§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE rose to ask whether His Majesty's Government are able to give the House any information as to the position of the Allied Forces at Archangel and Murmansk, and the steps which have been taken or will be taken to ensure their safety.
§ The noble Marquess said: My Lords, before I put my Question I desire to assure my noble friend, who I understand will reply for the War Office, that I have no desire to press him for any information which in the opinion of His Majesty's Government cannot be properly or conveniently given at the present time; but of this I am quite sure, that I am not the only member of your Lordships' House who feels very considerable anxiety with regard to the position of the Allied Forces at Archangel and in Northern Russia.
§ I am rather encouraged to approach the subject because of the frankness with which it was handled on Tuesday night by the noble Earl who leads the House, and 97 who took us very completely into his confidence in regard to the manner in which His Majesty's Government proposed to approach the Bolshevist problem. My noble friend dwelt eloquently upon the repulsive features of Bolshevism, upon the dangerous spread of the movement all over Russia, upon the ghastly events which have everywhere followed in its train, and he treated us not less frankly when he came to examine the possible alternative modes of dealing with Bolshevism. He made, I thought, a very strong case to show that, it was quite impossible for this country, at this time of day, to set out on the task of suppressing or extirpating Bolshevism or establishing some alternative form of Government to take its place in Russia. I agree with that view. I do not believe that at this moment such a task could be attempted without putting an altogether intolerable strain, not only upon the military and financial resources of this country, but upon the temper of the nation. Lord Curzon spoke with equal frankness as to the possibility of another alternative—the alternative of doing what I think Lord Milner called scrambling out of Russia and leaving things to take their own course there. The adoption of that course would have been, to my mind, one involving a great humiliation to this country and a very heartless desertion of those who have stood by us.
§ My noble friend found himself then driven to the only other alternative, the alternative which His Majesty's Government have determined to adopt—namely, that of arranging a meeting between representatives of the Allies and representatives of the different groups and communities in Russia, including, of course, the Bolshevist groups, at an island in the Sea of Marmora. My noble friend must have known—we must all have known—that this decision would come as something of a shock to most of us, but I am quite prepared to confess that I, at any rate, am not able to suggest any other procedure. A good deal of doubt has been expressed as to whether what is going to be done expresses a recognition of Bolshevism. I confess I do not think it matters very much what particular words we use in connection with this business. What really matters are the facts of the case, and the facts of the case are that we are, I understand, committed to the policy of meeting these Russian delegates and discussing with 98 them the possibility of arrangements for a general peace in Russia.
§ I may be told that all this is not very relevant to the question of Archangel. But I think it is. I believe we shall all be extremely rash to build our hopes too strongly upon the prospects of the Prinkipo negotiations. We are not yet assured that they will ever take place. In order that they may take place we shall have to collect, from a number of quarters, a very motley crowd of representatives, whom it will not be possible to get together in a very short space of time. The discussions, if they take place at all, are sure to be lengthy, and assuming that they lead to an acceptable conclusion it will take some time to carry out and enforce any terms with regard to which agreement may be arrived at. The Prinkipo Conference, as I have said, may never meet. If it does meet it may possibly fail, and in considering this Archangel problem I think this is a consideration of which we ought not to lose sight. Meanwhile events in Russia are moving fast, and some of them are, I must say, to my mind extremely disquieting.
