SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE.

HL Deb 18 March 1924 vol 56 cc817-47

Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion of the Earl of Balfour, That there be laid before this House Papers relating to the naval base at Singapore.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD)

My Lords, I think it will be for the convenience of the House if I read at once a statement which contains the considered policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the subject matter of the Motion which was brought before your Lordships by the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, last Thursday. We have given careful consideration to the proposal to develop the naval base at Singapore. We have closely studied the reasons which led to the adoption of this project, and the arguments in support of its continuation urged upon us from the point of view of naval defence. We had, however, to consider the matter in a wider relationship, and came to the conclusion that we could not ask Parliament to proceed with this scheme. We were convinced that, if we were to do so, our action would exercise a most detrimental effect on our general foreign policy. As we have repeatedly stated, we stand for a policy of international co-operation through a strengthened and enlarged League of Nations, the settlement of disputes by conciliation and judicial arbitration, and the creation of conditions which will make a comprehensive agreement on limitation of armaments possible.

As stated in the Prime Minister's letter to M. Poincaré on February 21, "out task meanwhile must be to establish confidence, and this task can only be achieved by allaying the international suspicions and anxieties which exist to-day." It seemed clear, apart from any other considerations, that to continue to develop the naval base at Singapore would hamper the establishment of this confidence and lay our good faith open to suspicion. Whilst maintaining the present standards in a state of complete efficiency, we take the view that it would be a serious mistake to be responsible for new developments that can only be justified on assumptions that would definitely admit that we had doubts of the success of our own policy. As a result we should almost inevitably drift into a condition of mistrust and competition of armaments in the Far East.

Having provisionally reached the conclusions which I have set out, we felt it our duty, in view of the discussions at the recent Imperial Conference, to communicate with the Governments of the self-governing Dominions. We therefore put the position before them and invited their views. I propose to give the House a summary of those views. The Canadian Government tell us that they wish to refrain from any advice on the proposal. The Irish Free State has adopted a similar attitude. As to Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland, I must explain quite clearly that their Prime Ministers wish, and indeed urge, us to continue with the base. The Commonwealth Government express cordial sympathy with our international policy of conciliation. They tell us that the desire in Australia is for a better understanding among the nations and a definite reduction of armaments on every possible occasion. They consider, however, that the action which we propose, instead of assisting the policy in view, will jeopardise it, in that any reduction in the mobility of the Fleet will reduce our influence in the councils of the nations. If the development of the Singapore base, the intention to proceed with which was, they point out, well understood at the time of the Washington Conference, is now to be discontinued, Australia would rather see this step taken as a means for securing further international agreement for mutual reduction of armaments.

The New Zealand Government attach great importance to the development of the base, their opinion being founded mainly on grounds of naval strategy. Whilst laying stress on the view that its use is for defensive and not offensive purposes, they feel that the interests of the British Empire in the Pacific will be endangered should our capital ships be unable to operate in those waters, and that the time has not yet come to rely solely on the influence for peace of the League of Nations. I should add that the Commonwealth Government have informed us of their readiness to submit proposals to their Parliament for a substantial contribution to the development of the base. New Zealand has already generously offered a first contribution of £100.000 towards it.

Lastly, from South Africa we have heard from General Smuts that our proposed policy, which he describes as "a bold move towards enduring peace," meets with his whole-hearted agreement. He feels that the authority of the British Empire as the protagonist of the great cause of appeasement and conciliation among the nations would be seriously undermined by the construction of the Singapore base.

From this summary, I think I may claim that we have a large measure of sympathy in the Dominions with our international policy, even if all parts of the Empire do not feel able to endorse the methods by which we consider that that policy should be carried out. The criticisms are founded, in the main, on the conception that the Singapore base is essential as part of a complete defensive Pacific strategy. Should the practical necessity for putting such a strategy into operation arise by reason of the condition of world politics and a return to attempts to provide Imperial security primarily by armaments, the whole question would have to be reconsidered, but in the opinion of His Majesty's Government that has not now arisen, and it is the duty of His Majesty's Government to try to prevent its arising. We have every confidence in our policy, and we feel that a decision not to proceed with the naval base at Singapore will give that policy the best possible chance of success, and is an earnest of our good faith. May I say in the first place, in regard to that summary which I have read of the opinion of the Dominions, that we are communicating at the present moment with the Dominions, to request them to allow us to publish their telegrams in full. They are secret telegrams at the present moment, and we could not proceed to the publication without first obtaining their leave.

But before I proceed to touch upon the policy which has been outlined in the statement of the Government which I have read to the House, perhaps it might be well for me to indicate the manner in which the Government have proceeded in this matter. It is well known, I think, to your Lordships, that the Government, when in opposition, held decided views against the policy of the Singapore naval base, but notwithstanding that, indeed I may say because of that, they felt it was imperative for them to enter into a very close and thorough examination of the whole problem, and so they decided that the question should be re-examined de novo. I think the reasons for that determination must be obvious to your Lordships. In the first place, the two previous Administrations bad affirmed the policy of the naval base at Singapore, and that, in itself, was a cogent reason why there should be careful examination by His Majesty's present Government of the reasons which actuated them in that policy. In the second place, it is obvious that the data which are at the disposal of the Opposition for forming a considered judgment on any matter, must be widely different from those which are at the disposal of the Government, which has all the inside knowledge at its disposal, on which to form an opinion.

Then, my Lords, I can say that the Government re-examined this problem afresh. They had all the facts, they had all the knowledge, they had all the experience which could be furnished to them by their highly trained expert advisers. If it had been a naval issue, pure and simple, which we had been called upon to decide, involving no repercussion on other spheres of policy, I think I should not be going too far in saying that the Government would have had no hesitation in accepting the purely naval point of view, if it could be taken alone. Indeed, I think it is clear from the statement itself, towards the end, where it is stated "and should the practical necessity for putting such a strategy into operation arise "the whole question would have to be reconsidered. We have not said to our experts—and are they not the finest in the world?—"We do not accept your facts, we doubt your knowledge and experience, we know better than you." Far from it. All we say in this statement of policy is this, that the naval issue cannot be judged by itself. It must be considered in a wider relation. I have dwelt upon this because I think it is essential, at the very outset of my remarks, to make quite clear what this decision of the Government means.

