SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE.

HL Deb 01 July 1925 vol 61 cc892-923

LORD THOMSON rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give any information as to the proposed base at Singapore; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, on the last occasion when the Singapore base was debated in your Lordships' House I was absent in the United States on purely private business, and therefore could not take part. So, in a way, I owe an apology for taking up the time of your Lordships' House with the Motion that stands in my name. However, as the question is a very complex one and involves all manner of issues, strategical, financial, political and moral, and as, moreover, it is a subject of perennial interest and is likely to be so in the future, I feel justified in returning to the charge, so to speak. I have read all the debates on this subject and will endeavour to avoid vain repetitions, but I am afraid there will be some.

With a view of eliciting information—and that really is my principal object—I have submitted a list of five questions in writing to His Majesty's Government, and with these I will deal first. I will amplify those questions and try, so far as possible, to explain their purport and w hat was in my mind when I put them. In the King's Speech of last November the reference to the Singapore base concludes with the following words: to proceed with plans already made for enlarging the naval base at Singapore. My first question is: Do these plans include a graving dock?—because, in March last, the late Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, replying to this same question, put to him by the noble Viscount, Lord Wimbourne, stated that the question had not yet been settled. As it is a very important point, further information on it is requested.

My second question is: Is it proposed to have both a graving dock and a floating dock, or are these alternative proposals? On the provision of the floating dock a good deal depends. The late Marquess Curzon, dealing with this point in the same debate, said: "We"—that is, the Committee of Imperial Defence— came to the conclusion that at any rate for the purpose of the floating dock there can be no doubt about it that the site on the old Strait is the only possible site. The Old Strait is some distance from what is commonly associated with the town of Singapore, Keppel Harbour. It is, as you know, situated on that stretch of water which lies between tae Island of Singapore and the mainland of Johore, and if this Old Strait site is going to be utilised then not only, so far as I can see, will the expenditure on the base be greatly increased, but also the area to be defended will be greatly extended. This point is somewhat important and it is for that reason that I have put this question.

My third question is: has His Majesty's Government considered the possibility of enlarging one or more of the existing commercial docks at Singapore so as to render possible the docking in them of capital ships of the largest size There are various reasons for my putting this question, and one of the most important of them is the question of economy. Next in order of importance comes my desire to find a sort of middle way between the attitude of the Government and that of the different Parties. In the last debate on this subject the late Marquess Curzon gave as one of the objects of the base, that it was to enable our Fleet to do at less cost what it might otherwise have to return to Europe to effect, and presumably repairs were in his mind. Then again, the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, in the debate of last July, said this:— all we ask for in pressing the urgency of the completion of this base is something at Singapore which can do for modern capital ships that which Hong Kong could do for capital ships at the time of which the noble Viscount was speaking. There is nothing new asked for. That was when the Labour Government was in office, and we were being urged to reconsider our decision. I would point out that up to 1910 our battleships were berthed in a commercial dock in Hong Kong. It seems to me that by enlarging the commercial docks at Singapore we shall not only meet the requirements of the Marquess Curzon, which I have already quoted, but we shall also meet those of the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, by providing an effective substitute for Hong Kong in pre-war days. There are other advantages, I imagine, also. I can hardly conceive that the initial outlay involved would not be considerably less, and in time of peace, if this dock were a commercial dock, some revenue would be coming in to meet current expenditure.

Another most important point, in my opinion, is that the area to be defended would not be extended. I will deal with this point later, but I wish to make it now while I am on the particular question of the commercial dock. Admittedly a large naval establishment, reserved exclusively for naval uses, is preferred by the Navy, and offers conditions far more ideal. But a large establishment of that kind would be reserved exclusively for the emergency of a future war, and I think, by general admission, that contingency is remote. The base that I suggest, though it would undoubtedly supply what is wanted at Singapore at present—namely, facilities for the repair of our largest ships—could not be regarded, even by the most captious of our critics abroad or at home, as an unreasonable provision

My fourth question deals with cost, and it is this: Has any comprehensive estimate yet been made of the cost of this new base? By "comprehensive" I mean one which includes the cost of barracks, hospitals, new coast defences and arrangements to meet air attack. The sum of £10,000,000 has frequently been quoted as the sum approximately correct, and I submit that the nation has a right to know the full amount to which it will be committed. In some matters it is necessary to go ahead at any cost. In others it is inure prudent, as the noble Earl, Lord Oxford and Asquith, reminded us on Monday, to cut ones coat according to one's cloth. There is, in addition, the question of current expenditure to be considered. This, in any case, will be considerable; but it will vary with the form of defence employed. It is probable that the first attack on this base at Singapore will be from the air. I admit that for the moment such an attack is not feasible, but aviation is making astounding strides. Aerial aircraft carriers—that is to say, airships capable of carrying aeroplanes, and thereby conferring on the aeroplane a far larger radius of action—are developments, if not of the immediate, at any rate of the near future. And I understand that this base will not be completed before the year 1937.

When I was talking about the commercial dock I referred to the size of the target and the necessity for avoiding any increase in the size of that target, simply because of its exposure to air attack. The target is large enough already. Not only have the docks, the camps and the forts to be defended, but there are the town and its suburbs also. And during the weeks that must elapse before the arrival of our Fleet at its Far Eastern base Singapore will require the same sort of defence as London required during the World War. After all, no security from air attack will exist until the enemy air fleet has been annihilated. If we are going to rely for the defence of Singapore on the presence of a large body of troops in that locality, hundreds of acres of cantonments will be needed for their accommodation. Thousands of soldiers will be exposed to the effects of an unhealthy climate in time of peace, and a large target will be offered to the enemy bombing aeroplanes in time of war. As for expense, as an old soldier who has had something to do with estimates in his time, if my experience is any guide for the future, more than twice ten millions sterling will be spent in the process.

My fifth question refers to a rather minor point. The late Marquess Curzon, in his speech last March, informed your Lordships that Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements had offered, respectively, gifts of £250,000 in cash and a piece of land worth £146,000 to His Majesty's Government for the prosecution of the enlargement of the base at Singapore. He added that these generous gifts had been gratefully accepted. He had previously announced that the total expenditure on the base for the current year would be £204,000 and implied that that would be more than covered by the gift of money from Hong Kong. What I want to know is whether these gifts are unconditional, or whether any future Government which suspends or modifies this scheme will be obliged to give them back. It would, indeed, be the irony of fate if a future Labour or Liberal Government had to vote money for, so to speak, the redemption of this scheme, in view of the emphatic protests which both Opposition Parties have launched against its initiation.

