HL Deb 10 March 1926 vol 63 cc527-45

LORD THOMSON rose to call attention to the Air policy of His Majesty's Government; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, since I put down the Motion which stands in my name there have been two debates in another place on the Air Force Estimates. These debates strayed far from prosaic considerations of £ s. d. into variety of contentious subjects and covered a wide field. In my remarks this afternoon I shall endeavour to deal briefly with some of the points raised. Before venturing to address your Lordships to-day I looked up the first speech I had the honour to deliver in this House rather more than two years ago on the same subject. My intention was to sec whether I had changed the views I then held and what difference there was between them and those that I hold now. Though as prone as any man to inconsistency, I am glad to say that there is no difference at all.

I stated then the Labour Government's policy in regard to aviation and the Air Force. That policy was to continue the scheme of expansion initiated in 1923 and to that policy we adhered faithfully. The present Government continued it last year, but this year, in the light of Locarno, has modified it, slowed it down, and, if I may say so with all respect, have acted rightly. The acid test of sincerity in regard to disarmament is to be found in Air policy. I believe that this gesture of the Government to-day will be noted and appreciated throughout the world, and I trust that their example will be followed and will result in a nearer approach to a more general reduction in armaments throughout Europe. If people only knew what was in store for them in the event of another European war I do not believe that there would be war talk or jingoes outside lunatic asylums. There has been no lethal weapon comparable in its operation to a bombing aeroplane and the appalling destruction that can be worked by these swift and terrible instruments of destruction was only just hinted at during the world War.

I hope I am not taking his name in vain, but I saw in a very reputable weekly newspaper the other day that the chief of the Air Force was reported to have said that he wished there were no air. I hope I am not doing him an injustice, but I think I understand what the chief of the Air Staff means. He realises to the full the ghastliness of aerial warfare, and while he directs with a knowledge born of wide experience and an instinct that amounts to genius the activities and training of the Air Force he would, I am certain, be a pacifist if he could, and he will be when he can.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Like everybody else.

LORD THOMSON

I entirely agree with the noble Marquess. It is for that reason that I greet this famous Air chief as a brother pacifist, although in arms. There are one or two points of detail in the Estimates to which I will refer. I regret that it has not been possible to do more in the way of allocating funds to research and commercial aviation. I know well the difficulty of extracting money from the Treasury in the month of March and that Chancellors of the Exchequer are very stony-hearted people and often deceptive. They are like diplomats in that when they say "Perhaps" more often than not they mean "No." But I will vary slightly an observation made by my noble friend Lord Haldane a short time back, and say that you can no more reduce the expenditure on the Air Force than you can on education. Personally I regard aviation as a branch of national and Imperial education. We have got to teach the British people the habit of the air, so that our Empire can be linked up by means of this new and rapid form of locomotion. Expenditure on research is, in my view, a sound investment. Thereby economies can be effected later, and flying will be rendered safer and therefore more popular. It is not so much at the present time a question of spending money or of spending large sums on research. I believe that for the moment, quite small amounts would be adequate.

But encouragement should be given to this department of the Air Ministry and men of science should be able to count on a career if they devote themselves to aeronautical research. That is not so at the present moment. No man of science can count upon a career by devoting himself exclusively to this science. If I were to pass a criticism upon that admirable body of men who comprise the staff of the Air Ministry, I should say that they are not so enthusiastic as they in might be in regard to research. They cannot be too enthusiastic. Aviation is still in its infancy and, great as have been the achievements of the past, they will pale into insignficance compared with what will happen when the best scientific brains in the country devote themselves to the conquest of the air.

A great deal of education in this matter is required it is an extraordinary feature of the times we live in that the English-speaking peoples, in spite of the many inducements to do so, do not appear to grasp the full significance of this means of transportation. In the United States of America there is an exactly similar state of affairs to that which we have over here. That huge continent has practically only one main air line across it. It is magnificently run, but for idle continent of America a disgracefully small allowance. In Germany a very different state of affairs exists. There the people take a keen interest in aviation. There is not an air pageant or exhibition of flying of any sort to which literally thousands of German people do not go, and in spite of the restrictions on construction in Germany, on civil construction, imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, the commercial aviation industry displays an astonishing vitality.

