THE LOSS OF THE "LEINSTER."

HL Deb 14 July 1919 vol 35 cc492-515

LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNE rose to call attention to the circumstances attending the loss of R.M.S.S. "Leinster" and to the existing condition of the communications between England and Ireland; and to move for an inquiry.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, there is much business before the House this evening and I shall try to be as brief as possible, but the question is one of some importance, and I am afraid I shall require a little time in which to explain it to your Lordships. It may seem, at first sight, as if the two subjects in my Question have net very much to say to each other, but I think I shall be able to show that they have a great deal in common. It is hardly necessary to point out that in moving for an inquiry I only intend to do so with regard to the circumstances attending the loss of the "Leinster."

If any of your Lordships were to ask an audience of Irish Unionists what was the most successful institution in Ireland, you would be told that it was the Kildare-street Club, Dublin; but if you appealed to a larger number of Irishmen, especially outside of Ulster, you would be told that it was the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company. Guinness's Brewery might possible run it somewhat close, but for political reasons I believe the preference would be given to the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company. It is a peculiarly Irish institution of which we are all proud. It is very well run, and for a number of Years has carried the mails between England and Ireland with great success, in spite of very keen but perfectly legitimate competition on the part of the London & North Western Railway Company. There is a feeling abroad in Ireland that they have been very badly treated by the Government during the war: in the first place, with regard to the arrangements which were made to provide for the safety of its vessels when crossing the channel; in the second place, with regard to the arrangements made as to pensions granted to the widows and orphans of some of its crew who were drowned when the "Leinster" was torpedoed; in the third place, as to the arrangements which were being made by the Government for replacing the steamers that had been sunk; and, in de last instance, there is a feeling in Ireland that not only the Steam Packet Company itself but all Irishmen, and indeed all Englishmen, suffer owing to the arrangements which are now made by the Post Office as to the running of the mails, which arrangements entail very serious inconvenience on all who wish to hold any communication, of any kind, either by travelling themselves or by letter, with Ireland.

I raised the subject of the sinking of the "Leinster" in this House in October last, but both I and my noble friend Lord Somerleyton, who then replied on behalf of the Government, were somewhat handicapped in doing so because there were facts known to all of us to which we were unable to allude, because by so doing we might have furnished information which would have been valuable to the enemy. That embargo has now been removed, because the facts have been made public both at the meeting of the Company and also in the public Press. The attitude taken up by the Government with regard to the sinking of the "Leinster" was expressed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons the day after the disaster occurred, in the following words— An Irish packet boat crammed with men, women, and children, was deliberately torpedoed in broad daylight by the Germans. It was carrying no military stores, and was serving no military ends. It was pure barbarism. We all know that when Mr. Balfour made this statement he only said what he believed to be the absolute fact, and I am perfectly certain it is the case that the "Leinster" was carrying no military stores and serving no military ends, but it is known to all of us that all the mail packets were used for the purpose of conveying backwards and forward between England and Ireland soldiers going on leave or rejoining their units.

A statement prepared by the company tells me that in the spring of 1918 the War Office converted the mail packets into troopships, and gave directions that the night boats were to carry 500 naval and military ratings and as many officers as wished to travel. Later that was modified to 500, including officers. This was the state of things in force at the time that the sinking of the "Leinster" took place, and then it was incumbent upon the Admiralty to provide adequate protection for this very large number of soldier, I think between 3,500 and 4,000, which crossed daily, to and from Ireland. In addition, the mails were sorted on board, which necessitated the presence on board of a large number of Post Office sorters. These, of course, we expect to be looked after by the Post Office, and those civilians who were on board expected their interests to be safeguarded by the Board of Trade. Those three Departments of the Government were actively interested in looking after the safety of these ships, and it must not be forgotten that the company were in a different position as regards the sailing of their ships front any other vessels which were going to sea at that time, because they were under contract to carry the mails in any circumstances, whatever might be the weather or whatever might be the danger from submarines, unless they obtained a specific order from the Admiralty that they were not to sail.

I will point out to your Lordships the difficulty which attended this. I may state that on one occasion when the "Cork," a cargo boat belonging to the company, was sunk, the chairman of the company went at once to Kingstown and saw the captain of the "Leinster" and asked him if he thought it was safe for the "Leinster" to cross that night. He said on the contrary that he thought it extremely dangerous, whereupon the chairman went to see" the Admiral at Kingstown and asked him to give orders that the ship was not to sail. The Admiral informed him that he had no authority to do so, and that the only person in a position to give orders not to sail was the Admiral commanding at Cork—the Commander-in-Chief. Consequently he agreed to send a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief to ask if permission might be obtained under the circumstances for the ship not to sail. Fortunately the Commander-in-Chief agreed to this being done, and the message ordering the "Leinster" not to sail arrived just a quarter of an hour before the time at which she was due to start. This points out the difficulties which attended ally stoppage of the mail steamer.