There is just one other point. The late Marquess Curzon laid great stress on the small expenditure which would be incurred during the first three years. Nothing can alter the total sum to be expended, except a radical modification of this scheme. The less money that is spent in the early stages the more that will have to be spent in the last seven or eight years. It is obvious that even et the lowest estimate the annual charge, during that latter period, for Singapore will be at least £1,000,000 per annum. There will be, in addition, the cost of maintenance. I mention this because, presumably, from the moment work is started at the Old Strait some measures will have to be taken for defending that locality.

Those are my questions, and I will now turn to the more general aspect of the matter. So far as the change of policy is concerned, and its effects in other lands, there is little left to say. I think it is indisputable that much anxious comment has been aroused in Japan, not only in peace societies or in the Japanese branch of the League of Nations, but among perfectly sober-minded people with no particular axe to grind. Most reasonable newspapers have commented in very anxious language on this situation. I do not think any well-informed person questions our right to build this base and certainly no one questions our good faith at Washington—no one who is well informed and knows the facts. I think am not exaggerating when I say that there has been considerable bewilderment in Japan at the revival of this plan—an old plan, on the admission of the late Marquess Curzon, who said that it had been for long in the minds of His Majesty's advisers. How long? From before 1902 or since 1922, because in the intervening period the Japanese were our Allies during a time of dreadful stress and anxiety and, indeed, Japanese sailors and marines assisted us to repress a mutiny at Singapore itself.

I am putting myself for the moment in the position of a Japanese naval officer, and I think he might say this to himself: "What are these British at? They are hard up and yet they are spending all this money. This battleship base in the Far East can have no meaning unless it means that the British are aiming at naval supremacy in the Pacific. This base requires subsidiary bases. Where are they? At Hong Kong or the Phillipines? Is an alliance against us contemplated, because a base so far distant from home waters and the Mediterranean is surely incompatible with the one-Power standard?" That may seem unimportant. It may seem merely a revelation of the military mind. Mens militaris res mirabilis; but that mind exists in all countries and it creates an atmosphere in which doubts and suspicions flourish and in which only one industry prospers—that of armaments. That is the very sort of atmosphere which the late Government endeavoured to dispel by its policy in this matter. I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that there is not a Japanese war game played to-day, nor yet a Japanese naval mess, where these questions are not being put and answered in the way that I suggest. And these are grave dangers in the situation. We have also, I think, by our conduct in this matter, caused considerable discouragement throughout the world on the part of well-wishers of the League of Nations. We are, after all, a leading Member of that League and yet it would appear that we take for granted that another war, or a war of sorts, will take place in the Far East in 1937 or soon after. We seem to these people to be preparing, in a spirit of cool foresightedness, for that contingency.

As regards the Washington Pact we have, of course, observed the letter of the Pact, but I wonder if we have not departed a little from the spirit that it was hoped would inspire the Washington Conference, whose main object was to limit armaments. Given the will, to arm and the belief that security depends on, force, there is nothing so easy as the evasion of the limitation of armaments. Any country with a. highly developed industrial system can equip itself with modern and more formidable weapons of offence and defence and, without infringing a single clause of any Treaty, the race of armaments can be commenced. There is the danger.

I have been at considerable pains to study what are the purposes of this base in the mind of His Majesty's Government. Various definitions have been given by different members of that Government. The right hon. Gentleman who is now Secretary of State for the Colonies and was at one time First Lord of the Admiralty, is reported to have said that the Singapore base was a piece of pure strategy unconnected with policy. Students at the Staff College are taught that strategy should be in harmony with policy. Experience often teaches that this is seldom the case, but it should be. Strategy and policy are, as a rule, an ill-assorted couple. During the War sometimes our policy was, shall I say, mercurial and our strategy somewhat stolid. Anyhow, there was a sort of union between them and not the complete divorce which the right hon. gentleman I have quoted seems to contemplate. Policy is the expression of a purpose, I presume. Strategy s the way of putting that purpose into effect. Very often the purpose is an unattainable ideal.

More often, again, strategy imposes severe restraints on policy, but they have got to work together. It is impossible for Chiefs of Staff to formulate a plan unless they have a policy to work on. Pure strategy, as I understand the expression, would mean that free licence was given to the strategist. In so doing any country embarks on a perilous and expensive course. Your Lordships will forgive a reminiscence. I remember once, in the Balkans, seeing pure strategy at work. The armies of the Balkan bloc outpaced the plans of statesmen. They conquered the Turks far more quickly and thoroughly than their statesmen ever thought they would, and the Balkan Premiers found, at the end of 1912, a thing that they had dreaded and hated for decades broken in their hands. They did not know what to do with it, and in spite of the frantic efforts of the noble Viscount, Lord Grey, here in London, the victors fell out over the division of the spoil, and a peace ensued eventually which, if it was not one of the causes of the World War, was at least a powerful factor in making that war unpreventible. It is almost unthinkable that there should be such a thing as pure strategy in a country under a democratic form of Government. Yet here is this statement on record on the part of one of His Majesty's present Government.

The noble Earl, Lord Balfour, in the first speech he made on this subject in my hearing, said this, in reference to the expenditure on the Singapore base:— this money, though spent on armaments, though spent on a naval base, is not only not spent for aggressive purposes, cannot be used for an aggressive purpose, and is incapable of being an instrument of oppression and aggression. There is no one who is not ready to admit the sincerity of those remarks, but I question seriously whether they represent the views of the Admiralty in regard to the uses of a naval base. Admittedy this is a repairing base. The site has been selected expressly because it is far distant from the expected theatre of operations, but it is none the less a strategical focus—and has been so described by a writer on this subject—for a number of operational bases in the Far East, and it is difficult to describe a place of this kind as wholly non-aggressive when it exists to render possible, and to facilitate, offensive action. Strategy, policy and tactics in times of tension all inhabit a vague borderland; it is difficult to say where one begins and the other ends, and one never knows what will happen. But I think the definition I have given of this base must be admitted as a reasonable one.

Later, the noble Earl spoke of the British Empire as one of the great securities of world peace. Personally I entirely agree with him. I will go further. I will say that I, as a Britisher, knowing the intentions of most leading British statesmen of any Party to-day, am quite prepared to admit that if we built this base at Singapore we should use it honestly and fairly to maintain the balance in the Far East and, in fact, to act as peace preservers. But while I think that, I think it is only reasonable to expect that other nations may take a different point of view. There is a new conception as to how peace shall be maintained to-day. We have entered into that conception as a Member of the League of Nations, and if we arrogate, to ourselves the right of being policemen there are mischief-making people in all other countries who may do exactly what they would do in this country, urge their Governments to follow our example and themselves start building bases. I should like to think that a base of this kind would act as a deterrent, but I greatly fear that it will not. Warlike preparations incite more often than they deter. That is not only the lesson of history just before the last War, it is the lesson of every war. War like preparations do not deter. Armaments are procreators of other armaments. Their evolution is prodigious in the number and variety of types produced.

