§ LORD ARNOLD who had given Notice to call attention to the Treaty of Mutual 836 Guarantee initialled at Locarno on October 16, 1925, and annexed to the Final Protocol signed on that date and to move for Papers, said: My Lords, this Motion was placed upon the Paper last week in my name after negotiations had taken place with the Government through the usual channels and it was then understood that so far as I am concerned the Motion was merely formal. It was put down with a two-fold object: first, to acquaint your Lordships with the fact that a debate upon the Locarno Treaty was going to take place to-day; and, secondly, to elicit from the Government a statement regarding the Treaty upon which discussion would then take place. It was intimated that so far as the Front Opposition Bench is concerned the main contribution would be made by my noble and learned Leader subsequent to the Government statement. In these circumstances I do not propose to detain your Lordships at all; neither do I propose to move for Papers, though I if there are any further Papers which the Government feel that they could publish with regard to this Treaty, we should like to have them. That is really the history of this Motion so far as I am concerned, and I propose at once to ask the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, who I understand is to speak for the Government, if he will be good enough to make a statement to your Lordships upon the Locarno Treaty.
§ THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE EARL OF BALFOUR)My Lords, I am not very familiar with the procedure of your Lordships' House in so far as it differs from the procedure in another place to which I am more accustomed, but I cannot help thinking that there is a certain inconvenience in the method adopted by the noble Lord and his friends on the Opposition Front Bench in connection with this subject. Of course, if they have no questions to ask, if they have no criticisms to make, it does not matter when the Minister rises from this Bench to deal with the question of Locarno. But obviously if they have criticisms to make, if they have questions to ask, it is very unfortunate that I have to speak before those questions are put, without any opportunity at a later stage of dealing with any points that may arise in debate. However, I do not wish to press that. Noble Lords adopted the procedure which they have adopted with 837 a full knowledge of its consequences, and I may be allowed to infer from the course which they have taken that they have no very serious questions to ask, no very important criticisms to make.
Quite frankly, I am not in a position to add anything to what is familiar to all members of your Lordships' House. There was a very full debate in another place and a speech from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who speaks, inevitably and naturally, not only with a fulness of knowledge but with an authority on this subject to which I make no pretence; and his speech has no doubt been perused by all members of your Lordships' House. Besides that, I do not think there is any important public transaction in the region of foreign affairs on which there has been a more complete statement of the Government case and of all the facts relevant to a decision upon this most important issue. There never has been n case in which the Government have taken more into their confidence not only the House of Commons, not only your Lordships' House, not only the British public, but the public of Europe at large. Therefore I do not for a moment suggest that I have anything to say to your Lordships with which you are not all familiar; but as the. Front Opposition Bench desires some statement from Ministers I shall be glad to do my best to satisfy them.
If anybody wants to realise what the stage in the gradual healing of Europe is which is marked and caused by the Locarno Treaty let them, if they will, cast their minds back even a very few years, and ask themselves whether it was then conceivable that there should meet around an equal table the representatives of Germany, of Italy, of France, of Belgium and ourselves in friendliest converse, dealing with perfect sympathy and comprehension, and ultimately perfect agreement, with the difficult international problems which the Locarno Treaty embodies. Is it possible to conceive such an event taking place, if you put yourselves into the frame of mind in which the different States of Europe found themselves when other influences were at work, other statesmen were at the head of affairs, and when fear and hatred were almost the dominant missions that influenced the policy of some great nations?
838 When I say that the change has been great do not let me be supposed to suggest that there has been any great change in the movement of public opinion in this country. So far as I am able to estimate the opinions of my fellow countrymen and the actions of preceding Governments, they have always been anxious for appeasement. All in their several ways, and to the best of their abilities, and according to the opportunities that circumstances offered them, have striven for the same end for which we have striven in the Locarno Treaty; and indeed the work of the Treaty of Locarno is based largely upon previous work done by those who were in office before the present Government came into power. I speak not of British public opinion but of Continental public opinion, and I speak with perfect confidence, when I say that it is impossible to conceive the great work which has now, I hope, been accomplished, which certainly has been accomplished in substance and is about to be completed in form, being undertaken, or if undertaken being brought to a, satisfactory conclusion, in the spiritual conditions which prevailed, relatively speaking, but a few months ago. That is an immense change. It is a change infinitely for the better, and I cannot help thinking that the public instinct is not deceived when it regards the Treaty of Locarno as the symbol and the cause of a great amelioration in the public feeling of Europe, as the beginning of a new era, as the end of an old and evil state of things, as the first great step towards that international amity which scarcely differs more from a state of overt war than it differs from the moral bitterness which prevailed, uninterfered with and unchecked, for so many years after peace was nominally concluded.
I think I am not going too far when I say that this happy change, and this great feat of international statesmanship which has marked the change, is not merely due—I do not quite know how to put it—to overt circumstances, but is due even more to the tact, the temper and the statesmanship of the various representatives of the great European countries which met on equal terms at the round table at Locarno. It has been our good fortune to see the coincidence of the right men dealing 839 with a happy situation. That situation could easily have been spoiled. I believe that one man at Locarno, chosen at random, had he been there to wreck the proceedings could easily have done so. But all the men who met there had two immense advantages. They had the advantage of their own statesmanlike temper, their own earnest desire to see that Locarno should be a substantial success in the cause of international morality and international peace. They had that temper which does not regard suspicion of those with whom you deal as the beginning of wisdom. They had the art of inspiring each other with a well-founded confidence in their own honesty of purpose and their own intense desire to see a happy termination of their labours. They had not only those personal qualifications; but they had the advantage, without which their labours would indeed have been vain, that each of them felt that ho had behind him, broadly speaking, the unanimous opinion of the country which he represented. Therefore it is that at the round table at Locarno, over which neither suspicion, nor greed, nor hatred, nor undue ambition, nor fear found any place, these statesmen, meeting together with very different traditions behind them, animated by very different memories, yet found themselves able to agree cordially and wholeheartedly and without afterthought to the drawing up of this great document which I firmly believe marks the beginning of a great and new epoch of moral reconstruction in European countries.