It may interest your Lordships to know what safeguards the Admiralty consider necessary in order to protect the ships. In the year 1916 I think it was they gave orders, without the knowledge even of the directors of the company, that the ships were to be armed with guns. This was after the submarines were armed with much heavier guns, so that the guns put on board the mail boats were absolutely useless, and only served as an excuse for the Germans to say that they were sinking armed ships. They also gave instructions to the directors to supply a large number of additional life belts. In fine weather a seaplane used to cross with the mail boats, but only in fine weather. Latterly, as we know, the night sailings were discontinued, and all ships were only allowed to sail by daylight, which as a matter of fact made them an easy prey to the submarines. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that the directors of the company thought that they ought to ask for further protection, and after the "Leinster" had narrowly escaped by a few yards being torpedoed at the end of 1917 the chairman of the company applied to Lord Justice Duke, who was then Chief Secretary, asking him to supply an escort. Mr. Duke agreed that an escort should be provided, and for a few days accordingly it was provided. But this was soon dropped, and on the directors expostulating they were told that the matter had been referred to the local representatives of the Minister of Shipping in Dublin. If he considered it necessary to provide an escort one would be provided, but at that time he did not consider it necessary. Considering the large number of troops on board and the number of civilian passengers travelling your Lordships may be interested to know who was the repre sentative of the Ministry of Shipping in Dublin. One would have thought that he would be a distinct naval officer who knew something about the matter. Not at all The local representative of the Ministry of Shipping was the general manager of the London and North Western Railway Company at North Wall Station, a very capable railway official but a gentlemen who could naturally know nothing as to the directions that ought to be taken to protect a ship at sea.

These were the circumstances on October 10, 1918, when early in the morning a German submarine was sighted off the Kish lighthouse. This did not make any difference to the sailing of the "Leinster." She was not warned or told not to sail, and she accordingly started, with 770 souls on board of whom no less than 500 were soldiers. When she got about twelve miles out—I am not quite sure that I am right as to the distance—she met the steamship "Ulster" on her way from Holyhead to Kingstown. It is interesting to note that subsequently the commander of the "Ulster" stated that in the whole course of the journey from Holyhead he had not sighted a single patrol boat. Within three minutes of the "Ulster" passing the "Leinster" the latter was torpedoed by a German submarine, presumably the one which had been sighted off Kish. The "Leinster" was not sunk, but her wireless installation was so badly damaged that she was only able to send out the signal: "Torpedoed, torpedoed, torpedoed," which fortunately was heard by the "Ulster." I will ask your Lordships to think what would have happened if the submarine had risen to the surface a few minutes before. The submarine would probably have got the Ulster "and the "Leinster" by right and left torpedo with the result that 1,500 souls would have perished instead of 500. As it was there was no destroyer near the submarine which had a clear way. She maœeuvred into position to launch another torpedo, and this she did, and the "Leinster" sunk, and 770 souls, or as many of them as still survived, were struggling, in an angry sea. There they remained for an hour and a half. A destroyer came to the rescue, and fortunately 200 of them were saved.

At the time this happened questions were asked both in this House and another place, and a demand was made for an inquiry. Dr. Macnamara, who replied on behalf of the Government, stated on October 15 that the Admiralty were entirely responsible for the safety of cross-Channel boats carrying a large number of passengers. He also stated that were it not that an Inquiry would involve the time and attention of those fully occupied with the work of protecting the Mercantile Marine, the Board of Admiralty would wish nothing better than that the carrying out of this duty should be investigated in the most minute manner. Subsequently on the 24th he again stated that the Admiralty would court a public inquiry, but that the proposal could not possibly be acceded to as the information laid before such an inquiry would be of the greatest possible value to the enemy. None of the reasons which then operated against the granting of an Inquiry have any effect now and there is no reason why it should not be granted. I have therefore to ask His Majesty's Government if, under the altered circumstances, they will agree to one being held.

I think that I have shown that the precautions which were taken by the Admiralty to safeguard the passengers between the two countries were in no degree adequate. When I asked a Question with reference to an inquiry last November I also asked my noble friend Lord Somerleyton what arrangements would be made as to the granting of pensions. He replied as follows— With regard to the second question, I am glad to be able to answer it entirely in the affirmative. The widows and children and other dependants of the officers and members of the crew of the "Leinster" who lost their lives when the vessel was torpedoed will, as a matter of course, be granted pensions and allowances in accordance with the War Risk Compensation Scheme for the Mercantile Marine. I was perfectly satisfied with that assurance. I thought that all that could be done for these poor widows and children would be done, and I was very much astonished to hear that in two instances pensions had been refused. Those were the cases of a superintending engineer of the company who was drowned (Mr. Ferber) and of Mr. Lewis, the shore steward.

