HL Deb 19 August 1921 vol 43 cc999-1024

DEBATE ON IRISH NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS CURZON or KEDLESTON) had given Notice to Move to resolve—

That the House on its adjournment do adjourn for business to Tuesday the 18th of October, except that if it appears to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor that the public interest requires that the House should meet at any earlier time during such adjournment, the Lord Chancellor may give notice to the Peers that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such Notice, and shall transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to that time.

The noble Marquess said: My Lords, it is my duty to move the Resolution that stands in my name upon the Paper. This Resolution, both in its wording and in its object, is no new thing. I think it is the third time in the last two years that I have been called upon to make a similar Motion, which has been then passed, from this Table. Accordingly, no words of explanation are needed from me as to the general character of the circumstances which render such a Motion as this necessary. It is a familiar and a convenient practice to enable your Lordships' House to be summoned together, should events of importance occur in the course of a recess which may demand your presence in Parliament.

The moving of this Motion to-day does not, of course, mean that the Government have changed their plans with regard to the holding of an autumn session. We may be driven, for reasons to which I will presently refer, to do so, but it was not part of our original, nor, indeed, is it any part of our present, aim. Anybody who knows what is passing from day to day must be thoroughly conscious of the fact that events may occur—we hope they will not—which will render the summoning of Parliament indispensable, and it is for that situation that provision is accordingly being made. The adjournment till. Tuesday, October 18, means nothing so far os the selection of the specific date is concerned, because, under the terms of the Resolution, power is given to the Lord Chancellor, in consultation, of course, with those who are responsible for the business of the House, to summon your Lordships at an earlier date. When October 18 comes, should the moment not be one at which the meeting of Parliament is required, nothing is easier than to arrange for another adjournment, or, should no meeting of Parliament be required in the course of the autumn, for prorogation.

That is all I think I need say as to the character and occasion of the Motion to which I refer, but inasmuch as the moving of this Resolution springs exclusively from the present situation in Ireland, and as it is upon that situation that the thoughts and anxieties of all of us are turned, perhaps your Lordships will permit me to say a word on the circumstances which have led up to the present situation. What is that situation? Within the last week or ten days, there have been published to the World the terms of the offer which has been made for the settlement of the Irish problem by His Majesty's Government to those persons who represent the majority of the population of that country. Nothing has been kept back. There is nothing of which your Lordships and, indeed, the whole world, so far as we are concerned, have not been informed, and this transaction, if it is permitted to go forward, as we all earnestly trust it may, is a transaction that will be conducted not only before the face of Great Britain and Ireland, but before the face of the British Dominions and the English-speaking population throughout the entire world. Therefore, one may say truthfully that we sit, so to speak, in a theatre, in which, in the stalls and in the pit, are ranged the whole of the subjects of His Majesty the King, in every part of the world.

As regards the terms of the offer, no one can say, nor has anyone been found to say, that they are not generous enough. The only criticism I have heard in any quarter— perhaps we may hear it to-day—is that they are too generous. Certainly, in framing them we have borne in mind the adage of the poet— Give all thou eanst; high Heaven rejects the lore Of nicely-calculated less or more. The Government have gone, in this respect, to the extreme limit of concession. They have given all, or rather offered all, that could be given or offered without compromising the safety of the realm, the sovereignty of the King and the unity of the Empire. Many British Governments might have given, or attempted to give, less, but I doubt whether, in the circumstances of the case, You would have found any Government, whatever its political complexion, which would have been disposed to give more.

Secondly, let us look at the moment at which this offer is made. We are all of us rather apt to exaggerate the circumstances in which we are placed. We are apt to talk of speeches as epoch-making speeches, whereas, in reality, they make no epoch at all, and are forgotten almost as soon as delivered. We are apt to talk about the psychological moment for doing this or that, whereas all moments for doing great things are in reality psychological. We are apt to talk about turning points in the history of nations. These are familiar and conventional exaggerations, and yet, I think, it would be no exaggeration to say that upon the manner in which this particular offer is received will depend, to a large extent, the future history, not only of Ireland but of this country. It is on this occasion a great emergency, a great crisis, and it may be a great landmark.

I have been in public life long enough now, in one House of Parliament or the other, to see a long series of attempts made to deal with this intractable Irish problem. I have seen Home Rule Bills, one after the other, introduced, rejected and finally passed. I have seen Irish Land Bills, many of them extremely liberal in character; I have seen Conventions set set up in Ireland to assist in the solution of this problem. Every variety of expedient and attempt has been made by a series of British Governments—I give no greater credit to one than to another—for the last half century, to solve this problem. I, believe that the bulk, I might say the whole of these attempts have been sincere. A few of them, notably, the Land legislation, have been successful. The remainder of them, the political attempts, have almost uniformly failed. Whether that has been due to the blunders on our side, as we are always told, or whether it has been due to some failure of receptivity on the other side, I do not pause to enquire. The fact remains that the two parties to the transaction have never been absolutely in contact at the same time and the right moment. When we have been willing, Ireland has not been ready; when Ireland has been willing, we were not prepared. Putting all that aside, taking our share of the blame, taking all the blame you like, can any one deny that here, at last, is offered a great act of renunciation, one may almost call it an act of sacrifice—anyhow, a very broad and liberal and notable concession for a proud country to make.

