§ Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE EARL OF LYTTON)My Lords, in asking your Lordships to give a Second Reading to this important Bill, I think it desirable that I should begin by making a brief survey of the conditions which led up to its introduction, and explain to your Lordships, if I can, how it happens that a Bill of this magnitude, which ought to come into operation on August 15, or, at any rate, as near that date as possible, is presented to your Lordships for the first time on August 11. I would ask your Lordships to carry your minds back to the debates which took place on the Ministry of Transport Bill in this House at the end of the session of 1919. Your Lordships will remember that I commended that Bill to your acceptance on two grounds. By an agreement made between the Government and the railway companies in 1911, the railway companies were guaranteed their net revenue of 1913 for the period of the war and for two years after the declaration of Peace, and the Government held that, as the State had guaranteed the cost of the railways for the next two years, it was necessary that the State should also possess the power of effecting economies and exercising control over administration.
The first object, therefore, of that Bill was to continue the general State control of railways for the period of two years during which the guarantee continued. The second purpose of the Bill was to enable the Government during those two years to think out, and to submit to the consideration of Parliament, a permanent scheme of railway administration which should take the place of the temporary scheme of control. Your Lordships will remember that the Bill was fiercely attacked in this House, mainly on the 471 ground that, in the opinion of its opponents, it was certain to lead to the nationalisation of railways. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Buckmaster, who is not in his place to-day, told the Government that they had by that measure already given away one of the most important outposts in the struggle that was bound to take place between private and national ownership of the means of wealth. I submit that this Bill is the complete vindication of the arguments which I ventured to address to your Lordships on that occasion, and a refutation of the prophecies and the criticisms which were then made by our critics.
The period of two years is now over, and the Government is submitting to Parliament its considered policy. It is not a policy of permanent Government control. It is not a policy of nationalisation. It is, as I foreshadowed, the only alternative to a policy of nationalisation. All through those discussions in 1919, it was assumed that the Government would have two years in which to formulate its new railway policy. As a matter of fact, only half that period has been available, because not only had the policy to be prepared during that time, but it had also to be submitted to and discussed in Parliament before August 15 of this year. I hope I shall be able to show to your Lordships that the Minister upon whom this duty was imposed has not lost any time in preparing his scheme and submitting it to Parliament.
The Ministry of Transport Act passed on August 15, two years ago. The powers of the Board of Trade were transferred to the Ministry on September 23. Three days later the railway strike was declared, which necessarily occupied the attention of the Minister and his officials for about two months. As soon as the strike was over, the Minister invited the Railway Companies' Association to appoint a committee with whom he could negotiate. A committee of nine, with the late Lord Bessborough as chairman, was appointed, and they first met the Minister on December 17. On February 22, 1920, the general line of policy prepared by the Minister was given to this committee, and at the same time the Rates Advisory Committee was asked to consider a general revision of rates and rate-fixing machinery. By June 24, 1920, that is to say, less than a year since the passing of the Act, the policy of the Government was complete. It was 472 embodied in a White Paper, which was published on June 28 last year. In July, the Minister met the Railway Companies' Association's committee and the Federation of British Industries, and several meetings between the officials of the Ministry and the general managers of the railway companies took place in the autumn. In the months of October and November the first coal strike occurred, and it was not, therefore, till December 8, 1920, that the considered views of the Railway Companies' Association were received, and the Report of the Rates Advisory Committee was not received until December 22.
You will see, therefore, that it was not until the beginning of this year that the Government was in a position even to draft its Bill, and at that stage there was an important point in the negotiations which has not been completed. It was apparent throughout that no settlement as to the future administration of railways could take place without an adjustment of the claims of the railway companies against the Government arising out of the period of State control, and to advise upon these claims a Committee, under the Chairmanship of Lord Colwyn, was appointed on September 24, 1920, and the Report of that Committee was not received until February 8, 1921. Early in March a draft of this Bill was in the hands of the representatives of the interests concerned. On April 1 the coal strike took place and work was again delayed. On May 3 a financial agreement with the railway companies was finally reached, and an agreement with the railway workmen was arrived at, and on May 11 the Bill was introduced into the House of Commons. From that time the Bill has been debated continuously in the House of Commons, and in order to get it through even by this date to your Lordships' House, the Government took the unusual, I believe unprecedented, step of dividing the Bill and submitting it to two Committees of the House of Commons who sat simultaneously.
I have given you this résumé of the facts to show that there has been no avoidable delay on the part of the Government in preparing this Bill, and certainly no disregard of the claims and rights of your Lordships' House. Nevertheless, it is true that the prolonged and complicated negotiations which have taken place ever since the passing of the Transport Act have resulted in the fact that this long and complicated 473 Bill, which I am now submitting to your Lordships, is of such an urgency that it could nut, be postponed for further consideration to later in the year. Your Lordships, I know, had some doubt as to that fact a few weeks ago, and appointed a Committee of your Lordships to communicate with the Minister to ascertain whether or not it really was the case that this Bill could brook no delay. I think I am right in saying that those who came to the Ministry to represent your Lordships on that occasion were satisfied that it really was necessary, in the public interest, to pass this Bill without any further delay.
It is, of course, obvious that in the few days remaining it will not be possible for your Lordships to examine carefully and in detail every clause and line of the Bill, but I submit to your Lordships that the Government has some justification for -asking you on this occasion to dispense somewhat with your undoubted rights of criticism with regard to this Bill, and that justification is this. There are two features of the Bill. First, there is its main policy for the re-organisation into groups of the railway companies of the country. That is a policy which is chiefly contained in Part I of the Bill. That policy represents an agreement which has been arrived at after long discussion and negotiations with all parties concerned, and that agreement having been arrived at it is now submitted to Parliament for confirmation. Not only was the policy announced, but it was actually published a year ago in the White Paper, and since that time no serious objection has been raised to it from any quarter. To this must be added the minor agreement with the railway workers' unions which is embodied in Part IV of this Bill, and which, it is hoped, will prevent the recurrence in the railway industry of the disastrous industrial dispute which followed the decontrol of the coal mines. These clauses, which contain the main policy of the Bill, therefore represent a balanced agreement between a great many different persons and interests, and while it is open to your Lordships to disavow the agreement which the Government have arrived at, and to reject it altogether, it would not be possible materially to amend it without upsetting this carefully adjusted balance.
