§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEMy Lords, I beg to ask whether His Majesty's Government are now able to give the House the information asked for on the 13th instant as to the position of the Allied Forces at Archangel and Murmansk, and the steps which have been taken or will be taken to ensure their safety.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONMy Lords, I am sorry to have to trouble your Lordships a third time this afternoon, but the Question which my noble friend put upon the Paper the other day is one which, when I read his speech—I had not the good fortune to hear it—turned out to have in the main a political import. In the form in which it appeared upon the Paper it seemed to relate exclusively to the military dispositions at Murmansk and Archangel, but when I read the speech afterwards I found that the noble Marquess had put a number of questions to which he was entitled to a reply, and I assume that in putting his Question again this afternoon he desires to give the Foreign Office an opportunity of making a response.
What the noble Marquess asked, alluding to the information that I had given as to the proposals about Prinkipo, was whether the policy of the Government might not be applied on a smaller scale, and whether it would not be possible to have something of the nature of a conference between the particular group which is concerned with military operations in Finland and the representatives of the Allies. The noble Marquess went on to say that it seemed to him that the difficulties of a large and comprehensive scheme of pacification involving the whole of Russia must be extremely formidable; and might not those difficulties be less, he asked, if the question, instead of being approached in a wholesale fashion, were to be dealt with in parts and by sections.
I think it must have been by a mistake that the noble Marquess alluded to Finland; because, of course, Finland has nothing to do with Archangel at all; nor is it directly a part of the Russian problem. The population of Finland, as nobody knows better than my noble friend, are not Russians at all; they are Finns. They are not under the Bolshevist Government of Russia. They have set up a Government of their own under an officer named General 268 Mannerheim, and they are seeking recognition. That. Government may, if they choose, on their own account deal with the Bolshevists. It has nothing to do with Archangel and the responsibility of His Majesty's advisers. Archangel has a purely Russian population and is a part of the Russian problem, as the noble Marquess rightly points out.
About the military aspect of the case I shall not say a word. My noble friend Lord Peel is here to answer the Question upon the Paper about the military position in Murmansk and Archangel; but I will reply to the suggestion of the noble Marquess. He said, Could not you consider the possibility of having a conference with the particular group that is in governing existence in that part of the world? I am not clear that my noble friend quite appreciates what is passing at Archangel. The group at Archangel is not the Bolshevists at all. The group at Archangel is a Provisional Russian Government, and Murmansk is under it. That Government is under an eminent man, Mr. Tchaikovsky, with whom I had the pleasure of a conversation during the last few weeks. He is by long tradition, by all the convictions of his life, an advanced revolutionary. He is a Socialist; but he is intensely anti-Bolshevist. He has formed this Russian Government at Archangel with the object in the first place of combining the North Russian States, and then if possible uniting them with a Federation of the whole of the various Russian groups or states which will endeavour to hold their own against the Bolshevist terror. These groups, as noble Lords know, are scattered throughout the Russian Empire. There is the group to which I am referring in the extreme north. If you go further south, in the direction of the Black Sea and the Caucasus, you have the great group—in the main consisting of Cossacks, very formidably armed, who won a. great victory the other day—under the military and political control of General Denikin. If you go to the East, to the heart of Siberia, you will find a Government at Omsk under Admiral Kolchak. Although the constitution of these varibus groups is not identical, their object in each case is the same—namely, to unite the Russian people, to rebuild the Russian nation, to give a chance to a resuscitated Russia against the tyranny by which it is overwhelmed. Mr. Tchaikovsky is at this moment in Paris, and he is a member there of a Conference which has been. set, up to 269 represent all these various anti-Bolshevist Russian Governments to which I have referred. Therefore, if that is the group to which the noble Marquess asked me to refer, there is no doubt whatever what will be its reply. They are already co-operating with us; and any failure on our part to fulfil the engagements into which we have entered with them would be a source of the greatest anxiety and alarm.
But perhaps the noble Marquess means something different. Perhaps he means, Why should not you go over the heads of this local Government at Archangel and try to come to some terms with the Bolshevists in the background? There is no local Bolshevik organisation at all. The central Soviet authority is at Moscow, nearly a thousand miles away, and the Bolshevist organisation is only represented in that part of the world by these ruffianly bands of armed soldiers who are murdering and massacring wherever they go. Supposing we were to go over the heads or behind the backs of these people and to try and make some special arrangement with the Bolshevist Government at Moscow about Archangel, what would Mr. Tchaikovsky and his Government say? They would regard you as having been guilty of an incredible act of treachery. They will not have anything to do with these murderous assassins; and if you were to desert them and try to make terms with the Bolshevists over their heads, they would continue to fight, until they went under.
