HL Deb 03 January 1918 vol 27 cc324-39

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

VISCOUNT SANDHURST

In presenting this Bill to your Lordships for Second Reading I hope that you will not find it so formidable as it looks at first sight. The Bill contains 47 clauses, and is of great importance. It passed through the House of Commons I think I may say with almost a minimum of controversy. The Bill deals with the Insurance Act of 1911, which was amended in some particulars in 1913 and has since in various details been amended according to circumstances required by the war. When we come to consider that Act, difficult and complicated as it was, dealing with the interests of 15,000,000 people and the administration of millions of money, affecting hundreds of societies and thousands of branches, and involving, I should think, hundreds of thousands of officials, it seems to me that it is remarkable not that we should require to amend this Act but that it has worked as well as it has.

I think I shall best consult the convenience of your Lordships if I endeavour to explain the main provisions of the Bill as concisely and as clearly as I can, relying upon the knowledge of your Lordships on the subject to pull me through a task which, I can assure you, I have not found a very easy one. But before I go further I should like to explain that nearly all these propositions are based upon the Report of a Departmental Committee which has come to be known as the Ryan Committee, because it was presided over by Sir Gerald Ryan. Sir Gerald Ryan, as most of us know, is, if not the greatest, certainly one of the greatest, authorities on insurance; and for the time and assiduity he gave to the work of this Committee I think the country and the Government owe him a great debt of gratitude, which debt extends also to his Committee. That Committee was composed of ladies and gentlemen holding extremely diverse views on various political and social subjects, but all of them were alike in this, that they were actuated by a sincere desire to come to right conclusions with a single-mindedness beyond all praise.

The Bill is divided into two Parts. The first Part, containing six clauses, has to do with the rearrangement to a certain extent of the financial scheme of the Act of 1911. Part II is entirely concerned with the simplification of methods in the Act of 1911 which have been found to be too cumbersome. It is to Part I that I will first direct your Lordships' attention. The Act of 1911 was based upon the supposition that the contributions, in the first place from the insured, in the second place from the employers, and in the third place from the Exchequer, would be found adequately to secure the financial stability of the scheme. But experience shows that these hopes have not been fully realised. It is also clear that there is a necessity for one comprehensive scheme, to embrace as far as possible all societies, for the readjustment of the finance of the principal Act.

The approved societies are of very different kinds. You have one class, which I will for the moment style individual, which has for its membership men or women or members from some particular industrial occupation. On the other hand you have another class, which I will call for the moment collective, which comprises in membership men and women and people belonging to various occupations and concerns. There are also societies with extremely numerous and others with very small memberships, and when valuation is made at the proper time it is possible that through no fault of their own but owing to the constitution of their membership, some of these societies may not be in a position to continue to pay the benefits for which they are liable under the Act. As a reason I might state this, that in a society you may have a large number of people who are employed in trades which are more dangerous to health than are some other trades, or you may have them living in localities which are unhealthy. Epidemics may supervene and health may be more precarious, especially in the case, of women, than averages have led us to expect. The principal object of Part I is so to readjust the finance that properly administered societies may be able to pay their way.

This, of course, necessitates money. It is proposed in the Bill to get this money from two sources—one, to a certain extent from money within the Act to be redistributed; and, two, by an extra grant from the Exchequer of £400,000 a year. This gives me £1,900,000. The present amount of the Sinking Fund is £4,500,000, which should redeem the reserve values of £70,000,000 by the year 1932. The whole of the money in the Act, as you know, comes from the 7d. paid by the men and the 6d. paid by the women and a State supplement of two-ninths of the expenditure in the case of men, and a quarter in the case of women. The Commissioners retain 1 5/9d. in the case of the men and 1½d. in the case of the women, and these small sums go to make up the £4,500,000. Now I propose to take away £1,500,000 from the Sinking Fund and reduce it to £3,000,000, and therefore at 3 per cent. the redemption will be postponed to 1947.