The second feature of the Bill is the highly complicated and technical machinery for fixing rates which is contained in Part III of the Bill. That machinery, 474 which occupies the greater part. of the Bill—42 clauses out of the total—represents the recommendations of the Rates Advisory Committee, a body of specialists which sat for many months and heard evidence from all parties and interests concerned, and whose recommendations have been embodied practically as they stand in the Bill. It is no disrespect to either House of Parliament to say that the procedure adopted by such a body of experts in preparing the policy which is embodied in these clauses does, to some extent, diminish the necessity for a careful scrutiny of every line by Parliament. In the discussion which took place between the Leader of the Opposition and the noble Ea, I, the First Commissioner of Works, as to the future stages of this Bill, it was pointed out that very little time would be available for minute criticism. So far as I am concerned, I desire that your Lordships should have all the time that is necessary for the purpose of making Amendments in Committee. But I submit that the circumstances I have mentioned make it probable that the number of Amendments your Lordships will desire to move will be much less than it would have been had this Bill not gone through already the stages I have explained. I apologise for making this long preliminary statement, and I now turn to the Bill itself.
For the first time in the history of the railways of this country the Government is now submitting to Parliament a settled policy towards railway transport. The system which has hitherto prevailed of leaving the railways of this country and the provision of railway' transport entirely to private enterprise, with no Government Department possessing any powers or duties except in relation to matters of safety, has not been altogether satisfactory. I have here a list of ten Committees or Commissions which have been appointed to examine into the question of railway administration since 1840, and every' one of these Committees or Commissions has recommended changes in the direction taken by this Bill, although up to the present nothing has come of their recommendations. That being so, it was not conceivable that when the period of control necessitated by the war came to an end, the railways should be allowed to revert entirely to pre-war conditions.
There were, as I have indicated, only two alternatives. One was a policy of 475 complete nationalisation, and the other a policy of grouping and amalgamation between the various railway companies. In this Bill the Government has chosen the latter alternative. This policy of grouping is embodied in Part I, Clauses 1 to 9, and the first three Schedules. The existing railway companies are to be amalgamated into four groups which are set out in the schedules. Smaller lines within the area assigned to each group will be acquired by the amalgamated companies. The companies in these four groups are called constituent companies. As soon as the Bill becomes law these companies may agree upon the terms of their amalgamation. If by January 1, 1923, they are unable to agree then the Amalgamation Tribunal, which is constituted in Clause 8, has to settle the terms of the amalgamation for them, and all amalgamations, whether obtained by agreement or by a decision of the Tribunal, are to become effective by July 1, 1923. The same process, either by agreement or a decision of the Tribunal, will apply to the terms of acquisition of the smaller companies, which are called in the Bill subsidiary companies. The details of this machinery are contained in the first nine Clauses and the first three Schedules.
Clauses 10 and 11 deal with the agreement which has been reached between the Government and the railway companies for the settlement of all claims upon the Government for the period of State control. This agreement provides for the payment of £60,000,000 by the State to the railway companies in two instalments of £30,000,000 each, to be paid on December 31, 1921, and 1922 respectively. This agreement represents the foundation and basis of the whole Bill, and it has only been possible to arrive at that agreement because, by other clauses of the Bill, every party and interest concerned has received something with which it is satisfied. Therefore, although this agreement is inserted in Part I of the Bill, it is only there because of what follows in Part II, Part III and Part IV of the Bill. I will return to that important consideration in a moment, when I deal with the Amendment which has been placed on the Paper by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parmoor.
Before I do so, may I complete my survey of the remaining parts of the Bill? The details of this settlement, in consideration of which a sum of £60,000,000 476 was agreed on, are set forth in Part II, of which Clause 15 is the most important provision. It is essential, now that the railway companies are to be secured in the monopoly of railway facilities in their districts, that the powers of the State should be more definite than they have been hitherto. At present the State can intervene only in matters of safety. It has no power to require the provision of railway services. In Part II of the Bill the State is now given powers to secure the benefits and avoid the evils of monopoly. Under this part of the Bill the responsible bodies are given the right to apply to the Railway and Canal Commission for an order requiring any railway company to provide services and facilities which may be considered necessary, and the companies may obtain an order from the Minister for the carrying out of those services.
The companies may also be required to conform, gradually, to common standards, adopt schemes of co-operative working and common user facilities. All these new powers are in the interests of the public, whilst the companies are protected against misuse of them if they can show that the capital expenditure that is involved, or that would be involved, would be prejudicial to their stockholders. Clause 18, the last in this Part of the Bill, prohibits the making of agreements between the amalgamated companies for the allocation of traffic or the pooling of receipts without the consent of the Minister.
Part III of the Bill deals with the machinery for fixing rates. Clause 19 constitutes a new Tribunal, called the Rates Tribunal, which will supersede the Rates Advisory Committee, and it will be the function of this new tribunal to fix the actual rates which the companies may in future charge. Hitherto, it has been the practice for Parliament to fix the maximum up to which the railway companies may raise the rates, but to leave the actual rates charged to the railway companies themselves. In the opinion of the Government, this system would not be fair to the public if it were continued under the new conditions which are set up by this Bill, and it is provided, therefore, that the Rates Tribunal shall fix the actual fares which shall in future be charged by the coin-panics. The system which will be adopted is, first, to fix a rate which will give to the companies what is described in the Bill as a standard revenue. The standard revenue 477 is the 1913 net receipts,plus5 per cent. of any capital which the railway companies may have expended during the period of control. The 1913 receipts are to be standardised, and are henceforth called the standard revenue. Any sums over that standard revenue which the companies may earn by economies are to be divided and apportioned between the public and the railway companies, to the extent of 80 per cent. to the public in the form of reduced charges, and 20 per cent. to the companies in the form of increased revenue.
Part IV deals with the relations between the new companies and their employees. These clauses give effect to an agreement which has been arrived at between the companies, the Government and the railwaymen's unions, and deal with wages and conditions of service in the future. All questions relating to rates of pay and conditions of service will, in future, be referred to a Central Wages Board, with an appeal to the National Wages Board. It was originally intended, and was embodied in the White Paper published last year, that there should sit on the boards of the amalgamated companies directors representing the railway workers.
That provision, however, was not inserted in the Bill, because, in the discussions which took place between the Government and the railway companies, it found no favour with any of the boards of directors of the companies; and, though the representatives of the men would have been glad if that provision could have been inserted in the Bill with the consent of the railway directors, they were not prepared that it should be put into the Bill against their will, believing that without the good will of the boards of the companies such a system would not work in practice. For myself, I regret very much that it has not been found possible to insert a provision of this kind in the Bill by agreement, because I believe that by some such system of joint management of this kind industrial disputes can best be avoided in the future. It is obvious, however, that you would not have joint management in any condition of harmony unless it were welcomed and accepted both by the directors and the men, and, since that consent was not obtained, the provision does not appear in the Bill.
The agreement arrived at between the railwaymen's unions and the directors provides instead for a system of councils 478 of officers and men, which are to be set up in each railway company, and also for the submission, as I have already said, of matters connected with wages and conditions of service to a Central Wages Board, with an appeal to the National Wages Board.