Therefore, while I made out a case the other day—and I am prepared to make it out again—for the proposals which we made with regard to Russia as a whole, and to which was postulated as a Condition a complete cessation of all these horrible acts and atrocities and of military operations in any form—whether it succeeds or not, the particular proposal that you should deal with Russia piecemeal would, if applied to Archangel, be attended with the most calamitous and unfortunate results. Look at it from the other point of view. I have said what would be the feelings of the Provisional Government at Archang I. What is the attitude of the Bolshevists towards the Government at Archangel, and what do they want to do? Their object is not concealed. They want to destroy these Provisional Governments one after the other and sweep them out of existence. They want to get hold of the northern ports in 270 order to prevent any access to Russia being possible from Europe by those who are friendly to a resuscitated Russia; and no doubt most of all they want to release the forces which are operating in those regions and take them south in order to hurl them against the various groups that are being organised by Denikin, Kolchak, and others.
You can realise, this being the state of affairs, the feeling of Tchaikovsky and his Government. They say "We are holding up the flag in the north; we are a little island over which the tide of horror has not flown. We are the stepping stone, one of the stepping stones, upon which Russia may possibly advance to recover her freedom. Are you going to allow us to be submerged? Are you going to make friends with our enemies? "I hope I have not put the case in too dramatic a way, but that I believe is substantially the position—as regards the relations between the Moscow Government and the Local Government at Archangel.
There was one other suggestion made by the noble Marquess. He said—
If we were in a position to tell these people that we could help them with the supplies they want, at any rate, that we would oppose no difficulty in the way of their reaching the starving people, I believe we might produce a very considerable impression upon them.That is exactly what we are doing at this moment. I know that the noble Marquess did not mean to imply that we were not. In this area over which operations are extending, the people in Archangel are being entirely fed by us. The resources of the country are almost nil. They can get nothing from Siberia, as communications are held by the enemy and all the communications are severed. The whole of their supplies are imported from Europe, and in the main from this country. In order to help them we have assisted the Provisional Government to establish a new rouble currency there, which is guaranteed in the last resort by a sterling fund at the Bank of England. These are the efforts which we are devoting to the relief of these poor people.When the noble Marquess said, in his concluding sentence, that we ought to assure them that we are not out to impose any form of government of our own choosing on the Russian people, that is not the particular misinterpretation to which we are liable in Russia. Nobody in Russia 271 thinks we want to impose on them some new constitution, some external body, and no one is so mistaken as to think that we are fighting Bolsheviks simply because we dislike or loath Bolshevism. That is not what the people of Russia are thinking of. They are thinking of living, security, food, life, and I am told by those who have just conic back from Petrograd, Moscow, and elsewhere that what the people want is in the first place to get food, and in the second place to keep the lands, and that the universal passion is not to do this under the auspices of the Bolsheviks, because they see they lose both, but to get rid of the Bolsheviks altogether. That I believe to be the real situation. Again as regards food, there is plenty of food in Russia, but the Bolsheviks will not let them have it. It is one of the weapons of terrorism which the Bolsheviks are applying. They have control of the food and the only arms in the country, and these two weapons they are using to terrorise, decimate, and destroy their own people. For my own part I feel the warmest sympathy with those who are conducting this unequal and heroic struggle, and I hope I have given to your Lordships' House sufficient reason to think that we should be ill-advised if we attempted to deal with the case piecemeal.
§ THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT PEEL)May I reply to the precise Question of the noble Marquess? The Leader of the House has stated his views on the general policy, and perhaps it would be convenient if I now gave some details as to the military position. The Allied Forces at Archangel are at present holding in the main three positions—one south of Onega (1C0 miles south-west of Archangel), on the railway which runs down south to Vologda, and on the river Dwina, 100 miles south and 130 miles south-east respectively of Archangel, and in the Pinega region 80 miles east of Archangel.
During the past month a very determined offensive has been launched against the southern fronts, causing a retirement of from twenty to fifty miles and the evacuation of the town of Shenkursk. These retirements were carried out with only slight losses in men and material while the enemy paid very heavily for his infantry attacks, many of which were pressed home and very severely punished. After the town of Shenkursk was captured we were informed 272 that the place was burnt and also pillaged by the Bolsheviks.