Having got the money, how is it proposed to dispose of it? Of the £1,500,000 from the Sinking Fund it is intended to set aside £280,000 to augment the funds for providing benefits for all women in all societies. The money is to be allocated in proportion to the number of women in each society. Out of the remainder of the £1,500,000 it is proposed to set up what is to be known as a Contingency Fund, which I will presently explain. Of the £400,000 it is proposed to set aside £250,000 for benefits for married women, especially in regard to pregnancy. That is to be allocated in proportion to the number of married women in societies and the number of confinements. That is to be called the Women's Equalisation Fund; and the remaining £150,000 is to start what is to be known as a Central Fund, from which money is to be taken to aid societies which for various reasons may have fallen into deficiency. That £150,000 is not to be automatically distributed, but is to be retained by the Commissioners and to be given out as and when occasion may demand. Then if that is insufficient, there may be taken a sum not exceeding £150,000 from the unused balances of the contingency funds of all societies. Power for [...] [...] taken in the Bill. The contingency fund is nothing more or less than a reserve fund, as it would be called in business parlance. Each society is to have its own fund, and the money will be distributed according to the numerical membership of each society. The object is that when on valuation a deficiency is shown the society will be able to make good out of its own resources. If there is no deficiency, the money will be placed to current account, but will not be expended in benefits until five years have elapsed.

Here I must ask leave to say a word with regard to pooling and association. The word "pool" appears in the Act of 1911. By that Act a society of 5,000 had an entity of its own, but societies below 5,000 were styled "small societies" and could associate with one another. The association became the unit, and societies forming that association became the branches. Societies within the association had to render to its authority one-third of their surplus if any, and their position in regard to deficiency was not so favourable as I shall hope presently to propose under this Bill. Small societies under 5,000 not joining an association were pooled according to groups in counties and county boroughs, of which there were 128. The county pool therefore became the society, the societies became the branches, and so on. It is proposed in the Bill that a society of 1,000 members shall have its own entity, its own valuation, and its own contingency fund. Societies of less than a thousand members are to be styled "small societies." The right of association of small societies will continue. Each association will have its own contingency fund, from which societies or branches will be aided as necessity arises, and each associated society will retain the whole of its own surplus. Small societies not associated will be grouped into four national groups. Each will retain its own surplus, and in case of deficiency will draw on its own contingency fund. It will draw on the national pool only if its own contingency fund is found to be insufficient, and will be in the same position as regards the central fund as the larger societies are.

This brings me to Part II, the whole object of which is simplification. Since 1912 experience which had to be gained has shown that there were anomalies, that methods were perplexing, that they led in many cases to avoidable expense and to a variety of complications, adding work and indeed in many cases creating work. Our object is, as far as we can, to prune away these methods which are not balanced by advantages; to do away with a great number of the innumerable exceptions—for exceptions in themselves lead to complications—and endeavour as far as possible to have one uniform rate of contribution and one uniform rate of benefit.

I think I shall probably best consult your Lordships' convenience if in regard to simplification I give two or three instances of how the Act works, and then pass to two subjects of more general interest. For instance, under the Act the late entrants can choose one of three courses. They can (1) pay the ordinary rate of contribution for a reduced rate of benefit; (2) pay an increased rate of contribution in proportion to age for full benefit; (3) pay a lump sum compensating for full benefit. You can easily imagine how perplexing were these alternatives and the references to tables and comparisons between ages and rates; altogether it was an extremely inconvenient system. It is now proposed to provide that all new or late entrants shall be entitled, after twenty-six weeks waiting period, to enter at a reduced rate of sick benefit—6s. instead of 10s. for men, and 5s. instead of 7s. 6d. for women; with, of course, medical and sanatorium benefit. At the end of two years, including the twenty-six weeks, they will be entitled to full benefit. We also abolish the differential rate for persons under twenty-one without dependants, so that all entering into insurance after reaching sixteen years of age will be eligible for full benefits at eighteen.