On Thursday last the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, addressed your Lordships on this subject. Of course, anything that the noble Earl may say on any subject would carry the greatest weight, and be entitled to the profoundest respect, and I think it must be clear from what I have already said that, so far as the purely naval issue is concerned, I am not combating, or endeavouring to combat, that part of the speech of the noble Earl in which he dwelt upon the naval aspect of the Singapore base. But he did not address himself—and how could he?—to the basic principle which underlies our statement of policy, It was not before him at that time, and, if I may, I will read to your Lordships again the objective of our foreign policy. It is in these words:— We stand for a policy of international co-operation through a strengthened and enlarged League of Nations, the settlement of disputes by conciliation and judicial arbitration, and the creation of conditions which will make a comprehensive agreement or limitations of armaments possible. Now, my Lords, I will ask you to consider what would be the Prime Minister's position when he approached other Powers with such proposals if he proceeded with the policy of the Singapore naval base.

Would he not be twitted at once with this: "Your intentions, no doubt, are admirable and strictly honourable, but we should have had greater confidence in your sincerity if it had not been that at the very moment when you are making these proposals to us you are developing the great naval base of yours at Singapore "? The noble Earl dwelt with great force in his speech last Thursday on the attitude of this country with regard to Singapore, and his words are so eloquent, and, if I may respectfully say so, so true, that I will read them to your Lordships. He said: And the fundamental defence of our view of Singapore is that by strengthening the defences of the Empire for which we are responsible, without at the same time threatening any other rival Power in those parts of the world, we are taking a step which safeguards peace, which makes in favour of the status quo, and which does nothing whatever, direct or indirect, either to raise legitimate jealousies, or to excite fears, be they right or wrong, or to produce the state of war which is too often the result of armaments designed for a different purpose and capable of being turned to a different use.'' I do not pretend for one moment that those who were responsible for the policy of the naval base at Singapore were not sincerely convinced that they were proposing nothing to raise legitimate jealousies or to excite fear. But surely, at this moment, what the Prime Minister has to bear in mind is not the rectitude of our own conduct, but the views and susceptibilities of other parties.

There has been a very striking instance just lately of the susceptibilities which exist abroad with regard to what we may very rightly consider to be perfectly innocent acts on our part. You have noticed that lately exception has been taken abroad to our Fleet exercises in the Western Mediterranean. May I state as a fact that for the last thirty years our squadrons which are based on home waters have cruised in the Western Mediterranean during the winter months, in order to get finer weather and longer days, and because the Western Mediterranean is a convenient point of meeting for the squadrons. ? In 1922 similar exercises took place in the same neighbourhood, and they only did not take place last year because of the situation in the Dardanelles. I am anxious to mention this for two reasons. In the first place, I hope to disabuse the minds of our friends abroad of the idea that these Fleet exercises have behind them any ulterior or sinister motives. I mention it also for a reason which is more germane to the reply which I am making to the noble Earl—namely, that surely this is not an inapposite example of the necessity of bearing in mind the views of other parties.

Let me take another illustration. The noble Earl in his speech put this question to myself: Does anybody think, does the noble Lord who is at the head of the Admiralty think, or is he prepared to contend, that the creation of a naval base at Singapore is of a character which can be seriously treated as a menace to any other Power at all? If one regards that purely from our point of view, I say: Certainly not, we cannot regard it as such. But one can quite conceive that other Powers may well say that defensive arrangements always connote offensive potentialities; and it is from this point of view that at this moment we have to approach this problem, and it is from this point of view that the Government have arrived at the decision which I have announced.

But it will be said, and it was said by the noble Earl, that the great Powers at Washington knew of this proposed base when the Washington Pact was come to. Of course, the Government know that that is so from the investigations which they have made, and I am not suggesting for one moment that ill faith could be imputed to this country if it were to proceed with the Singapore base. But I come back again to this point: it is not the rectitude of our own attitude which is at stake at this moment, it is that we have to convince the world of our sincerity if we are proceeding to approach them with a view to appeasement and the getting rid of the spirit of suspicion and hate which seems to exist almost everywhere. It is a simple and a broad point, which does not require much elaboration, which I will put before your Lordships, and it is this. It is imperative for the Government at this moment to convince the world of the sincerity of this country when it is approaching them with proposals with regard to a more peaceful state of things.

There is one more matter to which I should like to allude before I sit down. During the controversy which has been proceeding on this subject attacks have been prevalent on the Board of Admiralty, and if they had been levelled against myself as the political head of that Department there could be no possible ground of complaint. It would have been the right and proper course to take. But that has not been the case, and I want very briefly to point out the constitutional position. In 1910 the following was laid down with regard to the responsibility of the Navy in a Report of a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, of which the whole is published in Command Paper 2029: The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial Defence against attack from over the sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognised by the Admiralty, who have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against organised invasion from the sea. That principle was, in terms, endorsed last year. From that it is perfectly clear that the duty of the Lords of Admiralty is to advise the Government on the naval responsibilities as so laid down. As soon as they have advised, the responsibility passes to the Government, if it accept their advice, or if, as in this case, it has not rejected their advice, but has said that it must be considered in a wider relationship. The Admiralty then, in this case, must neither be regarded as having gone beyond its duties in advising on the responsibilities so laid down, nor, on the other hand, is it responsible for policy, which is the Government's alone. Like any other Government servants, they have given their advice, and with that advice their responsibility begins and ends.

I should not have alluded to this but for the ignorant and unfair attacks which have been made on some of my naval colleagues, and I would appeal outside for fair play—an appeal which, I believe, never fails when it is made in this country and to Englishmen. Like all Government servants, their mouths are shut, and it is for me to protest and defend them; and I need hardly say that the great sailors with whom it is my privilege to have been associated during the past few weeks possess the complete confidence of His Majesty's Government.

Now I have finished, and I hope, at all events, that I have made the position and policy of His Majesty's Government perfectly clear. I believe that I have set forth a policy, which, whether noble Lords agree with it or not, is at least intelligible and fraught with great possibilities. For my part, I can say we have every confidence in it, and we desire to give it the best possible chance of success. For us to pursue any other course would be to admit that we had doubts in our minds of the success of our own policy.

THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON

My Lords, the noble Viscount has just announced to your Lordships, partly from the paper which he read and partly from the remarks which followed it, the decision which has been arrived at by His Majesty's present advisers on this most important question of the development of the naval base at Singapore. That decision will have been received by your Lordships' House, I will not say with surprise, because it may be said to have been, in some respects at any rate, foreshadowed by previous utterances from members of the Party to which the noble Viscount belongs; but whether it has been received with surprise or not, I venture to assert that it will have been received by your Lordships with profound regret, and I would venture even to add a stronger phrase, and to say with feelings of dismay.

I shall turn in a moment to the reasons, to my mind the astonishing reasons, which have been given by the noble Viscount for this procedure on the part of the Ministry to which he belongs. Before I do that, may I say that I was glad to note that from his speech there disappeared any repetition of the argument with which we have been made familiar on previous occasions—namely, that the decision of the late Government to proceed with this naval base at Singapore could justifiably be regarded in any way as a ground of suspicion and complaint amongst those Powers who were represented at Washington; still less, that it argued any breach of good faith on the part of ourselves in this respect.

A year ago, when we had more than one discussion in this House on the subject, speeches were made by the noble Viscount, Lord Wimborne, and the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, in which, speaking without full information at their disposal, they hinted that at Washington our Government had been a little too clever, a little too smart, had got the better of our adversaries or, if not of our adversaries, even of our friends in this respect, and that altogether there was something a little unsavory about the whole proceedings. The speech of the noble Karl, Lord Balfour, completely demolished this groundless suspicion. Not only do we know that this policy of developing the base at Singapore has been one which has for long been in the minds of His Majesty's advisers, not only do we know that it was part of the instructions with which Lord Balfour went out to Washington, but we learned from him also that the fixation of the one hundreth-and-tenth parallel of Eastern longitude was arrived at with a perfect knowledge on the part of all those concerned, not only that we were at liberty to protect and fortify our bases lying outside that limit, but that we intended to do so; that it was known to the Americans; that it was known to the Japanese, and that it was known to all the signatories of the Washington Agreement. Therefore, nothing can be more clear than this, that the idea that there was any breach, technical or otherwise, either of the letter or the spirit of the Washington Agreement, or that there was any scintilla of bad faith on our part, may be, dismissed as purely baseless. I am very glad that that at least is swept away.

Now I would like to add what, perhaps, I am in a better position to say than anybody else. If no suspicion could be created out of what happened at Washington, could any such feelings of apprehension or disappointment be legitimately aroused in Japan? I was at the Foreign Office when these decisions were arrived at. Supposing there had been any ground for such apprehension on the part of the Japanese Government, supposing they had thought that the construction of a naval base at Singapore was in any measure directed against them, what would have been their natural action ? The Japanese Ambassador would have come round and seen me at once with his interrogations, with his challenge, with his, demand for further information. Did he do so? Not in the least. On the only occasion on which the Japanese Ambassador came to see me about this question, he remarked to me that he thoroughly understood our policy, that it was in consonance with what he knew to be our policy, that he himself did not, and his Government did not, share the apprehensions to which I am referring, and that he had no complaint whatever to make. Are we to be more sensitive, more suspicious and more susceptible than Japan ?

The Japanese Government behaved in this matter with perfect straightforwardness and good faith. They know, as we know, that, although the Alliance that subsisted for so many years between England and Japan has come to an end, the feelings of friendship and of concord that unite the two countries are not only strong, but lasting. They entertain no more suspicion of us for developing this base at Singapore than we do of them for spending two millions sterling this year in strengthening and fortifying their naval bases, as they are doing. Do we get up and level our suspicions against them ? Do we attack the Americans because, within the limits permitted to them in the Washington Agreement, they are acting in the same way ? No. And if we do not entertain these suspicions, neither for a moment do I believe that they are entertained by Japan or by any other country.

That brings me to the explanation of this decision on the part of His Majesty's Government which has been given by the noble Viscount, Lord Chelmsford. He has told us this afternoon that the resolution to continue the policy of the past two Governments in this respect would have a detrimental effect upon our foreign policy in general; that the task of His Majesty's advisers is to establish confidence—that has been the task of every Government that has ever spoken from the Front Bench in either House of Parliament—that it is for them to allay the suspicion and anxiety which everywhere exist and to destroy the impression that our good faith is not to be counted upon. The noble Viscount spoke about the spirit of suspicion and of hate that is abroad in the world. Where ? I wish the noble Lord would give his evidence, for, after all, it is only about two months ago that the noble Lord and his colleagues took office. Certainly when we retired I had, I suppose, as good means as anybody of ascertaining whether these feelings were in existence. I do not recollect them. I have no recollection of Ambassadors coming with frowning countenances into my room and telling me that we were living in a world of suspicion and hate, and that I must perform some signal act of abnegation, even at the expense of my country, in order to remove these feelings of suspicion and hate.

When did these feelings of suspicion and hate grow up ? What representations have been made about them and by whom; The only evidence the noble Viscount could adduce was this, that somehow or other in some quarter which he did not specify, because the British Fleet had been moving about in a certain part of the Mediterranean, someone—I believe it was an Italian newspaper—had said: "What are these people about ? Are they not really challenging our position in the Mediterranean ? "On that basis and that alone, as far as I can determine, the noble Viscount asks us to believe that we are living in this terrible state of affairs, which His Majesty's advisers are destined to exorcise.

He said that the pursuance of this plan would mean that we were drifting into a competition of armaments. Now, what does that mean ? What were we proposing to do at Singapore? As I understand, the proposal was simply this. The mobility of the British Fleet, for whatever purpose it be required, either for the keeping open of the trade routes, or the protection of our Dominions, or the vindication of the honour of our flag, requires that there should be certain facilities provided in respect of floating docks, graving docks, and so on, which do not at present exist, or, if they do exist, exist at a distance from the possible scene of action so great that the Fleet might be rendered useless for the purpose for which it might be called upon to act. For that reason, and for that reason only, it has been proposed to take a place lying in the channel between the Island of Singapore and the mainland, to create there these docks and these establishments in order to enable the Fleet to do with greater promptitude and at less cost what it might otherwise have to return to Europe to effect. That is, we are told, tantamount to a confession on our part that we are going in for competition in respect of armaments. Surely, that argument is one which cannot be sustained for a moment, and still less can we hold, as the noble Lord I invited us to do, that this is a bellicose step.

