§ LORD PARMOOR rose to call attention to the number of States which have signed or accepted, as compulsory, the optional clause of the Statute constituting the International Court at the Hague, and to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are now prepared to consider the signing and acceptance of the clause with or without reservations; and to move for Papers.
§ The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I am glad to have the Opportunity of bringing forward this subject before the noble Viscount (Lord Cecil or Chelwood) leaves for Geneva. I think he is leaving at the end or this week and therefore it is very convenient to have an opportunity of putting my Question to him before he goes away. I do not imagine that the matter is in any way controversial because questions of policy may arise between parties who are equally desirous to do their best to pro- 107 mote all the true interests of the League of Nations. So far as I know, this question will not lead to anything in the nature of antagonism between us. It is an important matter in connection with the inter-linked subjects of disarmament, security and arbitration—a very important matter. I do not think it is of much importance in which order those three subjects are put. The question which I am raising has an important bearing upon an advance on any of those three subjects, and still more upon their joint advance, which certainly must take place in order that the advance of any one of them may be successful.
§ I noticed the other day that the noble Viscount, I think quite rightly, said he disliked both optimists and pessimists on questions of this kind; therefore I shall try to confine myself to the facts and the documents without embarking upon either one side or the other in that controversy. Your Lordships will know that the Covenant of the League of Nations contains, in Article 14, a provision as to the constitution of a Permanent Court of International Justice and there can be no doubt, having regard to the real meaning and intention of the League of Nations which means a society of nations voluntarily co-operating for a common purpose and in the sense of mutual obligation in order that they may settle their international disputes—that there is need of an International Court of Justice. As a matter of fact, shortly after the League was constituted a number of jurists were appointed in order to consider the best constitution of the International Court of Justice, among whom was the noble Lord, Lord Phillip more, who took a leading part in the constitution of that Court. When the Court was constituted it was found that it went somewhat outside the terms of the Covenant; that is to say, it included, or might include, within the ambit of its jurisdiction, not only Members of the League, the signatory States, but also outside States as well, and consequently what is called a Protocol had to be prepared which would only be binding upon the States which signed it.
§ As a matter of fact nearly every State which is a Member of the League has signed that Protocol, the Protocol of the constitution of the Court. For the moment I am not dealing with the ques- 108 tion of the terms—I want to keep the two distinct. The latest list I have, though it was issued some time ago, shows that 48 States have accepted, amongst them Great Britain, all her great Dominions, who are Members of the Assembly, and India, therefore, as regards the general question of the institution of a Court of this kind, that is a matter of common ground and common agreement. The constitution of this Court had in it one special section to which I want to call attention this afternoon; it is the thirty-sixth section, which is known as the optional clause. The intention of that clause was to provide that certain matters were definitely suggested for optional purposes as matters properly within the jurisdiction of the Court. It was not a very wide range of subjects, but it was a very important range of subjects, including the interpretation of a Treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact that should be established to constitute a breach of international obligation, the nature or extent of reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. There is attached to the so-called optional clause a provision that any State might, if it so desired, adopt it as a compulsory clause; that is to say, it would come under an obligation to submit questions of this kind to the International Court, at the same time undertaking to regard as binding any decision that the Court might come to.
§ There was a further provision to which I must call attention in passing—namely, that in adopting the optional clause provision might be made for reservations excepting from the jurisdiction of that Court any specified matters. I mention that because when the matter was last discussed at Geneva in connection with the Protocol this country, which was very ably represented by the legal adviser of the Foreign Office, made it quite clear that if it did accept the jurisdiction of this Court as compulsory, there were certain matters which it intended to reserve and except, particularly as regards the international law affecting prizes at sea. That was quite understood, and no question was raised about it. What happened, of course, we know—that that proposal was part of the Protocol which itself was 109 not accepted. I will not go into that matter; I merely state it as an historical fact.
§
The next occasion on which this matter carne to the front, so far as I know, was in the proposal for the Treaty of Locarno. Your Lordships know that this country did not accept any arbitration or other obligations of any kind in the Treaty of Locarno. We were merely in the position of military guarantors. But it is important to note what was done regarding this question. The clause in the proposals at Locarno which directly refer to the matter to which I am calling your Lordships' attention is as follows:—
Any question with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights "—
that is, of course, legal rights—
shall be submitted to judicial decision and the parties undertake to comply with such decision.
That is the acceptance as obligatory of a judicial decision where the matter in dispute, either between Belgium and Germany, or France and Germany, is a question of right. I may say further that both Belgium and France have now signed this optional clause so as to make it compulsory and have signed it for a period of fifteen years. I do not know that any other country has signed it for so long a period, the general period for which a signature has been given being five years. At present something like thirty States have accepted this compulsory provision and a very large number of those have ratified it.