Part V of the Bill deals with Light Railways, and transfers the powers of the Light Railway Commissioners to the Ministry of Transport. Part VI contains some general provisions, of which perhaps the most important are Clause 75, which ensures the continuance of all existing exchange facilities as between the amalgamated companies, and Clause 77, which deals with the provision of adequate statistical returns in the working of the railways. Those are, in outline, the main provisions of this Bill.
1 notice that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parmoor, has put upon the Paper a Motion asking your Lordships to pass only Part I of the Bill, and to postpone Parts II, III, IV, and, V, including them in a separate Bill.
§ LORD PARMOORPerhaps I may say to the noble Earl that I propose to move that Motion only as regards Parts II and III.
THE EARL OF LYTTONI am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. I understand, therefore, that he proposes that Parts I, IV and V should be passed now, and that Parts II.and III should be deferred and included in a separate Bill in the future?
§ LORD PARMOORYes, that is so.
THE EARL OF LYTTONI think the noble Lord does not, perhaps, quite realise the extent to which this Bill is, as I have said, a nicely balanced agreement between a number of persons and organisations which have considerably divergent interests. There is, first of all, the State which is mainly interested in Part I of the Bill, and the settlement with the railway companies which is referred to in Clauses 11 and 12. There are also the railway companies, who are interested, indeed, in Part I, which secures the amalgamations and the payment of the £60,000,000, but who are also vitally interested in Part III, and who would never have agreed to take back their railways on August 15, or to accept any 479 settlement of their claims by a sum of £60,000,000, unless thay had at the same time obtained the new provisions contained in Part III, which guarantees to them their standard revenue in the future. I may equally say that the Government would never have agreed to the settlement at £60,000,000, unless they also had been satisfied that the provisions in Parts II and III of the Bill would go along with it.
In addition to the State and the railway companies, there are the bodies of traders who represent the general public, or users of the railways. All these persons are vitally concerned in Part II of the Bill, that Part which I understand my noble and learned friend would still wish to see deferred; and they are also interested in that portion of Part III which deals with the rate-fixing machinery, which holds out to them some prospects of a reduction of rates in the future, and which also secures to them 80 per cent. of any future economies which may be effected. Part II of the Bill is, very probably, of less interest to the railway companies, but it is really the charter of the traders, and those who represent the various bodies of traders in Parliament would never have agreed to the passing of this Bill unless Part II went along with it. Then again, there are the railway workmen, who are interested in Part IV. I understand, however, that the noble and learned Lord does not wish to postpone that part of the Bill.
The fact is that the Government have already endeavoured to do the very thing which the noble and learned Lord is suggesting that you Lordships should do. When it became apparent that this Bill could not be prepared without leaving very little time for its discussion in Parliament the Government endeavoured to divide the Bill and see whether it could not put some portions of it into another Bill, which might be held over until a later occasion; but when they came to discuss such a proposition with the various bodies concerned, they found that it was quite impossible to do so. They could not secure their consent to the passage of the Bill unless it went through as a whole. They approached the railway companies, who said they would be satisfied if they got Part I and the revenue clauses of Part III. The traders, on the other hand, said they would not he satisfied unless they got Part II of the Bill, and that if 480 got Part II and the rate-fixing clauses of Part III they would be satisfied. Labour, on the other hand, said they would be satisfied if they got Part IV of the Bill; but they all agreed that, unless they got those parts of the Bill in which they were vitally interested, they would bring the most strenuous opposition against the Bill as a whole.
Finding, therefore, that it was impossible to make a division on these lines, the Government had no alternative but to go forward with the Bill as a whole. I mention this to show your Lordships that the different parts of this Bill hang together, and must hang together—that they represent an equipoise, and that if you take out any one portion of the Bill then the balance is disturbed and the whole thing falls to pieces, like a house of cards from which you have extracted a single card. Desirable, as undoubtedly it would be, to give further time for discussion, it is not, therefore, possible to do what the noble and learned Lord suggests and divide the Bill into separate parts.
I have explained to your Lordships what were the proceedings and negotiations which led up to the introduction of this Bill, and I have tried, quite shortly, to describe some of its main provisions. I am afraid that most of its details are so technical that they would require the skill of a Parliamentary counsel to expound, and the patience of a Private Bill Committee to listen to the exposition. It is a subject of which I cannot claim to have any expert knowledge, and since I am speaking for a Department with which I am not myself connected. I must ask for a very special measure of your Lordships' indulgence. I have also dealt briefly with the Motion which the noble and learned Lord has put on the Paper, and tried to show how impossible it would be to do what he suggests, and divide this Bill into separate parts.
In conclusion, I have only one thing more to say, which, however, I think it is due to the Government should be stated. It is this: It is customary to regard the Ministry of Transport as the most costly/of the Departments of the Government, and the Minister who presides over it as the most extravagant, the super-spender, of all the Ministers of the Crown; and when I remember the hostility which was shown in this House to the establishment of the Ministry of Transport I conclude that that 481 popular idea is probably shared by many of your Lordships. Yesterday I read in the newspapers large headings which described how the taxpayers' money was being poured away on hordes of officials in the Ministry of Transport. Now, the Bid which I submit to your Lordships to-day is the best answer that can be made to criticisms of that kind.
I would ask your Lordships to consider for one moment what was the situation with which the Government was confronted at the termination of the War? There were ninety controlled railway companies in this country and thirty-two in Ireland. The capital invested in those undertakings was. I believe, £1,300,000,000, and the number of employees engaged in them was 737,000. At the end of the period of control the Government were liable to meet claims from those companies which, according to the Report of the Colwyn Committee, which looked into the matter, might have amounted to £150,000,000, and the document upon which these claims would have been based was a mere half-sheet of notepaper, drawn up in 1911, without any legal or technical assistance. I would challenge any one of your Lordships to show how it would have been possible for any Government to deal with a situation of that kind without establishing a special Department with a highly trained and official staff of experts. That was the case for the establishment of the Ministry of Transport. That Department has been in existence now for two years, and it has cost the country, in salaries and administrative expenses, during the whole of those two years, about half a million pounds sterling. To the extent of half a million pounds, in two years, the taxpayers' money has been poured away oil hordes of officials.
I ask your Lordships to consider what the State has gained by that expenditure of half a million. The first duty of the Department was to certify the annual net deficit on the working of the companies over the 1913 standard, and in order to arrive at that figure the income and expenditure of the companies which had to be investigated amounted to £500,000,000 a year, and I would ask your Lordships to realise what, in such a sum as that, is the margin for possible error. I am not suggesting anything in the nature of fraud or conscious mis-statement, but in figures of that kind the margin for accidental error alone is so enormous, that sums 482 amounting to between £15,000000 and £20,000,000 have been challenged by the Department in their close scrutiny of these accounts, and already over £6,000,000 has been actually returned by the companies and paid into the Exchequer as a result of this scrutiny. That is on the annual cost of running the railways. Now, when the period of control conies to an end, there are the claims ill final settlement which have to be met—claims which, I reminded your Lordships, were stated by the Colwyn Committee to be in the region of £150,000,000. Those claims have been settled in this Bill, by this Department, as a result of negotiations, at £60,000,000. Lastly, by the agreements with the railwaymen's unions, contained in Part IV of the Bill, the danger of a costly and dangerous industrial dispute, such as followed the decontrol of the coal mines, has been avoided. Thus, in cash alone, to say nothing of the increased efficiency and the economies which it is hoped may be realised in the future as a result of this Bill, this horde of officials has saved the cost of the salaries many times over.
