industry. Then I think the noble Lord will agree that some definite advantage will be obtained, and I trust he will use his influence with the Chancellor of the Exchequer to see whether that cannot be done. I am talking to one who I think is already persuaded, because the noble Lord's whole argument was based upon the fact that the existing preference was to be maintained. While I am on that subject, I do not see why the preference should not be increased a little and brought on to the same basis as the Canadian preference, for then the producers in the West Indies would obtain the same advantage as the Canadian producers, which they do not obtain at present.

I was interested in another reference made by the noble Lord, or rather in his reference to another observation, because I really think he threw over altogether, or attached apparently no importance to, the White Paper in which this wonderful offer was made by the Government, that if the bankers advanced money to the planters the Government would bear a portion of the loss, but that loss was not to exceed 15 per cent. of the whole of the amount advanced. I think the noble Lord probably, on consideration, felt that that was really a futile and useless offer. First of all, you are going to say to the banks: "You shall advance money on securities which are practically no security at all, because we cannot tell you whether the preference will remain in this country, and it you make a loss we will be so generous as actually to give you 15 per cent. of your loss."

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

It is only half of 15 per cent.

EARL PEEL

I was apparently being too generous. It was no less than the tremendous percentage of 7½ per cent. If the banks advance this money the Government are going to give them a grant of 7½ per cent. of their loss.

LORD PASSFIELD

May I explain? The point was that if the banks made their advances they would recover what they could, but it was contemplated that they might be let in for a partial loss. It would not be a total loss in any ease. If they made a loss, the Government would go halves in that partial loss, but the Government's total payment was to be restricted to 15 per cent.

LORD OLIVIER

Would that be both the Colonial Government and His Majesty's Government?

LORD PASSFIELD

It would be shared between the Colonial Government and His Majesty's Government. It was not 7½ or 15 per cent. of the loan, but half the loss up to 15 per cent.

EARL PEEL

The noble Lord does not see that there might even be a total loss.

LORD PASSFIELD

That the Government did not believe, nor did the banks.

EARL PEEL

I know from personal knowledge that the banks have sometimes made a total loss, but even if the Government were prepared to meet part of the loss made by the banks, what consolation is that to the planters? If a loss is made, it really is an academic subject to the planter whether it is to be shared between the banks and the Governments here and there. The point to the planter is of what use is it to him to borrow money at obviously a high rate of interest, when he is confident that he is going to make a loss on his crop and will find the greatest difficulty in repaying the loan? From the point of view of the planter and of the industry that offer was of no value at all. I really think that the noble Lord agrees with me.

LORD PASSFIELD

The sole reason of the offer was to prevent the banks from restricting their crop advances.

EARL PEEL

And I am afraid it has been of little avail. I also thought that the noble Lord, when discussing this subject, really laid little stress upon the proposal and did not think it would deal with the whole matter. What I urge upon the Government is this. I could not help thinking that he seemed to stand by and regard with rather philosophic calm the dying of this great industry. I think he seemed to doubt the words of the Report itself. I should like to read those words to your Lordships, for, after all, they were the considered views of these gentlemen who went to examine the question in the West Indies. They said:— Unless assistance on some such standard can be guaranteed and the promise of it inside at an early date we see no probability of the extinction of the British West Indian sugar industry being averted. Those are very plain words, which were put down on the full responsibility of the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, after this very extensive investigation into the conditions of the sugar industry.

I should like to put two further points before the noble Lord. I agree with my noble friend Lord Plymouth. It seems to me almost impossible that, considering the whole situation—the position of these Colonies, and their history—this Government can stand by and see the practical extinction of that industry. After all, this is not a case as has been often said, of ordinary commercial competition, and it is pointed out very forcibly in the Report of Lord Olivier that if this sugar industry were conducted on an ordinary free trade basis, without subsidies, without tariffs or preference, the price to the consumers of this country would be above the price at which it can be produced in the West Indies, and therefore there would be a fair profit. So that the condition to which we are being led in the West Indies is due, not to the action of the planters themselves, but to the action of other countries—to tariffs and preferences and to the overproduction which has resulted very largely from that peculiar condition of affairs. In that case you have individuals struggling with Governments, and that is a hopeless business; and one can only ask if the Government themselves will use their powerful influence in order to assist these individuals in fighting such conditions, which is more than they can compass themselves.