§ The importance or that is that as soon as this provision has been accepted as compulsory the difficulty of international disputes on questions of rights is met; I am not at present dealing with other questions. That is to say, you do not, leave a loophole through which the nations concerned can resort to war on questions of this kind, because by solemn obligations in the form of a solemn Treaty they have bound themselves to take such disputes to the International Court at the Hague, and to accept the decision of the Court as decisive. And it would be decisive, of course, in the same way, if I may give your Lordships an analogy, as the decision on the question which arose between this country and Iraq and Turkey on what is known as the question of the Mosul frontier.
110§ At the present time the Government of this country—not all Governments, there is a mistake about that to which I shall call attention in a moment—have not consented to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Hague International Court in these judicial disputes. They have not done it for this reason really and this is where the question of policy no doubt, comes in. They say: "We do not intend to bind our hands beforehand in regard to this matter. We want it left open until the time arrives." That means, of course, that you leave open a source or cause of international dispute which may result in warfare, and to that extent your security is not complete. Some time ago, I think it was last autumn, a petition was presented to the Government signed by no fewer than 488,000 people, which is a very large number to sign a petition of this kind. Unfortunately the members of the Government were too busy to receive the petitioners. The subject of the petition with which I am concerned is this. The petition asked that the Government should accept the principle of arbitration—what is meant by "arbitration" there is decision in cases of international dispute and not merely inquiry—and should begin by expressing its willingness to accept the optional clause. That is the clause I have been explaining to your Lordships. As I have said, 488,000 signatures were obtained to this petition.
§ The answer to that was sent by the present Foreign Secretary. I do not want to approach this in a critical way, but he states his views quite clearly and one of the Questions I am addressing to the noble Viscount who I understand is to reply to me, is whether there has been any change in the policy of the Government in this respect. The Foreign Secretary, if I may say so with all respect, made one mistake of fact in the answer Ire gave to this petition signed by 488,000 people. He said that the effect of it would be to take away the option which they now had in sending these matters for inquiry by the Council under Article 15, I think it is, of the Covenant of the League of Nations. That really was not dealing with the matter concerning which the petition was signed at all. Under Article 15, and this is one of the difficulties, there is no final decision of the 111 matters in dispute unless the Council happens to be unanimous in a particular case, and the provision is that in the want of uniformity the two parties are entitled to resile from any arbitration or judicial decision and, in fact, settle their differences by the old method of warfare. As long as that possibility exists in regard to these judicial questions you will have ran entirely different class of consideration from what would exist if the compulsory provision had been adopted. You make the application to the Court a matter of compulsion in the latter case and their decision binding upon all parties.
§ In the same reply, which I have no doubt the noble Viscount has read, the Foreign Secretary stated what was quite true—that this country had always taken a foremost part in general arbitration and in the matter of arbitration treaties. But he overlooked the fact that in none of those treaties, except one with a small South American Republic I think, are all matters of dispute referred to arbitration or decision, but all leave to this country an opportunity to say when the time arrives whether the country prefers to go to war or to take a decision judicially or by arbitration. The effect of that on the question of security is very important. If you want security, particularly in regard to disarmament—I think the noble Viscount is shortly going to Geneva to serve upon a Committee which will consider that question—you must be prepared, in the terms of the Treaty itself, to enter into obligations not to resort to war, which are defined in the Covenant as "promoting and achieving international peace and security."
§
That is the real point. It is not necessary to emphasise it with the noble Viscount, because he knows it perfectly well. There is all the difference between undertaking that you will submit these international disputes to an impartial tribunal and leaving question open, until the dispute has arisen, whether you will do it or not. In one case you have security, in the other case you have not. In the one case you have what is the true principle of the League of Nations—that is, that in the sense of mutual obligation the signatory States are willing to preserve this attitude of non-warfare, or, at any rate, of non-aggressive warfare, towards one another, whereas, in the other case, you have no security at all.
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I need not further elaborate the Question that I want to ask the noble 'Viscount, but perhaps I had better read the terms of the Notice: —
To call attention to the number of States which have signed or accepted, as compulsory, the optional clause of the statute constituting the International Court at the Hague, and to ask his Majesty Government whether they are now prepared to consider the signing and acceptance of the clause with or without reservations; and to move for Papers.
I particularly want the noble Viscount when he answers to notice the words "with or without reservations." I do not suggest that it could be done without reservation.