The late Marquess Curzon of Kedleston justified the new base on the ground that it was necessary for our Fleet to possess sufficient mobility to keep open trade routes, protect our Dominions and vindicate the honour of our Flag. I will, with your permission, take these points seriatim. First, as to trade routes. I suppose it is indisputable that in the event of war in the Far East, with the only possible enemy in that quarter, our trade north of Hong Kong would cease automatically on the day war broke out, just as automatically and completely as our trade in the Baltic ceased during the last War. What the value of that trade is it is difficult to estimate. Our trade south of Hong Kong would, or could, I am told, be maintained precariously, but still maintained. Again it is difficult to estimate the value of that trade. Our Colonial trade, that is to say the trade from Australia and New Zealand, does not for the most part pass through the Straits of Singapore, and what little of it that does could easily be diverted to a more southerly route round the Cape of Good Hope.

Before, our Fleet could reach this base eight weeks would have to elapse, and before it could take the open sea and fight an engagement against the only possible enemy, another four weeks would have to elapse. During that period of at least three months it is difficult to see how a base at Singapore could either mitigate the loss or increase the proportion of protected trade, and when our Fleet had won the war, when the fleet action had been fought after the first three months, if trade is the only consideration then there is at least one certain result, and that is that our best customer would have been ruined. Many figures have been given as to the value of this trade. For example, in another place an honourable and gallant Member stated that its value was £1,000,000,000 sterling annually, and that the £10,000,000 to be spent on the base at Singapore was only one-tenth of one per cent. of that amount, which was a cheap rate of insurance. I neither follow the arithmetic nor do I accept the. figures given as even approximately accurate. In the first place, £10,000,000 is not one-tenth of one per cent. of £1,000,000,000 but one per cent.; and in the second place, these figures are all misleading because what one really has to calculate is the amount of trade that would be jeopardised as the result of a war in the Far East. That is to say one has to deduct from the total amount of trade that part which could be diverted and that which could be maintained precariously.

I will now pass to the question of the defence of our Dominions, and I should like to put a question which is not among the original questions, but I am sure the noble Earl who is going to reply will forgive me for that. How can Japan or any country out there invade Australia? I am taking Japan because it is the nearest. When noble Lords opposite are claiming an innocuous and wholly non-aggressive character for this base they quote the distance from Singapore to Japan—about 3,000 miles. The distance from Yokohama to Thursday Island, the nearest point in Australia, is more than 3,000 miles and to Sydney it is 5,000 miles. How could, let us say, the Japanese undertake the invasion of Australia? The nearest Dominion has been selected and the nearest possible enemy in those waters. To do so they would first have to have an advance base either in the neighbourhood of the Dutch East Indies or of the Philippines. I am told that Jaluit, their place in the Marshall Islands, is only a coral atoll, and that immense preparations would have to be made before it could become a large base. Moreover, Japan, before it could possibly think of invading Australia, would have to possess, either by previous conquest or by an alliance, far greater resources in fuel oil and other necessities of naval warfare than it has at the present time. This is an international problem, and, I hope, one of the dim and distant future, but I really fail to see how the construction of this base can facilitate the solution of this distant problem, and I do see how it can import into it a new cause of suspicion and irritation.

As for the vindication of the honour of our flag, I am entirely in favour of that, but I ask myself whether to defend it by force is the only way, because, carried to its logical conclusion, that would mean that we must possess a naval strength superior to that of any other combination that could be brought against us in all seas. Not only is the expense prohibitive, but it is against all our commitments both to the League of Nations and to the Washington Conference.

My last point is an old point which has been frequently debated here, and has been replied to The noble Viscount, Lord Wimborne, raised it in the debate on his Motion. He asked whether the base could indeed be utilised, in the event of the circumstances which would render it necessary to us. At the time the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon, said that the Admiralty were satisfied that we should be able to utilise the base at Singapore. With all respect and with the utmost diffidence I still entertain some doubt. After all, the Admiralty is not the only party to be considered. There is such a thing as public opinion, and I wonder whether, in the event of a war in the Far East—a remote contingency we all agree, but a remote contingency which would bring with it a strong pro- bability that the war would extend and become another world war—I wonder whether, at a time like that, any Government or any Board of Admiralty would like to see three-quarters of our Fleet going to a far-distant base several thousand miles away. I have a theory that defence, like charity, begins at home, that the British taxpayer pays £55,000,000 annually for the Fleet to defend the heart of the British Empire and that, if he were told that that defence, or three-quarters of it, was going as far away as Singapore, either he would demand a one and three-quarter power standard at any cost or else a lot of people in this country would point out that we could economise, since it would appear that one-quarter of our present Fleet was sufficient for home defence. I have tried to examine this matter fairly and squarely. I did not want to bring this point into my speech at all, and it is only because I have a profound conviction on the subject that I have referred to it. That conviction is that Singapore either requires an increase in our naval forces or will not be utilised when the crisis comes.

In conclusion I want to indicate a policy. I venture to do so for this reason. Surely a matter like Singapore should not be one for constant change of policy, Governments succeeding each other and reversing the decisions of their predecessors. That is a most undesirable state of affairs for various reasons, in addition to that small reason that I gave regarding the Estimates. I believe that there could be reached a very general measure of agreement over a policy which, stated in its broadest terms would be this: that we were determined to insist on the protection of our vital interests in the Far East, and notably of our food supplies. That is a policy which will find approval in every political Party. We have to do this, and that policy, as I see the matter, has to be reconciled with three considerations. The first is our membership of the League of Nations; the second, our commitments at Washington; and the third, the situation at home.

As regards the first, as I said just now the problem is an international one. It affects other countries—France, Holland, as well as Japan and America. Of those four countries three are, like ourselves, Members of the League of Nations. Surely, in approaching this matter, we should consult with them, because people look to us for an example. As regards our commitments under the Washington Conference, I repeat that we have acted in perfect conformity with the letter of the Pact. The spirit of that Conference also, I repeat, was the limitation and reduction of armaments. If we approach the Singapore base in conformity with that spirit, I think we shall see more clearly the manifold dangers we run of making other people arm.