The noble Viscount himself gave the answer to his own charge when he quoted Lord Balfour's words. If there is any man who has a right to speak in this House, or to the public opinion of the country, with authority on such a subject as that, not merely as a statesman of the highest standing but as one who has been himself Foreign Minister, it is Lord Balfour. I suppose there is no one who has a greater right to speak than he, and the greater part of his argument in the latter portion of his speech was that this was not a menace of war but was an act of peace, that it was a measure which will enable us in the future to exercise that influence in Far Eastern waters, in the Indian Ocean, in the China Seas, and in the Pacific which undoubtedly will be a guarantee of peace rather than a menace of war.

The noble Viscount may say—he did not actually say, but I have heard it said before: "Is this provision required? What enemy do you possibly fear ? It cannot be the United States; it is inconceivable we shall ever be fighting with them. Is it not therefore Japan that you are aiming at ? "I think that is a line of argument that can only be pursued with considerable caution. As a matter of fact, you might use the same argument with respect to any part of our defensive forces. You might say: "You must not have a fleet in the Mediterranean, for that is a menace to Italy; you must not have a fleet in the Channel, because that is a danger to France; you must not have a fleet in the North Sea, or the Baltic, because that is shaking your fist in the face of Russia; you must not have a fleet in the Atlantic, because America may not like it."

The whole of the arguments of the noble Lord are really arguments not in favour of not proceeding with this particular measure; they are arguments in favour of disposing of the whole of our defensive forces. His argument is equally valid for saying: "We will not have an Air Force of any commanding character, because people will suspect us; we will not have an Army at all "—and indeed I read that a number of gentlemen in the House of Commons yesterday were arguing on those lines—" we will not have an Army at all, because, after all, if you have an Army someone knows that some day or other you may fight, and that is not the impression we desire to produce." Our armaments are kept and maintained, whether they are armaments in the air, or on the sea, or on land, not with a view to meeting any one antagonist, they are kept with a view to meeting any contingency that may arise, to meet any possible antagonist or any combination of antagonists that may conceivably occur. They are maintained not with a view to a situation that may arise to-morrow, or the next day, but with a view to all likely or conceivable contingencies in the future. They are, in fact, a part of the policy of insurance which we have to pay if we are to remain a great Empire in the world.

I pass to that part of the speech of the noble Viscount which dealt with the question of the Dominions. Here we are on very delicate and very tender ground. I had the honour of assisting at all the sessions of the Imperial Conference a few months ago. This question was most minutely sifted and explored on that occasion. The Ministers of the Dominions by no means came with their minds made up upon the matter. I remember very well that Mr. Bruce, the Prime Minister of Australia, in particular, before he was satisfied, required answers to a number of questions of a most searching character. But I also recall that when the matter had been discussed on no fewer than two or three occasions, he ended by saying that he was prepared to admit that they believed the establishment of a base at Singapore to be absolutely vital to their interests, and to the interests of the Empire as a whole. What Mr. Bruce then said was confirmed in the published Resolutions of the Conference, and has been not only confirmed but emphasised by the evidence which the noble Viscount has given us this afternoon.

He said, and I heard it with satisfaction, that His Majesty's Government propose to lay before Parliament the text of the opinions they have received. That is, if I may say so, quite right and proper. But I also hope the noble Viscount will lay at the same time the text of the communication which was addressed by His Majesty's Government to them. Many of us would rather like to know in what form the request for an opinion was couched, whether it indicated that the mind of His Majesty's Government had already been made up, or whether, the matter being still open, the Government desired the advice of their distinguished colleagues across the sea. The noble Viscount told us just now that the Canadian Government offered no advice, and that the Government of Ireland was in the same position. On the other hand, New Zealand, Newfoundland—I hope I am quoting correctly—and the Commonwealth of Australia expressed themselves in the strongest possible language, in stronger language even than the published Resolutions of the Imperial Conference.

As I gathered, the Commonwealth of Australia said that our action would jeopardise the position of Great Britain in the world, and diminish our influence in the councils of nations, and that the position of Great Britain in the Pacific would be in danger. So strongly do they hold these views that some of them, I gather, in addition to New Zealand, which six months ago placed in its Budget an item of £100,000 for this purpose, are prepared to increase their own contributions. Of the whole of the Dominions whose answers were quoted by the noble Viscount the only one that expressed criticism or dissent was the South African Government, as represented by General Smuts. Nothing will induce me ever to speak of General Smuts except with respect and admiration, but his views on these pacific questions are well known, and it may also be remarked that South Africa lies very much outside the purview of the scene of action in which a British Fleet might be called upon in connection with the base at Singapore.

One word about the position, if he will allow me to offer it to him, of the noble Viscount. He told us the other day of the circumstances under which he had accepted Office, and we respected the candour and the courage of his remarks. Now, in what position does he find himself to-day ?

VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD

I think I made it quite clear in my speech that I was in absolute and cordial agreement with His Majesty's Government in this matter.

THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON

I was not raising that point for a moment, and it would be most unfair to the noble Viscount to suggest anything of the sort. What I was pointing out was that the noble Viscount, as First Lord of the Admiralty, finds himself, unless there has been a complete change of opinion, acting, in concert with his colleagues, in opposition to the views of the whole of the naval experts in the Admiralty. Unless there has been a complete change of opinion, I assume that is the case. He finds himself acting in opposition in this matter to the views of the whole of the Dominions, with the single exception of South Africa; and I wonder whether he finds himself acting in harmony with the Government of India, he himself being an ex-Viceroy. India, and the Indian Ocean, are vitally concerned in this matter. The Indian representatives at the meeting of the Imperial Conference strongly endorsed the views taken by their colleagues from the Dominions, and all I suggest to the noble Viscount is this, that in the inauguration of a term of office, which we hope will be successful, to begin by acting in opposition to the views of the whole of your naval advisers, the whole of the Prime Ministers, with one exception, of the Dominions, and, so far as I know, in opposition to the opinions of the Government of India, of which he was once the head, is to assume a very grave responsibility indeed. The noble Viscount is conscious of his own ability to bear such a responsibility, but I may be pardoned if I point it out to the House.

