HL Deb 25 June 1924 vol 57 cc978-94

LORD RAGLAN rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give any indication of their general policy with regard to Egypt and the Sudan, and whether they intend to consult Parliament before deciding on any change in the status of the latter country. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I put down the first part of the Question which stands in my name less in the hope of getting any information out of the Government than with the object of drawing attention to an aspect of the Sudan question which is seldom, if ever, alluded to, either in the Press or in Parliament. I refer to the Southern Sudan. I served for five years in the Southern Sudan. During that period there were many occasions on which I did not see another white man for weeks at a time, and I had occasion to visit places which no white man had ever visited before. That experience is not, of course, unique, but it qualifies me I think to address to your Lordships a few words on this subject.

The Southern Sudan differs considerably from the Northern Sudan. The Northern Sudan consists largely of desert, but the Southern Sudan is a country of forests and swamps and mountains. The Northern Sudan is populated largely by Mahomedan Arabs, while the Southern Sudan is populated entirely by pagan negroes These negroes speak their own languages, or variety of languages, and observe thir own customs. These languages have an affinity with the languages spoken in Uganda, the Congo and elsewhere, but have not the least connection with Arabic. The population of this southern region is considerably more than half the total population. The people of this region had some fifty years' experience of Egyptian rule. That rule was almost entirely one of robbery and murder. Whole districts were depopulated and whole tribes exterminated, and every year thousands of these negroes were sent down to Cairo as slaves. No one who knows anything about the question doubts that if this area were again to be handed back to Egypt the same thing would happen. Since before the dawn of history Egyptians have kept slaves, traded in slaves and raided the Sudan for slaves, and it would be quite fallacious to suppose that, because their activities in this respect have been checked by the British Government for forty years, there is any change in their habits and ideas. They still regard the pagan negroes as a people really outside the pale of humanity.

To give your Lordships an example of the attitude of the present-day educated Egyptian to the question of slavery, let me mention that up to recently, when it was stopped by the Sudan Government, it was a common practice among Egyptian officers and officials employed in the Sudan to marry negro girls, take them back to Cairo, there divorce them and sell them for slaves. They followed a similar practice with regard to negro servant boys. Your Lordships may know that there is still a considerable demand for eunuchs in Egypt, but, owing to the activities of the British Government, the supply is not equal to the demand. The condition of these unfortunate negroes has so far improved that I remember reading in the Egyptian Press about five years ago of the eunuchs of Cairo holding a mass meeting and deciding to form a trade union. I do not suggest for a moment that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to hand over the unfortunate people in the south of the Sudan to the tender mercies of the Egyptians, but I think so much nonsense is talked, chiefly by supporters of the Government, about the tyranny of British rule in the East that these considerations should be borne in mind.

I now turn to the second part of my Question which raises a wider issue; it is whether the Government should have, the power to dispose of portions of the British Empire without first consulting Parliament. I expect that the reply of the Government will be that the Treaty made with Egypt will be submitted to Parliament for ratification. Ratification by Parliament is, to my mind, little more than a farce. Your Lordships know what happens. A conference is summoned, secret negotiations take place, and eventually a Treaty is signed, sealed and delivered. The Conference breaks up, some of the provisions of the Treaty are carried into effect. When the Treaty has become almost a matter of history it is submitted to Parliament for ratification and Parliament has no alternative except to ratify it. On any question which affects the future of any portion of the British Empire Parliament should be consulted before the Treaty is signed.

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

My Lords, I had intended to put down a Notice very much like that of the noble Lord, but with the addition of the words "and Iraq." I do not propose to move that as an Amendment now, because I do not want to go into details. At the same time, I hope your Lordships will allow me to explain why I think the three questions are really inter-dependent. I did not put my Notice on the Paper because, with the Zaghlul Mission approaching and with the discussions which must ensue, it might possibly be inconvenient to the Government to make a statement on this subject on the very eve of the Conference. They might find it difficult to make a definite statement without prejudicing the Conference from the beginning. But as the question has been raised, and without pressing the Government to make a definite statement, it is perhaps desirable that some of us who have formed definite views on the matter should state them as a contribution, for what they are worth, to the discussions on the subject. I do not know that my views represent the views of the Liberal Party, or even of the Liberal Party in this House. I have not discussed them with others, but as they are very definite I should like to put them before the Government for their consideration, for what they may be worth, in comparison with other views, which no doubt will differ from mine.