The third point that I would like to make about these proposals is this. None of us can fail to have been struck by the extraordinary, it would not be an exaggeration to say the unprecedented, unanimity of praise and support with which they have been received. In this country we are not unfamiliar with a type of journalism which daily directs its attacks upon the Government and. the policy of the Government, and yet, over the whole range of our Press, with one notable exception, I have seen scarcely any journal which has not given praise and encouragement to this offer. Extend our gaze beyond these shores, look at what is said in the Press of the Dominions. The Dominions are, of all people in the world, best qualified to judge of what Dominion status means, and the true character and scope of the offer that is now being made. A chorus comes from every land and population owning allegiance to His Majesty the King.

Take the foreign Press; not merely the Press of Europe, but, what is much more remarkable, the Press of America. No one who occupies my position can fail to admit that the task of the Foreign Secretary has, for years, been rendered anxious and difficult in so far as the United States are concerned, in the main, because the Irish question was unsolved. It has coloured, and darkened, and poisoned, the atom- sphere, at every stage. But amid the volume of Press notices, which it is my duty in the Foreign Office to read, which come from America in relation to Ireland, and which have caused me infinite anxiety and distress for years, I now find day after day telegrams appearing indicating precisely the same unanimity of tone to which I have referred.

I might quote fifty or a hundred of them, but I will merely quote a couple of sentences which indicate the tone, the novel tone, of opinion there. One paper considers— Difference between full independence and Dominion status is not a real issue. Moral sentiment of the world will be against Ireland if Dominion offer is rejected. Cannot believe de Valera will take responsibility of refusing offer which satisfies full aspirations of Irish people.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Are these newspaper comments?

THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Yes. Another paper finds it"impossible to see more than theoretical difference between Lloyd George and de Valera." It describes the settlement as"best conceivable in this imperfect universe "—possibly a slight exaggeration—and while it attacks the British Government for past outrages it considers this an"honest attempt to bring about peace, and that refusal of Sinn Fein would be short sighted and dishonest." I will not multiply these evidences. I may stun up in a word by saying that I believe, with scarcely an exception (and I hope that exception will not be emphasised or aggravated here), these proposals have been received with satisfaction, with encouragement and with hope, in every part of the civilised world.

What are the omens? If we look at the speeches that are delivered at Dublin I should not like to pretend that I can be over sanguine. Hard things, harsh things, unfavourable things have been said, and I dare say will continue to be said, there. It may be that the spirit which animates those with whom we have to deal may turn out to be too stiff and uncompromising. I am both to build upon that; I am both to believe that, after mature reflection, that can be the case; and for this reason. Looking at the thing from its political aspect, it is difficult to believe that any body of responsible men will reject the particular form and quality of independence, of Dominion status, which is more than they have ever had the opportunity to gain. It would really be sacrificing the fruit in order to obtain the rind.

During the last two or three years, since the war was over, a good deal of my work has revolved around the question of endeavouring to set up, in one form or another, independent States—I am speaking of the European scene—and, recalling the condition of many of these States, I ask myself: Is it conceivable. that the representatives of Ireland, if they have, as no doubt they have, a genuine interest in her future, would reject the status of Canada, of Australia, of New Zealand, with all that it means and involves, and leads up to? Is it conceivable that they will reject that status in order to be like Finland or Esthonia, or Latvia or one of the smaller States that have acquired what on paper looks like real independence, but which, in value and status, is not to be compared with the political Constitutions to which I have referred?

Neither can I believe it possible that public opinion in Ireland, any more than here, will willingly consent to a resumption of that cruel, wicked, pitiful and disastrous form of civil war upon which we have been engaged during the last year in that country. It may be, of course, that circumstances will compel the resumption of that struggle. It will not be we who will voluntarily take it up, and if a revival of that issue is compelled, it is scarcely possible to believe that history will not visit with the severest condemnation those who are responsible for beginning again that which we have fortunately for the moment put aside.

Eliminating that, and looking at the case from the point of view of a political forecast as to the future, will these men in Ireland of whom I speak be so ill-advised as to think that, if they reject this offer, they are going to get thereby complete separation, or, if they get complete separation, that they are going to do good business for Ireland? As regards their obtaining complete separation, this country and this Empire stand like a rock, and we all of us know that in no circumstances would either we, or a Government composed of noble Lords opposite, or any Government that one can conceive in this country, take the step of granting complete independence, complete severance from this Kingdom and this Empire to Ireland.

But let us suppose that these can be regarded as the polemical utterances of the hour—which they are not—is it to be believed that any responsible man in Ireland really conceives that, even were they to obtain complete severance from this country, they would gain thereby? What would it. mean? Infallibly it means civil war in Ireland itself. That would be the first stage and the second stage would be the ruin, political and economic, of Ireland herself. I decline, on this occasion at any rate, to contemplate any development so disastrous. I will only deal with it in one sentence in passing, and say that were we driven to contemplate any such alternative as I have described, we, that is the British Government—and I. am sure we speak here for the British nation—should accept the challenge, and we should not quail before the difficult task that might lie ahead of us.

I need not say much more, but I feel no apprehension myself as to what the general attitude of your Lordships will be in this matter. I have listened to many Irish debates here. There are many noble Lords in this House who speak with a singular knowledge of Ireland, and I have never, even in the days when Home Rule Bills were being dissected and rejected here, failed to notice in your Lordships' House a most kindly and sympathetic spirit in dealing with Irish conditions. A great many of the concessions that are involved in this offer which I am now discussing are concessions for which, a few months ago, noble Lords on that side and noble Lords for Ireland were pleading in your Lordships' House. I therefore speak with some confidence of the reception that they are likely to meet with in many quarters of this House. I would only say this in conclusion. The issue may be truly said to tremble in the balance. It may be affected by rash acts on either side. It may even be affected by rash words. It is for these reasons that, in the few remarks with which I have troubled your Lordships, I have endeavoured to refrain from anything like polemics, and to abstain from saying anything that might provoke controversy. I am sure that your Lordships will, all of you, be in favour of a similar spirit of restraint, and that nothing will be said here, and that you will resent anything if it be said, that is likely either to revive bitterness or to imperil the success for which we all hope.