Lastly, there is the situation at home and we have got to think of that. Today we are in the presence of a very serious situation. The pinch of poverty is cruel among large sections of the working classes. Is this a time to embark upon what, at the lowest estimate, is a vast expenditure abroad, and for entirely unproductive purposes? It is a vast expenditure. Later on it will fall with a heavy weight upon the people of this country, not only in the annual charge for building but in those tremendous charges which grow in connection with so vast an establishment as appears to be contemplated. Unless there are overwhelming reasons for the construction of this base, surely economy should be the first consideration.

Supposing there were an agreed policy, what would be the method of putting it into effect? I should like to say what my noble friend, Lord Haldane, suggested some years ago in this House in regard to matters generally—defence, and so on. He said that he invited this House to see that requisite study should be devoted to certain contingencies lest they should possibly mature and we should find ourselves unprepared in the face of what we had not thought out. That to me, as an old General Staff Officer, is the gospel. I would like to see personally a thorough investigation of this matter. I would like to see it studied from all points of view and that the people in this country should know what they are defending by this expenditure, against whom they are defending, and why, and how. I will be the first to admit that while expert naval opinion consider mammoth warships as essential to defence it is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs that we should not be able to dock our capital ships in the Far East, but for that surely an easier remedy can be found than this great base.

It is planned, as I understand it, on a gigantic scale. It is an old plan, dating before 1902 perhaps. It is an old plan in a new world with new conceptions. It is a case of putting old wine into new bottles, or new wine into old bottles. I do not know which applies best, but in any case the result is bound to be unfortunate. This base will not be completed for eleven years. When one looks back over that period, when one reflects on the number of warships that have been scrapped and the ruthless suppression of old types, on the advances made in the design of submarines and more especially in aviation, and when one reflects that His Majesty's Government propose, in accordance with the Resolution of the last Imperial Conference, to proceed. with plans already made for enlarging the naval base at Singapore, I submit that there is some ground for anxiety. Frankly, what I fear is this: That we are embarking upon a programme which will be at once costly, and far more costly than most of us realise to some extent futile—to what extent I am unable to say, but I have a feeling that it is to a large extent so out-of-date as to be liable to be futile—and a programme which, if not provocative, not consciously provocative, is at any rate disturbing. No public-minded man, reading the Press to-day of Japan or any other country, can deny that this programme is disturbing, and disturbing at such a time in our history.

I suggest, on the other hand, that by modification of this scheme, such as the enlargement of one or more of the commercial docks at Singapore—by means of a subsidy, if you will, as is being done at present, I understand, in the case of a dock at Auckland, New Zealand—a plan could be worked out by the three Chiefs of Staff which would satisfy all that our Imperial and national security requires with a minimum of irritation and at a far lower cost. That is a suggestion which I put forward with great diffidence, as I have said before. I have not put these questions in the spirit of Party politics, but in order to elicit information on a question of vital import- to the nation, to the Empire and, I think l may say without exaggeration, to the. world. I beg to move.

THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (EARL STANHOPE)

My Lords, the question of a naval base at Singapore has been so often debated in this House that, I fear I have very little that can be new, or of interest, to say to your Lordships this afternoon. I am very grateful, therefore, to the noble and gallant Lord for having sent me notice of some of the main points which he has put to the Government, to-day, and I propose principally to confine myself to the specific questions he has asked. He asked me, first of all, whether any decision has been reached in regard to a graving dock. The scale and development of the naval base is still under consideration by His Majesty's Government and no decision has yet been reached in regard to a graving dock. I may add that, as I think the noble and gallant Lord will realise, a great many preliminary measures have been taken before it is possible to get so far as to draw up detailed drawings and a possible contract. For instance, borings have to be made to discover the depth of various strata and I may say, in passing, that from the bore holes which were made when the base was under consideration by the last Conservative Government we have reason to believe that the strata in the Old Strait will be suitable and will not prove so expensive as has been thought by some other noble Lords in this House. We have reason to believe that there is a granite formation at no very great depth which will make possible foundations if they are required.

LORD THOMSON

For a graving dock.

EARL STANHOPE

For the graving dock and for any scheme which His Majesty's Government may eventually decide upon carrying out. Of course there are preliminary things which will take a good many months, and at any rate nothing whatever is likely to occur within twelve months from now. The provision for that is already in the Estimate which has been passed by another place and is included in the figures that were given to this house by the noble Marquess, the late Lord Curzon. Another point which is being dealt with at once is to reinstitute the anti-malarial work which was dropped when the last Government decided not to proceed with the base at Singapore. I think your Lordships will agree that the drainage work and the clearance of brushwood, and so on, and of the very thick undergrowth at the north part of Singapore, is an essential preliminary before any base of any kind is proceeded with to any great extent.

Then the noble and gallant Lord asked me whether it is proposed to have both a graving dock and a floating dock, or whether these are alternative proposals. They are not alternative proposals: they are complementary. The noble and gallant Lord raised the question and dealt with it several times in the course of his speech, that instead of making a graving dock in the Old Strait we should enlarge one of the existing commercial docks in Keppel Harbour. I am rather glad that my noble friend, in spite of his expert knowledge, fell into the same error that I did in thinking that it is usually the case that the enlargement of a dock is a cheaper thing than the making of a new one. As a rule it is not. It is a perfectly simple proposition to increase the length of a dock, but when it comes to widening or deepening the dock it is usually found that that is a more expensive operation than making a new dock. I think your Lordships will quite realise why. The moment you widen the dock, you have to strengthen the floor of the dock which. otherwise, is liable to buckle with the increased weight of water and the pressure. Therefore, as soon as you thought of widening a dock, it would be necessary to make a new floor, to widen the dock gates and make a new sill, and this you would have to do with all the existing docks at Singapore, which would have to be both deepened and widened. So that you have not only to break down the outside wall, but the floor as well. I think the House will realise that the moment you begin to deal with things of that kind a very heavy expenditure is incurred, and particularly as a large part of the work has to be done under water. On the whole, therefore, the experience of the Admiralty and their expert advisers is that it is probably cheaper to make a new dock rather than to enlarge an old one when that enlargement means deepening or widening. In the case of the docks at Singapore it would mean both.

There is a further argument against it. I understand that the five commercial docks at Singapore are at present in use practically continuously. An enormous amount of shipping passes Singapore every day. I am told that £800,000,000 worth of ships and of freight passes by Singapore in the course of a year. Therefore, if one of the commercial docks is going to be made use of by His Majesty's Navy, it can only be made use of to the extent that it is withdrawn from the use of commercial shipping. If, in addition to that, you begin to enlarge that dock or, as the noble and gallant Lord suggests, several docks, all those docks are withdrawn from operation for any ships while that work is going on: and it is a very lengthy operation to carry through.