A very interesting point raised in the Report is this. Is this condition of things likely to be permanent, or is it not? Because, if it is likely to be permanent, I agree that the attitude that would be taken by the Government would probably be a different one from that which they would take if it were likely to be temporary. They come to the conclusion—in fact, all the signs seem to be—that that condition of affairs is not likely to be permanent, because when so much capital is being put into some portions of the industry, in Cuba and elsewhere, and is receiving no sort of return, or very little return, the probability, almost the certainty, is that in the next few years the production of sugar will be restricted. In that case you are not asked to deal with a permanent situation but to tide the industry over a comparatively short and difficult period.

The Report also went into the question of whether there were alternative occupations and alternative businesses to which the West Indies might turn their attention. One of the things that struck me most forcibly when I was going through these islands was the great difficulty with which they could adapt themselves to a change. We are familiar with the position in the sugar industry. But as regards the industry of cocoa, of which a certain amount is grown in these islands, there they come into competition with an immense world industry, with which they find it extremely difficult to compete. It is the same thing with coffee and those minor productions like limes, for which it is extremely difficult, I understand, to get a sufficiently large market to produce on a large scale.

One has, I think, to balance the destruction or the reduction to very small limits of the sugar industry' against what will be done if that industry is extinguished and the fears of Lord Olivier are realised. I was very much struck in going through these islands to see the very large—not indigenous but imported—population. You have in British Guiana large numbers of Indians. You have large numbers of Africans, and it is very remarkable to see how through those islands these descendents from the old African slaves, or people who were imported, have attained to important positions in the economy of the islands. What are you going to do with these Indians? You cannot leave them where they are, either to starve or else to find a very hard and difficult living on some of these broken-up properties. You will be bound in their case to re-ship them to India, and you will be bound also to establish them to some extent. You cannot merely ship them back to India without any arrangements for their safety and their livelihood. What you are to do with the descendants of the Africans I do not know, because it is long now since they were separated from their native home. They have forgotten all the traditions, almost the language, which were theirs when they were in that country. They have made their home in the West Indies. That is now their home, and I do not see how it is possible to send them anywhere else. And, even so, the Local Governments will be utterly incapable of hearing so great a burden. They will have to be subsidised from this country, because if the great staple industry is shattered and extinguished it is obvious that the finances of the Local Governments will be unable to give them any real assistance.

I pass by the question of unemployment—whether it would be wise to forgo that large trade which we do with the West Indies, which must necessarily fail if they are incapable of that productive effort which has sustained that trade for many years now. So that there is a very heavy contingent liability upon the Government, a liability that you cannot get out of; and therefore from the purely financial point of view you have to balance very carefully whether the assistance given by preference or otherwise would not be cheaper than the method of going in for this large expense, which will be essential for the relief of distress, or merely to carry on the business of Government in these islands if the industry comes to extinction. There are, as is pointed out in the Report, several very serious risks before the Government. There is the very serious risk that the sugar interests in other places will get too great a control of the sugar market. There is a risk that when the industry, though it does not produce a very large proportion of the total amount of sugar, is extinguished prices will rise to a much higher level than they are now. The Commission point out very frankly that it would not be very fortunate for these islands if American capital got so tremendous a grip as it might have upon the world market, and they also allude to the tragic possibility of the loosening of the political ties which bind these islands to this country if they feel that they are left in the lurch in their time of trouble.