I will now refer briefly to some of the criticisms of the Air Force that have been made in another place and in the Press. Your Lordships are too well informed to pay attention to sneers about the "Royal Ground Force." Many of you have seen with your own eyes the proficiency of our airmen at Hendon. You will judge the tree by its fruits. Critics of the Air Force do not, indeed, attack the officers and men. They concentrate on the Air Ministry and accuse it of inefficiency and extravagance. To the first of these charges the answer is that most of the credit for the work of our pilots and mechanics should in common fairness be given to those who direct their training and supply them with equipment. The second charge is no less easily met.

Take, for example, the charge of there being fifty men on the ground for every single aeroplane in the air. Such a statement is most misleading. It gives the impression that while one machine is up fifty men on the aerodrome are gaping at it in idleness on the ground. This, of course, is not so. It is obviously absurd. That figure of fifty has been arrived at by including in certain calculations all manner of people. For instance, over 3,000 men and boys are now in training and will join in the future certain units not yet formed. There are doctors and a variety of men, not exactly airmen, who attend to airmen's bodies and their souls. All these are included in that figure of fifty. To me the chief value of any figure, or any set of figures, is that it enables one to establish some form of comparison. How they are arrived at is a matter of indifference. I was thinking of that only the other day when the noble Lord, Lord Bledisloe, was giving us some figures in regard to agriculture. The figures by themselves were absolutely meaningless; but one got a sort of an idea of why they had been got out when one saw the comparisons which were instituted by means of them. In this case, as I say, the figures include all sorts of people other than airmen—men who are necessary, teachers and others, to keep the Air Force efficient, but are never actually employed in an aeroplane.

But I am in a position to give your Lordships a figure by means of which you will be able to establish a comparison. At the end of the War for every aeroplane in the air there were eighty-four people on the ground. That figure of eighty-four was arrived at by precisely the same calculations and on the same data as the figure of fifty to-day and the reduction from eighty-four to fifty is the true measure of the success of the Air Ministry in bringing down the expenditure during the interval. I do not mean to say that we should stop at this reduction. I feel sure that further economics will be made whenever and wherever possible; but when it is argued that when we had the figure of 84 we were in a state of war, that extravagance was justifiable, that the expansion was continually going on and that those conditions do not exist to-day, I would remind your Lordships that we are still expanding.

We are expanding to-day owing to the fact that in the years immediately following the War an Air policy was pursued which allowed our Air Force to fall into a state of neglect. We are expanding, though slowly, at this very moment and the figure of fifty is, I think, a very creditable result. What I am now saying is not really my own opinion; it is based on that of men who possess far more expert knowledge than I do. I am thinking of men in France, in Germany, in the United States of America with whom I have had an opportunity of discussing this question, and they assure me from real knowledge of the subject that we are getting full value for our money in our Air Force. Ruthless economy must, of course, still be practised and constructive criticism which will help to promote that economy will, I am sure, be encouraged and welcomed by the Air Ministry. But let that criticism be fair and not take the form of sneers which, in some instances at least, indicate that those who make them are not so anxious to bring down expenditure as to change the system under which our fighting Services are organised.

On my return recently from the United States I found, to my surprise, that the question of the retention of the Air Ministry and Air Force as a separate entity was once more being discussed. I thought that had been buried in the past. My attention was drawn to the fact that on November 19 last year the following Question had been put to the Prime Minister in another place:— SIR F. HALL asked the Prime Minister whether, amongst. other avenues of economy in the public service, the Government will consider the possibility, in the interests both of efficiency and economy, of abolishing the present independent organisation of the Royal Air Force; and if he will appoint a special committee, which shall include a proportion of members, unbiased by official interests, to inquire into and report upon the question of effecting economy of administration in this direction? The PRIME MINISTER: This question, together with all other questions affecting possible economies in the fighting Services, falls within the scope of the Colwyn Committee. Since then, in reply to a Private Notice Question of Mr. MacDonald, the Leader of the Opposition, the Prime Minister has made a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that the Government had no intention of reopening the question of a separate Air arm and Air Ministry. He further expressed the conviction that the way to secure higher co-ordination between all three Services lay in combined action between those Services through the Committee of Imperial Defence and the recently instituted Committee of Chiefs of Staff. This statement was confirmed last Monday.