I know that diplomatists are very rarely credited with the wars which they save, though they have to bear the responsibilities of those which they have been unable to prevent; and equally, no doubt, Departments are very rarely credited with money which they save, though they are very freely criticised for expenditure which they incur. And so I have not the least doubt that this wholly unjustifiable legend about the Ministry of Transport will survive, in spit e of what I have said. But only those who actually had to grapple with the gigantic problems which were the legacy of the war can estimate the extent of the savings which have been effected on behalf of the taxpayers of this country by that most abused and least understood Department of Government, and only they can gauge the advantages which, as the result of two years' strenuous work by that Department, are now embodied in the Bill which I ask your Lordships to read a second time.
§ Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Lytton.)
§ LORD PARMOORhad given Notice, on the Motion for the Second Reading, to move, "That Parts II, III, IV, and V be postponed and included in a separate Bill." The noble and learned Lord said:
483 My Lords, I have put down this Motion on the Paper, not with a desire of delaying the effective operation of any portion of. this Bill, but in order, if possible, to make the revision power of this House something more than a farce in relation to this Bill. The noble Earl, in his admirable and lucid speech, has said that the portions of the Bill to which I object could not be dissevered from the rest without contravening a bargain which had been come to between, I presume, the railway companies and the Government. I am going to give sonic reasons why I think he has over-stated that part of the case. But I am glad to recognise that, if the portions which I desire to be separated from the rest of the Bill could have been so separated, the Government realise it would be desirable so to separate them. In that I entirely agree with him, and therefore I need not go further into that matter.
It was my misfortune, or good fortune. to be a Parliamentary counsel for a large number of years, and afterwards a great part of my professional life was spent before the Railway and Canal Commission, and I entirely agree with the noble Earl that it is really impossible, at any rate on the Second Reading, to deal at all effectively with the extraordinarily complicated details which we find, especially in Part III, in this Bill. But that was one of the main reasons why I hoped that those clauses might have been postponed until a future occasion, in order that there should be an effective criticism of their provisions, which, in my opinion, is most necessary and ought to be carried out by your Lordships' House. I will point out one or two matters in reference to which I make a general statement of that kind. The noble Earl has said, quite accurately, that the main policy of the Bill is contained in Part I. I agree with him in what he said with regard to Part IV—that it is a great advantage to have come to an arrangement under Part IV. But, so far as railway matters pure and simple are concerned—considerations such as the interests of traders, matters of railway user, the question how far it is possible to continue competition, and all subjects of that kind—those really come in the main for consideration under Part I.
Now, what is Part I? In my view it is necessary to appreciate what Part I means in order to appreciate the necessity of a most careful criticism of Parts II and III.
484 Part I is a reversal of the whole policy of railway legislation in this country. Railway legislation in this country has been founded on the competitive principle. It has been founded on a series of competitive lines, introduced on the theory—and I think the right theory—that by means of competition the public get a maximum of railway facilities and a proper lowering of railway wages and fares. I agree that in the course of time some re-arrangement was probably necessary in order that you might have maximum efficiency and economy in railway administration. But it appears to me that the grouping in this case has been fixed on such a basis as to make monopoly as wholly monopolistic as you could possibly make it. One feels that the Minister in charge of the Bill—I do not say this in any way to his disparagement—was an old official of the North Eastern Railway Company; I think he was assistant general manager at the time the war broke out, and I have often had the pleasure of meeting him over railway questions. But the North Eastern Railway is the apostle of the monopoly doctrine, and you could not select anyone more immersed in monopoly doctrines as regards railway traffic and railway management than the present Minister of Transport, Sir Eric Geddes.
I will give an illustration of what I mean. I remember very well when the North Eastern monopoly was attacked by the promotion of the Hull and Barnsley Railway. That railway was promoted by the merchants and the Corporation of Hull, and by the coalowners in the Barnsley coalfield; it was promoted for the very object of putting an end to the severity of the North Eastern monopoly in that district. For a very large number of years the traders and others who found the money for the working of that railway got no return on their capital at all. I believe that in recent years their affairs have been more prosperous. Now, what is the effect of this grouping? In the future this line, promoted by traders and coalowners in order to get an element of competition against the North Eastern Railway, is to be incorporated in the North Eastern group. You are doing the very thing which destroys all possibility even of potential competition in the future.
There is no necessity, except in the interests of railway companies possibly, why this severe form of monopoly should be 485 introduced. Take the ease of the Hull and Barnsley Railway, for instance. Why should it not be grouped with the. Midland, the effect of which would be to have effective competition in the North-Eastern I districts and Hull, and probably other adjacent parts. But one cannot help seeing that whoever made this bargain made it a monopoly bargain, to prevent the railway company from being subject to any competition in the future. I do not believe in the destruction of all competition. I do not think it is necessary to have monopolies in order to prevent what the noble Earl called nationalisation. In fact, I think the most effective opposition to nationalisation is a healthy form of; competition, and the essence of private management is that you should have corn-petition as against State monopoly, which is so dear, of course, to all officials, and which has generally the result of giving power of administration to official bodies.
Let me say another word about this grouping of railways in Part II. I very much object to the form of the Amalgamation Tribunal. Do not let it be thought that I object to the members of it—that is a different matter altogether. It is not a Tribunal which I think would be fair in the interest of the public. It is not so constituted. Why should you constitute a Tribunal of this kind at all? If it is constituted I think it should be given much wider powers as regards the grouping principle. There are two bodies I can think of which would be much better bodies to deal with a matter of this kind. In the first place, there are the Railway and Canal Commissioners. Why should not they be charged with a matter of this kind? They are presided over by a Judge. They are selected in such a way that one of the other members has legal knowledge and one has commercial knowledge. They are entirely independent, and are not in any way mixed up with railway companies.
There is another alternative and one which I should prefer as regards matters of amalgamation. There is more experience among what I may call the railway chairmen of the two Houses than in any other body that could be found. Hitherto, all questions of amalgamation have come before Private Bill Committees, presided over by what I may call experienced railway chairmen, and if you want a really independent Amalgamation Tribunal in order that all interests may be properly 486 protected—and it is almost always a legislative matter—why not set up a Joint Committee composed of the railway chairmen of both Houses? It would not interfere with the effective power of the two Houses. It would keep within the power of the two Houses what ought to be so kept—an effective control in relation to amalgamation and the statutory powers which railway companies have at the present time.