I do not know whether I can get much consolation from the observations of the noble Lord. I am afraid these communications with the Governors of the islands as to what should be done in the case of particular factories will not be of much avail. I go back to the original suggestion that I do not think anything could be done at the present moment which would have greater effect in strengthening and stabilising and encouraging the industry than if the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government could be persuaded, not only to say that they would retain the preference, but that the islands would get it through a certain fixed number of years to come. I feel that this, perhaps, is not only a financial question or a question of restoring a particular industry, but that anybody who has been to these islands must contrast with at least some feeling of emotion the extraordinary natural beauty of the islands with the possible misery that will come upon them if the Government does not take some action in order to relieve them. I was very much struck when I was there by the fact of how very deeply the inhabitants of those islands feel the difference between their position now and (shall I say?) two centuries ago when they played a great part in the history of the British Empire, and when the question of the exchange of one or two of the islands was discussed by diplomatists in many treaties. Any one who has been there must be deeply moved by the intense feeling of loyalty in those islands towards the Crown and towards their connection with the British Empire, and the almost pathetic feeling with which they seem to rely on the fact that in their difficulties and troubles they will still have the support of the strong hand of Great Britain and the sympathies of the people of this country.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

My Lords, the noble Earl who made this Motion and my noble friend Lord Peel have presented the case which we who are interested in this subject wish to put forward this afternoon so fully, so ably and, if I may say so, so eloquently, that I will confine my remarks, so far as I can, to a few short sentences. I venture to think that the reply of the noble Lord, Lord Passfield, will be received with no sense of consolation by the sugar planters of the West Indies. In effect, the noble Lord has informed your Lordships this afternoon that His Majesty's Government are able to do nothing to help the situation. The noble Lord informed your Lordships that the original remedy which he proposed in the earlier debates on this subject was no remedy at all. The actual words he used were that he could not pretend that it was a remedy. I do not wish to go into that question again because my noble friend Lord Peel entered so fully into it, but I should like to emphasise the point that the banks are not likely to make these advances or to abandon the ordinary custom of prudence and caution in making these advances, and that really that is no remedy at all.

The noble Lord also told your Lordships that the Government were considering the subject of improving conditions of production, transport and so on. But that is not going to help the situation to-day. The situation is far too serious for that to be brought up as a suggested remedy for the present state of affairs. It will take time; it may take two, three or four years. We all know how long it takes to alter and improve conditions which have been going on for many years, as they have been going on in the West Indies. There was perhaps, one ray of light in the noble Lord's speech. He suggested that the Colonial Development Fund might come into play. That might have been in response to my noble friend, Lord Plymouth's suggestion that certain Colonies should be given local loans to help them through their difficulties. But the noble Lord did not say actually and definitely that it was in response to the noble Earl's suggestion. He merely threw it out as a sort of possibility which might or might not take place and which had not been really definitely or seriously considered yet.

A further point which he made was in connection with preference. I say definitely, as I believe the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, has said in his admirable Report, that the only way you will really assist the sugar industry of the West Indies—I might almost say here of Mauritius too —is by extending the preferential system to those Colonies. The United States of America have granted preferences to Cuba for many years, and as regards Porto Rico and Hawaii they have free trade with those two places. What has been the result? That the sugar industries of those three islands have advanced by leaps and bounds. To-day a large American capital is invested in those three places and, notwithstanding the fact that owing to the over-production of five millions, of which the noble Lord has told us, there are great difficulties amongst the sugar planters in those islands, those difficulties are infinitesimal compared with those which exist in our own Colonies.

The result of a by-election was declared last night. That by-election was won by a policy called Empire Free Trade. I would make this suggestion to noble Lords who sit on the Benches opposite and I would make it especially to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because I am not so sure that the noble Lord (Lord Passfield), with his great and intensive knowledge of the subject, would be so adamant upon this question if it were not for certain members of His Majesty's Government who will not see daylight regarding it under any condition whatever. If this policy of Empire Free Trade or Imperial Economic Unity—I do not care what you call it—were adopted, if, as my noble friend Lord Peel suggested, you were to increase the preference to these islands even to the point of admitting their sugar free into this country and, on the other hand, were to increase the preference against foreign sugar, you would immediately create a very different situation in those Colonies.