Moved to resolve, That the. House on its adjournment do adjourn for business to Tuesday the 18th of October, except that if it appears to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor that the public interest requires that the House should meet at an earlier time during such adjournment, the Lord Chancellor may give notice to the Peers that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such Notice, and shall transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to that time. — (The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.)

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, I have no opposition whatever to offer to the Motion of the noble Marquess. There is no man so disagreeable as the one who says:"I told you so," and therefore I do not want to dwell upon the fact that I ventured to prophesy that His Majesty's Government would not be able to prorogue at once, as they announced their firm and decided intention of doing. It. seemed evident to me that, in the Irish crisis, it was almost inconceivable that Parliament should rise altogether without the opportunity of its being summoned, apart from the formal opening of a new session. That is distinct, as the noble Marquess indicated, from the question whether some autumn session for business, which for all I know may yet be held, would not have been desirable in itself. I still hold the opinion that sonic of the measures which we have been considering, under hasty and uncomfortable conditions, would have had more reasonable treatment, and been subjected to useful discussion, if His Majesty's Government had consented to my Motion of August 2; but I need say nothing further about that.

The noble Marquess has taken the opportunity, which was well within his rights, of saying something definite, and most interesting to us, on the subject of Ireland, thereby anticipating to some extent the Question which the noble Marquess (Lord Salisbury) has placed on the Paper. I may perhaps venture to assume that that discussion will now proceed, and that the noble Marquess will be able to carry on the debate initiated by the Leader of the House, and in the course of it, to ask his Question. I can only say, for myself, that I find myself in practically, complete agreement with everything which fell from the noble Marquess. I have rejoiced, as so many have, at the step which His Majesty's Government have taken.

If we had to be at all critical, at a time when one does not desire to be critical, some of us would say that the same step might have been taken earlier. As the noble Marquess said just now, it is more than a year since, on the Motion of Lord Monteagle, some of us pleaded for practically what His Majesty's Government are now offering to Ireland. It is true that at that time the suggestion did not receive the unanimous assent of noble Lords from the South of Ireland. It was not likely to be favoured by noble Lords from the North. For instance, I remember that Lord Dunraven, who has always been an advocate of the Federal solution, was not able to countenance the hopes expressed by Lord Monteagle and myself, among others; and there has no doubt been a distinct change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government, of which, in my opinion, they have not the faintest reason to be ashamed.

I think I may fairly say that up till quite lately it was the policy of His Majesty's Government to fight it out, and to conquer the forces of disorder in Ireland through the police and the military forces. I particularly remember a speech made on May 6 of last year by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, in which he expressed that determination with his usual vigour, and in considering the merit of the Government offer we have to remember that undoubtedly that could be. done. Nobody could say that it would not be possible, if this country put forth its whole strength, to conquer the South and West of Ireland completely, and to exterminate, if that became necessary in the course of reconquest, all those who have been fighting on behalf of the Irish Republic. But as we all know, that could only he done at an impossible. cost—not merely the cost of life, but it could hardly be done without cost of honour, and without outraging the consciences of the people of this country. To recur to the methods of the wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is something beyond the possibility of belief, and yet, the temper of sonic of the Irish being what it is, it might be scarcely possible to carry through the complete subjection of the country without something of that kind.

I most heartily concur in one statement of the noble Marquess, and I only repeat what I said in the debate on Lord Mont-eagle's Motion—namely, that the notion of a separate Ireland, of an Irish Republic, is not a matter for consideration, cannot be a matter of consideration, by the Government or the people of this country. That. possibility must be altogether set aside, and the sooner it. is understood by those who are the spokesmen for the Irish Majority, that that is so, the better is the chance of a conclusion of negotiations. The noble Marquess spoke not exactly hopefully, but not hopelessly, of the prospects of a happy end to the Irish negotiations. I feel, too, that it would be altogether wrong to despair of a favourable issue, merely from what has been said, in itself unfavourable, in some quarters in Ireland.

It is difficult not to refer to the analogy of South Africa. After the South African War the prospect of a happy and united South African Dominion did not seem hopeful to many, and to some who hoped for it ultimately it appeared that the prospect must be very remote. The Government of which I was a member, in 1906. gave self-government to the two Dutch Colonies, which, as you are aware, four years later, resulted in the South African Union as we know it. There were many who greatly doubted the wisdom of our action. Anybody who cares to look back to the debates in another place and hens of that year, will see how freely heads were shaken over our action at that time.

If we bad not been permitted to do what we were able to do I think it is quite possible that you might have had an Irish situation in South Africa. Those who were disposed to make terms, like General Botha, General de la Rey, and General Smuts, would either have been outnumbered by the extremists, just as Mr. Redmond and his Party were outnumbered by the Irish extremists, or they might themselves have been driven by force of circumstances definitely to join the anti-British Party. If that had happened, and, if, during the late war, we had been obliged, instead of welcoming the noble assistance given us from South Africa, to keep a garrison there, in order to prevent the junction of the South African Dutch with German South West Africa, there would have been many to say:"How right we were to prevent this grant of freedom to the Dutch Colonies; their present action shows now what a much greater risk it would have been, because their power would have been greater, if we had allowed the Transvaal and the Orange Free State to receive self- government in 1906." I do not want to go back upon history, but I cannot but feel more than ever at this moment that chance after chance has been missed—in 1885, in 1892 and. since—because Home Rule for Ireland. has always been made a Party subject in this country, instead of the different Parties coining together and seeing what the necessary limitations of Irish self-government must be.