I would like most respectfully to welcome and applaud this decision of the Government. Unfortunately, it does not do full justice to the Air Force, which, as is made clear by the Question of Sir Frederick Hall and the answer of the Prime Minister on November 19, was put on its trial not for the first time in its short history. It was on its trial before the Colwyn Committee. In spite of a public notification of part of the terms of reference, that, part which affected the Air Ministry, the Prime Minister stated recently that it was not proposed to publish the Colwyn Committee's Report, on the ground that it was a Cabinet document. I fail to understand the necessity for any secrecy in this connection. The Geddes Report was virtually an identical document, and it was not hushed up.

There are rumours, indeed it is being openly stated in the Press, that the Colwyn Report cannot be published because it contains passages which would be distasteful to the War Office and the Admiralty. I am an old soldier, and am all for sparing the feelings of those two Departments. No one has more respect for their great traditions than I have. I also recognise that a certain amount of jealousy on their part is very natural. The Air Force is the Cinderella, of the Services. It is her foot, and her foot alone, that fits the glass slipper of home defence, and of course her elder sisters feel that they are being cut out. But the personnel of the Air Force has its feelings also, and it is surely unjust to allow the character of the Air Ministry to be blackened, to say the least by insinuations of the character I have looted, to be accused of extravagance and inefficiency—charges which have not yet been proved to be founded—and that there should be no defence put up and no answer given, in order that the feelings of the elder sisters, the elder Services, should not be hurt. Moreover, in addition to the Question put by Sir Frederick Hall in Parliament, allegations have been made publicly and repeatedly which cannot he allowed to pass without refutation or substantiation. Quite apart from sentiment, though that does count for a great deal in the minds of the personnel of the Air Force, or indeed of the personnel of any of the fighting Services, the country surely has a right to know what was the verdict of the Colwyn Committee.

If there are reasons why the Government cannot publish the Report in full, and I can imagine several, I press for answers to certain questions. My first question was answered, in part, on Monday last. It was drawn into the debate which took place in another place and apparently the Colwyn Report does state that no economy could be effected if the Air Force and the Air Ministry were abolished as separate entities. So far so good, but I think a little more light is needed on this subject. We have to remember the recklessness with which accusations have been made in public against the Air Ministry. That rather official observation will not go far to console the personnel of the Air Force. It is a negative reply. What is wanted is something much more definite.

My second question is: Was an investigation made of the proposals that air co-operation should be provided in the future by separate naval and military wings, and if so, with what result? Did the Colwyn Committee report on that? I have seen it vaguely hinted in the Press that this point was included in its terms of reference. Then again, was a recommendation made by the Colwyn Report that the Navy and Army should have increased powers of control over those portions of the Air Force which exist primarily for co-operation with the other Services, or did the Colwyn Report say exactly the reverse—because that I have also seen stated in the Press? I do not ask for a verbatim quotation of the Report from the Government, but I submit that, in the interests of justice as well as of efficiency and economy, this House and the country have a right to know what, in general terms, were the findings of the Committee—composed of three distinguished members of your Lordships' House, the scope of whose inquiry was publicly stated in the House of Commons—about whose terms of reference and findings there has been a flood of rumour. And though that flood has now subsided, those of its who are not in the secrets of this Report are in a state of perplexity and doubt which is very damaging to the Air Force.

In conclusion, I wish to remind your Lordships of the circumstances in which our present system was set up. During the summer of 1917 it became evident that we were not holding our own in the air on the Western Front. At that time the dual system now recommended in certain quarters was in force. Before the War this system had excited constant bickering and consequent waste and confusion. During the War the less of efficiency became so serious as to jeopardise the prospects of victory. The facts of the situation were notorious and eventually both Parliament and public opinion throughout the country demanded drastic measures of reform. In response to this demand the War Cabinet appointed a Committee of investigation. On its Report various compromises were suggested and attempted, but by the end of 1917 the decision to amalgamate the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps into a unified Air Force was practically forced upon the Cabinet. There was considerable opposition, I need hardly say, and many difficulties had to be overcome which were inseparable from a change so momentous during the progress of hostilities. The reasons which influenced the War Cabinet then hold good to-day. The dual system had been given a fair trial and found wanting. It had not stood the only test that is worth having, the test of war. I admit that this system still obtains in the United States and France, but in both countries it is severely criticised.