What advantage is there to be gained by doing so? On the one hand, let us admit for the purposes of this debate that the sugar industry is not entirely going to be extinguished, but that a portion of it is going to be extinguished. When that industry is extinguished to that proportion, you are going to lose so much trade from this country in the form of manufactured goods exported to those Colonies, because, as the sugar industry declines, so the purchasing and the consuming power of the Colonies will decline in the same proportion and at the same time. The noble Lord referred to coal. I am surprised that he should have used coal as an example or as a comparison for the purposes of this debate. As your Lordships know, under the Goal Mines Bill, which is at present before this House, the price of coal is to be raised to the consumer in order to stabilise and even to increase the wages of the miners in this country. The noble Lord suggests that the price of sugar might be increased to the consumer. I apologise to the noble Lord, who shakes his head. If he agrees that by granting an increased preference the price of sugar would not be advanced to the consumer in this country, then I cannot understand why the Government will not take that measure. I myself should not for a moment consider it was a wrong thing to do, to increase at this moment the price of sugar to a price which pays the producer to produce it. That is what is being done under the Coal Mines Bill, and that is what we are asking the noble Lord and His Majesty's Government to do for sugar in the West Indies to-day.

Like the noble Earl who has just sat down, I feel some sense of despair upon this subject. I am going to make a suggestion and I do so with a full sense of responsibility, but at the same time with some humiliation that it should be necessary to make such a suggestion at all. Quite recently, in Canada, His Majesty's representative there made a proposal with regard to the drawing closer together of Canada and the West Indian Colonies. That subject was taken up in the Canadian House of Commons, and discussed there at considerable length without any conclusion being arrived at. The only reason I venture to approach this subject at all is that some twenty years ago, when I was administering one of His Majesty's Colonies in the West Indies, I had the privilege of taking part in the preparation and launching of the first Canadian-West Indian Agreement. That was in 1910 or 1911, and I should like incidentally to say that this Agree- ment was the result of a Royal Commission, at the head of which was a very distinguished member of this House, the late Lord Balfour of Burleigh, who was himself a Free Trader and left a Government on account of his convictions on that particular policy.

That Canadian-West Indian Agreement has been repeated four times since that date, and to-day there is an Agreement which is in a considerably extended form as compared with the first Agreement. What does that Canadian-West Indian Agreement provide? It provides on the one side that Canada gives, as my noble friend has stated, a preference of 4s. 8d. per cwt. or £4 8s. per ton on West Indian sugar. On the other side, the West Indian Colonies give a preference to flour and fish and certain manufactured goods which are produced in Canada. I am going to suggest to the West Indies that in these circumstances they should once more turn their eyes towards Canada to see whether they cannot make some even more advantageous arrangement with Canada. As a result of that Agreement Canada has for some years provided for the West Indies a very excellent steamship service, and I believe, if that Agreement were extended and arrangements were made of a wider nature, Canada might be able to help in other directions, by way of loans and so on to these Colonies.

There is one point which was discussed in the Canadian House of Commons which is of great importance in this matter, and was of great importance at the time of which I speak. It was suggested that Canada should take over the West Indies. Under the North America Constitution Act this would mean that representatives of the West Indian Colonies would have to sit in the Canadian House of Commons. That, in my opinion and from my knowledge of the conditions, would not be a convenient arrangement for Canada from the point of view of her emigration laws, etc. Besides I do not believe that any good would result from representatives of the West Indian Colonies sitting in the Canadian House of Commons, because they are not directly interested in the local affairs of Canada any more than Canada is directly interested in the local affairs of the West Indies. All they do want is to extend this Trade Agreement so as to make its application very much wider than it is to-day and confer much greater advantage upon both sides. To-day the population of Canada is 9,000,000. In another ten years its population is likely to be 20,000,000, and so far as I can visualise the situation, I am sure that in the next twenty years Canada will be able to absorb practically all the tropical products which will be produced by these Colonies in the West Indies.

