HL Deb 30 March 1916 vol 21 cc587-93
LORD BERESFORD

My Lords, I rise to ask His Majesty's Government whether the General Officer Commanding the British Forces now besieged at Kut-el-Amara had recommended, or was responsible for, the decision to advance on Ctesiphon, or whether in carrying out that advance he was only acting under the direct orders of the General Officer Commanding the Forces in Mesopotamia.

It has been stated in another place that all the military authorities were consulted and approved the Expedition to Baghdad, including the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia. The public, as far as I have gathered, understood that the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia was General Townshend. We know here that he was not. But what I ask is whether General Townshend, who had to undertake the campaign, was asked as to his capability to do it with the number of men that were sent with him, whether he asked for more reinforcements, and what opinion he gave with regard to this campaign. I need not remind the House of the terrible result if we have an accident or a reverse at Kut. We shall lose our prestige and wake up the Moslem mind all over the world, and the Turks will be able to say that they have beaten us not only in Europe, but in Asia. From the Press I understand that General Townshend started with one Division; but he had nothing like a Division. Looking at the harmful results which would come about if he got defeated, he ought not to have started on that campaign without three Divisions; yet, as I say, he left with considerably less than one. The line of communication is 380 miles of the worst kind of line of communication possible in war time—a river—and any military man knows that in a circumstance like that it is necessary to have an army on each side. There was nothing thought out ahead; there were very few light-draught boats, although the water was known to be very shallow. The Government must have been aware of the requirements.

I should like to ask the Government why, in a campaign of this extreme interest and vital effects, either in defeat or victory, no Despatches have been made public in this country since April of last year. It is only fair to the relatives, to those who are interested, materially interested, and to the country that some further Despatches should have been published. Since April of last year there have been three battles. Two of them were of a tremendous character, each lasting over three days. The first battle took place in June at Amara; the second was at Kut-el-Amara at the end of September, and the third was at Ctesiphon on November 22, 23, and 24—a three days' desperate battle. Our men were short of water and were fighting under the most terrific weather conditions. They have added to the traditions of both the British and the Indian Armies by their heroic acts.

Then there was a retreat. I get my news principally from the Press. I believe there were five Turkish Divisions at Baghdad. As I say, there was a retreat. Nothing has been better done or more brilliantly carried out in this war than that retreat, because our men were pursued with enormously superior forces. The method of that retreat was of the very finest military character. We know that General Townshend succeeded in getting back to the river, a whole ninety miles, and never lost a gun or a prisoner; and since that date, December 3, he has been besieged. In another place the Secretary of State for India has stated that the question of the medical necessities has been"shocking"—I think that was the word he used. But we have not yet heard about the question of the military necessities, and I think the Government, without letting the enemy know anything that they do not know at present, should give some indication as to the whole state of affairs in regard to this gallant little Army at Kut which fought those actions and which is now besieged.

The Government's answers are merely that they are "anxiously considering the position." With that I quite agree. But I say it is caused by their own folly, their own want of knowledge of war, and, as I said here the other day, by the political and civilian element controlling a war instead of paying attention to their policy and then turning it over to the soldier and the sailor to dictate what forces are necessary to make it a success. In fact the whole of these auxiliary Expedition's have been a series of gambles. We have no right to gamble with the lives of our men or the safety of the Empire. The Prime Minister said he did not think that in the whole course of the war there had been serious operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted, with better prospects of final success. There is only one absolute fact in that—namely, that they were brilliantly conducted. The rest of those statements proved absolutely contrary to fact. They were very much like the statements made by the right hon. gentleman the Member for Dundee and by Lord Robert Cecil with regard to the Dardanelles. It is really like setting off one gamble against another, like a plunger—when he loses at one game, he tries another to win. All these auxiliary campaigns have been made out for political necessities and not for military necessities. If we wish to win the war, political necessities must rest with the Cabinet. The Cabinet should dictate what those are; but they should not undertake them until they are perfectly confident, from the opinion of their naval and military advisers, that those policies can be brought to a successful issue.

I hope my remarks will not be thought more or less mischievous. I do not desire to find fault with the Government; I want to help them. I want to make them govern. They certainly have not governed yet in any single question which appertains to the success of the war. Every one of the points that appertain to the success of the war has been forced on the Government by public opinion. We are now getting the recruiting muddle to add to all the other muddles. Personally I have done all I could to help the Government. I have not taken much part in public life since the war began, but I have written certain letters. I wrote one to the Prime Minister which I shall get his leave to publish by-and-by, and I can assure your Lordships that if my advice in that letter had been taken the "Lusitania" would not have been torpedoed and we should not have lost battleships in the Dardanelles. But that will be for a future occasion when I make that public.

The relief party which had been sent to Kut will itself have to be relieved. Evidently we had not thought out what that relief should have been. The Relief expedition was beaten back. The Government should realise bow much more fatal it is to the success of a war to be beaten back in the East than it is in the West. That relief party should not have started until it was absolutely ready and certain to be able to go straight to General Townshend and relieve him. Now I suppose General Aylmer's Relief Expedition is itself waiting for reinforcements, and the Government are perfectly aware that very shortly the Tigris will be over its banks again and the difficulties will increase twenty-fold. I would like to ask the Government whether General Townshend was responsible in any way for the advance to Baghdad? Was he, as the General who had to undertake the work, consulted as to the number and equipment of the force that he considered necessary? If that is not so, I ask who is responsible. I think your Lordships ought to take note of these continual reverses and retreats, which really amount to disasters, and that the Government should give more information, particularly with regard to Kut, than they have deigned to give to the public up to the present time.