It was stated that no compensation could be given to the widows of these men. I communicated with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Walter Long, who was kind enough to see me on two occasions with reference to the matter. I was accompanied by Mr. Watson, the chairman of the company, and also by Dr. Macnamara, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, and Mr. Leak, representative of the Board of Trade, were present. On the second occasion there was also present Sir Norman Hill, Chairman of the War Risks Association. I was informed that it was impossible that pensions could be granted to the wives of these two men because they were not on the books of the "Leinster." What was the position of these two men? They occupied a similar position to that of staff officer whose duties are to see that the engines of the various ships of the Fleet are kept in proper order. Similarly Mr. Lewis was obliged to cross first by one ship and then in another for the purpose of supervising the catering and the linen and the various arrangements on board. It seems to me that it would have been as reasonable at the time of the Battle of the Bight, when Admiral Beatty was obliged to leave the "Lion" when she was hit and to go on a destroyer, to say that, if unfortunately that gallant. Admiral had then been killed, his widow would not have been eligible for a pension because he was not on the books of the ship to which he transferred himself.

I really can hardly believe that the Government, or the noble Earl who replies for the Government, can defend the position which has been taken up by the Board of Trade in this matter. I am told that they have already broken through the rule in one instance, where a pension was granted to the widow of an officer of a Cunard vessel. But, at any rate, I understood, in the conversation which I had, that if it was found undesirable on the ground of creating a precedent to break through this rule, a compassionate allowance would be granted in the case of the widows of these two men. The Board of Trade now say they have no money with which to do it—and this at a time when thousands of pounds are being squandered daily on unemployment allowances. I hope that the noble Earl will be able to tell me that this question has been reconsidered and that the widows of those two men who died, killed by the Germans in the execution of their duty, will not be refused a pension on a mere technical ground.

The third question to which I wish to refer is the attitude taken up by the Government in replacing the ships of the Company which have been lost since the beginning of the var. In 1915 the "Connaught" was taken possession of by the Government, and in 1917 this ship was sunk in the Mediterranean. The undertaking which was given when the "Connaught" was commandeered was this: His Majesty's Government undertook in the event of her loss to pay whatever sum was necessary to replace her by a vessel suitable in all respects to carry out the postal contract, and also to be responsible for any adverse effect which the requisition might have on the mail contract. After the vessel was lost a further undertaking was given. As it was not possible, owing to the exigencies of war, to allow the construction of the vessel to commence (and I would ask special attention to this) His Majesty's Government agreed that priority would be given for her construction over that given for any other vessel privately owned or owned by a railway company designed for a service similar to that of the mail steamers; and they also agreed that the Company should not be prejudiced in respect of the Post Office contract service.

How has that undertaking been carried out? Instead of the "Connaught" there has been provided a ship called "The Duke of Connaught," which takes about five hours to cross the Channel, with the result that travellers almost invariably miss the connection with Dublin by the night mails to the South and West. And, as far as giving priority to the rebuilding of a new "Connaught" is concerned, not only has that not been done but I am informed (and I will ask the noble Earl to inform me whether I am correct in the information I have received) that a priority has been given to the London and North Western Railway Company for five vessels, and that one of these vessels, the "Curraghmore," is already finished, and four more vessels will very soon be ready for service. Perhaps the noble Earl will be able to explain how the Government justify this breach of their undertaking.

Then there is the wider question of the communications between England and Ireland, and that is chiefly in reference to the arrangements made with the Post Office, by which the mail steamers leave Kingstown at a very much earlier hour than they previously did. I believe the Post Office justify this on two grounds. In the first place, the trains now take twenty minutes longer from Dublin to Kingstown than they formerly did, and this is not a very good justification, as under the new arrangement the trains reach London at 5.30 instead of 6.10; and in the second place they are desirous of delivering the Irish mails by the first post in the morning. I never get my Irish letters till 11.30. I have made inquiry of Irish people living in different parts of London and I am told that this is the case with them also; their letters are not delivered until half-past eleven. This causes the gravest inconvenience in several ways. In the first place, any one living in Ireland beyond Dublin (I take my own instance) takes two hours longer to reach London than formerly, and in a long journey of sixteen hours this makes a considerable difference.

But this is of comparatively small importance compared with the other point, which is that under the old arrangement the mails were delivered over nearly the whole of Ireland in time for a reply to be made next clay. Now the mails are not delivered till the train for England has departed, and thus there is a difference of twenty-four hours in the reply reaching London. This must cause the greatest inconvenience to people engaged in business and correspondence between the two countries. I have made inquiries both from the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company and from the London & North Western Railway Company, and they both assure me that they are perfectly ready to resume the old times of sailing and starting from Holyhead if the Post Office would only agree. I hope the noble Earl will tell me that the Post Office are willing to make some arrangement to this effect.

I have tried to put the facts before your Lordships as to the neglect of the Admiralty in safeguarding the ships, as to the shabbiness of the Government in granting pensions to the widows of those who have been killed, as to the construction of new steamers, and as to postal arrangements. Had I taken longer I might have been able to make even a stronger case, but I venture to think that the facts I have put before you are such as to deserve consideration from His Majesty's Government. I beg to move the Motion of which I have given notice.