I have ventured to mention this matter to-day because I believe, as it has been discussed in the Canadian House of Commons, and has become a matter of practical discussion in that House, it should also receive consideration in your Lordships' House. I do suggest that whilst the West Indies should continue to look to this country—for after all it is this country which is responsible for the West Indies—at the same time, as they have already begun to form very much closer arrangements with Canada, they should see how far they can extend those arrangements with Canada. I venture to hope that the noble Lord will impress upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer the necessity of considering the question of extending the preference, and I support the appeal of my noble friend 'Earl Peel in asking for the stabilisation of that preference, even if the Government cannot see their way to increase it.

LORD OLIVIER

My Lords, I am afraid it will be almost intolerable at this hour of the evening to inflict upon those of your Lordships who remain in the House a further speech in a debate in which a very small fraction seem to take any interest whatever. That is an example of the difficulty which the West Indies have to contend with. They have no representatives in Parliament. They are not a constituency. Their representative in Parliament is the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the only members of this House who can be expected to take any sympathetic interest in the matter are members such as Earl Peel and Viscount Elibank and others who have been in the different Colonies and feel their reality and importance. To others they are just a name. When my noble friend Lord Passfield comes to this House unfortunately he is not in a position to put the case for the West Indies. On every occasion he has been in the position of coming here and saying that we should not do anything. On account of that the effect of the whole of his speech this evening has been to minimise the case for the West Indies and to understate the difficulties which at present threaten them. I could not allow that speech to pass, although I have the most friendly feelings towards my noble friend, without screwing up a little the ease that he had put.

He first of all stated that it was an exaggeration to say that the West Indian sugar industry is threatened with extinction. Those of your Lordships who have read the Report of my colleague Mr. Semple and myself will, I think, recognise that we did make out a very good case for recognising the fear that it was threatened with extinction. The present price of sugar is about £7 8s. 9d. a ton, and no sugar industry in the world can produce at that price. That means a price of rather more than £6 a ton at the factory door. Over-production is still going on, with bankrupt stocks being forced on the market week after week, and it is bound to go on for a year or more before those stocks are worked off. The industry is threatened with extinction because the Chancellor of the Exchequer loses no opportunity of saying that he will take off the preference, and the moment the preference is off the industry is impossible to maintain. Extinction will come if the preference is taken off, and we are being continually threatened by His Majesty's Government that it will be taken off as soon as finance allows. That is why the industry is threatened by extinction. Nobody will pretend for a moment that the industry can be carried on in those circumstances.

The position to-day is that the preference has been maintained for the present and the industry is being carried on. The noble Lord seemed to indicate that he thought a considerable part of the industry could be carried on at present prices. The preference price is £11 6s. 8d. at present, but when he gave the cost of production in the West Indies he did not add to the cost of production in the West Indies the cost of transport and charges which may add £1 10s. or £1 15s. or even £2 to that cost of production. To put the matter very briefly, my colleague and myself considered that under existing circumstances and at pre- sent prices, it might be possible to expect about a quarter of the present sugar industry to continue to be carried on because of the capital invested in it and because of the determination of producers to hold on for a possible recovery, but hardly any, if any, of them can carry on at a profit even to the factory, and if there is a profit to the factory it is only obtained by starvation wages for the cane producers and the farmers. That is how the Cuban industry is being carried for the time. The producers are getting nothing for cultivation. The factories let the cane grow wild, and the farmers only get wages for the actual cutting and transport. The result is that there is a very severe agricultural and financial crisis in Cuba at the present time. The Government think they are threatened with famine and they have had to compel the farmers to grow food crops.

Already the pinch is being felt. Already, as I think the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, mentioned, wages are being reduced in several Colonies, and I may say I think they would have been reduced elsewhere but for the fear of the reaction of some of the population to a reduction of wages. There is a fear that they would set about burning the canes, and if they set about that they would have to be repressed and you would get further trouble. I say that the planters in the West Indies are very much afraid of that and consequently they are not reducing wages; but, as in the case of Barbados, where they have cut the crop they are not replanting. That is going on very widely and the present fortune of the industry is much more serious than the noble Lord was willing to give the House to understand. Noble Lords will judge for themselves of his speech. What he seemed to say was that there was no necessity to pay much more attention to the matter except to see what could be done to improve the industry. I have said on former occasions that nothing can be done to improve the industry to the extent which would enable it to pay its way under present conditions. I have said that before, and I do not want to repeat it, but I am sure the facts of the situation in the course of the present summer and the representations he will get from Governors and at the Imperial Economic Conference, will not allow him any rest in this matter.