First, with regard to Egypt: I realise that what has been done in Egypt cannot be undone. I deplore it. I have been told by people who have been in Egypt lately, and who know what is going on, that practically all the working administration which was set up by Lord Cromer, which we thought was so good and of which we were so proud, has absolutely gone, or is going. It is an instance of the difficulty of getting what we think is good to take root amongst peoples whose sense of values is different from our own. You get little success in these matters by applying the time-honoured counsel of doing unto others as you would be done by. We set up there a sort of administration in finance and justice which we should like to have ourselves. It is not what they would like, and if you want to please people who have a different sense of values you must not do unto others as you would be done by, but you must do unto them as they would be done by, which is quite a different thing in many cases.

I think there might have been a much better settlement in Egypt, better for us and better for Egypt, if the Report of the Milner Commission had been acted upon. It did a great deal of laborious, able and tactful work, and if the Report had been acted upon a much better settlement would have been made. That opportunity passed and now we are face to face with what has happened. We ought to recognise that what has happened is just this: that the administration so admirably set up by Lord Cromer is now undone. In the next place, we must recognise that having gone so far as this it is no good now trying to go back. I do not suggest to His Majesty's Government that, so far as the administration of Egypt is concerned, they should try to undo that which has been done. I think it is very much better, now that things have gone so far, that we should not attempt to retain a say in Egyptian administration which would only be irritating and could not be effective. We could not make a good job of it after that which has happened.

There is, of course, one exception to this and that is the Canal. The Canal was not made by Egyptians; it was made by Frenchmen, it is owned by British and French capital, and it is an international waterway. I hope that in the discussions which are to take place with the Egyptian Prime Minister it will be made perfectly clear that, however much the administration of Egypt is to be left to Egyptians, the right of protecting, safeguarding and administering the Canal does not pass to the Egyptian Government but remains in its present position.

If the Egyptians are to have their own way in Egypt, and we admit that now that things have gone so far they cannot be changed, I hope His Majesty's Government will be equally definite upon another point. I refer to the Sudan, where nothing of this kind has yet happened. We should give the Egyptians fairly to understand that we are not going to abandon the work which we have begun in that region. The Sudan was lost to Egypt because of the inefficiency of Egyptian Government. We all remember the tragic circumstances in which the Sudanese rose and turned the Egyptian Government out. Egypt would never have had a finger in the Sudan again if it had not been for us. It was purely British strategy and British control, force and enterprise which recovered the Sudan. Otherwise, Egypt would never have recovered it at all. I hope, therefore, that the British Government will make it quite clear in these negotiations that the question of the Sudan is now a question between the British and the Sudanese and one in which the Egyptian Government has no say at all. Just as we are going to be perfectly definite that we cannot go back upon that which has been done as regards Egypt, we should be equally definite with the statement that we are going on with the work which we are doing in the Sudan, and that we mean to retain our position there.

There must, of course, be one exception and that is the question of the Nile waters, in which, of course, Egypt is greatly interested, as everybody must admit. While we continue the administration of the Sudan without giving Egypt any say in it, I quite agree that as regards the Nile waters there is a case for a joint Commission to ensure that Egypt does not starve the Sudan of water and that the Sudan does not starve Egypt of water. On that point I think the Egyptian Government ought to be met. If there is difficulty in forming a thoroughly impartial Commission we might take some advantage of the precedents which have recently been set—and very admirably set—in which Americans have been asked to take the chair on European Commissions in more than one instance and in which the result has been most successful. I throw that out only as a suggestion. While being perfectly definite about retaining the administration of the Sudan, we must admit that as regards the Nile waters the Egyptian Government ought to be met. I think the best way of meeting it is to keep the point clear of the general question of the administration of the Sudan, and that a joint Commission should deal with this subject, and this subject alone.

This, at any rate, is a perfectly clear and definite policy. If His Majesty's Government hold that view, I would suggest that the sooner they express it, if not in public, at least to the Egyptian Prime Minister, the better. My impression is that the feeling which Egyptians have developed from that which has happened in Egypt is that we are on the run. That is why they are going so far as to say that until we withdraw from the Sudan they will have no discussion at all. I think that if we are going to stop at all on the road, we should make it clear at the earliest possible moment what our intentions are. The policy which I have described is one which is perfectly within our compass, provided we do not undertake too great responsibilities elsewhere. We have been in the Sudan for a long time. I believe the most valuable development in that region, from the commercial point of view, is in the growing of cotton. This development certainly will not continue if the British control and administration should go.