The noble Marquess behind me (Lord Salisbury) has placed a Question on the Paper. I say frankly that when I saw that Question on the Paper, and knew the noble Marquess's intention, I regretted it. Of all the 700 Peers—I think it must be something like that number in the long Roll of your Lordships' House—there is not one, I am sure, who acts more uniformly by the dictates of conscience than does the noble Marquess. But then one cannot help remembering that many of the most unfortunate things in all history, from the time of the Spanish Inquisition down to the time of the attempted coercion of the American Colonies, and on many occasions since, have been the results of a most fine and careful conscience. And I could not help wishing, therefore, that the noble Marquess had resisted the temptation to discuss from his point of view the Irish question before your Lordships' House rises.

But I do feel that the noble Marquess will respond in the most generous spirit to the appeal made to him by the noble Marquess opposite; that he will not, I am sure, say anything which can tend to exacerbate the feelings, which cannot as et have been altogether merged in the hopes of a new era in Irish politics, and that he will abstain—as I feel certain he will desire to do —from observations which, although in his opinion they must be just and fair, are likely to be in themselves provocative. I feel that the one motto which everybody ought to bear in mind at this critical moment, in dealing with Ireland, is"Patience, patience, patience "; that it is not merely useless to go back on old controversies, but it is also at this moment unwise to point out the undoubted difficulties, or, if you will, the undoubted defects attaching to any such proposals as those which His Majesty's Government have laid before the country. I cannot help feeling that at this moment the less said the better, and that there should be a complete abstention from anything in the nature of provocative argument.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY had on the Paper a Notice to call attention to the situation in Ireland, and to ask the Government whether, having regard to the profound dissatisfaction felt by many loyal subjects of His Majesty both in Great Britain and Ireland with the course of the Irish policy of the Government and to the position assumed by Mr. de Valera towards this country and to the Republican Oath of his followers, the Government propose to proceed further with the negotiations.

The noble Marquess said: My Lords, I am in the remarkable position of having had the answers to my speech delivered before the speech itself. That makes it rather difficult for me to do my duty, as I hope I shall do it, before your Lordships to-day. But let me say in the first place that I congratulate the noble Marquess that the Government have taken this last opportunity of making a statement to the country in respect of their Irish policy. I pressed for that statement very often. Your Lordships will forgive me if I say that I have little doubt that if some of us had not been so persistent there would not have been a statement even on this last day. But that is a small matter. We are thankful for what we have received.

The noble Marquess the Leader of the House made a sort of general appeal to the civilised world that they should approve of the policy of His Majesty's Government. No doubt they have the approval of the noble Marquess who sits behind me (Lord Crewe). That is not surprising; because they have, very late in the day, adopted the policy of the noble Marquess. But when I listened with attention to the citations which the noble Marquess the Leader of the House adduced in support of this claim, I was astonished that they petered out into a quotation from an anonymous newspaper. He need not look very far for a public comment upon the policy of His Majesty's Government. In this very place where we stand, in the ancient city of Westminster, there are two Conservative and (if I may use such a word) Unionist candidates before the constituency, and neither of them will defend the policy of His Majesty's Government—neither of them ! One of them absolutely repudiates it in its beginning and in its end. The other, although; he is not prepared to go so far as that, has nothing to say to the course of policy which has led up to this situation. He entirely dissociates himself from it. That is to say, that in asking for the confidence of one of the great constituencies of this country, no one can be found to defend the policy of His Majesty's Government.

I will not, especially after the appeal which has been made to me, go on to criticise in anything like detail the celebrated terms which the Prime Minister has offered to Mr. de Valera. I say that because I feel that no good purpose would be served if I did so, and that, indeed, I might do harm. Of course, I feel that. obligation upon me just as much as any of your Lordships whom I have the honour to address. But I must say this in reference to what has just fallen from the Leader of the House. When he speaks of these terms as being more generous—I think those were his words—than any other terms which have ever been offered to Ireland, it is a claim he might easily make. When he said it amounted even to sacrifice, what does he sacrifice? It is not, of course, anything personal to himself. I dare say he thinks that it is not very much of a sacrifice to his Government. What it is, then, is the sacrifice of the interests of this country. People are very glib in using such words as sacrifice, as if the obligation of self-sacrifice extends not merely to one's own individual belongings and interests, but that one has a right to sacrifice the interests of one's neighbours and the interests of the country to which one belongs. I cannot accept that as a defence of His Majesty's Government.