Moved, That an Inquiry be held into the circumstances attending the sinking of the R.M.S.S. "Leinster."—(Lord Oranmore and Browne.)

THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (THE EARL OF LYTTON)

My Lords, the noble Lord in putting his Question has travelled over a great deal of ground and dealt with matters which affect various 'Government Departments, but as his main criticism is directed towards the policy of the Admiralty, and the precautions, or lack of precautions, for which they were responsible, which led to the loss of the "Leinster," I think it will be convenient for me to answer the Question; and as the noble Lord has warned me in advance of some of the points he intended to raise, I shall be able to give him the answers with which I have been supplied from the other Government Departments concerned. The noble Lord has moved for an Inquiry to examine into the whole case—

LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNE

Into the sinking of the "Leinster" only.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

I quite under-.stand. This Motion I am unable to accept, not because there is any information which it is necessary to withhold now that the war is over, but because I think there is no information which cannot be given without the necessity of instituting an Inquiry which would single out this particular loss from many others which unfortunately occurred during the war. I hope to be able to-day to give my noble friend much fuller information than has hitherto been possible, and I trust that he may feel, when he has heard what I have to say about this subject, that it will not be necessary to press his Motion for the establishment of an inquiry.

Before I go into that Question, however, perhaps I had better clear on one side the points which the noble Lord has raised affecting other Government Departments. First of all, there is the question of the widows of two officers belonging to the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company, Mrs. Ferber and Mrs. Lewis. It is quite true, as the noble Lord has pointed out, that these two officers were on board the "Leinster" in a capacity which makes it impossible to bring their dependants under any existing Government schemes for pensions or compensation. As the noble Lord probably knows, there are two schemes. First, the War Risks Association which is a fund administered and contributed to by the State and the shipping companies for the payment of compensation to the dependants of all the officers and crews who are borne on the ship's books. Second, there is the Injuries in War Compensation Scheme, which is designed to cover the servants of any Government Department who may have lost their lives while travelling on duty. Neither of these two officers can come under either of these two schemes. They were servants of the company travelling on the company's business,

I agree with the noble Lord that this is a particularly hard case—all exceptional cases are. I personally should be extremely glad if some means could be found for paying compensation to their dependants. I am informed by the Board of Trade that great I trouble has been taken to ascertain whether any exceptional measures could be taken in order to provide compensation in these two cases, but up to the present moment without any success. I have not been acquainted with the matter before, and if the noble Lord will accept my assurance—he will understand that I cannot give him any promise—I will make it my business personally to inquire further into these two cases to see whether it is possible, since they cannot be brought under any existing funds, for some exceptional measures to be taken to meet these two cases.

The next point which the noble Lord raised had reference to the replacement of the "Connaught." It is true, as the noble Lord has said, that the City of Dublin Steam Packet. Company was given an assurance by the Shipping Controller—he will understand that this is not a matter which concerns the Admiralty—on June 9, 1917, as follows— When it can be put in hand the construction of the vessel to replace the 'Connaught' will be given priority over any cross-Channel boat of similar speed, etc., built for private, i.e., non-Government, use on the England-Ireland service. I am informed that the Shipping Controller considers that this promise has been adhered to, and the company's solicitors were informed on May 5 of this year that the promise had not been broken either in form or in substance. My noble friend, therefore, has been, I think, misinformed as to priority being given to the London & North Western Railway Company. I am informed that the London & North Western Railway had in April of this year no boats on the stocks or building other than it had when this undertaking was given to the City of Dublin Company. If, therefore, they have ships building at the present time they must be ships begun before this undertaking was given to the City of Dublin people. It must be added that the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company could have given orders for proceeding with the building of their new boat, if they had chosen to do so, after January 7, 1919, this being the date when private shipping companies were informed that they could once more proceed with shipbuilding.

One point raised by the noble Lord concerns the Post Office, and has reference to the existing service between Kingstown and Holyhead. It is true, as the noble Lord has pointed out, that whereas this service left Dublin at 8.10 in the evening in 1918 it now leaves at 7.5; and whereas it arrived at Euston at 6, it now arrives at 5.30 I am informed that the reason for this change is in order to ensure that the service will connect with the first delivery in central London; but during the months of May and June the train was on an average twenty-two minutes late and on six occasions failed to connect with the first delivery. It is clear that if the train were re-timed to arrive at 6 o'clock in the morning—which is what I understand the noble Lord to desire—the connection would rarely be made unless there were greater punctuality (which there is no reason to expect); and it is felt that there is greater advantage to the community in starting the service earlier from Dublin so as to connect with the first post in central London, than by delaying its arrival for half-an-hour and thereby missing the first delivery.