There is a new provision which was inserted in the House of Commons. It refers to the case of the unmarried mother. By the Act, under the misconduct rule it was provided that the sickness benefit might be suspended owing to misconduct of members, and some societies have refused to pay sickness benefit in the case of the pregnancy of unmarried women. The effect of subsection (3) of Clause 12 of this Bill makes it impossible for the benefit to be withheld, and the change in the law is accepted by all types of societies, I understand. The subsection is so drawn as not to prejudice the question whether such conduct is misconduct or not, and I think that it is a wise provision in the interests of the race.

Clause 13 defines the position of insured people who cease to be employed. A man might take a shop or become an employer himself, and he would then drop out of insurance. Assuming, however, a person could say that he or she was searching for work and was unemployed, he or she would be able to go on with full benefit for one year—a year's grace. Now it is proposed that all people who cease employment shall go on for one year on full benefit and then they will drop out of the society, and if they become re-employed they will have to re-insure and come in as new entrants.

I must pause at Clause 20 because I know there are one or two noble Lords in this House, who are administrators of large charitable undertakings, who take a particular interest in this. This clause makes more elastic the power, which was rather restricted in the Act, in regard to the payment of money to insured persons who are the inmates of institutions. You know that nothing can be paid to institutions which are maintained out of public funds; and the Bill now proposes that, after consultation with the insured and at the discretion of the society, the money payable to the insured who is in an institution can be paid to the dependants, if any, or, if none, can be paid in respect of any expenses for which the insured may be liable while in the institution, and, failing both these arrangements, the money can be paid to the institution; while if the money is not expended in any of these, ways it may be given to the insured when he comes out in a lump sum or in instalments, and at his death it passes to his estate.

Then there is a provision which I know has excited some interest, because one or two of my noble friends have been good enough to give me notice that they may at a subsequent stage suggest Amendments. That is with regard to what is known as the marriage benefit. It is proposed by the Bill to add to women's benefits by paying a marriage benefit of £2 to insured women when they marry, and to continue them at the same time in insurance as far as medical benefit is concerned; they have that advantage to the end of the following calendar year from the date of their marriage. If, having taken this £2, they remain employed or re-enter employment, they are to be treated as new entrants into insurance from the date of marriage or their re-employment, as the case may be. A woman who does not take the £2 marriage benefit and leaves employment remains in receipt of full benefits after her employment ends, as in the case I mentioned just now—that is, she has a year's grace. Notice of marriage should be given four weeks after marriage. It is hoped that this £2 benefit may be an inducement to women to give that notice. They are not at all prompt to do so, though it is very necessary that they should give notice as soon as possible to enable their insurance to be wound up, and for the general efficiency of administration. It is computed that six out of seven women cease to be employed on marriage. There are some rare cases, no doubt, in which women continue in employment immediately after they are married. These women would be entitled to continue in full insurance if they did not receive the £2 marriage benefit.

There are conditions attached to this benefit. In the case of a woman who has been insured for less than fifty-two weeks and more than thirteen, she would not receive her £2 marriage benefit but she would get 3d. per contribution for each week in the intervening period, and if she has been insured for less than thirteen weeks she does not get the benefit. If there had been sick benefit paid to the woman between the date of her marriage and the date of her election to take the £2, the money so paid would be deducted from the marriage benefit. I may add that this proposal obviates the necessity, which was rather inconvenient from many points of view, of ascertaining a woman's intentions as to employment in the present and in the future. I may mention that women's insurance is a very difficult matter indeed. I do not suggest that this proposal is ideal. It is a matter of compromise. The subject was fully explored by the Ryan Committee, the Advisory Committee, and also by a special sub-committee which examined alternative proposals from all sources, including those of the Women's Co-operative Guild. If the proposal had not its origin with these bodies, which I think it had, it certainly has the adherence of all of them; and the sub-committee concluded their deliberations by remarking that no alternative which had been put forward was open to less objection than the proposal now in the Bill. I venture to say that to change it now would lead to considerable controversy. It will doubtless save much labour, and I think I can show it is fair. Take the case of a girl of sixteen years of age who insures and subsequently marries at about twenty-three She has never been ill, has paid all her contributions, and had nothing to show for them. She was compulsorily insured, and, equally compulsorily, drops out of insurance on marriage. Her insurance is closed, and I think it is quite fair to regard the £2 marriage benefit in the light of a surrender value. If she is again employed and therefore reinsured, she has to begin again and go twenty-six weeks before cash benefit, and two years before full benefit, is payable. It does not interfere in any way with the provision for the maternity benefit, which conies from the husband's insurance.