In any case, it is a region where we know that we have done very good work. The state of the country before we went there was appalling, and I do not suppose there has been any instance in history of so tremendous a change from conditions which were excessively bad to something which was, at any rate, tolerable. The tribute paid fourteen years ago by the late Mr. Roosevelt, when he had been through the Sudan, was really the greatest tribute ever paid by a distinguished member of one country to the work done by another. That being so, if we are going to undertake vast responsibilities in a neighbouring part of the world, re- sponsibilities which may be beyond our strength, we shall get into trouble there, and then it will not be possible to make good our words about the Sudan. To make good our words, we must keep it perfectly clear that we are not going to undertake some new and greater responsibility which may involve us in such difficulties that we cannot discharge the responsibilities which we already have.

It is for this reason that one links the question of Iraq with Egypt and the Sudan. We went to Iraq during the war for purely strategic reasons. I was a member of the Government which went there, and I know that it was done for purely strategic reasons. After the war was over, I maintain that we were left with no obligation at all to Mesopotamia or Iraq, except to give independence to the Arabs, and with the cessation of the war the strategical reasons had disappeared. We stayed there. I wonder whether anybody can really say why we did stay there. We spent many millions fighting the Arabs to whom we had promised independence. We cannot have stayed there for strategical reasons; it must have been for political reasons, or some other reasons different from the reasons which took us there.

My feeling has been that, in all this question of responsibility in that region of the East since the Armistice, we have been drifting. At the very moment when the Government were apparently feeling that they were not strong enough to maintain the administration of Egypt, they were assuming enormous new responsibilities in another region. This can only have been done because people were thinking and living from hand to mouth, and doing what seemed most convenient in different places without any general line of policy. I cannot imagine anything more inconsistent, while we were giving up our responsibility in Egypt, than to go and undertake these enormous new responsibilities in Mesopotamia. I cannot say that which I should have said on this point a little while ago, when it was my hope that the Assembly at Iraq would refuse to ratify the Treaty. They never liked the Treaty or the Mandate, and had the Assembly refused to recognise the Treaty I hoped that the Government would say that they could not go on with the Mandate against the wishes of the population. If any other European Power wishes to have the Mandate for Meso- potamia and Iraq against the wishes of a hostile population, all I can say is, so much the worse for them if they attempt to undertake it. But for us I would gladly have been free of all responsibility, except that of giving independence to the Arabs, unless, of course, the Arabs wish us to stay there.

Now, the Assembly at Iraq has ratified the Treaty, and we have undertaken the Mandate, and I recognise that we are not as free as we should have been had the Treaty not been ratified. I do not press His Majesty's Government for a statement now, but I would urgently press upon them that if they are going to be perfectly definite about the Sudan they should go carefully into the question of what military responsibility we are involved in by our Mandate for Iraq. I know that there are a number of people who use all the ordinary phrases about our having responsibilities in Mesopotamia to develop the country and that it would be pusillanimous to leave it now, but we have had these phrases used often and have then done the very thing for which we have had to introduce other words than "pusillanimous" and "responsibility." If that be so, I think His Majesty's Government ought to be prepared—they may not be able to do it immediately, but some time—to let us know definitely, in what responsibilities we are involved by the Treaty and the Mandate.

I am ready to listen to any arguments provided the Government will begin with some statement of facts showing us what is the magnitude of our responsibility, and, if they are going to defend Mosul, showing us on what your force must be based and telling us how many men it will take to defend that sort of situation against any probable attack which you may have made against you. If they begin with those figures I am prepared to go on with the discussion, but without that information it is not, in my opinion, worth while going on with the discussion. There is one thing which I should like to say about this responsibility. It is not my own idea, but was given to me by a very distinguished soldier. He said: "Do not let us flatter ourselves that we can hold these Oriental places by an Air Force. Indiscriminate reprisals from the air do much to undermine our prestige. That is not the way by which British prestige is to be maintained, but it is the way in which it is undermined." It is said that since the coming of our Air Power we can hold places that we could not hold before, but I believe that that is contrary to the best military opinion.