Thirdly, it is advisable, apart from construction, on the score of economy, in carrying on the work of repair that you should concentrate your dockyards, and so on, as much as possible. If you have one floating dock at the north end of the island and a graving dock at the other end of the island, you presumably would have to have two sets of workshops and consequently much increased cost in doing your repairs. I think the noble and gallant Lord has got into his mind an entirely erroneous idea of the whole plan of this base, supposing it is carried through as originally proposed. I think he has in mind an establishment somewhat of the size of Portsmouth or Devonport. It is nothing of the kind. All that was proposed in the original instance was one floating dock and one graving dock, and the minimum amount of buildings in the way of workshops, and so on, that were necessary to do the repairs to ships in these docks or tied up alongside the jetties. It would be comparatively a very minor establishment.

The trouble of it is that these works invariably cost a very large sum of money. It is because of that large sum of money that His Majesty's Government are again going through the whole question as to how far it is possible to reduce the original plans, and to bring them more into consonance with what this country is willing and able to afford in these days. That brings out the point that there is no question of the Singapore base being a great base, from which there will be all sorts of advanced bases as well. You could only do that if you had a gigantic base, with all the paraphernalia behind it of great workshops, and so on, which, apparently, the noble Lord has in mind.

The noble Lord asked me to give him a comprehensive estimate of the whole cost of the base, to include barracks, defences, and so on. As I think he will have realised, that at present is quite impossible. The whole scheme, not only in regard to the docks but in regard to the defences, is still under consideration by the Government, and until many points have been settled it is impossible to give anything like an approximate estimate at all. I may say that the plans that are being considered are not plans dating from 1892, they are plans that are being considered by the three General Staffs concerned. The noble Lord will be glad to hear that the three Services are in very close touch on this question, and that both in regard to air defence and every other point full consideration is being given. The only trouble is that His Majesty's Government have so many points to consider in regard to it, and the cost of all defence is so great that it takes a considerable time to come to the minimum which is likely to be effective.

The noble Lord seemed to suggest that the whole of this question is a very recent one and that we have fell designs on some nation or other in the Pacific. So far from that being the case, I happened to come upon a Paper which is the third Report of the Royal Commission which reported in 1882. As the noble Lord will realise that is considerably before there was any possibility of Japan, or any other nation, coming into the horizon. This is what that Commission said: Singapore is, as regards the whole of Your Majesty's Possessions in the East, a position of great military and commercial importance, guarding the southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca—the main entrance to the Indian Ocean from the Eastward—and in some measure controlling the Straits of Sunda, 450 miles distant. It is a base for Your Majesty's ships employed in the protection of trade. Singapore must certainly be placed in a thorough state of defence. From that I think it will be realised that, entirely apart from the question of a naval base, the defences of Singapore need consideration.

I was somewhat surprised when this matter was debated on a previous occasion in your Lordship's House, that the noble and learned Viscount opposite said that when we made a naval base we should have to provide also oil storage and that this oil storage would require a garrison to defend it. We already have oil stored there, and the Government of which the noble and learned Viscount was a member added to that storage during the time they were in office. But, quite apart from the question of a naval base and of the storage of oil fuel, your Lordships will see that the defence of Singapore is essential from many points of view, and in particular its position in regard to the trade that passes its doors.

Finally, the noble Lord asked me in regard to the gift of £250,000 from Hong Kong and of the land that was handed over by the Straits Settlements. In regard to the land, I am informed that the Government of the Straits Settlements have bought the land and that they propose to hand that land over as it is required for a naval base. If it is not so required they will not, of course, hand it over, but will continue to rent it, as I believe they are doing at the present time. As to the generous gift of £250,000 by Hong Kong, that money was given under no conditions except that it was naturally for the development of the base. As year Lordships are aware, we hope to spend the greater part of that sum in this financial year, and, unless the life of the present Government is a great deal shorter than I have any reason to anticipate, I see no reason why there should be any question of its return. Therefore that point hardly arises.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

My Lords, it is always with reluctance that I take any controversial part in questions of defence. They involve considerations which are never wholly accessible even to Parliament. It is only to a limited extent that we can judge of what is required and what are our obligations. We have often made mistakes about defence in days gone by. In the time of Nelson, and in the days before his greatness, the Navy was much starved, and we suffered in consequence. It was only the genius of our Admirals that got us out of the difficulties which the negligence and parsimony of Parliament had brought about. To-day, I think, things are better, for the simple reason that they are more considered and more adequately understood. At the same time the old difficulty remains, that to some extent we are dependent on the guidance which we get from the Fighting Services—to some extent, but not to the whole extent; because into questions of defence questions of policy enter very deeply.

I will not discuss again the general policy of the Singapore naval base. We discussed that at considerable length on previous occasions, and I still adhere to the view which I maintained then, that this is a gesture which goes beyond anything we are wise in making and that, although quite consistent with our Treaty obligations, it is not a good thing to do in the way of promoting the general tranquillity of the world. But I wish to say that in questions of defence there are broad considerations, which are considerations for Parliament and the nation, and which restrict the zeal of even our Fighting Services. There are some parts of the world where, judged merely from the point of view of the Army and the Navy, we are running to-day great theoretical risks, and yet we never talk of them. I will only mention one. It is one that is hardly ever mentioned, though it is one that is very well known. We have a frontier line between Canada and the United States of nearly 4,000 miles long, which is wholly undefended. We never talk of defending that frontier line, not because it is not a great strategic task which would have to be undertaken if strategical considerations alone were to prevail, but because the general outlook has made us relegate that risk to the category of those risks which we are willing to undertake and which we do not fear.

My difficulty about the Singapore base has always been to distinguish it from that category of risks. Why are we undertaking this? If, as the noble Earl in his very clear speech said, we were only dealing with purely commercial questions and making a local provision for the protection of our commerce, the case might be otherwise. But that is not the footing upon which this base has been put forward. It is to be a real base of the Fleet in the East. You have said that, and Australia has said that and has asked for it for its own protection. You have assented to that, and thereupon that most potent body, the Navy, has got the Government fast by the tail and will proceed to twist it still further as it has twisted it a good deal already. I dread the Navy in this connection, not because of any want of confidence in its knowledge, but because of the excess of its zeal, and I am quite sure you will hear a great deal more from the Navy before you have finished your plans n regard to the Singapore base.