§ There might be a question arising between ourselves and our Dominions. That is an important point, and no one knows it more than I do. It is very important, for instance, that Canada—I take that Dominion as an illustration—expresses this desire for the optional clause being changed into a compulsory clause for the settlement of these judicial disputes, although at the same time it was not prepared to go as far as the Protocol, about which I cannot say anything. I think the Union of South Africa has taken the same attitude. Therefore it is not a question of separation in any sense between ourselves and our Dominions. It is not a question in which we have not got a common interest and not one of those questions to which the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, has referred more than once as being continental or regional rather than world-wide, as is the case with the British Dominions. I do not want that answer to be given. It would be out of place, having regard to what they have said and having regard to the possibility of reservation.
§
I do not wish to be an optimist or a pessimist, but I should like to read one passage from a speech of the present Prime Minister which was made on January 8 this year. It is so apt and so true and so important that I venture to quote it. He said:—
Who, in Europe, does not know that one more war in the West and the civilisation of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome?
If we know that, surely we must all be deeply concerned to prevent the outbreak of a war of that character. It is in the hope that a further step may be taken in
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the direction of a general principle that I ask the noble Viscount the Question of which I have given Notice and move the Resolution which stands ill my name.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD)My Lords, I have no coin-plaint to make of my noble friend for having raised this Question, arid I recognise that he is entitled to ask, if he wishes, for a reply from myself, which it is very good of him to wish for. It must be given this week or postponed for some little time. At the same time, I am sure that the noble Lord will see that there are circumstances at this moment which make it rather difficult to contemplate the question of arbitration without a certain amount of pessimism, which, he rightly says, is to be avoided. If we are not able to establish the principle of arbitration in our own national dispute it is not very likely that foreign countries will think us quite in earnest if we go as advocates of arbitration in international disputes. However, it would be out of order for me to go further into that matter, but the noble Lord will see how all these questions hang together and have their repercussion one upon another. I might almost say that the Question of the noble Lord could be answered in the affirmative. I think he asked me whether the Government are now prepared to consider the signing and acceptance of the clause with or without reservations. Undoubtedly the Government are prepared to consider that question.
§ LORD PARMOORPerhaps the noble Viscount will not mind me saying that I mean "consider sympathetically."
§ VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOODI am not going to ride off on a verbal reply. I will explain more fully what the attitude of the Government is. In the first place, I think the Government are fully alive to the merit and the value of tine work done by the International Court of Justice. I think its work has been beyond all praise. It has been quite extraordinarily good. After all, though it has only existed for a very short time, it has already decided, I forget how many international disputes.
§ LORD PARMOORSix.
§ VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOODTechnically perhaps the noble Lord is right in saying it has disposed of six disputes, but a great number of questions, advisory questions which, though they are technically not disputes, and rightly not disputes, yet involve national questions of the very highest importance, have been dealt with. It has decided six disputes and a large number of other advisory questions. I will not say that its decisions have always been right. It would be impertinent for me to pass any opinion upon that. What may be said, and said with absolute truth, is that no one has questioned in the, slightest degree the complete impartiality of every one of those decisions. Without any exception there has never been a word said against them. In every case the parties to those questions have accepted the decision of the Court without the slightest reluctance or qualification. I think that is a very remarkable tribute to the work of the Court. And we have seen that nationality plays little part in its decisions that Judges of one nationality have been found giving judgment against the nationality to which they belong, which happened to be a litigant in the dispute before them. That is a very great achievement and it certainly encourages the natural tendency of the British Government towards arbitration.
The noble Lord was perfectly right in saying that the British Government—I am not speaking of any particular Government, because for many years the whole course of policy of the British Government has been favourable to international arbitration. I think you may say without exaggeration that in every considerable dispute in which they have been engaged they have always been ready either to accept or suggest arbitration as the means of bringing it to an end. I do not believe there is any country in the world which has shown practically by what it has actually done a more favourable attitude towards arbitration than the British Government for very many years past. That is one thing. But there is another characteristic of the British mentality, of which all Governments must take account. We are distrustful of general propositions. I de not think that is a bad national characteristic. General propositions lead you into great difficulties, and we have always 115 preferred in our legislation, in our judicial system, to deal with particular cases and arrive at decisions about them rather than to tie our hands beforehand by the adoption of a general principle which may lead us into difficulties that it is impossible for human foresight to foresee.
On that ground, broadly speaking, successive British Governments have felt so far unable to commit themselves to what is called the optional clause; that is to say, to accept beforehand arbitration in a very large number of international cases which would in fact practically cover, or might cover, almost every international dispute, or at any rate a very large number of them, because one of the classes of question we should accept would be the construction of any Treaty. That evidently goes a very long way and not too far. I should be glad to see that established as the general principle throughout the world. It might involve a very large number of questions which at present are left to be determined by the Government when they arise as to whether they are or are not suitable for arbitration.