I do not know that there are any criticisms which I ought to consider before I sit down. I am not going to describe the Treaty. I will not weary your Lordships by repeating what you all know well—its broad outlines, its general intention. They are familiar to every reader of newspapers, to every one who has listened to debates and to every one who has taken part in them. But there are two broad points on which, perhaps, I may say a word. The first relates to the League of Nations. It has been suggested, not indeed by noble Lords opposite who have so far suggested nothing, but by very distinguished people that, disguise it as you will, the Treaty of Locarno is really a blow aimed, not intentionally but in effect, at the 840 League of Nations, that the Treaty of Locarno, as it were, puts a side the League of Nations as the guardian of peace and the arbiter of harmony and substitutes for it what may be relatively described as a private arrangement between certain great Powers from which the League, excepting in name, is obviously and manifestly excluded. I think that is a complete and profound misapprehension. I do not wish to dwell unduly upon the fact, which must be obvious to everybody who has glanced at the documents which have been laid before your Lordships, who knows the terms in which the Treaty is couched and the tenour of the documents by which it is accompanied, that in every one of those documents, almost in every paragraph of those documents, the position of the League of Nations is recognised, the aid of the League of Nations is invoked, and every effort is obviously made by those concerned in framing the Treaty to maintain, indeed, to increase, the prestige, if possible, and to help the authority of the League of Nations.
It may be said, possibly: "Well, that is true as a matter of style. The League of Nations comes very well out of the negotiations at Locarno. As a matter of drafting, no institution could be more handsomely treated by the Powers concerned at Locarno than the League of Nations has been treated. But that, after all, is merely the surface aspect of the case. Essentially, and if you look at the inward character of what has been done, the Treaty of Locarno, whether intentionally or unintentionally, probably unintentionally, is a blow at the prestige, the position and the power of the League." I think that is a very profound and even dangerous mistake. We have to consider, of course, that the League of Nations, as it is at present constituted, is not in every respect the League of Nations as designed by its original framers. It differs from that original plan not merely because certain great nations have declined to belong to it, although the fact that certain great nations have declined to belong to it does make an important difference in certain aspects of the League's potential activity. I do not think it has made any difference in the work which the League has actually done, and nobody who has studied what the League has done will, 841 in my opinion, be inclined to underrate the immense and growing services which it is doing to international relations and civilised society. I believe that those benefits are enormous, and I do not think they could have been better performed even if all the nations of the world had, as was originally hoped and planned, made themselves Members of the League.
It is not, therefore, what has been done, or what is being done, which causes anxiety to those who, like myself, think that the future of the world and of civilisation very largely depends upon the prestige and the growing power of the League of Nations. Their anxiety is not due, as far as I am aware, to their thinking that the League has defeated the designs of its framers in the way it has carried out the functions entrusted to it. It may have made mistakes. I am not aware of any human institution, national or international, which does not make mistakes, but, broadly speaking, I boldly say that any man who will take the trouble—and very few critics of the League do take the trouble—to see what the League has done, and is doing, will, I am convinced, take the view that it is an immense, novel and effective addition to the machinery of international civilisation. But behind that conviction, and behind any knowledge which you can get from seeing what the League has done or is doing, there has always lurked the fear that, seeing that several great nations are not Members of the League, seeing that they are not bound in any way by pledges to the League or by Treaties, the time might come when one of them, two of them, or—put it as you like—all of them might show a complete indifference to League ideals, might show a profound contempt for the power of the League, and might undo in one reckless moment the fabric so laboriously and so successfully in process of being built up at Geneva.
It is impossible to deny that such a catastrophe was conceivable. Had all the nations of the world, as was hoped, been active and believing Members of the League from the beginning, I do not think that particular nightmare would ever have suggested itself to the prophets of evil, but as it is it could not help suggesting itself, and it had suggested itself, and many people who admired the League, who believed that 842 it was right in principle, who admitted that it was doing good work and looked forward to its doing still better work as time went on, nevertheless suggested (which is easy to conceive) a strain being put upon the machinery of the League which would break it, and then all the labour world be thrown away. I do not say whether such a danger existed or did not exist. What I say is that it was thought to exist, undoubtedly it was thought to exist. That danger, be it real or be it imaginary, can only be cured or dealt with by considering a situation which, I hope and believe, is temporary, by looking around and seeing now where in the community of nations is this danger which I have indicated most likely to arise, or likely at, all to arise, and then dealing with that danger to the best of your ability. I will not say that that is all that has been done, but it is one of the things which have been done at Locarno. Undoubtedly it would be mere affectation to deny that the international relations in the west of Europe and the centre or Europe did give rise to this anxiety in many minds, to this anxious foreboding of which I have spoken, but I believe they have been completely put an end to so far as the great belligerents are concerned by the Treaty of Locarno; in other words, to use a phrase which has been in evidence in these debates, it has underpinned what is temporarily the weakest part of the League of Nations.
They have, I believe, found a remedy for the sort of evil which I have indicated. They have quite rightly stilled the fears of even the most timorous. They have given us a genuine security in the future which will not merely, as I think, prevent great nations coming to overt acts of hostility, but will, by putting that possibility altogether on one side, produce an atmosphere in which international amity may again grow up, and in which infinite possibilities of good will may find their completion and their consummation. If I am right, if I have not over-coloured my picture, if I have not over-stated my case, can there conceivably be a greater service, both to the League and to all the nations who are represented in the League, than the policy which finds its consummation in Locarno? The League are perfectly aware of what service Locarno does them. They passed a resolution clearly showing their approval of 843 the course which has been adopted. They are met by the very terms of the Treaty of Locarno, they are brought in at every stage to assist, they are perfectly conscious of the importance of the rôle they are asked to play, and it seems to me that no man who knows what the League of Nations is, how it works, the magnitude of its labours, the difficulty of its labours, but will agree with the League itself in thinking that the Treaty of Locarno, so far from being an attack upon the League, is one of the most valuable supports which the League has ever received.