There are many other points which I might have been disposed to take were it not that at this late hour, if the discussion is to continue to-night, it is undesirable to do anything more than allude to the particular observations that have been made by the noble Viscount. But this I would like to say in vindication of what I believe to be the attitude of the Party to which I belong. Why do we hold that the construction or the development of this naval base at Singapore is a matter of supreme importance ? And that question ought to be answered, because I remember that a year ago, when in its earlier stages we discussed the subject, while the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack admitted that a prima facie case might be made out, and while noble Lords speaking with authority quite agreed that the central position of Singapore rendered it a desirable spot to take, that the Navy would be strengthened by it, that the power of Britain would be enhanced—really at that date the question was more of the money it would cost than anything else—while that was the position taken up by the majority of speakers last year, all of them, as far as I can recollect, were disposed to admit that if the construction of this base could be shown to be vital and essential, then it ought, to be done.

It is our view that it is vital, that it is essential; and for that reason it ought to be proceeded with. Our view depends, as I understand it, upon our estimate and idea of what the functions of our Navy ought to be, and let me in a sentence or two attempt to define them. Most of us at home are apt, with the memory of the recent war upon us, to regard the Navy as our domestic shield, as the force which protects us from invasion, which secures our food supplies coming to these shores, and which is strong enough to defeat any enemy that may attack us. But that, of course, is only a small corner of the function of the Navy. What it has to do, inter alia, is to protect and keep open the whole of our trade routes in every part of the world, in the Pacific as much as in the Mediterranean or in the Atlantic, and, further, to secure from attack, from invasion, from the risks of loss, our possessions along the great trade routes in distant parts of the world.

I have spent a good deal of my life in travelling in those regions—I am speaking now of the countries which lie between India and Japan—and I have always contemplated with the gravest anxiety what might happen in contingencies in the future not wholly to be dismissed, in which attacks might be made by an enemy, or by a combination of enemies, either upon the shores of India, or upon Singapore itself, or upon Hong Kong: and even if those attacks were not made I have often wondered what would happen if, as is not inconceivable, the great Empire of China broke up in chaos and confusion and it were necessary to take steps there, by the despatch of powerful military and naval forces, to sustain our interests in those parts of the world. On such an occasion, may you not want the most powerful fleet that you can put on those waters ? And in such a case might it not be vital that it should have means of repair and docking which a great naval base in, those waters can alone afford ? Do not believe that such risks are a mere chimera. They may, or they may not, happen in the lifetime of any of us.

But supposing you dismiss my vaticinations and confine your attention to the question of the Dominions only. Nothing was borne in more strongly upon me when the case was recently discussed than the fact that these Dominions believed profoundly that they were not safe, that their security must depend in the future, as it has in the past, upon the action and co-operation of the British Fleet; that they have not the means and the resources to enable them to defend themselves, that reliance upon our Navy in the background has been the sheet anchor of their confidence and defence. Have you paused to think, not merely whether you do wisely in passing over the advice of the Dominion Ministers whom you have consulted, but of the effect you are going to produce on the populations of the Dominions as a whole ? What is the whole theory upon which we have built up and maintained this Empire ? Surely, it is that of common co-operation in a common interest, that while we, when we were in trouble, looked to them, and seldom looked in vain, for such assistance as they could render, they could always rely on the British Navy to assist them in their hour of need. That is the whole basis of our Imperial position in the world.

And what are you going to say to them ? No more of that mutual co-operation ! If you want to defend yourselves you must do it yourselves, meanwhile we are going trotting about the world in order to find a policy of disarmament; we are so much alarmed by the atmosphere of suspicion and hate that we are going all round the countries of the world cap in hand promising them reductions here and there in order to induce a better spirit ! The idea is admirable, purely platonic, wholly academic, and while you are pursuing this phantom—as I am sorry to say, in the existing state of affairs, it is—you are running the risk of shaking the confidence and the belief, and impairing the unity, of your Empire. That is the point of view from which I believe the majority of my friends, of the noble Lords with whom I act in this House, regard this matter.

We do believe, not in any bellicose spirit, not with any jingo designs, that a British Fleet can only perform the service for which it is intended, and in the pursuit of which it has hitherto acted, if it is given the facilities for mobility to which I have referred; and holding this view as strongly as we do, and resenting as deeply as we do the manner in which the opinion of our colleagues in those Dominions is about to be overruled, I feel that I have no alternative but to ask your Lordships to record these views in a Motion. At the present moment the Motion before the House is that moved by Lord Balfour last week for Papers. I should like to move, as an Amendment to that Motion on the part of the noble Earl, that the words after the word "that" be omitted, and that for them be substituted these words: "this House, believing that the development of the naval base at Singapore, as approved by the recent Imperial Conference, is urgently required for the protection of our commerce, the security of our Dominions and the future maintenance of peace, deeply regrets the decision of His Majesty's Government not to proceed with that measure."

Amendment moved— Leave out all words after (" That ") and insert (" this House, believing that the development of the naval base at Singapore, as approved by the recent Imperial Conference, is urgently required for the protection of our commerce, the security of our Dominions and the future maintenance of peace, deeply regrets the decision of His Majesty's Government not to proceed with that measure.''—(The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.)

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

My Lords, I think some of your Lordships who may not feel that this question of the naval base at Singapore is quite so simple as it would appear to anyone who has listened to the speech of the noble Marquess, will be placed in some difficulty by having a Resolution of which no previous notice has been given put to your Lordships for decision at this late hour of the evening. I am prepared to state my own views, but I will not attempt to do so at any length, the more so because, a year ago, I did express at some length my views, as they then were, on this question of the naval base at Singapore. I expressed considerable doubts as to its wisdom. The speech of the noble Marquess has not removed those doubts. It is the kind of speech which has always been made, and, I suppose, always will he made, and which is perfectly unexceptionable in itself, in defence of every increase of armaments that is proposed.