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (LORD ISLINGTON)

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord who has just spoken has travelled wide of the specific Question which he addressed to the Government. In the course of his speech he dealt in outline with the whole of the Mesopotamian Expedition, and While I can take no exception to the speech because wide latitude is always allowed in this House in broadening out the subject of Questions into various ramifications, I hope he will pardon me if in the circumstances I have to be restricted in the reply that I make.

The main Question upon the Paper is whether General Townshend was in any way responsible himself for the advance on Ctesiphon. If any recommendation or representation was made by General Townshend prior to his attempted advance on Ctesiphon it would, of course, have been addressed to the General Officer Commanding the Expedition in Mesopotamia—at that time Sir John Nixon. I may say, in reply to that, that no such recommendation or representation has been reported home. As has already been said by my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for India in another place, the responsibility for the advance does not rest with General Townshend in any way. It was authorised by His Majesty's Government on the advice of the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia and the Government of India. As to whether General Townshend was consulted by the General Officer Commanding, I am not in a position to give any answer to the noble and gallant Lord. I have no information, neither has the Government, in regard to what may have taken place in consultation or conversation between General Townshend and Sir John Nixon prior to the advance.

The noble and gallant Lord, as I say, travelled away from his Question on the Paper, which I have attempted specifically to answer, and I must ask him to be content with a very imperfect reply on the other various points that he put forward in the course of his speech relating to the broad aspects of the general campaign in Mesopotamia. He asked why there had been no Despatches published in regard to the different operations of the campaign. I should require notice to give an answer to that question. From time to time, as the House is aware, communiqués have been published giving in their broad aspect events which have taken place in Mesopotamia. The question whether it would be in the public interest to publish detailed Despatches in regard to any of those operations which have taken place during the past year is one on which I should require to consult with my colleagues before I was in a position to give a definite answer to the noble and gallant Lord. Then as regards the general campaign and the lack of preparation, with which my noble and gallant friend has charged the Government; as regards the numbers of the force that General Townshend had in his Expedition; as regards the numbers of the force of the whole of the Army in Mesopotamia—there, again, it is impossible for me to give any specific answer. I should think the noble and gallant Lord himself will realise that at this particular juncture, when the campaign is actually proceeding, it would be in the highest degree injurious to the national welfare that anything of a detailed character in regard to either the past or the present should be made public.

As to the conduct of the operations from now onwards, I do not think it is necessary for me to go into any detail, because that matter was dealt with very fully the other day in another place by the Secretary of State for India. Since February 16 the whole conduct of the operations has been transferred to the War Office from the India Office, and the War Office is now, in conjunction with the Government of India and the Military Departments of that Government, conducting all branches of these operations. Therefore the responsibility which formerly rested with the India Office as the Department at home in authority has, from February 16, been transferred to the War Office.

I would like, in conclusion, to echo what the noble and gallant Lord said with regard to the forces in Mesopotamia that have been taking part in these most arduous and difficult operations. The forces, both British and Indian, have displayed qualities of courage and endurance which, when the history of this great war is unfolded to the world, will compare favourably with those which have been shown in any other field of operations. As to my reply to the noble and gallant Lord, I have been obliged to give this very imperfect answer by reason of the public interest. But the Government in no way wish to avoid responsibility for what has taken place, and at the proper time, and when the public interest will not suffer injury, they will be prepared to face the closest possible scrutiny and examination of all that led up to and has taken place in Mesopotamia.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

My Lords, I think the noble and gallant Admiral will have anticipated the reticence of the noble Lord with regard to these operations, but I think we must ask for a pledge with regard to the publication of the Despatches as soon as possible. Your Lordships will recollect that so long as Lord Curzon sat upon this Bench he pressed upon the noble Marquess opposite the absolute necessity that these operations because they are carried out at a great distance should not be left altogether unrecorded while the war is going on, and up to last May, as my noble and gallant friend behind me pointed out, we obtained some information. But since then we have had no Despatches, and it is difficult to believe that it could not now be possible for the Government to publish a Despatch with regard to the earlier battles. Considering the immense importance of this matter to the friends and relatives of the officers and men engaged, I sincerely hope that we shall hear very shortly that some Despatches are to be published.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, in reply to my noble friend opposite we will, of course, see that the India Office and the military authorities in India are asked how far it is possible in the public interest to publish any of the bare outlines of which my noble friend (Lord Islington) has spoken. Speaking personally, I do not know what has been received in the form of Despatches, and even if I felt it proper to do so I could not make any pledge that material exists for the sort of publication which I most fully appreciate is earnestly desired by noble Lords, not merely on account of the intrinsically interesting character of the operations themselves, but from the fact that so many of us have had friends, and some relatives, concerned in them.

There is only one observation I should like to make with regard to the general remarks which fell from my noble and gallant friend opposite, and that is to say quite categorically that there has been no instance in the war, on any of the fronts or in any place in which military operations have taken place, in which either a naval or a military commander has been asked by the civil power to undertake an operation of any kind with a force which he had declared to be insufficient for the purpose. That is a statement which I make without the smallest reserve, and I hope that my noble and gallant friend, when next he thinks it necessary to offer a general criticism against His Majesty's Government, will be so good as to bear that fact in mind.