If you say to me: "Well, cannot you imagine an international system in which such arrangements as those embodied in the Treaty of Locarno would find no place, in which all the work of preserving the peace would be thrown upon the League of Nations, unassisted by subsidiary international arrangements? "—of course I answer in the affirmative I can easily conceive it. If you allow yourself to look forward to a time when every great nation will be a willing and a for rent adherent of the League of Nations and the principles embodied in the League of Nations, and engaged in practising those principles, I think it is quite likely that such arrangements as are embodied in the Treaty of Locarno will become entirely antiquated, wholly superfluous, and will in the future be looked upon as being merely a necessary stage in the general peaceful evolution of mankind. And no one would rejoice more than the authors of the Treaty of Locarno at such a consummation.
But meanwhile we are wise to take facts as we find them, and to embody in the subsidiary Treaties arrangements which might have been unnecessary had the League of Nations embraced the whole world. As things are they are necessary, and could not, I think, have been carried out more admirably than they have been carried out in the Treaty which is now under discussion. It is a great feat in international statesmanship. I do not think I am misled by national vanity in saying that this country and the Government, which in this respect at all events if in no other does represent the whole country, has taken a very notable part in carrying out a great common work. They could not indeed have carried it out alone. They could not have carried it out 844 unless they had found among all their colleagues a spirit like unto their own, which has enabled each country assembled at Locarno to make its necessary and invaluable contribution, its irreplaceable contribution, to the common work.
I do not think it is necessary for me to say anything more upon the Treaty itself, but I may be allowed to say one word about a matter which has caused a good deal of discussion in another place and in the newspapers with regard to the position of the British Empire as distinguished from the Government of the United Kingdom in this matter. I shall not deal with it in any detail, and if there are questions to be asked about it I hope noble Lords opposite will address them to the Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, who is perfectly well acquainted with all the facts and capable of dealing with them. At the moment I will confine myself to one or two general observations.
The criticism, of course, is that the British Empire as a whole took no part in the debates at Locarno, has expressed no formal agreement with the results of Locarno, and is not bound by the Treaty of Locarno. I do not for a moment deny that that, so far as it goes and in itself, is an unsatisfactory state of things; but it is a state of things which I trust we are in process of remedying—I do not mean an immediate process, but that all Governments are anxious to remedy it—and that in the evolution of the British Empire we shall find a remedy. I do not know that the remedy will be complete. I do not know that it is possible to get the sort of unity in the British Empire which is possible in other great States whose geographical conditions are different, whose constitutional position is different, who live under centralised governments and who belong rather to an older order of things. But though it is a matter for regret it is not a matter for shame that our Empire is less closely knit, less formally organised than the Empires of other States. We are engaged in an entirely new experiment in the world's history in empire building. We have slid into the position, as we have slid into other positions, by dealing with the difficulties and problems as they have arisen, until one day we awoke and said: "This is quite a new thing which we have almost in- 845 stinctively created. How are we to turn it to the best account?" There have been great Empires in the world before the British Empire was born or thought of, but there has never been an Empire in the least resembling the constitution of the British Empire, nor has there ever been an Empire which has had to face, because of that very fact, problems so novel and so difficult.
If you read the history of the United States of America you will realise the immense difficulties which the founders of the American Constitution came across when they attempted to deal with thirteen different States and weld them into the great American State which we know to-day. Their difficulties were great. We praise their triumphs. But their difficulties were nothing to the difficulties which British statesmen and Dominion statesmen are faced with; and it is foolish to suppose that, out of this slow-growing organization—the result almost of the instincts of our people more than their deliberate and set design—difficulties may not arise between these different communities, separated by half the globe in some cases but still sharing a common tradition, sharing largely common blood, sharing the same constitutional ideals, speaking the same language, obeying similar laws, but nevertheless each with its own centralised life, with its own special difficulties, each faced with its different problems and with different versions of the same problem.
The difficulties are immense, and they come out in their most forcible aspect when you are dealing with such a situation as the Government had to deal with when faced with the problems of Locarno. We did everything we could to obtain direct consultation with the Dominions. We took care that they were acquainted with everything that happened and were made acquainted with all the phases of British policy. We could do no more; nor could they have done any more. I am sure they are as anxious as we are to work with the Mother Country but, of course, the geographical divisions which embarrass us embarrass them as well, and it is perfectly true that the Locarno Treaty does not show the British Empire as the unity which, practically, it undoubtedly is, and it is the mere fact that it has been found impossible on this 846 occasion, as it was on a previous occasion impossible, to treat it as other States are treated, as other States, more centralised and under a wholly different Constitution, have been treated and were capable of being treated in the past.
But if anybody asks me—and I am sorry for this excursus into constitutional speculations, which is longer than I intended—if anybody asks me whether I have any misgiving as to the results of the fact that the Dominions are not bound more than they choose to be bound by the Locarno Treaty, I say that I have not. I am perfectly certain, in the first place, that it will be realised throughout the King's Dominions that this was a great effort on the part of the Home Government to secure peace, and I am equally sure that there is no interest which the Dominions possess and are more deeply conscious of than the necessity of preserving peace. In the second place, they will see, if ever war is forced upon this country because it is carrying out the spirit and the letter of the Locarno Treaty, that the whole of the moral forces of the world will be behind us, that the war will be obviously, on the face of it, a defensive war, and that, equally obviously, it will be a war intended to check brutal and unnecessary aggression. Not merely all the feelings of patriotism, not merely all the feelings of common kinship will move the Dominions to sympathise with the Mother Country, but also all the elements of the higher morality to which they are singularly alive.