In Clause 24 mention is made of soldiers and sailors. I do not think I need detain your Lordships for any length of time over that. They are mentioned in this Bill owing to certain reconstructions arising from amendments. They have practically all been already enacted in the existing Acts, and the arrangement for the surrender of a lump sum by the Admiralty and the Army Council to the Commissioners, which has been the method in practice for a long time, is now given statutory effect, and various minor alterations which have been made in the Acts to suit war conditions are now brought together in a more convenient form.

One subject will interest your Lordships very much. It created interest in the House of Commons and a certain amount of discussion in Committee; it is the question of the Mercantile Marine. This is rather a complicated matter, and I will explain it as clearly as I can and in broad outline. I may say that the origin of the changes finds its place, like that of all the other changes, in the pages of the Ryan Report. Both sides were heard before that Committee, and after protracted sittings and very careful consideration it reported unanimously in favour of the proposals which are to be found in the Bill. Experience shows that many of the existing methods have given rise to a certain amount of dissatisfaction and involve administrative difficulties. For instance, the National Seamen's and Firemen's Union say that the register work in regard to mercantile seamen is far more complicated and takes three times as long as the work for the ordinary employed contributor. The evidence of the Ryan Committee goes to show that the special process of accounting was extremely complicated, owing, among other things, to the differentiation of rates and conditions of contribution between seamen and their employers. For the purpose of calculating arrears four contributions count as five, because the foreign-going seamen pays for forty-two weeks, while his employer pays for fifty-two weeks, and the foreign-going seaman can claim an exemption certificate from having to pay more than his forty-two weeks. But these men very seldom avail themselves of this right or privilege. Then a separate card is required for each voyage, and there is no ready plan by which a seaman can ascertain his exact position in a contribution year. There are often, again, too many stamps affixed to the cards, and this further involves conversions of credits and reserve contributions for drawing on if unemployed. All this has to do with the foreign-going seamen.

The case of the men employed in the home trade or on shore or in hospital, as well as on foreign service, is more complicated and possibly worse still, to this extent, that it is shown that the man himself is a loser by the transaction. In some cases he pays more than the section demands. There exist fractions for which credit is not sometimes given, with the further result that the man goes on building credits of reserve contributions in excess of his needs. The whole thing seems to be perplexing in the extreme. We have so many different classes of the mercantile sailor. There is the foreign-going sailor in a foreign-going ship, the home-trading man in a home-trading ship or very possibly a foreign-going ship, the man on shore in hospital, and men now and then unemployed; and it was thought necessary, with so many different classes and so many different methods, to find a plan to meet them all in the Act. We endeavour to sweep away and reduce as far as possible these many methods, to disentangle the procedure, and to make a simple, broad, and intelligible plan.