He will have to pluck up his courage and go to his colleagues again and say: "You cannot ignore this. You must take some action, unless you are really going to accept the position that you do not care about the extinction of the West Indies." That was the dilemma I put the other day: Do you want cheap sugar or to keep the West Indies? The present position seems to be that we want cheap sugar. That is a very characteristic attitude of the Government on this matter. Your Lordships will remember that the very first speech which the noble Lord made in this House on the subject was chiefly a panegyric of cheapness. He said: "We all desire cheapness." That is the line on which we have to challenge the present position of His Majesty's Government and it is being challenged by all good Socialists in the Socialist Party. We do not think the first thing we ought to aim at is cheapness. We think that Free Trade was the invention of Manchester manufacturers to enlarge profits by mass production, and the noble Lord knows that as well as I do. That is not the Socialists' or Labour Party's view at all. We say, stabilise production, and in the Coal Mines Bill we do it.

I believe that no party in the State is really prepared to allow free competition to have its way in regard to the conditions of industry or prices. I want to emphasise that by a quotation from a Free Trade Commission of which I was the secretary about thirty-three years ago. That was a Commission composed of Sir Henry Norman, a very distinguished Indian administrator and a distinguished Governor of Jamaica, whose policy was devoted to the good of the people of Jamaica, Sir D. Barbour, who was a very eminent and rocky Free Trader of the Gladstonian school of finance, and Sir Edward Grey, now Viscount Grey of Fallodon, who was a very distinguished Liberal Free Trader. I will just take one or two extracts from what they said, because it bears upon the point. I have a very short extract of their statement of what was then the position owing to the competition of bounty-fed sugar. It is now precisely the position of the West Indies owing to the competition of over-production. This might be from the text of our Report: We say at once"— as the Commission said— that looking to the low prices now prevailing and to the probabilities as to the future of prices … the sugar industry of the West Indies is threatened with such reduction in the immediate future"— that is the case now; it is threatened with such reduction in the immediate future, preference or no preference— as may not in some of the Colonies differ very greatly from extinction"— I can say that in regard to British Guiana at the present time— and must seriously affect all of them, with the single exception of those which no longer produce sugar for export. If such reduction or extinction of the industry occurs…. the consequences are likely to be of a very serious character. The immediate result would be a great want of employment for the labouring classes, and the rates of wages, which have already fallen, would in all probability be still further reduced. The public Revenue would fall off, and the Governments of some of Your Majesty's possessions would be unable to meet the absolutely necessary public Expenditure, including interest on Debt, whilst additional outlay would have to be incurred in providing for the population, by emigration or otherwise, and the general standard of living would be reduced to a lamentable extent in every Colony which is largely dependent upon sugar. That is the situation to-day. I wish that the noble Lord had more explicitly admitted this, even if he cannot produce any remedy for it. He is not going to be let off being convinced of it in the course of this summer. They continued:— The islands which are likely to suffer most in such a contingency are Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts, Nevis and probably St. Lucia. …British Guiana would also suffer severely, and the problem to be dealt with in that Colony might prove to be one of exceptional difficulty. Jamaica and Trinidad have other resources.… In British Guiana and Trinidad the necessity for keeping faith with the East Indian immigrants, and of repatriating those of them who had a right to a free passage to India and wished to take advantage of that right, might involve a large expenditure.… upon the public funds. These Free Traders then went on to say:— it has been argued that the reduction in the price of sugar …. is such a source of gain to the British Empire as a whole that it would not be right for Your Majesty's Government to initiate any measures to bring about the abolition of that system. That is, the bounty system. In that argument we do not concur…. The benefit which the British Empire as a whole derives from any lowering of the price of sugar due to the operation of the bounty system is too dearly purchased by the injury which that system imposes on a limited class—namely, Your Majesty's West Indian and other subjects dependent on the sugar industry. Finally, they said:— We think…. that the loss to the British consumer, if it were the only matter to be considered, might reasonably be accepted in view of the importance of removing the disadvantage under which the West Indian producers at present labour. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, acted upon that principle. He set about the abolition of the bounties, and he said, speaking of this matter:— I have no doubt that the imposition of a countervailing duty will increase the price to the consumer of sugar and to the trades dependent upon sugar, and necessarily so. The Royal Commission say, and I agree with them, that this is a thing which ought not to be an insuperable argument against them. The noble Earl who opened this debate said that the Commissioners, Mr. Semple and I, seemed to have rather a pathetic illusion regarding this Government. It is perfectly true that both Mr. Semple and I thought that the conditions in the West Indies were of such a character that His Majesty's Government could not leave them as they now stand. According to all that we have been accustomed to hold and to the practice of the Colonial Office, it is the duty, if one may use the word, of His Majesty's Government to stabilise conditions and to avert the indisputable threat of the extinction of the sugar industry. I say that it is indisputable, and everybody who has studied the subject knows that it is so. It seemed to us incredible that we had been sent out as a Commission merely to bring back such a Report as apparently the noble Lord expected from us. He asked us to report as to what effectual measures could be taken. We told him that measures of improvement of efficiency and so on could have no immediate effect, and we recommended other measures of more immediate value. We recommended a single purchasing agency, such has been strenuously advocated for wheat by all the agricultural members of the Labour Party as being the most effectual step.