I listened with great interest to the noble Earl's speech. If I could take it in the way in which he limited it this would be a comparatively small affair. But I have never been able to look upon it in that light, because you have conceded the principle of making a proper base and of making a proper base for the British Fleet in the East, which carries you a good deal further than anything you have put on paper or expressed in words. The first thing that impresses itself very strongly upon me is that if you make this base it will be a base worth having—for other people. If you should get into a great war in the East, which I trust you never will, the first effort that will be made on the part of the Power with which you are at war will be to seize this base, because it will be capable of being used just as much against you as you can use it for yourselves. If that is so, you have to protect this base. You have to protect it by sea, by land and by air.

Your military protection, which would require barracks and guns and ships, is in itself a very substantial item, and with the present size of the British Army I do not know where you are to get troops to do this. You may get them from India, but if you get them from India you will have to pay for them handsomely. As regards the ships, from the beginning I felt that if you made a base which you had to defend by sea and for which the Navy was to be responsible, the Navy would tell you that it must have a sufficiency of ships there. But you have not a sufficiency of ships to defend a large and powerful base like that and at the same time to supply the necessities of the West. Therefore, in the end, I think, this proposal will inevitably lead to an increase of the Fleet.

What is the genesis of this proposal? It was the desire of Australia to feel itself completely defended, not an unnatural desire, but when it first came before the predecessors of this Government—I do not mean the last Government, because my right hon. friend Mr. Snowden was not emotional in these matters, but the previous Ministry—it was listened to, and listened to the more readily because that was not a time of the same financial stress as we are under to-day. I venture to say that if this proposition was put forward for the first time to-day, with the financial stress that we are under, it would not be looked at. The spirit in which it would have been approached would have been the spirit of asking: Is this risk outside the category of those resources which we ought to provide for? We are very chary to-day about undertaking the provision of new risks and we look very closely into them to see what they are.

One thing impressed me very much in listening to the speech of the noble Earl, and it was this: that the Government have not got very far with the details of this naval base. Whether it to be a graving dock, or merely a storage dock, apparently has not yet been determined. The form of the naval dock, whether it is to be graving or floating dock, is a matter about which nothing has been said except that there were to be both, but to what extent they are to exist and what are to lie their relations to one another is, to use a classical phrase which the noble Earl used, "still under consideration." In these circumstances I ask anybody how it is possible to give any estimate to the country of what the Singapore proposition involves. It involves taking into account not only the additional troops that will be required, the barracks and the artillery provision, but also the oil provision, because there will be a much greater oil provision if there are large ships out there. It also involves the provision of ships, of which I have spoken, as well as the provision of air defences. It is impossible to say to what this may grow without the closest scrutiny, and the items upon which that scrutiny depends have not been exactly ascertained.

It is, to me, pretty obvious that these things have not been exactly ascertained. I am quite sure that there have been meetings of the most solemn order of the Committee of Imperial Defence upon the subject, but I speak not without practice in estimating the probabilities of keeping within estimates, and I am quite sure, from what the noble Earl said, that the estimates have not been gone into with that minuteness and definiteness of. conception which is necessary to give any reliable opportunity of judging what we have let ourselves in for. The only thing that gave me comfort in the noble Earl's speech was that it seemed to me the Government were going very slowly over this business—very slowly indeed. I hope they will continue to go slowly. By all means clear away the malaria and brushwood and do things of that kind. That is good for Singapore as well as for every other purpose, but do not let us embark upon these enormous heads of expenditure without Parliament being told to what exactly it is committing itself. I do not like the plan of putting down a token Vote of £200,000 or £250,000, and then saying how little that is, because it involves something very large to which, in another year or so, the Admiralty will draw your attention, and say it was implied in what you did over this that you would do these other things, too.

I have said all I want to say. I do not believe that this can be a small base. I think that the Admiralty will see to it that it is a very large base before they are done with it, and I think you will find them very difficult to resist, because they will say "You made admissions at the beginning which carry you the whole way, and we, who are responsible for the defence of the country at sea, will not be content unless you do make such a provision as you promised us to make. "If that be so, then I think my noble friend Lord Thomson was well justified in calling attention in his five Questions to the details connected with this matter, and I respectfully ask your Lordships to give it further consideration before we are embarked more deeply on this plan.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE EARL OF BALFOUR)

My Lords, the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Thomson, the mover of this Motion, was divided really into two parts, one dealing with what I may call relatively technical details, the other dealing with broad questions of policy. As regards the technical details, I think your Lordships will admit that the speech of my noble friend near me (Earl Stanhope) was a model of clear exposition, and that he dealt with all the questions put to him by the noble Lord opposite in a manner which should satisfy the most ardent inquirer. But no doubt the noble Lord opposite acted in conformity with the general desires of your Lordships' House when, in addition to those details about which he asked information, he expresed, no doubt adequately, the views of the Party to which he belongs upon the broad question of Singapore. I must say that the treatment which that broad question has received both from the noble Lord and from the noble and learned Viscount who has just sat down seems to me entirely to miss the main point, and to be largely based upon a purely imaginary picture of a vast scheme of extension in the Far East of our naval responsibilities as well as of our naval expenditure. All that seems to me to be based upon a great illusion.

The noble Lord, if I did not misunderstand him, seemed to suggest that this naval base at Singapore was to be the fertile parent of a large number of other naval bases depending upon Singapore—am I not right?—which were to be spread out in the neighbouring oceans. Is not that a most fantastic hypothesis? In the first place, we are forbidden by the Treaty of Washington to have any more naval bases in the Pacific, and if these subsidiary naval bases, which he imagines, are not to be in the Pacific, where does the noble Lord suppose they are going to be erected, and why are those bases going to be brought into existence? The whole force of the attack, in so far as it has force, seems to me entirely to depend upon this dream that what we are doing at Singapore is only the beginning of a vast scheme of naval construction which, in itself, is to involve a large development of naval policy in the Pacific Ocean. There can be no development of naval policy in the Pacific Ocean. The whole object of the Treaty of Washington, in so far as it dealt with that vast sea, was to prevent any further extension within it, to prevent the competition of armaments, to reduce the armaments that. were already there, and to make provision in case there should be any dispute among the naval Powers in the Pacific Ocean for a Conference and the adoption of every precaution to prevent war. I cannot see the justification for this lurid nightmare of a vast expansion in these distant seas.