There is, I think, a third result to be expected. They will realise that this war, unjust as regards the conduct of our opponents, unprovoked from the very nature of the case, is a war in which the very existence of the Mother Country and of the Empire is really involved. There can be no war under the Treaty of Locarno in Western Europe which is not both an unjust war and a war which menaces the very heart of the Empire. If they realise all those things—and they will realise them—let nobody tell me that, so long as the British Empire exists, it will not act as a single body when that great moment comes and that we shall not see in the future, as we have seen in tie past, an absolutely united Empire, joined together, working with a single purpose for a single end 847 in the cause of peace and in the cause of public international morality. Therefore there is no aspect of the Treaty of Locarna which I regard with doubt or with misgivings. Whether I look at it from the point of view of the British Empire, or from the point of view of international peace, or from the even higher point of view of international amity, it seems to me to be one of the greatest steps ever taken to lift the community of nations out of the slough of difficulties into which it had sunk and to open out for ourselves and for our posterity a happier era than any to which, a few years ago, I had dared to look forward.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEMy Lords, in the statement which the noble Earl has made he began with something that sounded a little like a complaint. He asked, in effect, why we did not put down criticisms and specific questions to which he could address himself. But it was not for the sake of criticism or for the sake of specific questions that we put down this Motion. It is the practice of this House not to be content with statements that have been made in the other House. On that subject we are sensitive in this House, and the noble Earl will find as time goes on that one thing that we insist on, if I may use the expression, more almost than any other is that we should have statements to ourselves from Ministers of the Crown. It does not follow that such statements are bare repetitions. They can usefully be made with variations and as affording fresh information.
The noble Earl seemed to think that we wished to make some specific criticism of that which has happened at Locarno. For a very good reason we did not. Locarno has just begun; it is the beginning and not the end of wisdom. It is on the working out and, it may be, on the working out within the next few weeks, of that which has happened there that we shall have to pass judgment, and until we have the materials it would obviously be unwise to embark upon any criticism. The last thing that we wish is to be unappreciative of the work done by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He went to Locarno and there he displayed tact and—a thing that is held to be of great importance in this 848 country—character also; and when you have tack and character combined you are very strongly armed for diplomatic negotiations. He negotiated, and he negotiated with men who, so approached, turned out to be of the same mind as himself, and the result is the happy agreement which was arrived at. But that agreement is only the beginning of a long series of things.
The noble Earl did one thing for which I was grateful to him. He gave us an indication of the spirit in which we are conducting our communications with the Dominions upon this subject. Under the Treaty the right of the Dominions to assent or dissent is reserved. We shall hear in course of time what they think, and I find nothing at all to complain of in the spirit which the noble Earl indicated as the spirit in which we should approach the matter. You cannot too strongly realise that the way to deal with the Dominions is not to ask them to appoint the Foreign Secretary to conduct negotiations for them and to bind them. The right way is to inform them as swiftly and as closely as you can of everything of which you can tell them, and then leave them to judge. There is a much more powerful motive than any consideration of Empire that moves them, and that is the real community of purpose which they have with the Mother Country. Experience has shown that the more we have trusted to them, the more we Have acknowledged the full freedom of the Dominions in diplomatic negotiations and everything else, the closer the tie between us has grown, and I trust that this spirit, which was the spirit which the noble Earl indicated, will continue to be pursued and that nothing may occur to interrupt it.
Freedom is a great asset, a great conciliator. I have always thought that the Declaration of Independence was the most important event in promoting good relations between ourselves and: the United States, and without that Declaration I do not know where we should have been to-day. Given that Declaration, given the complete liberty which it brought, our relations are excellent; and, in quite another way, the same thing is true of the Dominions. They are Dominions, they are Governments under the King, and they must study the interests of their own people, and so long as they feel that the interests of 849 their own people lie together with the keeping up of the community of sentiment and interest which now attaches, all will be well.
I say these two things because, first of all, I am anxious to make it clear that I am making no criticism upon the way in which the Foreign Secretary conducted the negotiations. On the contrary, I think the country owes him a debt of gratitude, and I am satisfied with what the noble Earl said about the Dominions, but only one thing will I say in that connection, and this has a wider application than merely the Dominions. We are only at the beginning. Locarno is admirable so far as it goes. The marriage has taken place but we are not through the honeymoon, and even during the honeymoon disturbances may arise. We cannot tell. But it would have been of great interest to us if the noble Earl could have told us something about the attitude at this moment of Germany. Germany, obviously, has difficulties. So far as I can judge, Germany wishes 1o come, in the spirit of Locarno, into the League of Nations, and I think it will be a, great misfortune for the world if that does not take place. But we do not know. I am not sure that His Majesty's Government know very much more than we do, but at any rate they do not give us any information upon that point. It would have been interesting if the noble Earl could have done so.
The Treaty of Locarno is spoken of as if it were a Treaty that stands by itself, but it is one of a group of seven Treaties, some of which are of very different orders. First of all there is the Treaty of Mutual Guarantees. Then there is the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium, which is very important, as I read it, and I hope a beneficial one Then there is the Arbitration Convention between France and Germany—again of the utmost importance, bringing as it does the principle of arbitration to bear. Next there is the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, which is very good, as I read it, and there is another between Germany and Czechoslovakia, which is of the same order. Then I come to two others, one between France and Poland and the other between France and Czecho-Slovakia. I am not complaining of those, because the most foolish thing is to criticise your 850 neighbours when you do not know the circumstances which led to their action; but these, are Treaties which lie outside the character of the group of five to which I first referred, and they are Treaties which conceivably may make things hereafter not look BO smooth as they do at the present time. I am not saying that they could have been avoided—I am not sure that they could have been—but still there they are, Treaties of another order. Speaking for myself I look forward to the time when Germany will be in the League of Nations, and under a set of Treaties from none of which she will be excluded and in all of which she will have an interest. This has not come about yet with regard to these two last Treaties, and I hope that certain circumstances will make, these two last Treaties much less important than they seem to be to-day.