The plan very shortly is this. It is proposed to require payment by the foreign-going seaman of a complete contribution at a special foreign-going rate for every week of employment in foreign trade, and to utilise the small additional income for weeks over the forty-two weeks by enabling the society to pay sickness benefit to the dependants of these foreign-going seamen belonging to the society who are ill in hospital abroad. This discretion societies already possess in regard to the men serving in home ships. The other men—other than the foreign-going seamen—will continue as employed contributors at the 7d. rate, the usual rate, subject as at present to the conditions imposed on employers and men by the Merchant Shipping Acts. Then, again, any illness of a merchant seaman, on board, is at present counted as part of the twenty-six weeks for which he is entitled to sick benefit, although the seaman is not entitled to benefit for such illness, because under the Merchant Shipping Acts the master has to provide medical attendance, medicine, and so forth. The Bill provides that the seaman shall get the full benefit of the twenty-six weeks for illness on shore without any account being taken of illness on board ship.

One other point only I will deal with, and that is the money contributions which are paid by shipowners in respect of those who are domiciled outside the United Kingdom and do not come within the Act. That is popularly known as the Lascar money, and about it there has been a considerable amount of dissatisfaction. It is now proposed that there shall be created a body of trustees, from shipowners and representatives of the various seamen's societies, to deal with and administer the fund. The plan, I suggest, is simple. None will deny that the Mercantile Marine deserve our best endeavours to render the method simple and the benefits due under the Act easily procurable. The only other point I have to allude to is one dropping out pupil teachers and student teachers who have gone to their training colleges and become certificated teachers, and who then come under the superannuation scheme.

In Clause 32 mention is made of panel doctors. At present there is power to remove a panel doctor from one panel, but not from all panels. Power is also taken to reinstate this officer if it should be considered desirable and justifiable, and the procedure in regard to the various necessary inquiries is made much more simple. I do not think that I need weary you with any more details of this Bill. I said that the greater portion of Part II had to do with machinery and with matters of detail, and I fear that I have already overtaxed your patience. I have but to add that if you see well to pass this Bill through its various stages, I am assured that those who are best qualified to judge will consider that you have taken a great step towards rendering more efficient the administration of an Act of Parliament than which, many of us think, none more humane or beneficent ever received the Royal Assent. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a (Viscount Sandhurst.)

VISCOUNT KNUTSFORD

My Lords, I am not very conversant with the rules of this House, but I believe that this is the proper time to protest against one clause of this Bill which introduces for the first time a vital and radical change in all ideas of national health insurance. I do not think that many noble Lords can possibly know or have realised what is being introduced into this Bill, or we should not see such an empty House. At any rate, it is a satisfaction to the speaker that he will not have to bore many people with what must seem to many of us very complicated matters.

All will desire that everything should be done to simplify the Act of 1911 and its Amendments, and I am sure that those of us who have heard the speech of the noble Viscount will agree that, if I may say so without presumption, he dealt in an admirable way with a most complicated and difficult matter. I defy any one to read this Bill, simplified as it is said to be now, and understand it, even with the closest study and a most acute headache. It is Gladstonian and Henry James combined in the length of its sentences, and by the time that you have tried to master them you feel as if you were with Alice in Wonderland. No Bill that I have ever seen is so difficult to understand. I am not, however, complaining of the drafting of the Bill, except that it would be a very great cruelty to tell a woman that she should not have this or that benefit because she did not know the provision in the Act. If the public are to understand their benefits under this Bill some very much simpler form of it will need to be published.

I want, however, to draw your Lordships' attention—and I hope that what I say may go further—to a proposal in this Bill that is contrary and completely foreign to all idea of national health insurance. We are all anxious at this moment about the child-life of the nation, and any one of your Lordships who has been in close contact with the poor—and there are many of you who have been, and none perhaps more so than the noble Viscount who brought this Bill forward, who is head of the leading hospital in England—must realise the great want of equipment and misery in which the majority of your country-women have to face woman's greatest danger; and it is the misery and the conditions in which they have to face child-bearing that make the birth of a child to be deplored and mourned instead of being a matter for a woman to be proud of. It was to relieve some of this unnecessary suffering that the National Insurance Act was brought in, and the maternity benefit which was given to mothers was the most popular of all the benefits and the most far-reaching for good. I think that any one who has been in connection with the poor will admit that.