This has not been accepted. Failing that, we recommended temporary measures for carrying the industry on. These have been negatived, and the industry is to carry on as best it can.

It is said that in their despair the people of British Guiana are talking about annexation to America, with a very foolish expectation of benefiting thereby. The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, spoke of the West Indies being annexed to Canada. They do not want to be annexed to Canada. They want to remain British, as they consider that they have always been, and as Colonies they are senior to Canada. We took Mauritius from the French. The people of Mauritius look with longing eyes on the prosperity of the French Colonies of Martinique, Reunion, and other sugar-producing Colonies. They would be on velvet if they were still French. We took British Guiana from the Dutch. The noble Lord has impressed upon us the magnificent work that the Dutch have done in Java in building up the industry. Perhaps it would be better for British Guiana if we had left it to the Dutch. But on the whole the Colonies have taken the view that they want to remain part of the British Empire and they expect their representatives to make a proper fight for them in Parliament in their present condition. Some years ago, when this question was under discussion, even His Royal Highness the Heir to the Throne was moved to say in a public speech that the West Indies were not for sale. The West Indies may not be for sale, but it appears that they are liable to be given away with a pound of sugar, in order to keep sugar down to its present beggarly price.

We must face this matter upon the issue of prices, just as we shall have to face the question of wheat on the issue of prices. We must recognise that sugar is now being sold, and will go on being sold for several years, at too low a price, and that by the time it comes back to a reasonable and normal price, as was well said by a noble Lord, the survival of the richest will have taken place and Cuba and Java will be in command of the field. It is positively ridiculous for any Government which considers itself competent to administer the affairs of the Empire to say that this huge industry, the whole of the British West Indian sugar industry, is to be at the mercy of these terrible fluctuations in prices. What is the sense of allowing that industry to be wiped out, together with the British sugar beet industry? Are we not able to take means to protect ourselves? Of course we are, and any Government which hopes to be respected in the future has got to take steps to protect the West Indies from this débâcle of destruction which everyone knows is bound to come upon them unless some remedy is provided.

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

I do not wish to delay the House further at this hour. I have some degree of sympathy with the noble Lord. Naturally I am very much disappointed with the statement which he made, but I honestly believe that in his heart he is anxious that something shall be done to save the situation, and I sincerely trust that he will go on pressing his colleagues to get them to move in the matter. In that struggle I wish him every success. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.