I come now to the main point of the noble Lord's case—namely, the criticism he has raised against the Admiralty for the steps they have taken in the protection of the steamers on the mail route between Dublin and Holyhead. I fully accept, of course, on behalf of the Admiralty all responsibility for whatever measures were taken for the protection of shipping on this route as on all others. Needless to say, I accept no responsibility whatever for the loss of any particular ship. In spite of all the precautions which the Admiralty have taken ships unfortunately have been lost. What I accept responsibility for are the steps taken to ensure the least possible risk at the time. I think I ought to explain that in dealing with the submarine activities of the enemy our policy naturally fell into two parts—an offensive part and a defensive part. The public generally are apt to forget altogether the offensive measures which were taken for the protection of shipping. It is generally imagined that the only measures of protection were of a defensive kind, and if they were not such as to satisfy the public at any moment it was thought that the Admiralty were neglecting their duty. I have no hesitation in saving that if it were not for the offensive measures taken concurrently we should not have come through as successfully as we have done. Our offensive policy consisted in attempting to harass, and if possible to destroy, any submarine either on its operating grounds or on its course to and from them. For this purpose large numbers of small vessels, comprising "P" boats (a special type of anti-submarine vessel produced during the war), older destroyers, sloops, submarines, trawlers, drifters, yachts, and motor launches, were employed and in the later stages of the war United States submarine chasers were brought over in large numbers. All these vessels were equipped with the latest devices for detecting the presence of submarines, and for destroying them when brought within the necessary range. Those measures were being taken continuously in the Irish Sea as in all the other waters round our coasts, and to those measures is due to a large extent the immunity which I will endeavour to show in a few moments by giving the figures of the actual losses which have taken place.

The second branch of our policy, the defensive side, consisted in the convoy system of protecting our over-seas trade. This system necessitated the employment, as escorts for the convoys, of all the faster and more modern destroyers which could be spared from the essential forces operating with the Grand Fleet, and rendered it quite out of the question to spare any vessels of this type for regular escort of individual vessels on cross-Channel routes. Even so, although they were reinforced by a flotilla of United States destroyers, we had not at any time a sufficient number of these destroyers to contend with the heavy and arduous work thrown on them in the Atlantic. I would beg your Lordships to remember that at this time a fresh strain was put upon us by having to provide escorts for the protection of the large number of troops coming across from the United States; and the escort of cross-channel traffic was carried out across the English Channel only in the case of troop and ambulance transports. Then also, in what I call the defensive branch of our operations, for the purpose of evading enemy submarines instructions were issued by the Admiralty to the masters of all British vessels with regard to zig-zagging, use of high speed, keeping a good look-out, use of armament, smoke screens, and so on, all of which our experience during the war proved to be of value.

As to the application of these methods to the case of the "Leinster." At the time this vessel was torpedoed the following craft were stationed on the Holyhead-Dublin route, in addition to a large force of trawlers and drifters employed further north working from Lame in pursuance of the first part of the policy to which I referred—namely, hunting and harassing the submarine—at Holyhead, under the command of the captain of H.M.S. "Patrol," a most capable officer, there were ten older destroyers, one "P" boat, six U.S. chasers, eighteen motor launches, two rescue tugs; and at Kingstown, under the command of Commodore Kingstown, there were twenty-seven trawlers and drifters, one yacht, four motor launches.

At the time of the accident these forces were employed as follows. Of the Holyhead boats five destroyers were at sea working in positions which had been ordered; five destroyers were in harbour refitting, coaling and resting; the one "P" boat to which I have referred was at sea off the Skerries, three U.S. chasers were at sea working south from the Isle of Man and three U.S. chasers were in Carnarvon Bay; the motor launches were sheltering owing to the weather. Two rescue tugs at Holyhead raised steam and were sent out, bid they had to return on account of the heavy weather. Of the vessels which I have mentioned at Kingstown thirteen trawlers and drifters were at sea on the Northern and Southern patrols and in the Bay of Dublin, fourteen trawlers and drifters were preparing to relieve some of these or were refitting or resting or out, of action owing to influenza, one yacht was in the harbour, having just returned from sea and four motor launches were in harbour owing to the weather.

I know that these facts are not interesting given as I am obliged to give them, but I merely mention them in order to give all the information at my disposal with regard to the forces which were available at Kingstown and Holyhead and where each one of these ships actually was on this day. This statement is given so that it may be clear what the vessels on this route were doing at the time of the accident. As soon as the "S.O.S." was received with the information that the "Leinster" was torpedoed, all vessels at sea which could be communicated with closed to the scene to save life and to hunt the submarine. All vessels in harbour that could raise steam were also sent to the spot for the same purpose. There are two points which I want to emphasise in connection with the facts which I have given. The first is that of the various means at our disposal, none were of themselves infallible, and the second is that the cumulative effect of all these operations, offensive and defensive combined, was the means which prevented the designs of our enemies from being fulfilled. In the public mind it was generally assumed that if a vessel was escorted it was safe and that if a vessel was not escorted no adequate protection had been provided for it; and it is against these two erroneous views that I want to say one word. As was proved in the case of the "Justicia," which was torpedoed in the midst of her escorts, because a ship was escorted it was not necessarily safe, and that method was not, in itself, infallible.