§ The position at Archangel is obscure, but we gather that there must be about 25,000 Allied troops there or in that part of Northern Russia. In putting this Question I am not going to inquire how we came to be entangled in the Archangel occupation at all; how we became, to use the words of a distinguished member of His Majesty's Government, "mixed up" in the fighting which took place there. But the position of this Force, whatever its numbers be, has, I understand, been a defensive position, and the military operations which have taken place have, I understand, led to that Force withdrawing to the north and nearer to Archangel itself. A few days ago we read of a successful raid by the defenders, but that raid does not seem to have been a very considerable operation, and it was probably a defensive rather than an offensive engagement. One would like very much to know in these circumstances what is the strength of the Archangel Force; whether it is well equipped and supplied; and whether it is sure of a renewal of supplies should they become necessary. Archangel is, I believe, a wooden town and therefore extremely vulnerable. The port is not an ice-free port, and the occupants of the place are, during a great part of the year, cut off from the rest of the world
99§ I feel quite sure that most people would desire to terminate the situation at Archangel as soon as possible if it can be terminated upon honourable terms. I put down this Question particularly with the object of making a suggestion to His Majesty's Government. I would like to ask them, if they contemplate as possible and as likely to produce satisfactory results a Conference in the Sea of Marmora between the Allies and the Bolshevists generally, whether that policy might not be applied on a smaller scale, and whether it would not be possible to have something of the nature of a conference between the particular group which is concerned with military operations in Finland and the representatives of the Allies. It seems to me that the difficulties of a large and comprehensive scheme of pacification involving the whole of Russia must be extremely formidable. Might not the difficulties be less if the question, instead of being approached in a wholesale fashion, were to be dealt with in parts and by sections? Russia, we were told a few hours ago, covers an area nearly as big in Europe as one-half of Europe and nearly as large as one-half of Asia in Asia. We know that the whole country is in a chaotic and disorganised state, and it seems to me obvious that a general scheme of pacification must be a lengthy enterprise and must present the most formidable difficulties. We are inviting to the Conference representatives of every organised group that is now exercising, or attempting to exercise, political control anywhere in Siberia or within the boundaries of European Russia. That is a serious enterprise. These people may or may not come to the Conference. They may not come at all; they may not come with a sufficient mandate, and they may not be able to agree when they get there. I think there is a great deal to be said for making, perhaps as an alternative to this colossal scheme of negotiation, a much smaller attempt which would concern only those parties who are specially interested in the case of Archangel. The adoption of the smaller scheme need not at all stand in the way of the larger scheme if the larger one proves practicable.
§ I observed that the Prime Minister alluding to this question a few hours ago, suggested that in dealing with the Bolshevists we were to do what the Government of India is in the habit of doing when it has to deal with a turbulent and trouble- 100 some frontier tribe. In that case, says the Prime Minister, there are negotiations with the turbulent tribe; an arrangement is come to, and a punitive expedition is avoided. I would make one remark upon that analogy. In the case of the trouble with the frontier tribe the representatives enter upon the negotiations with the knowledge that if the result is not satisfactory the punitive expedition is there in the background. I confess I do not see how any punitive expedition in this case is going to get rid of Bolshevism in Russia. But there is another blemish in the analogy. When a turbulent tribe gives trouble on the Indian frontier it is very usual to send to the head men of that. tribe and to endeavour to make an arrangement with them, but you send only for the representatives of that one particular tribe. I have never heard of a case in which, when trouble was given by a single tribe, the whole of the frontier tribes from the Khyber Pass to the Baluch frontier were invited to come down and talk business with the Indian authorities.
§ There is, however, one feature in the Indian case which is, I think, applicable to the case that I am endeavouring to discuss. In the Indian case one of the weapons which the Government of India. employs, very often with the greatest effect, to bring about a satisfactory conclusion is the threat to stop supplies. If you are able to tell tribesmen that they shall not be allowed to emerge from their mountain valleys into the plains of India or to receive the goods that they want from Indian territory, you have a very powerful lever which you can apply to them. I am not sure that in this case of Archangel you could not employ a very similar lever. What I gather is happening throughout the greater part of Russia at this moment is that the population are in dire need of food supplies. As long ago as the month of November last Mr. Hoover, whose authority upon these questions will not be disputed, estimated that there were in Northern Russia some 50,000,000 of people who were cut off from supplies and inaccessible on account of the chaotic condition of anarchy into which the country had fallen. If we were in a. position to tell these people that we could help them with the supplies they want, at any rate that we would oppose no difficulty in the way of their reaching the starving people, I believe we might produce a very considerable impression upon them.
101§ What strikes one when one reads the accounts of these most unsatisfactory operations in Northern Russia is that probably neither side knows quite exactly what they are fighting for. I think something would be gained if the kind of negotiations which the Government have in view could take place on a smaller scale locally, and if we were able to make it clear to these people that what we require is the safety of those who have befriended us, that we are not out to impose any form of government of our own choice on the Russian people and, above all, that we have no desire to starve the population of Russia. I cannot help believing that if such negotiations could be begun we might find it possible to put an end so far as Archangel is concerned to a situation which, I must say, seems to me to be most unsatisfactory, and which fills me with very considerable misgivings in regard I to the future.