There is only one other observation that. I desire to make upon that passage in the noble Marquess's speech. In defending these terms, he said he could not believe that the Sinn Feiners would not accept a status which was good enough for Australia and New Zealand. I do not want to go into details, but that is a most ominous phrase, because the terms in the Prime Minister's letter are not the status of New Zealand and Australia, and it seems to me to be an intimation of a further advance upon the terms which have already been offered. We have a great responsibility in Parliament, and I plead this before your Lordships because we have in our charge the guidance of the judgment and the conscience of the people. It. is easy to say:"Let us say nothing about it. Let us pass the whole thing over in silence." It. is very easy to say that. That is the prim- rose path. The difficult thing is to nerve oneself to bring before the country the exact facts, in so far as they may be discreetly used, and to point out to the people of the country with what wisdom, or with what unwisdom, they are being governed. It is the condition of a democracy that they shall be told what has happened and what is happening; that they should be told what their Government is like, what is the record of their servants and whether they deserve their confidence. And though it is easy, of course, to leave all those things aside and to say nothing, yet we have a duty and an obligation to show to the country exactly what these Ministers have done.

For a long time the terms were secret. There was great reluctance to reveal them. I am not surprised ! When they were revealed I will venture to say they came with something like a shock upon a large number of people in this country. It is easy enough to deal in generalities. If he will allow me to say so, with great respect, the noble Marquess the Leader of the House is a master of eloquent generalities, and although, on the last occasion, the noble and learned Viscount upon the Woolsack used such phrases as:"The genuineness of the desire of this country for a real and permanent reconciliation "—as if that was in doubt in anybody's mind—arid spoke of how the Government had inflexibly adhered to those points which the vital interests and the safety of these islands required, I should have thought that inflexibility was the last qualification that he would have attributed to His Majesty's present Government.

What is their record, my Lords? The Act for the better government of Ireland was only passed last winter. I remember that the noble Marquess told us in a peroration that it held the field. How long did it hold the field? Nine months; after which its authors have torn it to pieces. What has become of all the safeguards which we debated at such length? What has become of the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant and of the Senate? I suppose all that has disappeared. What has become of the provision that Ireland was not to have a separate Army? That was contained in the Act of last year, and the Prime Minister, speaking on the Third Reading of the Government of Ireland Bill, said— We cannot consent to anything which will enable Ireland to organise an Army and a Navy of her own. He has consented. He has already consented—not to the Navy—that, no doubt, is to come—but he has already consented to the Army.

Then, your Lordships will remember that a great deal was made by the Government, in. constituting their Parliament in Ireland, in the safeguard of the Oath of Allegiance. We debated it at great length. Great questions arose in Committee as to whether the Oath of Allegiance—to His Majesty, I mean—could be looked upon as an effective safeguard, and the Government greatly relied upon it. They said:"We have set up a Parliament in Ireland, but it shall not function until it has taken the Oath of Allegiance to the. King." What has become of that? The Parliament has been set up; it is functioning, and it has taken an oath of allegiance—but not to the King! It has taken an oath of allegiance to the Irish Republic. And so finishes that safeguard.

How can the noble Marquess and his colleagues come to us with an appeal for confidence? Why should we trust them? I do not mean, of course, their honour; I am not speaking of that; but why should we trust their judgment? They have been uniformly wrong. They were, of course, Unionists originally—at least all those whom I am addressing. They have for a long time abandoned that faith. They produced the Government of Ireland Bill, and they have already torn it to shreds. It is not only in the sphere of legislation that they have been totally wrong, and that they have totally misled the country. And this is what I want, if I may, to press upon your Lordships. It is a high obligation upon British statesmen not to mislead the judgment of the country.

What have His Majesty's Ministers done? There was a speech by the Prime Minister ar Carnarvon, on October 9, 1920, in which he said— A small body of assassins, a real murder gang, are dominating the country and tyrannising it. It is essential that that gang should be broken up, and, unless I am mistaken, we shall do it. We are not going to quail before a combination of e, handful of assassins in any part of the British Empire. I really think that comment upon that is needless. That is exactly what the Government have done. The Government have allowed this action to be forced upon them by an organised campaign of assassination. That is not treating the country fairly.

The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has made a great many speeches on this subject, and there was a very notable speech that, he made in answer to my noble friend (Lord Donoughmore) quite recently, in June of this year. This is what he said— It is unfortunately the fact that a very great number of the members of Dail Eireann at this moment, if they do not actually belong to the class known as gunmen, undoubtedly belong to a class that is steeped to the lips in the express policy of assassination. Then, turning to my noble friend, he said— It is perfectly obvious then that the noble Earl could not go to any representative of Dail Eireann. The noble Earl, apparently, could not go, but His Majesty's Government have done so. This is exactly what they have done. although my noble friend most obviously, in the Lord Chancellor's opinion, was debarred from going to Dail Eireann because of their connection with the policy of assassination. Yet that is exactly what the great Government of England, His Majesty's Government, have done.

I hope I am not wearying the House with these extracts, because I have one or two more that I should like to quote. The Prime Minister, in February of this year, made a speech upon the Address. I am not going to read a long extract, but he said— After consulting those who are responsible for order in Ireland, and who are personally interested in putting an end to all this murder in Ireland, because they run very great personal risks—every one of them themselves have strongly urged that we should agree to no truce, except upon the express condition that arms should be surrendered. I think the House of Commons will agree that that was a wise decision. Yet the Government are negotiating, although these Irishmen retain their arms. That was a most formidable decision, because if you negotiate with a body of men who retain their arms—I will not use any harsh language—if you negotiate terms of extreme concession with men with arms in their hands, that is equivalent to a confession of defeat. It makes all the difference in the world whether those with whom you are negotiating retain their arms or not. The Prime Minister went on to develop his attitude, and to show how important it was, before anything was done, that there should be a surrender of arms.