Again, I want to show, by quoting to your Lordships certain figures, what was the combined effect of all those measures that were being taken. The following figures for the first nine months of 1918 clearly show the comparative safety of the Irish Sea traffic compared with that in other areas, and it may fairly be considered conclusive that the protection in the Irish Sea accorded by the Admiralty was on a scale commensurate with the submarine danger and the total forces available. During this period—the first nine months of 1918–4,456 steamers of over 500 tons gross or an aggregate tonnage of 5,499,000 tons crossed the Irish Sea. Of that 4,456 steamers three of over 500 tons were lost, and of the aggregate tonnage of five and a half millions the aggregate tonnage of these ships was 3,672 tons, bringing the percentage of loss to sailings, expressed both in numbers and tonnage, to .067. During the same period the losses of the United Kingdom overseas trade represented 1.37 per cent., and the losses on all United Kingdom trades, including Irish, coastwise and cross-Channel traffic, were .49 per cent. I quote these figures because I think they show two things. First of all, that the consequence of the various measures, both offensive and defensive, which were taken by the Admiralty for the protection of shipping in these dangerous times, was to produce amongst all ships a very low rate of loss having regard to the danger; and, secondly, that the Irish Sea received quite as much protection as any other part of the huge area which we had to guard with the forces at our disposal. I want to assure my noble friend—I hesitate to pursue the matter any further at this stage or to give any further details—that if there is any information which has not been produced in answer to questions in Parliament on other occasions or which I have failed to give to-day, I shall be delighted to obtain it for him. Any information which will bear upon the steps which the Admiralty has taken in regard to this or any other loss which has occurred during the war we have always been willing to give, and we are now able to give, seeing that it can no longer have any benefit for the enemy.

When the noble Lord asks for an inquiry, I must point out that if an Inquiry were granted into the loss of this particular ship there would be no reason for not granting at the same time an Inquiry into the loss of any other ships which, under circumstances either similar or different, may have been lost during the war. If it were not possible to obtain sufficient information without setting up an Inquiry of that kind I should have nothing to say. I do believe, however, that having regard to the fact that considerable time has now elapsed since the loss took place and the difficulty—perhaps, in seine cases, the impossibility—of obtaining the necessary evidence from witnesses who alone could give it, no really useful purpose would be served by setting up an Inquiry into the loss of this particular ship. Any information which is desired for the public in order that they may judge how far the criticisms which have been raised against the Admiralty are justified or not we are willing to produce in any form in which it may be asked for, but, for the reason I have mentioned, we are unable to agree to the Motion and I hope my noble friend will feel, after the information I have given him and the assurances with which it was accompanied, that it is not necessary to press his Motion on this occasion.

THE EARL OF DESART

My Lords, I hope that in the few remarks I want to make on this subject my noble friend Lord Lytton will not think (and I am sure Lord Oranmore and Browne does not think) that there is any question in our mind that throughout this war, both In the Irish sea and elsewhere, anything has been left undone by the Admiralty. Nothing in gallantry has been omitted by the Navy to protect our vessels across the Atlantic or the Irish Sea or the English Channel. To suggest anything to the contrary was very far from my noble friend's mind, and it certainly is not in my mind.

Lord Lytton has the disadvantage of answering not only for one Department with the action of which he is familiar, but also for two Departments from which he has had to derive information, and I think such strictures, if they may be so described, as were made by my noble friend Lord Oranmore and Browne, and such suggestions as to what ought or ought not to have been done in the case of the Royal Mail steamers between Kingstown and Holyhead, arises from the peculiar position in which those ships were and the combination of circumstances which exposed them necessarily, and also large numbers of people, to very special dangers. I would rather deal with that particular point a little later. I only want at the outset to try and remove from my noble friend's mind the idea that there was any question of attacking the Admiralty, certainly not the Navy, in this matter. It would be far from anything that I should purpose to do

The first question, which relates to the Board of Trade, was as to grants to the dependants of two men which have not been granted on the ground that they were not borne on the books of the "Leinster" at the time. In fact, these men were travel ling on the "Leinster" equally with the officers and crew for the purpose of the passage and for the purposes of the company, and the noble Earl really agrees that in equity their case is as hard as that of the dependants of men who were lost in the "Leinster" and who were on the ship's books. I understand that he will do his best to devise seine method by which the technicalities of the question can be overcome. I cannot help thinking that there must be some way round, and if there is I certainly think it ought to be found and followed. I am, of course, not familiar, on the second point, with the details of the arrangements as to the priority to be given to the "Connaught." She was lost in March, 1917, and I understand that up to the present date nothing at all has been done with a view to her replacement. I am informed that the company think they have been very hardly treated, that the proper facilities have not been given them, and I was disappointed when listening to the noble Earl to hear him say that the company had refused something, or they might have done something, in January 1919.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

I said they might have replaced their vessel in January of this year.

THE EARL OF DESART

Was a slip placed at their disposal then?

THE EARL OF LYTTON

So I understand.