I do not go quite so far as the noble Viscount, Lord Chelmsford, in founding my doubts about this base on the League of Nations or the prospects of future peace. I think it would be very dangerous and, indeed, disadvantageous to the future of the League of Nations if at the present stage we based any reduction of our armaments upon the hopes which we found upon the future of the League. I have my own views, upon which, of course, I will not enter to-night, as to how that League may be greatly strengthened and made a much greater reality than it is at present, and when that time comes I think it will automatically produce a reduction of armaments. But I will not enter upon that to-night.

I should like to point out, however, that we are not, to-night, discussing a diminution of armaments at all. The very point which I have put as to not basing reduction of armaments upon the prospects of a future pacific policy was put with more force than my own by the present Prime Minister in the House of Commons the other day when he was defending the building of five cruisers. It was put, with great point and force and without reserve, and it amounted to this—that we must not let our Navy down while the prospects of a future pacific policy were in the balance. But this is not a question of letting the Navy down. It is a question, as I understand it, of to-day, now, at this moment, agreeing to contracts which commit us irrevocably to giving to our Navy—not to maintaining to our Navy—a range of potentiality which it has not had before, certainly in recent years, and has not to-day. It is not an, increase in the size of the Navy, but it is a great increase in the striking power and the potential force of the Navy. That is a point which the noble Marquess did not make in his speech, and which is really a point of substantial difference.

If it were a question of diminishing the strength of the Navy from the point of view of a European standard, I should agree with everything the noble Marquess has urged. The country was very rightly sensitive for years before the last war on the subject of maintaining a Navy based upon a certain European standard, and that Navy was maintained. Preparations to meet the contingency of a European war were not only made but were kept, up to the very eve of war, at the pitch of preparedness. That was the case before the last war. But this is providing for an entirely different contingency—not a contingency of European war but a different contingency altogether. Sooner or later, we shall, I am sure, again come back to this, that our standard of naval strength, our primary and first consideration, is a European standard. This is not going to increase our naval power from that point of view. In so far as it adds to the naval expenditure, not merely the millions which are required to build this base, but the millions required to keep it up, it will weaken rather than strengthen our Naval Estimates for the contingency of another European war.

We are always at a great disadvantage in discussing these questions of naval expenditure, because it is indiscreet to come to realities. The noble Marquess spoke about providing for a possible contingency, a conceivable contingency, and so forth, but one knows very well that when this sort of naval expenditure is advocated it is advocated on grounds, discussed, presumably, in the Committee of Imperial Defence, which are not providing for possible or conceivable contingencies but for some definite contingency. Of course, it becomes invidious to discuss that question of definite contingencies. One knows perfectly well, in this case, that if there were not another powerful fleet in that part of the world this expenditure would not be advocated. If another powerful fleet began to be built in that part of the world probably the Admiralty would advocate this expenditure. It is therefore advocated for a certain definite contingency.

I am not impressed by the fact that the Japanese Ambassador was perfectly civil about, this expenditure. I am not impressed by the fact that the noble Marquess did not hear from the Ambassadors any evidence of the suspicion and hate which exist in the world. Until the eve of war the Foreign Office is the last place where any uncivil language is used. I agree that as regards ourselves and Japan any idea of suspicion and hate is out of the question, and I like to think that, although the Alliance is at an end, our relations remain as cordial as when the Alliance was in existence. But what happens with our expenditure on armaments is not that one nation comes down and objects to that expenditure, but that another, which always says it understands that expenditure, also spends itself.

I went at some length into this point of possible contingencies last year. I went into it at a length which I thought at the time, and which I think now, was possibly rather indiscreet. What I said is on record in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I am not going to take away from my remarks, nor am I going to emphasise them by repetition, because I think that on the whole what I said was sound. There is only one qualification which I wish to make with regard to what I said a year ago. It is this: the noble Marquess said I had hinted, at any rate, that this expenditure might be regarded in the United States or in Japan as a breach not of the letter but of the spirit of the Washington Agreement. Of course, it is always possible at such Conferences to be perfectly clear in your own mind as to what it is you want to get, and then afterwards, when the Conference has closed, rather to surprise those with whom you are in conference by disclosing that which was in your own mind, and of which they had not known until the discussion had closed. Therefore, I welcome the statement made by the noble Earl, and also by the noble Marquess, that not only was this question of the Singapore base known at the Washington Conference, but—I notice this with pleasure-that the suggestion that what was proposed about a base at Singapore was in any way a breach of the spirit of the Washington Conference has not been taken by public opinion or by the Government, either in Japan or the United States. I therefore qualify what I said last year by saying that I am delighted to know that that objection is out of the way.

But that is not the only thing. It is true, as Lord Balfour has said, that this measure of expenditure or proposed expenditure upon the base at Singapore is in our own minds, in our hearts and intention, purely a defensive measure. That is absolutely true. What is equally true, unfortunately, is that that descrip- tion of the expenditure is never accepted fully by other countries, as from their point of view the sole account of the matter, and it never will be; for this reason: that in most matters of strategy the most effective measure of defence is a measure of potential offence. That was a favourite doctrine of one great Sea Lord, no longer living, whose conception of defence was that you should be able to strike hard and strike first.

We may take it for granted that every measure we take for the increase of armaments, or the increase of our power, will be regarded, though purely defensive in our own mind, from the angle of vision of possible offence in the minds of other Governments mainly concerned. I do not think that the building of this base at Singapore will impair our relations with Japan if we go on with it, but I am perfectly certain that, although the direct consequences will not be to create friction between the Governments, the indirect result must be an increase of expenditure in that part of the world. One, expenditure leads to another, and I think there is strength in the argument of Lord Chelmsford that this is not the time for taking steps which will lead to a large increase in naval strength.

Then I come to a point of considerable difficulty, and that is the opinion of the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers. We, who do not wish to see this base at Singapore pressed at the present moment, and who agree that the line taken by the Government is not an unreasonable one, are placed in this difficulty. We are simply upholding views which we held a year ago, and which we professed, and were known to profess, on this question. Since we last expressed those views an Imperial Conference has been held, and the Government of the day came under, I will not say an undertaking but an agreement, an understanding, with the Dominion Prime Ministers to do certain things. They did it knowing that a considerable body of Liberal and Labour opinion was opposed to some of those things on which they were coming to an agreement or understanding with the Dominion Prime Ministers.