There is, finally, an extract which, if your Lordships will forgive me, I must make from the speech of the noble and learned Viscount, because it really sums up the position. This is what the noble and learned Viscount said in August of last year, and I draw your Lordships' attention particularly to this extract— My Lords, I speak quite plainly when I say that in my judgment our capacity to maintain the security and integrity of this Empire, and therefore our capacity to retain all the glory, all the security, all the material advantage of which this Treaty affords us a prospect— I think he meant the Peace Treaty— all this will be lost if we are unable to make it plain that we are the masters of our own house in Ireland, and that we will again restore and make effective the King's Courts, and that we will bring murderers and assassins to justice. The noble and learned Viscount said that the safety of our Empire depended upon restoring the authority of the King in his Courts throughout Ireland, and bringing those he termed"murderers and assassins"to justice. But the King's Courts do not function at all in Ireland now. Perhaps that is overstating it. I will amend the phrase and say that the King's Courts do not function at all over the greater part of Ireland, and that murderers and assassins, or their representatives, are received in Downing Street.

I have a great regard, if he will allow me to say so, for the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack. I cannot but believe that the extracts that I have read reveal his true mind. I am sure he was saying that which he thought was true when he made those statements. It would. be impertinent for me to attempt to pry into the secrets of the Cabinet room, but I cannot help believing that if the conduct of affairs had been in the hands of the noble and learned Viscount, and other members of the Cabinet who agreed with him, a very different course would have been pursued, and a very different history would have to be related.

Let me say again that the fact that the Government made these statements, and that they have not made them good, and that the noble Marquess standing at that box just now had. no apology to make for this deplorable misjudgment, this deplorable mis-direction of the public mind, has a profoundly demoralising effect. How can you expect the people to know what the truth is if their leaders, if their representatives in the Government, tell them these things with emphasis over and over again, and then, without a word of explanation, tear them to pieces, and in general phrases, like those used by the noble Marquess just now, defend a policy absolutely inconsistent with every word they previously uttered? How can you explain to people that the execution of Nurse Cavell was an outrage, and that her monument should be put up in Trafalgar Square as a testimony for all time that such things were beyond forgiveness, and then leave the murderers of Mrs. Lindsay at large, nay, to shake them by the hand, and negotiate with them? How can you expect the people to arrive at a just conclusion between right and wrong, if you expose them to contradictions. such as I have described?

My Lords, depend upon it, these things are more important than any of your policies. The great thing is to impress upon the minds of the people the sincerity of their Government, to get them to realise, and to know, that there are certain things which a Government will plead for and defend, in regard to which they would rather disappear, as a Government, than give way. With an almost cynical lightness.they sweep aside all these maxims which they have enjoined, all these examples which they have set. Then you have a profound demoralisation of the public mind. The people get to believe that there is no sincerity in public life, that all statesmen, of one Party or another, are to be condemned with the same condemnation.

That is my excuse for my speech. We must tell the people the facts. We must tell the people how they are being governed. We must tell the people what confidence they ought to give to their leaders, the Ministers of the Crown. I do not mean to say that if the Government disappeared to-morrow a wholly different policy could be pursued. Alas ! much of what they have done is irremediable. It is the tragedy of politics that a Government can, in the course of its life, by good administration, do a little good, and, by had administration, an infinity of harm. I admit, because it would be un candid not to admit, that there is no going back from a great deal of what the Government have done, but that makes their responsibility all the greater, that makes the answer which they will have to make to the electors of this country some day, all the more difficult.

I leave the past, and I have one word or two—I am sorry to have detained your Lordships so long—to say of the future. What further concessions are going to be made, if, indeed, they are to be made, I shall not inquire; but there are two points which I would certainly like to bring before your Lordships' notice, one positive and the other negative. I should like to know what, in any arrangement to which the Government can come, they propose to do in order to protect the interests of the loyalists in Ireland? I have a profound feeling for the loyalists of Ireland. I do not know what can be done for them, for I am not in the secret; I am not behind the scenes. But something can be done out of Ireland. Have the Government considered what can be done in giving them terms of migration from the disaffected areas?

I had the other day a pathetic letter addressed to me in the name of the ex-Service men resident in Ireland—that is to say, those men who fought and shed their blood for our country in the late war, and who are.Irishmen, glorious Irishmen. They wrote to me, and said: If we are left under a Sinn Fein Government., our future is obvious. We have served the hated Englishman." Are the Government going to leave the ex-Service men at the mercy of their enemies? I do not want to use extreme language, but it. may very likely be —I earnestly hope it will be—that a wholly different spirit will come over Irish feeling after these terms, or anything like them, are carried into effect; and it may be that the new rulers in Ireland will turn over a completely new leaf. Let us hope, please God, it may be so. But have the Government any right to run any risk? Here are these ex-Service men, and other loyalists too, but especially the ex-Service men because they wore the King's uniform, who ask" Can nothing be done to save us?.. I said,"When the time comes I will do my utmost "—as I am doing this afternoon. That is the positive question.

Then comes the negative question. I was glad to hear what the noble Marquess the Leader of the House said about the claim of Ireland for separation, and the noble Marquess behind me reiterated it. The noble Marquess opposite said it was a rock. How many rocks have there not been on which the Government have founded their policy which turned out to be nothing more than sand? But I do I believe that they will not give way upon that. Yet what hope have they, if that be so, that they will come to terms with the followers of Mr. de Valera?—because he has left no doubt about his view of the situation. He has said in the first place:"We cannot, and we will not, on behalf of this nation, accept these terms." That is how he has dealt with the terms.

How has he dealt with the Army? We do not mean to be helpless. We mean to, arm ourselves to the utmost of our power that we may be able to resist to the utmost of our power.