The mobilisation of the troops of the North Russian Government is in progress, and several units have already distinguished themselves in the fighting. These troops were equipped and armed with material brought from this country. Food also has been provided for the civilian population, amounting to about half a million persons. At Murmansk our forces are echelonned down the railway to the south of Soroka on the White Sea. Part of the front is held by Karelian troops who have been equipped by us and are led by British officers. The enlistment of Russians is being proceeded with, but as the major portion of the Russian population belongs either to the official class or to the railway workers they do not present any very large material from which troops can be enlisted. In this particular theatre there is something like 100,000 of the civilian population whose needs have to be provided for.
One point raised by the noble Marqucess was as to the safety of the forces. At prevent there is no immediate anxiety felt as to the safety of our forces in either of there theatres of operation, but there is a need of technical forces to carry on the distribution of food and other matters in that district. If the Bolshevik attacks continue ill spite of the suggestion of an Armistice that has been made at Paris—so far as can be seen at present their activitics have been rather enhanced than diminished by the suggestion—if that takes place, then it may be necessary to reinforce the troops we already have in those regions. At the present moment immediate and active steps are being taken to supply all technical troops necessary, such as railway medical supply and ordnance personnel, whose business it is to maintain adequately this extended line of communications. In addition to that, we have to be prepared to send reinforcements or details to supply the wastage of the force already there.
As to the general condition of the troops, I may acid that as the reason is now advancing and the sun is over the horizon, there has been a marked change in the general feeling and health of the troops, and in their spirits as well. They are well clothed, they have got Burberry coats lined with fleece, and fur coats also. Moreover, they have tire advantage of the presence there of Sir Ernest Shackleton, who, having great knowledge of these conditions, 273 has been training the men for life in the Arctic regions. There has been, I understand, comparatively little sickness, and only a few cases of frost bite. The first case of frost bite, I understand, was suffered by the doctor who was lecturing the troops upon the way to avoid it—rather an unfortunate beginning for the lecturer So everything is being done to secure that the health of the troops is properly safeguarded; and as for their protection, I think what I have said about their safety may for the present satisfy the noble Marquess.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEMy Lords, my noble friend who leads the House began his speech by a quite good-humoured complaint of me for the extension which I had given to my Question last week, a Question of which it is quite true I gave the Government very short notice. I am, on the whole, inclined to plead guilty to the indictment, but I would venture to suggest two extenuating circumstances. In the first place, I certainly did not understand from my noble friend Lord Peel, who warned me that it would not be possible for him to give me anything like a full answer to the Question, that he would not be able to give me any answer at all, and I rather hoped that there would be sonic shreds of information to be gathered at the time. In addition to that, I quite candidly confess that I desired to put before the House and the public the suggestion that, in view of the some What dubious prospects of the Prinkipo Conference, it might be desirable to propose negotiations on a somewhat more limited scale.
My noble friend gave us a good deal of extremely interesting information, and he usefully corrected a certain slovenliness in my geography. But I confess I ant still rather puzzled with regard to what is intended by this Prinkipo Conference. The House will remember that what was announced was that we were going to invite to Prinkipo representatives of all the organised groups exercising or attempting to exercise authority in Siberia or Russia. I was, like many others, puzzled to know what was intended by that description. My noble friend pointed out that the Soviet authority is concentrated in the hands of the Moscow Government. That, of course, we all knew, but I thought from the formula used that the Government had in their minds something other than 274 the central Soviet Government at Moscow. My noble friend was at great pains to defend himself from the suspicion of recognising the Bolshevists, and I do not know even now to what extent it is intended to do so. He gave us a sketch of the different anti-Soviet groups which are now holding their own in different parts of Russia. I gather from the newspapers that the only one of these groups which has made any signs of a readiness to accept the invitation to Prinkipo is the group which, roughly speaking, represents the Baltic Provinces. My information may be bad, but he did not tell us whether the Prinkipo Conference is still a going concern, and whether His Majesty's Government have any reason to believe that it is likely to take place or likely to have any useful results. In these circumstances it certainly does seem to me that we may be driven to what I called partial negotiations, which would include representatives both of the Soviet and anti-Soviet camps.
One thing I feel pretty sure of, and that is that we shall never get this question satisfactorily dealt with unless we can clear up the doubts and misunderstandings which exist with regard to our aims and our position in Russia. I am under the impression that both at home and in Russia our aims and intentions are not understood. I am quite sure that in this country there is very grave misgiving: as to the prolongation of these operations, in different parts of Russia. I had a letter yesterday from a man I had never heard of before, who wrote to tell me that his only son, a soldier who had volunteered in 1915, had been ordered out to Archangel, after the Armistice, and without even the final leave to which most of these soldiers consider themselves entitled. I know that there is a great deal of impatience and resentment throughout the country in connection with such cases as this; and in a very eloquent passage in his speech my noble friend, when talking just now of the possibility of more extensive operations in different parts of the Turkish Empire, warned the House of the growing impatience with which such far-reaching military commitments are regarded in this country.