Our discarded system has its candid critics. Allow me to read to you a few brief extracts from a Report prepared by order of Congress in the United States on the present dual system of controlling the Air Force in the United States. It is a public document. It was printed at the Government printer's office in Washington, and it can be bought for a few cents. This Committee may fairly be said to have had the first and last word on Air administration. There is another Report called the Morrow Report, which I hesitate to describe as a piece of whitewashing since I am talking of a country not my own, but at the same time I think it is fair to say that it cannot have the same weight as the Report which I am about to read to you. I say that for this reason. The Lampert Committee, the one from whose Report I am about to read, began its investigation in 1924. The Morrow Committee was set up in 1925. The Morrow Committee submitted its Report in November of 1925. The Report from which I am about to read some extracts was submitted in December, 1925. In other words, it was prepared earlier and produced later.

Now let me read these extracts. The first, extract I would read is this:— That in spite of the expenditure of nearly 40,000,000 dollars for purchase and overhaul of airplanes and motors the air services of both Army and Navy have deteriorated in equipment and in morale. … That is a Report on the United States Air Service. Here is a much more sweeping condemnation. The Committee find:— That there is no uniformity of Army and Navy policy as to organisation, equipment, control of personnel, procurement, design or use of aircraft; that there is no continuity of policy with respect to design and purchase of aircraft and engines in either the Army or the Navy; that the attempts to co-ordinate the activities of the Army and Navy by the use of joint boards, the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics and other agencies have been sporadic and occasional and therefore have not achieved the results desired; that there is a distinct conflict of opinion between the Army and Navy as to air activities in coast defence; that there is a wide divergence of opinion between the Army and Navy as to the effectiveness of aircraft operating against surface vessels"— and so on; showing the confusion that has arisen.

Now there are two other extracts to which I would like to draw your Lordships' attention. This seems to me the most telling:— A careful reading of the evidence taken before our Committee convinces us that (outside of the Air Services themselves) there is not now in the Army and Navy a proper appreciation of the importance of air power as a combatant arm. Then again: We find as a fact that there still exists an alarming situation both in the Army and Navy Air Services due to shortage of flying personnel and equipment, and that it is due further to a failure on the part of these Services to duly appreciate that importance of air power indicated. That is the Report on America.

There is also a very short Report from France issued by the Finance Commission. It is a literal translation that I am going to read:— Painful as it may be, we do not hesitate to make this criticism, albeit with the full measure of reticence necessary in dealing with a subject of this character, for, if there is not energetic action in the early future, naval aviation will continue to vegetate and will end by disappearing altogether. I do not know quite what reticence there is in that Report. It may be that we have not heard half the story. But the system as practised by these two countries has been put before you, or rather the criticisms upon it, and you have seen the fruits of it in the eyes of the perfectly impartial, honest men called upon to report upon it. That is the system that we are invited to follow by critics of the Air Force. The lessons seem to me to be perfectly plain. You can no more put the Air Force under either a soldier or a sailor than you could put an Army under an Admiral or a Fleet under a General. You have to have expert control over a technical service like the Air Force.

I should like to point out, on the other hand, what were the results achieved in time of War by the adoption of our present system. They may be stated in this way. The unified Air Force was set up at the end of 1917. During the last seven and a half months of the War the Royal Air Force was responsible for all air operations carried out by the British. When it is remembered that those months were among the most critical of the War and that the organisation was new and to some extent improvised, the fact that by the Armistice Britain had gained a lead in the air over all the other belligerents is noteworthy. The expression "lead" is a quotation. The United States Aviation Commission, which visited Europe after the Armistice, stated in its Report that, Britain was well in the lead in practically every phase of aerial development. That was the situation in the year 1919, after the unified Air Force had been in existence for about a year and a half.

If such a calamity as another European war should occur, I ask your Lordships to consider what in all probability would happen. As I see the matter, it seems to me that the situation that we should have to face would be one in which our ports and our industrial and military centres would be exposed to complete destruction before our Armies could be mobilised or our Fleets could put to sea. Against all such attacks the Air Force is the sole line of defence. It is not an auxiliary to the other arms; rather are the other Services its auxiliaries. The all-important task at that time would be to protect London and other centres from aerial bombardment, and to perform that task an Air Force is required whose personnel must be trained to the highest pitch of individual excellence, whose units must work within themselves and with each other with the precision of a clock and whose equipment must be up to date, or as much so as care and research can make it. Uniformity of training and standardisation, so far as is possible, of types are indispensable to this organisation, behind which there must be a nation-wide aviation industry with workshops up and down the land. And the man responsible for home defence, the Air Officer Commanding, is a person who will not only need to understand every detail of air work and a very sensitive personal but he will also require to be a man who can keep cool, can prevent himself being "rattled," and possesses the patience not to dissipate his forces in small actions but to wait to deliver a decisive blow. On his decision, I think it is no exaggeration to say, may depend the destinies of our race.