THE EARL OF DESART

That is certainly not the information which my noble friend has, or which I have. I understand that they have had no opportunity of replacing the vessel. I want to call attention to what the position really is on that point. The condition of the whole service is very serious indeed. The whole of the south and west of Ireland was served before the war by a Mail Service of two daily passages, by two North-Western lady passages, fast steamers on the Fishguard and Rosslare route, and a bi-weekly service from Cork to Fishguard. At the present moment, owing to the losses of the "Connaught" and "Leinster," the City of Dublin mail steamers are only two in number, and they are expected to perform a day and night service, and if anything goes wrong there is none at all, except such steamers as they can charter for the time. It is quite impossible that the mail service can be reliable. There is also a night boat-by' the North Wall route, and a passenger service from Fishguard to Rosslare which is not popular with passengers.

It is absolutely necessary that some relief should be given to Irishmen and Englishmen who are still travelling under, I think, unnecessarily uncomfortable conditions. No complaint was made during the war; they put up with it. But I should like to have an assurance that it is in the mind of the Government to give such facilities as they can for a reasonable service to Ireland. On this point may I ask whether there is any probability of the three turbine steamers of the Great Western Railway, which were requisitioned being shortly released; any chance of that route being utilised again. It would afford considerable relief, serving as it does a great part of the South of Ireland more conveniently than the Dublin route.

With regard to the change in the times of the service and the communications to which the noble Earl referred, I, of course, do not know the details as well as he does, but I know that they do cause considerable inconvenience, and as far as I can make out, the main object, the only object, was that in London letters should be delivered by the first post. I have been in London some time, and on not one single occasion have I got letters before 12 or 12.30 in the-afternoon. That is the experience of all my friends.

As to the protection of these boats, I want rather to press this matter. They were in a very peculiar position. Under the War Office, though not requisitioned in a technical sense, five-sixths of them were requisitioned every right. Under the Post Office they had to sail, and their officers had no discretion as to whether it was safe to do so or not. They followed the same route, perfectly well-known route, known to the Germans as well as to ourselves, and I think it was a case in which particular protection deserved a little exceptional consideration. I crossed a good many times whilst. I was a member of the Irish Convention, and I do not suppose there was ever less than 600 or 700 people on board. A few of those were civilians; the large majority soldiers. There was no room to move, and though I quite recognise that a ship travelling from 21 to 22 knots is not as likely to be torpedoed as a smaller and slower ship, I was very conscious every time I crossed that if anything did happen, by collision or torpedo, there was hardly a "dog's chance" for anybody on board. That was proved when the "Leinster" was lost. Whether that might have been met by an escort, whether some different form of patrolling the route might have done something, I do not presume to say. No doubt the matter was considered, but it cannot be repudiated that an escort would have been of use. In this particular case an escort had been used. It was always used when the Lord Lieutenant crossed. It was used in the Stranraer and Larne route, and on the routes of the English Channel boats. I cannot believe it could be quite as useless as is suggested. I recognise the difficulty of escorting when smaller and slower destroyers were the only ones available.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

I did not say it was useless—it was not infallible.

THE EARL OF DESART

It was useful; and it is quite true that the smaller destroyers in heavy weather cannot keep up with a vessel going 22 knots, not because they have not sufficient speed, but because they are liable to "bury" themselves. I know I shall be answered that in very rough weather there is rather less chance of being successfully torpedoed than in fine weather; and possibly in fine weather there might have been some system of escort, which I think the noble Earl was right in saying would not be infallible, but which would have been of use psychologically—I think the presence of an escort must be of use psychologically—and also of use in picking up people. Of course, I accept entirely what the noble Earl has said, but I was informed by a man who was in the water for nearly two hours that as far as he could make out the first destroyer did not come on the scene until nearly an hour after the "Leinster" sank. That is rather a long period, and of course on such a cold day it was a very serious thing that there should have been delay. Whether there should be an Inquiry or not I have some hesitation in expressing an opinion, but I think there would be this advantage in an Inquiry, that it is very much demanded in Ireland, and the holding of it would give great satisfaction to public opinion.

The statistics given by the noble Earl this afternoon may no doubt be convincing to some people but they will not be read in Ireland, and there is no doubt of the salient facts that the ship sailed and was obliged to sail knowing there was danger—there was a submarine known to be there—and that there was apparently a considerable amount of delay before the hope of safety arrived for those in the water. Those three circumstances do raise a very strong feeling in Ireland that the reason for them ought to be known. It is quite true, as the noble Earl has said, that it is a considerable time since the loss, but the reason given at the time was that the facts could not be made known without giving information to the enemy. That therefore disposes of the "considerable lapse of time" argument. I do not know that very much would be found out, but there is, as I have said, a very strong feeling in Ireland that an Inquiry is required, and it is a natural feeling, and I hope that the Government may see their way to grant it.