Very few people really know how we came to be entangled in these operations. Lord Milner made a very interesting statement upon the point, and made the 275 same kind of case, I think, that my noble friend made in the debate on the Address. The passage in Lord Milner's statement which I read with most satisfaction was this. He said—
The last thing His Majesty's Government desires is to leave any British soldier in Russia a day longer than is necessary to discharge the moral obligations we have incurred.He added that that was the guiding principle of all the Allies. "Nor do I," he said," myself think that the time when we can withdraw without disastrous consequences is necessarily distant." I hope that that anticipation of Lord Milner is likely to be fulfilled. An honourable withdrawal will, however, in my belief, never be possible until we have cleared up the position in Russia. I say this with no desire whatever to complain of His Majesty's Government. I think, on the contrary, that in attempting to set up these negotiations they are probably taking the only course which is open to them, and I sincerely hope that they will not be driven off their course by any taunts that they are negotiating with Bolsheviks.The Prime Minister has lately told us that the Soviet Government is the only Government in existence, and the only machinery available for the distribution of food in Russia. If that is so, and if, as I believe, the food problem is the really vital problem in that sorely distressed country, I think that His Majesty's Government are perfectly right in endeavouring to get into touch with the Moscow Government, but it is the case, I am afraid, and notably in regard to Archangel, that misunderstandings have arisen. It has been stated—I believe truly stated—that in the month of June last year distinct assurances were given to the Archangel Government that we had no intention of annexing the country or of interfering in its private affairs. That assurance was published in the Russian newspapers. Almost immediately afterwards—in the month of August—came the landing of the British force at Archangel, with the result that the Soviet Government fell, and that confidence was much shaken. I hope that His Majesty's Government will pursue their policy of negotiating whether by groups or otherwise, and unless they can do so, and can do so successfully, I do not see how we are to terminate a position which is extremely embarrassing, and I believe regarded with considerable impatience by most 276 people in this country. The only observation I will add is to thank my noble friend Lord Peel, who has left the House, for the information which he was able to give me with regard to the position of the Allied forces at Archangel and Murmansk. His statement seemed to me reassuring, and I listened to it with great relief.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEMy Lords, I merely desire to add a word to what has been said by the noble Marquess, because I cannot think that the speeches that have been made to-night have entirely cleared up this question. The noble Marquess who has just sat down congratulated His Majesty's Government on not having departed from the policy of negotiation, and stated, I think, that it appeared to be the only path towards safety. But the noble Earl opposite said nothing to-night whatever about negotiations. His speech was absolutely lucid, and it appeared, to me at any rate, to convey the idea of a Government policy altogether removed from the notion of negotiation with the Moscow Government. The noble Earl repeated those denunciations of the horrors committed by many, at any rate, of the Bolsheviks in terms with which we all agree. No words can be too strong to express our detestation of such outrages, and apparently, so far as we know, they have been numerous. The noble Earl appeared to imply that our national object was—he will correct me if I am wrong, because it is important not in any way to misquote him—rather to strengthen the hands of all those different independent Governments arrayed in different parts of Russia against the Bolshevik Government at Mcscow, and carrying out, as I understood him to state, the desire of the main body of the great Russian people to get rid of the Bolshevik tyranny. That is a perfectly intelligible policy, but I had no idea that that was understood to be the policy adopted by His Majesty's Government. We had supposed that His Majesty's Government, by their invitation addressed to all the different Russian authorities, including the Soviet Government at Moscow, to meet at Prinkipo, had. desircd to enter on a course of general negotiations. That course has been interrupted, or at any rate deflected by the unwillingness of many of those at any rate semi-established Governments to take part in any such Conference. That appears to produce something like a deadlock for 277 he time being, and what in these circumstances. His Majesty's Government propose to do we do not know, and it certainly would not be fair to press them for any immediate answer as to the course they propose to take; but the impression, I confess, that was made upon some of us by the speech of the noble Earl, was that they had in fact abandoned that policy in favour of an opposite policy of limited intervention—limited, in fact, by the possibilities of the case rather than by intention. The impression made on my mind by the noble Earl's speech was that, if we could only do it, we would gladly help all these other Governments to upset the Bolshevik tyranny and the Moscow Soviet.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONWe do not want to assist them to upset what the noble Marquess describes us the Moscow tyranny. In so far as we desire to help them, it is to sustain their own national. existence; and in so far as we are involved in hostilities with the Bolsheviks, it is not from any desire to interfere in the internal condition of Russia, but because it is perfectly clear that an aggressive and successful Bolshevism, after it has swept out of existence all these groups and communities to which I refer, will spread in a great wave over other parts of Europe.