In reference to the question of compensation which was dealt with by the noble Earl, I do not say a word. In my opinion it is a most fortunate matter that the sum has been agreed. And not only has the sum been agreed but I understand that the allocation is also largely a matter of agreement. It would have been a terrible misfortune to have had the kind of lengthy proceedings which must have been undertaken at enormous cost, if the sum had not been agreed upon, and I think it is greatly to the credit of both parties that an agreement has been conic to and that lengthy and expensive legal proceedings may be avoided.
Turning to Part II, I am afraid it is rather late to do so, but I should like to try to convince the noble Earl that there is no reason whatever why this part of the Bill should not be postponed while at the same time Part I comes into full operation. What is Part II? I do not think it can be really understood except by those who have had considerable experience of all this class of railway questions. Part II is headed "Regulation of Railways," and power is given to the Railway and Canal Commissioners to make certain Orders against railway companies in the future. It is not a matter of immediate concern. By that I mean that it is a matter of making future Orders against railway companies. In almost every respect the same Orders could be made at the present time, even though Part II had no existence.
May I explain what the difference is? The difference is that whereas in old days the Railway and Canal Commissioners were held not to have power to put capital expenditure upon railway companies against their protests, they are given power under Part II, to a very small extent, to put this capital expenditure upon railway companies in future. That is all it comes to. It is a very slight enlargement of the powers of the existing body, and surely 487 if is preferable, when you are giving powers of this kind, which cannot possibly be exercised to-morrow, or in the next day or two, to postpone the matter for six weeks or two months in order that it may be freely and fully discussed.
It would be out of place for me to discuss in detail the provisions of Part II, and I agree with the noble Earl that one would weary the House beyond all hope of a patient hearing by going into details upon Second Reading going I would like to give an illustration of what I mean. The whole bearing of Clause 18 of the Bill appears to anyone who has dealt pretty frequently with matters of this kind to be the safeguard of the monopoly. You will find that the public is the stalking horse, but nothing else. Power is given to companies and groups to enter into agreements with one another.
The marginal note of Clause 18 is "Restrictions on combination." It is really a restriction for the purpose of making monopoly unattackable. The words of the clause are—
it shall not be lawful for any…I will call them amalgamated company because groups of companies are referred to—without the consent of the Minister to enter into agreements with any constituent or subsidiary company in another group or with any other amalgamated company, as the case may be, for the allocation of trafficand so on. In other words, not only do you create the monopoly, but you prevent a monopoly from even entering into an agreement with another in case, perchance, under the terms of that agreement, the monopoly may be made less permanent or less rigid. I can see no possible justification for a provision of that kind. I am only dealing with matters generally; it is quite impossible to go into detail.Then Part III is headed "Railway charges," and in the first place, as the noble Earl has pointed out, provision is made for the appointment of a new Railway Rates Tribunal in Clause 19. What is the Rates Tribunal? This multiplication of tribunals is very bad as a matter of principle, and is by no means likely to conduce to that economy which the noble Earl has so much at heart. It is provided in subsection (4) that
Of the permanent members of the rates tribunal one shall be a person of experience in com- 488 mercial affairs, one a person of experience in railway business, and one, who shall be the chairman, shall be an experienced lawyer.What is the constitution of the Railway and Canal Commission at the present time? One member is a person of experience in commercial affairs, one a person of experience in railway business and one, the chairman, is a Judge of the High Court, and, therefore, a person whom one might call an experienced lawyer. What is the good of duplicating tribunals of this kind?It has been alleged against the Railway and Canal Commission that in proportion to their official salaries the work they have to do is almost nominal. It has been so for a series of years. Any one who reads the Reports which they make from year to year will know that they have ample leisure and time to deal with questions of this kind. Why, therefore, is it necessary to constitute a new Railway Rates Tribunal? It is a re-duplication of the Railway and Canal Commission with this small alteration in constitution—that in place of a Judge of the High Court the chairman shall be "an experienced lawyer "—to quote the words of the Bill. I agree with the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, in his eulogy of the legal profession at an earlier stage in the proceedings of your Lordships' House this afternoon, but I do not see why positions of this kind should be multiplied. I cannot understand, when you have a tribunal which was established in 1873, on the very same basis and in the very same way as the one proposed, why there should be a new tribunal set up under the railway charges portion of this Bill. It may be that the existing tribunal is too strong, and too independent. I am inclined to think that that may be so, but my view is that a strong and independent tribunal is absolutely essential to deal with these questions of railway fares and rates.
I must pass quickly over these matters. Coining to the jurisdiction of this new Tribunal I find that there are transferred to it practically the powers of the Railway and Canal Commission in respect of charges. As regards general provisions dealing with railway charges, nothing practically is transferred to them except what the Railway and Canal Commission now have. The next question is the classification of merchandise. The classification of merchandise is already provided for. It was originally settled by Sir Courtenay Boyle and the late Lord Balfour of Burleigh many 489 years ago, and can be revised from time to time. But if you want a further power of revision you have the expert body appointed for this very purpose—namely, the Railway and Canal Commissioners.
I want to make my position clear. The postponement of this clause would not mean any effective postponement of the principles which the noble Earl was anxious to bring into operation as soon as possible. If you look at the standard charges under Clause 29, you will find that they have to be submitted to the Tribunal not later than December 31, 1922. That is a year and a quarter ahead of the present time. What delay could there be if, in order to have those provisions properly discussed and revised, as I should hope they will be by your Lordships' House, the matter was postponed, as it would be, for six weeks or two months. We are dealing not with matters of immediate urgency, but with future matters, which, in their effect, may have a vital influence one way or the other upon the trade of this country.
Under the head of standard charges there is a matter which is most vital and important. The noble Earl spoke as though this Bill were an antidote to nationalisation. I have always been a great opponent of nationalisation, but what do these standard charges mean? If I followed the noble Earl, and if I follow the Bill. you do not leave the railway managers in their own house at all. The actual charges which they are to make are fixed for them by an outside authority, and they cannot alter them, either up or down, without going to the Minister or to the Rates Tribunal. What do you mean by nationalisation? I very much object to nationalisation, as I said, but suppose, officially, you leave the railway companies in the position that they cannot alter a rate one penny one way or the other without official authorisation, you are certainly going a very long way from the principles which make private administration and private enterprise of the enormous advantage which they have been to this country. At the same time, in order to make this principle effective—a vicious principle, as I think it, and a bad principle which ought not to be allowed—you scrap every statutory provision which deals with the rates at the. present time. I want to know why that is done.