§ VISCOUNT PEELMy Lords, the noble Marquess has raised, as I think he will himself admit, some larger questions than those suggested by his Notice on the Paper. I am rather sorry that these questions were not raised in the presence of the noble Earl the Leader of the House, who would have replied to them as dealing with foreign affairs, because I naturally find it difficult, representing the War Office in this House, to give the noble Marquess any answer to such extended considerations. In fact, I should be rather trespassing on the province of my noble friend if I dealt with these questions. I would only suggest to the noble Marquess that the possible conversations at Prinkipo, to which he has alluded, would be between the representatives of the Allies and all the different organised elements and forces in Russia, whereas such a negotiation as he suggests at Archangel would, I suppose, only be between the representatives of the Allied Powers and the Bolshevist forces who are fighting against them in that district. I am, of course, unable to deal with the question generally now. As to the points raised more specifically in the Notice on the Paper, I think I have already intimated to the noble Marquess that if he would be good enough to put the Question down for some date next week I should be able to give him much fuller information on the subject than I can at present; and if he is disposed to follow that course I think it would be much more advantageous to the House.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEMy Lords, it seems to me that the House has some reason to be grateful to the noble Marquess for having asked this Question, which simply attempts to fill up a gap that was left in the very full and candid statement made by the noble Earl who leads the House in the debate on the Address. Although I call quite understand that the noble Viscount opposite may not be in a. position to reply fully, yet the Question was on the Paper—I have no doubt the noble Earl who leads the House is detained elsewhere by some other business—and I venture to suggest that it might have been in the power of His Majesty's Government and their representatives on the Front Bench to supply us at this early stage in the session with an answer to practically the first Question on foreign or military affairs, placed on the Paper by so responsible a member of your Lordships' House as the noble Marquess.
The question raised is one of very real importance. We are told that negotiations are impending are likely to take place, between some representatives of the de facto Government in Russia and ourselves, possibly also between representatives of other Governments or other interests in Russia, although so far as one can gather from the public Press all those have so far declined to join in the proposed conference. Therefore it appears to us that the country might find itself in the position of carrying on negotiations in the South and carrying on military operations in the North with the same people. That appears to be the position as one can estimate it from what we see in the newspapers.
The noble Marquess mentioned, from the wealth of his experience, the interesting parallel which was drawn by the Prime Minister in another place between what sometimes occurs between the Government of India and the tribes on the Northwest Frontier But the parallel which comes to my mind, as to the position in which we shall find ourselves, is the more significant one of what took place some twenty years ago when the European Legations were beleagured in Pekin. I dare say your Lordships may remember that at that time violent and dangerous attacks upon the Legations and upon the places where the various representatives were gathered together alternated on the part of the Chinese Government with over- 103 tures of apparent friendship. I remember reading that on one occasion, after a particularly violent attack, the Dowager Empress of China sent a polite message to the besieged Legation conveying the condolences of the Imperial House with the Italian Minister on the assassination of the King of Italy. On a different occasion I remember that after another attack carts of vegetables were seen to be approaching, and it was shown that they had been sent by the Chinese Imperial Government because it was believed that the Legations were getting short of fresh supplies. That paradoxical position would appear to be created in Russia between ourselves and the Bolshevik Government, if at the same time negotiations were proceeding in the Sea of Marmora and fighting was going on in the neighbourhood of Archangel; and what the noble Marquess suggested regarding the desirability of some kind of local communications, as well as those large-scale negotiations which apparently are contemplated in the Island of Prinkipo, must be all the more enforced, it seems to me, by the fact that we do not really know how far the central Bolshevik Government exercises direct influence upon all the local manifestations which take place. It seems to me, therefore, that His Majesty's Government might well consider whether some local approaches of the kind which the noble Marquess has indicated might not accompany the larger negotiations of which we have heard. I will not attempt to pursue the matter further now, because, as the noble Viscount has candidly told us, His Majesty's Government would prefer to postpone the giving of any further information on the subject, but I repeat that I am very glad the noble Marquess raised it.