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEI am glad to have elicited that explanation from the noble Earl, because it undoubtedly makes the matter clearer than—if he will forgive me saying so—his original observations, which rather produced the impression that I endeavoured to convey. It still is not quite clear to me why, that being so, His Majesty's Government attempt to negotiate with the Bolsheviks at all. But I am quite content to leave the matter there. We cannot, I think, carry it further to-night in the direction of pressing for any further explanation. We must be content to assume that the situation is one of suspense, and must endeavour to obtain from His Majesty's Government later on such information as they are able to give.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I am rather sorry for the critical tone of the speech of the noble Marquess who has just sat down. I confess I listened to the speech of my noble friend the Leader of the House with great satisfaction. The policy which he seemed to indicate was the 278 only policy consistent, as I believe, with British honour in this matter. From time to time I hear people say that the Bolshevik tyranny is very horrible, but it nearly always seems to be accompanied immediately afterwards with some desire to make some sort of concession to them. I am afraid, I am a very simple-minded person. I believe the Bolshevik tyranny to be the most horrible thing that has ever existed. All English society, all English public opinion, has been deeply concerned for the last four years over the' German atrocities. Why, the German atrocities pale into insignificance beside what is being carried out in Russia every day. I do not know whether, when noble. Lords assume that kind of critical tone towards His Majesty's Government, they really realise what awful horror, what profound wickedness, what triumph of evil, is involved in the Bolshevist Government. Then the noble Earl the Leader of the House says we ought not to give the impression to those gallant Russians who are trying to resist the Bolshevist tyranny that we are going to throw them over. I should think not. General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak and M. Tchaikovsky are entitled to every sympathy from us and every recognition that we can give them. I am not saying that there should be actual intervention; that may be impossible; but I am suggesting that when the Government say they recognise these Governments and these efforts of patriotic Russians to throw off the Bolshevist tyranny, they are entitled to every support from your Lordships' House, and I should be very sorry were it thought outside that we were slow to accord that support which we believe to be entirely due.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI should like very much, if I may, to clear up one point which still rather puzzles me. Was it intended that to the Prinkipo Conference should be invited representatives of the Bolshevist Government or Governments?
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONI think there has been some misapprehension on the part of the noble Marquess, which has been visible in both his speeches. In his earlier speech he referred to Esthonia and the Baltic States, and he spoke about them as if they were on the same footing with the struggling groups of Russian nationalities to whom I referred. They are 279 not; they are an independent race. Those States are inhabited not by Russians but by people of other nationalities, and they are standing on their own feet and holding their own gallantly against the Bolshevists. The invitation to Prinkipo was an invitation to the central Soviet authority, I do not know whether I ought to call it Government, at Moscow. It was an invitation to that Government to meet the representatives of all these other groups to which I have referred—the group in the north, the group in the Ukraine (to which reference has not been made to-night), the group north of the Caucasus (of which Denikin is the head), the group at Omsk (where Kolchak is the head of the Government). Those, I think, are the main organisations; they are represented in Paris, and an endeavour has been made by their sympathisers to federate these movements in which M. Sazonoff has taken a prominent part. These are the persons who were invited to meet, and they were invited to meet on condition that there should be a truce to all hostilities. The object was, not to crush the Bolshevists, but to arrive at a cessation of this deplorable state of affairs; and, as we were incapable by our own arms—because we have not the men, and nobody else has the men—to invade Russia and bring the thing to an end in 280 that way, to arrive at a solution by negotiation between the different parties. That was the object. Whether it will or will not succeed I cannot say, but the attitude of most of those who have been invited so far has not been favourable.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI am afraid I was misled, and I think other people may have been misled, by the speech of my noble friend. A very striking passage in that speech was devoted to a refutation of the charge that His Majesty's Government were recognising the Bolshevists. I certainly thought, when we were told that representatives of all the organised groups who are exercising political authority in Siberia or Russia were to be invited, that that meant that at the Prinkipo Conference there was to be Bolshevist representation.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONThat is so. I said so.