But because we not only do not wish to carry out, and cannot by Treaty carry out, these great augmentations in the Pacific Ocean, have we, therefore, no responsibility in the Pacific Ocean? Have we no great Possessions, no great parts of our Empire which it is our business to defend? The noble Lord who opened this debate used one phrase which, in the connection in which it was used, I listened to, I must confess, with some misgivings. He said that in his opinion defence begins at home. There is a sense, of course, in which defence begins at home. If this country is unable to withstand direct attack it evidently is incapable of defending its outlying Possessions. If the heart of this Empire is not secure then its furthest members are evidently in great peril. But have we no duty towards those distant parts of our Empire? I confess that the frank admissions, or the deliberate statement, of the noble Lord filled me with some misgiving, and that misgiving was not diminished when I heard him, somewhat to my surprise, develop the proposition that if the people of this country, and more especially the working men of this country, realise that our Fleet was to be used anywhere but in the home seas, they would say that we had better cut down our expenditure on the Fleet to a much lower point than it is at the present time. The noble Lord shakes his head and I am sure he will acquit me of any desire to misrepresent him, but I thought, that was the general tenor of that part of his argument.

If it is granted that the British Fleet exists for the defence of the British Empire, does it not require much better arguments than any that have been advanced from the Bench opposite to show why it is to be deprived of those resources by which alone it can defend the British Empire? You are spending, no doubt, a very great sum of money on your Fleet. I do not believe it is too great a sum, and I do not think the Government of which Lord Thomson himself was a member thought that it was too large a sum. He felt, his colleagues felt, as we all feel, that the British Fleet, limited as it is by Treaty, has duties which are not only so onerous but are so far spread that it is impossible to diminish at all the scale on which it is now kept up. And can any worse economy be conceived than spending these vast sums of money on our Fleet and then not spending the additional sum which is required to make the Fleet available wherever British Possessions are in peril? That is the fundamental question which I have never heard answered from the Bench opposite, although this is the third occasion on which this debate has been raised by the noble Lords opposite.

If you reduce their arguments to their real substance they come to this. First, there is the dream which I already dealt with, that this is the beginning of a vast naval expansion on the other side of the world, and secondly, that we are giving, I will not say a just cause of offence, but a natural cause of suspicion to friendly nations in the Pacific Ocean. I am perfectly unable to understand that point of view. I am not arguing about people who are ill-informed, who are by nature suspicious, and would draw the most extravagant conclusions from the most innocent operation. But I do argue that we should assume that other nations who have Fleets in the Pacific Ocean exercise a little common sense upon the problems before them. I believe their Governments do, and that the majority of their populations do. I will not answer that this paper or that paper, this member of an Opposition or that critic of a Government, may not use phrases which can be employed by critics in this country to advocate their own views, but I ask the House whether there is the smallest ground for thinking that a base at Singapore can be a menace to any other naval Power in the Pacific Ocean?

The noble Lord drew a picture of members of the Japanese Staff playing the war game, and he said we could depend upon it that whenever they are playing the war game this question of Singapore comes up as a matter of interest and probably of suspicion. How can any human being think that Singapore is a menace to Japan and at the same time not think that Japan is a menace to Australia? The noble Lord, indeed, played this war game in his own fashion. He played the war game in front of your Lordships a few moments ago. He drew a picture of the difficulties that lay in the way or Japan attacking Australia. Are we really to believe that; it is impossible for Japan to attack Australia without not also believing, as I am quite ready to believe, that you cannot attack Japan from Singapore. The distances are practically the same; and in Japan there is a vast military force. At Singapore there is no question of there being, either now or in the future, any military forces which could be a menace, from the military point of view, either to Japan or any other Power. It can only be used for defensive purposes. I do not believe that Australia and New Zealand are in any serious peril, because I am a believer that peace is going to prevail, but after all, if you were quite sure that peace is going to prevail, if you could have that happy belief with absolute security, you would riot trouble to spend any money on your Navy at all; and that is really the fallacy of the noble and learned Viscount who has just sat down.

He said this in effect: "Look at the frontier between Canada and the United States of America; are you putting fortifications at the strategic points along that 3,000 miles? Of course, you are not. Nobody in the United States, nobody in Canada, nobody in Great Britain believes that there is going to be a war, or counts a war of that kind within the practical possibilities." I hope that is true. I myself am very much inclined to think that we are at the beginning of a great era of peace. That is, of course, my personal hope, and also my personal belief. But the idea that this country can allow its hopes of peace to make it incapable of defending its own position, if those hopes are disappointed, really is not the way to produce peace. It is the way to lay us open to a war which otherwise would never take place, because those who contemplate, if such there be or when such arise, a war with this country would see that it was a war in which the attackers were destined to fail.

Those are admitted commonplaces with regard to most of the world. Why should they not be accepted with regard to the Pacific Ocean? Here is a point in the geography of the ocean where an enormous amount of tonnage passes daily, east and west. Here is a point which is outside the Pacific Ocean and the fortification of which was always deliberately allowed anti, no doubt, was allowed with the full consciousness that, though it was never going to be turned into the sort of Portsmouth, of which noble Lords opposite speak, it would enable the British Fleet to act in the Pacific and would not keep out practically every heavy battleship from being used in that ocean. Here is a point which defends the East, as well as the West. Here is a point from which you can secure that no attack shall be made on India or on Indian trade from the east. Here is a point from which you can be quite sure that, if Australia or New Zealand are menaced, New Zealand and Australia can be adequately defended by the Fleets of the Motherland. And yet the noble Lords opposite exercise their ingenuity in deliberately excluding from the largest ocean in the world the possibility of Fleet action by the Power which, after all, has built up its success upon the ocean and which depends on its future success upon the ocean for the defence not only of its own shores but of the peace of the world.

There are one or two quite simple questions to which I hope the noble Lord, if he is going to reply, will address himself. If you admit, (1), that the Fleets of Great Britain are one of the great engines and instruments of peace; if you believe, (2), that the Fleets of Great Britain are what the whole Empire looks to as defending them against overseas attack; if you think, (3), that, however improbable the danger of overseas attack is, it is yet sufficient to require us to continue to maintain the British Navy—then how can you support the proposition which practically excludes from the activities of that Navy the greatest ocean in the world? All the talk about the waterways of the world, all the talk about the rôle which the British Navy has played in the creation of the British Empire, in the support of the British Empire, in the defence of the British Empire and in the maintenance under modern conditions of peaceful relations between all nations—all that talk seems to me to vanish away if you say that the British Navy, however valuable as an instrument of civilisation, however valuable as an instrument of defence, is to have excluded from the. possibility of its action a theatre of operations where we have immense interests, and where there are Dominions of our own growing up gradually into great and free States. It seems to me that, unless noble Lords will address themselves to those three or four simple questions, all this talk of detail is thrown away and will. I am certain, not convince your Lordships that His Majesty's Government have made any mistake in carrying out the unanimous verdict of all the competent authorities that they had the opportunity of consulting upon the subject.