The noble Earl referred to the League of Nations. If ho thought that there was any notion on these Benches that the League of Nations had been damaged by the Locarno arrangements, I think he was in error. You have only to read through the Treaties to see what a large part the League plays in them. If they succeed, the part of the League of Nations will be more important than ever before in the world. The principle of arbitration—of referring disputes—is developed, and I do not think we can forecast what changes may take place for the better in the adjustment between the nations concerned. For my part I dislike extremely the confession of guilt which was thrust into the Treaty of Versailles, in which Germany was made to acknowledge her sins. That was not got out at Locarno and I do not suppose it would be wise to suggest it should be got out, but it is not a thing which makes for smoothness, and I hope that one of the good results of the new orientation of affairs will be to make words of this sort seem less important. The noble Earl did not touch on any of these things, and possibly he was wise in not doing so, but he will understand how there was a certain curiosity in our minds, and a certain hope that he might have something to say about the things with which he did not deal.
The noble Earl's speech was rather a pæan of praise of Locarno, and if he had confined that strictly to the spirit in 851 which the Treaty was entered into, and had said: This is the beginning of wisdom and not the end, and now we shall see in the next six months how things work out, and then if in six months you put down another motion we shall be able to tell you a great number of things—not so nice, perhaps, but a great deal more numerous—I should have been more interested in the speech of the noble Earl, which, like all his speeches, was admirable in form. As things stand, 'however, I resume my seat feeling not much more wise than before I rose about the Treaty of Locarno, and I altogether disclaim the idea that we should put down hypothetical questions directed to situations which may never arise, and which I trust never will, but which if they do arise will have to be the subject of further comment.
§ VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODONMy Lords, I do not rise in any spirit of controversy with regard to anything that the noble Earl said, but I should like to support the remarks which Lord Haldane has already made on the subject of procedure in this House. I am not, any more than the noble Earl opposite, an authority on procedure in this House, and I still observe procedure in this House very much from the point of view of one the greater part of whose public life has been spent in the House of Commons. I do not know, however, that on Foreign Affairs, at any rate, the procedure in this House should be so very different from procedure in the House of Commons. The Locarno Treaties are, I think, the biggest things that have happened in foreign affairs since the Armistice, and in the House of Commons the debate was initiated by a statement—a very full statement—from Mr. Austen Chamberlain.
When the noble Earl opposite told us this afternoon that he thought there was a certain inconvenience in his speaking first, because Mr. Austen Chamberlain had already made so full a statement on behalf of the Government in the House of Commons, I could not help reflecting, somewhat sadly, that unless the House of Commons had changed very much since I was a member of it, supposing the Government there had refused to open a debate by making a statement on so important a matter, on the ground that a full statement had been already made 852 in the House of Lords, there would have been considerable commotion in the House of Commons. It would, of course, be an affectation not to admit that your Lordships' House does not in many respects perform anything like such important functions in the Constitution as the House of Commons does, nor has it anything like the same powers. But so long as your Lordships' House does perform useful functions in the Constitution I think that the question of foreign affairs is one of those subjects on which the prestige and dignity of your Lordships' House should be preserved, and it cannot be preserved unless on very important occasions, when a day is named for discussion in your Lordships' House, the discussion is opened by an authoritative statement from some member of the Government. I only want to make that remark on the general question of procedure.
On the Locarno Treaties I do not wish to weary your Lordships by repeating things that other people have said or that I myself may have said elsewhere, but I should like to say a word or two on the subject of the Dominions. At least one very uncomfortable speech has been made in the Dominions on the subject of the Locarno Treaties, the speech by General Smuts not so very long ago. I recognise fully, and I think the Dominions themselves must recognise, that there are very great difficulties in consultation about foreign policy. Every effort ought to be made to overcome those difficulties, and in this instance I dare say the Government have done all that could be done, but I would just suggest that before the Government went to Locarno they might have sent—and perhaps they did send—a full explanation to the Dominions of why the Locarno Conference was necessary, what was the policy which the Government intended to pursue at Locarno, and what it was that they hoped would be achieved there. Perhaps that was done. I only put it forward as an instance of the sort of method that might be pursued. Now that the Locarno Treaties are or will soon be an accomplished fact, I do not suggest that pressure should be put upon the Dominions to become parties to those Treaties if they have doubts, but I assume that explanations have been made, and indeed the debates have done a great deal to explain to the Dominions what are the merits of 853 the Treaties that have been agreed to, and to put them, in as full possession as we in this country are of the considerations which induced the Government to sign those Treaties and which make us attach such favourable importance to them.
On that point I would make one suggestion, which seems to me worth pointing out to the Dominions, as to why they must not regard these Locarno Treaties as if they had no obligations in Europe at all—they already have obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is not as if adhering or not adhering to the Locarno Treaties was going to make all the difference as to whether a self-governing Dominion had any obligations with regard to the Treaties or not. They all have adhered to the Covenant of the League, and they all therefore have potential European obligations under the Covenant of the League. It will therefore, I think, be worth while explaining to the Dominions exactly in what, respect they have obligations under the Locarno Treaties which they have not got under the Covenant.
I would put it this way: that they have already obligations under the Covenant, that those obligations might in certain circumstances assume a serious form, and that one of the reasons why we welcome the Locarno Treaties is that we consider that by bringing Germany into the League and by bringing France and Germany into political agreement with each other, placing them in the same diplomatic camp, the prospect of disagreeable obligations in Europe arising under the Covenant is very much diminished, and the Locarno Treaties, whether the Dominions become parties to them or not, will in our opinion diminish the risk which the Dominions already run of having to take serious action under the Covenant of the League, which they might find very disagreeable and burdensome. That is one point of view from which I regard the Locarno Treaties. They immensely strengthen the League of Nations, and, while strengthening the Covenant, they also very much diminish the risk that the obligations which we have already undertaken under the Covenant might become serious and embarrassing in Europe They do it by bringing Germany into the League and by bringing France and Germany, whose 854 quarrels have been the focus and origin of so many wars in Europe, into the same diplomatic camp.