Accordingly I ask your Lordships if it is reasonable to expose a man so placed, to the difficulties inseparable from a dual system, to hamper him by the necessity for consultation, or to cripple his activities with Departmental strife. It is not reasonable, and there is no man who could do himself full justice in a position of such tremendous responsibility unless he had a completely free hand and unified control. I wish with all my heart that this organisation and these men could be provided for £5,000,000 sterling annually. This year, unfortunately, they are costing £20,000,000. It would cost, I feel convinced, a great deal more if we did not have our present system, and it seems to me that efficiency would suffer. To me this is not a question of politics in the Party sense. It is one of national policy. It may be that this afternoon I have been flogging a dead horse. I hope I have. I am quite prepared to stand in a white sheet and say that I am sorry for wasting your Lordships' time if that should be the case, but this horse often strikes me as being hydra-headed, and the statement made by the Prime Minister in another place may have scotched him only and not killed him.

There are powerful influences behind these attacks on the Air Ministry and the Air Force. They are ever active, they are always cropping up and they work in subterranean fashion—often, I might even say, in submarine fashion—but they are ceaseless in their activity and, in my view, highly dangerous. Their aim is the subordination of the Air Force to one or other of the older Services or, worse still, to both. This means placing the control of a very technical weapon in the hands of men who do not understand its functions. The consequences of such procedure have been amply demonstrated by this extracts that I read to your Lordships from Reports on the state of affairs in the United States and in France.

I hope I am not unduly suspicious, but a much larger question has been dragged into the controversy lately and that is the question of a Ministry of Defence. I have a feeling that the idea in that may be that one or other of the older Services, probably the larger one, should swallow the two smaller ones in that Ministry of Defence. In my view the discussion of a Ministry of Defence at this time on the Air Force Estimates, is entirely irrelevant, but I understand the subject is to be discussed after Easter and I sincerely trust that an, opportunity will then be given to explain the views of all Parties in this House on that topic. But sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. The question of a Defence Ministry, as I understand the matter, has no connection whatsoever with the Air Estimates or, anyhow, only a very remote connection. The important and relevant questions are those which I have ventured to put in regard to the Colwyn Report and the reaction of that Report on Air policy, and it is because I consider this question so important and because I feel very deeply on this subject that I have ventured to address your Lordships at such length. I beg to move.

THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND)

My Lords, in rising as representative of His Majesty's Government I should like to take this opportunity of welcoming Lord Thomson's speech on the Air Force and also of telling him how glad we are to have his valuable advice and counsel in these matters. In my opinion, the Air is a question of such great importance for the safety of the Empire that it should be a non-Party question, and before I commence to deal with the few and very reasonable requests which the noble Lord made to me for information on certain matters connected with the Colwyn Report, research and civil aviation, I should like to say one or two words about, the general trend of the criticisms which have been going on in this country with regard to the Air Force during the last few weeks.

From the debates in another place on the Air Estimates, which have already been mentioned by the noble Lord, I think one might gather that there are three separate sets of criticisms that are being levelled at the Air Ministry at the present moment. The first set of criticisms is made by those who wish to scrap the Air Force entirely as a step towards general disarmament; the second set of criticisms comes from those who wish to increase the Air Force even more quickly than is being done under present arrangements; and the third set of criticisms comes from those who, while agreeing in the main with the present extent of expenditure on the Air Force, consider that the money is not being spent to the best advantage. These three views are very diverse ones. Some people are displeased for one reason and some for another, and from very opposing directions. It is clearly impossible to please everyone, but I am very glad indeed that the noble Lord who introduced this Motion in his speech to-day did not support any of those criticisms. On the contrary, with few modifications I think I am right in saying that he supported generally the present policy of the Air Ministry—a policy which, as he himself said, he had so much to do with building up only a short time ago and which, during his term of office, if he will allow me to say so, he upheld in such an able and efficient manner.

In spite of what these various critics tell us, there is no doubt in my mind that of all the Services the Air Service to-day has as good a chance of being well administered as an Air Service as any other Service. It is young, but it it not too young. It is run by men who have had active experience in the development of this new arm, by men who know as well as can be known the possibilities and the difficulties of the situation and who are in the best position to weigh those difficulties. They are not men who have had their active experience in a dim past which has long ceased to correspond with modern conditions. They are, in short, a picked body of men with expert and first-hand knowledge.

