§ LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH had the following Notice on the Paper—
§ To call attention to the abandonment of the scheme for an aviation base at Loch Doon; to ask on whose authority the scheme was undertaken, and on whose authority it was abandoned; and to move for a Return of the expenditure involved.
§ The noble Lord said: MY Lords, I am sorry to take up the time of the House in asking a second Question. Perhaps I should also apologise to the noble Lord for insisting on this Question in spite of the letter which I had from his private secretary yesterday in which he was good enough to tell me that there was an Inquiry going on at the instance of a Committee of another place. That I knew already, but, of course, I have no means either of attending that Inquiry or of knowing what questions are to he put; and I am by no means sure whether the whole of the ground will be covered.
§ I believe that a very serious waste of public money has occurred in connection with this matter. Your Lordships will see that the Question which I put is to ask on whose authority the scheme was undertaken; on whose authority it was abandoned; and to ask for a Return of the expenditure involved. I am perfectly well aware that the noble Lord, the new President of the Air Board, cannot possibly have been responsible for the inception of the silicate. I am absolutely ignorant whether the military authorities at the War 565 Office, or the Navy, or the Air Board (or whatever Air Committee was in existence a year or two ago) were responsible. All those of us who reside in Scotland know that the scheme was undertaken, that a large expenditure took place upon it, and that it has now been abandoned without, so far as I know, a single use ever having been made of it. Those facts are, I think, undoubted. It is a part of the country that I have known very well indeed for fifty years, and I have many friends residing in it.
§ Hitherto the Defence of the Realm Act has stopped any public criticism of this scheme, but, now that it is abandoned, the circumstances are changed, and I think we are free to ask questions. At any rate, I cannot see that there is any public interest that would be contravened by a full statement of the facts and discussion of them. I know, from my own personal knowledge and the testimony of friends, that if the advice of those with real local knowledge had been taken this scheme would never have been begun at all, and I do not think it is unfair to ask who was responsible for the selection of the site, what inquiries were made before the money was expended, and what engineering advice was taken. Beyond all question a large sum of money has been spent. Aerodromes have been built, roads and railways made on an extensive scale, workshops, camps, reservoirs, pipe tracks put in position, and large schemes of drainage undertaken.
§ The real point of the whole matter is this. Was the place really suitable? Was proper local information and advice appealed to before the expenditure was undertaken? I have read the discussion which took place in the other House, and if I understand that discussion rightly the Royal Engineers were the advisers. If I can trust to the testimony of a private friend, a man whom I have known for fifty years, the person who was really responsible was an English engineer of a town in the south of England, who had no practical knowledge of the particular conditions he would have to meet. My friend tells me that he interviewed this gentleman—I do not mention his name because I do not want to be unjust—told him the scheme was impossible and gave hint the reasons, but that all objections were repelled and no advantage of local knowledge was taken at all. Beyond all question a very large amount of local 566 damage has been done, and the forecast of those who knew the circumstances has, if my information is right, been absolutely fulfilled.
§
My friend goes on to say—
In my opinion there never has been a madder scheme or a more shameful waste of public money. It is impossible for an outsider to form any real estimate of the public money which has been wasted, but I am told that about £3,000,000 has passed through a Bank at Dalmellington. I know all traces of the muddle are being destroyed as fast as possible, and one correspondent says he thinks there is enough cement buried at Loch Doon to build a wall round Jerusalem, and all this is being covered up so as to hide it as a monument of the stupidity of those concerned.
§ THE PRESIDENT OF THE AIR COUNCIL (LORD ROTHERMERE)My Lords, I was not aware that the noble Lord was going to raise the question as to who was really responsible for the inception of the Loch Doon scheme. The Air Ministry is not in possession of the information, but if I had known he was going to raise the point I would have endeavoured to obtain it and communicate it to the House. If the noble Lord wishes, I will endeavour to ascertain full particulars as to who advised its adoption and will communicate the information to him at the earliest possible moment.
The responsibility for the abandonment of Loch Doon rests with the Air Council, who decided on this course in the following circumstances. The Air Council, late in January, took over the construction of all works, including Loch Doon, from the War Office and at once proceeded to examine them. It was found that Loch Doon did not realise what had been expected. The project had already proved far more costly than was originally anticipated. The original estimate for the scheme was £150,000. This had already been largely exceeded, the sum of £420,000 having been spent, and sanction had recently been asked for the expenditure of a further considerable sum. Meanwhile, in spite of the amount of work done, there were grave doubts as to whether the place would ever be suitable for the work of a School of Advanced Aerial Gunnery. An unfavourable report on it was sent in by the Commandant in November of last year.
In these circumstances I invited two members of the Air Council, the Under- 567 Secretary of State and the Administrator of Works and Buildings, to proceed to Loch Doon and report upon it. This was done, and as a result of their report the Air Council decided that there was no alternative but to abandon the scheme, and the Army Council were so informed. The Air Council's decision was based on the view that after eighteen months' work there still remained no prospect of Loch Doon being available for a further indefinite period. The engineering difficulties, which had been recognised to be great from the start, proved far more formidable than was anticipated. An indispensable part of the scheme was the provision of an aerodrome on the Loch side, and in order to do this attempts had been made to drain a considerable area. The results of this experiment had failed to provide the necessary aerodrome, and the Administrator of Works and Buildings came to the definite conclusion that it could not be made.