I have pressed upon the Government certain definite views, and I hope that the noble Lord who will speak on behalf of the Government will give us all the information he can to-day, and the more definite he can be about the Sudan the better. I hope the Government will give us all the information they can as to their views and policy to-day. If they cannot give us as much information to-day as they think might be given later, I hope that on some later date we may have another debate, and that the Government will give us a clearly-thought-out outline of policy on these three points closely connected on which, I think, we have hitherto been drifting and have got into trouble. Let them think out their policy and then announce it.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (LORD PARMOOR)

My Lords, the noble Viscount, whose authority on these subjects is second to none, has made a very important declaration on these questions of foreign policy this afternoon. I will endeavour as far as I can to answer his questions, although, as he has pointed out, the points which he has raised with regard to Mesopotamia do not arise directly out of the Question put down by Lord Raglan. I should like to say, too, before coming to the answer, that His Majesty's Government realise the importance of Lord Raglan's views upon these questions, because, as he has stated, he has himself spent much time in the Sudan district.

Perhaps, having regard to the emphasis placed upon the various parts of the Question, I may begin with the Sudan. It is a matter of the first importance. Now I want to say, in absolutely definite language, that His Majesty's Government is not going to abandon the Sudan in any sense whatever. It recognises the obligations which have been taken towards the Sudanese and, as the noble Viscount pointed out, it regards those obligations as of a character which this Government could not abandon without a very serious loss of its prestige in all these Eastern districts. The work done in the Sudan has been referred to more than once, and I should like to make one or two quotations in order to emphasise the statement which I have made, I hope in a quite definite manner. I intend my language to be quite definite, so that there can be no doubt hereafter.

The Prime Minister, in another place, when asked a Question in reference to Egypt and the Sudan, made this answer. As regards Egypt I will come back to it, but I am speaking now with reference to the Sudan:— No useful purpose will be served by a discussion in this House of the difficult and delicate questions outstanding with Egypt, in advance of negotiations being undertaken in pursuance of the policy already approved by Parliament. The question is: What is the policy which has already been approved by Parliament, and in pursuance of which these negotiations are being undertaken? I will divide that policy under two heads. The first is, as the noble Viscount has pointed out, that there is no going back at this stage on the policy towards Egypt itself, which has been adopted for a considerable time and by successive Governments. That, as he recognised, is quite impossible.

When we come to the question of the Sudan entirely different questions arise, and I have taken the trouble to see exactly what was said on this point when the matter was discussed in another place on February 28, 1922. This was the statement made by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George. He said: I now come to the Sudan, which is very important to the British Empire … His Majesty's Government will never allow the progress which has already been made, and the greater promise of future years, to be jeopardised. I emphasise this point and say that the same view is upheld by the present Government. Then Mr. Lloyd George went on to say, on another matter to which the noble Viscount called attention:— Nor can His Majesty's Government agree to any change in the status of that country which would in the slightest degree diminish the security for the many millions of British capital which are already invested in its development—to the great advantage of the Sudan. Those statements were made on these questions of policy in February, 1922, and they were referred to in the answer which I have read, which was given by the Prime Minister in another place.

There is another matter with regard to the Sudan to which the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, referred; that is, the question of any change in status without the authority of Parliament. I cannot, on the present occasion, go into the question whether Parliamentary procedure on matters of this kind is on the whole satisfactory or not. But I can say quite definitely, and without any hesitation, that no change of status in the Sudan will be allowed or carried through without the authority of Parliament, and Parliament shall have the opportunity of expressing its view before it is too late. We recognise the responsibility of this country towards the inhabitants. May I use the actual words which have been supplied to me from the Foreign Office, for I want to be very accurate on a constitutional point of this kind—"And in view of the fact" (referring to this status) "that any agreement arrived at will be submitted to Parliament …" that is any agreement affecting the status of the Sudan. I do not think I can say anything more with regard to Egypt and the Sudan because I have made the position quite clear, and when a position is made clear there is no use in adding further words.

As regards the negotiations with Egypt to which the noble Viscount has referred it is impossible to say anything at the present time because the negotiations are shortly to be begun and, of course, it would be impossible to give any definite account of the direction which they are likely to take.

The noble Viscount also referred to the very important question of Iraq, although it was not mentioned in the Question on the Paper. The policy towards Iraq, or Mesopotamia, was begun long before the present Government came into power. The present Government has merely carried on the policy of continuity, which we are often told should be pursued in matters of this kind. The Treaty proposed by His Majesty's Government was accepted a few weeks ago by the Iraq Constituent Assembly, who adopted it by a majority of 38 votes to 26. It will be submitted to Parliament in the ordinary course, and will not be ratified before it has been so submitted. If it is approved and ratified, the ordinary course will be followed. The intention would then be to obtain League approval of what is called the "draft instrument," of which the effect is to convert the Treaty into the form of a Mandate under the control of the League. If this is done the Treaty or Mandate remains in force for four years as a maximum, or until such time as Iraq becomes a Member of the League. I think the noble Viscount will agree with me that the time for detailed discussion of this matter will be when the actual Treaty is before Parliament. I should be glad to give him any information in my power, but I do not think that it is possible at the present time to go into further details. I want to end by emphasising in the strongest terms that so fat-as the Sudan is concerned it is definitely decided that there will be no abandonment of our position by the British Government and no abandonment of the obligations which we have undertaken towards the Sudanese themselves.

THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON

My Lords, I am sorry not to have been in the House in the opening stages of what has clearly been a very important discussion. I was obliged to be elsewhere. When I came into the House my noble friend was speaking about Egypt, and he had reached that point in his speech in which he was arguing, on the one hand, that in any discussions that are likely to take place with Egypt, having gone so far as we have gone, it would be a mistake to boggle about any matters that would involve, or might involve, interference in the Egyptian administration. That, I think, is a commonplace which we all accept. From that he went on to say that there were two reservations which he desired to make, and to which—and he spoke with the general assent of the House—he attached supreme importance. The first was with regard to the Sudan, the second was with regard to the Canal.

As regards the Sudan, he based his case upon the historical facts of the recovery of the Sudan, for the most part by British troops and under British generalship, and further upon the enormous improvement that has taken place in the condition of the Sudan and its people under the administration that has existed during the last twenty years. In that we entirely concur, and any idea of wiping that out, or handing back the Sudan to Egyptian administration, would be abhorrent to every one of us. I think he might have put the case even more strongly than he did, because to my mind the governing factor in the question of the Sudan is not so much what we have done, or what return we are entitled to for our sacrifices, but what is the sentiment and desire of the Sudanese people themselves. Everybody who has come in contact with representative Sudanese knows that the one thing that fills them with dismay is the idea of being handed back to Egypt. And therefore we are pursuing no Imperial policy of our own; we are acting in strict accordance with the sentiments of the population itself if we continue the form of administration which at present exists.

In one respect I think my noble friend Lord Grey a little under-stated the case from one point of view or overstated it from another. He said that the Egyptian Government had no interest or stake in the matter at all excepting so far as the water was concerned. That is not quite the case, because he will recollect from his experience of the Foreign Office that they supply the garrison and pay for the garrison, and that the Sudan would be bankrupt at this moment if it were not for the financial expenditure undertaken by Egypt. If you go to the point of saying that Egypt has no connection with the Sudan at all except that of water, and you eliminate Egypt from any voice or share in the administration at all, the Sudan would be quite unable, in the existing conditions, to pay its own way. It means that this country would be obliged to accept an obligation that might amount to over a million pounds a year. I do not think the noble Viscount could have anticipated that. In dealing with Egyptian interests in the Sudan the fact must not be forgotten that they are, for the most part, the paymasters at the present moment.

As regards the Sudan, I am sure that this House has listened with the greatest satisfaction to the clear, unequivocal, uncompromising and thoroughly satisfactory statement that we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Parmoor, and it was satisfactory in two respects. In the first place, he told us that the present Government adhere to the attitude and abide by the pledges, which in themselves were unequivocal, made by their predecessors. Those pledges have not only been given by Mr. Lloyd George in the passage quoted by the noble Lord; they have been reiterated in quite recent times by Lord Allenby who, in the course of his visits to the Sudan, has given the most emphatic assurance to the people of that country that they shall not be restored to a form of government which they detest. I was glad also to hear from my noble friend Lord Parmoor that he gave an assurance equally emphatic and equally satisfactory that no arrangement will be made with regard to the Sudan without being previously submitted to not merely the discussion but the assent of Parliament. That was, I think, his assurance, which we accept with much satisfaction.

Now may I point out to my noble friend Lord Grey that the two points to which he attaches such natural and proper importance are two of the four points that were reserved by the late Government when they made the arrangement in February, 1922? The four points that were reserved for future discussion were, (1) the Sudan, (2) the protection of foreign interests, which is a matter, of course, in which the foreign countries concerned will look after their own interests and as to which no arrangement can be made to which they are not parties. The third question was the defence of Egypt, and the fourth was the security of Imperial communications; that is another way of putting the question of the Canal. Therefore, the very points which my noble friend Lord Grey urged the Government to bear in mind are the points which were reserved as of supreme importance by the late Government for future discussion.