On the other aspects of the question I would only endorse most warmly what has been said by the noble and learned Viscount about the value of the part taken by Mr. Austen Chamberlain. I subscribe to the utmost to what has been said about the value of his personal qualities at the Conference, and when the noble Earl was saying how fortunate the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs had been in the personalities of those, whom he met at Locarno I am sure those who met him at Locarno are equally enthusiastic and whole hearted in feeling that to the part he played with them was greatly due the success of the whole Conference, just us the noble Earl very rightly admits that the success of the Conference was due to the representatives of other nations besides our own. In fact, so far as the personal part is concerned, I regard it as a most welcome thing that, when Mr. Austen Chamberlain returned to this country from Locarno he brought home to us, not only these Treaties which had been, initialled there, but the confidence of all the foreign colleagues with whom he had worked—a confidence which, so long as he remains at the Foreign Office, is bound to be fruitful in carrying on the work which was begun at Locarno.
I will not labour obvious points—the value of Germany's entering the League and of France and Germany coming together—but I would like to say a word or two about the spirit of Locarno. It has become a commonplace, but not the less important or true because it has beer so often repeated, that the spirit of Locarno is more important than the Treaties themselves. I think that by "the spirit, of Locarno" one of the things that we mean is this, that the desire to secure future peace has got a greater hold on the nations who were represented at Locarno than it ever had before. Before 1914 peace was on the lips of everybody, and peace, I think, was in the minds and intentions at any rate of most people. Whether it was in the minds and intentions of everybody is, of course, a matter of propaganda and counter-propaganda, and will continue to be so. But I think there was something more than an intellectual conviction at 855 Locarno as to the value of the work they were doing. I think there was, if one may use the expression, a conviction of the feelings, there was something like enthusiasm—not, I think, at the beginning of the Conference, for a more important thing was that it seemed to grow up after the Conference began—a sort of enthusiasm in those who took part in it, which meant that their feelings and emotions were engaged in the work which they were doing.
In all human relationships, whether it be between friends or whether it be between nations, it is a most valuable bond if the emotions are engaged in a feeling that they are co-operating in an end which they desire. That is more than a merely intellectual co-operation, and it seems to me that part of the spirit of Locarno is that there was a touch of feeling and emotion, an enthusiasm about it which I do not remember to have occurred in any previous international Conference. Indeed, I think Locarno differed from previous Conferences in that it was not a question, as on so many occasions since the War, of rights on one side and obligations on another. It was not, as international Conferences so often are, a Conference where nations meet who know perfectly well that they come there desiring different things and who argue together in order that they may arrive at an agreement which, as they desire different things, is, of course, a compromise. Locarno was quite different from that. It seems to me that those who met there came to feel that they were all desiring the same thing and pursuing the same end. They had not come there to adjust differences, to settle separate national interests, and to balance them one against the other. They had come there to pursue a common object which each believed to be the paramount interest of them all.
What was that object? That object was to avoid war in future; to settle all disputes between them by some method other than war. It was much more than settling any frontier question. It was to put into practice the principle of settling disputes by some method other than war. One of the things which is most valuable is that, so far as human documents can avoid it, we shall not have a difference of opinion, if war breaks out in Europe, as to who is the aggressor. For those 856 who are parties to it the League of Nations acts, and will act, as a test in settling who is the aggressor such as we have never had before in international affairs. In the dispute between Greece and Bulgaria the other day each maintained that the other was the aggressor. The League of Nations provided the touchstone. The question as to who was the aggressor did not depend on the statements of either of them. Once the test of their observing their obligations under the Covenant of the League and putting their dispute before the machinery of the League was applied, the one who refused to do that ipso facto became the aggressor. As I understand the Locarno Treaties, they do that in the most specific form, not only for Germany and France, but for Germany and all her neighbours. They are most valuable documents to have in the international affairs of Europe.
I would like to say a word on what the noble Earl opposite said about the part which the Government preceding the present one had in bringing this about. The Labour Government found Reparations the acute question in Europe. As long as the question of Reparations remained unsettled it was a barrier to a political settlement. They were parties, and the handling of the subject by their Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary contributed considerably, I believe, to getting a settlement of the Reparations question and thereby preparing the way for a political agreement. Then they proceeded to the Protocol. I have never been so critical of the Protocol as some people have been; but the present Government felt themselves bound to reject the Protocol. The fact that they felt themselves bound to reject the Protocol and the fact that the Protocol was in favour with many nations of Europe and was rejected, was, by itself, a step towards doing something to take the place of the Protocol. As I have never been very critical of the Protocol, though I have always thought it would require some reservations or amendments before we could accept it, I would suggest that if the Locarno Treaties, though of less scope and less ideal than the Protocol, bring Germany into the League of Nations they will really be a more effective step forward than anything like the 857 Protocol, however ideal, would have been, unless it had simultaneously brought Germany into the League. That is a point worth bearing in mind in comparing the Locarno Treaties and the Geneva Protocol.
Mr. Austen Chamberlain said the other day that this was the beginning and not the end. We all feel the truth of that remark. Just let us consider what is to follow Locarno. Something has followed Locarno already which was not in the Treaties at all. Apparently at Locarno, though the Locarno Treaties had nothing to do with the Treaty of Versailles, there was an expectation that one of the fruits of the Locarno Treaties would be an evacuation of Cologne and certain alleviations in the occupation of the Rhineland. As far as I can gather, those fruits have already appeared. As I understand, though I know it only through the Press, Germany has undoubtedly recognised that the Locarno Treaties have borne fruit already in something which was entirely outside the scope of the Treaties themselves. That is one thing of which Locarno has been the beginning, and if the spirit of the Locarno Treaties is maintained after they are completed I am sure they will bear still further fruit in softening that occupation and, perhaps, bringing it to an end altogether before the final and latest date fixed by the Treaty of Versailles. Anyhow, something has been done in that direction already.