Let us suppose that the critics were right. It would, indeed, be difficult for us to know what policy to follow, because the critics themselves contradict one another even more violently than they differ from the policy of the Air Ministry. They may be dealt with in turn. The first group is composed of those pacifists who want to do away with the Air Force in order to give practical effect, as they say, to the Locarno spirit and secure the end of war. It seems unfortunate, but to the ordinary non-pacifist mind they would appear to be urging a policy which would have exactly opposite results from those which they desire. For this country to weaken its forces and dismantle so vital a force as the Air Force, would not bring general disarmament nearer. On the contrary, it might destroy all hope of it. Disarmament will not come from the actions and desires of the weak, but from the deliberations and agreements of the strong.

There is certainly more to be said for these critics, on the other hand, who urge us to spend much more money on the Air Force and not to retard in any way the speed with which we are strengthening it. They realise, what has indeed become a platitude, namely, that we are no longer an island; that we have become a continental nation joined to Europe by the air. But surely it will be foolish for us not to take the present opportunity of that new spirit in Europe about which Lord Thomson spoke, brought about by the Locarno Treaty, to economise wisely and well. There is no reason why we should weaken our forces, that is to say, weaken them proportionately with those of other nations, but if it is possible to slow down in one particular and by so doing to improve and consolidate the foundations of our future strength, we should surely be unwise not to do so.

That is what the Air Ministry is doing. It is building up its strength from the bottom in order to stand more firmly in the future. Economy is now so greatly needed in every direction that one cannot feel that any legitimate effort in this direction should be opposed. Critics need not fear that the Air Force will be starved. The policy of the Air Ministry is to hold a balance between the new feeling of peace produced by the Locarno Pact and the need for a strong Air Force. This policy can be varied, altered or modified each year in accordance with the position of affairs in Europe without vitally affecting the gradual but necessary growth of the Air Force as a whole.

The third body of criticism is directed against the present composition of the Air Force and the manner in which the money provided in its Estimates is being expended. We are told that the Air Force has become a ground force, and that too much is spent on the comfort of the personnel and on housing, staffing and administrative expenses, and too little on flying. It must be realised, however, that we are building up a great new arm, that unlike the Army and Navy we have never had barracks provided for us. A number of officers and men of the Air Force are still living in the huts which were built for them during the War. Some of them, which I have seen myself in the past, are exceedingly draughty, damp and ill-adapted for the winter climate of this country. I remember well, in connection with my visit to the boys' training centre at Halton, that the hospital there was, until a very short time ago, merely a series of huts and they impressed me at that time—about two and a half years ago—as being a death trap for all but the strongest. I believe that since then these things have been gradually improved, but that instance will suffice to show that the Air Force has always been terribly underhoused and that the present expenses are caused to a very great extent by the necessary housing and barracking of a new force, which has never had buildings like the older Services have always had in time past. Any one who has had practical experience of building up anything knows that the overhead charges are always heavier in the first instance.

Some critics quote the fact, on the other hand, that our great Ally, France, has a smaller quota of men per aeroplane than we have. This is a very difficult thing to calculate and very misleading. A great many of their ground staff have been drawn from the Army and Navy and these figures are difficult to calculate accurately. But if it is a fact that they have a larger proportion of aeroplanes to men than we have, is it not also a fact—I do not know whether your Lordships are aware, but it is a fact—that they have a much larger number of accidents and crashes in proportion to the number of machines than we have in this country? It is easy to push a large number of young men into the air before they are fully trained and tell them to go up and fly whether their training has been sufficiently carried out or not. But if you do this you must he prepared to be responsible for their premature and unnecessary deaths. If the people who speak so glibly about the "Royal Ground Force" when speaking of the training of pilots knew these facts, perhaps the boot would be on the other leg. It is disastrous to start on any kind of business without adequate equipment and it, is more expensive in the long run. I think the experts who are directing and controlling this expenditure might be given credit for having taken this fact into consideration.

The complaint has been made also from various sides that members of the Air Force are put through a certain minimum—it is only a minimum—of parades and that complaint seems to me the worst grounded of all the criticisms. Is it so scandalous that these men should be taught the virtues of discipline, smartness and physical fitness by the method universally in use in every fighting force, and one might add in every educational institution? No, it is not by this sort of criticism that we shall advance along the road of aerial progress. Let us rather unite in considering the question for the good of this great Empire.