Might we not reasonably expect, when an amending Bill is brought in, that this maternity benefit would be extended; that this popular and healthful benefit would be more widespread and made easier if there are funds available? But what do we find? I very earnestly ask your Lordships' attention to this. There is money available, and it is to be used under Clause 22, not to provide for the mother, not to provide for the baby, not to give help to mother or child to get a stronger hold on life, but it is to be used to give a wedding present of £2 to every woman at the time of her marriage, provided that she notifies the marriage within a month to the society to which she belongs. It is almost incredible! Naturally Lord Sandhurst, in bringing it forward, could not lay stress upon the very great change that this involves. Here, for the very first time is a clause in a National Health Insurance Act diverting to another purpose money subscribed for the purposes of health, and giving a present of £2 to a woman on her marriage. A sum of no less than from £250,000 to £300,000 is to be taken away from money actually subscribed for the national security of health and given as a marriage present to these young women at the time of their marriage. Do the framers of this clause expect that these women will put by this £2 to provide perhaps for the coming child or to provide for sickness? We know that a young woman at the time of her marriage suddenly getting a present of £2 and able to buy comforts and luxuries—which, perhaps, she never will be able to buy again—will spend the £2 on luxuries. We know that no woman will resist, when the whole world is smiling upon her, the temptation of spending this money upon luxuries for her home.

The question is not whether a marriage dowry even of a miserable £2 should be given, but whether we have any right whatever to take this £2 from money subscribed for one purpose and give it to a purpose utterly foreign from national health insurance. If the State wants to give wedding presents to every woman who marries, let it do so, but not under a National Health Insurance Bill. What possible excuse can there be for doing this? I have had a number of letters from different authorities protesting against it. County councils all over England and other bodies are being asked to provide for maternity benefits out of the rates, and they turn to us and see that this vast sum of from £250,000 to £300,000 is being wasted upon this utterly inadequate marriage portion. At the moment when we are doing this, the Academy of Medicine in France is proposing to give a premium on motherhood. There is a proposal also in France to grant to French mothers from 2s. 6d. to 4s. a month for four months before the child is born and for one month afterwards, with the very wise provision that she must do no work in the period. Here are we taking away money which, as I say, is subscribed for the very purpose of national health insurance, and using it in this extravagant and stupid way.

What is the defence? The first line of defence which the noble Viscount has taken is this, that women who have been subscribers to a society for a considerable time have a sort of surrender value. It is perfectly true up to a point that there may be a surrender value, but I am not quite sure about it, because it seems to me that the subscription that a man or a woman pays each year for his insurance insures him for that one year. I should not have thought, therefore, that there was a surrender value. But granted that there is, is that any reason for applying the money in a totally different way from that for which it was subscribed? If there is a surrender value, for goodness sake let us spend the money in some useful manner connected with health insurance. Why should not the £2 be kept? Here is a married woman who is leaving off being insured, who is entering on married life. Instead of wasting it on a marriage dowry, why should not we keep it and give it to her when she has her first child? Then we should be helping the child-life of the country.

The second defence raised was "administrative reasons." It is said that it is all-important for the societies to know whether the woman is married or not—granted, it is very important—and that the offer of this £2 will be a bribe or an inducement to her to notify her marriage to the insurance company. If she does not notify, you observe, she does not get the £2. Therefore the £2 is to be offered as a bribe to the woman to notify her marriage. I have never had any experience in a spending Department of the Government, but I should have thought that it was very expensive to spend from £250,000 to £300,000 a year simply in bribing women to notify their marriages. After all, I have no doubt that what Lord Sandhurst said is quite true, that it is very important for the insurance companies to know whether a woman is married or not. But have we not to think of something more than the convenience of administration of the insurance company? Have we not to think a little bit about the woman who has given this money, and whether we cannot help the community more, and help the woman more, and help her child more by using this £2 in a better way than in giving it to her upon her marriage? And if it is so necessary for the society to know that the woman is married, why you have everywhere all over England the registrars of marriages. It would not cost from £200,000 to £300,000 to put the registrars of marriages in close touch with the societies, and then you would have notification of marriages.