Another thing which is necessary if that spirit of Locarno is to continue is that there should be good faith on the part of Germany with regard to the disarmament obligations. Again, so far as we understand, the Conference of Ambassadors and Germany have practically come to an agreement on that point. Good faith on the part of Germany as well as the preservation of a conciliatory spirit on the part of the Allies is necessary to the getting of the full value out of the Locarno Treaties. But assuming that Germany has kept her obligations for disarmament, there remains a further step forward. If Germany keeps her obligations as to disarmament, the other countries who are parties to the Locarno Treaties should also proceed to the reduction of armaments. Just as Reparations barred the way to a political agreement which should include France and Ger- 858 many, so I think the want of a political agreement and the want of the feeling of security which a political agreement might have produced barred the way to any reduction of armaments.
I understand—I have not verified the reference—that when very strict obligations were imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles to remain unarmed, or comparatively unarmed, part of the reason and justification for that obligation was that it would free her neighbours from the burden of excessive armaments. The wry has been cleared for some advance towards the reduction of armaments and I hope that in the course of a few years—I am not pressing for things in a hurry, because I realise that Locarno itself could not have been brought about had we been over-anxious and over-pressing to reach a political agreement of that kind before the time was ripe for it—just as it is one of the satisfactory things about Locarno that those who were parties to the war met there on equal terms, so we may arrive at a reduction of armaments on the part of Germany's neighbours which will make it appear that if Germany remains with limited armaments it is not because an inequality has been imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles, but because the fact that she remains disarmed and has entered into those Treaties has enabled other nations to reduce their armaments also. Thus the reduction of armaments will cease to have an invidious appearance in respect of one Power because they will all be on equal terms.
Although I might have gone a little more into detail about that, I do not think that I have gone beyond what Mr. Chamberlain himself said with regard to the prospects of a reduction of armaments and the influence which Locarno may have on the reduction of armaments. I do think that Locarno may be the beginning of a feeling of security in Europe such as has never been known before, and it may well be that only one of its results will be the reduction of armaments. It was the piling up of armaments in Europe before the War which made the War, some people may say inevitable, at any rate so near, and it always must be so. So long as Europe is covered with powder magazines there will never be a feeling of security simply because people have come to an agree- 859 ment not to put a match to those powder magazines, it is essential that materials for making war should be reduced in amount if there is to be a secure peace. We have been in a vicious circle about armaments. It is fear which produces armaments. Armaments in Europe, I think one may say, have always been materialised animosity, or materialised fear, but mainly fear. Until you can get rid of the fear you cannot get rid of the armaments, and so long as the armaments go on they lead to more fear, so that the circle is an exceedingly vicious one.
Now the whole question of the future is—I put it hopefully—will these recurring Treaties be so fruitful that they will undermine that sense of fear in Europe and remove it? I think the mere signing of them will do something, but it will mean a few years of showing the spirit of Locarno, the enthusiasm that was felt there, the belief that the preservation of peace in Europe, the settlement of disputes in Europe, by some methods other than war is such a paramount national interest of everybody that no separate national interest should be pressed at any conference to a point that was likely to damage that paramount interest—it is that alone which can remove the fear which has caused armaments. Locarno at any rate has done this much. It has diminished the chance, if not indeed made it impossible, of Europe finding itself growing divided into two opposite diplomatic camps. It has brought the nations who are parties to it, including France and Germany, into the same diplomatic camp, and it has brought them into the same diplomatic camp not against any other nation, not in a way which excludes any other nation. It is open to any other nation to gain admittance, provided that it has the one qualification of real good will to peace and believes that the preservation of peace is its interest as well as that of Europe. Locarno gives us the first hope that we have yet had, I think, since the Armistice that something has been set on foot which may grow in strength, and get so into the feelings of nations in their dealings with each other that it may undermine that sense of fear which has really been at the root of armaments and at the root of previous causes of war in Europe.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, there has been in this debate 860 practically no criticism of the action of His Majesty's Government except, if one may dignify it by the name of criticism, a certain comment upon what the noble and learned Viscount opposite thought was a complaint by my noble friend (the Earl of Balfour) that he was called upon to begin the debate, or practically so, and as that was repeated by the noble Viscount who has just sat down, perhaps I may be allowed to say one word upon it. I am quite sure your Lordships will believe that I am immensely pleased that noble Lords opposite should be so anxious to maintain the full privileges of your Lordships' House. I wish in past times they had always been animated by that feeling. It is certainly a matter of great satisfaction, and one in which I entirely share their views, that there is no subject upon which the country expects enlightenment from your Lordships' House so much as on the subject of foreign affairs, notably because there sit in this House so many noble Lords who are great authorities on the subject. It is, amongst other things, of the greatest importance that the country should know what the noble Viscount opposite thinks of any question of foreign affairs, and any opportunity which he gets of addressing your Lordships ought to be eagerly availed of. I am quite sure your Lordships will believe that my noble friends and myself will do everything we can to further that object, but I should like to say, as the matter has been made a subject of comment, that the more usual practice of raising debates in either House of Parliament is for the critics to begin.