Before I sit down I want to ask three questions which are apart altogether from the Inquiry. Firstly, we have an assurance about pensions. I want to know whether facilities will be given as far as possible for the replacing of the "Connaught" and of the "Leinster." On that I must say one word. The position of the "Leinster" appears to b this. She was insured—not for War Risks—but could not possibly be eplaced by the insurance money in consequence of the large increase in the cost of labour and materials, and it is very difficult for the directors to embark upon replacing her unless they have some assurance with regard to the continuance of the mail contract. I understand that that contract can be terminated by six months' notice, and therefore the directors do not see their way to run the risk of building a boat of that enormous value if there is a chance of losing the mail contract. I therefore want to know whether that will be considered—of course I do not ask for an answer to-night—whether they could be given security for some longer term.

I want also to ask whether the practice of commandeering a large portion of the ship for soldiers will be continued. If necessary it must be so, but it is important to know that because it affects this company very much. I also ask whether there is any prospect of the Fishguard and Rosslare steamers being released, and thus another route made available. The present conditions for travelling are very hard for some people. During the war people were constantly being left at Holyhead or Kingstown for sometimes one and sometimes two days, and the discomfort was very great. I do not know that I can press the case further, but I think the City of Dublin Packet Company has served Ireland and England very well for a great many years. They were the pioneers of good boats and good travelling, and they have a great claim on both communities which I hope will be considered as favourably as possible.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

I will communicate with the authorities concerned upon the points which have been raised, and let the noble Earl have an answer to them.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

Could not the noble Earl go one step further? Two or three points have been made quite clear, and that is that the Admiralty did all that t hey could in those seas in protecting all classes of vessels, and I think the noble Earl might have said that no Commander-in-Chief could have done more than was done, and that the services of the Admiral in question were of the utmost value to the country. They were successful in protecting a large number of vessels, but from the time the American troops began to come over it was impossible to afford more destroyers in the Irish sea. On the other hand, it is clear that the mail had to sail under the postal contract: that instead of, as Mr. Balfour suggested, serving no military purpose, she was carrying a large number of military ratings. I myself crossed over at that time repeatedly, and I know that she was crammed with troops. In those circumstances I do not know what my noble friend feels, but I would not press for an. Inquiry so far as it affects private individuals. I feel that private individuals crossed kit risk of their lives, but if they were obliged to cross they were bound to run that risk and you could not expect the Government at all times to protect the mail.

If, however, they could not protect the mail and the ship had to go, I think the question of compensation ought to be treated more generously. Would it not be possible to admit that the pensions, which have not as I understand been given on the full scale that Las been given to combatants, should be treated as the pensions of combatants? Secondly, those travelling on duty, which includes officials of the company forced to cross in connection with the mails, should be admitted to pension; and thirdly, that some consideration should be shown to the company, which was forced to run this risk in the greatest possible dangers during the whole of that period. If the noble Earl would give us an assurance that those three points will be reviewed, which I do not think would be unduly onerous on the Admiralty, then I hope my noble friend would accept that instead of an Inquiry.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

The noble Viscount will understand that I cannot give him any pledge on behalf of a Department with which I am not connected, but I have no doubt whatever that the Ministry of Pensions has given a great deal of consideration to the questions that have been raised, so far as they concern pensions under the Ministry of Pensions and I know that the Board of Trade have given special considerations to the two cases which I have dealt with. The only thing I can do—and this I will do—is personally to take up with the various Departments the cases to which he has referred, and see whether anything can possibly be done which has not yet been done. Beyond that I cannot give any undertaking. I cannot say that pensions will be reconsidered, or that those who have not received them will receive them but I will undertake personally to investigate the cases with the Departments concerned

LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNE

My Lords. I thank my noble friend very much for the very full information that he has given me, and also for his offer to give me further information if I desire it. With regard to the question of the pensions to the widows of the two men to whom they have not been given, their case has been so well and so strongly put by my two noble friends that it is hardly necessary for me to say anything more on this subject. I should like to call the noble Earl's attention to the fact that an exception has been made in the case of an officer of the Cunard Company. Legally I believe he did not come under the War Risks' Scheme, and yet a pension was obtained in respect of him. I would also point out that if it is thought undesirable to create a precedent by giving pensions to these two ladies under that scheme, that compassionate allowance should be granted. I feel certain that the noble Earl is willing to give the matter his full attention, and with the sympathy that I know he has for the case I feel confident that a pension will be granted.

With regard to the question of the mail steamers, I would again point out the inconvenience that is caused by the delay of an additional twenty-four hours in obtaining a reply in London to a letter sent from here to any part of Ireland. It seems to me that this more than counterbalances any advantage which might be gained by delivery in London by the first post. In spite of the assurance of the Post Office, I can testify from my own knowledge that letters are never delivered till half-past eleven or half-past twelve. After the very full particulars which the noble Earl has given with regard to the precautions and safeguards which were taken by by the Admiralty in the matter of mail steamers—although I might criticise them in some respects, and I am of opinion that they might have been improved in certain particulars—I do not think that it would be fair for me to press for an inquiry. I therefore ask the leave of the House to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.