VISCOUNT LEE OF FAREHAM

My Lords, before the noble Lord replies, perhaps he will allow me to say one word. I came down here this afternoon with quite another purpose and, indeed, I had not noticed that this particular subject was coming up for discussion, but as the debate has proceeded I have been filled naturally with a desire to support His Majesty's Government in any matter, and particularly in a matter affecting Imperial defence. But I find myself, after listening to the speeches that have been made, in a difficult case. I venture to think that the spokesman of the Admiralty on this occasion has taken up a much too apologetic tone towards this national and Imperial necessity. He has been at pains to stress the point that we are really doing very little, that we are going as slowly as possible. That is, in effect, the advice given by the noble Viscount opposite—that we should proceed slowly. I venture, on the other hand, to urge with all the force I can command that we should proceed with greater resolution and speed in this matter of providing the essentials of national and Imperial defence.

This is, after all, no new or hastily conceived project. When I occupied the position, which the noble Earl is now occupying, of Civil Lord of the Admiralty, which is now, I think, some twenty-three years ago, I remember that this matter was then under discussion—it is true in a somewhat vague manner, but at any rate we had been studying the question. We have been studying it ever since. When I had the great honour of occupying the position of First Lord of the Admiralty, some four years ago, the matter had received such prolonged consideration that there did not seem to be any excuse for dallying with it any longer, and it was decided to proceed with what I have already called a national necessity, if we are to contemplate the British Fleet ever visiting the Pacific at all for any purpose. I hope that the Government will not be moved by these pleas and counsels proceeding from the other side of your Lordships' House.

Nor, I must confess, have my views on the subject been shaken at all by the strategic authority of the noble Lord who moved for these Papers. Like him, I was at one time a General Staff Officer—I forget whether it was Grade 1 or Grade 2—but it never occurred to me that, in a matter of this kind, I should, in your Lordships' House, set up my strategic opinion against those of the combined General Staffs, expressed not only recently but over a long period of years, that this base was an absolute necessity. The noble Viscount went further. He said that if we create a base we shall be inciting somebody to attack it, and that we should not run that risk. If that were carried to its legitimate conclusion you would never have a naval base anywhere, at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Rosyth or anywhere else, because it would merely constitute a point of attack for this nation or that, and therefore would be in themselves dangerous and reprehensible.

The arguments used by the noble Earl who has just addressed the Rouse are surely irrefutable and final in this matter. I do not want to argue the case again, but I do venture to press upon His Majesty's Government the necessity for no longer confining themselves to the control of malaria at Singapore and other interesting preliminaries, but to carry out what I believe to be the considered opinion of all naval and military authorities and of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which brings in political considerations as well, and treat this as a chose jugée, and press on with this base with all possible speed.

LORD THOMSON

My Lords, I have been invited to reply to the points raised by Lord Balfour and before I do so I should like to thank the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, for the very full answers which he has given to my questions. While expressing gratitude I should like to say how gratified I ant because, taking his account of what the Government propose as their future course of conduct with respect to the Singapore base, it nearly meets what I myself have ventured to suggest. This base, apparently, is not going to be a great base. It is not going to be a base laid down in accordance with plans already made. Apparently, those plans are not yet made. Apparently, so vital a question as the graving dock has not yet been settled. Yet in the gracious Speech from the Throne we were told that the Government proposed to proceed in accordance with plans already made.

I agree that it is difficult to give full answers to questions like these and I am the first to recognise the many technical difficulties in the way, but the general impression left upon my mind by the remarks of the noble Earl are most encouraging. This base is going to be quite a small affair and whether it will include the Old Strait site or not I do not know, but it seems to me that some extra cost must be incurred thereby. I should like to express my amazement that the conversion of a dock should be more expensive than the making of a new dock. Of course, accept the statement and I was prepared for it, because I had already gone into the matter myself, but I am still amazed.

When I was listening to the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, I rather thought that I was hearing two different points of view. Parts of his speech made me feel this: Why have a base there at all? Why have anything if our intentions are so innocuous, and the prospects of peace so assured, and this can do nothing, and is intended to do nothing, in the way of menace? Other parts of his speech made me feel this: If we are really building a base at Singapore which is intended to protect so vast an ocean as the Pacific, why not have a really big base and not the modified thing which Lord Stanhope conveyed to our imaginations to-day?

EARL STANHOPE

I do not want to give the noble and gallant Lord any false impression. There is no question whatever at the present moment of dropping the original scheme. All that I wished to convey was that the scheme was being reconsidered by the Government. It may be modified, parts of it may be dropped, but there is no question of modifying the original estimate, which appeared in the Naval Estimates, of £11,000,000.

LORD THOMSON

I think the Estimates expressly covered a graving dock, a floating dock, and a few shops. The general impression left on my mind by the statement of the noble Earl was that it was going to be quite a small affair and as cheap as possible; in fact, more or less in accordance with the suggestions which I ventured to make, because I am afraid that the scheme in accordance with the plans already made is going to cost far more than £10,000,000 or £11,000,000 and something like £20,000,000 or £30,000,000. The noble Earl, Lord Balfour, asked me whether I admitted that the Fleets of Great Britain were engines of peace. I was at particular pains in the course of my remarks to say that I did think so, but I questioned whether other people could be expected to take the same view.

Then he asked me whether I agreed that the British Empire looked to the Fleet for its defence. I quite agree with that; it does. But what I was trying to make as a point in my remarks was the proportion of our trade that would be menaced and which we should be defending with, it may be, three-quarters of our Fleet. In a time of very great crisis, when we may be involved at home in a war which may extend to a world war, I am informed that only 1 to 2 per cent. of our trade might be involved in that part of the world.

His third question was whether the danger of attack justified our maintaining a Navy. For the moment I am prepared to admit that it may, but it is a question of the use of the Navy in time of emergency that I am a little anxious about. I really do not want to detain your Lordships any longer than is necessary, and my last remark is this: If I and my noble friend Lord Haldane indulge in lurid terms about the character of this base, and the intention behind it, I think in common justice that noble Lords opposite should impute the blame where it properly lies. I would recommend them, if they have not already done so, to read the articles which have appeared in the Press, and the statements made in another place by members of their own Party. This they should do, because the pacific motives attributed to this base by the Government in this House are not shared by some of the writers in the Press or by some of the speakers in another place on their own side in politics. Those writings and speeches have not been characterised by diplomatic reticence, and they are quoted very largely in Japan. That is all that I have to say for the moment, and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.