My noble friend has referred to the Treaties of Locarno. He is perfectly right in saying that they constitute a very important gesture towards the principle of arbitration. Though it is quite true that we are not in any way bound by the arbitral part of those Treaties—those arbitral parts were exclusively applied to disputes between Germany and France and Belgium—yet the general tendency of those Treaties is very strongly in favour of arbitration. That is one of the many reasons why I am able to assure your Lordships that this matter is now under the very serious consideration of the Government. I am not in a position to tell your Lordships what their decision may be or when it will be reached, but it is being considered. The whole question of arbitration is being considered very seriously by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary and by the Government in general, and they hope that it will be a subject of discussion at the Imperial Conference in the autumn. I am sure the noble Lord will agree that no subject could be more suitable for discussion in such an assembly than that.
The noble Lord has said with great truth that this is a matter on which the Dominions have expressed great interest. 116 Some of them have expressed, as he rightly said, a very strong feeling in favour of arbitration; and it is quite clear that for us, directing as we necessarily do the foreign policy of the Empire, to agree that we would accept compulsory arbitration in the manner which the noble Lord desires would be a decision which would, or might, affect every part of the Empire. He is right in saying it would not be a question which would affect one continent or another. This is a broad, world-wide question and I am sure the noble Lord will agree with me that it is important that the closest touch should be kept between the Dominions and the Mother Country when this matter is being considered. Therefore, I hope it will be discussed by the imperial Conference, and I hope the noble Lord will allow me to postpone any declaration of policy until that discussion has taken place.
I should like to add that I hold as strongly as the noble Lord that the future is with international arbitration. Whether we have reached the time when it would be desirable to say all international disputes should be submitted to arbitration I do not know, nor do I know whether we can even take the step which the noble Lord desires us to take. I am quite certain, however, that where you can submit an international dispute to arbitration and particularly to decision by the Permanent Court of International Justice, you are adopting a method of decision which is infinitely more satisfactory than submission to any political tribunal or political discussion. The moment you get into a judical atmosphere you get into a position where no question of manoeuvring or intriguing can take place, and I am satisfied that the more international disputes can be decided by the Hague Court the better all lovers of peace will be pleased. Beyond that I am afraid I cannot go and I can only ask the noble Lord in the circumstances to accept that as the best reply I can give.
§ LORD PARMOORMy Lords, I accept with much gratitude the noble Viscount's reply. I quite feel that in the position in which he is placed he could not go any further than he has gone at the present time. There are, however, two matters about which I should like to say a word. I rather hoped, in reference to what was said by the noble Viscount when he began 117 his speech, that international differences might be decreased by the kindly and sympathetic way in which he has dealt with the proper method of coming to a decision in international disputes. At any rate if one side for the moment seems to bring to the front friction I am glad to hoar from the noble Lord that on the other side, in the international sphere, in his view great progress is being made in the settlement of these disputes "by peaceful means." Those are the words used in the Locarno Treaty and perhaps it may be that in national matters we may learn from the experience of international affairs that "by peaceful means" is the only way in the long run of finding a peaceful settlement. There is another matter to which the noble Lord referred. He used the words "the construction of any Treaty". I think we shall all feel that that is a judicial matter. I hope that when he is considering that he will bear in mind the wider matter of "questions of right"—those are the words from the Locarno Treaty which I quoted—and that questions of right should be decided by the International Court of Justice.
§ VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOODI was only referring to the noble Lord's Question as it appears on the Paper, Which is that we should consider signing the optional clause. That of course means accepting the criteria of questions laid down in the Covenant.
§ LORD PARMOORI am quite at one with the noble Lord. It is one of the four specified subjects. But I have often thought that these specified subjects are rather narrow. In the Treaty of Locarno, which when it is ultimately ratified will regulate these international disputes between Belgium and Germany and France and Germany, the words used are really wide and very important and I hope they may be present in the noble Lord's mind when he is considering the question. Be talked about general principles and general propositions. Those are two different things. As a general principle we do refer all legal matters to legal tribunals in this country. There may be a dispute as to what are legal matters and what are not, but no one denies in general principle that a legal question must be decided by legal tribunals. As regards general propositions, I do not want to 118 speak in undue praise of the English system of law or of any other system, but I do not think you find in any other system more general propositions—propositions which are of enormous advantage because in that way you get precedents which prevent litigation being embarked upon. I am entirely in agreement with the noble Viscount regarding the Dominions. I hope that the noble Viscount will believe that I asked this Question in all sincerity. I thank him for his sympathetic answer and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.