In the concluding part of his speech, the noble Viscount, Lord Grey, went on to speak about British policy with regard to Iraq. Here, if he will allow me to say so, I think he spoke without full knowledge of the situation and the manner in which it has developed during the past year. He began by saying that he was one of those who had all along questioned the wisdom of the assumption of extensive British responsibilities in that quarter. His memory will, perhaps, carry him back to a date at which, at a meeting of the War Council or Committee of which he and I were members, I was the only man who opposed going to Baghdad at all, being rather timidly and tentatively followed by Lord Kitchener. Therefore, my hands are clean upon the matter, and certainly, in all that I have had to do with Iraq since, I have never desired for one moment to assume responsibilities that we could avoid, to extend responsibilities already existing, or to mark out or map out that part of the world as an arena of British rule or Empire in the future.

The noble Viscount asked: Why did you go there or why, having gone there, did you stay there? The answer is twofold and is absolutely clear. The reason why, when the war was over, we could not retire at once was that the very Arab administration which we had sought to set up would have collapsed at once. Do remember this: the Arabs, after centuries of subjection to the Turks, had developed no power or capacity for self-government. They had not the men; they had not the traditions; they had not the machinery. Your house of cards, when you set it up, would have disappeared at the touch of a finger, unless you had, for the time being at any rate, devoted your energies to giving it strength. And if the first reason was loyalty to our pledges to the Arabs, the second was this: that the Arab administration being essentially weak and unstable, the result of our disappearance would have been that the Turks would have been back at once. I do not hesitate to say that within six months they would have been back in the whole country, and the object for which you fought that portion of the war would have been sacrificed. Those are the reasons, briefly put, why we were compelled to stay in Mesopotamia.

Now the noble Viscount has referred to the Treaty and seems to have some sort of idea that this Treaty, which was ratified the other day at Baghdad by a certain majority, is in itself a continuance and, perhaps, even an extension of our responsibility. It is the very reverse. The Treaty in question, which was suggested by us only a few months ago, is a means of diminishing our responsibility and handing it over, and of creating an Arab State. I am, perhaps, more familiar with it than any one in this House, because I was largely responsible for the circumstances under which it was proposed and set up. And when the noble Viscount says that we shall want in this House a clear explanation of what the Treaty involves, what the military responsibilities are that are entailed, and so on, let him read the Treaty. They are there entirely. The whole object of the Treaty, instead of this indefinite continuance of our rule which, under the form previously proposed, was to have lasted for twenty years, is to terminate it in four, and if Iraq can be admitted to the League of Nations at an earlier date, in a less period than four years. The actual nature of our military responsibility and of our financial responsibility diminishes every year. It is clearly stated in the terms of the Treaty, and the whole object has been to accelerate the moment at which, under the auspices of the League of Nations, Iraq will be able to stand alone.

Then the noble Viscount said: "Why did you ever accept a Mandate for Mesopotamia?" The answer to that is found in the history of the last six or eight years. It is too late to ask that question now. The policy of Mandates was deliberately accepted by all the Powers at Paris. The policy of dividing Mandates among different Powers—France to take Syria, Britain to take Mesopotamia and Palestine, Mandates of a different character in other parts of Africa and the world, and so on was all most, carefully worked out years ago, and if anybody wanted to object to our taking the Mandate for Mesopotamia the time to have done it would have been in the year 1920 when the Mandates were given. I cannot recollect a single critical or hostile voice in this country. The policy of Mandates was one of universal acceptance.

Now what do we want to do? The whole object of the recent transactions has been to escape, the onerous responsibility of the Mandate by transferring it to the League of Nations. I should have thought that no man in England would have more welcomed the present line of policy than the noble Viscount, Lord Grey, because the idea was that this Treaty if it be concluded is only to last for four years. It is, as described by the noble Lord, to be referred to the League of Nations, and, assuming that Iraq has shown a capacity to govern itself and actual signs of setting up a stable Government, the State of Iraq will itself become a Member of the League of Nations. Then the responsibility of the future arrangements will be shared by the body at Geneva. The whole of this matter is, perhaps, a little widely removed from the discussion which has been raised by the Question on the Paper, and I have only been tempted to pursue it because the noble Viscount raised the question himself and, if he will allow me to say so, because he is not fully aware of the meaning of the actual steps that have been taken or of the policy that lies before us. Certainly there was no desire on the part of the late Government to extend their responsibilities in that direction. Rather did we desire to curtail them. As regards the subject on the Paper, I have only to express again my complete satisfaction so far as it goes with the statement we have received from the noble Lord.