I venture to invite your Lordships to consider this question from the point of view of a war measure. The necessity for providing our pilots with the highest possible form of gunnery instruction is vital, both for their own safety and for their efficiency. It would be in my view criminal to neglect anything which could possibly conduce to increased efficiency in this respect. The fact of Loch Doon proving a disappointment is regrettable. The site was chosen in somewhat of a hurry. The requirements of a school of this nature, which I have already described, are not easy to find. Every site has disadvantages. Loch Doon appeared, to those then responsible, to come nearer to fulfilling the requirement than anything else that could be found. It has turned out a disappointment, and the necessity to abandon it is obviously regrettable, but I venture to think that after we had reached the conclusion that it was unsuitable it was impossible to justify any further expenditure on the scheme, and that the only proper course was to face the inevitable criticism which would be aroused by its abandonment.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEMy Lords, this most regrettable incident is one which is not unknown and not novel in the history of our military administration. The same kind of thing happened when the fortifications were made at St. Lucia, which subsequent investigation found were wholly 568 unsuitable for the purpose of naval strategy. The same thing happened when the old Garrison Artillery stations overseas, provided in large numbers, subsequently had to be scrapped and thrown away as it appeared that the proper kind of defence was naval defence. These things occurred in the old days and for the same reason as has happened now—namely, that there is no proper distribution of the function of thinking about these things beforehand from the function of doing them. Naval works were taken in hand without any proper General Staff consideration, and so was provision for the Overseas Garrison Artillery. These things were not thought out at the time that they were done.
At the time when this was done the Air Service was merely a sort of appendage of the War Office. There was no separation of the General Staff work of the Air Service from the administrative work such as there is at the present time. It would be a monstrous iniquity if to-day a great new Artillery School were set up without the conditions having previously been submitted to the General Staff for consideration as to whether they were likely to be effective. The General Staff, if it knew its business, would at once advise, and I think always has advised in such cases, that what has taken place should not go on, but with the Air Service unfortunately that was not so in the early stages. Here we have an illustration of the muddles that result when there is not a proper amount of military forethought taken. Anybody, of course, ought to have been able to discover, with a proper staff for the purpose, that Loch Doon was a wholly unsuitable place, having regard to climatic conditions and other things, for the Air Service, assuming always that in those days the conditions under which an aviation station could be established were known and ascertainable.
It is different now. The noble Lord has got in the Air Service of which he is the head a General Staff organisation separated from the administrative organisation, and I trust that no such cases will ever happen in the future. They are inevitable when you do not have the consideration that I have indicated. They have happened, as I have said, on many occasions before. I could multiply instances from my own memory. They have happened on this occasion for the very same reason. The noble Lord is quite right to 569 cut the losses. Had he gone on with this nothing but great mischief, further losses of money, and probably loss of life and of efficiency would have resulted, and it is much better for the country to put up with the loss of a large sum of money rather than incur further waste. I think that this incident, which in its magnitude is much more than an incident, will be an illustration to the country of the absolute necessity of the policy, not only in things military but in all things, of thinking out beforehand, with special skill and special knowledge brought together and assembled for the purpose, the probable consequences of the courses on which you intend to embark.
§ LORD LAMINGTONCan the noble Lord say whether another site has been found?
§ LORD ROTHERMERENot a similar site. We are still looking for one.
§ Loan BERESFORDMay I ask whether the individuals who were responsible for this extraordinary muddle are still in the service of the State?
§ LORD ROTHERMEREI cannot tell the noble Lord which individual was responsible for this matter, and I have myself thought that probably an Inquiry would hardly be proper, as I believe that quite a large limber of officers were consulted in regard to it upon its inception.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGHCan the noble Lord say limier what Ministry and at what date it was actually authorised?
§ LORD ROTHERMEREI believe it was in June, 1916, but I am not quite sure under what Ministry the work was undertaken. I believe it was the War Office.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNMy Lords, I do not think that I have ever heard such an answer given, or such a waste of public money confessed to. I am not at all inclined to seek for revenge on the persons who did this, but at the same time I think we ought certainly to know their names, and all the facts of this case ought to be published in the country. Not a shadow of an excuse has been given for a waste of what we are told amounts to £3,000,000.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONNo £420,000.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNI thought that some one said £3,000,000, but I accept £420,000. Still, my Lords, the persons who made this muddle ought to be amenable to public opinion, and we ought to know by whom the name of the country has been thrown away. Of course, the noble Lord is not in the slightest degree responsible himself, but I hope that he will furnish us with a Return of the persons who were responsible, and I will move, if necessary, that a Return of that kind he furnished.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONMy Lords, I think it undesirable that your Lordships should, without further information, pass any Motion on the subject at all. My noble friend has admitted with perfect candour that a great mistake was made, and the policy of cutting the losses of that mistake is, I believe, as the noble Viscount (Lord Haldane) said, accepted by the House. About that there is no dispute. But other noble Lords are anxious to find out how this sort of thing occurred, and who was responsible for it. That is in itself a reasonable request. I have a faint recollection of hearing the matter mentioned when I was connected with the Air Board. I assumed charge of the Air Board about the middle of 1916, and I believe that this project had already been decided upon. I think my noble friend—I am speaking only from recollection—was right when he said that it was a War Office scheme. I have a recollection also of hearing that the matter was only decided upon after a most careful examination by experts, or by so-called experts. I do not imagine that any Government even in the rather inchoate days as regards air policy and air administration, of which I am particularly speaking, would have embarked upon any scheme of this sort without some preliminary investigation of a detailed character. I think that the House is entitled to further information upon the matter, and I would ask my noble friend to make, inquiry upon the point, and perhaps when we meet again, if some noble Lord will put a Question on the Paper, we may be able to carry our investigation of the matter further.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGHAfter what the noble Earl the Leader of the House has said, I ask permission to withdraw the Motion, and will consult with the noble Earl himself and others as to what is the best form in which to put it down again hereafter.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.