They were perfectly entitled to do that. The Dominion Prime Ministers must have known perfectly well that the decisions at the Conference which required the sanction of Parliament must be subject to Parliamentary sanction, that those things which required money and taxation, and so forth, would require the sanction of the House of Commons. They knew that, and they knew there was considerable opposition, but they were entitled to enter into these agreements, and I think the Government were entitled to make these agreements, because they had a majority in the House of Commons, and they had every prospect, and indeed every right, to say to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions that they were in a position not merely to pledge themselves but to make those views effective in Parliament. What has placed us in a difficulty is that the Government which conducted the Imperial Conference put all the decisions of that Conference to the hazards of a General Election.

That has created a most unfortunate situation. If the Dominion Prime Ministers are disappointed, I do not think that the responsibility for their disappointment ought to be placed upon us who repeat this year the views which we had expressed last year. Their disappointment, if they feel any, should be with the late Government, which put to the hazard of a General Election the agreements they had come to with the Dominion Prime Ministers, when they might have continued in power till those agreements had been made operative in Parliament.

I am not convinced by anything that we have heard that the views we expressed a year ago as to the wisdom of this base at Singapore were unsound. I had very-great doubts as to whether it is a wise step to commit ourselves to this expenditure. I should, of course, have been perfectly prepared to accept the Motion of the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, asking for Papers, and I would endorse the request of the noble Marquess that not only the replies of the Dominions but the Despatch of His Majesty's Government to the Dominions should be published together. I am anxious for the fullest information on the point, but, as the noble Marquess has moved an Amendment which directly challenges views which we expressed a year ago, and which I see no reason to change, though I know that he may have with him a large majority of your Lordships, I shall feel bound myself to express my inability to accept his Amendment by voting against it in the Lobby, if it goes to a Division.

VISCOUNT NOVAR

My Lords, if the statement which has been made on behalf of the Government has caused dismay among the great majority of the members of your Lordships' House, it is not surprising to learn that it is regarded in Australasia, in the Dominions of the Southern Seas, as a fatal decision. The Prime Minister has undoubtedly hitched his waggon to a star, and the realities are lost sight of in pious aspirations. It will be in the recollection of your Lordships that, as with Singapore, so with Rosyth and the subsidiary bases in Scotland, precious time has always been lost through the vaccillation of the Government and the opposition of the Treasury. The year 1914 found Rosyth incomplete and unprepared to meet the urgent necessities of the Grand Fleet for mobilisation, to its no small hazard and danger. In the years preceding 1914 the people of this country were no more ready to anticipate war in the North Sea than they are now to contemplate the possibilities of trouble in the Pacific, or to grasp the ineffectiveness of even the greatest Navy in the world, if it is tied to one part of the world for lack of repairing and refitting docks in the other.

Mobility is the first necessity of the Navy of the British Empire, and, without adequate docks in both hemispheres, where lie the lands that it has to protect, the British Navy has not a chance. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, a confirmed pacifist, freely accepted the Rosyth scheme as one which merely provided the ordinary, obvious requirements of our Fleet. Singapore stands in the same category. Rosyth provided for the requirements of the Navy in Northern waters, Singapore for the same requirements in the Pacific, where, it is unnecessary to remind your Lordships, the British Navy always has business. At present there is no base in the Southern Seas which can accommodate our largest ships, nor are there repairing facilities, or places of shelter.

I should not have intervened in this debate on a subject with which so many experts in external affairs and in naval matters have dealt so adequately, were it not for the fact that I had the opportunity of seeing how the problem looked from the other side of the world. When war broke out Australia had to send her troops 12,000 miles across the sea, and to provide defence against the vessels of von Spee. At that time Australia had her own efficient naval unit. Japan was our faithful ally, and together these ships provided convoy, and kept watch and ward till the German cruisers were disposed of. But those favourable conditions might not always prevail. We might find ourselves single-handed in the Pacific, in which other Powers have large naval bases. The United States has a specially fine one at Honolulu, of recent creation, and her interests in the Pacific can scarcely be said to be more extensive and vulnerable than ours. Moreover, in 1914, despite cur advantages, we know that had not von Spee met his fate at the Falkland Islands the duties of convoying troops, protecting commerce, and defending our immense coastline might have proved too tough a job for the ships at our disposal.

Nor would it have been possible, in case of need, for ships of larger size to operate in those waters. There are no docks there of repairing capacity, or with harbours adequate, to receive them. Despite the magnificent Sydney Harbour, which the noble Viscount knows so well, the "Renown," which brought His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to Australia, could only just turn and find adequate room for anchorage. Fortunately, no such critical occasion arose during the war, but we learnt from the exploits of the "Emden" and the "Wolf" by the sinking of our ships close inshore, through mines laid by unseen enemies, how terribly vulnerable we were: and the bombarding of Madras by a light cruiser showed what might have been the fate of the big coastal cities of Australia. Of course, it is probable that Australia will once more build a small fleet for the purposes of local defence, but, so long as such a fleet can never hope for backing at times of great emergency from the Grand Fleet, we cannot pretend that the Southern Dominions are adequately protected. Nor can we pretend that Britain exercises any real control in the Pacific. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the present state of the world. Australia should feel deeply interested in the Singapore base.

Prior to the war, the Australian Government had evolved schemes for establishing Australian bases and had spent a good deal upon them, acting under the advice of Admiral Henderson and other eminent naval and dock authorities. Operations at those bases were suspended by the war, and later in anticipation of the visit of Lord Jellicoe, who was commissioned to inquire and report on the problem of the defence of the Pacific. I hope that the noble Viscount will soon be amongst us, and able to give us first-hand, authoritative information on the subject. At the present time Australia awaits our decision before formulating any fresh plans of defence. Lord Jellicoe anticipated that her local fleet would use Singapore as a base, and have the advantage of cooperating there with ships of the Royal Navy. This would be of the greatest advantage and would secure homogeneity in methods, discipline, and standards of efficiency between the different units of His Majesty's Naval forces. This Report, unfortunately, has never been studied as it should have been—the minute scrutiny given by Lord Jellicoe, the greatest of strategists, to every side of the question. Still fewer have read the convincing arguments with which he had supported his considered recommendations that the best Eastern base for the British Naval forces was Singapore. If Australia recognises the advantages of Lord Jellicoe's scheme she will, I believe, recognise also her financial responsibilities towards it. New Zealand has already promised a definite money contribution.