There is, I admit, in this case no criticism, and I expect that is the reason why noble Lords did not wish to begin. It is quite true that it would be treating your Lordships with scant courtesy if there was any desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to withhold any subject from your Lordships' consideration, and there is no idea of any such thing in the minds of any of us. But, after all, we are very practical people in your Lordships' House. The noble Viscount who has just sat down used the phrase: "I do not propose to weary your Lordships by repeating what has been said by other people." My noble friend beside me did not propose to weary your Lordships by repeating what had been said by 861 Mr. Austen Chamberlain in another place. As I have just remarked, we are practical men, and what we want to do is to address ourselves to the subject, and what we can do and what we always do is to approach the subject not merely by repeating what has gone before but in order to add something fresh and useful. Noble Lords who have spoken in this debate are eminently qualified to do so; therefore it seemed good to us to suggest that if there was any matter in the policy of His Majesty's Government which had not been explained in another place, or had not been explained in a form that was acceptable to noble Lords, then any comment They wished to make they should make here. That would in no way have restrained ray noble friend from making a, speech, but would have had the effect of directing his remarks into those channels which were most interesting to the House. That is what he desired to do. After this great effort on the part of the Opposition, I think the speeches have shown that there are certain subjects upon which my noble friend might hav3 been able to enlarge if he had only known that they were to be raised. But, as noble Lords opposite preferred that my noble friend should begin, he was, of course, perfectly willing to do so.
I should have been content to have left the matter there. So far as we are concerned, we certainly do not desire to deprive your Lordships of any opportunity which the other House possesses of debating these great subjects, especially subjects connected with foreign affairs. But there was one, piece of comment—I will not call it criticism—by the noble Viscount who has just sat down which does require to be cleared up. If I understood him aright he made it a subject of criticism that the Dominions had not been more fully informed of the policy which His Majesty's Government intended to pursue at Locarno. If I am misinterpreting him he will correct me.
§ VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODONI said I did not know, and I shall be glad to get information as to what was done.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI can only repeat what was said by Mr. Chamberlain in another place, and perhaps I might be allowed to recite what he did say:—
We did seek a conference with the Dominions and India before we announced 862 our policy with respect to the Protocol, and that not merely for the purpose of deciding what was to be done with the Protocol, about which all the Governments of the Empire were in agreement, but because we simply could not turn down the Protocol and leave nothing in its place, and because there must be an alternative policy which we must adopt,That is to say, the Government would wish to have a Conference with the Dominions not merely on the Protocol, which it was agreed by all the Governments of the Empire we could not accept, but also upon the policy which was to take its place. That is the policy which your Lordships are discussing this evening. Mr. Chamberlain explained that we should have wished to have that Conference. He went m to say:—I do not for one moment criticise the Dominion Governments which were unable at a moment's notice to come and meet us in conference. But the affairs of the world do not stand still.They could not meet us; and we were very sorry. We should have been most anxious if it could have been carried into effect. I think that will, be a sufficient answer to the noble Lord.
§ LORD PARMOORMy Lords, I should like to say one word in answer to what the noble Marquess has said as regards the position of the Colonies and Dominions. The question of the Locarno Treaty began, and was initialed by Germany, in February last. Surely there was time between February and the succeeding six months, not perhaps for a personal conference between the Colonial Ministers and ourselves but at least to have had communication with them in order to show that we were prepared to consult them on important matters of this kind and at the same time to ascertain what their opinion might be. I yield to no one in my desire that the good feeling, which has been so well pointed out by the noble Earl, should be maintained between the commonwealth countries which form the British Empire. It is not only in South Africa that comments have been made. Remarks have been made in another of our great Dominions, Canada; and on this footing—not in the least antagonistic to us—that so far as possible, if there is to be a common foreign policy such as we all agree is desirable from every point of view, every opportunity should be taken to consult with the Dominions beforehand in order that their views might be ascertained.
863 I do not, of course, go beyond that. The question is whether in this case the opportunities which, in fact, arose were taken advantage of and whether, between February and the meeting at Locarno, negotiations might not have been opened in order that the Dominions might have had full information as to what our policy would be, and their opinion asked as to whether they were in support of it or not. I am not going beyond that point because I think the question of the future position of the Dominions and Commonwealths in the matter of foreign policy requires very careful consideration indeed. It is a difficult matter. It is not an easy matter at all, and I lay this down at any rate, that whenever it is possible and as far as it is possible I hope opportunities will be taken to consult beforehand; that is, before a policy is confirmed. I understand that the noble Marquess opposite agrees with me.
There is one matter which has not been considered this afternoon with regard to the position of the Colonies. It is quite true that they are under no obligation to come to our assistance, but under the principles of international law should this country be engaged in war they would be in the position of belligerents. That cannot be helped. It is part of the position, because His Majesty the King is the head of the Executives of the Mother Country and of our Dominions. I do not know that in this case the matter is likely to be of much importance, but one can never tell what the future will bring. It is one of the points which we certainly ought to bear in mind when we consider any general resettlement of the relationship of the Dominions on matters of foreign policy, and the great desirability of giving them full opportunity to express their opinions beforehand and not leaving it open on such occasions for them to express the view that they cannot regard themselves as bound because they should have been taken into consultation in the first instance.
§ THE PARLIAMENTARYUNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS(THE EARL OF CLARENDON)My Lords, I have no desire to prolong this debate, but as the noble Lord opposite has specifically asked a further question some answer from His Majesty's Government is necessary. I should like to say quite definitely that the Dominion 864 Governments from time to time have been kept fully apprised of the general policy of His Majesty's Government on this subject. I am correct in stating that the representatives of the Dominions at Geneva were very fully so informed. I think it must be realised that in all matters of this kind, when decisions have to be taken at a moment's notice, it is impossible when fresh points crop up, as they did at Locarno, to communicate with and receive answers from the Dominions thousands of miles away, but I might say that so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned the suggestion has been made to the Dominions that all these matters might be the subject of discussion at the next Imperial Conference when it takes place. The Foreign Secretary, in another place, distinctly stated that he hoped the Imperial Conference would not be delayed too long. I think that answers the first point raised by the noble Lord. The latter point is a subject which, I suggest, could be dealt with at the Imperial Conference. With regard to the points raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, His Majesty's Government will consider the question of putting them forward in any future communications with the Dominions.