Is there an alternative? Well, we are told that people have sat and considered whether there was an alternative. I have never found any difficulty in finding an alternative when I had money to spend, and I cannot think that it passes the wit of man to evolve a better scheme than this for spending this money. But there is an alternative. If a woman does not notify her marriage there is an alternative suggested in the Bill itself. She is to get other benefits. Why not make that apply to all women who marry and leave their society? That is one alternative. She is to get her insurance for a year and 30s. maternity benefit for her child if it is born within a year. That condition is an unnecessary cruelty, because how could you refuse to a woman the maternity benefit if the child is born on the 366th day?

The alternative that I should like to see would be that the £2 which is proposed to be given as a marriage dowry should be given to the woman as a present on the birth of her first child. Then we know that the money would necessarily be well spent because then the need is pressing on the woman for money for herself and for her child. My alternative may not be the best one. I should be very sorry to say that anything was best where people quarrel, as they do, over this insurance, and where so many interests are involved, and I have no experience to say whether my alternative is the best one, but I have experience enough to say that this £2 gift on marriage is an outrage on common sense. It is utterly bad, and in my opinion it is indefensible, because it goes away from all the principles of national health insurance—in fact, instead of being a step forward it is distinctly and most regrettably a very serious step backwards.

LORD SYDENHAM

My Lords, this is a very important and most necessary Bill, as the noble Viscount has made so clear in his admirable explanation. The principal Act was a somewhat hasty piece of legislation, and possibly for that reason it has disappointed some of the rather too rosy expectations which were formed of its operation. But when one considers the complexity of the Act, which it is impossible for anybody but an expert to understand, I think it is wonderful, as the noble Viscount has said, that the Act has worked as well as it has. But it has had the disadvantage, already pointed out, that it has led the approved societies very near to the verge of bankruptcy. This Bill will introduce many improvements and simplifications, and I hope it will have the effect of creating permanent financial stability for all the societies.

There are, in my opinion, two important defects in the Bill. The noble Viscount, Lord Knutsford, has pointed out most clearly the objections which we both feel to Clause 22, and I agree with every word he said. The treatment of the married insured woman has not been quite satisfactory under the old Act, and I am inclined to think that the new Bill will make it somewhat worse, especially from the point of view of maternity benefit, to which the noble Viscount referred. But the main objection is that on which he laid most stress, that Clause 22 appropriates money raised for health purposes and turns it over to provide a wedding present to a woman on the day of her marriage. The Act of 1911 is entitled "an Act to provide for insurance against loss of health and for the prevention and cure of sickness and for insurance against unemployment, and for purposes incidental thereto." The words "incidental thereto" are, I admit, of a rather comprehensive character. But I do submit to your Lordships that the provision of this £2 dowry does not fall within the definition of the principal Act, and I hope that His Majesty's Government will reconsider this clause before we get into Committee. I believe that there are several alternatives which might be found, and that probably an agreed Amendment might be arrived at.

There is another serious want in the Bill, and I have put down an Amendment which I trust will fill that want. In Clause 12, subsection (3), provision is made to abrogate the misconduct rule in the case of certain women. That is a most wise, necessary, and humane change, and I ask by my Amendment that this abrogation of the misconduct rule shall be made general in the case of all persons suffering from venereal disease. The effect of that rule as it now operates, as I hope to be able to show in Committee, is seriously detrimental to national health; and it is also quite at variance with what we now know of the nature and treatment of venereal diseases. I think that my Amendment will not be found to be controversial, and I hope the Government and your Lordships will accept it. I strongly support the Second Reading of the Bill.

On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Thursday, January 17.