LORD WEARDALEMy Lords, before the noble Earl addresses the House, I may, perhaps, be permitted to say that I most cordially thank the noble Marquess for having raised this question so early in the course of the session. It is one of paramount importance, and, as all those who, like myself, have some knowledge of the country about which we are speaking know, it must be approached with the utmost caution. It is one of the most difficult problems with which one has had to deal, and I am afraid that the rather piecemeal inquiry with reference to the Archangel expedition is hardly sufficient for our purpose. I hope, therefore, that 104 an opportunity will be given to us at a very early stage of discussing the whole question of our attitude with regard to the Russian people. The Archangel expedition is not the only military expedition in which this country is engaged in Russia. We have, I believe, forces in Siberia. We have naval forces, as we know, in the Baltic. Some naval ships only a few days ago were bombarding some seaport towns on the Esthonian coast; consequently it is insufficient, in my judgment, to deal with the question of Archangel alone. We must reconsider our attitude as a whole with regard to Russia.
I only wish to make a few remarks on this question, and I do so with very great diffidence, because I know how difficult it is. In the first place, I think it has been shown that military intervention, at all events in the way in which we have approached it, has been a mistake. It has only had the effect of inciting the Russian people themselves to take up a hostile attitude towards all neutrals, or friendly intervention on the part of the Allies. The Russian people have been led, and are being led, by the Bolshevik authorities in Russia to regard all our acts as aggression upon Russia as a whole. It has drawn them together. It is not undermining, I am sorry to say—because I am no friend of the Bolshevik administration, Heaven knows—the authority of Bolshevik administration. What we have to do is to adopt a policy which will attract the sympathy of the people of Russia as a whole. I admit that it is a very difficult problem, but the only way in which I think it can be approached is very much on the lines indicated by the noble Marquess, by showing that we are prepared to help them, to bring them aid of all kinds, particularly food, at the present moment of terrible suffering. It could be done and it should be done, not only through Archangel, but at other points more convenient, perhaps, for the proper feeding of the people of Russia.
I think that it should be shown to the people of Russia that we are. not desirous of interfering in the least degree with their internal affairs; that we have no desire to impose upon them some régime to which perhaps the majority may be opposed; that, in short, we are entirely free from all suggestions of that kind, and are only anxious to approach them in a most friendly spirit, and to give them the fullest oppor- 105 tunity of settling their own form of Government. If we can bring that home to them by some process on a very large scale of sympathy and support, we shall do more to bring about the regeneration of Russia than by any armed enterprise. Taking that general view of the situation, I hope that an opportunity will be given to us on an early occasion of hearing what the intentions of the Government are, giving this House an opportunity of thoroughly discussing the subject and of placing it, as I hope, in a better and truer light before the people of Russia as a whole.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (THE EARL OF CRAWFORD)Your Lordships can have any opportunity that you may care to take next week to discuss this matter. I only wish to say to the noble Marquess opposite that I think he does my noble friend some injustice in what amounted to a censure at his being unable to answer this Question.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEI must protest against the noble Earl's interpretation of what I ventured to say. I simply called attention to what appeared to be the utterance of something like censure by the noble Viscount on the noble Marquess for having brought this Motion forward to-day.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDI hope I did not err in saying what I did. Certainly the last thing my noble friend did was to censure the noble Marquess sitting on the bench below the gangway. I merely want 106 to explain that the Notice only appeared on the Paper this morning. Lord Lansdowne was informed by my noble friend that he could not give any adequate reply to it to-day. My noble friend assumed—indeed, anybody reading the Notice would assume—that it was purely a War Office Question as to the safety of the troops at Archangel and Murmansk. My noble friend and I, and others, thought the Question referred to the forces at our command there, and to their equipment and revictualling, and so on. My noble friend was not in a position to reply to it to-day. He has given notice that early next week he will have all these particulars ready, and will make such reply as he can. The debate has developed into a first-class one on foreign affairs, in which my noble friend is not versed, and without notice of which it is impossible for him to reply. Next week we shall be warned, and no doubt Lord Curzon will be glad to give a full answer from that point of view.