The protection for the trader, which Parliament imposed many years ago, was 490 on the principle of what was known as the maximum rate. You scrap that entirely. In the old days the railway companies got their charters on the basis of a certain level charge. That was a condition under which they got their powers for charging the public for the use of" their railway lines. That is scrapped from top to bottom. Every single statutory provision which now exists as regards the railway companies is swept away by this proposal of standard charges. In order that the noble Earl may see what I mean, I will ask him to look at Clause 34. As was pointed out, the appointed day is not the day when the Act passes. It says:—
As from the appointed day all statutory provisions, and the provisions of all agreements with respect to classification of merchandise and with respect to charges for or in connection with the carriage of merchandise or passengers by any railway which becomes a railway of an amalgamated company, or of a railway company to which any schedule of standard charges is applied, shall to the extent to which these provisions relate to the matters aforesaid he repealed and cease to be operative.At one fell swoop, in the case of every railway company in this country, you take away the protection which Parliament has provided in order, no doubt, that too high charges shall not be made. I can understand some people bargaining for a Bill of this kind. The noble Earl did not tell us exactly between whom the bargain was made. I think that these clauses have all the evils which you find where a bargain is made between competing people whose last thought is the interest of the general public. That is the sort of logrolling agreement which you reach under conditions of this kind.Coming to the exceptional charges, I would point out that exceptional charges can be made now. There is nothing novel in exceptional charges. Our railways are largely under the common law principle that the carrier shall only make reasonable charges. That was the old principle, and reasonable charges, of course, tend to be equal charges. All that is swept away. In reference to these exceptional charges, I will read subsection (2) of Clause 41. These exceptional charges, and through charges, were for the benefit of traders, and in order to maintain competition as between the railway companies. I ask your Lordships to look at this subsection (2):—
If the Minister is of opinion that any company has granted exceptional fares in such a manner 491 as prejudicially to affect any other class of users of the railway, or so as to jeopardise the realisation of the standard revenue of the company, he may refer the matter to the rates tribunal—That means that the company cannot give the trader a low rate if, in the opinion of the Minister, it jeopardises the realisation of the standard revenue of the company.What is the effect of that as regards private enterprise? It means that you may wish to meet your customer, but an outside official will say: No, you must not do that, because you may possibly diminish your own revenue." To meet your customer is the essence of private enterprise and private efficiency; yet you actually have a provision here, in favour of this severe monopoly, as I call it, by which, if the Minister can say that by lowering your charge to a trader you possibly jeopardise your revenue, you are not to be allowed to lower that charge. Is that a matter for the Minister to decide, or is it a matter for the railway companies to decide? In my opinion every line of Part III requires revision and reconsideration. I can only call your Lordships' attention to one or two matters, and I am sorry to have taken up so much time.
As regards the conditions of traffic and miscellaneous provisions as to charges, all these matters can be dealt with now. I have looked very carefully through Clauses 42 and 43 and so on, down to Clause 52, and I cannot find anything that you could not deal with by the Railway Commissioners of the present time. These clauses are introduced, apparently, as a kind of "window-dressing," as far as I can understand. There is no differentiation between the real matters which are introduced, which are all in favour of monopoly, and the residue still left over of the statutory provisions in favour of the traders and users of the railways. I have come to the conclusion that that is the substance of this Bill.
Clauses 58 and 59 refer to the adjustment of charges to revenue. That is a most complicated matter and ought to receive full consideration at the Committee stage. It is a new provision which would enable companies, in certain circumstances, to put up their charges almostad infinitumso long as they could get any traffic to carry. The first consideration is the railway revenue. It is not the trader, it is not facilities for traffic, it is not the conditions 492 for traffic, but it is that such a charge may be made as shall keep up the revenue of the railway company. When you have a provision of that kind what becomes of the inducement to economy and efficiency? I know perfectly well that the Rates Tribunal, or the Minister, is said to have regard to economical and efficient management. How can they do it? There is no safeguard as regards economy and prudent management except the self-interest of the trader, or the manufacturer, or the railway company, as the case may be.
I cannot go further because it would be trespassing too much on your Lordships' time. I did hope that this House would have a fair opportunity of considering these extremely important questions as regards railway regulations and railway charges. It becomes a farce if we have to consider this in Committee either on Monday or Tuesday. It is a farce in which I decline to take any part whatever, and I say that not that I should not be desirous of giving what assistance I could to your Lordships' House, but because it is utterly futile, on one afternoon late in August, that you should attempt to deal with these complicated problems. The noble Earl has recognised the complication of the provisions of this Bill; they are full of masses of detail, and every line ought to have careful consideration and revision. If I am in order, I move that Parts II and III be postponed and included in a separate Bill.
§ LORD NUNBURNHOLMEMy Lords, I should like to say a few words in support of what Lord Parmoor has said on the monopoly side of this Bill. Before doing so, I must say I hesitate to speak in the presence of so many railway directors, because I cannot help thinking that the railway directors, or the railway managers, and the Government have made a very good bargain for themselves in this matter, and that the public has been left out, especially the traders. Take the case of the Hull and Barnsley Railway, which has been mentioned by my noble friend, Lord Parmoor. Why have they been put into a monopoly group? The people of Hull do not want that railway put in that group. It is true that the Hull Chamber of Commerce and the Hull Corporation have done what they could to oppose this Bill. The people of Hull are universally opposed to it with the exception, perhaps, of one or two railway directors who happen 493 to be connected with the companies who are going into these groups.
We intend to put down Amendments in Committee to maintain the freedom of the Hull and Barnsley Railway. We feel that a big industrial area like Hull which serves the Midlands and a great portion of industrial England should be allowed some portion of (to use a modern phrase) self-determination. I hope your Lordships will allow that freedom to remain which is threatened to be cut away by the Bill. We in Hull cannot help thinking that the Hull and Barnsley Railway has been put into this group because Sir Eric Geddes happened to be a former official of the North Eastern Railway. At the same time, I should like to take this opportunity of saying that the people of Hull fully recognise the great expenditure of money that the North Eastern Railway have made in that port, and the extensive facilities which they have given, but it is thought by the people of Bradford and the centre of Yorkshire, by the colliery companies, by the coal shippers, and all the other traders who use the Hull and Barnsley Railway, that this particular railway company should be cut out of the Bill in the same way that similar companies have been cut out of other groups in other parts of England.
Before I sit down I should like to protest at the port of Hull being subjected to the monopoly of one group of railways only, when they have to compete with ports like Bristol and Liverpool, which have more than one group serving them. Both those ports have two groups of railways, and other private lines in addition, such as the Cheshire lines. I hope that we shall be given more time to discuss this Bill next week, and to go thoroughly into all these matters.
§ LORD FARRERMy Lords, I wish very briefly to ask one question on the arrangement of the railways. The main point of the Bill is Part I; that is to say, the re-arrangement of the railways of England into great groups. But there is one railway, of which I was a director for a good many years, the Somerset and Dorset Railway, which does not appear in the schedule. I know from the figures of the noble Earl and of the Government generally, that they always think in millions and Empires, but after all in the case of a railway line that runs from Bristol to Bournemouth, and where it is really a 494 question of competitionversusmonopoly, I think the matter ought to be put to this House in some concrete form before we are asked to consider the Bill. I should like to know why that railway has been left out of the Schedule.