On the question of secession he said: We are not claiming any right to secede, because there never can be, in the case of Ireland, a question of secession; there never has been union.

He claims absolute separation, and that is confirmed in the most solemn manner by all the members of Dail Eireann. This is what they said: I do further swear that to the best of my knowledge and ability I will support and defend the Trish Republic and the Government of the Irish Republic, which is Dail Eireann, against all enemies foreign and domestic, and I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same. That is the oath they have sworn before God.

Are the Government not satisfied? Is there anything more? I do not ask them to break off the negotiations. I am not in their confidence; I do not know their secrets; I do not know the condition of things in Ireland. I do not know their resources, and I cannot, of course, any more, than any of your Lordships, accept any responsibility for them. But I say this: that. they are still the Government of this country and while they remain so I earnestly hope that they will, even at this eleventh hour, remember their duty and will not allow the fair name and fair fame of this country any longer to be dragged in the mire.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

My Lords, if there is going to be no debate on my. noble friend's Question this is not the moment that I feel it consistent with my duty to keep silent. I shall trouble your Lordships for a few moments only, but there are certain things that I should not consider myself honourable if I did not say from my place to-day. I wish, in the first place, to associate myself completely with all that has fallen from the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I think, whether your Lordships agree with what he has said or disagree, you will feel that it was a very notable utterance. I do not want to touch exactly on the same aspects of the case as he did, but there are certain other matters to which I would refer.

It does not seem to me to be possible to apply the word"rational," in the sense in which that word is generally used amongst civilised people, to the frame of mind of those with whom His Majesty's Government are negotiating in Ireland at this moment. Just think what that attitude is. Mr. de Valera ignores geography and discards all history, except that which suits his own argument. He does not seem to be aware that there is another side to the case. The welfare and safety of Ireland is to be the sole consideration of Irishmen, but the welfare and safety of England is not a matter for consideration by Irishmen at all. In fact, I do not think I should be saying more than the lessons of history teach if I said that moderate counsels, as understood in England, have very seldom any weight in Ireland.

The counsels which have weight are those of the extreme men. The great misfortune, the tragedy of the moment, is that now, as so often before, the extreme men are the gunmen. I know that the authors of the Government of Ireland Act, 1914, believe that if that Act had been in operation when war broke out all would now be well and that we should have been spared the tragedy of the intervening years. I do not believe anything whatever of the kind. I believe if that Act had been in operation, if the gunmen, in the last resort, had the same influence they have now, that they would have taken an opportunity during the war of giving the Empire a far worse stab in the back than they were able to do under the existing circumstances.

The ruling sentiment—and this is what England must remember, however terrible is the thought—the ruling sentiment of the gunmen is not love of Ireland but hatred of England, and it is in the light of that fact, in the light of the influence that these men wield at the present moment., that I feel it my absolute duty to examine the proposals of the Government. I have nothing to say merely against a rebel. If a man thinks his cause sufficiently good, if he has weighed the terrific responsibilities and is willing to take his life in his hands, I say that man often has been, and may be, an honourable man, and one with whom any Government might wisely negotiate. But the question I should not like to answer, if I were the Government, is—Are they negotiating with rebels or with assassins? Among those with whom they are negotiating, who are those who have the last word and supreme influence—the men who are only rebels, or the, men who are chiefly assassins?

At this supreme moment it is not possible to forget the policy which has led up to this tremendous crisis. The present Government have a responsibility for four and a half years, beginning with the fateful régime of Mr. Duke. I do not think it is possible to exaggerate, nor ought we to forget, the enormous mischief done during the period of office of Mr. Duke as Chief Secretary, a policy which was defended time after time, in the face of the gravest warnings, by the noble Marquess opposite. I am one of the severest critics of the régime, of Mr. Birrell, and we all know how that ended. But the responsibility of Mr. Duke is even greater, arid the responsibility of the Government who supported him is greater because they had before them the example of what the régime of Mr. Birrell had led up to.

Yet it was during those two years, when apparently there was no attempt to govern Ireland, that the Sinn Feiners were allowed to perfect that organisation which has enabled them to put up this tremendous fight in Ireland during the past two years. Then followed that vacillating policy, which is the actual trademark or hallmark of a Coalition Government. Never has there been one consistent policy throughout. Releases to-day, reprisals to-morrow; one day the Prime Minister purred, and another day he roared. The consequence is that the Irish of all shades of opinion have lost all faith in the consistent policy of any Government.

And now the Government make this offer, to certain of the terms of which I most strongly object, and I wish here to-day, in my responsibility as a Peer, to state to what I object, why I object, and upon what experience I base my objection. In the first place. I say that, in my judgment, it is wholly inconsistent with the safety and welfare of the Empire, or of England, that there should be a Sinn Fein Army in Ireland. It is not consistent with our national safety that there should be an Army in the United Kingdom not under the exclusive command of the Imperial Government. I utter my most solemn protest against this wholly unex- petted feature of the terms offered. I have been told by friends of mine, again and again, in the last three months, that I should see the Government take this step and offer Sinn Fein an Army. I always said it was impossible. I did not believe that there was any Government, even a Labour Government, that would ever appear before Parliament or before the world and offer a Sinn Fein Army to a Sinn Fein Parliament.