The Government has consulted the Dominions, and they may possibly judge to a certain extent of their enthusiasm for this scheme by the size of their promised contribution. This is fair enough; but though the Singapore base ensures the defence of India and the Eastern Dependencies and protects British commerce, it is Australia and NewZealand—the most undefended, the most vulnerable and, I think I may add, the greatest prizes of the Southern seas—that stand to gain most by carrying out the scheme which will bring Indian and Pacific waters under the protection of the Grand Fleet. The burden on the British taxpayer for defence, as for other purposes, is far heavier than that which rests on the citizens of any of the Overseas Dominions. Their comparatively light taxation and rating, their strong financial position, makes the inequality of sacrifice on defence more apparent. Therefore, it is only natural that we should look to Australia to become a live partner in the undertaking. I believe that both Dominions can do this without adding to their burdens, because they could save enormously on schemes of first-class and subsidiary bases for their own defence. This scheme is one in which the co-operation of all parts of the Empire is necessary.

With every sympathy for Imperial Preference, one cannot be blind to the fact that as long as the Dominions remain unfavourably disposed to increased imports, so long as England cannot afford, for very good reasons, to tax food, nothing very substantial can be done through Preference towards further Imperial unity. On the other hand, much can be done to foster unity by developing, cheapening and speeding up inter-communications, by combining in one great and comprehensive scheme of defence, the central factor of which must be a mobile and adequate Fleet, centred, according to the necessities of the day, either in the northern or southern hemisphere. It is in view of the need for this that I welcome the Amendment moved by the Leader of the Opposition.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I feel that I must reply, but at this hour I shall do so very briefly. The noble Viscount who has just spoken has expressed himself from the point of view of Australia with the strength which one would expect from any one who has occupied so distinguished and intimate a position as he has in her affairs. He expressed what I have no doubt is the general feeling in Australia. But he also spoke of the position of the British Navy and the great value of Singapore as a base. I do not challenge what he said from a naval point of view. The British Navy, when all has been said, fulfils the functions of holding the Empire together by being its principal instrument of defence, and I have no doubt that a naval base at Singapore would add considerable strength to the position of the British Navy.

But that is not the point. The point is whether that ought to be done at this moment. The Government, justifiably perhaps, and certainly with a very strong sense of what is their duty, are making an effort to assist the nations of the world to a better frame of mind than they have been in for some time. With the object of getting a common point of view, the Government have themselves abstained from anything that would have the appearance of being, or could be interpreted as, hostile, or as giving rise to suspicion. I agree with what my noble friend Lord Grey of Fallodon said upon this subject. It is not so much a question of depending on the League of Nations as a question of agreeing with the nations on something like a common point of view; even if you only began with a view and then progressed.

Between the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, to which I listened with the closest attention on Thursday, and the speech of the noble Marquess, the Leader of the Opposition, there was a considerable gulf. Lord Balfour was extremely cautious. He recognised that this base might give rise to suspicion if it was regarded from the point of view of offence but not if it was regarded from the point of view of defence. Lord Balfour's speech, admirable in temper and very moderate in tone, brought the matter to this—that the justification for the base was that it was purely for defence. The noble Marquess did not, indeed, say that it was for any other purpose than defence, but he spoke in a somewhat more resolute tone.

I am not questioning this matter from a purely naval point of view. What I am questioning, and what I questioned when I spoke in this House last summer at the same time as my noble friend Lord Grey, is the expediency of taking this step at this time. As I said before, from the naval point of, view, no doubt, Singapore would add considerably to the strength of the position of the Navy. If you established a base at Singapore, there is little doubt that, to use the phrase which I have heard in this House more than once, you would dominate the Pacific. There is nothing comparable to it, with the British Navy there, in the Western hemisphere. Again I say, if it was only a question of defence, I should regard the controversy as one open to very different considerations to the controversy which we have before us to-night. You can have things that are purely defensive. If you put up artillery positions to defend Portsmouth or Dover, they are purely defensive formations and they cannot be used for offence. It is said that is a purely defensive measure, and that it cannot be used for offensive purposes. But if you make a great naval base and fortify it at Singapore, and protect it by a garrison, and make large docks and large storing places, what is your position ?

You have a position from which your Fleet can sally forth and establish subsidiary bases, and become a directing power over a large range of ocean. That may be desirable from a purely naval point of view, but observe what it means. The suggestion to the world is that you are extending, and extending vastly, your armaments. You are making a great weapon for yourself that you did not possess before. The noble Marquess will say that nothing was further from the minds of those who conceived the Singapore project than that it should be regarded as a menace. He said that he never felt safe unless he was armed with a sharp sword. But if you have a sharp sword it is a weapon which can be used for attack as well as defence. You cannot separate offence from defence, except in such cases as those I have mentioned. Whenever you do a thing such as you are proposing to do in the case of Singapore, you are, no doubt, making a splendid instrument of defence, but it is also a potent weapon of offence. You cannot expect those with whom you are dealing to accept your assurances at the same measure that you put upon them. They may regard them in an entirely different way.

The Government felt that they could not make this base without doing something that was inconsistent with the guiding principle of their policy. Do not let anybody suppose that we are considering merely economy, and do not let anybody suppose that we are overruling the Dominions. General Smuts, who, after all, knows as much as anybody in the Empire, is with us, and Canada does not oppose. In the condition of things that we have, what are we to do ? In a great issue of foreign policy we are bound to judge of it ourselves, and to take the decision upon it ourselves, although, of course, we must take into consideration the views of the Dominions. That the Government have done, and they feel that they must resist the Amendment of the noble Marquess.

On Question, Whether the words proposed to be left out shall stand part of the Motion?

Resolved in the negative: Amendment agreed to accordingly.