§ VISCOUNT CHURCHILLMy Lords, I think it possibly may be of advantage to your Lordships if, as chairman of the Railway Companies' Association and claiming to speak for a very large majority of the railways of the country, I make now the very few remarks which I wish to make to your Lordships. If I may respectfully say so, I cannot help thinking that the points raised by the two noble Lords who spoke last are points essentially for Committee rather than for Second Reading. However that may be, I have no doubt that when we get to that stage they will be considered.
There was one remark made by the noble Earl who introduced the Bill, which I want to qualify to a certain extent. He described it as an agreed Bill, I should rather prefer to describe it as a compromise—a compromise that has been arrived at after months and months of hard work and negotiations carried on by the Government, the railway companies and traders, and by Labour—and the Bill is now in a very different form from that in which it would have been had it followed the exact lines of the White Paper published some fourteen months ago. I know there are some railway directors and others who wish that the Bill had never seen the light of day. If it had been in the form originally suggested in the White Paper I am not sure that I should not have felt so myself. But such a difference has been made in it that I consider, taking all things into consideration, that it represents a very reasonable compromise.
Your Lordships are well aware that at the commencement of the war the railways were taken over by the Government. During the period of control, which still continues and comes to an end next Monday, August 15, vast concessions have been made to labour in the shape of wages, conditions, and hours of service, and they entail on the railways an increased expenditure of something like £120,000,000 per year. These concessions, as you will realise, could never have been made by the railways if they had been managed on 495 commercial lines. Consequently, when the railways are handed back at the end of control, a very serious national situation would have been created had not the provisions brought forward in this Bill been arranged.
The noble Earl has explained to you how the Bill has been before Lord Colwyn's Committee where the financial arrangements were most carefully considered. It has also been considered by Sir F. Gore Browne's Committee, and on its recommendations the rates clauses of the Bill have been drafted. Before that Committee the interests of the traders and agriculture, as well as those of the railways, were most carefully considered; they were represented by counsel. I do not think, therefore, it is fair to say that this part of the measure has not received sufficient consideration, especially after all these months have been occupied over it.
With regard to the financial settlement—namely, the £60,000,000—this, again, is essentially a compromise. The claims which the railway companies had under the control arrangements were vast, and. it was felt on all sides, by the representatives of the railways and the Government, that, having in view the huge cost of litigation had we been obliged to go to litigation, the long period over which it would have lasted (the most conservative estimates gave from three to four years) during which period financial chaos would have reigned on the railways, it was eminently desirable that some settlement should be arrived at which was fair and satisfactory to all parties. As far as that is concerned, I think scant justice has been done to the railways, but, taking into consideration all the difficulties I have described, I think a wise course was pursued in coining to the settlement in the Bill.
The details of the Bill have been so very ably described by the noble Earl, as I am sure the House will agree, that it is not necessary for me to go into them. There is only one point to which I desire to refer, and it relates to those clauses which deal with management, and which are the result of agreement arrived at between the railway companies and the trades unions. In the White Paper, although it was never in the original Bill, it was foreshadowed that working men might he placed on the boards of railway companies, but every practical man in the railway world, members of the unions included, knows perfectly well that that would not work. The con- 496 sequence was that the railway companies got into communication with the representatives of the trades unions, the matter was thoroughly thrashed out, and the scheme as embodied in the Bill is the result. It is a scheme which both parties consider ought to work smoothly and for the well-being of all parties.
I should like to take this opportunity of acknowledging the great help which I and those who were negotiating on behalf of the railway companies received from Mr. J. H. Thomas and the representatives of the trades unions. They were most helpful, and I am perfectly certain they are satisfied that workingcon amore, as the councils will be worked, will tend more to what we all have in view—namely, a closer co-operation of labour and the directorate. There are, of course, points which will have to be raised in Committee, but this is not the moment to discuss them. As far as our business this evening is concerned, I can only say that I sincerely hope your Lordships will give the Bill a Second Reading.
§ LORD KNARESBOROUGHMy Lords, I did not intend to say anything on the Second Reading. but as two noble Lords have thought fit to attack the North Eastern Railway Company, of which I happen to be chairman, I think it is necessary for me to indicate that we shall have plenty to say, but this is not the proper time to say it. The noble Lord, Lord Nunburnholme, has told us that he intends to put down an Amendment to carry out his views with regard to the Hull and Barnsley Railway. If I were to go into that question now it would mean inflicting two speeches on that subject, and I shall be consulting the general convenience of your Lordships if I say that the observations we have to make on that particular subject will be reserved until the Amendment is brought forward in Committee.
THE EARL OF MAYOMy Lords, I should like to ask the noble Earl in charge of the Bill one question—and may I most sincerely congratulate him on the able way in which he explained the Bill? He mentioned that responsible authorities could go before the Railway and Canal Commission if they had any complaints with regard to the railways.
THE EARL OF MAYOI am speaking of Part II generally. The noble Earl went on to say that Part II was the charter of the traders. I want to know what is the charter of the passengers, because I do not know what body of passengers with a grievance has any chance of getting that grievance dealt with under this Bill. Lord Parmoor dealt very clearly with monopolies. Let me give the noble Earl in charge of the Bill a clear conception of what a real monopoly is. Let us take the London and North Western Railway from Chester to Holyhead, and from Holyhead to Kings town. That is absolutely a monopoly, with which nobody can interfere, unless by making a line to run alongside it in competition, which is impossible. Now that that railway has got a monopoly, they can do exactly what they like for the convenience or the inconvenience of the passengers. I do not complain very much about it, but there are certain inconveniences which might be put right, and I should like to ask the noble Earl how passengers can possibly be heard in this matter. I should be very glad if he could, tell me that, because this particular monopoly has existed for a long time.
Let me give a little instance of the pressure that was brought to bear on this railway at one time. There was no third class a great many years ago, and the Nationalist Members said that if a Were, not put on the Irish mail they would oppose every London and North Western Railway Bill that came before Parliament. A third class was put on that train, and they did not oppose the Bills. There is no chance of that sort of thing happening now, and the London and North Western Railway with their monopoly from Chester to Holyhead, and from Holyhead to Kingstown, can practically do exactly as they like.
§ LORD ASKWITHMy Lords, I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parmoor, is going to press his Motion, but if so, I should fail to agree with him on that point.
§ LORD PARMOORI am told that, in form, my Amendment is out of order, and therefore I could not press it.
§ LORD ASKWITHThen it will not come up at all?