I should like to refer briefly to two or three points which Lord Thomson raised to-day. The first of these is the Colwyn Report. Lord Thomson asked me if I could make public the further recommendations of the Colwyn Report. All that I can tell him at the present moment is that the Colwyn Report is a Cabinet document and cannot therefore be published, but I can also tell the noble Lord a good deal more than has already been made public. In general terms I may say that the Colwyn Committee recommended the continuance of a single unified Air Service to carry out all air work, whether for the Navy, the Army or the Central Air Force. They went on to say—and this is new—that they favoured a strengthening rather than a weakening of Air Ministry control over those portions of the Air Force which co-operate with the Navy and Army respectively.

The noble Lord also alluded to the question of research and said that he would like to see research so arranged that experts could go into the research department of the Air Ministry and make a life's work of it. I noted very carefully what he said about experts serving a lifetime as research experts. I quite agree with him that if it is possible it would be a very splendid idea, and I shall put that matter to the Air Minister at, the first opportunity and see if any way can be found by which this matter can be dealt with. But a good deal has been done by the Air Ministry in the last year or two in regard to research. The Government attach the very greatest importance to the prosecution of aeronautical research as well as scientific research generally. They are spending a good deal more this year than they did in 1925–26. Hampered though they are by lack of funds they have yet been able to reorganise their technical organisation, and they have, as your Lordships may know, constituted a separate Director of Scientific Research, with a small staff, to ensure that the more purely scientific aspects of the problem of aviation shall receive the fullest consideration under the most favourable conditions. That was done last year.

Moreover—and this is quite new—they are endeavouring to make a fuller use of the outside scientific resources in this country. They have recently formed at Oxford and Cambridge two air squadrons which, among other rôles, will serve to maintain the closest touch between the Air Force and the Air Ministry on the one hand and the scientists of the Universities on the other. By these means we hope to be able to enlist the assistance of the unrivalled scientific talent to be found in the Universities, to aid us in solving the many difficult problems of aeronautical research which confront us. These and other steps recently taken show clearly the intention of the Government to do everything possible to foster research by all means in their power.

In regard to civil aviation, the subsidies will undoubtedly increase from year 10 year. I am glad to say that expenditure on civil aviation in the coming year will be £105,000 higher than that provided for in the Air Estimates for 1925–26, and the provision for subsidies would have been materially larger had there been a full year's provision for the subsidy (£93,600 annual maximum) which we propose to pay for the operation of a regular fortnightly service between Cairo and Karachi. This new service, which will be in operation by the end of the current calendar year, will provide a most important link in our Imperial air communications. It is necessary to proceed slowly and carefully, as the noble Lord knows, in organising a service of this kind, and it is essential to see that it is inaugurated on the most favourable basis, that is, with first-class technical equipment. Imperial Airways, Ltd., who are to operate this service, are purchasing for it a number of three-engined machines of the most up-to-date type, which should ensure a high standard of punctuality and reliability.

Nor must it be thought that the expenditure shown specifically under civil aviation headings in Vote 8 of the Air Estimates completes the tale of expenditure on civil aviation. A sum of £362,000 is provided under other heads for airship development, and expenditure on airships is undoubtedly, for civil and commercial Imposes and the speeding up of our Imperial communications, of as great a value as it is for military purposes, if not greater. Much of the expenditure on research also, with which I have already dealt, is of value from the point of view of civil, just as much as from the point of view of Service aviation. I do not think there is very much more that I can tell the noble Lord. I hope I have answered all his questions. If I have not, would like to make it clear that it is not our wish to go on increasing the expense of civil aviation; that we want to get civil aviation on its legs as a really good commercial proposition and that when that time comes we shall be able to save the nation a great deal by no longer paying the subsidy.

LORD THOMSON

My Lords, I will net say that my curiosity has been entirely satisfied by the speech of the noble Duke, but I am exceedingly grateful to him for the information he has given, which goes a long way towards satisfying that curiosity. His observations in regard to research and civil aviation seemed to me more satisfactory than I at first imagined would be the case. I did not realise that this special section or department in the Air Ministry had been set up. It is a thing I always advocated, though I must confess that while I was Secretary of State I did not introduce it because there were no funds. In the circumstances, I ask permission of your Lordships to withdraw the Motion standing in my name.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.