The second point upon which I wish to protest—and here I cut myself altogether adrift from the line of my noble friends, Lord Crewe and Lord Midleton—is this: I believe you are leading up to a tremendous disaster in the future by establishing within these two islands two different sets of Custom Houses. I do not believe that is possible without consequences in the future quite as grave as any that have happened in this horrible tragedy between England and Ireland in the past. You may, by your concessions now, if these are accepted, have a lull in this terrible struggle, but you are laying up nothing but a damnosa hereditas for our descendants. I have had experience in this matter.

Lord Crewe asked your Lordships to remember what had happened in South Africa, and he drew his moral. Let me draw another moral. Why was it that, after self-government had been granted to the Transvaal and to the Orange Free State, the Union of South Africa was brought about within three years? I was right in the middle of those negotiations, and I did all I could to help in bringing then to a successful conclusion. There was only one reason for the Union of South Africa, and it was this: the statesmen of all the four Colonies, statesmen of both races, Boer and British, saw that, if they did not have a Union, there would be civil war. This civil war would arise from two forces only; it would be a war of railway rates and a war of Customs. That is exactly the element of future strife, of bitter strife, that you are introducing between Ireland of the future and Great Britain of the future. After all, in the old days, if my history serves me aright, in the days before the Union, what was the greatest grievance Ireland had? It was the way she was treated by the British Parliament in connection with Customs. That is the whole material for a future strife as terrible as that which we all now deplore. I need nor, tell your Lordships that I desire to see an end of this age-long strife as much as any human being in this House, or outside it. But it is because I do not believe that this is the way really to end that strife, because I believe that two Armies in the United Kingdom, two Custom Houses in the United Kingdom, are the way to discord and not the way to peace, that I ask leave to-day to record my protest.

In this moment there are only two bright lights in this sombre picture. The first—and for this I thank His Majesty's Government—is that the six counties of Ulster are now secure from the vagaries of Party Government at Westminster. They have their own Constitution and can work out their own safety. But have your Lordships noticed that, in exactly the quarters from which you would expect, it is already being pointed out that, if these negotiations fail, the real fault does not rest with Mr. de Valera or with his friends, but with the Lord Chancellor, with Lord Carson and with Sir James Craig? We have already been told that the true enemies of all well-disposed people are the Ulster Unionists. In the day, of our anguish the Ulster Unionists stood by us, as our friends; the friends of Mr. de Valera stabbed us in the back. And vet the former are already being held up by a certain section of opinion as the enemies of England, and the latter are the subject of all admiration, respect. and assistance.

I do not think it would he possible to pervert morality more than it is perverted in the minds of these men, who adjure us to betray our friends and to give everything to our enemies. I hope it will be remembered that these things are very often written in the newspapers by men Who are themselves Sinn Feiners, and that sentiment, of course, is a natural one from a Sinn Feiner. But in so far as they arc written by Englishmen, I say that they add gross hypocrisy to moral perversity, because there is not any Englishman, of whatever political opinion, who would himself willingly live under a Sinn Fein Government.

The second bright spot is the record of the British Army in Ireland during the past two years. I do not think it is possible to speak about that without emotion, and I have no words at my command sufficient to express my admiration. I am not going to allude to what I believe to be the fact, that they have inflicted tremendous punishment in fair fight upon the Irish Republican Army. But I do speak of their wonderful, their never-failing courage and their never-failing devotion to duty in the most trying and terrible circumstances, circumstances far worse than any in the trenches of Flanders or in any field of warfare.

Ask any soldier who has served in the Great War and in Ireland which of those experiences he would prefer to pass through again, and he will always tell you that any experience in Flanders was better than his experiences in Ireland, and yet they have served through all this, as I have already said, with the most wonderful courage and devotion, and, above all, with the most magnificent and unfailing discipline. Under the utmost provocation they have never been inhumane, have never got out of hand, and have shown a forbearance which even the greatest admirer of the British soldier could not have believed to be possible. I should have thought myself wrong if I had not, on this occasion, made my protest against certain aspects of the policy of the Government, and expressed my utter dissent from the whole of their policy during the last four and a half years, and if I had not said what I thought about the record of the British Army in Ireland.

THE FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (THE EARL OF CRAWFORD):

My Lords, may I intervene and say a word as to our arrangements for this afternoon? Several Peers desire to speak, and I am inclined to think that probably it would be most convenient if I now moved the adjournment of the debate on Lord Curzon's Motion, that we should then adjourn for three-quarters of an hour, but that, before we adjourn, we take two formal stages which I will mention in a moment, in order to send Messages to another place, and that upon meeting after the adjournment the debate on Lord Curzon's Motion be resumed. Is that convenient?

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

I think so. I presume the noble Earl refers to the Irish Railway Bill.

THE EARL OF CRAWFORD

No; that will take some time. I referred to the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill, in which it is intended to insert a drafting Amendment, and to the Commons Amendment to the Lords Amendment to the Railways Bill.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

We have been discussing Lord Salisbury's Question, but do I understand that he is not going to ask it? If the debate is going to take place, there are words in Lord Salisbury's Question upon which I wish to comment.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I am in your Lordships' hands. Of course, the Motion of the Leader of the House took precedence over my Question, and it was therefore impossible for me formally to ask it. As soon as the Motion has been disposed of, I will put the Question, or if it is desired I will put it now, or perhaps your Lordships will take it that I put the Question in the course of my speech.

THE EARL OF CRAWFORD

I think the House understood that Lord Salisbury put his Question when he made his statement on Lord Curzon's Motion. I beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.

Moved. That the debate be now adjourned.—( The Earl of Crawford.)

On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

[For continuation of debate, see col. 1026 et seq.]

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