§ LORD PARMOORI do not think so
§ LORD ASKWITHI should have opposed it for this reason: if this Bill goes through, it might just as well go through in a short time as he postponed to some later date. Lord Parmoor has pointed out very clearly that the principle of competition practically disappears under this Bill. That is the principle upon which our railway legislation has been based. Competition is mentioned only in one clause of the whole Bill—namely, in Clause 52, where, upon new circuitous routes, if the Minister considers that the proposal involves unreasonable competition, he may refer the matter to the Rates Tribunal. Further, the control of the railways by Parliament largely goes by the board. The control of Parliament appears only in Clause 31, dealing with the standard charges and also with the limit beyond which an increase in those charges shall not be levied without reference to Parliament. Lord Parmoor mentioned that the maxima had gone, but, as I read the Bill, it rather retains the maxima, which have to be brought before Parliament in a Report which the Minister has to submit to both Houses of Parliament, and which then have to be based upon Resolutions of both Houses.
The reason why competition goes by the board in the Bill has been clearly expressed by the noble Earl who moved the Second Reading, and by the noble Viscount on my left. It is that, instead of competition, in the future we are to have a compromise, and to trust that compromise. No doubt it is a speculative element, but perhaps it was necessary in the circumstances. A compromise has been made—a balanced agreement, I think the noble Earl called it; a balanced compromise, as the noble Viscount called it—by the railway companies with the Government, with the employees, with the shareholders, and presumably with some of the traders; although at the time when I was head of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade, I was not aware that the railway companies always saw eye to eye with the traders. But however that may be, the chances of the Bill in the future depend upon the spirit in which it is worked. There is to be a review at the end of every year for three years of a great many of the charges under this Bill. There is then to be another review, if the Minister so directs, in every third year after. In fact, the whole question of the incentive of the railway companies to improve them- 499 selves and the incentive to reconstruct the rates, entirely depend upon these reviews, and the spirit in which the four bodies that I have mentioned work together.
What I fear in this Bill, and its actual method of working, is the enormous amount of red tape and the Committees connected with it. Every railway company will have to keep some experts, whose whole time will be engaged in attending Committees and Tribunals, or, unless the spirit is extremely good, in arguing out various questions of rates and charges. So far as I can make out, fourteen (Efferent Committees are established by this Bill. We have the Amalgamation Tribunal; the Rates Tribunal; the present Railway and Canal Commission; a committee on standardisation and co-operation; local committees at the instance of the Rates Tribunal under Clause 21; a Committee on Classification; two Committees dealing with the wages of the workpeople; a Committee for schemes of councils; a Committee for settling the affairs of the railway police; a Committee on Accounts; local inquiries when ordered by the Minister; an advisory panel advising the Minister; and, lastly, in certain cases, a body dealing with the compensation of existing officers, arbitrators to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor.
Of those Committees, that which has to do the most work of all is the Rates Tribunal. The Rates Tribunal is mentioned in 24 out of the 86 clauses of this Bill, as having control over the various parts of the business of the railway companies; and, as if that were not sufficient, at the end of the Bill, in the Fifth Schedule, there are eleven new duties added to it, new matters upon which it has to give its decision. At the end of the first year, any of these decisions that are questioned may have to be reviewed. At the end of the second year, they have to be reviewed again, and at the end of the third year they have to be reviewed once more. These perpetual examinations and decisions may be necessary to some extent for settling the affairs of the railway companies at the present time, but, as I have remarked, one can merely guess how this system will work in replacing the system which has worked in the past. It entirely depends upon the spirit which exists in the country with regard to the working of the railways, as to whether they will be in a state of chaos or whether peace is established among them.
THE EARL OF LYTTONMy Lords, I have no reason to complain of the reception which your Lordships have given to this Bill. Indeed, the only critical speech was made by Lord Parmoor, and, as I see he is not in his place, I do not think it is necessary for me to reply in any detail to his criticisms have, however, been asked one or two questions to which I think it right I should reply before the Motion is put. My noble friend, Lord Farrer, asked a question about the Somerset and Dorset Railway, and he was afraid, I think, that because this was a small railway it had somehow or other been overlooked by the Government, and was not provided for. The facts about that railway are these: The railway is a joint railway now between two companies, and it will remain under the Bill a joint railway between two groups. It is not the only railway in that position. All railways which are joint railways between two companies that will in future be amalgamated into one group will, of course, be absorbed, and are mentioned in a schedule of the Bill, but all lines which will continue to be joint lines between two groups are not absorbed into either one or the other, but will continue in the future, as in the past, to be joint lines, and for that reason are not mentioned in a schedule of the Bill.
Then I was asked a question by Lord Mayo. He pointed out, what is true, and had I been called upon to reply to Lord Parmoor I should have reminded that noble and learned Lord, that there is to-day no competition, in the matter of railway facilities, in many parts of the country. There are many places served to-day by one line only. I might also have pointed out that under the Bill there will, in future, be competition, in spite of the grouping and amalgamation, in many parts of the country where competition exists to-day. Lord Mayo asks me what are the provisions of the Bill which enable groups of passengers to make any representations in support of their interests. If the noble Lord will look at Clause 15, which is the first clause of Part II, he will see that"any body of persons"representing certain interests may make representations; and if he will look at Clause 78 he will see there a definition of the persons who may make representations, and among those he will see is included"the council of any county or 501 borough or district "; and will he possible—
THE EARL OF MAYOCan any body of persons in Ireland make representations with regard to the monopoly between Holyhead and Chester?
THE EARL OF LYTTONAny body of persons may make representations with regard to the manner in which their interests may be affected by the railway administration, and call upon the companies concerned to provide facilities, and, the Minister giving the Order, the application will then be heard in the case of passengers exactly in the same way as in the case of any body of traders. It is in those two clauses that the interests of passengers are provided for.
THE EARL OF MAYOMay I ask this: The noble Earl said that in parts of England there would be monopolies and that provision was made for competition.I do not see what provision possibly can be made for competition against the London and North Western railway between Chester and Holyhead. We are entirely in their hands from that station to the harbour of Kingstown at present.
THE EARL OF LYTTONI was pointing out to the noble Earl that the existence of monopoly, and the absence of competition, exist not only in the case of Holyhead but on a number of routes from London to many parts of the country, and therefore it is not a new thing to find parts of the country where there is no competition between different railway companies. There will, in future, under this Bill, when all the amalgamations have taken place; be competition in places where there is competition to-day. For instance, the noble Lord can travel to Scotland by the East Coast or the West Coast group, and that competition will exist in the future under the Bill. Therefore, it is not true to say, as Lord Parmoor said, that all competition was being swept away by this Bill, and it was only in consequence of that remark that I have given this explanation.
THE EARL OF MAYOEngland is an island; we have to get across the Irish Sea, and there is a monopoly there now.
THE EARL OF LYTTONThese are points which would be better raised in Committee, and I will deal with them then if they are raised. I can only thank your Lordships for the reception that you have given to this Bill.
§ On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.